the science (and politics) of missile...
TRANSCRIPT
The Science (and Politics) ofMissile Defense
Steve FetterUniversity of Maryland, College Park
Philosophical Society of Washington9 November 2001
Outline
• A brief history of missile defense• A description of the proposed National
Missile Defense (NMD) system• The vulnerability of this type of system
to countermeasures• Other missile defense concepts• Politics of missile defense
A Brief History: 1950s-1972Nike → Sentinel → Safeguard
Sprint and Spartan interceptors5-megaton Spartan warhead
PAR Phased Array Radar
ABM Treaty of 1972
The US and the USSR…Considering that effectivemeasures to limit ABM systems would be asubstantial factor in curbing the race in strategicoffensive arms…Have agreed:
Article IEach Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systemsfor a defense of the territory of its country andnot to provide a base for such a defense, and notto deploy ABM systems for defense of anindividual region except as provided for in ArticleIII of this Treaty.
A Brief History
1983 Reagan “star wars” speech, SDI born1991 End of the Cold War
Gulf War, Iraqi Scud attacks1993 SDIO → BMDO, focus shifts to theater
defense1995 Contract for America: NMD by 20031996 Clinton NMD plan; talks with Russia begin1998 Rumsfeld Report
Taepo-dong launch by North Korea2001 Bush: withdraw from ABMT, deploy NMD
National Missile Defense Act of 1999
It is the policy of the United States to deploy assoon as is technologically possible an effectiveNational Missile Defense system capable ofdefending the territory of the United States againstlimited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,unauthorized, or deliberate)…
It is the policy of the United States to seekcontinued negotiated reductions in Russiannuclear forces.
Kill vehicle uses LWIR to home on thewarhead, destroying it by colliding with it:
“hit-to-kill intercept”
Clinton plan: start small, add additionalinterceptors, sensors, sites over time
$49*$36*$30Cost (billion)201120102005-07IOC
DSP → SBIRS-highFB-XBR, SBIRS-lowUEWR
XBR at GBI sitesOthersensors
125 GFAlaska125 AK10020-100
GBIs
larger attackwith better
CM
small attackw/CM
small (5 RV)attack, no CM
Intendedcapability
C3C2C1
*Does not include $11 billion for SBIRS-low
Hit-to-kill intercept has proved difficult:• Of 22 tests of exoatmospheric hit-to-kill systems
(4 HOE, 2 ERIS, 4 LEAP, 8 THAAD, 4 NMD),only 6 have scored a “hit”
• Recent problems often related to quality control;BMDO criticized for “rush to failure”
• Tests unrealistic (no decoys or one balloondecoy, one-on-one engagements in one head-on,short-range geometry), using “surrogates”(beacon/GPS, low-acceleration booster)
Nevertheless, reliable hit-to-kill interceptshould be possible in test situations
The proposed NMD system—and anysimilar system—is unlikely to workagainst a real adversaryA country or group able to build (or buy) an ICBM,RV, and nuclear or biological warhead, would alsobe able to build (or buy) effective countermeasuresto an exoatmospheric hit-to-kill system
“However absorbed a commander may be in theelaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimesnecessary to take the enemy into account.”
