the role of collective action in determaining the benefits...

The role of collective actionin determining the benefits

from IPPK logging concessions:A case study from Sekatak,

East Kalimantan

Charles Palmer



East Kalimantan

CIFOR Working Paper No.28

Charles Palmer



East Kalimantan

CIFOR Working Paper No. 28

Governance Program

Cover photo by Budhy Kristanty

Published byCenter for International Forestry ResearchMailing address: P.O. Box 6596 JKPWB, Jakarta 10065, IndonesiaOffice address: Jl. CIFOR, Situ Gede, Sindang Barang,Bogor Barat 16680, IndonesiaTel : +62 (251) 622622Fax: +62 (251) 622100E-mail: [email protected] site: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org

© 2004 by CIFORAll rights reserved. Published in 2004

iiiCollective action and benefits from IPPK: A case study from Sekatak, East Kalimantan - CharCharCharCharCharles Ples Ples Ples Ples Palmealmealmealmealmerrrrr

Table of Contents

Table of Contents iii

Abstract iv

1. Introduction 1

2. Forest policy changes as they relate to Bulungan 3

3. The process of application for IPPK permits in Bulungan 4

4. Background on Bulungan and Sekatak 5

5. Earlier community experiences: HPH and the first wave of IPPK in Sekatak 7

6. Later community experiences: IPPK agreements and collective action 9

7. Discussion 14

8. Conclusions 17

Endnotes 18

References 21

Appendix 23

iv Collective action and benefits from IPPK: A case study from Sekatak, East Kalimantan - CharCharCharCharCharles Ples Ples Ples Ples Palmealmealmealmealmerrrrr

Since the reform of Indonesia’s Forestry Law in 1999,newly empowered forest-dependent communitieshave been allowed to negotiate directly with loggingcompanies for access to financial and social benefits.Fieldwork undertaken in May and June 2003attempted to assess the impacts of this decentralizationreform on communities in the subdistrict of Sekatakin Bulungan, East Kalimantan. Results suggest that theprocess of negotiations influenced the benefits thataccrued to these communities. It seems that the mostimportant factors were increased collective action andco-operation among the communities situated in and

sharing forest areas, prior experience of dealing andconflicts with logging companies, plus strong andrelatively transparent local leadership. Taken togetherthese factors enabled communities to obtain benefitsat the higher end of the scale for the area as a wholeand provided a mechanism by which to deal withproblems as they arose. These results suggest that inthe absence of other means by which to protect theinterests of local communities and to enforce the law,local capacities for collective action may be a potentialand effective substitute for future development.

Abstract

1Collective action and benefits from IPPK: A case study from Sekatak, East Kalimantan - CharCharCharCharCharles Ples Ples Ples Ples Palmealmealmealmealmerrrrr

Since the fall of ex-President Suharto’s centralized andautocratic government in 1997, the Republic ofIndonesia has undergone rapid decentralization, whichhas resulted in changes to the institutions and processesgoverning the management of natural resources in thecountry (Barr and Resosudarmo 2002). Governanceover forests has shifted in a haphazard manner, from acentralized system of logging concessions and protectedareas to one now informally controlled by over 300district-level governments. These changes have resultedin newly empowered forest-dependent communitiesexerting property rights over adat (customary) forest,leading in many cases to communities negotiatingdirectly with logging companies1 in exchange for accessto financial and social benefits. Thus, for the first timeever, commercial timber harvesting operations havebeen paying fees and providing goods and services tocommunities in recognition of their presumedcustomary claims, although these are yet to be clearlydefined in a formal legal sense (Wollenberg andKartodihardjo 2002).

Previous empirical research in Kalimantan (see forexample Barr et al. 2001; Anau et al. 2002) indicates alarge variation in contractual outcomes and in actualbenefits received by communities, i.e., financialpayments and provision of consumer goods andpublic goods. The key observation from these studiesis that compared to pre-decentralization, when thecentral government redistributed only a fraction ofthe timber rents from logging activities to theprovinces, the decentralization reforms and directnegotiations have allowed local governments andforest-dependent communities to capture at leastsome rents. Despite the variation in these financialpayoffs, their generally low level (see for examplePalmer and Obidzinski 2002) and the lack ofinformation regarding the ecological costs of logging2,it seems that relative to the situation prior to 1998many communities have benefited financially fromdecentralization, at least in the short-term.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and analysethe conditions that may lead to this variation incontracted outcomes and benefits. Previous researchsuggests that variation among villages may result fromthe processes of negotiation (leading to agreementsbetween communities and companies), the degree ofcontract compliance by the company and the degreeof enforcement of the contract by the communities.Therefore, the impacts of decentralization on thesecommunities and their subsequent empowermentmay be better understood through an analysis of theprocesses underlying the formation of community–company agreements and their outcomes.

