the second time around: british policy toward the kurds (1921-22)

The Second Time around: British Policy toward the Kurds (1921-22)Author(s): Robert OlsonSource: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Bd. 27, Nr. 1/3 (1987), pp. 91-102Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1570517 .

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Die Welt des Islams XXVII (1987)

THE SECOND TIME AROUND: BRITISH POLICY TOWARD THE KURDS (1921-22)

BY

ROBERT OLSON

University of Kentucky

This article focuses on documents from the Public Record Office of Great Britain written by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rawlinson on 4 March 1922 and minuted by Colonial Office officials through 17 March.' The report and its minutes are significant because they give succinct statements regarding the possibilities and potential of British support for Kurdish rebellion in Anatolia, i.e., territories which the British did not occupy militarily. Rawlinson was an

intelligence and political agent of the British in the Middle East from 1918 to 1922. He was on duty in Turkey from October 1919 to November 1921 at which time he was released from prison by the nationalist Turkish forces and exchanged for Turkish prisoners interned by the British at Malta.2

Upon his return to Great Britain, Rawlinson wrote several

reports for Lord Curzon and Winston Churchill, respectively Foreign Secretary and Colonial Secretary as well as the Director of

1 Colonial Office (henceforth C.O.) 730/28. Rawlinson's report and the accom- panying minutes of Colonial Office personnel are dated from 4 March to 17 March 1922 and consist of pages 200-209. References will be to these pages unless otherwise indicated in the text.

2 Soon after his release from prison in Turkey, Rawlinson wrote Adventures in the Near East (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1929), about his activities in the area. Also see Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923 (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 24. According to Sonyel, Rawlin- son's reports were of some interest and importance to British officials especially regarding the differences among the nationalists leaders such as Rauf Orbay, Selaheddin Bey and Vehbi Hoca and Kemal Atatiirk, see Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, p. 163.



ROBERT OLSON

Military Intelligence at the War Office.3 The report which concerns us here was written at the request of Winston Churchill.

In the first part of his report, Rawlinson posed three questions and then proceeded to answer them: (1) How far the policy of the Allies contributed to the consolidation of the nationalist power; (2) What measure of success attended their defiance of the Allies' proposals; and (3) What prospect the Turkish nationalists considered themselves to have realizing the terms of their "pact".4 In response to question one Rawlinson stressed the uncertainty among the nationalist leaders of being able to "obtain the general support of their countrymen despite their strengthened position after the Erzurum Congress (23 July to 7 August 1919) and the Sivas Con-

gress (4 to 11 September 1919)." Up until spring 1920 the Turkish nationalists still had much opposition. But, contended Rawlinson, this opposition evaporated as a result of the allied occupation of

Constantinople (16 March 1920); allied support for the Greek inva- sion of western Anatolia via Izmir (15 May 1919) and the announcement of the Peace Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) and the Nationalist Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union (16 March

1921).5 In answering question two regarding the success of nationalist

defiance of the Allied proposals for peace, Rawlinson stated, that

they had been able to mobilize the entire Turkish (Osmanli) population; they captured Kars and the Armenian forces

(September 1920) and they began vigorous military operations against the Greeks in western Turkey. In addition, the nationalist

leadership sent German trained intelligence officers to establish

regular connections via Kabul with revolutionary leaders in India, Iraq, Palestine and Egypt.

3 Rawlinson, Adventures, pp. 351-3. 4These and subsequent events can be followed in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy,

pp. 35-85 and in Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," pp. 172-209 in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953); Briton Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne. Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 (Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1976), pp. 163-319; Omer Kiirkuioglu, Turk- Ingiliz Iliykileri (1919-1926) Turkish-British Relations 1919-1926 (Ankara: Univer- sity Press, 1979), pp. 137-250.

