the scottish-spanish circle of john mair. some basic themes

7/27/2019 The Scottish-Spanish Circle of John Mair. Some Basic Themes

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Alexander Broadie


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ALEXANDER BROADIE

THE SCOTTISH-SPANISH CIRCLEOF JOHN M AIR.S O M E B A S I C T H E M E S

EL CRCU LO HISPANO-ESCOCSDE JOHN M AIR.A L G U N O S T E M A S B S I C O S

TRADUCCIN:PALOMA PREZ-ILZARBE

Cuadernos de Anuario Filosfico


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ANUARIO FILOSOFICOJuan Cruz Cruz

Cuadernos de Anuario FilosficoSerie Universitariangel Luis Gonzlez

C O O R D I N A D O R

Serie Universitaria, n 37: Alexander Broadie, The Scottish-Spanish circle of John Mair. Some basic themes - El crculohispano-escocs de John Mair. Algunos tem as bsicos.Traduccin de Paloma Prez-Ilzarbe, 1996.Ilustracin d e la cubierta: John M air enseand o en P ars, sacado de In PetriHyspani Summulas Commentaria (c. 1505) 1996. Alexande r Broadie.Cuadernos de Anuario Filosfico, ISSN 0066-5215.Dep si to Legal : N A 1275-1991, Pamplona.Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra. S. A.3108 0 Pam plon a. Tfn.: (94 8) 42 56 00. Fax: (948) 42 56 36Eurograf. Po lgon o Industrial . Calle 0, n 31 . Muti lva Baja. Navarra


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NDICE

Presentacin 5

T E X T O I N G L S1. Th e Scottish-Spanish Circle of John M air 72. Th e Scotist inheritance 133. Asp ects of action 274 . Faith and logic 40

V E R S I N C A S T E L L A N A1. El crculo hispano-escocs de John M air 532. La herencia escotista 593. Aspectos de la accin 734 . Fe y lgica 87

Bibliografa 101


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8 Alexander Broadietopics in the light of their writings. In the present work I shall beparticularly concerned with the Scottish philosophers in thecircle. In a later volume I hope to give corresponding attention totheir Spanish colleagues.Courtesy requires that the members of the circle should firstbe introduced. There is room for discussion concerning whethercertain of the men I list are too far from the centre to beincluded, but at least provisionally I suggest that among the Scotswho should be listed with John Mair (c . 1467-1550) are HectorBoece ( C .1465 - C .1536), David Cranston (died 1512), GeorgeLokert (c.1485-1547), Robert Galbraith (c.1483-1544), WilliamManderston (c. 1485-1552), Peter Houston (dates uncertain) andGilbert Crab (c. 1482-1522), and that among the Spaniards whoshould be listed are Juan de Celaya (c.1490-1558), AntonioCoronel (died c.1521), Antonio's brother Luis Coronel (died1531), Juan Dolz del Castellar (dates uncertain), Fernando deEnzinas (died 1523), Juan Glida (c . 1496-1556), Gaspar Lax(1487-1560), Jernimo Pardo (died 1502), Agustn Prez deOlivan (dates uncertain) and Antonio Ramrez de Villaescusa(dates uncertain). 4

John Mair, from the village of Gleghornie a few miles SouthEast of Edinburgh , spent a year a t Cambr idge beforematriculating at the University of Paris c.1491. He gained hisM.A. in 1494 after studying under, amongst others, the greatSpanish logician Jernimo Pardo, to whom he refers, shortlyafter Pardo's death as: 'Meus amicus Hieronimus Pardo, cuiusanimam exaudiat Deu s' . 5 In 1495 his studies in theology began, asalso did his teaching career at the College of Montaigu, a collegewhose members included many of the Scots and Spaniards who4 For bibl iographical detai ls see J . Durkan, 'The school of John Major:Bibl iography ' , Innes Review, 1 (1950) , 140-57; V. Muoz Delgado, LgicaHispano-Portuguesa hasta 1600 (Notas bibliogrfico-doctrinales), Salamanca(1972) ; James K. Farge , Bibliographical Register of Paris Doctors ofTheology, 1500-1536, Toronto 1980; A. Broadie and Paloma Prez-I lzarbe,'The Scot t i sh-Spanish c i rc le of John Mai r : a pre l iminary bibl iography ' ,Pamplona (for thcoming).5 H. Elie (ed.), Le Traite 'De Vinfini'de Jean Mair, Paris (1938), p.138 line 5.See also ibid., footnote 2, where Elie criticises Villoslada's interpretation of theterm 'amicus ' used of Pardo by Mair . Vi l loslada draws the conclusion thatPardo did not teach at the Collge de Montaigu. Elie argues that that conclusionis unwarranted.


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The scottish-spanish circle of John Mair. Som e basic them es 9were to figure prominently in his circle. He was awarded hisdoctorate in theology in 1506 along with Josse Clichtove, andwith Jean de Fenario, subsequently Master General of the Orderof Preachers; Fenario was in due course to become a teacher inParis of Francisco Vitoria. Clichtove was later to speak of Mairas 'a distinguished theologian and a doctor with a brilliant namein Paris ' . 6 Clichtove's description was apt even at the time ofMair's doctorate, for by 1506 he had already published morethan fifteen books, some very substantial, and had started to winfor himself a reputation in Paris as a star lecturer.

He returned to Scotland in 1518 to become principal of theUniversity of Glasgow, and in 1523 transferred to the Universityof St Andrews for three years, where he worked with a Scotslogician from Paris, George Lokert, who had, shortly before,been elected rector of St Andrews. Mair returned to Paris in1526, but by 1531 was back in Scotland, this time permanently.He took up the post of provost of the Collegiate Church of StSalvator's, a College within the University of St Andrews, and hedied aged about eighty three, when still provost. During hisperiod of provostship at St Salvator's he was the theology teacherof John Knox, the leader of the Reformation in Scotland. JohnKnox described Mair as a man 'whose word was then held as anoracle on matters of religion'. But though greatly admiring histeach er, there were non e the less fundam ental differencesbetween them. John Knox worked zealously to banish fromScotland the faith by which Mair lived and which Mair haddevoted his life to upholding and defending.

The subsequent history of Mair's works is, on the face of it,surprising, but knowledge of the Scottish context within which heworked in his latter days and knowledge also of his chosencompany in Paris make subsequent events much less surprising.In Scotland his logical and even more his theological writingsceased to carry weight, as ideas owing more to Luther, and toCalvin (who must have heard Mair lecture in Paris) took a firmhold on the religious life of the people. In Scotland Mair'sreputation remained intact only in respect of his work as ahistorian. Nevertheless his Historia Maioris Britanniae (a title6 Quo ted by Vil loslada op.cit. p.137: 'insignem theologum et celeberrimi apudParisios nominis doctorem '.


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Th e scottish-spanish circle of John Ma ir. Some basic them es 11At Mair's instigation Coronel also produced an edition (1512)of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae of St ThomasAquinas, while the Dominican Peter Crockaert (also a regent atMontaigu) published an edition of the Secunda Secundae in thesame year. Mair himself prepared an edition (1504) of JohnDorp's commentary on Summulae Logicales of John Buridan,and in 1512 edited Adam Goddam's Commentary on theSentences of Peter Lom bard. Four years later George Lokertedited a collection of writings by Buridan, Albert of Saxony andThimon, on physics.Many other editions were prepared by Mair's circle. Two areof particular interest in the present context. First, there is nodoubt that Mair owed a great debt to his teacher Jernimo Pardowho died in 1502, and it was probably as an act of homage to hislate teacher that Mair published in 1505 an edition of Pardo'smagnum opus, the Medulla dyalectices. Secondly, there is specialsignificance in the fact that Mair was responsible for thepublication in 1517-1518 of an edition of the Reportata superSententias Duns Scoti. Duns Scotus, greatest of Scott ishphilosophers, is quoted frequently by Mair, always with thegreatest respect, even when, as sometimes happens, he disagreeswith him. There is evidence that Scotus cast a long shadow acrossScottish philosophy and in several ways profoundly affected theScottish philosophical tradition. Mair himself was probablyparticularly conscious of the ever-present influence of his greatpredecessor. This is at any rate a matter that deserves closescrutiny. Some work shedding light on this issue, has alreadybeen done. In view both of Mair's significance for the philosophyof sixteenth century Spain, and also of the well recognised Scotisttendencies of that same philosophy, the question of Mair 'scon t r ibu t ion to those Sco t i s t t endenc ies a l so deservesinvestigation.In the present work I shall focus on certain philosophical

topics of particular significance in relation to that larger project.The topics all relate to voluntarism. Scotus placed the concepts ofwill and freedom at the centre of his system, and Mair and anumber of his colleagues had a great deal to say about theseconcepts. I shall now turn to a discussion of the topics at issue,while keeping in mind particular writings both by Scotus himself


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II. THE SCOTIST INHERITANCE

The doctrine of the primacy of the will is of great significancein the history of western philosophy because of its close linkswith the dispute between nominalists and realists, the disputewhich, more than any other , dominated philosophical andtheological debate during the Middle Ages, and arguably thedispute which is dominant in those fields in our own time also.Philosophers can be categorized as ei ther voluntar is ts orintellectualists, with the former accepting the doctrine of theprimacy of the will, and the latter accepting its main rival, thedoctrine of the primacy of the intellect. We find the link betweenvoluntarism and intellectualism on the one side and nominalismand realism on the other, exhibited in practically every importantphilosophical issue.Let us consider, for example, the main metaphysical questionin axiology: what is the mode of existence of values? Inanswering it, a theistic voluntarist focuses upon the role of thewill. He holds that whether an act is good or bad depends uponGod's will. According to this view God is not constrained tocommand acts of a particular sort because He recognises that suchacts are good; instead it is His command to us to perform such

acts that makes them good. The goodness exists by divine fiat. Acommon non-theistic version of this theory is that we humanscreate our values by an act of choice. We might think that we aremerely confronted by values whose existence does not in the leastdepend upon us. But we are mistaken in this; those values,contrary to appearance, do not exist independently of our wills.Theories of this kind are essentially nominalist. They hold thatsomething that seems to have an independent reality, that is, to be

mind-independent, is in fact mind-dependent. In such cases ouracquaintance with values is not simply by an act of intellect, butby an act of will. It is primarily as agents, and not simply asspectators that we know them . H ere we see a clear link betweenvoluntarism and nominalism.


