Meiji University

　

Title

The Scientific Negotiation Theory“HIerarchical

Conflict Analytic Theory（HICAT）”and its

Evaluation

Author(s) 熊田,聖

CitationThe Bulletin of the Institute of Social Sciences

Meiji University, 19(2): 1-20

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10291/17822

Rights

Issue Date 1996

Text version publisher

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

DOI

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/

Abstract

The nature of this paper is based on how inforrnation is handled by negotia-

tors. The setting is the introduction of new theories that will help better describe the nature of the negotiation process. In the study of negotiation

rnany factors are taken into consideration， but through the research presented in this paper it was found that one point has been overlooked. This point is

related as to how negotiators interpret the data presented to thern. The sirn幽

plification of this is based in the fact that negotiators actual1y use ordinal data rather than cardinal data. Based on this sirnple discovery this paper will reject

the Garne Theory that is the rnost cornrnonly used theory in the study of negoti-ation. Instead this paper will use conflict analysis and expand it by presenting

the Hierarchical Conflict Analytic Theory (HICAT) and the Hijiri Point.

Prior to the introduction of these theories， this paper will go through the steps of differentiating the Garne Theory frorn Conflict Analysis. The exarnina-

tion of the Garne Theory produced the conclusion that it is highly dependent on cardinal nurnbers. Yet， by actual exarnination of the negotiation process conducted by the negotiators it was found that ordinal nurnbers are rnostly

used for the evaluation of data. That is to say that in rnost negotiation cases the negotiator is prornpt to used ordinal nurnber inforrnation in the forrn of cornparisons to other objects. Thus， the paper rnoves to the conclusion that

Conflict Analysis is a better solution for the negotiation table due to is flexibili“

ty in using ordinal nurnbers.

Two problerns where to be found in this conclusion: (1) the problern of ac-curacy when using ordinal nurnbers， and (2) the rnultiple equilibrium strategies that are a byproduct of conflict analysis. To solve the品rstproblem a new theo-ry cornbining the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) Theory and the Conflict Analysis Theory was created and introduced as the Hierarchical Conflict Ana-lytic Theory (HICAT). The HICAT uses the AHP Theory to rnaintain the con-sistency in the ordinal nurnber choice made by negotiators and irnproves upon

the accuracy of order. As for the second problern this paper introduces the Hijiri Point in order to solve the byproduct of having multiple equilibriurn

strategies. The concept of the Hijiri point is that it integrates the notion of the most suitable utility into the selection process of the equi1ibrium strategy in the Conflict Analysis Theory.

Therefore， in the study presented in this paper the AHP Theory and the Conflict Analysis Theory are rnerged into the Scientific Negotiation Theory of

the Hierarchical Confiict Analytic Theory， hereby referred to as the HICAT. The basis of making reference to its being a Scientific Theory is due to the simu-lation study carried out in the form of a statistical study proving the effective-ness of the HICAT.

Key Words

• The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) ・TheConflict Analysis Theory ・TheHierarchical Conflict Analysis Theory (HICAT) ・TheHijiri Point.

Opening Remarks

Chapter 2，4， 5， and 6 are the revised and brief versions of my dissertation presented to the Division of Public Administration at the Graduate School Pro-

gram in the International Christian University， for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1996. The original version included the detailed descriptions are in J apanese.

Chapter 3 is the revised and enlarged version of my dissertation and my

report submitted to the proceedings of the 9th Congress of the J apan Institute of Negotiation， 1996， Sapporo， Japan.