5 C.O. 730/28, p. 207.

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BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE KURDS 1921-22

Rawlinson then posed his third question as to whether the above

operations had met with "very considerable measure of success." He answered that (1) the nationalists were certainly confident that the Greek forces posed no threat to the nationalists; (2) "under no circumstances will the Allies be prepared to undertake any military operation in Anatolia"; and (3) therefore they had nothing to fear from the Allies' present policy, "but that the longer that policy con- tinues the more certain they will be of obtaining their demands in full and they are therefore prepared to consider nothing less."

In Rawlinson's opinion the realization of the nationalists' confidence would result in demands the fulfilment of which would result in the creation of a confederation between all Muslims, i.e., Sunnis from the "Bosphorus to the Caspian including Daghistan with the ports of Batoum and Baku in Turkish hands, this being the avowed object of their eastern aims, as such a confederation would dominate the political position in the Near East."

To prevent such an eventuality, Rawlinson thought it important to "consider whether a line of policy cannot be adopted by the

Allies, or even by the British Government alone, which will tend to weaken the Nationalist position and so render them less truculent and more amenable to the consideration of reasonable propositions, so that by this means a way be opened to an eventual settlement." Rawlinson stated that to achieve such ends and to be of any prac- tical value such a policy should (1) not be antagonistic to Islam; (2) be such as to inspire a dread of its further development; (3) not call for the employment of troops of any considerable expenditure; (4) be capable of being discontinued whenever desired.

Rawlinson then suggested that a policy meeting the above four conditions could be implemented "owing to the disaffected and uncontrolled state of the Kurdish tribes in the Eastern Valayets." Furthermore, due to the mobilization of every available Turk on the eastern and western fronts, the Kurds were "left enormously in the majority in the eastern districts of Anatolia and all Turkish

posts there being very weakly held are at the mercy of the local

Kurds, being particularly vulnerable should Kurdish raids be carried out approximately simultaneously, say within the same month."

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ROBERT OLSON

Rawlinson reported the Kurdish chiefs were dissatisfied with their position and extremely antagonistic to the Turks. He thought the chiefs could be induced to carry out raids for little money or

arms; significantly Rawlinson mentioned machine guns. Each Kur- dish chieftain would attack the Turkish posts and garrisons in his own district. Such raids would require little co-operation among the tribes of which, said Rawlinson, the Kurds would be incapable of in any case.

Rawlinson suggested that the above policy could be put into effect "by use of a fast British vessel, preferably a destroyer, in the Black Sea, which could call at night at various points on the Anatolian coast, land agents etc., and, standing out to sea during the day, the vessels would return at night in accordance with a

prearranged system of fire signals from coast range. Such an under-

taking would be inexpensive to organize and, even if not attended with entire success, it was a line of policy which the nationalists above all things dread, as they are well aware of their weakness in this direction." The success of such a policy would have a great impact on the nationalists for "they also dread the great moral effect of such a policy, and the possible cutting off of their eastern from their western armies with the danger of dissensions amongst themselves, which by that means would be encouraged."6

In Rawlinson's view this policy had three advantages: (1) there could be no question of any religious feeling being aroused; (2) an end could be put to any policy at any moment; and (3) the under-

taking could be carried out without any European publicity such as attended to the Franklin-Bouillon mission.7

Rawlinson concluded his report by suggesting the Kurdish tribes and/or chieftains to carry out the mission should be: (1) Ayeeb [Eyiib] Pasha of the Olti district who would be capable of taking Erzurum; (2) Hussein Pasha of Alashgird who would be capable of

taking Kara Kilise or Bayezit; and (3) the Dersim Kurds who were

already in open insurrection and capable, thought Rawlinson, of

6 Ibid., p. 208. One of Rawlinson's duties during his mission in Turkey in 1920- 1 was to learn of and, if possible, to create dissension among the various nationalist officers, see Adventures, pp. 267-334 and Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, p. 163.

7 In this regard see ibid., pp. 130-40.

94




taking Erzincan at any moment.8 There were still others who could be made use of in Rawlinson's view as the coast [Black Sea] range was "in the hands of insurgent bands consisting of Pontine Greeks and deserters who could also be encouraged."

