the role of communities in protecting education from

GCPEA

Global Coalition to

Protect Education from Attack

The Role of Communities in Protecting Education from Attack: Lessons Learned

Global Coalition to Protect Education from AttackGCPEA

TheGlobal Coalition to Protect Education from Attackwas established in 2010 by organizations workingin the fields of education in emergencies and conflict affected contexts, higher education, protection,international human rights, and humanitarian law who were concerned about ongoing attacks on educa-tional institutions, their students, and staff in countries affected by conflict and insecurity.

GCPEA is a unique coalition of leading international organizations including:

• CARA

• Human Rights Watch

• Institute of International Education’s Scholar Rescue Fund

• Norwegian Refugee Council

• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

• Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict

• Save the Children International

• Scholars at Risk Network

• United Nations Children’s Fund

• United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

GCPEA is a project of Tides Center, a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization.

This paper is the result of an external study commissioned by GCPEA and may not reflect the reviews ofindividual member organizations. The study was prepared by Hannah Thompson, lead researcher andwriter; Jennifer Budden and Paul Julian Braga, Côte d’Ivoire researchers; and Amy Kapit, editor andGCPEA Program Officer. GCPEA gratefully acknowledges the generous support of PEIC, UNICEF, and ananonymous donor.

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AWECO Comité pour le bien-être des femmes d’Afrique - Africa Women Welfare CommitteeCFS Child Friendly SpacesCCMEF Club des Mères des Filles - Clubs of Mothers of School GirlsCNO Centre, Nord et Ouest– Centre, North, and West Region of Côte d’IvoireCNPRA Comité national de pilotage du redéploiement de l’Administration - National Committee to Manage the

Redeployment of Government Administration COGES Comité de Gestion des Etablissements Scolaires - School Management Committee (SMC)CPC Child Protection CommitteesDFID UK Department for International DevelopmentDRENET Direction Régionale de l’Education Nationale et de l’Enseignement Technique - Regional Office for National

Education and Technical TrainingDRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office FGD Focus Group DiscussionGBV Gender-Based ViolenceIEP Inspection de l’Enseignement Primaire - Inspectorate of Primary TeachingINGO International Non-Governmental OrganizationIRC International Rescue Committee LIZoP Learning Institutions as Zones of PeaceM&E Monitoring and EvaluationMENET Ministère de l’Education Nationale et de l’Enseignement Technique - Ministry of National Education and Technical

TrainingMILF Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism – The UN-led mechanism monitors six grave violations against children in

situations of armed conflict in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1612 and 1882. These include:recruitment or use of children; killing and maiming; abduction; sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals;and denial of humanitarian access to children

NGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNRC Norwegian Refugee Council OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsOFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster AssistanceOHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human RightsONUCI Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire - United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Côte d’Ivoire PTA Parent Teacher AssociationPTUZ Progressive Teachers Union of ZimbabweSIP School Improvement PlanSMC School Management CommitteesSMS Short Message ServiceSZoP Schools as Zones of PeaceTLS Temporary Learning SpacesUN United NationsUNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

Acronyms

ContentsAcknowledgements

Acronyms

1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................5Terminology ...................................................................................................................................8

2. Methodology .........................................................................................................................9

3. How to implement programs in collaboration with communities ..............................................10Mobilizing communities, step-by-step ...........................................................................................10Cross-cutting strategies and approaches.......................................................................................22

4. Côte d’Ivoire: how communities have worked with United Nations agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations ...............................................................25Key findings ................................................................................................................................26Steps for engaging communities and lessons learned in Côte d’Ivoire.............................................31

5. Conclusion and recommendations .........................................................................................38

Appendices......................................................................................................................................40i. Typology of community engagement ............................................................................40ii. Working with and through local NGO partners................................................................41iii. Child participation in practice ......................................................................................42iv. Côte d’Ivoire methodology ............................................................................................43

Endnotes .........................................................................................................................................44

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Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack

Children at a school in Aleppo, founded andsupervised by a group of young Syrian communitymembers, 17 March 2013. © 2013 REUTERS/Giath Taha

Introduction Attacks on education occur in conflict-affected environ-ments worldwide. Students and teachers are killed,injured, kidnapped, and threatened. Schools arebombed, burned, and taken over by armed groups to beused for military purposes. These attacks impedelearning and stunt social and economic development.Protecting students, educators, and the buildings wherethey learn and teach is, therefore, imperative for bothshort and long term peace and stability.

There is some evidence that involving local communitiesin initiatives to protect education makes these effortsmore effective. Indeed, assessments of programs toprotect education indicate communities have a crucialrole to play.1 There are several reasons why engagingcommunities may be beneficial. First, in many conflict-affected countries, governments, though the ultimateduty bearers for ensuring education, lack the resourcesand capacity to fully protect education from targetedattacks on students, teachers, schools, anduniversities.2 In such situations, measures taken by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and communitiescan usefully complement state actions, and also reducedependence on centralized resources. Second, insettings where armed groups oppose the state,community engagement in measures to protecteducation from attack may help promote theappearance of political neutrality and, therefore,enhance security.3 This atmosphere of neutrality mayalso lessen the risk, in some cases, of governments andtheir allies themselves attacking schools, students, andpersonnel.4 In general, communities are often wellplaced to protect education. They may know and be ableto negotiate with the real or potential attackers moreeffectively than external actors such as NGOs,government, or donors.5 Furthermore, encouraging localinvestment may boost ownership, making communitiesmore likely to ensure the protection of education facil-ities at a later date.6

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Indeed, much of what has been written on communityengagement—often published by internationalagencies—assumes that working with members oflocal communities is inherently a good practice.However, a community-based approach to educationprotection programming may also present certainchallenges and risks that should be recognized andaddressed from the outset. Community mobilizationprocesses may take time and require long-termcommitments on behalf of NGOs and donors. Theydepend on strong and trusting relationships betweenagencies and local community members, as well as ona deep understanding of the local context on the partof external actors. Outside organizations must ensurethat the responses they implement locally arecompatible with human rights standards and do notexacerbate discrimination or prejudices existing withina community or endanger community members.Furthermore, the short-term funding frameworks thatare available for rapid onset emergency response orconflict-affected, fragile environments may not beconducive to supporting actions that require long-terminvestment.7 And, finally, the voluntary nature ofcommunity involvement may lead to high turnover orlack of willingness to participate in programming.8Thorough assessment and participation of communitylevel stakeholders during the program planning stagesmay mitigate some of the risks to various stakeholdersand individuals.

The goal of this paper is to serve as a guide forinvolving communities in protecting education in waysthat harness the benefits and minimize the risks.

First, drawing on a global review of programming, itsuggests a series of steps that should be taken whenengaging communities in the protection of education.Where information is available, case studies havebeen included that demonstrate the challenges, andidentify solutions and lessons learned for the differentsteps in the process. Subsequently, the paper looks atcross-cutting approaches that should be taken at alltimes when working with communities throughout thevarious programing stages. Next, the paper summa-rizes the results of research carried out in Côte d’Ivoirein September and October 2013, highlighting someadvantages and challenges experienced at differentsteps in the process of engaging communities. Thepaper concludes with recommendations for differentstakeholders.

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Afghan students appointed to provide security at aschool’s entrance check bags as pupils arrivethrough its gate in Kabul, 25 August 2010. © 2010 YURI CORTEZ/AFP/Getty Images

Terminology: Attacks on education: Intentional threats or use ofviolent or coercive force against students, teachers,academics, and other education staff, education tradeunion members, government officials, or aid workers,and against schools, universities, and other educationalinstitutions. Attacks on education are carried out forpolitical, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, orreligious reasons.

Military use of schools: The use of educational institu-tions by state military and security forces or by non-statearmed groups, including for: barracks or bases;offensive or defensive positioning; storage of weaponsor ammunition; interrogation or detention; militarytraining or drilling of soldiers; military recruitment ofchildren contrary to international law; or as observationposts or firing positions. The term does not includeinstances in which forces are present in the vicinity ofschools and universities to provide for the school’sprotection, or as a security measure when schools arebeing used as election polling stations or other non-military purposes.

Protecting education:9 For the purpose of this paper,protection measures consist of actions to prevent,mitigate, and respond to attacks on education andmilitary use of schools.

• Prevention actions include strengtheningmanagement of education, negotiation to preventattack, development of codes of conduct or desig-nation of schools as zones of peace,awareness-raising about education, nationallegislation, advocacy, adaptation of educationdelivery, physical strengthening of schools,appointment of night guards, day guards orsecurity personnel, and popular protest.

• Damage mitigation efforts include contingencyplanning, safety and first aid training, and estab-lishment of early warning systems.

• Response involves monitoring and reporting ofattacks in order to prevent future attacks, negoti-ation to end military use of schools or to releasekidnapped students or teachers, and recon-struction of schools.

Communities can be involved in all forms of protectiveaction.

Community:10 In this paper, community denotes a groupthat recognizes itself, or that outsiders recognize, assharing social, cultural, or religious characteristics,background, and interests, which contribute to acollective identity.

This paper considers communities in relation to specificsites of education. These communities may consist of:

• Children’s clubs and groups

• School-aged children (both in and out of school)

• Youth

• Mothers’ or fathers’ groups

• Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and/or SchoolManagement Committees (SMCs)

• Teachers and school administrators (who may beboth community members as well as governmentemployees/representatives)

• Teachers’ unions operating locally

• Religious, traditional, and community leaders

Community engagement: How communities play a rolein protecting education can be considered according tothe following typology (see Appendix 1):11

• Community-initiated: Community membersconceive of and set up program activities, basedon parameters they establish, and communitymembers manage, implement, and resource theprojects.

• Community-implemented: Groups external to thecommunity conceive of a project, but rely oncommunities to manage, support, or resource theactivities.

• Community-inspired: Community membersconceive of and develop projects, but commu-nities rely on some form of external support(human resources, skills, knowledge, advocacy,or funding) to fully implement them.

• Community-involved: External organizations,donors, or governments use participatoryprocesses to solicit community perspectives onprogram implementation. Communities mayprovide voluntary human resourcing to supportinitiatives on a one-off basis, but typically do notprovide long-term support. No further efforts aremade to include communities in decision-making, monitoring, management, or resourcingof the intervention.12

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In reality, the lines between these different types ofaction are not always clearly established, nor are therelationships between them linear. This paper focusesprimarily on how international organizations canimplement community-involved and community-inspired action.

Methodology This paper is based on a desk review of reports and evaluations from international and nationalNGOs, United Nations (UN) agencies, advocacy organizations, inter-agency bodies, research insti-tutes, universities, and media sources. Additionally, actors engaged in efforts to prevent orrespond to attacks on education in the countries where they occur were solicited for informationand in some cases interviewed. Lessons and recommendations were drawn from: Afghanistan,Central African Republic, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), India,Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines,Sri Lanka, Syria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In addition to the desk review, a small case study wascarried out in Côte d’Ivoire.

Concrete evidence of the effectiveness of community-based efforts to protect education fromattack tends to be scant and impressionistic, without baseline data, comparative analysis, orrepresentative or systematic sampling. This paper consolidates and adds to this existingknowledge with research from Côte d’Ivoire. Although initial telephone interviews indicated thatlocal individuals and groups have been actively involved in preventing and responding to militaryuse of schools and threats to children throughout Côte d’Ivoire’s different crises, there has beenlimited documentation of these efforts (please see Appendix 4 for a the methodology used toconduct the case study).13 Those working to protect education, both in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere,have valuable insights that indicate the advantages and challenges of employing differentapproaches when working with communities. This paper cannot be considered scientificallyrigorous, but it synthesizes lessons from those implementing projects that protect educationspecifically, as well as children and the affected population more generally.

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Each setting is unique, and any intervention must beadapted to the specific political, cultural, and environ-mental context.14 However, understanding anddocumenting how communities have been engaged indifferent contexts reveals lessons learned that mayassist those designing programs to protect educationfrom attack. The following section breaks down, step-by-step, the process of working with communities. Itsynthesizes lessons learned about community partici-pation in education protection activities. For each stepin the process, where information is available, thissection provides case study examples and identifieslessons learned, successes, and challenges faced

during the activity implementation process. It concludeswith a summary of general program managementapproaches that are essential to the success ofcommunity-based programs to protect education fromattack.

Mobilizing communities, step-by-stepThis section outlines the main steps that may be taken tocollaborate with communities. In addition to education,it draws on reports and studies from the sectors ofprotection, child protection, and health.15 The stepsdetailed are not chronological. Rather they may occursimultaneously or iteratively. The steps outlined are:

How to implement programs in collaboration with communities

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(1) Coordinating and collaborating

(2) Mapping and power analysis

(3) Creating social cohesion

(4) Identifying issues of concern to community-level stakeholders

(5) Creating wider ownership

(6) Developing a plan

(7) Monitoring, evaluating, and ensuring accountability

(8) Carrying out a risk analysis

(9) Allowing groups to organize themselves

(10) Capacity strengthening, awareness raising, and/or social behavioral change

(11) Resourcing and implementing the plan

(12) Feeding back lessons learned to community groups

Step 1: Coordinating and collaboratingEffective prevention and response to attacks oneducation involves collaboration among all educationactors, as well as those from other sectors, includingsocial welfare, health, and security. Mechanisms forcoordination between these disparate groups areessential for reducing duplication of efforts, identifyinggaps, and engaging community members and groups.Coordination methods should include inter-sectorialand sectorial meetings, sharing of information, jointassessment, and planning.