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14 Alexander BroadieOn the other hand, a value realist holds that values do exist in arelatively independent way, and in particular are not products ofany voluntary act. Hence we do not have agent-knowledge ofthem. They are however objects of the intellect and hence wehave a spectator's knowledge of them. In this sense value realistsare intellectualists and not voluntarists in respect of their teachingon the mode of existence of values. It is commonly held thatScotus was an extreme voluntarist as regards his teaching onvalues. I shall later indicate reasons for doubting this commonview of him.To take a further example, one concerning a topic, universals,of which Scotus presented a distinctive and famous account, thevoluntarist holds that universals are not things whose existenceowes nothing to us. He holds that they are mental entities,concepts formed in and by our intellect enabling us to classify thecontents of our world. In brief, universals are principles ofclassification. In many cases they are adopted by an act of will,

but even when thus adopted they are not the less universal. Asobjects of will, they do not have an existence independent ofourselves who are related to them as agent to object. Hence thevoluntarist tends to be nominalist about universals. In contrast,the realist holds that universals have a relatively independentexistence, being able to exist without our mental acts in generaland our voluntary acts in particular. Existing in that way,universals are possible objects of the intellect, though not objectsof our will. Consequently the realist is intellectualist, and notvoluntarist, about universals.

Examples can be taken from other areas of philosophy. Butenough has been said to indicate the grounds for holding that thedispute between voluntarists and intellectualists, between thosewho assign primacy to the will and those who assign it to theintellect, approximates closely to the dispute between nominalistsand realists. On that basis it must be concluded that the disputeconcerning which psychological faculty has primacy is of thegreatest consequence. As regards common reputation, St ThomasAquinas is regarded as the great intellectualist and Duns Scotusthe great voluntarist. 8 To the extent that these reputations are8 A rival for the t i t le of 'voluntarist par excellence ' is Kant. For hiscontribution to the debate see especially: Critique of Practical Reason , P t . l ,


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Th e scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Som e basic themes 17media between the distinctio realis on the one hand, which hefound in Aquinas's writings on will and intellect, and thedistinctio rationalis on the other, which he found in Henry's.Scotus makes a further distinction, between two sorts of will. 1 2This distinction is important in relation to his doctrine of theprimacy of will over intellect, for it is only one of the two sortsof will that has primacy. As regards one sort, we seem by ournature to be confronted by imperatives. Most fundamentally theorganism demands its continued existence. We can decide toreject the demand, but the rejection does not silence the demand,it merely overrules it. The organism wills one thing, and we willthe opposite and we might win against the organism. There aremany other things that we will by nature. They can be groupedunder the heading 'perfection', the perfection of the naturalorganism. I am referring here to its f lourishing or wellfunctioning. The principle in us by which we have a naturaltendency or inclination to our perfection is in a sense a principleof passivity. For when, if ever, we give nature its head andfollow through such tendencies, we are living according tonature's laws, responding passively to nature as it is articulated inus.

There is also an active principle in us, and that also is termed'will ' . This principle is exercised when we do not simply letnature take her course, but instead interfere with the orderlyunfolding of natural processes. We stand against nature andeither will contrarily to it, or we will consistently with it but notin virtue of being compelled by nature. For example, people havea natural fear of death, but some have found it possible toovercome that natural fear and will their death. The principle ofaction by which we will to reject life is clearly a different sort ofprinciple of action from the natural principle within us by whichwe will to live.This active principle is will, properly speaking, and it is a willof a kind that is, properly speaking, free. It is free, not just fromdetermination by nature, though that is an aspect of freedom; butit is free in a positive sense also. Scotus develops the positiveconcept by means of an application of a distinction that Aristotle1 2 Wol te r ibid . p p . 180-3.


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18 Alexander Broadiedraws between rational and irrational powers. 1 3 On the one handthere is a power to produce opposite effects, this being a rationalpower, and on the other there is a power to produce one effectonly, this power being irrational. For example, our free will isrational for in the very same circumstance we can will to speakand will to be silent. But a fire is not a rational power. If a coldobject is placed next to it the fire will heat the object, and cannotdo otherwise. It is true that it can melt ice, and bake mud hard.But these facts about fire do not count against the thesis that afire can produce one effect only, for if ice is placed next to thefire the fire can do nothing other than melt it; it is not free notto . Likewise it can do no other than bake the mud; it cannotsoften the mud still further.

The account of a rat ional power needs to be made moreprecise, as Scotus appreciated. He is not saying that a rationalpower can produce opposite effects simultaneously, but that at themoment it produces one effect it could equally, and in those verysame circumstances, have produced a different effect instead. Atthe very moment at which I spoke I could equally have remainedsilent. The fact that I spoke was due to an act of will. It was notdue simply to the circumstances in which I performed that act ofwill, for in those very circumstances I could, by an act of will,have remained silent.It might be argued that if the free will is equally able, from itsown resources, to produce opposite effects, then which of theopposites it produces cannot be explained solely in terms of thepower of the will; the fact that that effect rather than another wasproduced must therefore be explained by reference to a furtherpower, for example, desire. If so, then the will cannot produceopposite effects. Indeed it seems that by itself it cannot produceeither effect. Scotus's reply to this attack against the claim thatthe free will qua rational power can produce opposite effects, isthat the attack starts from a false conception of the nature of freewill. The free will is free, truly free, precisely in virtue of the1 3 Aristotle Metaphysics IX, 1046 b 1-4: 'It is clear that some potencies will benonrational but others will be with reason. Hence all the arts or productivesciences are potencies. ' For Sco tus on rational and irrational pow ers see W olteribid. pp. 144-73. Wolter 's text is a revised version of Scotus, Opera Omnia,ed. Wadding, vol .VII , pp .606-17.


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The scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Som e basic themes 19fact that without any further determination, and in particularwithout input from another psychological power, it is able todetermine, from within its own resources, which of the oppositeeffects within its power it will produce. Free will therefore is thefaculty of self-determination.Nevertheless there is an essential element of indeterminacy inthe will, and this fact suggests an interesting similarity betweenwill, as conceived by Scotus, and matter. For matter, no less thanwill is essentially indeterminate. Matter 's indeterminacy is itspassive power to receive any one of an indefinite number offorms. That is, whatever the form by which matter is informed,it could equally have come to be informed by some other forminstead. The piece of wood which the sculptor cuts in the shape ofa hand could equally well have been cut in the shape of a head.The stone which became hot because it was placed in a fire wouldhave become cold if placed on ice. In each case the matter wasnot determined, solely in virtue of anything within its ownnature, to receive just the form it did and not another oneinstead. Likewise free will is also indeterminate in respect of itsacts; it can, as earlier noted, will to produce either member of apair of opposite effects.

So much for the similarity between will and matter. There isalso a metaphysically important dissimilar i ty . Matter is aprinciple of passivity or receptivity. It receives forms; and theforms, by giving form to the matter, are active in relation to thematter. In contrast, free will is a principle of activity. Indeed it ispossibly the clearest paradigm we have of an active principle.Free will is indeterminate, but its indeterminacy is due to whatScotus terms its 'superabundant sufficiency'. It is as if the willhas more being than it needs for itself, and so can afford to givesome of its being to other things, which it does by willing theminto existence. Of course, the will can afford to be generous, forit is not diminished when it gives. Its superabundant sufficiency issuch that however much of its being it gives by willing, itremains superabundant in its own being. I conclude that thoughboth principles, matter and will, are indeterminate, they are sofor opposite reasons; one because it is a principle of passivity,and the o ther because it is a principle of activity.


