the secular transition: the worldwide growth of mormons, jehovah’s witnesses, and seventh-day...

8/9/2019 The Secular Transition: The Worldwide Growth of Mormons, Jehovahs Witnesses, and Seventh-day Adventists

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The Secular Transition: The WorldwideGrowth of Mormons, Jehovahs Witnesses,

and Seventh-day Adventists*

Ryan T. CragunUniversity of Tampa

Ronald Lawson

Queens College, CUNY

A question that continues to attract researchers in the sociology of religion is what factors lead toreligious growth. This article examines three well-known Christian religious groups that share manycharacteristics (i.e., supply-side factors): Mormonism, Jehovahs Witnesses, and Seventh-day

Adventists. Membership data from these groups were gathered from 1960 through 2006 for mostcountries around the world. Membership growth rates were analyzed while controlling for country-level characteristics (i.e., demand-side factors). The results of this analysis indicate that bothsupply- and demand-side factors are important in determining growth. The strongest predictors of

growth are: growth momentum in a country, the level of economic development, and severalcountry-level characteristics. We conclude that socioeconomic development of countries ultimatelyleads to a secular transition, curtailing the growth of these religious groups.

Key words: Mormonism; Jehovahs Witnesses; Seventh-day Adventists; secularization; religious

economies model.

A question in the sociology of religion that continues to attract attentionis what factors influence the growth of religious groups (Bruce 2002;

Iannaccone et al. 1995; Iannaccone 1994, 1996; Kelley 1972; Stark and Finke2000). This question has recently been reframed in economic terms (Stark andFinke 2000): Supply-side factors are variables that influence the growth of a

*Direct correspondence to Ryan T. Cragun, University of Tampa, 401 W. Kennedy Blvd,Tampa, FL 33606, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. An earlier version of this paper was

presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. We wantto thank David Voas, David Knowlton, Rick Phillips, and Henri Gooren for reading earlier draftsof this paper and commenting on them. Dan Gazzano helped aggregate data on the Seventh-day

Adventists.

# The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Associationfor the Sociology of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:[email protected].

Sociology of Religion 2010, 00:00 1-25doi:10.1093/socrel/srq022

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Sociology of Religion Advance Access published April 9, 2010

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religious group that are controlled by the group; Demand-side factors arevariables that influence the growth of a religion that are controlled by thepopulation in which the religion is trying to grow. Admittedly, disentanglingthese two sets of factors can be difficult, as supply-side factors can influence

demand-side factors and vice versa (Demmitt 1992; Kosmin and Keysar 2006;Moore 1995).

Proselytizing religions provide fertile ground for testing theories aboutsupply- and demand-side factors since they tend to grow rapidly and maintainrelatively accurate membership data (Stark 1984). Previous research has ana-lyzed Latter-day Saint (Mormon) growth, but most of that research focuses ontheir growth as a whole and not on their growth in a localized or country-levelcontext (Anderson 2006; Bennion and Young 1996; Hadaway 2006; Hepworth1999; Knowlton 2005; Shepherd and Shepherd 1996, 1998; Stark 1996, 2001;

Lobb 2000; Loomis 2002; Phillips 2006). By focusing on total growth, thenuances are overlooked. When analyzed at a more local level (Gooren 2006;Knowlton 2005; Phillips 2006), Mormon growth is seen to be more complexthan the aggregate numbers indicate.

The growth of Jehovahs Witnesses (JWs) has also been analyzed previously(Holden 2002; Voas 2007; 2008). Voas (2008), for example, breaks the analysisdown by individual countries and finds nuances in growth, including a poten-tial carrying capacity or saturation point for the number of JWs a countrycan handle. However, this analysis fails to examine the role of a number of

demand-side factors in growth. Finally, previous research has also examined thegrowth of Seventh-day Adventists (SDAs) (Lawson 1995, 1996, 2005, 2007).While these analyses look inside countries, a broad perspective comparinggrowth across countries is lacking (though see Lawson 2005, 2007).

By examining 3035 years of global growth for three strict, proselytizingreligious groupsThe Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (aka,Mormons or LDS), JWs, and SDAscountry by country, this article is able toillustrate the influence and importance of both supply- and demand-side factorson religious growth.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Mormon Growth

Perhaps the best known examination of Mormon growth is Starks 1984projection, in which he assumed straight-line, decade-exponentiating growth ateither 3 or 5 percent. Starks projection was based on the past growth of theentire religion and did not look at growth in individual countries. The primary

assumption in Starks analysis was that it was the characteristics of Mormonism(supply-side) that determined growth and not demand-side factors.

The many responses to Starks projections also used only the aggregatemembership data of the LDS religion, but produced alternative growth forecasts.

2 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

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Voas (2008) examines the growth of the JWs, focusing on one particularaspecta surprising relationship between JWs growth and the percentage ofthe population made up by JWs. Voas describes this self-limiting characteristicof the JWs as a cultural carrying capacity, a term borrowed from evolutionary

biology to suggest that there are limitations to how many members of a speciescan survive on a given piece of land (Ehrlich et al. 1995; also called a satur-ation pointsee Lawson 2007). In the case of the JWs, as the percentage ofthe population that is made up of JWs increases, the growth rate decreases.This suggests that there is a limited percentage of any given population that isattracted to JWs beliefs and practices.