• Coordination mechanisms as a first step in thePhilippines’ Learning Institutions as Zones ofPeace:16 In Mindanao, Philippines, the United

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in collabo-ration with local NGOs, the Department ofEducation, and conflict-affected communities, isimplementing the Learning Institutions as Zonesof Peace (LIZoP) project. The intervention engagescommunity leaders, parents, teachers, stateagencies and parties on opposite sides of the

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Students of a primary school in Colombia take shelterunder their desks, 25 July 2011. The school is locatednear the heavily fortified local police station and has600 students who have to take cover every time theFARC guerrillas attack. © 2011 LUIS ROBAYO/AFP/Getty Images

conflict to enable children to access education ina safer and more secure environment. The firststep that UNICEF took in implementing the projectwas to establish a mechanism for coordinatingwith other agencies to identify where theyworked. This was considered essential to avoidduplication of work.

• Ensuring the inclusion of all actors in Nepal: Asimilar intervention, Schools as Zones of Peace(SZoP), has been implemented in Nepal. In oneschool community in which the project was imple-mented, Maoists initially rejected theintervention. However, Maoists staying in thecommunity became integrated into it throughongoing collaboration and relationship building,and they eventually acceded to the community’swishes to designate the school as a zone ofpeace.17 The example indicates the importance ofensuring that all parties to negotiation are equallyengaged.

Coordination must also happen at local, regional, andnational levels. Relying solely on national level coordi-nation may mean that some remote regions with uniqueneeds feel excluded from decision-making.18Wherefeasible and safe, community structures for coordinationshould be identified and linked to national and regionalsupport systems to facilitate information sharing, suchas on lessons learned. Information should travel in bothdirections. For example, national level legislation orpolicies should filter down to the regional and locallevels so that they can be implemented. Conversely,information on local trends on attacks on education caninform national level analysis and shape policy devel-opment and decision-making.

• Ugandan model of decentralized coordinationand community integration:19 The UN Monitoringand Reporting Mechanism (MRM) is implementednationally. However, engaging communitymembers ensures more comprehensive andtimely reporting of incidents and enables datacollection to be carried out in a more sensitivemanner.20 In Uganda, the MRM Taskforce21engaged communities and others in MRMreporting by mapping out the different stake-holders who could help collect information.These included UN agencies, inter-agencyhumanitarian clusters, international non-govern-

mental organizations (INGOs), service providers,and community-based groups.22 The Taskforcesubsequently developed mechanisms for coordi-nating information sharing between it and each ofthese actors. This facilitated reporting on graveviolations, including attacks on schools. Thesemechanisms included meetings held on arotating basis in two locations: the nation’scapital, Kampala, and the northern Gulu District.The fact that not all meetings were held in thecapital enabled stronger relationships betweenthe Taskforce and local NGOs in the North, whichare more deeply rooted in the local communitieswhere violations occur. The efforts were deemedsuccessful and plans were made to expand thismodel of coverage to other locations in thecountry.

Furthermore, the Taskforce coordinated with localChild Protection Committees (CPCs), supportedby external agencies, on data collection.23 TheTaskforce carried out training for CPC members,developed a form they could use for reporting,and set up a hotline that allowed groups to reportdirectly to the Taskforce on all six ‘grave viola-tions’ (recruitment or use of children; killing andmaiming; abduction; sexual violence; attacks onschools and hospitals; and denial of humani-tarian access to children).

Step 2: Mapping and power analysis In initiating activities to mobilize communities inprotecting education, a full mapping of communityresources and a power analysis of local actors shouldtake place.

Mapping: Mappings of community resources shouldconsider pre-existing assets, mechanisms, structures,systems, leaders, and focal points. They should includeidentification of individuals who may be “naturalhelpers”—people from within the community whomchildren approach for advice, help and assistance—andgroups that support children, such as PTAs, children’sclubs, youth groups, or parent’s groups. The mappingshould consider what actions these actors are taking,how they organize themselves, and how to build on pre-existing activities to support children’s educationalneeds. Through these activities, the effectiveness ofcommunity structures may be amplified. However, it isalso important that these groups do not come to rely on

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outside support and longer-term sustainable solutionsare found.

• Improving children’s well-being and access toeducation in Northern Lebanon:24 A Save theChildren project implemented to improvechildren’s well-being and educational accessduring fighting in refugee camps in NorthernLebanon in 2007 included a mapping of organiza-

tions and institutions. This mapping enabled theorganization to establish links between actorswith diverse resources, formalizing a nascent pre-existing network and facilitating new linkages tosupport children and their education. The initialgoal of providing referral services to 70 childrenwas overwhelmingly successful, with more than700 children reached by the end of the project.There was also evidence that local communitiesand organizations took full ownership of theseinitiatives and used their own resources to fillgaps in the limited services offered by the localauthorities.

Power analysis: A power analysis is essential for identi-fying social groups that have the ability to influenceothers, or that are excluded from community decision-making.

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A teacher watches as Lebanese students take their entranceexam next to tents installed in the playground of a school thatwas damaged following Israeli forces' bombardment during the34-day long Hezbollah-Israel conflict, in the south of Lebanon,9 October 2006. © 2006 AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari)

• Election of committee members in Nepal:25Engagement of previously marginalized groups inschool management through the SZoP initiativereduced threats to education, including loweringfrequencies of military and political use ofschools. A power analysis showed that previousschool management structures were oftendysfunctional, politicized, and prejudiced againstcultural and linguistic minorities and women. Thismay have made schools more vulnerable toattacks during the ten-year conflict. UNICEF, inpartnership with local administrators, parents,and community leaders, addressed the problemby supporting democratic election of representa-tives to school management committees andensuring participation of excluded groups in thenegotiation and enforcement of codes of conduct.

Step 3: Creating social cohesion The mapping and power analysis carried out in Step 2may identify points of community tension and conflict.The success of interventions implemented will rely onaddressing these issues from the outset. Activities tocreate social cohesion may aid in this process and areimportant to carry out prior to implementing the fullintervention. This may be particularly fundamental whenit comes to protecting education, since the discord mayreflect wider conflict dynamics. Building social cohesioncan help disparate groups agree on their priorities, asoutlined in Step 4, below. Additionally, members ofgroups with strong social cohesion may be more likely toparticipate and collaborate in educational interventions.

• Community relationship building in West Timor:26Save the Children invested resources inmitigating tension between local communitiesand displaced persons from Timor Leste. Theseincluded holding festivals and other informalactivities to allow the different groups to talk, airgrievances, and get to know each other. This workprovided a strong foundation that allowed new orimproved schools to be established to meet theneeds of both communities.

Step 4: Identifying issues of concern to community-level stakeholdersIt is essential to work with community groups andindividuals to address their primary concerns forchildren and education. It may be useful to include in

these discussions general protection concerns, ratherthan just focusing on attacks on education. These mayinclude food, health, water, and/or shelter.Incorporating broader concerns may make communitiesmore inclined to engage, particularly when resourcescarcity or inequality fuels conflict, and education is notseen as the highest priority for children.27

• Shared priorities in Zimbabwe:28 The ProgressiveTeachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) found thatinvolving parents, students, and teachers indiscussions about their needs allowed for thedevelopment of mechanisms to protect teachersin a state where educators are often accused ofpolitical activism and repressed by thegovernment and government-supported groups.PTUZ worked with School DevelopmentCommittees,29 which consisted of parents, andgroups of teachers. However, the two groups haddifferent priorities. The parents wanted theschools open and operating, while the teacherswere more concerned with their personal safety.Discussions between the groups minimized thedistrust that initially existed between them andenabled the establishment of voluntary Teacher-Student-Parent Defense Units. Through these,parents warned teachers of impending danger30and, at times, arranged evacuation by rapidresponse teams. Parents also intervened asmediators between would-be attackers andteachers.31 However, PTUZ reported that oncetheir children had completed school, parentswould lose interest in the group’s activities,making it difficult to continue to engage some ofthe best negotiators and requiring on-goingrecruitment and training of new group members.32

Children are a particular stakeholder group that shouldbe engaged, especially when identifying issues ofconcern related to protecting education. Often childrenexperience events differently than adults. Solicitingtheir views enables programs to address their needsmore accurately and should be done using techniquesthat allow children of different ages, genders, andabilities to discuss their concerns (e.g. focus groupdiscussions, theatre forums, role-playing, games, andother participatory activities).

One method for eliciting community concerns, includingthose of children, is through a needs assessment that

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identifies education needs, local capacities, and theways in which external actors, international and nationalNGOs, donors and government, might collaborate withcommunities to ensure children’s right to education isprotected. Needs assessments also help establish abaseline according to which program effectiveness canbe monitored and evaluated.

• Syrian crisis:33 In January 2013, an interagencyhumanitarian team, supported by the EuropeanCommunity Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the UK

Department for International Development(DFID), and the Office of US Foreign DisasterAssistance (OFDA) carried out an intersectorialneeds assessment to determine the conse-quences on education of the Syrian conflictbetween government and rebel groups.34 Theassessment35 found that communities havebegun responding to the crisis by developinglocal mechanisms for educating children. Localcivilian councils and activist groups have estab-lished informal community schools in mosquesand private homes in areas where governmentschools were destroyed or it is no longer safe toattend school. Inadequate educational resourceshave limited these efforts, but, because of theneeds assessment, external actors can ensurethat they complement rather than duplicate thecommunities’ efforts.

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Syrian children attend a small makeshift school, set up forfamilies who were scared to send their children far in the midst ofwar, in a village in northern Syria, 9 February 2013. The lessonsare taught by a medical student whose own studies were cut shortbecause of fighting. © 2013 Lynsey Addario/VII

Step 5: Creating wider ownershipSimultaneous to Step 4 above, programmers shouldcultivate a sense of common responsibility andownership among community members. By recognizingand reiterating the contributions of different individualsand groups within the community, this stage may alsoreinforce a more inclusive approach to programming.Indeed, it is hypothesized that schools managed bycommittees comprised of community members from

different religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups tend togarner greater support from the community as a wholeand be less vulnerable to attack.

Step 6: Developing a plan External actors should work with the representativecommunity groups and individuals to develop a jointplan that reflects community concerns, availableresources, possible risks, and constraints. Subsequentintervention should follow these jointly agreed plans,since veering from them may fuel distrust and tensionbetween external actors, school administration, andcommunity groups, threatening the success of any activ-ities to prevent attacks against schools. Additionally, allstakeholders should be made aware of the plans toensure there is trust between different parties andaccountability of all stakeholders.

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A teacher holds an outdoor class under military guard onthe outskirts of Mihtarlam, Afghanistan, where decadesof war and conflict have destroyed hundreds of schoolsand colleges, 19 December 2012. © 2012 Noorullah Shirzada/AFP/Getty Images

From the beginning, there should be a system for trans-parently reviewing and revising plans in case thesituation and priorities change. This is particularlyimportant in conflict-affected contexts, where thepolitical environment is dynamic and can have a signif-icant impact on the education system, with schoolsclosing, teachers being transferred, or curriculumamended. These changes should be taken into accountwhen operationalizing plans.

• Zimbabwe’s model of community-basedplanning:36 SNV Netherlands DevelopmentOrganization implemented a school-communityplanning process to contribute to school devel-opment. Through this process, communitymembers and school staff identified andanalyzed school development challenges andagreed on a plan through which the communitycould help develop the school. First, schoolheads, selected teachers, School DevelopmentCommittee representatives, traditional leaders,councillors, and relevant district stakeholdersfrom education, social welfare and localgovernment departments were trained withrelevant skills. Next, this group developed five to10 year school development plans to address themain education challenges. They also developeda plan for implementing specific activities in eachyear. The plans helped the school communitiesidentify funding partners, including UN agenciesand NGOs. In addition, the planning processcontributed to building trusting relationshipsbetween school staff and community members.

• School improvement plans in Nepal:37Save theChildren supported School ManagementCommittees (SMCs), PTAs, and students incarrying out a participatory school self-assessment that led to the development ofSchool Improvement Plans. The midterm projectevaluation found that all schools with the projecthad an improvement plan, in comparison withonly three out of eight control schools. TheNepalese government requires these plans inorder to access funding, so it is unlikely that onlythree schools had one. However, the findingscould indicate a lack of community awareness,involvement, and ownership over the schoolimprovement plans.