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The scottish-spanish circle of John Mair. Some basic themes 23opposite effects. I merely say that if we do not, then at least onScotus's view of the matter we are not free agents. Consequently,if w e have a free will we m ust be able to stand sufficiently farback from any directive of our intellect to be able to reject it.Even if we do not reject it, the possibility of doing so remainsopen to us, right up to the moment that we act. That a particularpossibility in our power is a crazy one for us to actualise, is nodoubt going to be our reason, or part of our reason, for notactualising it. But that is not to say that we cannot actualise it; itis simply our reason why we will not. That is what it is for theintellect to have pondus et inclinatio in its relation to the will.This point brings to the surface a question which has beenlying submerged for some time. Can the judgment of the intellectreally carry weight with the will and incline it, if the will doesnot include an intellectual component? For surely weighing ajudgment of the intellect is itself an intellectual act. In that case ifthe will can perform such an act is the will not an intellectualfaculty? But it is agreed that the intellect is not a free faculty, andtherefore neither is the will. That is, to attribute properties of theintellect to the will is to imply the doctrine of intellectualdeterminism. On the other hand if the will does not have anintellectual component why should the judgments of the intellectmake any difference to it? And if i ts judgments make nodifference, then surely our freely willed acts would be random.But, as noted earlier, experience teaches us very plainly that ouracts are not random. And in all his philosophising Scotus neverloses sight of the plain deliverances of experience.

Scotus's answers to these question have to be considered in thelight of his deployment of the formal objective distinction, inparticular in the doctrine that will and intellect in each humansoul are really the same and formally distinct; they are one subratione entis, and two sub ratione formalitatis. The will cannotever distance itself sufficiently from the intellect to be able toignore its directives. Yet the two faculties are not identical, atleast not formally identical, and it is the fact that will is formallyother than intellect that gives will freedom of manoeuvre.We now see how Scotus is able to avoid both the chief problemwith extreme voluntarism, namely that the doctrine implies therandomness of our free acts, and also the chief problem with


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The scottish-spanish circle of John Mair. Som e basic them es 2 5Nevertheless, despite conceding that Scotus might be describedas an intellectualist of the most moderate sort, there is point todescribing him as a voluntarist rather than as an intellectualist,the point being to acknowledge the fact that he argues for theprimacy of the will . Here we have to note the powerfultheological currents running beneath Scotus's philosophy. Heplaced the concept of love at the centre of his theological system,and the concept duly emerges in his metaphysics, epistemologyand ethics. And this indeed is what we should expect of aFranciscan. I t is typical of Franciscans to subscribe to thedoctrine of the primacy of love over knowledge. Love issuperior to knowledge and, especially, love of God is superior toknowledge of Him, to the extent indeed that if we had a choiceper impossibile between loving God without knowing Him andknowing God without loving Him, we should choose the former.This has immediate implications for the doctrine of the primacyof the will, for love is located in the will and knowledge in theintellect. Since love has primacy over knowledge, will must haveprimacy over intellect. In short, if the highest act of which weare capable is an act of will, then will has primacy.Scotus recognises several possible lines of criticism of thisthesis. I shall deal here with one which involves a principlealready quoted, one which would later be invoked frequently byMair and his colleagues, Nihil volitum quin praecognitum. Thewill can do nothing except in the light of a prior act of intellect.

In contrast, the intellect can act without a prior act of will. Therethus seems to be a one-way dependency relation between the twofaculties, with will dependent upon intellect, and it is tempting toargue that what is dependent cannot have primacy in relation towhat it is dependent upon. Should we yield to this temptation?Scotus says no, and offers as a counter-example the relationbetween means and ends. 1 8 The end depends upon the means, yetit is the end that has primacy. Consequently the fact thatsomething is dependent does not imply that it does not haveprimacy over what it depends on.

Though Scotus does not spell it out, it is plain that he isbearing in mind the fact that though in one respect the end18 Oxon ., IV , q. ex lat. , n.18 , in Wad ding ed. vol XX I, p.155 .


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26 Alexander Broadiedepends upon the means, in two crucial respects the dependencyrelation goes in the opposite direction, (i) There is a dependencyof existence, for if the means were adopted solely in order toproduce the end aimed at, the means would not exist were it notfor the end. Thus the existence of the means depends upon theexistence of the end, and not vice versa, ( ii) There is adependency of value, for the value of the means depends upon thevalue of the end. Something in which we find no value becomesvested by us with value when we see in the thing the possibility ofusing it as a m eans to an end that we seek to realise.When Scotus discusses the primacy of will over intellect it isreally the primacy of value that he has in mind. We must not losesight of the Franciscan idea that love of God has greater valuethan has knowledge of Him. On this basis, the conclusion Scotusdraws, that will has primacy, is irresistible. To deprive Scotus ofthat conclusion would be to undermine his philosophy and tostrip him of his Franciscan inheritance. Without these two thingshe would be unrecognisable.


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3 0 Alexander Broadieconversion of the conclusion, we reach: 'An intellect is a will'.And yet this conclusion seems counter-intuitive. By means of ourpower of intellect and our power of will we perform acts ofunderstanding and of willing respectively. It might be said thatsince such acts are different in kind, the powers must be ofdifferent kinds also. Yet for Mair, this last move involves amisunderstanding of the metaphysical status of the powers inquestion, as I shall now attempt to show.It will be recalled that at the start of the quaestio underdiscussion Mair declares that 'the mind is its own principalpower'. What he means is that to have a mind is to be able toperform mental acts, an ability that is the 'principle power' of themind. There are different kinds of mental act, for example, actsof understanding, of willing and of remembering. To have anintellect is no more than to be able to understand things, to have awill is to be able to will things, and to have a memory is to beable to remember things. These three powers, intellect, will andmemory, are subordinate powers to the 'principal power', whichis the power to perform mental acts. But this latter power is itselfthe mind. We have here the basis of Mair 's exposition of thesense in which the mind has parts. To say the mind has severalparts is to say that there are several kinds of mental act. To saythat the parts are intellect and will and memory, is to say that wecan understand, and will, and remember.

Mair does not reject totally the use of the term 'parts' asapplied to the mind. But he does think that that use is seriouslymisleading, in that it is liable to suggest a metaphysic of mindwhich is simply false. In particular it is liable to suggest a modelof the mind as an extended substance, a substance which isdivisible into parts in the obvious way , that is, having parts whichare spatially separable from each other. And this is the wrongway to think of mind. The correct way is to think of it as ourability to perform mental acts of different sorts. For this reasonMair affirms that parts are ascribed to mind not properly[proprie ] but only by analogy [similitudinarie ].232 3 Two texts. First [2 Sent . 96ra] : 'nullas habet [sc. anima] partes propriedictas. ' Sec ond ly, 2 Sent. 97ra: in dealing with the argument: ' Intellect andwill are called parts of the mind. A part is not identical with the whole.Therefore neither intellect nor will is identical with the mind' , Mair argues as


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Th e scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Some basic them es 31In this this context Mair invokes the concept of extrinsicdenomination. That concept is deployed at crucial points in late-medieval philosophy. One point comes in respect of theascription of truth-value to a truth bearer. I t was commondoctrine that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-value;it was however added that judgments, that is, acts of assent anddissent, can also, and in a derivative way, be said to be truth-value bearers. Properly speaking it is the proposition, theimmediate object of a judgment, that is the bearer, but therelation between the judgment and the proposition is very close,and it is natural to think of an assent as true if the proposition towhich assent is given is true. No harm need arise from theadoption of this way of speaking so long as it is clear what thereal situation is. Philosophers marked that situation by saying thata ju d g m en t w as a t r u th - v a lu e b e a r e r by ' ex t r in s i cdenominat ion ' . 2 4We find that in discussions of another fundamental concept,

that of the unity of the mind, the concept of extrinsicdenomination is again deployed. In particular Mair affirms that itis only by such denomination that the mind can be said to haveparts. The class of mental acts has parts in the sense that itcontains subclasses. And by extrinsic denomination the mindinherits the 'partibility' of the class of mental acts, just asjudgments inher i t the t ru th-value and the complexi ty ofpropositions judged, and as outer acts inherit the freedom ofinner acts. Speaking of the parts of the mind, Mair says a greatdeal in a brief sentence: 'They are parts in an analogical sense,and in a certain way subjectively by extrinsic and accidentaldenominat ion . ' 2 5 Mair uses 'accidental' [= accidentali ] to expressfol lows: 'Respndete dis t inguendo quod sunt par tes animae. ( i ) Vel par tesessentiales vel integrales et sic negatur. Tales partes non habet anima sicutdicitur in De spiritu et anima cap. 8. Tota animae essent ia in suis potent i isconsisti t. Nec p er partes dividitur cum sit simplex et individua. E t si aliquandopartes habere dicatur ratione potius similitudinis quam veri tate composi t ionisintel l igendum est . Simplex substant ia est anima, ( i i ) Vel quod sunt par tessimilitudinarie e t quodammodo sub iec t ive denomina t ione ex t r nseca e taccidentali . Et sic conced o. '2 4 See e.g. Ge orge Lo kert , Scriptum in materia noticiarum (Paris 1514) sig. e8va.: 'Notit ia iudicativa dicitur vera vel falsa denominatione extrnseca quiarespond et proposit ioni verae vel falsae. '2 5 See sentence following (ii) in note 5 above.