CONTENTS

1 Introduction................................................... 1

2 Literature Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 2.1 The Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 2.2 The Conflict Analysis Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2

3 The Construction of the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT. . . . . .. 3 3.1 The ‘AHP' in the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT .... 3 3.2 The Hijiri Point in the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT. 6 3.3 The Hijiri Point in the Simulation study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10

4 The Methodology for the Study of .............................. 10 the Scienti6.c Negotiation Theory HICAT

4.1 The Simulation Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11

5 Evaluating the effectiveness of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12 the HICAT in the Simulation Study

6 Conclusion................................................... 16 6.1 Contributions......................................... 16 6.2 Limitations........................................... 16 6.3 Future Research Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16

Appendix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18

Appendix-A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18

Appendix-B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19

1 Introduction

The study of the negotiation process is rnost cornrnonly associated to the Garne Theory due to its widespread acceptance as a preparation tool for negoti-ation cases. But， in reality the negotiation process is rnost cornplex in actual negotiation situations. Thus， this paper presents a solution to control the real

environrnents of the negotiation process. There are rnany negotiation theories， but for the purpose of this paper the Confiict Analysis Theory has been chosen due to is innovative rnanner that presents a solution to the usage of cardinal

nurnber. The usefulness of the Confiict Analysis Theory in real negotiation situ幽

ations is obvious， and points out two rnajor areas which need irnprovernent in order to alternatively allows the usage of ordinal negotiator's input in negotia-

tion the negotiation situation. Analyzing these two points has resu1ted in the creation of a new scientific negotiation theory， the HIerarchical Confiict Anル

lytic Theory (HICAT)， hereby constructed and tested in a sirnulation study affirrning the effectiveness of the theory.

The Paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2， the necessary characteris-tics of the Garne Theory and the Confiict Analysis Theory are presented in ord-

er to define their relationship to the purpose of the HICAT. In chapter 3， the specific description of the details cornprising the HICAT are explained. In chapter 4， the creation of a sirnulation study using the HICAT is designed to prove the effectiveness of the hypothesis which the HICAT is based on. In

chapter 5， the sirnulation data is analyzed and the results in terrns of the hypotheses are tested and explained. Chapter 6， presents the final conclusions of the thesis with a surnrnary of the findings and their irnplications. Future

research directions are also suggested.

2 Literature Review

2.1 The Game Theory

The Garne Theory as viewed in von Neurnann and Morgenstern's The theo-ry of garnes and econornic behavior， if used in a negotiation situation creates a volurne of inforrnation which the negotiator needs to define as being cardinal in forrn. However， in a real negotiation situation， it is suggested that actual cardinal inforrnation is only available in rare cases. The rnost cornrnon situルtion wil1 be that the negotiator is able to attain ordinal inforrnation pertaining

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Table 2.1 The DiJferences in Input Information

望四3 E 号回

Available Feature of Desirable Output Input Information Information Information

Negotiator ordinal little the most suitable strategy

Required Feature of Output Inform冒tionInput Information Information

一

EgEi b

The Game cardinal much equilibrium Theory strategles

Conflict ordinal little equilibrium Analysis strategies

HICAT ordinal little the most suitable strategy

a specific side of the negotiation. That is to say， the negotiator can not ade-quately explain the given negotiation situation by using a cardinal number but

might be able to compare certain strategies， and explain them by making use of ordinal numbers as portrayed in the following Table 2.1.

Viewing the above table portraying the actual situation one can clearly see

that the negotiator is using ordinal numbers. This situation also makes the va1u-able implication that in order to deal with cardinal numbers input information

has to be voluminous in order to achieve a viable solution. Thus， the most suit-able theory for this negotiation condition would be the Conflict Analysis Theo-

ry.

2.2 The Conftict Analysis Theory

The Conflict Analysis Theory (Fraser， Hipel， 1984) requires less informa-tion input than the game theory. In real negotiation situations， most negotia-tors are not able to obtain detailed information. Thus a theory which does not

require cardinal information may be useful.

However， by analyzing this theory it became clear that two areas were in need of improvement (Kosaka， 1994) (Table 2.2). The first， is in the manner of precision in the data that takes the form of an ordinal number. This being the

value placed in the negotiation information which the negotiator places into

order. The second area is the existence of plural equilibrium strategies that are

the outcomes of the Conflict Analysis Theory.