Step 7: Monitoring, evaluating (M&E) and ensuringaccountabilityProgram plans should also include mechanisms forcontinuous monitoring, evaluation, and accountabilityto take place throughout the project. This should includerepeated assessment of the level of participation bydifferent community groups, including marginalizedones, to ensure that it is appropriate for the projectdesign. Community members, including children shouldparticipate in the M&E process; involving a wide range ofstakeholders at each stage of project implementationhas been associated with overall improved programimpact.38Where possible and appropriate, communitymembers may lead aspects of the M&E process so thattheir perspectives influence the design process morefully. On-going monitoring, assessment, and evaluationcan enable early identification of tensions that mightcreate greater risks for education.

• A flower of understanding in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo (DRC): In the DRC, Save theChildren conducted an evaluation of thechallenges in their M&E and accountabilitysystems. The evaluation uncovered a need tochange the design of data collection tools. Forexample, one challenge identified was that incarrying out evaluation research, children andtheir families did not want to give written consent.In response, Save the Children staff were trainedon ways to teach communities about informed,confidential, and voluntary consent. Theydeveloped a “flower of understanding” tool toaccompany the discussion, in which thumbprintsof those consenting replaced the written consentform. Without the evaluation, this problem wouldnot have been uncovered and addressed.

Accountability mechanisms, in particular, are essentialfor ensuring that a program meets the needs of affectedbeneficiaries, the priorities of different groups arebalanced, and staff do not engage in inappropriatebehaviour. Any project should include mechanisms forcommunity members to share relevant concerns so thatthese issues can be addressed. A lack of accountabilitymechanisms may fuel distrust between communitiesand external actors, leading to program failure. This isparticularly the case with vulnerable populations,including children who may be more susceptible toabuse and exploitation.39 Establishing a system for

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children to report such incidents is vital since adultcommunity members may not be aware of all the abusesfaced by children.

• Child friendly complaints and responsemechanism in Dadaab, Kenya:40Save theChildren piloted a child friendly complaintsmechanism in Ifo refugee camp in Dadaab. Themechanism involved consultation with childrento understand how comfortable they were givingfeedback, ‘feedback’ desks where children couldreport complaints,41 beneficiary reference groups42 established to proactively solicit and givefeedback to the community, group discussionswith boys and girls separately, children’s clubmeetings, feedback boards, and drawing compe-titions. An evaluation of the feedback mechanismindicated four features that may make acomplaint mechanism more effective. It should:(1) be informed by children’s ideas and needs, (2)be located somewhere safe and confidential, aswell as be easily accessible and known tochildren, (3) use child friendly language, and (4)be managed by people trained to work withchildren, including on child friendly ‘inter-viewing,’ active listening, tolerance and patience.

• Challenges in implementing complaints mecha-nisms:43An INGO in Pakistan set up a complaintsmechanism as one component of an emergencychild labor prevention program. This includedhotlines, regular field monitoring visits, focusgroups with children and adults, and separateforms and systems for children to submitfeedback. However, a year and a half into theprogram, it was found that no children had usedthe separate systems for reporting. Had therebeen regular review of the system, the lack of usemay have been identified sooner and solutionsmay have been found.

Step 8: Carrying out a risk assessment The process of preventing and responding to attacksagainst education may be extremely risky, both for thosereporting cases and for those implementing protectiveprogramming. Risks have been reported to be especiallyhigh when engaging communities in the MRM,44supporting communities involved in negotiations witharmed groups and forces (including for the developmentof codes of conduct),45 and when individuals or groups

carry out advocacy or protests.46 A full assessment ofrisks to staff, community members, and children musttake place prior to protection activities, and on-goingrisk assessment should take place over the course of aproject. The risk assessment should identify possiblethreats, their probability, and means to mitigate them.Program plans should include activities to minimizerisks.

• Negotiations in Nepal: In Nepal, the risks toindividuals involved in negotiations have beenmitigated by holding secret, ‘back-door’ orinformal negotiations. These allowed groupscomprised predominantly of women to negotiatewith Maoists in a more discrete and less exposedmanner.47

• The MRM in Nepal:Communities in Nepal havealso been involved in the MRM, where field levelrespondents have reported that monitoring graveviolations under the MRM framework is particu-larly risky because of the level of detail andverification requirements. In Nepal, the MRMCountry Taskforce, co-chaired by UNICEF and theOffice of High Commissioner on Human Rights(OHCHR), and consisting of other UN agencies,INGOs, and local NGOs, was established inNovember 2005 to systematically document andreport on grave violations against children.48 TheTaskforce developed and put in place guidelinesand a code of conduct to ensure the safety ofmonitors and victims. Monitors were regularlytrained on personal and data security. Contactswith influential individuals in affected commu-nities facilitated access and dialogue with victimsin families, which helped protect the monitors.And in cases where monitoring was deemed riskyto the point of injury or death, monitors wereremoved from the case. Monitors also alwaysmade sure their respective district, regional, andcentral offices were aware of threats received.49

Step 9: Allowing groups to organize themselves Although external actors may suggest the establishmentof management committees or structures, allowingcommunity groups to organize and arrange these in amanner that suits them is important for encouraginglong-term momentum and sustainability. Communitygroups should, themselves, decide who should partic-ipate and lead activities, who should take on what roles

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and responsibilities, how often groups should meet, andhow work should be administered. External actors maygive guidance throughout the process, presentingoptions such as elections for a selection process,working group structures, or descriptions of roles liketreasurer, secretary, or president. They may also helpensure that principles like equality and non-discrimi-nation are maintained. It is important to find a balancebetween allowing communities to organize themselvesand making certain that interventions are consistentwith human rights standards. For example, if the struc-tures community members choose reinforce structuralbiases and exclusions, external agencies may presentalternative options that address entrenched powerdynamics. This may allow community members torecognize these concerns themselves and find solutionssuitable to their contexts.

Depending on context, groups may organize themselvesin different ways. In some situations, excluded groupsmay prefer parallel decision-making structures. Thesemay reassure those who are marginalized that theirvoices are given equal weight and contribute todecision-making.

Step 10: Capacity strengthening, awareness-raising,and/or social behavioural change communication Once a community and its partners have developed aplan, organizational structures, and focal points, it isimportant to jointly determine learning or capacitystrengthening needs. Communities should help identifythese needs rather than external groups imposingsubjects and strategies for social or behavioural changeand learning. Some of this information may have beengathered during needs assessment processes, or duringmeetings with community groups and individuals.Based on these needs, a capacity building, awareness-raising, and behavioural change strategy should bedeveloped.

• Capacity building efforts in Gaza:50 Followingescalating violence in the Gaza Strip in December2008 and January 2009 during Operation CastLead, Save the Children implemented a projectthat aimed to engage community mechanisms inimproving the protection of Palestinian childrenaffected by armed conflict. A component of thisproject was training of members of organizationsrunning Child Friendly Centers and engaged in theChild Protection Network. However, capacity

building was limited by the fact that manyindividuals who attended initial trainings laterchanged jobs. The evaluation indicated thatcapacity building should have been morecarefully planned, integrating regular review andrisk mitigation strategies into the plans.

• Bal Bandhus (child rights defenders) in India:51India’s National Commission for Protection ofChild Rights launched a three-year pilot, the BalBandhu Scheme for Protection of Child Rights inAreas of Civil Unrest,52 to address conflict experi-enced in remote locations in parts of AndhraPradesh, Chhattisgarh, Assam, Maharashtra, andBihar, which has disrupted children’s educationand led to military use of schools. The success ofthe program hinged on selecting resourcepersons53 to help choose Bal Bandhus, or childrights defenders. Chosen with communitysupport, the Bal Bandhus attended three-daytraining sessions during which they visitedexisting, successful community-driven initiativesin order to learn techniques for garneringcommunity support. They then returned to theircommunities, and between December 2010 andMarch 2012 were successful in organizingmarches and rallies, writing community letters ofprotest, and meeting with officials. These actionsmay have been one factor that led to the vacatingof schools by police or armed forces and thereturn of large numbers of children to school.

In order to successfully participate in activitiesprotecting education, communities must be aware of thecontent of the programs and of the expectations.

• Awareness-raising in the Philippines:54 InMindanao, the public signing of the codes ofconduct agreed to at the school or community-level ensured that all community members wereaware of the accords. This enabled a wider set ofpeople to be involved in holding parties toconflict to account.

Awareness-raising on the value of education may beparticularly important. In some social settings, what isperceived as “Western style” education may be viewednegatively. For example, the popular name of theNigerian group “Boko Haram,” literally translates to“western education is sinful.” Media reports indicatethat the group may have some popular support in thenorth of the country.55 In a context like this, communities

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A pupil at a bush school in Central African Republic.In this area in the northwest, around 80% ofchildren had to abandon school completely to fleefighting between the government and armed rebelsin 2008. © 2009 Simon Davis/Department for International Development

may be ideologically aligned with those who attackeducation. Community support for and ownership ofeducation may, therefore, enable more effectiveprotection of education. While difficult to cultivate,external actors may take several actions to buildcommunity support for education, includingengaging in long term-intervention and relationship-building, using role models to demonstrate the valueof education and encourage community support foreducation, and collaborating with local NGOs.56

Step 11: Resourcing and implementing the planThe resources to be provided and methods for imple-menting protection projects should be jointly agreedupon by all stakeholders, including communityrepresentatives. Community members and groupsmust be given the opportunity to identify andpropose the resource contributions they are able tomake. Community provided resources may include:individual or group time, a meeting place, adminis-tration or management activities, transport, ormaterials. Mobilizing community level resources canbe vital in the humanitarian contexts in whicheducation is under-funded.57 Once resourcingresponsibilities are agreed upon, the plan, asdeveloped together in Step 6, may be implemented.

• Community appointed guards in Liberia58 andAfghanistan:59 In Liberia, several commu-nities in the north of the country contributedunarmed guards as a cost-effective andsustainable protection mechanism, whichmade teachers and students feel safe. InAfghanistan, some communities later tookover the responsibility for resourcingcommunity guards to protect schools, andcommunity members sometimes supportedassigned guards with patrolling at night.

•Bush schools in Central African Republic:60Humanitarian organizations in the CAR haveimplemented “bush schools” as anemergency education response in conflict-affected communities that lack open schoolsor qualified teachers. These temporary schoolstructures have been set up in areas ofdisplacement and villages deemed secure.UNICEF and partner NGOs have trainedparents to work with teachers (known inFrench as maître-parents). They also have

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trained parents’ associations to manage paymentof school fees and maître-parents’ salaries and toprovide students with textbooks and other schoolmaterials. Where communities have not had themoney, they have sometimes paid salaries “in-kind” by farming land or providing agriculturalproducts from their harvest.

Step 12: Feeding back lessons learned A mechanism for ensuring that any lessons learned,decisions made, and outcomes achieved are sharedwith all stakeholders throughout the project cycle willhelp maintain engagement of community groups andretain trust between different stakeholders. Frustrationand a lack of trust can prevent plans from progressingand being properly implemented.

• Volunteer frustration in Gaza:Volunteers engagedin the Save the Children program to improve thewell-being of children in Gaza and Lebanonexpressed frustration that their internationalpartners did not provide any feedback on theeffect of their work.61

Cross cutting strategies and approachesCertain strategies for engaging communities should beconsidered throughout all project cycles in order to buildpositive working relationships at the local level. Thefollowing approaches are relevant to each of the 12 stepsdiscussed above. They include staffing, partnershipsand child participation, and the principle of do no harm.

Staffing the program team

Staff working to implement the education protectionproject or program should have the language skills andcultural understanding to work with the community inquestion, and their religious, political, ethnic, andlinguistic make-up should be representative of thepopulations they will be working with. Recruiting a paidstaff team entirely from one ethnic, religious or linguisticgroup to work with a different ethnic, religious, orlinguistic group may exacerbate pre-existing tensions ifthese are a cause of conflict. It may be preferable torecruit from within the community or among individualswith similar cultural background and languages for thepositions that work most closely with those commu-nities. Doing so can ensure community ownership,create stronger relationships, enable better adaptationof programing to local conditions, empower the local

population, and enhance sustainability. However, itmust be done in a way that is not discriminatory andmaintains neutrality to the greatest degree possible sothat the project or school is not viewed as associatedwith a particular party to conflict.62

Working with and through local NGO partners

Working with and through local NGO partners may be agood method for engaging communities. In somecontexts, working with international actors mayendanger community groups. For example, inAfghanistan, association with particular internationaldonors can increase risk.63 In other contexts, local NGOsmay have stronger knowledge of and more establishedand longer-term relationships with communities. Indeveloping codes of conduct, for instance, UN agenciesand INGOs have had success in engaging communitiesthrough local partners, whose staff speak locallanguages and understand the context.64 Furthermore,engaging NGO partners may enable on-going programmonitoring that could not be achieved by externalactors, without very high resource investment. For somemore detailed case examples of working through andwith local NGOs, see Appendix 2.