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32 Alexander Broadiethe fact that the partibility of the mind is not an essential featureof it. And 'subjectively' [= subiective ] is used to express the factthat the division of the mind into parts is something done by usthinking subjects. It is our way of thinking about the mind, a waywhich is prompted by our recognition of the different classes ofmental act, and which in turn leads to our imposing upon themind the differentiation we find in the class of mental acts.The mental acts are also spoken of as ways in which the mindfunctions. Thus Mair writes: '"Intellect" connotes a power ofunderstanding. That is one function of the mind. "Will" has aanother connotation by which another function of the mind isconnoted. "Memory" signifies the mind being able to remember,and so on. The term "mind" does not have such a partialconnotation. And so, since these terms imply a part of thesignification of "mind" they are said to imply parts of themin d ' . 2 6 Since the signification of 'mind' has parts the significateof 'mind' is also said to have parts, but by extrinsicdenomination. Mair 's summary is unambiguous: 'In a familiarway of speaking, we say that will and intellect are differentpowers of the mind in virtue of its different functions and of thediversity of its acts'. 2 7

It should now be plain how Mair will deal with an obviousobjection to his thesis that will and intellect are each identicalwith, that is, are the same reality as, mind. The objection is in theform of an argument: 'Intellect and will are called parts of themind. But a part is not identical with the whole of which it is apart. Therefore intellect and will are not each identical withm i n d ' . 2 8 The reply is that mind is simple and indivisible andhence is not divisible into parts, taking 'parts' strictly. It is onlyif the term 'parts' is applied to mind by extrinsic denomination2 6 2 Sent. 97ra: ' Intellectus potentiam connotat ad intell igendum. Ecce unumofficium animae. Voluntas habet al iam connotat ionem in qua al iud animaeofficium conno tatur. M em oria significat animam potentem m em orari . Et sic dealiis. Term inus an ima non habet talem conno tationem partialem. Et sic quia istitermini important unam partem significationis animae dicuntur partes animaeimpor tare . '2 7 2 Sent . 97rb: 'E t in famato modo loquendi d ic imus volunta tem e tintel lectum esse varias animae potent ias propter diversa off icia et actuumdiversi tatem. '2 8 See note 5 above.


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The scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Some basic themes 35there is a distinction of sorts since the terms are non-synonymous. How, then, can there be both a distinction and alsonot a distinction between intellect and will? The obvious answeris that the terms are convertible because there is one principalpower we have, the power to perform mental acts, in virtue ofwhich we both will and understand. Will and intellect, as saidearlier, are really the same because both are really mind. Yetthey are mutually distinct because the act of willing is distinctfrom the act of understanding. Willing and understanding are thesame in so far as they are mental acts. But a mental act can take avariety of forms, and an act of understanding is a mental act ofone form while an act of willing is a mental act of a distinctform. A person's considering a plan of action is an act of oneform in relation to a given object, the plan; and his willing inaccordance with that plan is an act of a different form in relationto that same object. We must not think of this as a temporalsequence. The priority here is, as Mair would say, a priority ofnature rather than of time, for while the person is willing the actthe object is being grasped by the intellect. In this case the oneagent is simultaneously performing two formally distinct mentalacts directed to the same object. And though the distinction isformal, it is also, as Mair would admit, grounded in reality. Wehave not merely invented the distinction between willing andunderstanding. On the contrary the distinction is forced upon usby our experience of people's acts. In a way that it is thephilosopher's business to articulate, the distinction is more thanmerely logical while being less than a distinction betweendifferent beings.

Scotus of course uses the term 'formal' to qualify thedistinction at issue, and Mair affirms that he himself posits nosuch distinction as that posited by his fellow countryman. Yet wehave to be on our guard against representing a terminologicaldispute as one over a matter of substance. In the light of theforegoing discussion it seems to me that there is room to takeseriously the possibility that Mair position is a good deal closer toScotus's than Mair himself acknowledges. In particular it can beargued that the distinction classed by Scotus as distinctio formalisa parte rei is employed by Mair but is brought under the headingof 'rational' rather than 'formal'. Crucially the two men agree (i)that will and intellect are not really distinct, (ii) that willing and


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The scottish-spanish circle of John Mair. Some basic themes 37acts of will, and this is precisely the doctrine of intellectualdeterminism. In language strongly reminiscent of Scotus, Mairaffirms that, faced with two equal objects, the will is able toaccept one and reject the other; and indeed faced with a lessergood and a greater, it can accept the lesser and reject theg r e a t e r , 3 5 a fact to which experience test if ies , thoughintellectualists have a problem with it.Mair is nevertheless aware of the need to defend the thesis thatthe will is essentially free. To mention one argument, heconsiders the claim that the will can be overcome by temptation,the point being that if we give in to temptation then we actaccording to will but not freely. He writes: 'One might doubt thefreedom of the will. For it can be overcome by temptation. Thisis obvious. For it is more difficult for the will to will to suffermartyrdom, or to or to abandon the many goods of fortune andenter a religious order, than to will to become a prebend atGlasgow Cathedral. And if the will experiences difficulty inrespect of willing some objects then it is not free in respect of alli ts acts ' . 3 6 The point being made at the end of this quotation isevidently that if it does indeed experience difficulties then whilesome of them can be overcome others will no doubt prevail, andin those cases we act but not freely - the difficulties have won.Mair's immediate response to this is pure Scotus: 'A probableanswer to this difficulty is that the will is just as free when itperforms the elicited act of willing martyrdom as when it willsthe movement of a finger, notwithstanding any disposition wemay h ave that inclines us in the opposite dire ctio n'. 3 7

3 5 1 Sent . 25rb: 'Approximatis duobus obiect is aequal ibus voluntas potestpraeacceptare unum refutando aliud. Imrao oblatis maiori bono et minori bonopotest acceptare minus m aius respuendo. '3 6 1 Sent. 26rb: 'Secundo dubi tatur contra l iber tatem voluntat is . Ipsa enimpotest vinci a tentatione. Quod patet quia difficil ius est voluntati velie patimartyrium vel relinquere multa bona fortunae et intrare religionem quam veliecapere praebendam in ecclesia Glasguensi . Et s i voluntas potest diff icul tar ic i rca a l iquod obiec tum iam ipsa non es t l ibera respectu omnium ac tuums u o r u m . '3 7 Ibidem: 'Ad hanc difficultatem est unus modus dicendi probabilis scil icetquod voluntas est i ta l ibera respectu actuum el ici torum suorum respectumartyrii sicut movendi digitum non obstante quocunque habitu in oppositum.'


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38 Alexander BroadieThough Mair terms this a 'probable' answer, it is plainly theanswer that he accepts; that is , as Scotus also holds, at themoment of action the will can override even a very strongcounter-disposition. That is the nature of the will. As Mair putsthis crucially important point: 'The burden of the arguments onthis matter is to this effect: that granted a judgment of reason orany passion pointing in the opposite direction, the will is ablefreely to say "no" to them, not only in respect of the act itself butalso in respect of the degree of the act. For if a disposition or apassion can obstruct part of a degree thenthere could be a disposition so great that it will obstruct the act ofwill itself; and then the will will be in difficulty'. 38In the light of this teaching Mair declares the will to be queenin the realm of the mind. Though the intellect proposes, it is thewill that disposes. Mair is as fully committed as Scotus to thedoctrine of the primacy of the will.Having made his position plain in the first book of his

Commentary on the Sentences, Mair returns to the topic in thethird. In the course of a discussion on the question of which ofthe cardinal virtues is the most noble, he deals with the questionof the relation between intellect and will, for the cardinal virtuesare not all related in the same way to those two powers of themind. In particular he argues that the will is a nobler power thanthe intellect, and hence the virtues located in the will are noblerthan those located in the intellect. Why does he hold that the willis nobler? Among his arguments, already familiar to us from our

3 8 1 Sent. 26vb: 'Sed pondus argumentorum in hoc iacet quod stante iudiciorat ionis et quacunque passione ad opposi tum voluntas potest nol le l ibere nonm odo in actu sed in gradu actus quia si unus ha bitus vel passio potest imp edirepartem grad us dabitur habitus i ta magn us quod ille actum voluntatis imp ediet etsic i terum voluntas difficultabitur. ' The point that Mair is making in thisdifficult passa ge is the follow ing: if a we ak disposition is able to encro ach upo nthe freedom of the wil l , thereby diminishing i ts f reedom, then a s t rongerdisposi t ion wil l diminish i ts f reedom even more, and perhaps a very s t rongdisposition will destroy it entirely. But in the opinion of Mair, as of Scotus, nodisposition is so strong that it can annihilate the freedom of the will. Thereforewe must reject our initial assumption, viz. that a weak disposition can encroachupon that freedom . In short , our will is exactly as free in the face of a verystrong disposit ion as of a very weak one.


