the rule of law, judicial independence and judicial ...the rule of law requires that the meaning of...
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TheRuleofLaw,JudicialIndependenceandJudicialDiscretion
20January2016
TheHonourableJusticeMatthewPalmerJudgeoftheHighCourtofNewZealandKwaGeokChooDistinguishedVisitorNationalUniversityofSingapore
Engāwaka,engāmana,engāreo, tēnākoutou, tēnākoutou, tēnākoutoukatoa.
Justice Coomaraswamy, fellow judges, Dean Chesterman and faculty, ladies and
gentlemen,friendsandcolleaguesandmyfamily.
Iamhonouredtoaddresssuchadistinguishedandinterestingaudience. AndIam
honouredtodosoastheKwaGeokChooDistinguishedVisitoratNUS.In1936at16
yearsofageMadamKwaGeokChoowasthetopstudentacrossallofMalayainthe
seniorCambridgeexamswhereshewentontostudylaw,gainingfirstclasshonours
in twoyears. Shewasawell-knownpartner inLeeandLee. Shehelpeddraft the
PAPconstitutionandthewater rightsagreementbetweenSingaporeandMalaysia
afterseparation.Shewasapublicchampionforwomen’srightsinSingaporeaswell
asamuchlovedwifeandmother.Iknowsomethingoftheinfluencethatwivesand
mothers can have on public officers; in providing firm, trusted but different
perspectives on all sorts of issues. I am quite sure thatMadam Kwa contributed
significantlytotheshapeofthenationstatethatisSingapore.
Mytopictonightstartsandendswiththeruleof lawand judicial independence. I
offer you a concept and applications to four different topics: international
commercialdisputeresolution;judicialreview;judicialdiscretionandconstitutional
dialogue.Thisissomewhatinthenatureofasmorgasbordoratapasmenu.Ihope
everyonewillfindsomethingtotheirtaste–sometopicsmightbeswallowedwhole,
somemightbealittlepiquant,othersratherchewyandatleastoneamealinitself.
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TheRuleofLaw
FirstIshouldsaywhat,forme,istheruleoflaw;andwhatitisnot.
I emphasise “for me” because the rule of law is simultaneously ubiquitous and
uncertain. It is ubiquitous in its appeal; not only to lawyers and judges but to
academics and media commentators, and to politicians of all stripes. Professor
TamanahaquotesRobertMugabeofZimbabweasstating“[o]nlyagovernmentthat
subjects itself to the rule of law has any moral right to demand of its citizens
obedience to the rule of law.”1 Professor JeremyWaldron, an eminent jurisprude
who is from New Zealand though based in the US, discussed the appeal to the
rhetoric of the rule of lawbyboth sides ofUS legal and political debate over the
2000electionandthecaseofBushvGore.2
Perhaps thewideappealof the ruleof law is related to theuncertaintyabout the
concept. Waldron suggests the rule of law is “an essentially contested concept”
whichcanbeusedtomeanlittlemorethan“hoorayforourside”.3Certainlythere
aresignificantdifferencesinthecontentoftheruleoflawasitisenvisagedbylegal
theorist Joseph Raz compared to Ronald Dworkin or, say, that great British judge
Lord Bingham. In what has been chararacterised as a “formal” conception, Raz
suggests that the ruleof lawmeans that lawsmustbepassed in the correct legal
mannerandshouldbecapableofguidingone’sconductinorderthatonecanplan
one’slife.4Fromthishederivesafamiliarlistofspecificattributesoftheruleoflaw
suchasprospectivity,stability,clarity,anindependentjudiciary,accesstocourtsand
therequirementthatadministrativediscretionshouldnotunderminethepurposes
oflegalrules.
1 Brian Z TamanahaOn theRule of Law:History, Politics, Theory (CambridgeUniversity Press,
Cambridge,2004)at2.2 JeremyWaldron“Istheruleoflawanessentiallycontestedconcept(inFlorida)”(2002)21(2)
Law&Philosophy137.3 At141.4 JosephRaz“TheRuleofLawanditsVirtue”(1977)93LQR195;seealsoJosephRazEthicsinthe
PublicDomain,EssaysontheMoralityofLawandPolitics(ClarendonPress,Oxford,1994).
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By contrast, the late Lord Bingham’s elegant 2006 David Williams lecture,
subsequentarticleandthenbookidentifyeightprincipleslyingbehindthe“core”of
theprincipleoftheruleoflawthat“thatallpersonsandauthoritieswithinthestate,
whetherpublicorprivate, shouldbeboundbyandentitled to thebenefitof laws
publiclymade,takingeffect(generally)inthefutureandpubliclyadministeredinthe
courts”. 5 One of these principles, for example, is that “the law must afford
adequateprotectionoffundamentalhumanrights”.
In my previous academic writings I have espoused an approach to constitutional
theory based on legal realism. This is an approach to the description and
understandingoflegalphenomena,nottotheirnormativevalue.Butasarealist,at
thispoint,Ioughttodeclaremyownconceptionoftheruleoflaw.
AsInotedina2007article,anda2008book,mydefinitioncentresoncertaintyand
thefreedomfromarbitrarinessinthelaw.6Itinvolvestakingseriouslythewordsof
thephrase“theruleof law”andattemptstohone inonthefunctionalpurposeof
theruleoflawinconstitutionaldesign.AsajudgeIcannowassertauthoritatively
thatsuchanapproachmarriesbothtextandpurpose. Iseekthecoreelementsof
thedoctrinethatarecommontomostothers’accounts,thatarelikelytobewidely
accepted,andthatcanbesimplyandcoherentlystatedsothattheruleoflawcan,
relativelyeasily,begraspedandapplied.