Child Participation

As noted in several of the steps above, engaging theperspective and input of children can ensure that theirpriorities are addressed. Children’s views should besought throughout the intervention process, from identi-fying needs and setting priorities to evaluation projectoutcomes. Special systems should be put in place toensure children’s inclusion. These may includerecruiting and training staff with skills for working withchildren, adapting communications materials and toolsto different age groups, and organizing activities in away that is engaging, welcoming, and appropriate forchildren (e.g. holding events at times of day that areaccessible and safe for children). For some moredetailed examples of ensuring child participation inprogramming, in particular, guidance on includingchildren’s input in the MRM system, see Appendix 3.

Adapting programming to context

The project implementation process and each of itscomponents should be adapted to the individualcommunity in which an intervention is implemented.Implementing activities in a way that contravenesculture and traditions may breed distrust and tension,

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which is particularly problematic in situations ofconflict. Decisions about project materials, staffing, andprogramming techniques should take into accountcultural, political, religious, ethnic, and linguistic differ-ences between communities. Engaging communitiesearly in the planning process, as well as in on-goingmonitoring and evaluation, can facilitate the adaptationof program design.65

As discussed in these steps, working with communitiesmay make the work of external actors in protectingeducation more effective. It may help reduce costs,

ensure actions are tailored to context, achieve sustain-ability, and gain credibility with parties to a conflict. Thenext section of this paper explores in depth how UNagencies and INGOs in Côte d’Ivoire have engagedcommunities to protect education, providing examplesof each step in the process where relevant.

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A teacher plays ball with Syrian refugee kids in theschool grounds in Lebanon, September 5, 2013. Thiseducational program is sponsored by UNICEF andexecuted by a Lebanese NGO. © 2013 Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images

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A poll worker marks votes for former presidentHenri Konan Bedie on a school blackboardduring vote counting at a polling station innorthern Côte d’Ivoire, 31 October 2010. © 2010 AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell

Côte d’Ivoire: howcommunities haveworked with UNagencies and INGOs In recent years, Côte d’Ivoire has been plagued bysporadic political and ethnic violence, which peakedin 2002 and then again in 2010, following contestedelections.66 From 2007 until the 2010 elections, thecountry was divided between the government, whichcontrolled the south, and the Forces Armées - ForcesNouvelle (FAFN), which controlled the center, north,and west of the country (referred to as CNO, Centre,Nord, et Ouest). A buffer zone, the Zone de Confiance(the Zone of Confidence), separated the country intwo.67 Since 2010, the government of PresidentAlassane Ouattara has administered the wholecountry.

The CNO region in particular has continued to besignificantly poorer than the rest of the country withits education system badly affected by conflict. The2002-2003 crisis was most intense in the west of thecountry, and huge numbers of people migrated fromthe north to the south. The government called forteachers to move to the government-controlledsouth, and education budgets to the CNO remainedfrozen for years, draining the north of educationprovided by professionals.68 The quality of educationdeteriorated, and the cost of education, whereschools remained open, fell upon parents.69

Furthermore, in the CNO and across Côte d’Ivoire,schools have been damaged and looted, and armedgroups and state forces have used them for housing,ammunitions and weapons storage, and as massgraves.70 In total, during 2011, 477 schools wereaffected, depriving an estimated 67,500 children ofeducation.71 Across the country, school closureslasted anywhere from a few days to five months,72with the regions of Moyen-Cavally, Haut-Sassandrain the west, and Lagunes in the south, worst-affected.73 During the 2010-2011 crisis, there werealso reports of kidnappings and knife attacksagainst school directors, teachers, and students.74 Inthis context, communities have played a role inprotecting education by engaging in negotiations

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with non-state armed groups and state armed forces,escorting children to school, setting up alternatives toformal education, and participating in school recon-struction.

This section presents a case study of communityinvolvement in the protection of education in Côted’Ivoire. Information for the case study was collectedin-country, through interviews, focus group discus-sions, and visits to three conflict-affected communities(one urban, two rural). Respondents includedMinistère de l’Education Nationale et del’Enseignement Technique (MENET) officials, UNagency staff,75 NGO staff,76Direction Régionale del’Education Nationale et de l’Enseignement Technique(DRENET) officials, members of local Comité de Gestiondes Etablissements Scolaires (COGES) or schoolmanagement committees, school principals, teachers,community leaders, children, and parents (seeAppendix 4 for more details on the case study method-ology).77

Key findings: Actions to protect education from attack Community visits, focus groups, and interviewsconducted for the case study demonstrated thatcommunities in Côte d’Ivoire are engaged in efforts toprevent, mitigate, and respond to attacks oneducation. The following are the main methods forprotecting education that communities have used.

• Prevention

° Sending children to school in groups and/oraccompanied by parents: In the urbancommunity, students and parents reportedthat pupils would initially travel to and fromschool in groups as a safety precaution evenbefore the crisis. Some mothers said thatfollowing the crisis, they accompanied thegroups of students as an additional safetymeasure. Later, successful negotiationsbetween the school principal andcommanding officers in the area eliminatedthe need for group travel and escorts for thestudents.

° Redeployment of teachers at risk: Followingthe 2002-2003 crisis, the governmentredeployed all civil servants, includingteachers to the CNO areas. Teachers received

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Children attend primary school in western Côte d’Ivoire,May 2011. At that time, only a third of the teachers hadreturned since the school had reopened. © UNICEF/NYHQ2011-0587/OLIVIER ASSELIN

financial incentives to return to their posts inthe CNO.78 Interviewees described this effortas protective because the presence ofteachers allowed schools to remain open.Participants reported that schools thatremained closed were more likely to beattacked and/or used for military purposes.

• Mitigation

° Use of short message service (SMS) betweenstudents to monitor well-being and send

warnings: Students and parents in urbanareas reported using mobile phone communi-cation as part of informal early warningsystems during and after the 2011 crisis.Students called friends and family to check ontheir safety and find out about the situation,and women used mobile phones to confirmthe safety and well-being of theirchildren.When fighting was bad and it wasdifficult to obtain phone credit, some networkoperators provided free airtime to theircustomers.

• Response

° Monitoring and reporting of attacks againstschools and advocacy: In Côte d’Ivoire, partici-pants reported that data collected under the

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Damage to a school building located near the military camp ofAkouedo is seen following fire from U.N. and French militaryaircraft aimed at troops loyal to Côte d’Ivoire’s incumbentpresident in Abidjan, 10 April 2011. © 2011 REUTERS/Thierry Gouegnon

MRM has informed national and internationaladvocacy initiatives. MRM data from Côted’Ivoire has indicated that schools there weremore likely to be used for military purposeswhen they were closed for long periods oftime. UN agencies, NGOs, and communitylevel actors have tried to reopen schools asquickly as possible following crises in order toprevent this type of use, and they haveengaged in advocacy to this end.

° Negotiation with armed groups and forcesusing schools: In several cases where schoolswere used for military purposes, communitiesreported negotiation between schooldirectors, COGES members and leaders, andsoldiers, zone commanders, or regional SousPrefet (Sub Prefect) for the removal of securitypersonnel from the schools. Preliminarytelephone interviews to COGES in affectedregions found that ten out of 20 communitiescontacted had engaged in this type of negoti-ation, with mixed outcomes. In one of thethree villages visited, there were community-led negotiations to remove the armed forcesfrom school facilities that they were using formilitary purposes. These negotiations werepartially effective. Violent incidents werereduced and some troops left, but othersstayed in the school. (See below example forStep 8: Carrying out a risk assessment formore details on negotiations in thiscommunity.)

° Temporary learning spaces (TLS) and alter-native forms of education delivery: A range ofinternational actors have supported theestablishment of non-formal educationcenters in Côte d’Ivoire as alternative mecha-nisms for maintaining education for children.Actors including, UNICEF, Save the Children,the International Rescue Committee (IRC), andthe Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) havecoordinated with communities to implementTLS and accelerated learning programs in theCNO regions of the country where childrenwere unable to access formal education inareas under FAFN control. COGES and parentsin one rural community visited for this studyreported building apatams (temporary struc-

tures made from bamboo) so that damagedschools could resume classes. These informaleducation structures may be less likely to beattacked than formal schools because theyare not associated with the government andhave less permanent infrastructure, andbecause communities may feel greaterownership over them.79 In addition, wherecommunity dissatisfaction with the lack ofgovernment service provision in CNO areasbreeds violence, these alternative educationforms may contribute to longer-term stabilityby maintaining children’s access toeducation. Among all of the protectivemeasures found in Côte d’Ivoire, Ivoriancommunities were most active in supportingalternative delivery of education. As reportedin all three sites, community members facili-tated independent study during schoolclosures, or, as reported in two sites in eachlocation, they mobilized themselves to takeup the role of teachers (reported in both therural locations) or to help construct TLS.

° Rehabilitation of school buildings: Communitymembers have provided labor and materialsto rehabilitate school buildings damaged byattack. Communities also were involved infundraising for the rehabilitation of schoolbuildings in two locations visited. One ruralcommunity reported that villagers contributedfinancially to projects otherwise funded by theWorld Bank. They provided five percent of theconstruction budget for a teachers’ house andanother five percent to rehabilitate a three-classroom building. Parents also donatedtheir time and labor to maintain the school—for example, by cutting the grass. In anotherrural community, female community memberscontributed to a Solidarités project rehabili-tating two classrooms by providing water andcarrying sand.

These examples highlight instances where Ivoriancommunities were successful in protecting education,but also illustrate several failures. Significantly, some ofthe most significant ways in which communities act toprotect education (e.g. escorting students, using SMSfor warning, and negotiating with armed groups) havebeen done independently of external involvement.

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A female facilitator draws with Ivorianchildren, who had taken refuge in Liberia withtheir family, at a Child Friendly Space (CFS)run by Save the Children. © 2012 Canadian Press/AP Images

Indeed, communities reported a lack of trust in interna-tional agencies and government actors, whichoccasionally impeded cooperation. As the next sectionshows, engaging communities according to the stepsdiscussed in this paper may help address communities’concerns.

Steps for engaging communities and lessons learned in Côte d’Ivoire Research in Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates the advantagesand challenges of many of the steps of communitycollaboration. The illustrations below include exampleswhere steps were taken effectively, generating positiveoutcomes, as well as instances where steps weremissed, with negative repercussions. For one of thesteps (6: Developing a plan), no example was found.

• Step 1: Coordination: The researchers foundseveral cases where insufficient coordinationamong international and local actors increasedcommunal tensions and decreased the effec-tiveness of efforts to protect education. In onecommunity visited, NGOs failed to coordinatetheir efforts, leading agencies to compete witheach other for community participation. TheNGOs gave varying stipends in exchange forparticipation, making some more “popular”among community members than others.Increased coordination among these NGOs couldhave mitigated these problems.

In another example, insufficient coordinationamong potential stakeholders resulted in inade-quate monitoring of attacks on education.Although the MRM mandates monitoring attackson school buildings as well as on individuals, nosystems for monitoring attacks againstindividuals were found in Côte d’Ivoire. Closercollaboration between education and childprotection actors could have facilitated reportingon attacks against students, teachers, and othereducation staff. For example, education actorscould work with CPCs, which already have mecha-nisms for reporting and managing data collectedon individuals who experience violence andabuse. Training the community-based CPCs ongrave violations relating to education wouldenable them to identify and report on attacksagainst education.

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• Step 2: Mapping and power analysis: Insufficientmapping of efforts that Ivorian communities werealready engaged in to protect their children andschools meant that external actors failed toidentify opportunities to enhance these efforts.Indeed, initiatives such as parent escorts ofchildren to and from school or the use of mobilephone technologies for early warning are innova-tions that international organizations could buildon. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, the majority ofthe population has access to a mobile phone,80and its use for information dissemination hasstrong potential. Students and parents reportedusing SMS systems informally to warn each otherof attacks and to monitor others’ well-being. Hadinternational organizations carried out athorough mapping of the communities, they mayhave recognized the actions that the commu-nities were already taking to use mobile phonesto identify threats and have been able to createprogramming that built on them by creating amore structured warning system that formalizedcommunication trees at school-level. This couldbe a feasible, low cost, and effective way to buildan early warning system against attacks.Similarly, research in Côte d’Ivoire indicated thatstudy groups can be an effective way to maintaineducation and keep teachers and students safe.The government, UN agencies, and INGOs couldinvest in developing modules and programs thatcan be accessed remotely using technology,including the Internet and mobile phones.

• Step 3: Creating social cohesion: Two examplesfrom Côte d’Ivoire illustrate the importance ofsocial cohesion and how it can facilitate access toa protective and peaceful educationenvironment. One rural community in the west ofthe country consists of several different religiousand ethnic groups, as well as various national-ities—a consequence, in part, of waves ofinternally displaced populations settling in ornear it. Because of this diversity and the pressureof newcomers, the community was the site ofsignificant internal tensions following the 2003and 2011 crises.