Thus, as far as JWs growth goes, there have been limited attempts toexplain why JWs grow where they grow and which factors limit that growth.There is also a lack of recent research on JWs in general (see Beckford 1975

and Penton 1985 for excellent but older research), though Holdens 2002 bookgoes a long way toward filling that lacuna.

Seventh-day Adventist Growth

The growth of SDAs, like that of the JWs, has received only limited atten-tion. Most of the research on SDAs has focused on specific characteristics of thereligion or its members (see the work of Roger Dudley and Ronald Lawson).Only one published article has looked at SDA growth (Lawson 1998c), thoughseveral unpublished conference papers have (Lawson 2005, 2007). Lawson

(1998c) examines the changing demographics of the SDA religion in New YorkCity and finds an increasing appeal of the religion among immigrants instable, economically developed countries. Another of his papers extends thisfinding to England, France, and Canada (1998b). His 2005 paper finds a similar,though less prominent, pattern among JWs and Mormons.

Despite the relative scarcity of research on JWs and SDAs concerninggrowth, this brief overview of the existing literature indicates that all threereligious groups are still growing, especially when contrasted with mainlinereligions (Kosmin and Keysar 2006; Roof and McKinney 1987). However, the

existing literature leaves open the question of why these religious groups growwhere they do. Which demand-side factors explain the growth of thesereligious groups remains to be examined.

Theoretical Approach

Rather than engage in a debate between supply- and demand-side factorson religious growth, we argue that both are important factors. We also arguethat economic development can reach a stage where a secular transition takesplace, resulting in slowed growth of these religions.

Given where these religions are growing, it appears as though there is someoverlap in the appeal of these three groups. Holden (2002) argued that it is thesalve for modernity offered by the JWs that accounts for their appeal to con-verts and members. Given that Mormons and Adventists are also growing in


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developing countries (see the Analysis and Results section), they may sharethe same appeal as JWs. Leman (1998) also proposed this as an explanation forthe conversion of Belgians to the JWs.

Modernity is also a key component in the secularization framework devel-

oped by Bruce (2002; see also Berger 1967; Dobbelaere 2002; Voas 2007).According to Bruce, religious groups tend to do well in countries that areundergoing modernization, but not in thoroughly modernized countries or inpremodernizing countries. Bruce (2002:35) argues that Modernization disruptscommunities, traditional employment patterns and status hierarchies.Modernization leads to social dislocation, and strict religions (Kelley 1972;Stark and Finke 2000) provide an existential salve that alleviates the angstcaused by social dislocation. The appeal of strict religion has been posited tobe temporary: as countries grow more developed and modernized, people will

develop other ways of dealing with modernity that do not rely on religion(Bruce 2002; Dobbelaere 2002). Thus, the most modernized countries shouldsee limited interest in strict religions.

According to Bruce, initial modernization can lead countries to experiencegrowth in orthodox and strict religion. Rather than constant decline as somesuggest (Stark and Finke 2000), secularization theory as formulated by Bruceactually posits a possible increase in strict religion as countries begin to moder-nize, followed by a decline once countries reach high levels of modernization.Secularization is, therefore, curvi-linear, not linear. If Bruce is correct, there

should be little growth of strict religious groups in pre-modernized countries.However, their growth, if it occurs, should be rapid as countries begin to mod-ernize, and then slow significantly as countries reach high levels ofmodernization.

An explanation for the appeal of strict, proselytizing religious groups comesfrom the work of Norris and Inglehart (2004), who argue that religion providesexistential security in the face of socioeconomic insecurity. While Norris andInglehart do not discuss religion prior to the onset of modernization, they dooffer a specific mechanism for declining religiosity: the replacement of religious

security with social security. Thus, if Norris and Inglehart are correct, theirinterpretation of secularization also suggests a curvi-linear pattern. Countrieswith low development may already be religious, but the interest in strict, prose-lytizing religious groups will be low as the society is relatively secure due tomechanical solidarity. As countries modernize and mechanical solidarity and itsconcomitant security decline, the appeal of strict, proselytizing religious groupswill increase. However, once countries reach a certain level of economic devel-opment and begin providing secular sources of security, interest in strict religiousgroups will wane. In essence, these countries undergo a secular transition.

As Gorski and Altinordu (2008) note in their review of secularization,modern formulations of secularization theory are not as amenable to testing asis the religious economies model. Part of this is due to the fact that the reli-gious economies model is laid out by its chief proponents with assumptions,

WORLDWIDE GROWTH OF MORMONS, JWS, AND SDAS 5

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propositions, and definitions in a manner that is amenable to falsification(Stark and Finke 2000). In contrast, a clearly delineated outline of seculariza-tion theory that is amenable to falsification is missing. Part of the reason maybe the fact that it is now an agglomeration of disparate theories that have been

pieced together as a result of being attacked by the advocates of the religiouseconomies model. These include declining religious authority (Chaves 1994),existential security (Norris and Inglehart 2004), and intentional agents of secu-larization (Dobbelaere 2002; Smith 2003), among others.