I consider that the phrase itself suggests there is some distinctly separate or
objectivemeaningtolawthatisindependentofhumaninterests.Itislawitselfthat
rulesandthatshouldrule.Isuggestthisdefinition:
Theruleoflawrequiresthatthemeaningofalawasitisappliedis:
• Independentoftheinterestsofthosewhomadethelaw;and
5 TomBinghamTheRuleofLaw(PenguinBooks,London,2010)at8.6 MatthewSRPalmer“NewZealandConstitutionalCulture” (2007)22NZULR565at586-589;
Matthew S R Palmer, The Treaty ofWaitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (VUP,Wellington,2008)at285-289.
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• Independentoftheinterestsofthosewhoapplythelaw;and
• Independent of the interests of those to whom it is applied; and, Ithink,
• Independentofthetimeatwhichitisapplied.
Thisformulationemphasisesthattheruleoflawisanideal–whichmayexplainthe
contestover its content. All law is,of course,ahumanconstruct– formulatedby
humans, applied by humans, to humans. Wemust all accept by now that giving
meaning to words is inherently an interpretative exercise by an interpretive
communitycomposedofhumanactors.
But Isuggestthatthe idealforwhichtheruleof lawstrives istoremove,asfaras
practical,the influenceofthe interestsofparticularhumanactors. Theessenceof
theconceptoftheruleoflawseekstoadvancejusticebyinvokingaRawlsianveilof
ignoranceofone’sparticularinterestsinrelationtothecontentoflaw.7Removing
humaninterestsfromdecisionsmadethroughhumanagentsmustbeanideal–like
a limit approached but never reached through differential calculus. But aworthy
idealisworthattemptingtoapproach,aswellastoencapsulateclearly.
Itcanalsobeseenhowthisconceptionoftheruleoflawisintimatelyboundupwith
theseparationofpowersandjudicialindependence.Theseparationofpowersisa
necessary(butnotsufficient)conditionfortheruleof law. Ifa lawmakernotonly
makesbutalso interpretsandapplies the law then themeaningof the law that is
interpreted and appliedwillmore likely reside in the lawmaker’s intention at the
timeitisapplied.Thelawmaker/interpretercanretrospectivelyidentifyinthelaw
“whatImeantatthetime”evenifthatwasnotpresentorevidentinthelegaltextat
the time. It is this aspect of the combination ofmaking and applying law that is
contrarytotheruleoflaw–themeaningofthelawwouldbecomethatwhichthe
makerandapplier laterdeems,potentiallyarbitrarily, tobecorrect - ratherthana
7 JohnRawlsATheoryofJustice(BelknapPress,Harvard,1971).
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meaning that resides in the law itself. Law would not rule; it would have no
independentmeaning.Thelawmakerandapplierwouldrule.
I do not imagine that the separation of powers doctrine is controversial either in
New Zealand or Singapore. I do, though, propose to consider tonight what that
separation really requires. Does the separation of powers require only that the
identityof the individualswhomakeandapply lawbeseparateanddifferent? Or
doesitrequirethattheirperspectivesormindsetsarealsoseparateanddifferent?I
returntothislaterinmyaddress.
Fornow,Isimplysuggestthatmyconceptionoftheruleoflawzeroesinonessential
underpinningsthatarecommontothemostinfluentialcommentators.Itistherule
oflaw,notmanorwoman.Andnomanorwomancanbeabovethelaw,torecall
Professor Albert Venn Dicey. It requires that laws be public so that all those to
whomitisappliedhaveequalopportunitytoobservelaw.Itrequiresthatlawsbe
prospective for the same reason. It requires that laws are applied through a fair
hearing so as to be independent of the interests of those who apply them.
Generality,certaintyandfreedomfromarbitrarinessarecoretotheconcept.
Butobservealsowhattheruleoflawisnot,accordingtomyconception.Iyieldto
nooneincommitmenttohumanrights.ButImostrespectfullydisagreewithLord
Bingham.Idonotconsiderthathumanrights isanecessaryelementoftheruleof
law.Itisaseparateconceptwithaseparatejustificationandbasis.Iacceptthat,as
such,theconceptionIoffer,followsRazasbeingmoreinthetraditionofthe“formal”
rather than “substantive” theories of the rule of law, according to the dichotomy
analysedbyPaulCraigandothers,8orDworkin’s“rulebookconception”ratherthan
his“rightsbased”theorywhichmergestheruleoflawwithhistheoryoflawitself.9
8 PaulCraig“FormalandSubstantiveConceptionsoftheRuleofLaw:AnAnalyticalFramework”
[1997]PL467(thoughIsuggestthatmyconceptionisnot“formalist”inthesenseofrelatingonlytoprocedure,becauseitisconcernedwiththesubstanceofalaw).Similarly,itismoreofa“formalist”idealthana“historicist”,“legalprocess”or“substantive”idealintermsofafour-part classification proposed by Richard H Fallon “’The Rule of Law’ as a Concept inConstitutionalDiscourse”97ColumbLRev1(1997).