Local and international NGOs (includingSolidarite, Handicap International, and IRC) withthe support of UNHCR, tried to address the

problem of social cohesion by implementingcommunity athletics days, trainings, workshops,and cultural activities. A local NGO (AWECO) alsoestablished a Peace Committee in the village. Themembers of the Peace Committee receivedtraining and support on conflict mediation andsubsequently implemented communityawareness raising workshops, helped repaircommunity relationships, and strengthencommunity cohesion. These activities allowedcommunity members to come to agreements onseveral issues of difference, including theconstruction of a new school that opened in 2013.

In addition, across Côte d’Ivoire, the governmenthas implemented peace and reconciliation initia-tives at schools. Following the most recent crisis,MENET held a workshop encouraging all teachersand school administrators to ensure that theirschool atmospheres were safe and politicallyneutral after schools reopened. One schoolprincipal reported building on what he hadlearned at the workshop by holding meetingswith community and religious leaders on culti-vating peaceful relationships within thecommunity that would enable children to resumeclasses in a safe and peaceful environment.

• Step 4: Identifying issues of concern tocommunity-level stake holders (includingchildren): When they speak with all community-level stakeholders, external actors in Côte d’Ivoireare able to make sure that they are aware of thepriorities and concerns of all groups. For example,some interviewees reported that by speaking withgroups of boys and girls separately, they wereable to find out that secondary school boys wereparticularly concerned about recruitment intoarmed forces and groups, while adolescent girlswere wary of sexual violence. Without havingspoken to these different groups of children, thedistinct issues they face would not have beenknown.

• Step 5: Creating wider ownership: The researchcarried out in Côte d’Ivoire underscored theimportance of cultivating community ownershipand positive attitudes that sustain education intimes of crisis. Interestingly, interviews indicatedgreater parental participation and ownership of

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schools in rural than in urban areas—a findingthat might be attributable to the fact that thereare fewer educational options in rural commu-nities. Parents in urban areas tended to havegreater awareness of their rights, demand more ofthe state, and demonstrate less commitment tosupport schools. As was demonstrated in thesecommunities, the greater a sense of ownership acommunity has over its education, the more likelyits members are to invest in protecting theeducation system by providing human resources(e.g. volunteer teachers and unarmed volunteerguards), construction materials, or space fortemporary schools, or to engage in negotiationsto protect their schools.

• Step 6: Developing a plan:No example of step sixwas found in Côte d’Ivoire.

• Step 7: M&E and ensuring accountability: Acouple of examples from Côte d’Ivoire show thatmonitoring programs and holding stakeholdersaccountable are essential activities—particularlyfor building trusting relationships betweencommunity members and external agencies thatenable effective programming. Trust was aconcern that arose commonly in focus groupdiscussions, with participants reporting that lackof trust impeded collaboration between commu-nities, school administration, NGOs, and UNagencies. For example, one community reportedan example in which an international agencytransferred funds directly to a school principal,bypassing the COGES and making it impossiblefor parents to monitor the funds. The funds laterwent missing, straining the relationship betweenthe community and the agency. On the otherhand, the World Food Program engaged parentsin monitoring and distributing food at onecommunity’s school, reportedly improvingrelations between the school administration andthe community because parents appreciatedknowing how donations were used anddistributed. These examples show how importantit is for external agencies to increase parentalresponsibility and engage parents in schoolmanagement processes.

• Step 8: Carrying out a risk assessment:Negotiations that took place in several Ivorian

communities show that, although there are limitsto what a risk assessment may uncover, real risksdo exist. It is critical to consider these whenengaging in sensitive activities. Indeed, thesuccess of local negotiations varied greatlydepending on highly context-specific factors. Inone case, community members ended up fleeingafter being threatened by the soldiers they werenegotiating with over the use of the school. Inanother case, negotiations resulted in unarmedfighting between villagers and soldiers. However,other cases were more successful. In one ruralvillage, an armed group led by Liberians andSierra Leoneans took over the teachers’ lodgingsand a military checkpoint was built close to theschool. The armed groups threatened and physi-cally beat the principal and teachers. The villagechief, who had lived in Liberia for many years,negotiated for them to vacate the premises,offering a goat. While the armed group stayed,they reduced the number of troops, and thecommunity reported a reduction in the number ofviolent incidents. As these examples demon-strate, negotiations may be highly risky. Withoutassessing these risks, organizations interested infacilitating negotiations could end up fuellingtensions between community members andarmed groups; or, alternatively, they could end upnot being able to take advantage of factors thatcould facilitate negotiations.

• Step 9: Allowing groups to organize themselves:Save the Children and UNICEF have engagedmarginalized groups like children and mothers bysupporting children’s and mothers’ clubs inprimary schools throughout Côte d’Ivoire.However, their efforts demonstrate thechallenges in allowing groups to organizethemselves while at the same time ensuring thatall relevant stakeholders are empowered toparticipate. Across Côte d’Ivoire, Save theChildren helped establish children’s clubs,training a child-selected mentor and explaining toother stakeholders, such as school directors,SMC members, teachers, and parents, the objec-tives of the clubs. However, it was found thatwhile the children’s clubs were effective in raisingawareness of rights and protection concerns, thedirect engagement of children in school

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management committees, as mandated by agovernment decree, is tokenistic at best.Although the children’s club presidents areofficially members of a school’s managementcommittee, in reality, they are not always invitedto meetings and are given few opportunities toexpress their views.

• Step 10: Capacity strengthening, awareness-raising, and/or other social behavioural changecommunication:An intervention carried out bySave the Children in Côte d’Ivoire illustrates howraising local community awareness abouteducation can help effectively protect students,teachers, and schools. As part of its Rewrite theFutureprogram,81 Save the Children hasencouraged communities in Côte d’Ivoire toimplement security measures, with the goal ofincreasing access to school and improving thequality of education. Project planning involvedraising awareness among school directors,teachers, children’s clubs, and parents. Initialevents were targeted at children and COGES, afterwhich children and teacher mentors developedtheir own awareness-raising activities (oneducation, child rights, and protection) targetedat the whole community. Subsequently, Save theChildren, along with parents, children, teachers,and COGES, identified the resources that thecommunity could contribute to schoolprotection.82 Communities helped providevolunteer guards and improve school enclosures,fencing, gates, and doors, and children helpedfundraise for school construction.

• Step 11: Resourcing and implementing the plan:In Côte d’Ivoire, community resources have beenvital for protecting education. For instance,communities have supported the alternativedelivery of education, including managing thesites (day-to-day supervision and budgetsupport), providing suitable spaces, andconstructing makeshift or temporary buildings. Incomparison to urban locations, the rural commu-nities visited reported providing more resourcesto support alternative learning spaces, includingin-kind payments, as well as provision ofmaterials for and participation in schoolconstruction.

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Soldiers from the 'Invisible Commandos' practiceambush techniques at a middle school serving as abase in the PK-18 area of the Abobo neighbourhoodin Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 19 April 2011. © 2011 AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell

Furthermore, one of the most important ways thatcommunities have contributed to alternativelearning is through the provision of volunteerteachers. Volunteer teachers were pivotal afterthe attempted coup of 2002, since, even aftergovernment education personnel began to beredeployed, staff shortages remained and trainedteachers were unwilling to work in areascontrolled by the FAFN. Teachers were oftenparents or students who had completed theirhigh school certificates. Depending on theirlocation, they may have received training andtechnical support from education ministry staff inregional offices or NGOs. The government alsoprovided training modules for untrained teachers,and while communities initially paid teacherswith either cash, in-kind, or field labor, thegovernment later began to integrate them intotheir payroll. However, reliance on volunteer

teachers has tended to reduce the quality ofeducation that students in the CNO areas receive.Even those students who have completed andpassed their baccalaureate still face discrimi-nation if they try to further their education inAbidjan because of the assumption that they arenot well trained. In response, existing non-formaleducation programs in Côte d’Ivoire are beingharmonized, training is being given to educatorsto ensure quality, and the government is recog-nizing the value of these alternative forms ofeducation. In collaboration with the Ministry ofEducation, the NRC is developing national guide-lines to standardize implementation practices inbridging programs helping children in littleserved areas to access services. These efforts toensure more equitable access to education areimportant given that lack of service provision,such as of education, in the CNO areas has been

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How the step by step process works in practice: The IRC’s model of community involvement in school rehabilitation in Côte d’IvoireResearch in Côte d’Ivoire uncovered a strong example of collaboration between communities andan international NGO.83 The NGO initially contacted the village in January 2010 and held acommunity meeting about implementing the project. According to IRC staff, “elders, youth,women… everyone was there” (STEP 5 - Creating wider ownership). The community was asked toprioritize a project (STEP 4 – Identifying issues of concern to community-level stakeholders) anddecided they wanted to refurbish their school, which had been damaged during the 2002 crisisand subsequently deteriorated through general disrepair.

When the community was notified the project would go ahead in February 2010, a communityrehabilitation committee was set up to support the project. The committee had to send out arequest for bids for the construction project, organize committee members’ participation in recon-struction,84 and generate 5% of the funding themselves (STEP 9 - Allowing groups to organizethemselves and Step 11 - Resourcing and implementing the plan). The NGO trained the committeeon monitoring and evaluation, including reporting requirements (STEP 7 - M&E and STEP 10 -Capacity strengthening).

Construction finally began in October 2010, but was interrupted by the 2010-2011 crisis, duringwhich the school’s doors were broken, desks were stolen, and the teacher’s lodges used anddamaged by armed forces. The contractor fled for safety. To restart the project, the community hadto send out a second tender. They did this on their own initiative.

one source of political tension, conflict, andviolence in Côte d’Ivoire.

• Step 12: Feeding back lessons learned: Amongthe violations that the UN-led MRM tracks areattacks on schools, including on students andteachers. Efforts to engage communities inreporting these violations show how important itis for external actors to provide feedback. In Côted’Ivoire, MRM data has primarily been collectedthrough informal networks made up of schoolinspectors, regional education district officers,UN agencies, and NGOs. Although community-based Child Protection Committees (CPCs) wereintended to feed information from communitiesinto the MRM, in practice, this system forreporting has not functioned well, with attacksagainst teachers and pupils going largely undocu-mented and only physical attacks against schoolstructures (including damage, looting, and use ofschool buildings as barracks, weapons storage,and mass graves) being recorded. This is in partbecause CPCs in Côte d’Ivoire vary in whether ornot they function. Additionally, while CPCs, whichfocus more on people, are trained to identify childprotection cases and employ basic casemanagement practices, they have not recordedand reported systematically on attacks onschools. Research in Ivorian communitiesindicated that this failure to report is in part dueto a lack of understanding and awareness aboutthe MRM and its purposes. Only a handful of keyinformants mentioned monthly data collection,and even they did not know the purpose of theinformation sharing process. The information gapis compounded because it is often difficult todetermine whether individuals are injuredbecause of general conflict-related violence orbecause they are directly targeted because oftheir status as educators. More comprehensivefeedback to CPCs and local communities on thepurpose of the MRM and the types of informationthat need to be collected could increasemotivation to report the relevant incidents.

ConclusionThe case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates a range of ways inwhich communities might participate in the protectionof education: building and contributing to early warningsystems, providing human and material resources toprotect schools, negotiating with armed groups, andfeeding into monitoring and reporting systems.Research from Côte d’Ivoire also demonstrates howimportant it is to carefully plan and consider how to workwith local communities towards the protection ofeducation. It suggests that, in situations of conflict,communities remain concerned with maintaining theirchildren’s education.

Nevertheless, there is significant potential for misstepswhen engaging local communities, and doing so can notonly damage program effectiveness but inflame existingtensions, putting students, teachers, and their schoolsat even greater risk. As the successes and errorsdescribed in this case study show, external actors mustdevelop in-depth and detailed knowledge about thecommunities, as well as strong relationships withcommunity members, in order to successfullyimplement initiatives protecting education. Makingmistakes—either because of a lack of contextualknowledge or for any other reason—can decrease trustbetween communities and external actors and withincommunities themselves.

Among the challenges and potential pitfalls whenworking with communities to protect education are thefollowing:

• Variations in the composition of communitiesmeans that one model of response does not fit allcontexts. The issue of addressing attacks againsteducation requires a highly sensitive and timeand labour intensive approach that accounts forcultural differences and ensures that tensions arenot exacerbated.

• Ethnic and cultural divisions between nationalstaff, education personnel and community levelgroups, may reflect the divisions that are at theheart of the conflict. This may lead to antagonismbetween education structures and the commu-nities in which they are based.

• There may be language barriers between interna-tional and national agency staff and thecommunity groups with which they work, particu-

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larly in remote locations. This can contribute tomisunderstandings between external actors andcommunities.

• Where literacy rates are low, relying on writtenforms of communication, as INGOs and UNagencies often do, may limit outreach andfeedback.85

• Communities may not be inclined to maintainsupport, such as volunteerism and resourcedonation, for a program over the long term. Thiscan increase dependence on limited governmentor donor funding, and, in the worst case, lead to acessation of activities,86 contradicting theassumption that community action is moresustainable.