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Table 2.2 The Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT

Conftict Analysis's Improvement by making Improvement Points ....，砂 use of the HICAT over over the Game Theory the Conftict Analysis

Ordinal number as input ー→

Develop the precision of information ordinal numbers by using AHP

Plural equilibrium -→

Less than 2 most feasible strategies strategies analyzed by

3 The Construction of the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT

The negotiation process consists of the negotiator being able to analyze the

negotiation situation. If the available information is in the form of cardinal numbers， the Game Theory is used. However， in most cases of negotiation， the negotiator is often not able to explain the negotiation through the use of cardi-

nal numbers. The easiest way may be to compare each strategy and number

them according to preference， importance， and/or availability， among others. To assist the negotiator in these situations an effective theory called the

HICAT has been developed. The basis of this theory will further be explained

throughout this chapter.

3.1 The ‘AHP' in the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT

The HICAT deals with the first area discussed in Section 2.2 by converging

the Analytic Hierarchy Process， hereby referred to as the AHP， (Saaty， 1980) (Tone， 1989， 1990) and the Conflict Analysis Theory. This new theory will be constructed throughout the remainder of this thesis. In the HICA T， the prefer-ence order which is the outcome from the AHP is more consistent， and the ord欄

er more preClse.

The following is the basic assumption of the AHP where numbers 1 to 9 are used for the pairwise comparison scale in Table 3.1.

The analysis of the construction of a garbage refusal facility， includes three elements consisting of detail information in the negotiation stages. Such are

the elements of cost， reputation and the time limit placed for the completion of the negotiation. A1so there are two players defined as the local residents and the administrative organ. Thus， it is necessary to analyze the AHP factor for

each negotiator's preference. The local residents as one negotiator decide their

preference of each element and is shown in Table 3.2. The negotiator represent-

ing the administrative organ shows their preferences in Table 3.3.

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Table 3.1 Thc pairwise comparison scale (Farr， 1986)

Intensity of Definition Explanation Importance

1 Equally important Two activities contribute equally to the objectives

3 Weakly important Experiences and judgment slight1y favor (to each other) one activity over another

5 Essential or strongly Experiences and judgment strongly favor important one activity over another

7 Very strong or demon- Activity is favored over another; its started importance dominance is demonstratcd in practice

9 Absolutely important The evidence favoring one activity over another is of the highest possible affirmation order

2，4，6，8 Intermediate values When compromise is needed between adjacent

scale values

Table 3.2 The pairwise comparison scale of Local residents

Local Residents C.I.=O.04 C.R.=O.07

Cost Reputation Time Limit weight

Cost 1 -7 3 0.304

Reputation 7 9 0.063

Time Limit -3 -9 0.633

Table 3.3 The pairwise comparison scalc of administrative organ

Administrative Organ C.I.=O.04 C.R.=O.07

Cost Reputation Time Limit weight

Cost 7 -3 0.145

Reputation -7 7 0.785

Time Limit 3 7 0.066

Giving into consideration the above AHP factors the next step of the AHP

is to compare the strategies concerning each of the three elements. The AHP then allows the analysis of the strategy for each grouping rather than each in-

dividual negotiator as portrayed in Table 3.4. The resu1ts showing that the

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Table 3.4 The pairwise comparison scale of strategies

Cost C.I.= C.R.=

strategy A ... z weight

A ... -3

... z 3 ...

Reputation C.I.= C.:R..=

strategy A ... Z weight

A ... -3

... z 5 ...

Tinie Limit C.I.= C.R.=

strategy A ... Z weight

A ... 7

...

z -7 ...

Table 3.5 The total weight of each negotiator

Local Residents

strategy Cost Reputation Time Limit Total weight

A

z

Administrative Organ

strategy Cost Reputation Time Limit Total weight

A

Z

preference for the negotiators for each negotiation element are different.