While this paper is not the place to delineate a robust set of propositionsfor secularization theory, we do offer several based on the formulation of secu-larization theory by Bruce (2002), while also drawing on Durkheim (1997) and Norris and Inglehart (2004). These propositions are necessarily limited inscope, since this paper focuses on three specific religious groups rather than on

religion generally:

Societies at the lower end of the economic development scale willhave little interest in strict, proselytizing religious groups due to themechanical solidarity and concomitant security their close-knitsocial structures provide.

Societies undergoing economic development will be attracted to theexistential security provided by strict, proselytizing religious groupsdue to a breakdown in mechanical solidarity and an increase in exis-

tential insecurity resulting from economic development andmodernity.

Societies at the higher end of economic development will be lessinterested in strict, proselytizing religious groups due to the spread ofboth organic solidarity, which accompanies modernization, andsecular forms of existential security, which generally result from gov-ernment social safety nets as well as from a higher standard of living.

If our interpretation of the factors driving the growth and decline of strict,

proselytizing religious groups is accurate, the use of indicators of modernizationto predict growth should allow us to test this. Mormons, JWs, and SDAs are allideal candidates for testing the idea that modernization significantly affects reli-gious growth. All three are strict, proselytizing religious groups. They are allgrowing, indicating they have supply-side appeal. The question is whichdemand-side factors interact with supply-side appeal to translate into growthfor these religious groups? The demand-side factor of most interest in thepresent study is modernization. This leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Modernizing countries will have the highest rates of religiousgrowth for strict religious groups.

Hypothesis 2: Premodernizing and highly modernized countries will havemuch lower rates of religious growth for strict religious groups.


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Additionally, one factor contributing to growth that is rarely discussed inthe sociological literature is growth momentum (Hoge and Roozen 1979): oncea religion begins growing in a region, that growth tends to spur additionalgrowth. This process is likely due to two factors: (1) once the institution

observes initial success in a region, it may move resources there in order tocontinue that success (i.e., resource mobilization; Zald and McCarthy 1987);(2) once people in the growth region observe institutional growth, they may beattracted to the institution because of its success (i.e., movement framing;Benford and Snow 2000). Taking into account, institutional momentum is animportant factor in understanding the growth of a movement. In the Analysisand Results section, we discuss how such momentum can be measured.

DATA

We use the official membership data from each of the three religiousgroups.1 However, each group uses different criteria in enumerating itsmembers: SDAs count only baptized members;2 Mormons also count baptizedmembers, but add younger children in Mormon families; JWs count only"publishers" and omit baptized members who are not active to this extent,while adding older children who begin publishing in advance of baptism(Lawson 2007).

Dependent Variables

Mormons report only one number for members in a country, without speci-fying whether that is the beginning, ending, or average number of members ina given country in that year. That is the number we used. JWs report two poss-ible membership numbers: average and peak publishers. Average publisherswere used. SDAs also provide two numbers: membership at the beginningof the year and end of the year. For uniformity, the number from the end ofthe year was used. The membership data were used to generate the dependent

variables: Mormon, JW, and SDA growth rates.3

1Details on the sources for the data and how the data were recoded are found inAppendix A in the Supplementary Material accompanying this article at Sociology ofReligion online (http://socrel.oxfordjournals.org ).

2None of the three groups baptize infants.3We used exponential growth rates. The formula for the exponential growth rate r is:

Yt Y0 ert

Solving for r,

r ln Yt=Y0

t

where Yt is the population at Time 2, Yo is the population at Time 1, t is the time periodbetween o and t.


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In light of the fact that Mormonism excluded blacks from full membership inthe religion prior to 1978 (Mauss 2003), a dummy code for race is included(1) predominantly black (greater than 60 percent) or (0) not predominantlyblack (less than 60 percent).

Most communist countries are avowedly atheistic and restrictive of religiousgroups (Gabel 2007). Thus, a dummy code for type of government is includedin the analysis: (1) currently a communist country or (0) not currently a com-munist country.5 As there is some evidence that these religious groups aregrowing rapidly in former Soviet Bloc countries (Borowik 2002; Greeley 2002;Pollack 2003), a dummy code for former Soviet Bloc was included: (1) formerSoviet Bloc or (0) not former Soviet Bloc. Finally, because there is limitedgrowth of these religious groups in predominantly Muslim countries (Pink2005), a dummy code indicating whether or not a country has a majority of

Muslims was included: (1) predominantly Muslim (greater than 60 percent) or(0) not predominantly Muslim (less than 60 percent).

Most of these dummy-coded variables are demand-side factors since theycapture characteristics of the potential consumers of the religious groups ofinterest. However, two of them, predominantly Muslim and currently commu-nist, could be seen as supply-side factors. In a sense, these two characteristicsreflect (a type of) religious competition and therefore religious suppliers aswell.

Several additional variables are included to control for different factors. In

order to capture any effect of natural increase on membership, the populationgrowth rate for each country is included. This variable should explain some ofthe growth of these religious groups as retention of offspring contributes to reli-gious growth. The data on country populations come from The World BankGroup (2006). Where necessary, linear change over time was assumed andmissing values were imputed.