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The scottish-spanish circle of John Mair. Some basic themes 39consideration of Scotus, are (1) will, unlike intellect, commandsother powers, and (2) will, unlike intellect, is free. 3 9Of course, he has to take note of his doctrine that it is one andthe same thing, viz. mind, that is both intellect and will. Each isidentical to mind and therefore each is identical to the other.Hence neither is nobler than the other, for nothing can be morenoble than itself.40 We should by now be able to anticipate hisreply. Speaking of the two powers, will and intellect, which headmits he has been speaking about as if they were a plurality ofpowers [loquendo ut plures ], he writes: 'I posit no real or formaldistinction in the way that some do between these two powers.They are one and the same thing, something which has variousnames on account of its various functions, like [one person who isboth] k ing of the French and the leader of Br i ta in .Notwithstanding this, the acts inhering in these powers arespecifically distinct on account of the distinction between thesep o w e r s ' . 4 1 In saying this, Mair proclaims a large distinctionbetween himself and Scotus. On this matter Scotus's influenceconsists not in persuading Mair that he, Scotus, is right, but inpresent ing a s t rongly argued doctr ine wi th which Mairrecognises that he has to deal, even if his dealing with it takes theform of a head-on attack.

3 9 3 Sent. (Par i s , 1517) 103va: 'Voluntas es t nobi l ior potent ia quamintelle ctus . Pro ba tur. ...aliis pote ntiis im pera t et est libera. N on sic intellectus .Igitur. ' And elsewhere also he affirms very plainly the liberty of the will in itsrelation to the intellect . See e,g, 3 Sent . 114rb: 'Dico enim dato quodintellectus habeat m aiorem et mino rem d ispositas in prima figura cui actuali terassentit ut omn e dulce est gustan dum et mel est dulce voluntas ex l ibrtate suapotest nolle gustare mel. Nu llum iudicium intellectus universale vel p articularencessi tt voluntatem ad vel le vel nol le . Immo quocunque iudicio intel lectusstante voluntas est libera librtate contradictionis et libertatis.'4 0 3 Sent. 103vb: 'Eadem res est intellectus et voluntas ut in 2 Sent, distinctio16 dictum est. Ergo intellectus non est perfectior volntate. Consequentia tenet.Nihil est perfectius vel imperfectius se.'4 1 3 Sent. 104ra: 'Nullam distinctionem realem vel formalem more aliquoruminter haec duo [sc. intellectum et voluntatem] pono sed una et eadem res sunt.Et propter varia officia habet varia nomina ut rex Francorum et dux Britanniaenon obs tante ac tus h i s potent i i s inhaerentes spec ie d i s t inguuntur a t a l idistinctione potentiarum.'


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IV. FAITH AND LOGIC

As we have observed, Scotus contrasted the formalities of willand intellect in respect of the different kinds of causalityassociated with them, will producing its effects by free causalityand intellect by natural causality. But despite his emphasis on thiscontrast between the two powers, he did not lose sight of the fact,basic to his philosophy of mind, that they are identical with eachother; they are one reality, a mind. We are, therefore, in virtueof the one power, the mind, able to relate to the world both asagents and as spectators. As spectators we seek to understand ourworld, and as agents we seek to change it. And we make thechanges in the light of the deliverances of our intellect. The twoformalities of the mind are therefore in alliance, and they cannotbe otherwise, given the underlying metaphysical reality - which,as we have seen, is not to say that a person cannot will a crazy acteven while recognising its craziness. There are, indeed, severalareas, of great interest to philosophy, where a unity of theseopposite formalities is manifest. One such area is faith, and inthis chapter I shall explore faith from this point of view. Certainof the teachings of John Mair and his Scottish colleagues will bemy guide. The writings on this topic by the Spanish members ofMair's circle repay close examination, and will form the subjectof a separate study.

Let us approach the topic of faith by way of a consideration ofnatural causality. As regards dead matter its acts are entirelydetermined by natural law. A heavy body falls by an innerprinciple of action, called gravity, and fire rises by an innerprinciple of action, levity. Heavy bodies and light ones cannot doanything about it. Living things likewise have a nature in thesense of an inner principle of action. A plant draws up nutritionfrom the soil, its leaves turn to face and follow the sun, and itbears fruit in due season, all by natural law. Human beings quabodies are as bound by natural law as are plants and lifelessthings. If we trip we fall, if we eat wholesome food we arenourished, by a natural causality.


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Th e scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Some basic them es 41The modal category under which these acts occur is that ofnecessity. Mair's colleague in Paris, Gilbert Crab, identifies therelevant modality very plainly when he defines 'natural act' thus:'When everything required for its production is posited, it isproduced by a necessity of nature'. 4 2 That this modality applies toour acts prompts an obvious question in view of the fact that wehave minds as well as bodies: does the necessity of nature governour mental acts no less than our physical ones? The questioncannot be avoided since an act of faith, considered as a particularkind of assent, is a mental act. Now there are some mental actswhich are dependent upon the well functioning of our physicalorgans, and such acts are, indisputably necessary. Crab's owne x a m p l e 4 3 is that of seeing; I open my well functioning eyes andby a natural necessity I see what is before me. But using our eyesand ears, and having visual and auditory experiences is one thing;and judging, that is , assenting to or dissenting from aproposition, is another thing. Are such acts also governed bynatural necessity? It was precisely in the context of this question

that faith, considered as a kind of assent, was discussed in the lateM iddle Ages.There are two main sorts of assent. Any assent is either evidentor inevident. Several subordinate sorts of assent fall under thesecond heading, but let us attend first to the evident sort. Mairdefines 'evident assent' in this way: 'It is an assent which is true,unhesitant, caused by principles which necessitate the intellect,

and in thus assenting the intellect cannot be deceived'. 4 4 DavidCranston offers a definition which is verbally different eventhough it may prove to be substantially the same: 'Evident assentis assent which is true, naturally caused, and unhesitant, whetheror not the intellect, in thus assenting, can be deceived'. 4 5 It is4 2 Tractatus terminorum moralium (Paris, 1514) sig. b 3r: 'Actus naturalis estactus qui positis omnibus requisitis ad eius productionem necessario necessitatenaturae prod uci tur.'4 3 Ibidem : Visio est actus naturalis respectu potentiae visivae.'4 4 1 Sent. fol . 6va: 'Est assensus verus sine formidine a principiis intellectumnecessitantibus causatus quo non est possibile intellectum assentire et in sicassent iendo decipi . '4 5 Tractatus noticiarum (Paris , 1517) s ig. c 2va: 'Assensus evidens estassensus verus natural i ter causatus s ine formidine s ive in s ic assent iendointellectus potest decipi sive non.'


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Th e scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Some basic them es 45successfully to resist even God if He seeks to arrange for me tobe deceived when I give assent to propositions such as 'I exist'and 'A whole is greater than any one of its parts'. Do what Hemay, He cannot succeed in getting me to assent falsely to suchpropositions. On the other hand, I have no power in one respectfor, on grasping the sense of such propositions as the two justcited, I am totally powerless to resist the determination of myintellect to give assent to them. I can no more prevent myintellect assenting than God can prevent me assenting truly whenI do assent. If God is to prevent me assenting to suchpropositions, His only way is to prevent me grasping the sense ofthe propositions. And that, of course, is easily enough done; Hehas merely to divert my attention so that I am not thinking thepropositions. While I am not thinking them, I cannot be givingactual, as opposed to habitual, assent to them. However, in thatrespect I also can prevent myself assenting to a proposition bydiverting my attention so that I am not thinking the propositionin question. I can do this by a simple act of will, and do not needto invoke God's will to explain how such a thing is possible.In this restricted sense, it is subject to my will whether I giveassent to a proposition that I see to be necessary. If I do giveassent, it will be unhesitant assent. But it is important to be clearhow I manage it. I do so by willing to think, or not to think, theproposition. If I think it, then the assent is unhesitant, and itsbeing unhesitant is not a product of a separate act of will fromthe act of will by which I will to think the proposition. This lastpoint prompts a question: can I will to assent unhesitantly to aproposition to which I already assent? I am not here askingwhether assent can be subject to will, but instead whether thepsychological modality of unhesitancy can, by an act of will,modify the act of assenting. Let us think here not in nominalterms but in adverbial ones, not in terms of the unhesitancy of anact, but in terms of acting unhesitantly. There is our assent, andthere is the way we assent. My question is whether the adverbialmodification of the act of assenting, the modification that ismarked by the adverb 'unhesitantly', is subject to voluntarycontrol. All the members of Mair 's circle who wrote on thistopic answered in the affirmative. I should like now to explorethis matter. To do so is to investigate the concept of faith.