9 RonaldDworkinAMatterofPrinciple(HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,1985).
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Imaintainthat,fortheruleoflawtoremainausefulconcept,itshouldbeconfined
to itsessence. Otherwise Iworry that,becauseof theapparentgenericappealof
the term there is a great temptation to freight it with aspects of all those other
fundamental legal concepts that are also appealing. This will end in messy
incoherence, as perhaps it has already. Further, such doctrinal incoherence risks
constitutional incoherence in systems where, as Lord Hope said of the United
Kingdom,““[t]heruleoflawenforcedbythecourtsistheultimatecontrollingfactor
onwhichourconstitutionisbased.”10 InNovember2015,Singapore’sChiefJustice
Menon reiterated this in a judicial review judgment challenging the legality of an
orderdetainingan individualwithouttrial -TanSeetEngvAttorneyGeneral.11He
said:
Theruleoflawisthebedrockonwhichoursocietywasfoundedandonwhichithasthrived. The term, the rule of law, is not one that admits of a fixed or precisedefinition.However,oneofitscoreideasisthenotionthatthepoweroftheStateisvested in the various armsof government and that suchpower is subject to legallimits.But itwouldbemeaninglesstospeakofpowerbeing limitedweretherenorecourse to determinewhether, how, and inwhat circumstances those limits hadbeen exceeded. Under our system of government, which is based on theWestminstermodel,thattaskfallsupontheJudiciary.Judgesareentrustedwiththetaskofensuringthatanyexerciseofstatepowerisdonewithinlegallimits.In2012,at theRuleof LawSymposium thatwasheld inSingapore,ProfBrianZTamanahaobservedthatjudgeshavethespecifictaskofensuringthatthearmsofgovernmentareheldtothelaw,andinthatsense,theultimateresponsibilityformaintainingasystemwhichabidesbytheruleoflawlieswiththeJudiciary.12
It even risks legal incoherence in systems, such as New Zealand, where law
practitioners are under a statutory duty imposed by s 4(a) of the Lawyers and
ConveyancersAct2006 to “comply”with the “fundamentalobligation” to “uphold
the rule of law and to facilitate the administration of justice in New Zealand”. I
understand there is no equivalent statutory duty in Singapore's Legal Profession
Act.13But advocates and solicitors in Singapore's legal profession might well be
foundbythejudiciarytohavethesameduty.AsthepresentAttorney-Generaland
10 JacksonvAttorney-General[2005]UKHL56,[2006]1AC262at[107].11 TanSeetEngvAttorneyGeneral[2015]SGCA59at[1].12 CitingTamanaha"TheHistoryandElementsoftheRuleofLaw"[2012]SJLS232at244.13 LegalProfessionAct(Cap161,2009RevEd).
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formerJusticeVKRajahsaidinPublicTrusteeandanothervByProductsTradersPte
Ltd:14
Inthefinalanalysis,solicitors,asofficersofthecourt,mustintheirdealingswiththecourt, acknowledge that their obligations to the court reign supreme, over andabove their client's and their own interests. When they enter the profession,solicitorsacceptaresponsibilitytoassist inupholdingtheruleof law.Tofulfil thatresponsibility, theymust be committed to ensuring the sanctity and soundness ofthelegalsystemandtheadministrationofjustice.Solicitorsmustaidandassist,andneverimpairthecourt'sabilitytodischargeitsimpartialadjudicatoryresponsibilities.
Forme,theriskofincoherenceofthenotionoftheruleoflawisgreatenoughthat
(withasmallcaveatIneednotpausetoexplain)IjoinJosephRazwhosaysthat:15
..theruleoflawisjustoneofthevirtuesbywhichalegalsystemmaybejudgedandbywhichitistobejudged.Itisnottobeconfusedwithdemocracy,justice,equality(beforethelaworotherwise),humanrightsofanykindorrespectforpersonsorforthedignityofman.
Democracy, justice and human rights stand on their own feet, with their own
meanings.Asdoestheruleoflaw.Theseconceptsmustbedistinctinordertobe
useful,eveniftheyareinter-related.
InternationalCommercialDisputeResolution
Somuchfortheoreticalthroat-clearing. Letmemovenowtosomeapplicationsof
myconceptionoftheruleoflaw.
First, and relatively briefly, international commercial dispute resolution – a topic
withwhichSingaporeiswellfamiliar.
Economicactivityrequiresaframeworkofstablebehaviouralexpectationsinorder
tofunctionmosteffectivelyandefficiently. Inthelanguageof lawandeconomics,
unpredictability of behaviour, especially of the legal frameworks that govern
behaviour,causedbytheabsenceor lackofclarity in thedefault rulesofproperty
14 Public Trustee and another v By Products Traders Pte Ltd and others [2005] 3 SLR(R) 449;
[2005]SGHC103at[57].15 JosephRaz“TheRuleofLawanditsVirtue”(1977)93LQR195at196.
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and liability,causetransactionscostsand informationasymmetriesthatcan inhibit
efficienteconomicexchange.
This iswhythedoctrineoftheruleof law is importantnotonly inaconstitutional
but in an economic sense. The rule of law, manifested in the concept I have
advancedtoday,militatesagainstthelawmeaningsomethingthatdependsonwho
madeit,orwhoappliedit,ortowhomitisapplied,orthatdependsonthetimeat
whichitisapplied.
Ina very realway the ruleof law is a countervailing forceagainstarbitraryuseof
executiveandlegislativepower.Wearefamiliarwiththeconstitutionalreasonsfor
that.Butmypointhereisthatarbitraryuseofeitherexecutiveorlegislativepower
can also be directly detrimental to the stability of the behavioural expectations
necessary for efficient economic exchange. That is as true of the rule of
internationallawasitisoftheruleofdomesticlaw.
Theprincipleoftheinternationalruleoflaw,inthesenseIhavedefinedit,iscrucial
to the regulatory framework for international commercial dispute resolution
becauseoftheimportanceofstabilityinbehaviouralexpectations:
• Uncertaintyoverwhethersovereigndebt lendingcanbeenforcedagainsta
reluctant sovereign, wielding the power of domestic Parliamentary
sovereignty,willonlybereflectedinahighersovereignriskpremium.Andit
willbecontrarytotheruleoflaw.
• Ifaclauseofaninternationalinvestmenttreatyfavoursorunfairlytargetsa
particularnation,ormulti-nationalcorporation,internationalinvestmentand
developmentwillbeinhibited.Anditwillbecontrarytotheruleoflaw.
• If an international tribunalappliesa rule inanewway, retrospectively, the
internationalhorsesoffinancewillbefrightened.Anditwillbecontraryto
theruleoflaw.