However， the preference of the strategies for each negotiation elements are the same between different negotiators. Because of this one can see the feature that

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one negotiator prefers the one strategy when the other does not. The final step of the AHP is the weighing and the calculation of the above

five tables and rewritten into one table (Table 3.5).

Thus， when the AHP is introduced into the conflict analysis process， the AHP's outcome becomes the input data for the conflict analysis. The outcome of the AHP in each negotiation strategy is ordered according to its impor-

tance， which is then called the weight. This if weighted heavily， that is， that it

contains a larger number， means it is more preferable to the negotiator. Ac-cordingly， in the preference vector tab1e of the conflict analysis， the heavier weighted strategies are in order from the left. This bringing into the light the

problem of having multiple equilibrium strategies that may arise to satisfy the

negotiation situation which is the second area. Thus， the HICAT creates the Hijiri Point to solve this problem.

3.2 The Hijiri Point in the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT

The second area， concentrates on the HICAT and the development of the concept of the Hijiri Point. The Hijiri Point is deemed in this paper as the

most feasible method in determining the most suitable equilibrium strategy for

the conflict analysis. This is done by dividing the Hijiri Point into the two types

of strategies that may arise in the Dominant and the Max Product forms.

1) Dominant

The Hijiri Point focuses on the equilibrium strategies' difference that arise

in the interpretation of ordinal numbers between the negotiators. The first step

in deciding the Hijiri Point， is in making c1ear each of the negotiator's equi1ibri-um strategies and their corresponding ordinal numbers. If there is a dominant

strategy which shows as being the largest ordinal number in both negotiator's

Table 3.6 Players and their Options

Player Option

Local residents Hard line: Severe concern over safety standard and revocation of business permission

Litigation: Legal action based on environmental concerns

Administrative Hard line: No change in business permission organ

Compromise: Adopt safety standard

6

Table 3.7 Hijiri Point-Dominant in Ordinal Number

(1) Local Residents The order of the equilibrium strategy 9 8 7 4 3

(2) Equilibrium strategy Local residents: Hard line O

Litigation 。 。 。Administrativ巴organ: Hard line O

Compromise O O O 事0: not choose Choose this

(3) Administrative organ The order of the equilibrium strategy 7 6 5 3 2

Hijiri Point ↑

orders， then it is decided as being the Hijiri Point. This meaning that the strategy indicated by the Hijiri Point as being dominant， would be the stable equilibrium strategy and the most preferred by both negotiators.

For example， in the garbage refusal facility issue， each negotiator has two options described in Table 3.6. This showing that the local residents' options are Hard line， or in the form of Litigation， and the Administrative organ's op-tions are Hard line， Compromise form， or both of them.

Local residents as one negotiator ordered their preference of strategies as shown in a item number 1 on Table 3.7. The negotiator representative of the administrative organ show their preference as item number 3 on Table 3.7. Item number 2 details the information about each strategy. Showing that both

negotiators had two options from which they were free to choose or reject. This order comes as a result of the AHP. In this example there were sixteen

possible strategies in the beginning of the analysis. The most preferred strategy was ordered and numbered from the left， and by viewing this data it was seen that the strategy having the larger order number meaning江tobe the most preferred strategy. Thus， in this negotiation example， conflict analysis con-cludes that the above five strategies are the equilibrium strategies.

Further， to explain the equilibrium strategy order number 9 for local resi-dents in Table 3.7 (order number 7 for the administrative organ) a combina-tion of the options such as (10 10) is evaluated. This (10 10) means that the 10・

cal residents have chosen to follow a hard line and wish not to move into a liti-gation as in strategy (10ー).The administrative organ like wise has chosen to follow a hard line and also does not want to compromise which is likewise strategy (ー10).Thus， the outcome for the conflict analysis was presented as an ordinal number of equilibrium strategies.