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46 Alexander BroadieMair opens his Com mentary on the Sentences of PeterLombard with a brief discussion of faith, and takes as his prooftext 'He who does not believe will be condemned' {Mark 16, 16].Mair makes two comments upon this verse: 'Since God obliges usto believe and does not oblige us to do what it is beyond ourpowers to do, believing and not believing will both be free' and'Nothing is a precept unless the wil l cooperates in i tsimplemen ta t ion ' .5 1 Believing is a kind of assent, and hence thereis a kind of assent that is subject to voluntary control. It wasappropriate for Mair to state this position, for the OxfordDominican, Robert Holkot, had presented the view that faith isproduced purely naturally without the cooperation of the will.The opposite to the position Holkot presents is that an assent offaith is solely a product of free causality.Though rejecting Holkot's doctrine, Mair and his colleaguesdid not accept the opposite doctrine either. Instead they adoptedan intermediate position according to which an assent of faith is

produced partly by natural causality and partly by free causality.Lokert refers with approval to the 'more common opinion of thedoctors', which is this: 'An assent of faith is caused (1) by aprobable motive, that is, by an assent to an inference and also tothe antecedent in the inference or to its premisses at least one ofwhich is opinative, and (2) by an act of will by which someonewills that things be [as stated in the conclusion of the inference]or wills to adhere firmly to the proposition and wills not to seekreasons for holding the opposite'. 5 2The teaching of Juan de Celaya accords well with that of Mairand Lokert. Celaya writes: 'As regards the production of an actof faith there are three opinions. The first is the opinion ofWilliam Ockham, who holds that an act of faith is caused solelyby a command of the will. The second opinion is that of Robert5 1

1 Sent. fol . lvb: 'Cum Deus obliget nos ad credendum et non obliget nos adi l l ud quod t r anscend i t v i r e s nos t r a s l i be rum e r i t c r ede re e t noncredere . . .Nul lum enim es t praeceptum nis i ad e ius imple t ionem concurra tvo lun tas . '5 2 Not. sig. f 5ra-rb: 'Communior / opinio inter doctores dicit assensum fideicausari a m otivo probabili hoc est ab assensu con sequen tiae et antecedentis autpraem issarum opinativis vel quoru m unus est opinativus et actus voluntatis q uoaliquis vult i ta esse vel firmiter adhaerere tali proposit ioni et non quaerererat iones ad opposi tum. '


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Th e scottish-spanish circle of John M air. Som e basic themes 49doctrine that the intellect plays a role in assents of faith in virtueof the fact that such assents are based upon an inference, and toinfer is an act of intellect, not of will. Included in the inferenceof faith there is, as we have seen, a conclusion which is judged tobe probable on the basis of the premiss. It follows from thatdoctrine that every act of faith is in part a rational act. In thatsense, there is no such thing as 'blind faith', that is, faithunsupported by a probable argument. Any assent of faith issupported by an argument sufficient to support an opinion by theperson who gives the assent of faith. Once he has the opinion, thewill is then exercised, in an act of pia affectio , to replace thehesitation logically associated w ith opinion.

We are dealing here with a logical point about faith. Let us suppose that w e can , by an act of will, give unhesitant assent to a proposition which is unsupported by a probable argument. Lokertwould say that in such a case the assent is not an assent of faith,however strongly willed, and even if the proposition is a true oneconcerning God or the mysteries of the Church. The opposite tothe kind of assent just described is evident assent. If a personassents to the proposition that God exists, and does so because heaccepts as valid a demonstration of the proposition, then he doesnot have faith in the existence of God. There is no room forfaith; the will has been overwhelmed by the intellect. Evidentassent and faith, therefore, are mutually incompatible acts inrelation to the same proposition, because it is impossible to givefirm assent to a proposition both by purely natural causation (aswith evident assent) and also by free causation (as with faith).

While the account of faith given above may seem to imply thatfaith is not irrational, for it is produced partly by a probableargument, there might also seem to be a serious element ofirrationality in faith, for Lokert speaks of the person with faith,the fide lis , as 'willing not to seek reasons for holding theopposite'. Does this not imply a closed mind? I think that theanswer is 'no', for there is a difference between going in searchof reasons, and recognising them for what they are if they arethrust upon you. The person of faith does not go searching forreasons for holding the opposite. Why should he? He holdsfirmly to the truth of the proposition he accepts on faith. Since hethinks the proposition true, why waste time by looking for


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50 Alexander Broadiereasons for thinking it might be false? But of course if hehappens to notice a reason for thinking it might be false, then thatis another matter. He has to take the argument seriously, andestablish whether the proposition that he has accepted on faith canin fact be squared with the new facts that have come to hisattention. I think that Lokert means nothing more than this; andif my interpretation is correct, then he says nothing that impliesthat the person of faith has a closed mind.Granted the possibility of a person ceasing to have faithbecause he comes to see the strength of an argument against theproposition in which he has faith, it follows that there is roomfor a concept of degrees of faith, based upon the degree ofprobability an argument must be judged to have before theperson's faith is shaken by that argument. This point is basedupon the fact that logically we cannot have faith in a propositionunless we have sufficient evidence to be able to give opinativeassent to it. It follows that if we find evidence which underminesour ability to give even that opinative assent, then that evidencewill also undermine our ability to give an assent of faith. Thereare no clear rules for determining when, in the interests ofrationality, an opinion (in the technical sense of the word) has tobe abandoned, though we can all recognise when the evidenceagainst a proposition is so strong as compared with evidence inits favour, that to give assent is to be guilty of the intellectualvice of credulity - you say 'yes' too easily; just as we can allrecognise when the evidence in favour of a proposition is sostrong as compared with the evidence against it, that not to giveassent to it is to be guilty of the intellectual vice of incredulity -you say 'no' too easily.

I think that it is with considerations such as these in mind thatMair presents the concept of degrees of faith. In his Commentaryon the Sentences he asks whether faith can be intensified, likelove [caritas ], and whether it can be weakened, 5 7 and replies: 'Asregards acquired faith [as opposed to infused faith] there is nodoubt but that it can be intensified and weakened both as regardsan act of faith and as regards the disposition [habitus ] of faith'. 5 85 7 1 Sent. fol. 4ra: 'an fides intendatur sicut caritas. '5 8 1 Sent. fol . 4rb: 'de fide acquisita non est dubium quin i l ia intendatur etremittatur tam quoad actum q uam q uoad habitum.'


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5 2 Alexander Broadiewhat was not an assent of faith (for it was merely an opinativeassent) becomes an assent of faith. And secondly, it is through theact of will that the assent of faith acquires its merit. No act, suchas an opinative assent, produced by purely natural means ismeritor ious.But despite these considerations, Mair does not locate faith inthe will. On the contrary, in the course of his discussion of thethree virtues of faith, hope and love (or charity = caritas ), helocates hope and love in the will and faith in the intellect. 6 0 Thisis of particular interest to Mair at that point in his discussion, forhe wishes to argue that since love is nobler than faith, it followsthat will is nobler than intellect - a line of argument reminiscentof Scotus's argument that since it is a better thing to love Godthan to know Him, and since love is located in the will andknowledge in the intellect, will has primacy over intellect. Thepoint of immediate concern for us is the particular associationclaimed between intellect and faith. Why is faith not locatedfirmly in the will, given the role of the will in transforminghesitant assent into unhesitant? I think that the answer relates tothe contrast between the basis of faith on the one hand and hopeand love on the other. Faith is a form of assent, and assent is anact of intellect. And here we need to remind ourselves thatthough the assent of faith cannot be made without an act of will,nevertheless in so far as it is an assent at all, it owes its existenceto our acceptance of a probable argument - and that acceptance isby natural causality. Thus the will produces not the assent but thepsychological mode of the assent, viz. the unhesitant way inwhich we make it. By contrast, neither hope nor love is a formof assent, and therefore the latter two virtues do not stand in thesame relation to the intellect as does faith, and the difference, aswe have seen, is sufficient to persuade Mair not to locate hopeand love in the intellect. He is therefore able to develop theargument we have noted: love is nobler, and love is in the will,therefore the will is nobler. And Mair is able to square his claimthat (i) intellect and will are really and (pace Scotus) formallyidentical, with the thoroughly Scotist doctrine that (ii) the willhas primacy.

6 0 3 Sent. fol. 103va: '[voluntas] recipit caritatem et spem et intellectus fidem.'


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I . EL CRCULO fflSPANO-ESCOCS DE JOHN MAIR

Durante las pr imeras dcadas del s iglo XVI f i lsofosprocedentes de Escocia y de Espaa colaboraron estrechamenteen la Universidad de Pars 1. Cooperaron de diversos modos, porejemplo, como miembros de un grupo que preparaba nuevasediciones crticas de las obras de maestros anteriores comoToms de Aquino, Juan Duns Escoto y Andrs de Novocastro. Enun caso importante su cooperacin tom la forma de la autoraconjunta de un manual de lgica sobre el tema de las inferencias,y en varias ocasiones tom la forma de ayuda mutua en la importante tarea de preparar los ndices de sus propias obras. No setrataba de una ayuda prestada de manera fortuita o casual; alcontrario, se basaba en un cuidadosamente pensado y sistemticamente aplicado principio de cooperacin. La mente directoratras esta cooperacin era John Mair 2 ( 'Johannes Maior', paradarle el nombre latino que adopt), un escocs que pas ms detreinta aos en la Universidad de Pars, donde desempe un papel clave en la comunidad acadmica como centro de un crculode distinguidos escolares, en especial procedentes de Escocia yEspaa. La historia del crculo de John Mair debera ocupar unlugar destacado en cualquier informe suficiente sobre las relaciones filosficas entre Escocia y Espaa 3. El presente trabajo noofrece tal informe, pero s aportar materiales perfectamenteaplicables a l. Voy a centrarme en varios temas relacionados quecaptaron la atencin de los filsofos en cuestin, y discutir esos1 Para detalles biogrficos vase H. Elie, "Quelques matres de l 'Universit deParis vers l'an 1500", Arch ives d'histoire doc trinale et littraire du moyen ge,25-6 (1950-1), 193-243; A. Broadie, George Lokert: Late-Scholastic Logician,Edinburgh (1983) , cap. l .2 Vase R. Garca Villoslada, La Universidad de Paris durante los estudios deFrancisco de Vitoria O.P. (1507-1522), Rom a (1938), 127-164; J . Du rkan y J .Kirk, The University of Glasgow 1451-1577, Glasgow: (1977), cap.9.3 Para la contribucin de los escoceses a la lgica vase A. B roadie, The Circleof John Mair: Logic and Logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland, Oxford(1985), y para el puesto de Mair y los miembros escoceses de su crculo en lahistoria de la filosofa en Escocia, va se A. Bro adie , The Tradition of ScottishPhilosophy, Edinburgh (1990) .