Rawlinson had confidence of the policy's success as he had "personally seen and conversed with the leading personalities in those tribes." Rawlinson was confident the policy's success would be

"very effective in modifying the present attitudes of the nationalist Turkish government."

By 8 March John Shuckburgh, assistant undersecretary of State at the Colonial Office, had distributed Rawlinson's report with his own minute attached to Reader Bullard, member of the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office, Colonel Richard Mei-

nertzhagen, Military Adviser in the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office and to T. E. Lawrence who was serving as an adviser on Arab Affairs in the Middle East Department at the Col- onial Office.

After mentioning the salient points of Rawlinson's plan, Shuckburgh brought it to the attention of his subordinates that Sir

Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner in Mesopotamia, had "more than once raised the question of utilizing the Kurds from the

Iraq side, but that we here [Colonial Office] have always strenuously opposed the suggestion." Shuckburgh mentioned that in Rawlinson's view the Kurdish chiefs accessible from Iraq would be of no use as they did not have sufficient influence or following. Shuckburgh thought, however, that Rawlinson's proposals elicited the objection entertained at the Colonial Office to similar proposals by Sir Percy Cox.

T. E. Lawrence made his minute on the same day. His view was that such sporadic local movements would only call for "police work in prevention and will not gravely embarrass the Kemalists." In addition, suggested Lawrence, to foment a successful revolution would require foreign direction and experts such as "assisted the

8 Rawlinson had observed or undoubtedly heard at first hand of the insurrec- tions and rebellions of the Dersim Kurds during 1919-1920. The most detailed account of these rebellions, sometimes called the Koc Kiri rebellions, is Dr. M. Nuri Dersimi, Kurdistan Tarihinde Dersim/Dersim in the History of Kurdistan

(Aleppo, 1952), pp. 120-79.

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ROBERT OLSON

Hejaz operation during the war." Lawrence did not like the loca- tions from which the revolt would spring. Olti and Alashgird backed on to Russia and would require Lenin's help; the Dersim

region was impossible to reach except by the Euphrates Valley. Lastly Lawrence thought it was madness to attempt to make a serious rebellion from the base of a single destroyer.

In spite of his reservations to Rawlinson's proposal, Lawrence did "believe a Kurdish movement is a possibility if such a power as ourselves is willing to provide the bases, or base, the arms stores, instigating staff, & the money." The amount of the money would be considerable because, "the Arab Revolt, a fair parallel, under better circumstances, occupied some eight ships, fifty British

officers, and ? 5,000,000 in money, and over ? 16,000,000 in stores."9 Lawrence concluded his minute by stating that if a Kur- dish revolt was to be considered it should be on the same scale as the Arab Revolt. But its aftermath would create formidable dif-

ficulty with Turks and Armenians. "I regard it as a desperate measure," stated Lawrence.

Reader Bullard was more critical in his minute stating that Rawlinson's proposals violated most of the conditions he laid down as essential such as: (1) armed action against Turkey would be

interpreted in some quarters as antagonistic to Islam; (2) heavy expenditure, such as mentioned by Lawrence, would be incurred; (3) "and it could not (underlining is Bullard's) be discontinued at will." Bullard had other criticisms: "Is it seriously proposed that we should stir up the Kurds against the Turks and then leave them to be massacred when we have secured the political advantages we desire? Hasn't Col. Rawlinson learnt from the fate of the Arme-

nians, who were instigated by the Russians to revolt against the Turks and, later on, abandoned?" Furthermore, Bullard thought Rawlinson's proposal, to some extent, cancelled those of Sir Percy Cox because the Kurds Cox wanted "to stir up are precisely those whom Col. Rawlinson thinks no good." Bullard was "totally opposed to our becoming involved in Turkish Kurdistan ... even the Kurds of Iraq sit on the fence when a company of ragged

9 It is difficult to come by accurate figures with regard to the costs of the Arab Revolt. Lawrence's figures in this regard are enlightening.