To explain the cited variation I asked whether therewere any community attributes, such as ethnicity, sizeor level of dependence on the forest with respect tolivelihoods, that appear to have significant impact onthe processes that lead to outcomes. I analysed hownegotiations were undertaken in communities, whonegotiated with whom, the level of participation bycommunity members and the types of agreementsmade. I also examined the company response to theagreements: do they keep the promises made tocommunities? If not, then what was the communityresponse given that company contractual obligationsare usually not formally enforced by the government(Richards et al. 2003)?

Community ‘self-enforcement’ and conflicts betweencommunities and companies are recurring themes inKalimantan, typically involving demonstrations androad blockades (see for example Obidzinski 2003). Iwas especially interested in the determinants of self-enforcement by communities given the weak capacityand interest of local government to this end. Theliterature suggests successful collection action bycommunities may result in more efficientmanagement outcomes with respect to the use ofnatural resources (e.g. Ostrom 1990; see Baland andPlatteau 1996 and Agrawal 2001 for reviews). What

Introduction1

2 Collective action and benefits from IPPK: A case study from Sekatak, East Kalimantan - CharCharCharCharCharles Ples Ples Ples Ples Palmealmealmealmealmerrrrr

might affect community capacity for collective actionin self-enforcement in logging agreements?

This case study focuses on how aspects of negotiationaffected community access to logging benefits in thesubdistrict of Sekatak in the district of Bulungan, EastKalimantan. I chose this subdistrict because of theeffective nature of collective action among theseparticular communities and how this measureappeared to influence the processes and the outcomesof their logging agreements. Information for this studywas obtained through interviews with key membersof the ‘village elite’, subdistrict government officialsand employees in the main village of Sekatak Buji,between May and June 2003. Also, interviews wereconducted with local nongovernmental organisationsand officials from the Bulungan forestry office in thedistrict capital of Tanjung Selor and the town ofTarakan. This case study forms part of a larger, ongoingstudy on the processes of negotiation and the variationin benefits from agreements made between forest-dependent communities and logging companies inEast Kalimantan3.

First, I describe forest policy changes in Bulungan andtheir implementation on the ground. Next, I presentbackground material on the villages and the study areafollowed by a description of pre-decentralisationcommunity experiences with logging operations.These logging operations continued afterdecentralization reforms began and interacted withthe newer operations that started after the firstcommunity–company negotiations in 1999. Here, Iillustrate the early community experiences withnegotiations and associated problems from 1999 untillate 2000. By late 2000, however, the ‘boom’ incommunity–company agreements and associatedproblems in Sekatak led to a change in communitynegotiation strategy. This change seems to haveinvolved more community-to-community collectiveaction, which I describe along with the resultantcontractual outcomes and the benefits that accruedto the communities in Sekatak. In the followingsection, I discuss these findings and the conditions thatmay have had a significant influence on processes andoutcomes. The final section concludes.


The reform of Indonesia’s 1967 Basic Forestry Law in1999, UU No. 41/1999, gave some provisions for therecognition of customary (adat) lands, whileGovernment Regulation No. 6/1999 gave authority todistrict governments (Pemerintah Daerah or Pemda)to allocate Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan (HPHH, orRights to the Harvesting of Forest Products) in areasclassified as ‘Permanent Forest Estate’ (KawasanBudidaya Kehutanan, or KBK). The implementationof regulations relating to HPHHs was detailed in aseries of decrees from the Ministry of Forestry andEstate Crops in May 1999 (Barr et al. 2001). Specifically,Ministerial Decision No. 310/1999 gave the head of adistrict (Bupati) the authority to distribute HPHHpermits, which should be valid for no longer than oneyear and govern forest parcels no larger than 100hectares. The beneficiaries of the permits were to becommunities that lived in and utilized the forest inquestion and hence recognized many long-standingcommunity land claims, typically for so-called adatforest (Suramenggala et al. 2001).