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• If a rule of a bilateral investment treaty is applied differently because it is
appliedornotappliedtoaparticularnation,forexampletheUnitedStates,
capitalaswellashorseswillbefrightened,fleeandbecomemoreexpensive.
Anditwillbeinconsistentwiththeruleoflaw.
This is why I suggest that it is in the interests of both sovereign nations and the
internationalcommercialcommunitytocommitthemselvestointernationaldispute
resolutionmechanismsthatcomplywiththeruleoflaw.Moreparticularly:
• Theoutcomeof adisputemustnotdependonwhohasmade the law– it
must favour all parties equally. There must not be a systemic bias, for
instance,againstdevelopingstates.
• Theoutcomeofadisputemustnotdependonwhohasappliedthelaw–we
must be able to have confidence in the independence of those resolving
disputes,suchastribunalsbeingindependentoftheincentivesonpart-time
arbiters who are otherwise international commercial litigators with a
particularongoingfinancialinterestincertainoutcomes.
• Theoutcomeofadisputemustnotdependontowhomthelawisapplied–
allborrowersandlendersmustbeequalbeforethelaw.
• Andtheoutcomeofadisputemustnotdependonwhenthelawisapplied–
law,includingthelawgoverningexpropriation,mustapplyprospectivelynot
retrospectively.
Investment treaties are international law that should conform to the same
expectationswehaveofanyformofeconomiclaw.Breachofanyoftheaspectsof
the rule of law in relation to international investments will increase the cost of
capital forus all. And just as, if notmore importantly, itwouldnotbe consistent
withafundamentalbuildingblockofourconstitutions–theruleoflaw.
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Finally on this topic I pause only to compliment the creation of the Singapore
InternationalCommercialCourtwhichIhadthepleasureofobservinginactionthis
month. Its independence appears directly to address rule of law concerns raised
about other international commercial dispute resolutionmechanisms – and I look
forwardwithinteresttoitscontributionstointernationalcommercialjurisprudence.
JudicialReview
The secondbrief application ofmy conception of the rule of law is to the judicial
reviewofadministrativeaction–atopicwithwhichNewZealandhashadextensive
experience.IdonotpurporttobefamiliarwithjudicialreviewinSingapore.
By judicial review I do not mean the judicial review of legislation by which the
judiciary may strike down legislation for inconsistency with some constitutional
instrument. The Singapore judiciary has that power under its constitution though
theNewZealandjudiciarydoesnot.
RatherImeanthejudicialreviewofadministrativeaction–or,perhaps,ofpubliclaw
decisions – the review by the judiciary of decisions by Ministers, officials or
sometimesotherbodies toexercisepublicpower. The lawof judicial reviewgrew
significantlyinthe1970sto1990sinNewZealand.Currently,NewZealandlawasit
isappliedhas littlerequirement forstanding inordertoentitlesomeonetotakea
caseanditdeploysawideconceptionofwhatdecisionsmaybechallenged.
Although there has been less development of judicial review principles in recent
years16 there appears to have been an increasing use of existing principles by
litigants.AsDeputySolicitor-GeneralandatthebarIdefended,tookandintervened
in judicial review actions against the Crown and other entities in relation to, for
example:
16 Matthew Palmer “Judicial Review” in Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (eds) The
SupremeCourtofNewZealand2004-2013(ThomsonReuters,Wellington,2015)158.
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• a decision by a private television channel not to allow two political party
leadersparticipateinapartyleaders’debate;
• thenon-establishmentofaUniversitybyaMinister;
• animmigrationdecisionoftheDistrictCourt;
• theMinisterofHealth’sdecisiontosackaDistrictHealthBoard;
• asecondaryschool’sexpulsionofastudent;
• Customs’impositionofcostrecoveryfeesonaninternationalairport;
• The Minister of Commerce’s placement of a number of companies into
statutorymanagement;
• theCommissionerofInlandRevenue’simpositionoftax;
• theMinistryofPrimaryIndustries’relaxationofbiosecurityregulationofthe
importationofporkproducts;
• Customs’proposedimpositionofmillionsofdollarsofexcisedutyonapetrol
importer;
• the Environmental Protection Agency’s determination that a particular
techniquetomodifygeneswasnotgeneticmodification;
• Ministers’ decisions regarding the residential red zone created in
Christchurchfollowingtheearthquakes;
• TheAucklandCouncil’sdecisiontoextendawharfintotheharbor;and
• alocalbody’simpositionofratesonratepayersonthebasisofretrospective
Parliamentaryauthority(whereIinitiallysoughtaformaldeclarationthatthe
Actwascontrarytotheruleoflaw).
Irrespective ofwhich side I acted for I consider that the availability of the law of
judicial review to test the legality of exercises of public power is a direct
manifestationoftheruleoflaw.Ifapublicbodypurportstoexercisepublicpower
in a specific instance those concerned with that exercise must be able to ask an
independent body – the courts – whether the exercise of public power accorded
with law. If it did, no harm is done by testing the question and, indeed, public
confidenceinlawandgovernmentisenhanced.Ifanexerciseofpublicpowerwere
notmadeaccordingto lawthentheruleof lawrequiresthatbeaddressed,as it is
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whenanyotherdecision-makeracts inconsistentlywith law. To leavethedecision
totheexecutivebranch,untested,istoleavetheeffectivedeterminationofthelaw
–ajudicialfunction–totheexecutive.