In order to capture population size, the carrying capacity that countriesmight have for these religious groups (Voas 2008), and the effect of networkson religious growth (Bibby and Brinkerhoff 1973, 1983), the percentages of

each countrys population made up by members of the religion were alsoincluded as control variables. If networks are the main contributor to religiousgrowth of these groups (Leman 1998), the larger the percentage of the popu-lation made up by members of one of these religious groups, the higher thegrowth rate should be. However, if there is a negative relationship between thepercentage of a countrys population made up by members of one of these reli-gious groups and the growth rate, this would indicate a limited carryingcapacity for that religion.

Dummy codes for periods are included. There is some evidence that

Mormon growth is slowing (Anderson 2006; Phillips 2006). Including periods

5Current Communist countries include: China, Cuba, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam.


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in the analysis can determine this. Data points in each decade were codedindependently: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. A (1) indicates a growth ratefrom that decade; (0) indicates a different decade.

Finally, there is some question as to whether these three religious groups

compete for adherents (Gooren 2005; Lawson 1995; Pink 2005). To test forthis, the percentages of the respective countrys populations made up bymembers of the other two religious groups were included in the analysis.

Independent Variables

In order to test the specific hypotheses concerning the influence of moder-nity and modernization on religious growth, a measure of societal moderniz-ation was required. This does introduce the tricky issue of how one definesmodernization. Unfortunately, it does not appear to be the case that there isa universally accepted measure of modernization in the sociology of religion(Bruce 2002; Casanova 1994; Crockett and Voas 2006; Dobbelaere 2002;Gorski 2000; Warner 1993). Rather than create a new index of societal mod-ernization, the UNs Human Development Index (HDI) is used (United Nations 2007). The index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicatingmore developed countries. The UN HDI has only been calculated going backto 1975. As a result, the present analysis is limited to years since 1975. WhereHDIs are missing, linear change was assumed and imputed values for the yearsin between those data points were calculated.

Given our theoretical framework, which suggests that the growth of thesereligious groups follows a curvi-linear trend based on modernization, the HDImeasures were divided into eight different variables that mostly reflect tenthsof the scale.6 Breaking the scale up into pieces like this rather than using theactual numbers from the HDI allows one to detect curvi-linear effects.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The first step in the analysis was to determine if there is regional variationin growth for these three religious groups. Table 1 shows the mean annualgrowth rate for the three religious groups by cultural region based on whetheror not the countries with zero growth are included or excluded (the regions arebased on Sanders 2002). The growth rates in table 1 illustrate the importanceof including the zero growth country-years in an investigation of the factorsthat contribute to growth.7 Without including the zero growth country-years,

6Deciles were used except on the bottom end as there are very few countrys withHDIs below .29. There are a total of 104 country-years in the 0.29 range from countrieslike Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

7It should also be noted that these mean growth rates differ from the aggregatedgrowth rates of the religion. There are several reasons for this. First, aggregate growth is


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Mormons have an 11.18 percent annual growth rate in Southeast Asia, whichgives the impression that Mormonism is growing very rapidly in that entireregion. But when country-years are included for countries where Mormonism isnot growing at all in Southeast Asia, a different picture emerges: Mormons aregrowing at around 4.61 percent annually in that region. While the inclusion of

the zero-growth rate country-years does not alter the JW and SDA growth ratestoo substantially in most regions, it does for the Muslim culture region wherethere is little growth.

Table 1 also illustrates that there is substantial variation by region for allthree religious groups, though it varies most for Mormons and least for JWs.

TABLE 1 Mean Annual Growth for LDS, JW, and SDA by Cultural Region1960

2006

LDS JW SDA

Zero

growth

countries

excl.

Zero

growth

countries

incl.

Zero

growth

countries

excl.

Zero

growth

countries

incl.

Zero

growth

countries

excl.

Zero

growth

countries

incl.

Anglo-America 3.53% 3.53% 2.89% 2.89% 2.72% 2.72%

Australia and

New Zealand

5.02% 5.02% 3.20% 3.20% 1.27% 1.27%

Europe 4.48% 3.41% 4.04% 3.61% 1.26% 1.06%

Islamic Region NA 0.04% 4.24% 0.98% 3.22% 0.45%

Latin Americaand Caribbean

10.47% 9.85% 6.31% 6.31% 6.58% 6.58%

Pacific Islands 7.05% 7.05% 4.56% 3.72% 4.31% 4.31%

Russia and

Eurasia

16.20% 9.26% 7.57% 5.26% 3.39% 3.39%

South Asia 9.43% 4.81% 6.93% 3.63% 4.69% 3.60%

Southeast Asia 11.18% 4.61% 5.74% 3.31% 5.13% 3.72%

Sub-Saharan

Africa

12.02% 3.23% 6.23% 5.32% 7.83% 6.08%

Overall mean 8.58% 4.49% 5.57% 4.30% 5.02% 3.88%

Note: These are growth rates averaged across countries.

adding people to a large base, so it would be smaller than average growth. However, theaverage growth rates in Tables 1 and 2 include country-years with zero annual growth,

which decreases growth rates to below the aggregate rates. For aggregate growth rates forthese religions, see Deseret Morning News (2007), Lawson (2005, 2007), Stark andIannaccone (1997). Additionally, the mean growth rates give each country equal weightwithout controlling for the size of the population, which explains why the mean growthrates do not match the aggregate rates.