In 1999 and 2000, many districts in East Kalimantantook advantage of the new regulations to managedirectly forests within their district boundaries byallocating large numbers of HPHHs (Barr et al 2001).Following this and in response to demands fromcommunities for increased access to logging benefits,the district head of Bulungan with Decision No. 19/1999provided for the issuance of small-scale forestconversion licenses known as Timber Extraction andUtilization Permits (Izin Pemungutan dan PemanfaatanKayu, or IPPK4). The ruling stipulated that IPPK permitscould be allocated to allow timber harvesting associatedwith forest conversion in areas designated as ‘SocialForest’ (Hutan Rakyat) or ‘Privately Owned Forest’(Hutan Milik), areas that are supposed to fall outsidethose classified as Permanent Forest Estate (Anau et al.2001). In 1999 after logging companies began holdingnegotiations with villages in the district, 16 IPPK permitswere issued for a total area of 3,740 hectares.

In 2000 the district head of Bulungan issued DecisionNo. 196 (2000) concerning the distribution of IPPKpermits for the harvesting of forest wood products,forest ownership, forest people and adat forest inBulungan. This ruling formally brought the IPPKsystem into line with the HPHH system in that eachIPPK permit was supposed to be valid for one yearonly and for an area not to exceed 100 hectares5.Moreover, this ruling stated that only regions of ‘forestconversion’ or ‘production forest’ which had alreadybeen ‘converted’, i.e. already selectively logged, couldbe allocated for IPPK concessions. These areas weregenerally located within the Permanent Forest Estateand hence gave the district government much moreflexibility with respect to the geographic allocation ofIPPK permits. In 2000, a total of 592 IPPK permits(comprising 59,200 hectares) were issued among 42companies and approximately 30 villages inBulungan6.

Decision No. 196 (2000) required that the followingbe made available to the Bupati’s office before thedistrict head may issue a permit.

• Written recommendations and signatures from thevillage head (kepala desa), the adat head and thesubdistrict head (camat) along with a ‘proposal’,i.e. a written explanation of how activities in theproposed IPPK area would be conducted.

• The formation of a group of farmingrepresentatives (wakil kelompok tani) from thecommunity, which is responsible for activities andforest management in the proposed IPPK area.Proof of compliance with this regulation is givenin the form of a collection of signatures and copiesof state identity cards of group members.

• Technical recommendations from the districtforestry office and other departments (alsoincluding those from the provincial level), whichwould include appropriate forest maps etc.

Forest policy changes as theyrelate to Bulungan2


This process, as observed in many parts of EastKalimantan7, typically follows a number of steps withthe involvement of a number of different actors8,perhaps most importantly the ‘entrepreneur’ or‘businessman’ (pengusaha9).

1. An entrepreneur who, on behalf of a company(usually a CV10), approaches the districtgovernment and the community to propose anIPPK for the community’s adat forest. Thisindividual usually comes from the locality(sometimes even the same community) and wouldhave some connections to the timber industry. Hismain role is to act as liaison among communityrepresentatives or village managers (usually thevillage head and adat head), the company andgovernment officials.

2. If a community is interested in allowing a companyaccess to the forest, then the entrepreneur, afterhaving found an interested company, arrangea ameeting between company representative andsubdistrict head, who will be asked for help inmaking a proposal on IPPK requirements andconditions.

3. Next, the entrepreneur asks for recommendationsand signatures from the village head and adat head11,as well as for assistance with the formation of the‘farmers group’ and the gathering of identity cards12.The recommendations are used to allow the transferof adat forest from the community to the third party,i.e. the company, and usually, but not always, involve

some meetings and discussions with other membersof the community as well as the subdistrict head.Around this time, discussions invariably involvenegotiations over benefits the community willderive from the transfer of forest, which is discussedin more detail for Sekatak later on.

4. These negotiations usually lead to an agreementor contract between the company and thecommunity. The contract typically contains a listof proposed community benefits and companyactivities and is usually finalized and notarized inthe town of Tarakan before being signed byrepresentatives from both parties. This contractmust be secured by the entrepreneur along with amap of the proposed logging area before an IPPKpermit can be issued by the district government.

5. The entrepreneur facilitates co-operation amongthe private actors: the company (as the potentialpermit holder13), an investor (with the capital), thecontractors (owning logging equipment, usuallyfrom Malaysia14) and the timber buyers (in the caseof Bulungan, also from Malaysia). Sometimes,many or all of these functions are undertaken bythe same individual.