AsformerJusticeSirJohnMcGrathsaid,speakingforhimselfandChiefJusticeElias
intheNewZealandSupremeCourtin2011:17
Judicialreviewisthecommonlawmeansbywhichthecourtsholdsuchofficialstoaccount.18Itprovidesthepublicwithassurancethatpublicofficialsareactingwithinthelawinexercisingtheirpowers,andareaccountableiftheydepartfromdoingso.Statutes limiting recourse to judicial review to challenge statutory decisionsaccordingly raise issues of constitutional concern. This concern is reflected in thepresumption of the courts, when interpreting such legislation, that it was notParliament’spurposetoallowdecisionmakerspowerconclusivelytodetermineanyquestionoflaw.19
Legislation which does not on its terms prohibit judicial review, but restricts itsavailability, can nevertheless interfere with full supervision by the courts of theconformityofactivitiesofgovernmentwiththeruleoflaw.Thecourtsarereluctantto read legislation in amanner that impairs their ability to hold public officials toaccountinthisway.
JudicialDiscretion
InapreviousaddressinNewZealandIoutlinedmyconceptionoftheruleoflawand
applied it to legislation inNewZealand.20 I called for the independent andpublic
assessmentofdraftlegislationasitprogressesthroughtheNewZealandParliament
forconsistencywiththeruleoflaw.Suchanideamayormaynotbeofinterestin
Singapore but I do not pursue it tonight. And of course the rule of law,which is
intimatelyboundupwithjudicialindependence,isoftencharacterisedasintension
with that other primary constitutional doctrine in New Zealand – Parliamentary
17 TannadyceInvestmentsLtdvCommissionerofInlandRevenue[2011]NZSC158,[2012]2NZLR
153at[3].18 Recognisedins4oftheJudicatureAmendmentAct1972.(citationintheoriginal)19 BulkGasUsersGroupvAttorney-General[1983]NZLR129(CA)at[133].20 Matthew S R Palmer “Assessing the Strength of the Rule of Law in New Zealand” (paper
presented to Unearthing New Zealand’s Constitutional Traditions Conference, New ZealandCentre for Public Law, Wellington, 30 August 2013). Available at:http://works.bepress.com/matthew_palmer/38/
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sovereignty. The ruleof law isoften“prayed inaid”as itwere,of the judiciary in
thatinstitutionaltension.
However, the third applicationofmy conceptionof the rule of law that Iwant to
discusstonight isto judicialreasoningratherthantoParliamentaryenactments. It
seems tome that judges need to be just as, if notmore alive, to the nature and
implications of the rule of law as do Parliamentarians. In particular, I want to
examinetheimplicationsoftheruleoflawforjudicialdiscretioninaparticularlegal
contextinNewZealand.
My interest in thiswas sparkedbya case Iheard last year. Iwon’tmention itby
nameas thedoctor in thecasewasappealingadisciplinarypenaltyand refusalof
namesuppressionandtheappealperiodhasnotyetexpired.21
I was surprised to find that counsel for the doctor and the relevant Professional
Conduct Committee did not agree on whether New Zealand law regarding the
approachtoappealsofprofessionaldisciplinarypenaltieswassettled. Counsel for
thedoctorsubmitteditwassettled–bythe2007SupremeCourtjudgmentofAustin,
Nicholsthatfoundthatanappellatecourtinageneralappeal“hastheresponsibility
of arrivingat itsownassessmentof themeritsof the case.”22And indeedAustin,
Nicholshadfoundjustthat.Itstatedthat:23
Those exercising general rights of appeal are entitled to judgment in accordancewiththeopinionoftheappellatecourt,evenwherethatopinionisanassessmentoffact and degree and entails a value judgment. If the appellate court’s opinion isdifferentfromtheconclusionofthetribunalappealedfrom,thenthedecisionunderappealiswrongintheonlysensethatmatters,evenifitwasaconclusiononwhichmindsmightreasonablydiffer.InsuchcircumstancesitisanerrorfortheHighCourtto defer to the lower Court’s assessment of the acceptability and weight to beaccordedtotheevidence,ratherthanformingitsownopinion.
However, there is a distinct and longstanding line of authority reiterated in a
subsequentSupremeCourt judgment,KacemvBashir in2010, that commentators
21 ThejudgmentisnowavailableasTSMvAProfessionalConductCommittee[2015]NZHC3063.22 Austin,Nichols&CoIncvStichtingLodestar[2007]NZSC103,[2008]2NZLR141at[5].23 At[16].
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accuseof sitting somewhatuncomfortably alongsideAustin,Nichols.24 InKacemv
BashirtheSupremeCourtsaidthis:25
Inthiscontextageneralappeal istobedistinguishedfromanappealagainstadecisionmadeintheexerciseofadiscretion.Inthatkindofcasethecriteriaforasuccessfulappealarestricter:(1)erroroflaworprinciple;(2)takingaccountofirrelevantconsiderations;(3)failingtotakeaccountofarelevantconsideration;or (4) the decision is plainlywrong. The distinction between a general appealandanappeal fromadiscretion isnotaltogethereasy todescribe inabstract.Butthefactthatthecaseinvolvesfactualevolutionandavaluejudgmentdoesnotofitselfmeanthedecisionisdiscretionary.
Bothcounselinmycasewereagreedthatthisapproachappliestotheappealofthe
name suppression decision, on the basis of Court of Appeal precedent (which
counsel for the doctor reserved his right to challenge). This approach to appeals
against “adecisionmade in theexerciseof adiscretion” is also theapproach that
New Zealand courts say they take to appeals of criminal sentences and bail
decisions.26
No doubt it can be difficult to determine when an appeal is susceptible to one
approachor theother.27And itmaybe that there is littledifferencebetween the
twoapproachesinpractice–adecisionthatis“wrong”or“plainlywrong”foundsa
successful appeal under either (though there is authority that there is a material
differencebetweenthosetests).