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There is virtually no growth of the Mormon religion in predominantly Muslimcountries and substantial growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. For allthree religious groups, the highest mean annual growth rate when no-growthcountries are included is in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Table 2 presents mean annual growth rates by the dummy-coded countrycharacteristics, by decade, and by HDI. Again, two numbers are reported foreach religion: growth rates with and without zero growth country-years included.

There is substantial variation both within and between the three religiousgroups. Mormons have the lowest growth rate in predominantly black countrieswhereas SDAs have the highest. Of the three groups, JWs are growing fastestin predominantly Muslim countries.

TABLE 2 Mean Annual Growth for LDS, JW, and SDA by Country

Characteristics19602006

LDS JW SDA

Zero

growth

countries

excl.

Zero

growth

countries

incl.

Zero

growth

countries

excl.

Zero

growth

countries

incl.

Zero

growth

countries

excl.

Zero

growth

countries

incl.

Predominantly

black

11.59% 3.81% 5.88% 5.19% 7.62% 6.16%

Currently

communist

NA 0.00% 4.40% 1.01% 3.05% 2.42%

Former Soviet

Bloc

13.69% 5.30% 5.73% 2.95% 2.19% 2.01%

Predominantly

Muslim

11.19% 0.62% 5.94% 1.91% 6.27% 0.02%

1960 1969 13.84% 5.00% 7.91% 5.68% 5.53% 3.64%

1970 1979 8.88% 3.93% 6.21% 4.97% 5.12% 3.60%

1980 1989 8.93% 4.54% 6.00% 4.63% 5.24% 4.03%

1990 1999 8.72% 5.26% 5.67% 4.46% 5.31% 4.49%

2000 2006 5.89% 3.98% 2.84% 2.42% 4.30% 3.86%

HDI 0.00 .29 7.80% 0.09% 0.26% 0.26% 7.36% 2.33%

HDI .30 .39 15.96% 2.45% 5.48% 5.08% 9.38% 8.80%

HDI .40 .49 14.86% 6.37% 6.11% 5.16% 7.98% 7.07%

HDI .50 .59 10.70% 6.35% 5.93% 4.93% 7.67% 6.46%

HDI .60 .69 11.84% 7.81% 5.32% 3.91% 6.80% 5.55%

HDI .70 .79 9.93% 8.06% 5.92% 4.86% 5.48% 4.78%

HDI .80 .89 5.12% 4.61% 3.73% 3.42% 1.82% 1.68%

HDI .90 1.00 1.67% 1.63% 0.98% 0.95% 1.09% 1.07%

Overall mean 8.58% 4.49% 5.57% 4.30% 5.02% 3.88%

Note: These are growth rates averaged across countries.


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Over time, all three groups have seen some variation, but the trend issimilar: an increase in growth from the 1960s through the 1980s, followed by aslowdown in growth through today, though the slowdown is pretty minor forthe SDAs. As for the HDI measures, all three exhibit a similar curvi-linear

patternvery slow growth in countries with an HDI below .29 and very slowgrowth in countries with HDIs above around .80 to .90. However, there issome variation in the patterns here. Mormonism peaks in countries withHDIs in the .60 .79 range; SDA growth peaks in the .30 .39 range; JWgrowth is fairly constant in modernizing countries.

All of the above descriptive statistics indicate three things. First, includingzero growth country-years in an investigation of the factors that influencegrowth for religions is important, so the numbers are not biased toward growth.Second, there are some differences between the religious groups, for they do

not grow at the same rate in similar contexts. This means supply-side factorsare important. Third, there are some differences among the consumers of thesegroups, indicating that demand-side factors are also important. In order todetermine the relative strength of these factors on the growth of these religiousgroups, multiple autoregression analyses were performed.

Tables 3 5 report the results of autoregression analyses. Autoregressionwas employed as these are repeated data points over time. In many cases, serialautocorrelation is a problem, but in this case, serial autocorrelation is actuallyindicative of growth momentum. If the autoregression coefficient is significant

in these analyses, it indicates that there is significant growth momentum forthese religious groups from year to year, that is, once a religion begins to growin an area it tends to continue growing. The remaining coefficients in the ana-lyses can be interpreted as coefficients of OLS regression.

Table 3 presents the results of a step-wise autoregression using the annualMormon growth rates of each country as the dependent variable. Model 1includes just the control variables. As expected, Mormons grow significantlyslower in communist countries and Muslim countries. There is also a significantnegative relationship between percentage of the population, that is, Mormon

and Mormon growth, suggesting a carrying capacity or saturation point forMormonism. There is a significant, positive relationship between Mormongrowth and countries being former Soviet Bloc countries.

Model 2 introduces the HDI measures. Because of multicollinearity, oneof the HDI deciles has to be left out of the regression; it is reflected in theconstant and the coefficients of the other variables are relative to it. InModel 2, the .30 .39 HDI range is the reference group. As expected fromtable 2, Mormons grow faster in developing countries, particularly those inthe .60 .79 range. They also grow significantly slower in the highest HDI

range. With the HDI measures included, there is little change among thecontrol variables.