6. Once co-operation and agreement have beensecured from the private actors and thecommunity, the entrepreneur facilitates co-operation among different offices and departmentsof the local government, mainly the district forestryoffice and the district head’s office, to obtain theIPPK permit.

The process of application forIPPK permits in Bulungan3


Before the political changes in 1998 and 1999, the olddistrict of Bulungan consisted of three distinct areasthat are now independent districts: Malinau, Nunukanand Bulungan. In ‘new’ Bulungan, there are fiveadministrative subdistricts, or Kecematan: TanjungPalas, Peso, Sesayap, Bunyu and Sekatak. Governmentdata show that together the five areas consist of 85villages and cover nearly 2 million hectares, with a totalpopulation of nearly 100,000 in 2000 (CDK15

Bulungan Tengah 2000). The area that is the focus ofthis case study is the subdistrict of Sekatak.

Sekatak claims an area of approximately 8,800 km2,with territorial borders to Sesayap in the north,Tanjung Palas in the south, Malinau town to the westand Tarakan city and the sea to the east. Data fromthe district of Bulungan describe Sekatak as an areaof 2,000 km2, composed mainly of forest andmountain ranges, with swamps where the territoryborders the sea. Irrespective of which territorial sizeclaim is the more accurate, Sekatak has 21communities with a total population of approximately7,000 divided among approximately 1,500 families(Kecematan Sekatak unpublished data). Three of thesecommunities—Sekatak Bengara, Pungit andPentian—are located near the swamp areas, where theSekatak river opens out into the sea, while theremainder are to be found further inland.

The populations of 19 Sekatak communities arepredominantly Dayak Berusu and Dayak Punan, whilethe villages of Sekatak Buji and Sekatak Bengara aremainly non-Dayak. Sekatak Buji is by far the largestcommunity with 1,600 people spread amongapproximately 350 families. It is the onlypredominantly Muslim community in the area andhas been in its current location inland from theopening of the Sekatak river for at least threegenerations since the 1800s. The population iscomposed mainly of the Bulungan and Tidungindigenous groups, who claim to have descended from

families in Tanjung Selor, a trading port and formerbase of a precolonial sultanate. Within thiscommunity, there are small minorities of Javanese andTimorese, in addition to even smaller numbers ofpeople from Sulawesi, Madura and Toraja.

As a consequence of its ethnic composition, history,links, position (situated almost halfway between thetowns of Tarakan and Tanjung Selor) and large size,Buji is unique when compared to most othercommunities in Sekatak. What distinguishes Buji isthe fact that 17 (Dayak) communities have moveddownstream within the last 40 years and have allrelocated near Buji with the result that all these villagesare within easy walking distance of one another (seeFigure 1). The main reason for this relocation was toenable Dayak families to send their children to schoolin Buji, which now has at least three schools. However,as in other parts of East Kalimantan these types ofmovements have complicated land-use claims inSekatak because of a lack of agreement about how toshare local forest resources. Furthermore, subdistrictand other government administrative offices (e.g.police station) are all located in Buji, and economicallyBuji’s experience as a trading post has been exploitedby the local Dayak as well. In addition to forestproducts such as rattan and gaharu (used to makeincense and perfume), Dayak antiques and baskets areexported via Buji to Indonesian tourist centres suchas Bali and East Java.

However, livelihoods for most communities in Sekatakincluding Buji are still based on subsistence agriculture(padi, palajiwa, ladang) and fishing, as well as thetrading of forest products, reflecting a generaldependence on the forest and the river. A few peoplefind employment as public employees of thesubdistrict government, as teachers and with smallcompanies (e.g. as mechanics). Infrastructure is poor.Former logging roads link some of the villages toTanjung Selor and Malinau, but most people still travel

Background on Bulungan andSekatak4


by river. There has been electricity in all villages since1995, when the government provided two largegenerators in Buji. Also, the road to the village wasbuilt in 1995 by a HPH (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, orforest concession holder16) concessionaire. The onlyphone (satellite) in Sekatak is located in the house ofBuji’s village head and is used as the area’s publicphone.