—Winston Churchill
Countermeasures
A Technical Evaluation of theOperational Effectiveness of the Planned
US National Missile Defense System
Andrew M. Sessler (Chair), John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter,Sherman Frankel, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth
Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright
Union of Concerned ScientistsMIT Security Studies Program
April 2000
Available at http://www.ucsusa.org
Three countermeasures examined in detail:• biological submunitions• nuclear warhead with antisimulation balloons• nuclear warhead with cooled shroud
Each countermeasure• defeats midcourse hit-to-kill systems (NMD,
THAAD, NTW)• can be deployed by new missile state, without
flight testing
Biological Submunitions
• submunitions or “bomblets” are the preferredmethod of delivering CBW agents– better coverage of target– better dispersal efficiency
• 100 bomblets/missile, 2 kg anthrax/bomblet,could result in ~100,000 deaths
• dispense bomblets soon after boost phase ends,before interceptors can reach payload
• design of dispensing mechanism, submunitionsstraightforward
Antisimulation Balloon Decoys
• Instead of making decoys look like warheads,make the warhead look like a decoy
• Enclose warhead in a mylar balloon; alsorelease many empty balloons (1 lb each)
• Trajectories, radar/IR signatures almost identical• Empty balloons could display diversity of
signatures (size, shape, temp, mass, spin)• Even a “hit” may not destroy warhead inside• Implementation not difficult
Cooled Shroud
• Place nuclear warhead in a shroud cooled withliquid nitrogen
• Million-fold reduction in IR signal (at 10 µm)– Thousand-fold reduction in detection range– Warhead is detected too late for homing
• Current KV does not use visible light for homing,but night launch (or polished surfaces) wouldprevent this
• Implementation not difficult (~100 kg extra mass)
Other NMD ConceptsImproved midcourse defense• Improved discrimination
– radars to monitor dispensing of warhead, decoys– lasers to “push” balloons
• Destroy everything– Nuclear-armed interceptors– Multiple miniature kill vehicles
Terminal defense• Atmosphere strips away decoys, but too many
targets to defend
Boost-phase DefenseMany advantages:• destroy entire payload• booster easier to detect, track, and destroy• defended area much largerKey disadvantage:• Must be close to launch point, at launch time
– space-based systems in orbit– land, sea, or air-based systems near enemies
• could not intercept missiles launched deep insideRussia or China
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 7000
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Range (km)
Altitude (km)
200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 7000
100
200
300
400
500
600
700Missile Powered Flight Profile
Range (km)
Altitude (km)
A
ltitu
de (k
m)
Alti
tude
(km
) Flight profiles of GBI and Navy Theater-Wide Interceptor
Flight profiles of typical and fast-burning ICBMs
Locations shown at 5second intervals
70 s8.5 km/s
55 s5.5 km/s
130 s
250 s 320 s
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 7000
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Range (km)
Altitude (km)
Boost-phase Engagement
Intercept point if interceptorlaunched 95 s after ICBM
Location of ICBMwhen interceptoris launched
GBI at 100 s
ICBM at250 s
GBI at 150 s
North Korean missile attacks on Moscow,Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, and Honolulu
Vladivostok
Moscow Washington Chicago San Francisco
Honolulu
Boost-phase Engagement
Honolulu
Washington DC Chicago San Francisco
Honolulu
Range of GBI 150 Seconds After Launch
End of North Korean ICBM Powered Flight
Intercept Points If GBI is Launched 50 Seconds After ICBM is Launched
Moscow
Last Chance Intercept If GBI Launched 125 Seconds After ICBM Launch
Intercept Points If GBI is Launched 100 Seconds After ICBM is Launched
Range of GBI 125 Seconds After Launch
Range of GBI 190 Seconds After Launch
Range of GBI 100 Seconds After Launch
Interceptor Burnout Speed ! 8.5 km/se c
Boost-phase Engagement
Honolulu Washington DC San Francisco
Honolulu
Range of Boost -Phase GBI 190 Seconds After Launch Range If Interceptor Launched Within 60 Seconds of ICBM Launch
ICBM Launch
Point
Interceptor Burnout Speed ≈ 8.5 km/sec
Boost-phase Engagement
Honolulu Washington DC San Francisco
Honolulu
Range of Boost -Phase GBI 190 Seconds After Launch Range If Interceptor Launched Within 60 Seconds of ICBM Launch
ICBM Launch
Point
Interceptor Burnout Speed ≈ 8.5 km/sec
Other Modes of Delivery
• ICBMs are not the only (or even the best) wayto deliver nuclear or biological weapons:– short-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles
launched off ships– airplanes– covert delivery (e.g., shipping container on
commercial ship)• Third-world ICBMs are less reliable and more
effective than other modes of delivery• Unlike missiles, no “return address”
International Politics of NMD
Russia and China worry about U.S. NMD• want to deter the U.S. from threatening interests• even if ineffective, politicians might not believe it;
might worry that U.S. believes it is invulnerableRussia and China would react to NMD• countermeasures; more missiles/warheads;
higher alert rates; other modes of deliveryThese reactions could decrease U.S. security