ButIconfesstofindingthelatterapproachsomewhattroubling.Theapproachtoan
appeal from a decisionmade in the exercise of a discretion appears tome to be
tantamounttojudicialreview–aprocesswhichemphasisesproceduremuchmore
than substance. Unlike theAustinNicholsapproach itdoesnotnecessarilyentitle
theappellanttojudgmentinaccordancewiththeopinionoftheappellatecourt.If
24 See M B Rodriguez Ferrere “The unnecessary confusion in New Zealand’s appellate
jurisdictions”(2012)12OtagoLR829.25 KacemvBashir[2010]NZSC112,[2011]2NZLR1at[32].26 MayvMay(1982)1NZFLR165(CA);BlackstonevBlackstone[2008]NZCA312,(2009)19PRNZ
40at[8]27 See also KJ Keith “Appeals from Administrative Tribunals” (1969) 5 VUWLR 123 cited in
OphthalmologicalSocietyofNewZealandIncvCommerceCommission[2003]2NZLR145(CA)at[37].
15
mindsmightreasonablydifferit isthelowercourt’sopinionwhichoughttoprevail
accordingtothisapproach;buttheappellatecourt’saccordingtheotherapproach.
Yet Parliamentwould appear to have conferred a right of general appeal in both
instances.Thedifficultyofdeterminingwhatisdiscretionaryandwhatisnotmakes
thedistinctionshakybutoneonwhichthejudiciaryfoundsimportantconsequences.
Perhaps the reluctance to require an appellate court’s substantive opinion on an
appealofanexerciseofdiscretionisbecausesuchcasesaresimplyhardtodecide.
Nodoubttheyare. ThatwasclearlyputbyLordFraser inhis1985remarksabout
theroleoftheEnglishCourtofAppealinrelationtocustodyofchildren.28
But I wonder whethermyworry about the distinction derives from a rule of law
concern.RecallRaz’sconcernthatadministrativediscretionmustnotunderminethe
purposeoftherelevantlegalrule.AndLordBingham’ssecondprincipleoftherule
of law that “questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by
application of the law and not the exercise of discretion.” And Hart’s recently
rediscoveredarticlethatstrugglestojustifydiscretionasconsistentwiththeruleof
law.29
Atfirstsight,itdoesnotappearconsistentwithmyconceptionoftheruleoflawfor
theresultofanappealtodependonwhetheronefirstinstancetribunaloranother
hearsit.Yetthatseemstobetheimplicationofanapproachthataccordsdeference
to the substance of a first instance over an appellate decision.30 I’m not sure
whetherthat isexacerbatedormitigatedbythediscretion involved indetermining
whetheranappealisfromanexerciseofdiscretion!
TheSupremeCourt’sapproach inAustin,Nicholstowhat isrequired inacasethat
Parliamenthasdeemedworthyofageneralappealrequiresasubstantiveopinionof
the appellate court. Using the same approach in relation to a relatively wide
28 GvG[1985]2AllER225(HL)at228.29 HLAHart“Discretion”(2013)127HarvLRev652andseeGeoffreyCShaw“HLAHart’sLost
Essay:‘Discretion’andtheLegalProcessSchool”(2013)HarvLRev693.30 RodriguezFerrere,aboven22.
16
discretion exercised by a first instance tribunal could simply require the appellate
courttobeclearaboutthenatureoftherelevantlaw-therelevantsubstantivelaw
andrelevantlegalmethodologyorstepsoflegalreasoning.Thatseemstometobe
whatusuallyhappensinsentencing,bailornamesuppressionappealsanyway.
Ifoundtheapproachinthecasebeforemerelativelystraightforwardtoresolve.But
Ididsaythis:31
Intheabstract,“discretion”asaconcept,and itsrelationshipwiththeruleof law,hasbeen the subjectofextensive jurisprudential consideration [here I citedDworkin,Hartandother academics–which I hasten toadd isnot thenorm inmyorotherNZHighCourt judgments].
In practice, of course, there are elements of discretion in many
aspects of the judicial enterprise, including the identificationofwhich law is relevant,the identification of which facts are material, and in the interstices of the law’sapplication to the facts. At a basic level, I consider the rule of law requires that theapplicationoflawinimposingapenaltymustinvolveatleastamodicumoftransparency,certainty and predictability. That, in turn, favours the explicit application of identifiedlegalmethodology andprinciples to shapewhatmayotherwisebecome the relativelyarbitrary exercise of discretion. Suchmethodology and principles constitute law. Theymeanadecision-maker’sreasoningcanbemoreeasilyidentifiedandanalysedonappealwhereanappealisprovidedforbylegislation.Thisappearstometoenhancetheruleoflaw.
AsI’msureyouwillunderstand,Ioffermyquestionstonightaboutalongstanding
lineofNewZealandauthoritytentatively,asanewjudge,andinaspiritofinquiry.
ThelawinNewZealandasithasbeendeterminedbytheSupremeCourtisrelatively
clear;fornow. IftheCourtdecidestorevisitthetopic, itwillbeinterestingtosee
whetherandhowtheruleoflawfiguresinthecourt’sreasoning.
ConstitutionalDialogue
Finally, I turn to a larger constitutional canvas to explore a further final question
abouttheruleof law. HereIreturntothequestionofwhatexactly isrequiredby
theruleoflawandseparationofpowers.Isitenoughthatthepowertomakelaw
and toapplyand interpret law is exercisedbydifferent, separate, institutions. Or
should these powers also be exercised by institutions with different or separate
mindsetsorperspectives?
31 At[15].
17
Thisquestionderivesfromtheconfluenceoftwoareasofinterestofmine.Thefirst
is the subject of the course I am teaching here at the National University of
Singaporethismonth.Iamteachingagroupofverygoodstudents“LawandPolicy”;
acourseIhavetaughtbefore,atHongKongUniversity,andatopiconwhichIhave
writteninthepast.32Mycorethesisisthatthedisciplinesoflawandofpublicpolicy
areverydifferentintheirformsofreasoningordisciplinarymethodology.