• Donor funding in conflict settings tends to beshort term, seeking quick impact, often withoutlonger term planning. This is often incompatiblewith effective local-level collaboration, sincedeveloping contextual knowledge and buildingstrong and trusting relationships takes time.

• Certain villages and communities may opposespecific aspects of education. Where educationstaff are viewed as aligned with a national orforeign government, tensions between commu-nities and school personnel may be high.

• If adequate and effective feedback mechanismsare not put in place from the outset, it is difficultto build trust, and communities may becomemore and more reluctant to collaborate withexternal actors in the future.

Only by recognizing and addressing these challengescan program actions implemented in collaboration withcommunities be successful. Working with local commu-nities has significant potential for protecting education.Keeping in mind the twelve steps outlined in this paperand ensuring the programs are comprehensivelymonitored and remain adaptable can enable externalpractitioners, planners, and policymakers to produc-tively and effectively keep students, teachers, and theirschools safe.

Conclusion andrecommendationsWhile the outcome or impact of engaging communitiesin protective mechanisms is not rigorously documentedor evaluated, humanitarian principles and codes ofconduct87 assume that collaboration with localindividuals and groups is a ‘best practice.’ Practitionersalso report that working with communities improvesprogram design and implementation, relevance, andsustainability, and lowers costs. This assumption thatcommunity engagement is intrinsically positive can beseen in guidance and reports on the protection ofeducation, which tend to promote collaboration withcommunities as a protective measure.88

However, this paper indicates that there remains limitedunderstanding of how different forms of communityengagement and strategies for engaging communitiesmay impact program outcomes—either positively ornegatively. Furthermore, conflict-related dynamics, suchas the forms and motivations for attacks on education,may inform how best to engage communities inprotecting their schools, students, and teachers.

A review of documentation on community engagementin protection and education generated primarily positiveand active examples of community engagement inprojects implemented by external actors. This may bebecause this material is reviewed from a UN or NGOperspective. However, research in Côte d’Ivoire contra-dicted this perspective. There, communities visitedreported feeling frequently unsupported or engagedonly superficially. In the absence of strong andsustained external support, communities haveoccasionally taken it upon themselves to protecteducation and increase access to it. A stronger under-standing of these efforts, community perceptions onworking with external actors, and of the relative benefitsof working with communities is necessary for strength-ening relationships between local, national, andinternational partners.

The following recommendations are made based onthese broad conclusions and the information gatheredand detailed above:

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Further research:• Conduct additional research on community

engagement: To inform programming and ensurethat it is effective, detailed and rigorous, researchis needed on:

° The relative benefits and risks of communityengagement in protective action, includingprevention, mitigation, response actions, andduring different steps in the project devel-opment, implementation, and monitoringprocess.

° The forms of community engagement thatenhance different types of program effec-tiveness, and under what conditions.

Donors: • Allocate longer-term funding for education

protection programs in conflict-affected states:Funding should go beyond immediate emergencyresponse and support both recovery and conflictpreparedness in order to enable UN agencies andINGOs to build strong and trusting relationshipswith communities.

• Invest in new technologies for early warning andalternative education delivery: Case studyresearch in Côte d’Ivoire indicated that there isgreat potential for technology to support earlywarning systems and alternative education toprotect education in conflict settings. Donorsshould invest money to explore and pilot howthese technologies can be applied.

• Allocate sufficient allocation of funding in allgrants for research, monitoring and evaluation:Additional funding for international agencies toassess and research the impact and outcomes oftheir efforts to protect education would enablefuture application of lessons learned.

UN agencies and INGOs: • Collaborate with secondary schools:Côte d’Ivoire

research indicated that certain forms of attack oneducation, including sexual abuse of girls ontheir way to and from school and boys beingrecruiting into armed groups at school, are signif-icant threats for children attending secondaryschool. However, UN and INGO efforts are oftenfocused on primary education. Close collabo-

ration with protection teams and communitiescould allow education teams to indirectly supportsecondary education and secondary school-agedchildren, even without funding to implementsecondary education programs.

• Invest in building trust:Case study researchunderscored the high importance of buildingtrusting relationships within communities andbetween communities and NGOs and UNagencies seeking to work in them. This is particu-larly important in contexts of conflict, duringwhich political and ethnic tensions and mistrustmay be heightened and exaggerated.

• Develop collaboration between education andchild protection actors in implementing the MRM,setting up and supporting community groups,and engaging in community mobilization andawareness-raising:

° Child protection actors have pre-existingmechanisms for reporting and managing datacollected on individuals who experienceviolence, and abuse. Engaging these in MRMreporting could help overcome challenges intracking incidents of attack against teachers,school administration, and children.

° Increased collaboration, including joint needsassessment, planning, monitoring and evalu-ation, between education and child protectionactors could help avoid duplication of effortswhere both set up community-levelcommittees to address issues facing children.This is important to avoid competition forvolunteer time and community resources.Additionally, because communitymobilization and awareness-raising is timeconsuming, joint workshops, events, andactivities may help preserve humanresources.

• Learn more about pre-existing communityresponses:As Côte d’Ivoire indicates, commu-nities may develop their own methods forprotecting education. INGOs and UN agenciesshould more systematically and thoroughly investin collecting information about these mecha-nisms since they could help develop innovativeprotection strategies.

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AppendicesAPPENDIx 1: Typology of Community Engagement

This four-level typology of community engagement hasbeen adapted from a typology of community partici-pation used by child protection actors to classify ways ofengaging communities in activities to achieve children’swell-being.89 The categories of engagement set outbelow indicate interconnected and sometimesoverlapping ways that communities can be engaged byexternal actors at the outset of the activity and take onlevels of responsibility. These include: community-initiated, community-implemented,community-inspired, and community involved.

Community-initiated: These program activities areconceived and set-up by community members, based onparameters established by them. They are alsomanaged, implemented, and resourced by communitiesthemselves. Maintained action is reliant entirely oncommunity motivation.

Community-implemented:Groups external to thecommunity conceive of and design program activities,but rely on community members to manage, support,and/or resource them. The assumption justifying thismodel is that when an external actor’s funding endscommunity volunteerism will sustain the intervention.

Community-inspired: Community groups conceive ofand develop projects, but rely on some form of externalsupport (human resources, skills, knowledge, advocacyor funding) to fully implement them. External actors mayplay a significant role in management and rollout ofactivities.

Community-involved: External actors conceive ofprogram activities, but solicit community perspectiveson implementation through participatory processes.Community members do not typically play a role indecision-making or management. They may volunteeroccasionally to support the project, but do not serve aslong-term human resources. The intervention is onlylikely to continue as long as the external funding streamis available.

Each of the different measures to protect education mayinvolve different forms of community engagement.Different forms of support may be more or less realistic

or effective depending on the contextual factors, such asthe nature of attacks or community values with regardsto education. Furthermore, activities may start out withone form of engagement and then evolve into another.For instance, an activity may originally be community-initiated but then be emulated by external actors, suchas UN agencies, NGOs or the government, who bring thatintervention to communities in other locations. It thusmay become a community-involved activity. Within onesetting, community, or program, it is also possible thatseveral different actions will be carried out with differentforms of engagement. Program planners can use thistypology to consider different options for communityengagement at different stages of the project implemen-tation process. Decisions should be made based onanalysis of how each option may help or hinderachievement of the desired outcomes. Which approachan NGO, UN agency, or government ministry decides totake will shape their staffing, funding, and operations.

Forms of Community Engagement: Case Examples COMMUNITY-INITIATED: Children and parents in Côted’Ivoire use SMS services on their mobile phones tomonitor the safety of children going to and from school.Parents also accompany their children to and fromschool during times of conflict.

COMMUNITY-IMPLEMENTED: UN agencies, INGOs, andthe MoE in the DRC initiate school managementcommittees. Community guards to protect schools inAfghanistan, initially supported by the government, arenow the responsibility of communities themselves.

COMMUNITY-INSPIRED: Communities initiate alternativeforms of education, such as bush-schools in CAR andcommunity schools in Afghanistan. Governments, inter-national NGOs, and UN agencies then adopt and scaleup these interventions.

COMMUNITY-INVOLVED: In rapid onset emergencies,international agencies solicit input from communities onthe design, implementation, and evaluation of projectsto provide temporary learning spaces. During the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, NGOs set uptemporary learning spaces in camp settings, aftercommunities fled.90 Because TLS needed to be estab-lished quickly, the degree to which the NGOs couldengage community participation was limited. However,community perspectives were solicited to informprogram design and monitoring.

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APPENDIx 2: Working with and through local NGOs

The following are examples of INGOs cooperating withlocal NGOs to engage local communities.

• SZoP in Nepal:91 In Nepal, Save the Childrenimplemented a SZoP program through localpartner organizations, often working with VillageChild Protection Committees previously set up bythe INGO. Working through these local groupsand other local organizations, Save the Childrenrecruited members of the local community towork as social mobilizers to support and facilitatethe development of local committees and childclubs. Child clubs and SMCs were instrumental inpromoting and monitoring the intervention. Theyenabled communities to be more involved inproject development and to play a central role inagreeing on the terms of the Codes of Conduct forteachers, students, and the community.

• Implementing the MRM with local NGOs inNepal:92 Nepal’s Country Taskforce on the MRMfound that working with local NGOs meant thatchildren and communities were morecomfortable sharing information than they wouldhave been if they were reporting to externalagencies. They preferred to report incidentsverbally to the local organizations, rather thanusing the complaints boxes set up by the INGOs.

• Mindanao Peoples Caucus monitoring violationsin the Philippines:93 The Mindanao PeoplesCaucus (MPC), formed in January 2003, trained3,500 local volunteers, called the BantayCeasefire group, to monitor and report violationsof the ceasefire agreement between the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) and thegovernment. Although their mandate is notspecific to education, it includes monitoringattacks on schools. It is believed that knowledgeof a civilian-led monitoring team watching andreporting on violations made armed actors morecautious.

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APPENDIx 3: Child participation in practice

The following are examples of regional and internationalactors engaging children in protecting their own rights,including the right to education.

• The Children’s Network (Red de Niños) ofColombia:94 This children’s movement inColombia has brought together children affectedby the conflict and violence. Children fromdifferent regions select representatives toadvocate on specific issues that concern them.They have been involved in:

° Writing a letter to the churches in Colombia,urging them to work on specific issues thatconcern children

° Presenting the concerns of children at theUnited Nations General Assembly SpecialSession on Children

° Campaigning for peace and for the release ofthose kidnapped by paramilitary and guerrillaforces at local level

• Children’s clubs in Nepal:95 As part of Save theChildren’s SZoP projects in Nepal, children’sclubs and peer networks helped ensure thatlearning continued in places where fighting wastoo intense for schools to stay open. These clubs,along with CPCs and SMCs, were believed to beone of the most important factors determining thesuccessful implementation of SZoP. Theyreportedly helped children gain awareness of andconfidence in defending their rights as children toadults, including school authority figures andpolitical groups.

Best practices in involving children in implementingthe Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism96

To monitor abuses against children in conflict settings,the MRM, established by the United Nations, ismanaged by a country taskforce, which relies on reportsfrom children, communities, civil society groups, NGOs,and UN agencies. Children should participate in thisprocess, both as survivors/victims of violations and asagents of protection themselves. In some situations,children, under adult supervision, have been involved inreporting, advocacy, awareness, and alert activities

through their communities and in schools. Children maydirectly report the details of incidents of grave viola-tions, such as attacks on schools, sexual violence, orrecruitment. For example, in DRC, children’s clubs, alongwith SMCs and PTAs, were trained and encouraged toreport violations of children’s rights through the MRM.97In addition children’s clubs in targeted schools weretrained and encouraged to participate in the MRM.Children have also undertaken local awareness activ-ities in conflict-affected areas to inform parents andother children about their rights and reporting systems.

In involving children in this way, it is important thatspecial care and consideration is taken to ensure theirwell-being and safety. Reporting should not increase therisk of children or their communities to threat, attack, orother violence. The best interests of the child, and thehumanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impar-tiality, and do no or less harm, guide the implementationof the MRM.

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APPENDIx 4: Côte d’Ivoire Methodology

Information was collected for the case study fromseveral sources. Thirty-five semi-structured interviewswith key informants were carried out at the national,regional, and local levels, including with Ministère del’Education Nationale et de l’Enseignement Technique -Ministry of National Education and Technical Training(MENET) officials, UN agency staff, NGO staff, DirectionRégionale de l’Education Nationale et de l’EnseignementTechnique (DRENET) officials, members of local Comitéde Gestion des Etablissements Scolaires– COGES, andschool principals.