The first step in deciding the Hijiri Point is to search for the ordinal num-

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ber decided by each negotiator. 1n this example， the strategy (10 10) has at-

tained the largest ordinal number by both negotiators， so the Hijiri Point lies within this strategy. The manner factors involved do not necessarily produce a

dominant strategy， thus， the a1ternative will be the Max Product form of the Hijiri Point.

2) Max product

The lack of a dominant strategy in the ordinal number data evaluated

makes way to the next step to find the Hijiri Point. In this step， the corre-

sponding ordinal number of both negotiator's in each equilibrium is multi“

plied (Item 3 in Table 3.8). The numerical value ofthis result thus becomes the

target of consideration (*1). 1n the scientific negotiation theory HICAT， the purpose is to introduce the concept of equilibrium and appropriateness into

the negotiation analysis. Consequently， the Hijiri Point would be the strategy which gives the largest value from the mu1tiplication of both negotiator's ordi-nal numbers for each strategy.

Using the example in Table 3.8 one can see that there is no dominant Hijiri

Point (refer to items 1 and 4). Thus， the next step would be to multiply each or-dinal strategy number. Following the rest of the process， the strategy (11 01) (the order number 7 for local residents， 8 for the administrative organ) would

achieve the maximum value by mu1tiplication. This strategy then， would be considered to be the Hijiri Point.

Table 3.8 Hijiri Point-Max Product in Ordinal Number

(1) Local Residents The order of the equilibrium strategy 9 8 7 6 4 3 2

(2) Equilibrium strategy Local residents: Hard line 1

Litigation 。。O 。Administrative organ: Hard line 1 。。 。O

Compromise 1 O 。 。本1: choose this 0: not choose

(3) Multiplied ordinal number 45 16 56 36 32 27 1

(4) Administrative organ The order of the equilibrium strategy 5 2 8 6 7 9 I

Hijiri Point ↑

*1: The largest sum of both negotiator's preference order would mean an efficient agreement. On the other hand， the smaller the difference would mean a greater fairness in the agreement.

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Administratlve Org:創 E

~ strategy (0011)

12ベf 吋 gy(川 )

11

10 :~一一-Hi，'iiriPoint

Local Residen飽1 ... 10 11 12

Figure 3.1 Grapbical expression of tbe Hijiri Point

The process of determining the Hijiri Point in the HICAT method is based in the evaluation of the ordinal number by ca1culating each strategy with mul-tiplication. This information is then potentially very helpful in understanding the details about the expectations of the strategy judged as the Hijiri Point. To make this concept easier to understand this paper presents a graphical view.

3) Graphical expression

The strategy having the largest multiplied number is the Hijiri Point. This idea comes from reviewing the Nash Point Theory (von Neumann， 1928， 1937， 1944). The HICAT substitutes the negotiator's exact numbers of their utility with the strategy's order of numbers being used. Then the most satisfactory utility point is named the Hijiri Point. The analysis of the Hijiri Point is shown graphically in Figure 3.1.

The curve b， c， and d represents the highly preferred equilibrium strategies of the negotiators. The decision of which one of these three strategies is the Hijiri Point， two steps are applicable: (1) decide the analytical points on each of these curves， each analytical point being on line a and tangent to a curve a; (2) look for the point closest to a right angle. This point will then be considered to be the most preferred strategy， also called as the Hijiri Point.

Therefore， as mentioned above， this thesis presents a new scientific negotia-tion theory called the HICAT， which is represented by the conversion and im-provement of the Conflict Analysis and the AHP Theory， and further sup-plemented by the decision concept of the Hijiri Point. All which brings this the-sis to testing of the aforementioned theories and the decision concept.