The paradigm of the discipline of law in a common law system is defined by the
methodologyofthecommonlaw.Commonlawyersandjudgesapproachanopinion,
anargumentora judgmentby identifying the issue, identifying thematerial facts,
outliningtherelevantlaw,examiningtheargumentsfromboth(i.e.onlytwo)sides
andapplyingthelawtothefacts.Thisisaninductiveformofreasoning–fromthe
particularsofindividualcasestowardsthegeneralrule.Itpaysattentiontospecific
factualcontextofparticularcases.Itlookstopastprecedentsforguidance.
Theparadigmofthedisciplineofpublicpolicyanalysis,however, isquitedifferent.
Policy analysts typically start with the government’s general objectives. They
identify theproblem tobe resolved. They identifynot just twoargumentsbut all
possibleoptionsforaddressingtheproblem.Theyanalyse,orshouldanalyse,allthe
options in terms of which will best achieve the general objectives, in terms of
financialimplications,andallothersetsofimplications.Thisisdeductivereasoning
– from the general to the particular. It is more abstract. It is less interested in
factualcircumstances. Itsevidencederivesfromgeneralsocialscienceanalysisnot
anecdotesfromaparticularfactscenario.Itlookstothefuturenotthepast.
Mypointisnotthateitherpolicyorlegalanalysisisbetterthantheother–justthat
they are different. And, if they are undertaken for long enough they affect the
mindsets of their practitioners – each imparts to its practitioner different biases,
presumptions, prejudices and tendencies. The paradigms of law and policy, as
32 Matthew SR Palmer “Thinking about LawandPolicy: Lessons for Lawyers” (presentation to
Crown Law Office & Law Commission, Wellington, December 2006). Available at:http://works.bepress.com/matthew_palmer/10.
18
disciplines, carry with them differentmethodologies, differentmindsets, different
perspectives.Iconceiveofthemasdifferent“languages”–evendifferentcultures.
Lawyers are good at problem identification but can forget about objectives. They
revel in factual contextbutget impatientwithgeneralisations. Policyadvisersare
goodidentifyingallpossibleoptionsbutcanforgettotesttheiranalysisinpractical
applicationstospecificscenarios.Theytheoriseandgetimpatientwithanecdotes.
I should say also that I regard politics as a third language – one of bargaining,
negotiatingandlogrolling–persuasion,compromiseandpragmatism.
I then apply this construct to the second area of interest: constitutional dialogue.
Constitutionaldialoguetheoryderivesfromthe1997articlebyPeterHogg,another
NewZealandacademicthistimebasedinCanada,andAllisonBushell.33Thetheory
isthattheoldbinary(dareIsayparadigmaticallylegalapproach)ofaskingwhether
the judiciaryor legislatureshouldbesupremeshouldgivewaytoamoredynamic,
iterativeunderstandingofconstitutional interactions. There’saclue in the titleof
their first article: “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or
PerhapstheCharterofRightsIsn’tsuchaBadThingAfterAll)”.So,iftheCanadian
Supreme Court strikes down a statute for being unconstitutional, that does not
constitute judicialsupremacybecausethat isnottheendofthestory. In67of89
cases to 2007 they found that the Canadian Parliament responded by re-enacting
anotherstatutetoaddressitsobjectiveinadifferentway.
Rather thanaone shotgamewhichdetermines “supremacy”, thedevelopmentof
constitutionallawandpolicyismoredynamic.Eachbranchofgovernmentreactsto
each other – as in conversation or dialogue – through their Acts and judgments
respectively to explore and clarify themeaning of law and policy iteratively, over
time. My friend Dr Yap Po Jen has recently published an excellent book entitled
33 PeterWHoggandAllisonABushell, “TheCharterDialoguebetweenCourtsandLegislatures
(OrPerhapstheCharterofRightsIsn’tsuchaBadThingAfterAll)”(1997)35OsgoodeHallLJ75.
19
Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia, applying this theory to Singapore,
MalaysiaandHongKong.34
Thesamedynamicoccursinrelationtolawandpolicyatasub-constitutionallevel.
When a court interprets a statute it gives it meaning in a specific instance. If
Parliamentdoesn’tlikethatmeaningitcanchangeitbylegislativeamendment.This
isinter-institutionaldialogueaboutthemakingandapplicationoflawandthepolicy
underlyingit.
Andmy suggestion is thateachof thebranchof governments speak in theirown,
different,language–viatheirownmethodologiesorperspectives.35So:
• the public service in the executive branch of government in New Zealand
speaks the language of policy – focusing on objectives, identifying options
andprovidinganalysesthatarereasonablygenericandabstract.
• Ministers and Parliament speak the language of politics –mediating policy
recommendationsthroughtherealityofbargainingandnegotiatinginorder
topasslegislation.(ThoughgoodMinisterseventuallybecomebilingual.)
• And the judiciary interprets legislation and makes common law in the
languageofthecommonlaw–byfocusingonthefactualcontextofspecific
cases.
Perhapshereisaclueastowhyacommonlawjudiciaryisrelativelymoreassertive
ininterpretationofsomesubjectmattersthanothers.Anapproachthatemphasises
the factual context of specific cases basedonpast precedent is notwell-suited to
analysingissuesofsocialandeconomicpolicywhich,ofnecessity,requireempirical
34 Po Jen Yap Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2015).35 MatthewSRPalmer“OpentheDoorsandWherearethePeople?ConstitutionalDialogue in
the Shadow of the People” in Claire Charters and Dean R Knight (eds)We, The Peoples:ParticipationinGovernance(VictoriaUniversityPress,Wellington,2011)50.
20
social sciencedataandconceptual frameworksofanalysis. Butsuchaapproach–
thecommonlawapproach–doesfeelmoreconfidentinanalysingspecificcasesof
injusticefocusingonthe“rights”ofindividualsvisaviseachotherandvisavisthe
state.