Model 3 introduces the period dummy codes. Due to multicollinearity, onehas to be omitted. In Model 3, the 20002006 period is omitted. Mormon


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TABLE 3 Mormon Growth Rate Regressed on Independent Variables (Autoregression)

Model 1 (n 5,140) Model 2 (n 2,980) Model 3 (n

B SE B SE B

Predominantly black (1) 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.018*

Current communist (1) 20.069*** 0.016 20.097*** 0.023 20.089***

Former Soviet Bloc (1) 0.026*** 0.008 0.049*** 0.010 0.061***

Predominantly Muslim (1) 20.066*** 0.005 20.077*** 0.006 20.074***

Population growth rate 0.087 0.054 20.014 0.065 20.033

% of total population 20.107* 0.052 20.213** 0.071 20.171*

HDI 0.00 to .29 (1) 20.010 0.015

HDI .30.39 (1) 0.018

HDI .40.49 (1) 0.028** 0.010 0.053***

HDI .50.59 (

1) 0.020 0.011 0.047** HDI .60.69 (1) 0.033** 0.011 0.058***

HDI .70.79 (1) 0.021 0.011 0.049**

HDI .80.89 (1) 20.021 0.012 0.007

HDI .901.00 (1) 20.052*** 0.013 20.015

19701979 (1) 0.042***

19801989 (1) 0.028***

19901999 (1) 0.024***

20002006 (1)

% JW

% SDA Autoregression coefficient 0.520*** 0.012 0.431*** 0.017 0.431***

Constant 0.066*** 0.003 0.069*** 0.011 0.018**

Log-likelihood 6120.404 3435.251 3454.577

*p, .05; **p, .01; ***p, .001.

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TABLE 4 Jehovahs Witnesses Growth Rate Regressed on Independent Variables (Autoregression)


B SE B SE BPredominantly black (1) 0.022*** 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.007

Current communist (1) 20.045*** 0.010 20.069*** 0.014 20.067***

Former Soviet Bloc (1) 20.001 0.006 0.023*** 0.007 0.025***


Population growth rate 0.005 0.022 20.015 0.020 20.017

% of total population 28.946*** 0.997 26.208*** 1.193 25.406***

HDI 0.00.29 (1) 20.008 0.016

HDI .30.39 (1) 0.009

HDI .40.49 (

1)2

0.004 0.007 0.006 HDI .50.59 (1) 20.001 0.008 0.009

HDI .60.69 (1) 20.006 0.008 0.002

HDI .70.79 (1) 20.005 0.008 0.005

HDI .80.89 (1) 20.025** 0.009 20.015

HDI .901.00 (1) 20.041*** 0.010 20.028

19701979 (1) 0.003

19801989 (1) 0.022***

19901999 (1) 0.020***

20002006 (1)

% Mormon% SDA

Autoregression coefficient 0.781*** 0.008 0.784*** 0.010 0.782***

Constant 0.059*** 0.003 0.070*** 0.008 0.048**

Log-likelihood 10582.781 7140.714 7189.465

**p, .01; ***p, .001.



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TABLE 5 Seventh-day Adventists Growth Rate Regressed on Independent Variables (Autoregressio


B SE B SE B

Predominantly black (1) 0.031*** 0.003 0.012* 0.005 0.012*

Current communist (1) 20.009 0.008 20.035** 0.014 20.036**

Former Soviet Bloc (1) 20.016*** 0.005 20.010 0.006 20.011


Population growth rate 0.190*** 0.044 0.105* 0.047 0.106*

% of total population 20.115 0.096 20.309* 0.125 20.305*

HDI 0.00.29 (1) 20.074*** 0.014

HDI .30.39 (1) 0.072***

HDI .40.49 (1) 20.018* 0.008 0.054***

HDI .50.59 (

1) 20.022** 0.008 0.050***HDI .60.69 (1) 20.031*** 0.008 0.040**

HDI .70.79 (1) 20.038*** 0.008 0.034*

HDI .80.89 (1) 20.072*** 0.009 20.003

HDI .901.00 (1) 20.083*** 0.009 20.012

19701979 (1) 20.001

19801989 (1) 0.001

19901999 (1) 0.004

20002006 (1)

% Mormon

% JWAutoregression coefficient 0.338*** 0.013 0.372*** 0.016 0.372***

Constant 0.037*** 0.002 0.094*** 0.008 0.021

Log-likelihood 7554.415 4619.478 4620.509

*p, .05; **p, .01; ***p, .001.



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growth is slowing down as the period dummy codes included in the equationare all positive and significant relative to the omitted group. Also of note inModel 3, with period controlled, the predominantly black variable becomessignificant, indicating Mormon growth is picking up in predominantly black

countries. Model 4 introduces two final variablesthe percentage of the coun-trys population made up of JWs and SDAs. It appears Mormons do not actu-ally compete with JWs or SDAs as there is not a significant relationshipbetween these variables. Finally, in all four models, the autoregression coeffi-cient is significant and substantial, indicating growth momentum accounts formuch of the variation in Mormon growth rates. That growth momentumaccounts for most of the growth does not suggest that these religious groupswill continue to grow indefinitely, but rather that it was an important factorduring the period under investigation. The HDI and the other demand-side

factors will ultimately dictate whether the religious groups continue to grow orbegin to decline.