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Table 3.9 The Hijiri Point in the Simulation Study

The order of the strategy 12 9 8 7 11 10 6 5 4 3 2

Local Residents

Strategy O 。 。 1 O 1 O O O O 。。 O O 。O 。 。。。 1 1 1 。O O 。。O

Multiplied ordinal number 120 36 40 14 121 120 18 30 28 3 16 9

The order of the strategy 10 4 5 2 11 12 3 6 7 8 9 Adminおtrativeorgan

The equilibrium strategy E E E

Hijiri Point ↑

3.3 The Hijiri Point in the Simulation study

Prior to the simulation study， the Hijiri Point was predicted (Table 3.9). According to the HICAT， the Hijiri Point would be the equilibrium strategy， such as (10 11) (10 for the local residents， 11 for the administrative organ) in the construction of the garbage refusal facility. The second hypothesis in this thesis is to predict that a larger number of negotiators， using the HICAT agreed upon the strategy decision concept of the Hijiri Point， than the negotia-tors who were not using the HICAT.

4 The Methodology for the Study of the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT

This thesis has developed a new area in the study of management in the Game Simulation Studies. In the first step of the Game Simulation Studies， the new scientific negotiation theory HICAT has been constructed. In the second step the Hijiri Point was introduced to help analyze the strategies. Now the effectiveness of this theory needs to be verified through experimentation. The results of the experimentation will make clear the effectiveness and a1so the limi-tations of this theory. The simulation study will be conducted by making use of the System Development Research Methodology (SDRM， Nunamaker， Chen， 1990).

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Table 4.1 Experiment Population's Education Level

Education Freshman Sophomore哩 Junior Senior Other All

Negotiator 9.71170 32.3070 22.6% 16.2% 3.2% 100 A 句b

Negotiator 32.3% 29.0% 25.8% 9.7% 3.2% 100 B 1170

Total 21 % 38.7% 24.2% 12.9% 3.2% 100 Percentage 1171。

4.1 The Simulation Study

The task for this study involved local residents who were living within prox-

imity of a garbage refusal facility， and an administrative group who was negotiating a garbage disposal problem. The main concern was that suspicion

regarding the facility's environmental safety. This task was chosen because，社was felt students could better relate to this scenario rather than， for example， a

business dispute or a nation wide negotiation. A critical point is that this sort

of problem is current and the number of similar scenarios are expected to esca-late the problem to a global scale.

1) The Subject

The experiment for this simulation study was conducted at the Internation-al Christian University， during the Autumn Semester of the 1995-1996 school year. The study involved the students of the Undergraduate Negotiation Proc-ess course. A total of 62 students participated in the experiment (Table 4.1).

One justification for using student subjects is the fact that negotiation is more familiar to students. Secondly， a study which compared business people to students indicated that their negotiating behavior and the outcomes were often similar (Lusk， Wright， 1981).

2) The Use of the Scientific Negotiation Theory HICAT

The subjects ‘negotiated' two types of negotiation. The first type was a negotiation setting without using the HICAT. The second type was a negotia-tion setting using the HICAT. The subjects carried out their negotiations given

valid negotiation data in the regular form and the data induding the resuIts of the analysis by HICAT respectively.

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3) The Method for the Simulation Study

This simulation study found three hypotheses which estimate the effective-ness of the HICAT and are as follow.

Hypothesis 1: No significant differences at the .05level of confidence will be found between the average score for utility of the agreement strategy.

It is estimated that negotiation using the HICAT would get a higher utility than the negotiation not using the HICAT.

Hypothesis 2: No significant differences at the .05level of confidence will be found between the average number of the agreement strategy.

It is estimated that negotiation using the HICAT would reach agreement on the strategy near the Hijiri Point.

Hypothesis 3: No sign出cantdifferences at the .05level of confidence will be found between the average times required by the participants to reach their agreement strategy.

It is estimated that negotiation using the HICAT would reach agreement in a shorter span of time.