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El crculo hispano-escocs de John Mair. Algunos temas bsicos 55miembros se encontraban muchos de los escoceses y espaolesque iban a destacar en su crculo. Consigui su doctorado en teologa en 1506 junto a Josse Clichtove y con Jean de Fenario, quems tarde fue Maestro General de la Orden de Predicadores;Fenario iba a convertirse andando el tiempo en uno de los maestros de Francisco de Vitoria en Pars. Clichtove hablara mstarde de Mair como 'un distinguido telogo y un doctor con unbri l lante nombre en Pars ' 6 . La descripcin de Clichtove eraadecuada incluso en el momento de su doctorado, porque en 1506ya haba publicado ms de quince libros, algunos de ellos muysustanciosos, y haba comenzado a ganarse una reputacin enPars como un destacado profesor.

Mair regres a Escocia en 1518 para convertirse en rector dela Universidad de Glasgow, y en 1523 se traslad durante tresaos a la Universidad de St Andrews, donde trabaj con otro lgico escocs procedente de Pars, George Lokert, quien poco antes haba sido nombrado rector de St Andrews. Mair volvi aPars en 1526, pero para 1531 haba retornado a Escocia, estavez definitivamente. Ocup el cargo de preboste en la Colegiatade St Salvator, un colegio perteneciente a la Universidad de StAndrews, y muri a la edad de ochenta y tres aos aproximadamente, siendo an preboste. Durante su perodo al frente de StSalvator fue el maestro de teologa de John Knox, cabeza de laReforma en Escocia. John Knox describi a Mair como un hombre 'cuya palabra se tena entonces como un orculo en materiasde religin'. Pero, aunque admiraba profundamente a su maestro,haba sin embargo diferencias fundamentales entre ambos. JohnKnox trabaj con empeo para desterrar de Escocia la fe por lacual Mair vivi y a cuyo mantenimiento y defensa dedic su vida.

La historia subsiguiente de las obras de Mair es a primera vistasorprendente, pero el conocimiento del contexto escocs en el quetrabaj en sus ltimos das junto al conocimiento de la compaaelegida en Pars harn mucho menos sorprendentes los sucesosposteriores. En Escocia sus escritos lgicos y todava ms sus escritos teolgicos dejaron de tener autoridad, a medida que lasideas debidas ms bien a Lutero y Calvino (que deba de haberescuchado las clases de Mair en Pars) fueron dominando la vida6 Citado po r Vil loslada ibid. p.137: " insignem theologum et celeberr imi apudParis ios nominis doctorem".


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II. LA HERENCIA ESCOTISTA

La doctrina de la primaca de la voluntad tiene una gran importancia en la historia de la filosofa occidental debido a su estrecha relacin con la disputa entre nominalistas y realistas, ladisputa que, por encima de cualquier otra, domin el debate filosfico y teolgico en la Edad Media, y quizs la disputa quetambin en nuestra poca domina en dichos campos. Se puede calificar a los filsofos como voluntaristas o intelectualistas, siendolos primeros aquellos que aceptan la doctrina de la primaca de lavoluntad, y los segundos aquellos que aceptan su principal rival,la doctrina de la primaca del intelecto. Podemos ver cmo ellazo entre voluntarismo e intelectualismo por una parte y nominalismo y realismo por otra, aparece prcticamente en todas lascuestiones filosficas de importancia.

Consideremos, por ejemplo, la principal cuestin metafsica dela axiologa: cul es el modo de existencia de los valores? Alresponder, un voluntarista testa se centra en el papel de la voluntad. Sostiene que la bondad o maldad de un acto depende de laVoluntad divina. Segn su opinin, Dios no est obligado a ordenar actos de un tipo determinado porque reconoce que tales actosson buenos; ms bien es su mandato de que realicemos tales actoslo que los hace buenos. La bondad existe por el fiat divino. Unahabitual versin no testa de esta teora es que los seres humanoscreamos nuestros valores por un acto de eleccin. Podramospensar que simplemente nos encontramos con valores cuya existencia no depende en lo ms mnimo de nosotros. Pero esto es unerror; esos valores, contra toda apariencia, no existen independientemente de nuestras voluntades.Las teoras de este tipo son esencialmente nominalistas.Sostienen que algo que parece tener una realidad independiente,

es decir, independiente de nuestra mente, en realidad depende denuestra mente. En tales casos, nuestro conocimiento de los valores no procede simplemente de un acto del intelecto, sino de unacto de la voluntad. Es ante todo en cuanto agentes, y no simplemente en cuanto espectadores, como los conocemos. Aqu podemos ver un claro nexo entre voluntarismo y nominalismo.


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60 Alexander BroadiePor otra parte, un realista respecto al valor sostiene que losvalores existen de un modo relativamente independiente, y enparticular que no son productos de ningn acto voluntario. Por lotanto, no tenemos conocimiento de ellos como agentes. Sin embargo, son objetos del intelecto y en consecuencia tenemos conocimiento de ellos como espectadores. En este sentido, los realistasrespecto al valor son intelectualistas y no voluntaristas respecto asu doctrina acerca del modo de existencia de los valores. Suelesostenerse que Escoto era un voluntarista extremo respecto a sudoctrina de los valores. Ms tarde indicar las razones para dudarde esta opinin comn sobre l.Tomando un nuevo ejemplo, relativo a un tema, los universales, acerca del cual Escoto presenta un caracterstico y famosoplanteamiento, el voluntarista sostiene que los universales no soncosas con existencia completamente independiente de nosotros.Sostiene que son entidades mentales, conceptos formados en y pornuestro intelecto que nos permiten clasificar los contenidos de

nuestro mundo. En resumen, los universales son principios declasificacin. En muchos casos son adoptados por un acto de lavoluntad, pero incluso entonces no dejan por ello de ser universales. Como objetos de la voluntad, no tienen una existencia independiente de nosotros mismos, que estamos relacionados con elloscomo el agente con el objeto. Por lo tanto, el voluntarista tiende aser nominalista respecto a los universales. En contraste, el realista mantiene que los universales tienen una existencia relativamente independiente, pues son capaces de existir sin nuestros actos mentales en general y sin nuestros actos voluntarios en particular. Puesto que existen de este modo, los universales son posibles objetos del intelecto, aunque no objetos de nuestra voluntad.En consecuencia, el realista es intelectualista, y no voluntarista,respecto a los universales.

Podran tomarse ejemplos de otras reas de la filosofa. Perobasta lo dicho para indicar los fundamentos de la afirmacin deque la disputa entre voluntaristas e intelectualistas, entre aquellosque asignan primaca a la voluntad y aquellos que la asignan alintelecto, est muy relacionada con la disputa entre nominalistas yrealistas. Sobre esta base debe concluirse que la disputa acerca dequ facultad del alma tiene la primaca es de enorme importancia.De acuerdo con su habitual reputacin, Toms de Aquino es con-


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El crculo hispano-escocs de John Mair. Algunos temas bsicos 61siderado el intelectualista por excelencia y Duns Escoto el volun-tarista por excelencia 8. En la medida en que estas reputacionesson merecidas, la disputa entre Aquino y Escoto est por lo tantocargada de una significacin universal. Sin embargo, como indicar ms adelante, la distancia filosfica entre ambos hombresquiz no sea tan grande como algunos han pensado. Este puntodebe tenerse en cuenta al valorar la posicin de John Mair en elespectro realista-nominalista, porque su habitual situacin en ellado nominalista, y en el lado nominalista extremo, es casi seguroalgo exagerado.Por supuesto, hay en este asunto posiciones intermedias. Tantoconceptual como histricamente, el voluntarismo se superpone alin te lec tual ismo. Y Escoto , l lamado con propiedad DoctorSubtilis, ocupa una parte tan desdibujada en el espectro que nopuede afirmarse con seguridad que est ms en un lado que en elotro. Escoto es sin duda un cierto voluntarista, pero no era extremista y en particular la exposicin moderna habitual de suvoluntarismo no tiene suficientemente en cuenta algunas de susafirmaciones clave. En consecuencia, tal exposicin subestima engran medida el papel que asigna al intelecto en la direccin de lavoluntad 9.