Buji is apparently recognised by the othercommunities in the area as the ‘strongest’ communityin Sekatak and the one that assumes leadership for allthe others in the area. Hence, records kept by the

village head in Buji usually include those for all villagesin Sekatak and unsurprisingly there are strong linksamong the village head, the subdistrict head andofficials from the local government office. The Bujivillage head is arguably the most powerful figure inSekatak and is at least as influential as the subdistricthead. Up to 50 people a day from all villages in thearea visit his house to pay their respects and to havetheir problems and disputes resolved. Furthermore,in the context of co-operation over land-use and IPPKnegotiations, the village heads of all the other villagestend to defer first to the village head of Buji and notthe local government officials.

Figure 1: Location of villages near Sekatak Buji plus Pangkalan logging (HPH) camp runby Intracawood and border of its logging concession area.

117˚3’0"E

117˚3’0"E

117˚4’0"E

117˚4’0"E

117˚5’0"E

117˚5’0"E

117˚6’0"E

117˚6’0"E

3˚18

’0"N

3˚18

’0"N

3˚19

’0"N

3˚19

’0"N

3˚20

’0"N

3˚20

’0"N

0 500 1,000250Meters

Legend

Villages

Rivers

PT Intraca Hutani Lestari

Source:Kelola Sosial & Social Impact Monitoring MapPT. Intracawood ManufacturingPropinsi Kalimantan Timur


HPH in SekatakBuji claims a territory of approximately 100,000hectares in Sekatak, half of which was logged by HPHand IPK17 concessionaires before 1999. PT Intracawood,operating on behalf of state-owned PT Inhutani I, hasbeen the main HPH concession holder18 since 1976 witha concession of 250,000 hectares that covers forest inSekatak and Bengalun (CDK Bulungan Tengahunpublished data). As of June 2003, it was the soleremaining HPH operator in Sekatak.

For all communities in Sekatak, previous experiencewith HPHs for the last 30 years have generally beenquite bitter. Problems and conflict with HPHcompanies is a recurring theme in East Kalimantanboth before and after the advent of IPPK (Yasmi 2003).For example, up until the road to Buji was completedin 1995, villagers were not informed and wereapparently unaware of the HPH concession locatedso close to the village. In another case, the burialground forest of a neighbouring Dayak communitywas logged by another HPH about 10 years ago. TheHPH was forced to pay some compensation to thecommunity after violent protests by communitymembers. In 1993 the same company also built amosque in Buji, although no financial compensationwas provided until after the first IPPK entrepreneursarrived in Sekatak in 1999 (see below).

Before 1999 the central government allocated HPHconcessions in East Kalimantan and established themusing spatial land planning set at the provincial level bythe government of East Kalimantan. It used theclassification of Permanent Forest Estate (KBK) andNon-Forest Estate (Kawasan Budidaya Non Kehutanan,or KBNK). However, these classifications have neverreally been completely accepted or recognized bycommunities in Bulungan (Suramenggala et al. 2001).Furthermore, so-called ‘KBK regions’ claimed by HPHcompanies also tended to be land considered as ‘adatforest’ by communities. Consequently when IPPKcompanies sought to negotiate for concession areas in

1999 and 2000, many were placed within KBK regionsin HPH areas (see Appendix). This however, was not ofany concern to the communities because in their mindstheir adat rights to this land were already ‘stolen’ by theHPH operations.

Soon after the first IPPK operations were establishedin 1999 in Sekatak (all in the Inhutani I/Intracawoodconcession area), conflicts arose between HPH andIPPK companies over the practice of IPPK companiesto establish operations inside previously unlogged‘production forest’ within KBK regions of the HPHconcession area. Otherwise, the HPH operationsappeared to tolerate the activities of IPPKs in‘converted production forest’, land that had alreadybeen selectively logged by the HPH in the past orwithin KBNK regions. In Buji, where up to 50,000hectares of relatively accessible HPH land (via oldlogging roads) has already been selectively logged, itwas relatively easy for small-scale IPPK operations toenter this forest and extract the smaller trees19.

Consequently, the HPHs defended their concessionareas, usually with ‘hired members’ of the securityservices such as the Indonesian Army. This was asituation that particularly angered the localcommunities as it implied ‘business as usual’ for theHPHs after the political changes of 1998–99. There issome evidence (see for example Suramenggala et al.2001) that during HPH–IPPK conflicts, communitiestended to side with the IPPK operations against theHPH operations, although it is unclear exactly howactive the community role was during these disputes.For example in 2001, Buji ‘confiscated’ the roads andlog pond previously established by Intracawood,because these were allegedly situated on its adat land.The village then used this seizure as leverage inextracting concessions from the HPH company suchas ensuring that the IPPK company, CV SuryaRamadhan, had continued access to its roads and logpond.