In addition, three communities were visited, selectedbecause: a) their schools experienced attacks during2010-2011 post-electoral crisis; b) the community tookaction in response to these attacks; and c) the schoolcommunities had contact with an NGO or UN agency,enabling the authors to gain access for researchpurposes. Two school communities in rural locations inthe west and a high school community in the economiccapital in the south were visited. These are the regionsthat were worst affected by fighting during the 2010-2011crisis. During these visits, a total of 15 focus groupdiscussions took place, including 123 individuals.98These included:

• School going children (5 girls and 5 boys between13 and 16 years old)

• Non-school going children (5 girls and 5 boysbetween 13 and 16 years old)

• COGES executive committee members (10-13members)

• Women from the community (10 women)

• The village chief and council99

• Religious leaders100

In general, the interviews and focus group discussionssought to understand community attitudes towardeducation, community initiatives to protect education,successes and challenges in the protection ofeducation, and the role of external actors in supportingthe protection of education. Focus group participantswere reimbursed for transportation but were not paid orgiven any other incentives to provide information.

Interviewees were given no incentives to provide infor-mation.

Finally, project and program documents were collectedfrom government, NGOs, and UN agencies, in addition tonews releases, situation reports, and governmentcommuniqués. These provided background informationon the situation of education in Côte d’Ivoire and detailson specific program activities discussed.

Limitations: There were a number of limitations to thecase study research. Time constraints meant that onlythree sites in two regions of the country were visited.Given how widespread attacks on education in Côted’Ivoire are, according to the country’s EducationCluster,101 data collected from these three sites cannotbe considered systematic or representative of the overallresponse to protecting education from attack in Côted’Ivoire. Data collection on the 2002 crisis was impededby a high turnover rate of staff in government, NGOs andUN agencies, low institutional memory, and the timethat has passed since the 2002 crisis. Additionally,interview and focus group participants often mergedissues of attacks on education and access to education.Therefore, it was difficult to disaggregate the two discus-sions.

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Endnotes 1 For example, Glad, M. (2009). Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education inAfghanistan: Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation. Kabul, Afghanistan:CARE. 2 O’Malley (2010). Education Under Attack 2010. Paris: UNESCO, p. 10. Watchlist(2012). No one to trust: Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia. New York: Watch-list, p. 37.3 See, e.g. Groneman, C. (2011). Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures toProtect Education from Attack. New York: GCPEA, p. 13-15.4 UNICEF (2011). The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Case Study – Nepal. NewYork: UNICEF.5 Glad, M. (2009). Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Risksand Measures for Successful Mitigation. Kabul, Afghanistan: CARE, p. 3.6 Burde, D. (2010). Preventing violent attacks on education in Afghanistan: Consider-ing the role of community-based schools. In UNESCO, Protecting Education from At-tack: A State of the Art Review. Paris: UNESCO, p. 257.7 Ellery, F. and Webley, K. (2010) The Future is Now: Education for Children in Coun-tries Affected by Conflict. London, UK: Save the Children, p. 50.8 See, e.g., Save the Children (2009). Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation NepalMidterm Country Report. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 11.9 Previous research by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack [Grone-man (2011)] lists the programmatic measures to protect education from attack underfour broad headings, Protection, Prevention, Advocacy, and Monitoring, with com-munity involvement listed as a specific form of action under the category of “Protec-tion.” Here we see community involvement as an option in all forms of protectiveaction, and thus we will be looking at the full range of programmatic interventions. 10 Definition based on material found in Action for the Rights of Children (2009).Foundation module 6: Community mobilization. Geneva: ARC, p. 10; Child Protec-tion Working Group Sudan (2012). Working with Community-Based Child ProtectionCommittees and Networks: Handbook for Facilitators. Hong Kong: Child Frontiers, p.76.11 Thompson, H, (2014). The role of communities in protecting education. In GlobalCoalition to Protect Education from Attack, Education Under Attack 2014. New York:GCPEA, p. 86.12 For full details of the typology see Appendix 1.13 Prior to selecting Côte d’Ivoire as the location for research, twenty community-based groups were contacted by telephone and asked if they had been attacked,and what they had done in response to attacks on education. 14 In fact, mobilizing communities is recognized as a means of enabling the genera-tion of local solutions that are tailored to diverse settings. See Howard-Grabman, L.and Snetro, G. (2003). How to mobilize communities for health and social change.Baltimore, MD: Health Communication Partnership.15 The steps outlined in this report are based on the actions proposed for imple-menting programs that mobilize communities, as presented in the following publi-cations: Wessells, M. (2009). What Are We Learning about Protecting Children inthe Community? An inter-agency review of the evidence on community-based childprotection mechanisms in humanitarian and development settings. Save the Chil-dren Fund; Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2007). Action sheets 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and5.4. In Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Set-tings - Section on Community mobilization & support. Geneva: IASC; Child Protec-tion Working Group (2012). Minimum standards for child protection in humanitarianaction. CPWG; Howard-Grabman, L. and Snetro, G. (2003). How to mobilize commu-nities for health and social change. Baltimore, MD: Health Communication Partner-ship.

16 Learning Institutions or Schools as Zones of Peace is an initiative implemented bya variety of agencies, including UNICEF and Save the Children. Building on the con-cept of “children as zones of peace”—the idea that children should be protectedand should have access to services essential to their well-being—it typically con-sists of negotiations between school communities and armed groups to makeschool settings off limits. 17 Save the Children (2009). Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal MidtermCountry Report. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 9.18 The LIZOP process in The Philippines builds upon and is underpinned by nationallegislation, which is shared with local communities through the coordination mech-anisms that are integral to the project. See Diares, Brenda K. (2012). A SituationalAssessment of Attacks on Education in the Philippines. Davao City, Philippines:Save the Children;and Sheppard, B. and Knight, K. (2011). Disarming schools:strategies for ending the military use of schools during armed conflict. United Na-tions Institute for Disarmament Research.19 Watchlist (2008). Getting It Done and Doing It Right: Implementing the Monitor-ing and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict in Uganda. NewYork: Watchlist.20 See, e.g. Shrestha, M. (2012). The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism onGrave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A CivilSociety Perspective. New York: Watchlist, p. 8.21 In 2005, the UN Country Team in Uganda elected to implement the UN-led Moni-toring and Reporting Mechanism. In May 2006, the United Nations established theUganda Taskforce on Monitoring and Reporting. Co-chaired by UNICEF and the Officeof the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Taskforce’s members alsoinclude the Uganda Human Rights Commission, Save the Children in Uganda, andthe UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).22 The full list of participants is as follows: The child protection and gender-based vi-olence (GBV) sub-clusters, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM)cluster, UNHCR-supported camp management programs, service providers, andother NGOs.23 CPCs were first established in Uganda in 2005 to more efficiently coordinate theinitiatives of child protection agencies and district authorities. Since 2005, morethan 130 CPCs have been established throughout Acholi, Lango and Teso regions. 24 Johnson, S., Sbardella, D., Odaymat, F., and Alam, S. (2011, May 11-12). Protectingthe rights of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict through community-based mechanisms in the Gaza Strip and North Lebanon. Regional Workshop inAmman, Jordan. Beirut, Lebanon: Save the Children Sweden, p. 11-12.25 O’Malley, B. (ed.), and Smith, M., with Ashton, C., Prelis, S.,Wheaton, W., Sinclair,M. (2012). Case Study 4: Nepal: Negotiating a ‘Schools as Zones of Peace’ agree-ment. In

Global Education Cluster. Protecting Education in Countries Affected by ConflictBooklet 3: Community-based Protection and Prevention. Geneva: Global EducationCluster, p. 11-12; See also, Davies, L. (2012). Breaking the Cycle of Crisis: Learningfrom Save the Children’s Delivery of Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States.London, UK: Save the Children. 26 Ellery, F. with Webley, K. (2010). The Future is Now: Education for Children inCountries Affected by Conflict, Save the Children. Regional Workshop in Amman, Jor-dan. London, UK: Save the Children, p. 13.27 Communities appear to be more likely to support peace-building activities whenthey receive assistance in meeting their basic needs. For example, see Iyer, P.(2004). Peace Zones of Mindanao, Philippines: Civil Society Efforts to End Violence.Cambridge, MA: Collaborative Learning Projects, p. 22. 28 Pswarayi, L. and Reeler, T. (2012). Fragility and education in Zimbabwe: Assessingthe impact of violence on education. Harare, Zimbabwe: Research and AdvocacyUnit; Norwegian Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH)(2012). The language of the police batons: attacks on teachers and students in Zim-babwe. SAIH; and Personal Correspondence with key informant, May 2013.

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29 School development committees (SDCs) are bodies that are democraticallyelected by parents and communities on an annual basis. They provide communitiesmembers a voice in school management decision-making. For example, see Boon-stopel, E. and Chikohomero, R. (2011). School Development Committee Capacity Re-inforcement Project in Zimbabwe. SNV Netherlands Development Organization. 30 Groneman, C. (2011). Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Ed-ucation from Attack. New York: GCPEA, p. 66.31 Personal Correspondence with key informant, May 2013. 32 Personal Correspondence with key informant, May 2013.33 Assessment Working Group for Northern Syria (2013). Joint Rapid Assessment ofNorthern Syria: Final Report; Human Rights Watch (2013). Safe No More: Studentsand Schools under Attack in Syria. New York: HRW. 34 In Syria, the conflict between government and rebel groups has led to the deathand departure of many teachers. Thousands of school buildings have been dam-aged, and thousands more have been occupied by the internally displaced. Parentshave stopped sending their children to school for fear for their safety, resulting in asignificant reduction in school attendance. The Ministry of Education has stated thatin the areas worst affected by fighting, the percentage of children attending schoolmay be as low as 14 percent. In its February 2013 report, the UN Commission of In-quiry on Syria stated that “[s]chool attendances ranges from 38 to 100 percentacross government-controlled areas,” and that attendance “appears severely lim-ited” in opposition-controlled areas. The Ministry of Education announced in No-vember 2012 that only 14 percent of children attend school in the northern Aleppogovernorate, where the fighting has been particularly intense. Cited in HumanRights Watch (2013). Safe No More: Students and Schools under Attack in Syria.New York: HRW, p. 4.35 The assessment methodology included interviews with a range of community ac-tors, including relief committees, religious leaders, local organizations, heads ofhouseholds, medical staff, and local police as well as direct observation of publicplaces such as schools, hospitals, water points, markets, or small shops. A reviewof existing literature, secondary data and agency, or sector specific assessmentsalso took place. Careful attention was made to ensure that there were mixed teamsof enumerators, and to avoid bias, verification procedures were put in place. 36 Boonstoppel, E., et al. (2008). Building School-Community Relations throughEmpowerment of School Development Committees in Zimbabwe. SNV NetherlandsDevelopment Organization. 37 Save the Children (2009). Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal MidtermCountry Report. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children. 38 Emergency Capacity Building Project (2007). Impact Measurement and Accounta-bility in Emergencies: Good enough guide. Herndon, VA: Oxfam GB and World VisionInternational, p. 8.39 See for example, Csaky, C. (2009). No One to Turn To: The under-reporting of sexualviolence against children by peacekeepers and aid workers. London, UK: Save theChildren, p. 16. 40 Save the Children (2011). Guide to a child friendly complaints system. Lessonlearned from Dadaab Refugee Camps. Based on the proceedings of a workshop inDadaab Refugee Camps, Kenya. For guidance on the 10 steps to setting up a Com-plaints Response Mechanisms, see the video available at: http://aimstand-ingteam.wordpress.com/2012/03/08/save-the-childrens-short-video-on-complaints-and-response-mechanisms/41 The desks were set-up in Child Friendly Spaces, at refugee check-in desks, and inNGO offices in camps and host communities. They dealt with general complaintsand feedback with regards to all program implementation by all agencies present inthe camp. Certain cases were referred to NGO supervisors—particularly sensitivecases, such as those involving sexual violence, staff misconduct, or dissatisfactionwith the way previous feedback had been handled. 42 One BRG was linked with each information desk. The groups consist of nine mem-bers: four camp leaders (two male and two female), three religious leaders, and twoteachers. These representatives were selected in a meeting held with religious andcamp leaders. BRGs were involved in monthly feedback meetings.