Pero cul es la relacin entre voluntad e intelecto? Decir queuna facultad tiene primaca sobre la otra implica ciertamente ungrado de distincin, pero precisamente esta distincin es lo queEnrique de Gante, en la interpretacin que Escoto hace de l,niega. Tal como Escoto ve el asunto 1 0, Enrique identifica entre s8 Un rival de Escoto para el t tulo de "voluntarista par excellence" es Kant .Resp ecto a su contribucin a este debate, vase en especial: Crtica de la RaznPrctica I, lib. 2, cap .3 , sec. 3, y L.W. Beck, A Comm entary on Kant'sCritique of Practical Reason, London 1960, pp. 249 -50.9 Para una inestimable seleccin de escritos de Escoto sobre el tema que tratoen este cap tulo, vase Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, se lecc in,traduccin e introduccin de Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., Catholic University ofAmerica Press , Washington D.C. , 1986. Para una val iosa y amplia discusin,ver B .M. Bonansea "Duns Scotus ' s voluntar i sm", en J .K. Ryan y B.M.Bonansea ( eds . ) , John Duns Scotus 1265-1965, Cathol ic Univers i ty ofAmerica Press , 1965. Vase tambin "Phi losophy of mind in the thir teenthcentury" en Anthony Kenny, The Heritage of Wisdom : Essays in the Historyof Philosophy, Oxford 1987, pp. 52-67.1 0 Un texto clave es Oxon. II , d.16, q.un. en Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. L.Wadding, ( segunda ed . Par i s 1891-5, 26 vols . ) vol .XII I , pp .23a-59b. Al l


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62 Alexander Broadievoluntad e intelecto, y ambas con el alma. Esta postura tiene paranosotros un inters histrico, adems de filosfico, porque haypruebas, que examinaremos ms adelante, de que en este temaconcreto Mair estaba del lado de Enrique y contra Escoto. Laidentificacin de las dos facultades entre s y con el alma vieneexigida por la intuicin metafsica de que el alma tiene una unidad especial, una unidad tan grande que es imposible que unaparte del alma sea realmente distinta de cualquier otra parte.Podemos decir que el alma acta de diferentes modos, porquequerer y entender son diferentes tipos de acto, pero es un nicoprincipio de accin que realiza estos tipos diferentes de acto.A q u i n o 1 1 , por el contrario, sostiene que la voluntad y el intelecto tienen un tipo de ser distinto al del alma, porque el alma esuna sustancia y su voluntad y su intelecto son ambos accidentes. Yadems, la voluntad y el intelecto son distintos entre s, son diferentes accidentes de la nica alma.Escoto reconoce las virtudes de cada una de estas dos posturasopuestas. Est de acuerdo con la intuicin de Enrique de la especial unidad del alma, y tambin con la doctrina de Aquino de queactos tan diferentes entre s como el querer y el entender deberadscribirse a distintos principios de accin. La tctica de Escotoes buscar una via media entre estos dos extremos, y lo lleva acabo desarrollando un concepto, ya usado por otros pensadores,pero que l adapt de una manera particular, el concepto de ladistincin formal objetiva (distinctio formalis a parte re).Sostiene que voluntad e intelecto estn ligados en una unin quees absoluta en el sentido de que ni siquiera Dios podra destruiruno de ellos en un alma humana preservando el otro. Pero en esecaso no son seres realmente distintos. Y sin embargo son distinguibles por el intelecto, porque es posible para uno actuar independientemente del otro. Por ejemplo, la experiencia nos enseaque la voluntad puede rechazar una propuesta del intelecto. Eldiscute Escoto varias posturas opuestas , incluidas las de Enrique de Gante yToms de Aquino.1 1 Vase arr iba, nota 3. La exposicin de Escoto de la postura de Toms deAquino es la s iguiente: "Hie est unus modus dicendi quod intel lectus etvolun tas sunt du ae potentiae realiter distinctae inter se, et ab essentia anim ae (dememoria non loquor) ; passiones enim animae sunt i l lae duae potent iae, e tproprietates, et accidentia fluentia ab ipsa; accidens autem reali ter differt asubstant ia" . Vase Wadding ed. vol .XIII , p.24.


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70 Alexander Broadietorios. Y en todo su pensamiento Escoto nunca pierde de vista losclaros mensajes de la experiencia.Las respuestas de Escoto a estas preguntas deben considerarse ala luz del despliegue de su distincin formal objetiva, en particular en la doctrina de que la voluntad y el intelecto en cada almahumana son realmente lo mismo y formalmente distintos; son lomismo sub ratione entis, y son dos sub ratione formalitatis. L avoluntad nunca puede separarse del intelecto lo bastante comopara poder ignorar sus instrucciones. Sin embargo, ambas facultades no son idnticas, al menos no formalmente idnticas, y es elhecho de que la voluntad es formalmente distinta del intelecto loque da a la voluntad libertad de maniobra.Ahora vemos cmo Escoto puede evitar tanto el problemaprincipal del voluntarismo extremo, es decir, que esta doctrinaimplica el carcter aleatorio de nuestros actos libres, como elproblema principal del intelectualismo extremo, es decir , queimplica el determinismo intelectual. Escoto utiliza su distincinformal objetiva para decir que nuestros actos no son ni aleatoriosni intelectualmente determinados, porque la identidad real de lasdos facultades evita que nuestros actos libres sean aleatorios, y ladistincin formal de las facultades asegura que nuestros actos libres no estn completamente determinados por el in telecto .Repitiendo una frase anterior: el intelecto propone, pero la voluntad dispone. La ltima palabra corresponde a la voluntad, y lavoluntad no es esclava del intelecto, aunque est obligada a escucharlo. Que la voz del intelecto nunca puede ser sin ms ignoradaest implcito en la afirmacin de Escoto: "Es difcil para la voluntad no inclinarse hacia el juicio final de la razn prctica, perono es imposib le" 1 7. Esta postura est claramente lejos del voluntarismo extremo, que niega que el intelecto jueg ue algn papel enel dar forma a nuestras voliciones. Si Escoto est en lo cierto, elintelecto apenas podra jugar un papel ms importante, siendocompatible con el rechazo del determinismo intelectual.1 7 "Diff ici le est voluntatem non incl inan ad id quod est dictatum a rat ionepract ica ul t imat im, non tamen est impossibi le ." Rep. Par., II , d.39, q.2, n.5,en la edic in de Wadding, vol . XXIII , p .205a . Aqu Escoto cont ras ta lavoluntad l ibre con la razn prct ica. El pasaje ci tado est precedido por laasercin: "intellectus practicus est , qui necessario assentii agibl ibus, voluntasautem libere."


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El crculo hispano-escocs de John Mair. Algunos temas bsicos 71Al comienzo de este captulo haca referencia a la estrecha relacin entre voluntarismo y nominalismo, por una parte, y susopuestos, intelectualismo y realismo, por otra, y destacaba el hecho de que durante mucho tiempo se ha considerado a Escotocomo voluntarista y realista a un tiempo. Podra parecer que siesta fama est justificada, entonces hay una grave tensin en susistema. Ahora estamos a mitad de camino en la respuesta a estacrtica. Porque la discusin precedente prueba que el voluntarismo de Escoto es del tipo ms moderado, tan moderado que unintelectualista igualmente moderado estara lo bastante cercano al como para estrechar su mano. En otras palabras, Escoto tambin podra ser caracterizado como un intelectualista del tipo msmoderado, y en ese caso no debe desconcertarnos tanto el hechode que tambin sea un realista. Espero discutir en otro lugar queel realismo de Escoto es tan moderado como su voluntarismo, yque difcilmente podra ser ms moderado a este respecto sin sertambin un nominalista, aunque, por supuesto, un nominalista deltipo ms moderado.Sin embargo, aunque se conceda que Escoto podra ser descritocomo un intelectualista del tipo ms moderado, hay una raznpara describirlo como un voluntarista ms que como un intelectualista, y esa razn es el reconocimiento del hecho de que Escotoargumenta en favor de la primaca de la voluntad. Aqu es preciso sealar las poderosas corrientes teolgicas que circulan bajola filosofa de Escoto. El coloc el concepto de amor en el centro

de su sistema teolgico, y el concepto emerge debidamente en sumetafsica, epistemologa y tica. Y esto es realmente lo que deberamos esperar de un franciscano. Es tpico de los franciscanossuscribir la doctrina de la primaca del amor sobre el conocimiento. El amor es superior al conocimiento y, en especial, elamor a Dios es superior al conocimiento de El, hasta el punto deque si per impossibile tuviramos que elegir entre amar a Diossin conocerlo y conocerlo sin amarlo, deberamos elegir lo primero. Esto tiene consecuencias inmediatas en la doctrina de laprimaca de la voluntad, porque el amor se localiza en la voluntad y el conocimiento en el intelecto. Puesto que el amor tieneprimaca sobre el conocimiento, la voluntad debe tener primacasobre el intelecto. En resumen, si el acto ms elevado del quesomos capaces es un acto de voluntad, entonces la voluntad tienela primaca.


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78 Alexander Broadie"partibilidad" de la clase de los actos mentales, como los juiciosheredan el valor de verdad y la complejidad de las proposicionesjuzgadas, y como los actos exteriores here

the scottish-spanish circle of john mair. some basic themes

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