96




Turkish infantry comes to Rawanduz." Bullard concluded his minute by stressing that as soon as a policy decision was made, Sir Percy Cox had to be told what should be done with Khalil Bey Bedirkhan and Major E. W. C. Noel. The former was a Kurdish nationalist of the Bedirkhan dynasty who was at the time cooperating with the British in Iraq. Major E. W. C. Noel was one of the chief political and espionage agents of the British at this time among both the Kurds and the Bakhtiyari.10

Meinertzhagen was more curt in his minute. He appreciated, he said, the "desire of vengeance which must be indelibly stamped in Col. Rawlinson's heart," but he regarded "the scheme as immoral & mad. Any success would be but temporary & in the end it would rebound against us, as all such ventures in the past, including the Hejaz Revolt." It is interesting to note at this point that in addition to Meinertzhagen several other members of the Middle East Department, including Reader Bullard, considered the Arab Revolt rather a failure. And this was in 1921-2. In this regard they usually disagreed with T. E. Lawrence's proclivity to support more

10 E. W. C. (Edward William Charles) Noel had a very long, fruitful and adventurous career by all accounts. There is extensive coverage in the Colonial Office records of his exploits (some called him "The Second Lawrence") in the Caucasus during World War I, amongst the Jangalis of Kuchak Khan in Gilan in 1919 where he was imprisoned and among the Bakhtiyari and the Kurds. He also was active among the Pathans and the tribes of the Northwest Frontier in India to which government he was assigned. There is a good portrait of Noel in Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 31-7; 127-9. Noel wrote a seventy-seven page treatise of his reconnaissance and espionage among the Kurds, Diary of Major Noel on Special Duty in Kurdistan, from June 14th to September 21st 1919 (Basrah: Government Press, 1920). A copy of this report can also be found in Foreign Office 371/5068. Noel also wrote one other published piece, "Note on the Kurdish Situation," (Baghdad: 1920), 20 pp. Noel was also present at the Cairo Conference during March, 1921. See in this regard Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 110; also see F.O. 371/6343 where the original reports of the Cairo Con- ference can be found, especially Appendix Ten "Fourth Meeting of the Political Committee of the Middle East Department 15 March 1921."

It is difficult to keep track of the peripatetic Noel, but Sir Percy Loraine, British High Commissioner in Iran, informed Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, on 27 January 1922 that Noel had left Teheran for India on 15 January 1922; see F. 0. 371/7824 E 3809/203/34. Whether Noel was back in Baghdad by mid-March, 1922 is unclear. Noel had spent much of 1921 in the Bakhtiyari coun- try of Southwestern Iran. For his activities there see C.O. 730/10.

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ROBERT OLSON

adventurous schemes of intrigue and rebellion of one kind or another.

On 15 March a group council meeting of the concerned personnel met with Shuckburgh and rejected Rawlinson's scheme in toto.

Meinertzhagen also informed the group that it was the opinion of the Director of Intelligence at the War Office that "the Turkish Nationalists have the Kurds in their pocket & that to rely on them to any degree in embarrassing the Turk is to live in false hope." Furthermore even if the Turks could be so embarrassed, the Direc- tor of Intelligence considered Rawlinson's method both "crude &

unpractised." The same day Reader Bullard was again quick to remind Shuckburgh"? [Winston Churchill?] must tell Sir P. Cox that as there is no prospect of adaption of Kurdish insurrection scheme in near future (if ever) it is unnecessary to retain either Noel or Khalil." On 15 March Shuckburgh recommended to Sir James Masterton-Smith, Permanent Undersecretary of State for the Col-

onies, that Rawlinson's proposals for the reasons discussed in the minutes be dropped and that Sir Percy Cox "be informed that as there is no likelihood of our adopting the policy of utilising the transborder Kurds there is no reason why he should keep Major Noel and Halil at Bagdad any longer." On 15 March Masterton- Smith approved Shuckburgh's recommendations in his minute and on 17 March Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Col-

onies, initialed his approval.