43 This example is based on the author’s own research into an INGO’s program inte-grating education and child protection to prevent child labour after an emergency.44 See for example, Watchlist (2008). Getting It Done and Doing It Right: Implement-ing the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict inUganda. New York: Watchlist, p. 6; Shrestha, M. (2012). The Monitoring and Report-ing Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Perspective. New York: Watchlist, p. 8.45 Child Workers in Nepal (2008, November 24). Nepal Case Study: Schools as Zonesof Peace. PowerPoint Presentation. Retrieved April 24, 2013 from http://www.power-show.com/view/5706-Njk0N/NEPAL_CASE_STUDY_SCHOOLS_AS_ZONES_OF_PEACE_powerpoint_ppt_presentation, slide 7.46 BBC Profile: Malala Yousafzai. BBC News. (2013, July 11).; Malala Yousafzai NamedTo Time’s 100 Most Influential People and Huffington Post. (2013, April 18). Huffing-ton Post. 47 Other negotiations, such as the establishment of Schools as Zones of Peace, werecarried out publicly. Stakeholders were invited to public meetings; Codes of Conductwere launched at community events; and posters detailing decisions were placed inpublic spaces. The advantage of “back-door” negotiations can be that they are morediscrete, reducing risk to those engaging in discussions. In places like Nepal, wherespeaking with Maoists may put stakeholders at risk, this can be an advantage.UNICEF (2011). The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Case Study – Nepal. NewYork: UNICEF, p. 40; See also, Shrestha, B. (2008). A Mapping of SZoP Programs inNepal. Kathmandu, Nepal; and Child Workers in Nepal (2008, November 24). NepalCase Study: Schools as Zones of Peace. PowerPoint Presentation. Retrieved April 24,2013 from http://www.powershow.com/view/5706-Njk0N/NEPAL_CASE_STUDY_SCHOOLS_AS_ZONES_OF_PEACE_powerpoint_ppt_pre-sentation.48 Shrestha, M. (2012). The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Viola-tions against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Per-spective. New York: Watchlist. 49 Ibid, p. 9.50 Johnson, S., Sbardella, D., Odaymat, F., and Alam, S. (2011, May 11-12). Protectingthe rights of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict through community-based mechanisms in the Gaza Strip and North Lebanon. Regional Workshop inAmman, Jordan. Beirut, Lebanon: Save the Children Sweden.51 Rai, U., Majumdar, S., and Jain, R. (2012). Bal Bandhu: In Defence of Child Rights.Dehli, India: National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. 52 Communities took initial steps to prevent children from being recruited to armedconflict or trafficked. Communities, along with women’s groups, youth groups, andgram panchayats—local self-governments at the village or small town level in India—tracked every child in their area.53 The 20 resource persons selected had considerable experience in working in con-flict-affected areas. Some of them had worked with the Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA)(Translation: The Education for All Movement), the Government of India’s flagshipprogram for achieving the Universalisation of Elementary Education (UEE). See web-site for further details: http://www.ssa.nic.in/. They, therefore, had experience inmobilizing communities for child rights. 54 Iyer, P. (2004). Peace Zones of Mindanao, Philippines: Civil Society Efforts to EndViolence. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative Learning Projects. 55See Hirsch, A. (2013, May 9). Nigerian sect Boko Haram demands Islamic state.The Guardian. Retrieved July 29, 2013 fromhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/09/boko-haram-nigeria-islamist-state. 56 These recommendations are based on the author’s own experience working inCôte d’Ivoire. 57 See UNESCO (2011). Monitoring progress on financing Education for All. In EFAGlobal Monitoring Report: The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education. Paris:UNESCO, p. 25; and Global Child Protection Working Group (2011). Too Little, TooLate: Child protection funding in emergencies. CPWG, p. 4.

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58 UNESCO (2010). Key findings and Implications. In UNESCO. Protecting Educationfrom Attack: A state of the art review. Paris: UNESCO, p. 28.59 Groneman, C. (2011). Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Ed-ucation from Attack. New York: GCPEA, p. 34.60 Watchlist/International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011). An Uncertain Fu-ture? Children and Armed Conflict in the Central African Republic. New York: Watch-list/IDMC. 61 Johnson, S., Sbardella, D., Odaymat, F., and Alam, S. (2011, May 11-12). Protectingthe rights of Palestinian children affected by armed conflict through community-based mechanisms in the Gaza Strip and North Lebanon. Regional Workshop inAmman, Jordan. Beirut, Lebanon: Save the Children Sweden, p. 25.62 UNESCO (2010). Key findings and Implications. In UNESCO. Protecting Educationfrom Attack: A state of the art review. Paris: UNESCO, p. 10. For example, inAfghanistan, local community members were no longer making a distinction be-tween organizations working with the military and those that were not. This was as-sociated with a breakdown in trust between communities and humanitarian anddevelopment organizations, increasing threats to aid workers.63 Key informant interview, NGO education program manager, Afghanistan.64 Groneman, C. (2011). Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Ed-ucation from Attack. New York: GCPEA, p. 18-19.65 UNHCR (2013). Protection Policy Paper: Understanding Community-Based Protec-tion. Geneva: UNHCR Division of International Protection, p. 14.66 Based on information from Ivory Coast Profile. (2013, June 18). BBC News. Re-trieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13287585; Time Line: IvoryCoast. (2011, November 30). Al Jazeera. Retrieved fromhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010121971745317811.html; UnitedNations Security Council (2006). Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. S/2006/835. New York: UNSC; Oved, M.C. (2010, De-cember 31). UN Troops walk Tightrope in Ivory Coast. The Globe and Mail. RetrievedOctober 16, 2013 from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/un-troops-walk-tightrope-in-ivory-coast/article1321812/; and Côte d’Ivoire on the Edge: A NewDisplacement Crisis in West Africa. UNHCR. Retrieved October 22, 2013 fromhttp://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d831f586.html. 67 UNSC (2006) Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict inCôte d’Ivoire, S/2006/835, para. 2. This reported covers the period from January2005 to September 200668 Chelpi-den Hamer, M. (2013). When war enters the school: Impact of the Ivoiriancrisis on the local educational system, Government responses, Strategies to accom-pany the process of national reconciliation. UNICEF.69 Ibid.70 Côte d’Ivoire Education Cluster (2011, June 15). Attaques Contre l’Education: Rap-port sur l’impact de la crise sur la système éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2, p. 3.71 United Nations Security Council (2012). Children and Armed Conflict: Report of theSecretary-General, A/66/782–S/2012/261, para. 32.. New York: UNSC. This reportcovers the period from January to December 2011. 72 Chelpi-den Hamer, M. (2013). When war enters the school: Impact of the Ivoiriancrisis on the local educational system, Government responses, Strategies to accom-pany the process of national reconciliation. UNICEF. Participants in FDGs and KIIsnoted that school re-openings varied. Individual school administrations decidedwhen to re-open schools based on the local political environmental and the inten-sity of fighting in their area. 73 According to the Côte d’Ivoire Education Cluster, Abidjan’s Education Districts 1, 3& 4 reported 112 reported; Guiglo in Moyen Cavally reported 31 education attacks;and Dalao in Haut Sassandra reported 31 attacks. Côte d’Ivoire Education Cluster(2011, June 15). Attaques Contre l’Education: Rapport sur l’impact de la crise sur lasystème éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2, p. 3.

74 Some of these attacks are attributed to the Rally of the Houphouetistes forDemocracy and Peace (RHDP), which allegedly wounded teachers, administrativestaff, and school directors who did not respect civil orders given by Ouattara’s Gov-ernment. RHDP is a coalition of political parties that includes the Democratic Partyof Côte d’Ivoire (Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire), the African Democratic Rally(PDCI-RDA), the Movement of the Forces of the Future (MFA) and the Union forDemocracy, and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI). See Côte d’Ivoire Education Cluster(2011, June 15). Attaques Contre l’Education: Rapport sur l’impact de la crise sur lasystème éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2, p. 8.75 UN-affiliated interviewees were from UNICEF, the Office for the Coordination of Hu-manitarian Affairs (OCHA), and Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (theUN’s Peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire, ONUCI).76 NGO staff interviews were carried out with both child protection and educationpersonnel.77 Interviews were carried out with UN staff (6), NGO staff (6), MENET officials (3),DRENET officials (8), COGES Regional Coordinators (3), COGES leaders (3), and schoolprincipals (5). 78 CNPRA (2005). Bilan du PNRA. Retrieved fromhttp://www.seydouelimanediarra.net/carriere_CNPRA.html. 79 See, e.g. Burde, D. (2010). Preventing violent attacks on education in Afghanistan:Considering the role of community-based schools. In UNESCO, Protecting Educationfrom Attack: A State of the Art Review. Paris: UNESCO, p. 257. 80 Côte d’Ivoire has a 75% mobile phone penetration rate, meaning that there arethree mobile phone lines for every four inhabitants81 Vedsted, S. and Coulibaly, J. (2011, January). Joint Evaluation of the Rewrite the Fu-ture Program 2006 – 2009 in Côte d’Ivoire. Save the Children Sweden.82 Ibid.83 Community level interviews and FGDs described this as a positive example ofworking with an INGO. The steps outlined explain some of the reason why the com-munity felt this was a positive working relationship. 84 COGES and parents were responsible for fundraising and providing what materi-als and labor they could.85 Save the Children (2009). Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal MidtermCountry Report. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 24.86 Liberia’s unarmed guards became a permanent fixture, with costs paid by theschool. UNESCO (2010). Key findings and Implications. In UNESCO. ProtectingEducation from Attack: A state of the art review. Paris: UNESCO, p. 10.87 For details of the Humanitarian Principles see ICRC (1996). Annex VI: The Code ofConduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs inDisaster Relief. Retrieved from http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/arti-cle/other/code-of-conduct-290296.htm. For how the Code of Conduct and associ-ated principles apply to other organizations engaged in humanitarian activities, seeOCHA (2012). OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles. Retrieved fromhttps://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf. 88 See for example, UNESCO (2010). Protecting Education from Attack: A state of theart review. Paris: UNESCO, p. 33; and Global Education Cluster. Protecting Educationin Countries Affected by Conflict Booklet 3: Community-based Protection and Pre-vention. Geneva: Global Education Cluster.89 This adapted from the Interagency Learning Initiative’s (ILI) four-category typol-ogy. See Benham, N (2008) Agencies Communities and Children: A Report of the In-teragency Learning Initiative: Engaging Communities for Children’s Wellbeing.Washington, DC: USAID.90 Deters, L. (2011, May 4). Ivory Coast: thousands of children still out of school.Save the Children [blog posting]. Retrieved May 26, 2013 fromhttp://blogs.savethechildren.org.uk/2011/05/ivory-coast-thousands-of-children-still-out-of-school/.

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91 Save the Children (2010) Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation: Nepal Country Re-port. Save the Children; Save the Children (2009). Rewrite the Future Global Evalua-tion Nepal Midterm Country Report. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children.92 Shrestha, M. (2012). The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Viola-tions against Children in Armed Conflict in Nepal 2005 – 2012: A Civil Society Per-spective. New York: Watchlist.93 Diares, Brenda K. (2012). A Situational Assessment of Attacks on Education in thePhilippines. Davao City, Philippines: Save the Children; and Mindanao People’sCaucus (n.d.). What is the Bantay Ceasefire? Retrieved May 7, 2013http://www.mpc.org.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105&Itemid=87.94 Stephenson, P. with Gourley, S. and Miles, G. (2004). Child Participation. In Black-man, R., Resourcing Organizations with Opportunities for Transformation and Shar-ing (ROOTS 7). Teddington, UK: Tearfund. 95 Save the Children (2009). Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Nepal MidtermCountry Report. Kathmandu, Nepal: Save the Children, p. 3; Save the Children(2011). Rewrite the Future Global Evaluation Final Report, p. 32.96 Details about the MRM are from O/SRSG-CAAC/UNICEF/DPKO (2011, April). Fieldmanual, Monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) on grave violations againstchildren in situation of armed conflict. Additional details on ensuring the well-beingof children are based on the author’s experience. 97 Groneman, C. (2011). Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Ed-ucation from Attack. New York: GCPEA, p. 44.98 The researchers visited all three sites prior to FGDs to ensure the selection criteriawere understood and to foster goodwill. Fifteen FGDs took place since, in some set-tings, not all participants could make FGDs on the chosen day. A total of 123 individ-uals participated in FGDs. 99 At two research sites, the village chief could not meet at the arranged time.100 At one research site, the religious leaders could not meet at the arranged time.101 Côte d’Ivoire Education Cluster (2011, June 15). Attaques Contre l’Education: Rap-port sur l’impact de la crise sur la système éducatif Ivoirien, Rapport Numéro 2.

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THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES IN PROTECTING EDUCATION FROM ATTACK: Lessons Learned

48

Education Under Attack 20142014

Institutional Autonomy and the Protection of Higher Education from Attack2013

Study on Field-basedProgrammatic Measures toProtect Education from Attack2011

Prioritizing the Agenda forResearch for the Global Coalition to ProtectEducation from Attack: Why Evidence is Important,What We Know, and How to Learn More2011

Protect Schools andUniversities fromMilitary Use2013

Draft Lucens Guidelinesfor Protecting Schoolsand Universities fromMilitary Use duringArmed Conflict2013

Lessons in War: Military Use of Schoolsand Other EducationInstitutions duringConflict2012

Report from the KnowledgeRoundtable on ProgrammaticMeasures in Prevention,Intervention and Response toAttacks on Education2011

All GCPEA communications materials and publications are available on our website: www.protectingeducation.org or by contacting the Coalition at: [email protected]

OTHER GCPEA PUBLICATIONS

GCPEA

www.protectingeducation.org

Global Coalition to Protect Education from AttackSecretariat350 5th Avenue, 34th FloorNew York, New York 10118-3299Phone: 1.212.377.9446Email: [email protected]

Front cover: A teacher and school owner is seen with her pupilssitting in front of their school. The building was destroyed onAugust 4, 2009, during a wave of violence in Maiduguri, Nigeria.

© 2009 AP Photo/Sunday Alamba