Table 4 replicates the autoregression analysis with JWs growth rate as thedependent variable. Model 1 indicates that JWs grow significantly faster in pre-dominantly black countries. However, they grow significantly slower in predo-minantly Muslim and currently communist countries. Additionally, as thepercentage of JWs in a country increases, there is a significant and substantialdecrease in growth.

In Model 2, the expected pattern is observed with significantly slower

growth in countries with HDIs above .80. Of note, predominantly black is nolonger significant, which is likely because of the HDI measures, which accountfor some of the variation of that variable. Model 3 indicates that there was aslowdown in JWs growth in the 1970s (not significant), but it picked up in the1980s and 1990s, only to slow again after the turn of the century. Model 4indicates that there is a significant relationship with percentage Mormon,suggesting some competition between Mormons and JWs. In all four models,the autoregression coefficients are significant, indicating growth momentum isthe single best predictor of JW growth.

Table 5 replicates the autoregression analysis with SDA growth rates as thedependent variable. Model 1 indicates that SDAs grow more rapidly in predo-minantly black countries and in countries with high population growth rates.However, they grow more slowly in former Soviet Bloc countries and predomi-nantly Muslim countries.

In Model 2, every single HDI measure is significant (p, .001): SDAsgrow most rapidly in countries with a .30.39 HDI measure. Close scrutiny ofthe slope coefficients does indicate that growth is slowest in countries below.29 and above .80. Thus, the curvi-linear relationship is observed. There is also

some change in the control variables. Former Soviet Bloc and populationgrowth rate are no longer significant. Some of the variation in growth ratesexplained by those variables are explained by the HDI measures (based on col-linearity diagnostics; not shown). Predominantly Muslim is still a negative


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growth rates calculated are probably off the mark to some degree. Fromone point of view, they actually underestimate growth as the number of peopleadded through baptisms is probably accurate and they are being added to a basethat is smaller than that reported by LDS Church headquarters. However,

Gooren (2006) has shown that at least in Central America, the majority ofnewly baptized members drop out within the first year or two, which suggests arapid turnover of membership. One potentially serious concern with the highturnover might be a correlation between inflated membership numbers andmodernization as research indicates that retention is lower in less developedcountries (Lawson 2007). If the inflation is not uniform and/or random, itwould affect the calculations. Unfortunately, a way to test and then compen-sate for such a problem is not readily available, and there is no other source forglobal membership data.

DISCUSSION

The fact that country-level characteristics are significant predictors ofgrowth for all three religious groups indicates that demand-side factors areimportant in understanding growth. At the same time, demand-side factors donot have identical effects on growth for the three groups, indicating supply-sidefactors are also important. Is one set of factors more important than the other?

Perhaps. But rather than debate which is more important, combining the tworesults in the best models of religious growth.

As far as the two hypotheses are concerned, both were supported by thisanalysis: (1) the three religious groups tend to have the highest rates of growthin modernizing countries and (2) much lower rates of growth in premodernizingand highly modernized countries. This finding supports the curvi-linear natureof secularization as suggested by Bruce (2002).

This analysis also supports the idea outlined by Voas (2007) that countriespass through a secular transition. While Voas outlined what this transition

entails from a theoretical standpoint, our analysis provides evidence for an actualtransitional range of modernization. As a countrys HDI moves into the .80 range,the secular transition begins. Most countries around the world today with HDIsabove .90 have largely secular populations (Zuckerman 2006). While by nomeans a definitive study testing all aspects of secularization theory, this analysisdoes indicate that a clear transition takes place for exclusive, strict, proselytizingreligious groups near the upper-end of the HDI range. We cannot, however, saywhether the root cause behind that decline in growth rates is specifically theintroduction of social safety nets or more general elements of modernization.

Some details related to the control variables warrant discussion. That therewas not a significant relationship between Mormon growth rates and countriesbeing predominantly black until period was controlled is no surprise: until1978, Mormons did not actively proselytize among blacks and limited their


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participation in the religion (Mauss 2003). While it appears Mormon growthin predominantly black countries has picked up, Mormonism is not growing atthe same rate in predominantly black countries as are the other religiousgroups. That is probably due to the legacy of discrimination. The finding that

JWs and SDAs grow more rapidly in predominantly black countries may alsobe, at least in part, due to the continued limited appeal of Mormonism inthese countries, reducing competition. Or rapid growth of JWs and SDAs maybe due to the generally high levels of growth in Africa, reflecting culturalacceptance of religion at the moment due to many of those countries moder-nizing. This supports Bruces (2002) and Holdens (2002) arguments that strictreligions buttress the insecurity that accompanies modernization.

None of the religious groups are growing rapidly in currently communist orpredominantly Muslim countries. This is not surprising considering the regu-

lations placed on religious groups in these countries (Pink 2005). That said,there is some reason to believe that there is at least some growth of JWs andSDAs in some of these countries. Both JWs and SDAs have historically contin-ued to worship and even proselytize in communist countries (Lawson 1995,2005). This makes sense in light of the motivations and characteristics of theJWs in particular. JWs are tenacious in the face of persecution (Holden 2002).They also have a tendency to ignore government restrictions. However, this isnot the approach taken by Mormons or SDAs (Gooren 2006; Lawson 1995;Shepherd and Shepherd 1998). Mormons have usually waited until they gained

official recognition before entering a country to begin proselytizing. SDAs, onthe other hand, were active in most communist countries prior to the restrictiveregimes taking power. They made concessions to the political leadership, agree-ing to tamp down their activity and to allow their young men to undergo com-pulsory military training in order to maintain their organization andcongregations, biding their time until things changed (Lawson 1996).