Conclusion

Rawlinson's recommendations for instigating a Kurdish rebellion substantially north of the territory occupied by British forces in Iraq indicates how out of touch he was with the direction of British policy towards Turkey in early 1922. While various schemes had been floated to stir up the Kurds throughout 1920-21, they had

begun to be viewed with increasing disfavor by the middle of 1921. Rawlinson thought the Turkish nationalist forces could still be checked or intimidated sufficiently to withdraw from their stated

objectives of the National Pact of 28 January 1920, especially those clauses of the Pact which demanded national sovereignty and ter-

98




ritorial integrity over Anatolia, western Thrace and Istanbul."1 This meant Greek and British evacuation of those areas. The rejec- tion of Rawlinson's scheme points out the rather dramatic evolution of British and Allied policy toward the nationalist government after the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920. The year 1921 marked victories of the Turkish forces over the Greeks and important and crucial nationalist agreements with France, Italy, the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and Afghanistan. The most important achievement was the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty of 20 October 1921.12 A Turkish scholar has labeled 1921 as the year of 'soften- ing' of British policy toward the nationalists.'3

There were other factors affecting British policy toward Turkey. In addition to the consequences of the Turkish nationalist successes in 1921 and early 1922 and the French and Italian withdrawal from the demands of Sevres, there was also a parallel evolution of policy toward Kurdistan and the Kurds. Article 62 of the Treaty of Sevres had advocated an autonomous Kurdistan. The treaty had also stipulated that Kurdistan had the right under the Treaty to opt for independence within one year i.e., 10 August 1921. British policy toward Kurdistan and more importantly toward the Kurds reflected the changing diplomatic and military situation of 1921. This change in British policy toward the Kurds, especially the possibility of instigating rebellion among the Kurds in Turkey, is reflected in the change of British policy as announced, but not decided or clarified at the Cairo Conference held 12-30 March 1921. At Cairo Winston Churchill, supported by Hubert Young14 and Major Noel, agreed that a Kurdish state ought to be set up without delay. Such a state would have been under the direct control of the High Commissioner and not a part of, or responsible to, the Iraqi government.15 Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner to

1 Kiirkciiolu, Tiirk-Ingiliz, pp. 137-250. 12 These events can be traced in Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, pp. 91-182,

Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," pp. 172-96; Kuirkgiioglu, Tiirk-Ingiliz, pp. 137-250. Detailed accounts of published British documents are in Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, volume XVLII, Greece and Turkey, January I, 1921-September 2, 1922 (London: 1970).

13 Kiirkciioglu, Tiirk-Ingiliz, pp. 137-8. 14 Assistant Secretary, Middle East Department, Colonial Office. 15 Klieman, Foundations, p. 110 and F.O. 371/6343, pp. 591-61.

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ROBERT OLSON

Mesopotamia, wanted southern Kurdistan, i.e., the divisions of

Kirkuk, Sulaimaniya, and districts north of Mosul, to be incor-

porated into Iraq. The differences between Cox and Churchill were

highlighted in an exchange of telegrams between 9 and 24 June 1921.16 Cox was of the view that two alternative policies were mooted at the Cairo Conference: (1) that Kurdish districts should be retained as part of Iraq; (2) that districts should be encouraged to separate. Cox thought the balance of opinion was in favor of the former. The correspondence between Cox and Churchill for the remainder of 1921 and early 1922 pivots on whether the British should support an autonomous Kurdistan or whether the areas

designated as southern Kurdistan should be incorporated into Iraq. By early 1922 it was clear that Cox's policy was to obtain and the Kurdish districts under British control were to be included in Iraq. The Turkish suppression of the Koc Kiri Kurdish rebellion in 1921

along with their other military and diplomatic successes had

precluded the possibility or the potential of an autonomous Kur- distan other than in British held territory. Secondly, King Faysal in a conversation with Cox on 21 September 1921 stated he did not want the Kurdish areas "excised" from Iraq. Faysal indicated the British "were aware there was already technical and numerical

preponderance of Shiahs and excision of a large slice of Sunni districts of Iraq out of State and exclusion of their representatives from National Assembly would place Shiahs in a very strong position and filled him with misgiving. Personally he [Faysal] believes as long as they [the Kurds] were assured of being administered by Kurdish officers and if necessary to deal with the Iraq Government through High Commissioner (an arrangement which if necessary was quite acceptable to him) rather than resort to possible alternative of becoming part of a Mandated State under control of some