But more generally I say that the dynamics of constitutional life of a nation, as
characterised by this framework, is determined by what languages each of the
branchesofgovernmentspeak,andhowloudlyeachofthesevoicesareempowered
tospeaktoeachother.
And it seems to me that the normative constitutional health of New Zealand
government is improved by having the different branches of government which
exercise public power thinking and speaking in different languages. You want
institutionsthinkingbothabstractlyabouttheformulationofgeneralpolicyandlegal
principlesandcontextuallyabouthow thoseprinciplesapply, and shouldapply, to
themessy realityof specific factsofparticular cases. Eachperspective checks the
other. As that doyen of American constitutional scholarship, Alexander Bickel,
said:36
TheCourtoftenprovokesconsiderationof themost intricate issuesofprinciplebythe other branches, engaging them in dialogues and “responsive readings”; andthereare timesalsowhentheconversationstartsat theotherendand isperhapslesspolite.Ourgovernmentconsistsofdiscreteinstitutions,buttheeffectivenessofthewholedependsontheirinvolvementwithoneanother,ontheirintimacy,evenifitoftenisthesweatyintimacyofcreatureslockedincombat.
Thesamesortofchecks,bringingdifferentperspectivestobear,arepresentinother
specificaspectsofconstitutionaldesign–suchasthedifferenceintheUnitedStates
between the very short term local perspective of Congressmen in the House of
Representatives and the longer term state wide perspective of Senators. New
Zealand institutionalises the presence ofMāori voices in the electoral system and
Parliament. Singapore,as Iunderstandit,doesthesamewithoppositionMPsand
minoritygroups.36 AlexanderMBickelTheLeastDangerousBranch:TheSupremeCourtattheBarofPolitics(2nd
ed,YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1962)at261.
21
And here, finally, is my link to the rule of law, separation of powers and judicial
independence. Try to conceive of a constitutional system inwhich the executive,
legislatureand judiciaryall speak the same language–allhave the samemindset,
thesameprejudicesandassumptions,thesamebiases–allthinkandapproachlegal
andpolicyissuesinexactlythesameway.ThisisclearlynotthecaseofSingaporeor
NewZealandwhere the languageof common law iswellentrenched in thecourts
and quite different from what is spoken within the political branches. But
theoretically–ifitwerethecase–woulditbeaconstitutionalproblem?
Perhapsnot. Afterall ifeveryone isspeaking indifferent languages inanordinary
conversationtherewouldbechaosiftheydon’tunderstandeachother.Indeed,in
New Zealand, one might sometimes wish for a bit better understanding by the
branchesofgovernmentofthelanguagestheothersspeak.
But, in the hypothetical extreme, I think I would worry about a uniformmindset
acrossallbranchesofgovernment.Thegreatadvantageofthecommonlawmethod
seemstometobethecross-check itprovidesonthegeneralityof legislation–by
examining theeffectofgenerallydrafted law in specific factual circumstances. By
doing justice in the individual case, courts test the formulation of legislation and
themselvesformulatethecommonlaw.Ifallbranchesapproachissuesinthesame
waythenlawsandpolicies,includingconstitutionallaw,wouldnotbenefitfromsuch
cross-checking.Therewouldbelittlepointinconstitutionaldialogue.Whyneedthe
judiciary raise its voice to the executive or the legislature if they have the same
view?
Andthisismyquestion:isthispartoftheseparationofpowersandtheruleoflaw?
In my hypothetical scenario, the same individuals would not be interpreting and
applying the law as those who make it. But if they share the same biases,
assumptionsandprejudices–iftheyhavethesamemindsetandperspective-then
theymayaswellbe.
22
Myinstinct isthatthiswouldbecontrarytotheruleof law. Notonlydoweneed
our legislators and judges to be different people, we need them to be think
differently. Otherwise, it would not be the law which rules. It would be the
commonperspective,languageorculture–the“ruling”culture.
Thegeniusof thecommon lawsystem liesnot in the spiritofMontesquieu’s laws
thatwehavedifferentpeopleordifferentinstitutionsmakingandapplyinglaw.Itis
thatwejuxtaposeintheseinstitutionspeoplewhothinkintermsofgenericprinciple
andotherswho think in termsof the justiceof the individual case. Together, the
dialogue between these perspectives jointly contributes to the health of our
constitutional common lawsystems.37 Yes, ithelps if theyunderstandeachother;
butperhapsitwouldnotiftheyunderstandeachothersomuchthattheylosetheir
ownlanguage.
Thisisthemostabstractandacademicofmytapasmenuofapplicationsoftherule
oflawtonight–andtheonethatIthoughtmightbeamealinitself.Butperhapsthe
academicsherewillbestimulated.
Conclusion
Ihavecoveredarangeofdifferenttopicsatsomeriskofincoherence.Ihavedone
soinordertoofferandtoexploretheimplicationsofaconceptionoftheruleoflaw
thatmight at first sight seem relatively narrow. But I suggest it can offer useful
normativeimplicationsfor:
• essential features of the systems of international commercial dispute
resolution;
• theutilityofthelawofjudicialreview;
• therisksandlimitsofjudicialdiscretion;and
• importantaspectsofconstitutionaldesign.
37 See Philip Joseph “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 KCLJ
321.
23
Attheheartofallofthesediversetopicsistheimportanceoftheruleoflaw–ofthe
ideal of certainty and freedom from arbitrariness and of independence of the
application of law from human interests. I add to this the normative utility and
complementarityoffirm,trustedbutdifferentperspectivesinthejointenterpriseof
formulatingandapplyinglawandpolicy.
Nōreira,tēnākoutou,tēnākoutou,tēnākoutoukatoa.