Another finding of note is the substantial and significant negative relation-ship between the percentage of the population that is part of these three reli-gious groups and their respective growth rates, particularly for JWs. This

supports both Voass (2002) and Holdens (2002) arguments that there is alimited pool of people interested in the product of the JWs, but also seems tohold true for both Mormons and SDAs. However, it should be noted that thefact that their appeal in these countries is limited does not mean that growthof these religious groups does not occur through social networks, as previousresearch indicates it does (Leman 1998).

Perhaps the only unexpected finding was the lack of competition betweenthese religious groups. When the percentages of a countrys population madeup of the other two religious groups is included in the regression equations, it

generally does not make much of a difference. This may indicate that differentpeople are attracted to the different religious groups; indeed, Lawsons researchindicates that this is the case (2005). It may also overlook intra-country vari-ation as there are regional variations in growth for these religious groups within


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countries: one religion may dominate one region while another will findsuccess elsewhere (Knowlton 2007).

Much has been said about the rapid expansion of religious groups intoformer Soviet Bloc countries (Greeley 2002; Pollack 2003). This analysis indi-

cates that these religious groups are doing fine in those countries, but not par-ticularly stellar. Part of the explanation may actually be a pent-up/missedopportunity effect explained by the main finding of this paper. There mayhave, in fact, been a pent-up demand for these religious groups during themodernization of these countries. But due to government restrictions on thesereligious groups, they were not allowed to focus as much effort inthese countries as they would have liked. By the time those restrictions fell,these countries were sufficiently modernized as to have begun to pass throughthe secular transition. As a result, these religious groups now have limited

appeal. If that is true, there will be no major religious revivals in formerly com-munist countries, nor in any highly developed, predominantly Muslimcountries if religious proselytizing restrictions are ever removed.

Mormons and JWs have experienced significant slowdowns in growth; theSDAs appear to be experiencing a slowdown, but it is not a significant reductionin growth over previous periods. The interpretation that makes the most sensefor this slowdown for the other two religions is the concentration of JWs andMormons in developed countries (Lawson 2005, 2007). Since a high proportionof their membership is located in developed countries where growth has slowed,

these members are not having much success in attracting new recruits; only themissionaries in the developing countries are succeeding. The SDAs are not asheavily concentrated in countries that have passed through the secular tran-sition, resulting in growth rates that remain high. If our interpretation of secular-ization theory is correct, then the appeal of these religious groups around theworld will continue to decline as development continues, slowing growth ratesfor these three religious groups even more in the future. Another factor thatmay be contributing to the slow down is reduced religious fervor among themembers in developed countries (Alston and Aguirre 1979). As religious groups

there increase in size, the dedication and fervor of the members tends todecrease. It may be that there is less missionary zeal among the already con-verted. This is probably the case for JWs in Europe, where they are experiencingactual decline, and apparently reduced interest in converting others.

Finally, the different patterns of growth of the three religions relative tothe HDI measures make sense in light of the different approaches of thegroups. SDAs were often the first of these groups to enter countries, thoughthey followed in the footsteps of various Protestant groups and Catholics. Theybrought with them hospitals, schools, and other institutions that helped spur

development (Lawson 1995, 1996, 1998a). Thus, the high degree of success ofSDAs in the lower HDI countries makes sensethey have a high appeal topeople who possess very little. JWs, on the other hand, bring with them onlytheir strict theology. Given this theology (Holden 2002; Leman 1998) and the


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high demands they make on members, it makes sense that they appeal to onlya limited number of people in a given society. Thus, the relatively flat relation-ship of JW growth across the moderate HDI ranges makes sense. Finally,Mormons have often been late-comers, for they rarely enter countries where

they are not welcome (Bennion and Young 1996). Moreover, they do not gen-erally fund schools, hospitals, or other institutions that contribute to societaldevelopment. Also, educational and financial success are encouraged amongMormons (Heaton et al. 2005), unlike JWs (Holden 2002), which mightexplain why their growth rates tend to peak somewhat later.

CONCLUSION

We examined and modeled membership data for three strict, proselytizingChristian religious groupsMormons, JWs, and SDAsin nearly everycountry around the world to determine the influence of supply and demandfactors on growth. The single largest predictor of growth is growth momen-tumonce a religious group starts to grow in a country, it continues to grow.However, that growth eventually slows due to a variety of factors, includingreaching a saturation point and reduced demand. Aside from momentum, bothsupply and demand factors are important. However, of these, the most promi-nent is level of economic development. Once countries reach a moderately

high level of economic development (HDI of .8 ), these three groups experi-ence very little to no growth. Whether that is due to modernization generallyor social safety nets specifically, we cannot say. Future research should attemptto discern which of the two (it may be both) actually causes the secular tran-sition. Either way, it is clear that once that point is reached, the future of theseproselytizing religious groups in those countries is gloomy.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

A supplementary section is located with the electronic version of thisarticle at Sociology of Religion online (http://socrel.oxfordjournals.org).

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