European state they would prefer to be nominally under rule of Muhammadan King.""7 Cox thought it reasonable to work for inclusion of Kurdish districts and their participation in National

Assembly on condition of local autonomy, and special supervision

16 C.O. 730/2 Telegram no. 201 from Cox to Churchill and no. 196 from Chur- chill to Cox.

17 C.O. 730/2 no. 203, Cox to Churchill.

100




by British officers and if necessary by High Commissioners. In

response to Cox, Churchill wrote on 3 October that the proposals were acceptable to him.'8

In view of the Turkish nationalist successes and the resulting decision on Britain's part to begin serious negotiations with the nationalist government from August to November 1921, Winston Churchill became less supportive of instigating Kurdish rebellion in

Turkey especially by utilizing the Kurds in Iraq. On 11 November 1921 Churchill rejected Cox's proposal to stir up the Kurds, and

"encourage Kurds to aligned with Greek forces, against the

perceived Turkish threat to Iraq. "I deprecate," wrote Churchill, "any attempt at the present moment to encourage the Kurds."19 Churchill's response was based on and included arguments of other Middle East Department hands such as J. H. Hall, Reader

Bullard, John Shuckburgh, Sir James Masterton-Smith all of whom for various reasons, but primarily because they did not want to jeopardize the possibility of earnest negotiations with the Turkish

nationalists, had rejected Cox's proposal. It seems that after November 1921 Britain did not support a policy of instigating the Kurds outside Iraq. This policy was to be continued even after the Lausanne Treaty in June 1923. Even during a period of tense relations between Turkey and Great Britain from July 1923 with

regard to the settlement of the question of the Mosul Vilayet, to the conclusion of the treaty between them on 5 June 1926 which settled the boundary and oil dispute and during the height of the Sheik Sait rebellion in spring 1925, the British did not pursue a policy of

instigating rebellion among the Kurds of Turkey. By then it would have jeopardized their Sharifian policy of imperial control of the Arab Middle East and their geo-political concerns with regard to the Soviet Union and Iran as well as Turkey. By 1922 the British had decided to settle for a 'national' home for the Kurds rather than for an autonomous Kurdistan, but this home was to be confined to

Iraq rather than larger areas in the Middle East.20

18 C.O. 730/2 no. 403, Churchill to Cox. 19 C.O. 730/6 no. 519, Churchill to Cox on 11 November. 20 In a telegram to Churchill on 23 November 1921, Cox informed Churchill

that Khalil Bedirkhan was leaving Iraq and that another Kurdish nationalist

101



102 ROBERT OLSON

In March 1922 as Rawlinson was offering his proposals for

instigating Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, the three allied foreign ministers-Poincare of France, Curzon of Great Britain and Schanzer of Italy-were meeting in Paris to consider modifications of the Treaty of Sevres in favor of the Turks. While many obstruc- tions lay ahead, the road to Lausanne was opened and there was to be no place along that road for an autonomous Kurdistan and no place for instigating rebellion among the Kurds in Turkey.

operative one 'Rafet' [Ri'fat] was returning to Constantinople; see C.O. 730/7, no. 700, 23 November.

On the importance of the Sheik Sait rebellion see my and William F. Tucker's, "The Sheik Sait Rebellion in Turkey (1925): A Study in the Consolida- tion of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism and the Rise of an Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism," Die Welt des Islams, vol. XVIII, no. 3-4 (1978), 195-211.