4) The support for the negotiator

A questionnaire was used to examine whether the HICAT would be able to support the negotiator. The participants' satisfaction level was measured by re-garding their response to the three statements. Each of these questions having a five point measure scale in which they evaluated their level of satisfaction. In this paper it was estimated that the negotiator using the HICAT would get higher satisfaction level than the negotiation not using the HICAT.

5 Evaluating the effectiveness of the HICAT in the Simulation Study

In this thesis a simulation study was carried.Qut for the purpose of examin-

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ing the effectiveness of the H1CAT. 1n the simulation， three hypothesis estimat-

ing the effectiveness of the H1CAT have been proven. A statistical analysis was

developed to analyze the results from the simulation study in the form of the

following hypotheses. The means ， standard deviation and range for the hypothesis are list in APPEND1X-A.

Table 5.1 The utility of the agreed strategy-Mann-Whitney U-Test

z=6.79 Using the HlCAT Not using the HlCAT P<0.05

Utility Order Utility Order

55

60 5

70 9.5

72 20.5

120 32.5

121 47.5

Ri Value 1365 465

Table 5.2 Agreement c10se to the Hijiri Point-Mann-Whitney U-Test

New name of strategy Number of negotiation reaching agreement

: Feature of strategy Using the HICAT Not using the HICAT

1: Equilibrium and 26 21 Hijiri Point

2: Equilibrium 3 。3: Equilibrium 2

4: Other 8

z=1.65 Using the HICAT Not using the HICAT Pく0.05

New name Order New name Order of strategy of strategy

23.5 23.5

2 47.0

3 50.0 3 50.0

4 50.0

Ri Value 808 1022

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Hypothesis 1:

No significant differences at the .051evel of confidence will be found between

the average score for utility of the agreement strategy.

The data accumulated shows that negotiation using the HICAT would get a

higher utility than the negotiation not using the HICAT (Table 5.1).

Hypothesis 2:

N 0 significant di宜'erencesat the .051evel of confidence will be found between

the average number in the agreement strategy.

These data shows that negotiation using the HICAT would reach agree-

ment on the strategy near the Hijiri Point than the negotiation not using the

HICAT (Table 5.2).

Hypothesis 3: No signi量cantdi旺'erencesat the .05level of confidence will be found between

the average times required by the participants to reach their agreement

strategy.

These data shows that negotiation using the HICAT would reach agree同

ment in a shorter span of time than when they negotiate without using the

Table 5.3 Number of negotiation reaching agreemen瓜t-Man盟.姐.柄f涜hitne町yU-Test

z=6.07 Using the HICAT Not using the HICAT P<O.05

Number of Order Number of Order negotiation negotiation

9.5

2 21.5

3 30.5 3 30.5

4 39.5 4 39.5

5 47.0

6 52.5

7 55.0

8 57.0

10 59.0

Ri Value 510 1367

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Table 5.4 Ease in choosing the strategy-x1 Test

Data E (Data-E)l!E (N=62)

1 Very Easy 55 27.5 27.5

2 Easy 4 12.5 5.78

3 Moderate 3 15 9.6

4 Difficult O 3.5 3.5

5 Very Difficult O 3.5 3.5

X2=49.88 P < 0.01

Table 5.5 Effectiveness of the given data-x2 Test

Data E (Data-E)2IE (N=62)

1 Very Effective 47 26 16

2 Effective 10 9 0.1

3 Moderate 4 18 10.8

4 Noneffective 。 6.5 6.5

5 Very Noneffective 2.5 0.9

χ2=34.3 Pく0.01

Table 5.6 Satisfaction about the negotiation agreement-x2 Test

Data E (Data-E)2IE (N=62)

1 Very Satisfied 44 29.5 7.12

2 Satisfied 12 16 1.0

3 Moderate 6 11.5 2.63

4 N ot Satisfied O 3.5 3.5

5 Not Very Satisfied 。 1.5 1.5

X2=15.75 P<O.OI

HICAT (Table 5.3). The statistical analysis as mentioned above was conducted with the use of

the Mann-Whiteney's U-Test. The objective of this test was to find out if a sig-

nificant difference of agreement existed between the two types of negotiation

一 15-

using the HICAT and without using the HICAT. The Mann-Whiteney's U-Test indicated that each type of negotiation was significantly different from the other. The means ， standard deviation and range for the questionnaire are list in APPENDIX-B.

The following statistical analysis conducted was a 'X2' test (Table 5.4， 5.5， 5.6). The objective of this test was to find out if a significant difference of satis-faction existed between the two types of negotiation using the HICAT and without using the HICAT. The 'X2' test indicated that one type of negotiation was significantly different from the other.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Contributions

The above study in its results has led to the following conclusions: 1. The e:ffectiveness of the HICAT model for decision making in negotiation

has been proven. 2. The Hijiri Point was the most preferred strategy in negotiation. This is the

usage of available data which clear1y shows the negotiators' position. The existence of the Hijiri Point supports social activity in reaching balanced solutions.

3. The existence of the Hijiri Point enables us to conduct negotiations and to reach an agreement in a shorter period of time. Also， it is able to assist the negotiator in spending the smallest amount of energy in reaching an agree-ment.

Given the above it is clear that the HICAT is e宜'ectivein analyzing various negotiation situations and in helping the negotiators' decision making process. Furthermore， it helps create the best solution to a conflict in a negotiation situa-tion using the win-win concept. Thus， the ideal solution will be for both sides to be satisfied.

6.2 Limitations

The main limitation of this study is its generalization and or simplification of many factors. Also， the simulation study carried out among students was carried out in a laboratory setting which disregards environmental e町ects.Thus， it is necessary to apply the HICAT to many more areas of negotiation

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that wi11 provide better data and further validation of the data presented.

6.3 Future Research Directions

Viewing the result of the simulation study， it can be seen that it has been proven that the scientific negotiation theory HICAT is effective in the area of ana1yzing and supporting the negotiation process in actual situations. Theoreti-cally， there would be two streams of thought for future research in this theory.

One future study could focus on how to analyze the negotiation process in more detail and to construct models more ‘situation specific.' For example， it may be a viable solution to the research of cu1tural negotiation factors such as the ones arising between Japanese and American businessmen. Another wi11 be the study focusing on expanding the relevant紅 eaof the negotiation process which the HICAT is able to analyze.

Finally， many areas are sti11 opened for future research in the field of negoti-ation in order to contribute to the peaceful coexistence of the human race. Fur-ther， the above presented theory need be once again proved mathematically as well as tested outside laboratory conditions. Thus， the contribution of the scientific negotiation theory HICAT is one that 1 feel cannot be ignored.

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APPENDIX-A

N=62 Using Not using the HICAT the HICAT

Average 118.12 68.61 Hypothesis 1 The ut出tyof the agreed Standard Dev. 15.25 5.62 strategy. (point)

Range 224.95 30.62

Hypothesis 2 Average 1.26 1.9 Agreement c10se to the Hijiri Point. Standard Dev/， 0.68 1.35 (l=Hijiri point

Range 0.45 1.76 2，3=Eq. 4=other)

Hypothesis 3 Average 1.69 4.57

Number of negotiation Standard Dev. 0.97 1.69 reaching agreement (Times) Range 0.90 2.72

APPENDIX-B

N=62 Using Not using the HICAT the HICAT

Average 1.1 3

Ease in choosing Standard Dev. 0.35 0.96 the strategy

Range 0.11 0.9

Average 1.25 3.04

Effectiveness of Standard Dev. 0.54 0.97 the given data

Range 0.28 0.91

Average 1.32 2.4

Satisfaction about Standard Dev. 0.59 1.12 the negotiation agreement

Range 0.34 1.24

1 (Very Satisfied)ー2(Satisfied)ー3(Moderate)ー4(NotSatisfied) -5(NotVerySatisfied)

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