Earlier community experiences:HPH and the first wave of IPPKin Sekatak

5


All these problems associated with adat forests locatedin HPH areas and conflicts between HPH and IPPKoperators continued until May 2001, when the districthead of Bulungan gathered together communityowners of adat forest and managers of HPH and IPPKoperations for the settlement of these land conflictsthrough discussion and cooperation (Suramenggalaet al. 2001). Also, it is understood that the village headof Buji had a key role in facilitating discussions amongthe other village heads in the area during this time.Bulungan’s district head moved all IPPK concessionsallocated in KBK regions either to KBNK regionswithin the HPH area or outside the HPH areasaltogether. Furthermore, in an attempt to preventfurther HPH–IPPK conflicts in Sekatak, the districthead has not issued any ‘new’ IPPK permits since theend of 2000 and has extended only some of thoseoperating at that time (see below and Appendix). MostIPPK companies in Sekatak have continued to operateon land claimed by Inhutani I/Intracawood, some ofwhich is still being logged by Intracawood. It seemsthat similar to the Inhutani II concession area inMalinau (Barr et al. 2001), many of the IPPKs hadconcluded some kind of deal with Inhutani I (orIntracawood) as a result of negotiations held in 2001.This deal would involve the use of old HPH loggingroads as well as the infrastructure used to load logsonto log boats. Also, two HPHs operating in Sekatakclosed shop in 2001, and many people who formerlyworked for these have joined or ‘merged’ with the farcheaper and flexible IPPK operations20.

With communities proposing and preferring the newIPPK arrangements at this time, HPH operations wereforced into negotiating similar agreements withcommunities. For example, Intracawood agreed to paycommunities in Sekatak a fee of Rp10,000/m3 ofproduction. This indicates that there was somecompetition among logging companies, suggestingmarket power in favour of communities at this time.

The first wave of IPPK negotiations andagreements: 1999 until late 2000In late 1999 the district head of Bulungan gave outfour IPPK permits for a total area of around 2,000hectares of forest in Sekatak. The villages involved inthese deals, Sekatak Bengara, Buji, Pungit and Pentian(see Appendix) negotiated the agreementsindependently of one another. Following these initialdeals, people from villages not participating startedmoving their families into villages, such as Buji, inorder to share in the new benefits. This caused conflictsamong villages that had already concluded logging

deals and those not involved in the process, as well asbetween residents and newly arrived migrants withinparticipating villages.

These problems continued into 2000, when Bulunganreleased further IPPK legislation, and were exacerbatedwhen more villages opened negotiations with IPPKentrepreneurs for new concessions. In July 2000,Kelising made an agreement with CV Raya Bhakti andin August, Keriting and Anjar Arif made an agreementwith CV Malindo Jaya Sekatak. At the end of August,the district government gave an extension to SekatakBengara and CV Mutiara Utama for another 500hectares, which was soon followed by an extension givento Pungit and Pentian and CV Wana Prima Mandiri(see Appendix). The ‘IPPK boom’ in Sekatak had begun.

By this time all villages in Sekatak demanded their ownagreements with IPPK companies and hence accessto the benefits from these deals. However, while thesevillages justified their demands for independent dealswith the problems created by people moving fromvillage to village, problems related to contradictoryforest land claims further intensified intervillageconflict. Communities in Sekatak already ownedborders to local territories, shared some adat areas andtended to mutually respect borders among villages.But while communities could agree collectively onthese areas, the more remote forest areas were disputedamong villages. For example, Buji has a much largerand wider-ranging forest claim than all the othervillages, although there are recognized overlaps withthe claims made by the villages of Pungit and Pentian.Also, the situation vis-à-vis forest land claims wascomplicated by the past movements and habitationsof the Punan and Berusu communities, whotraditionally ranged across large areas. Thus, thesecommunities sometimes laid claim to areas where theyno longer lived or gathered forest products, similar toother areas in East Kalimantan such as Malinau (seeAnau et al. 2001).

Until December 2000 there was, by comparison toevents afterwards, relatively little co-ordination amongvillages and a number of problems eregarding adatand forest border claims. The situation was furthercomplicated by conflicts taking place between HPHoperations and IPPK operations situated inside theirconcession areas. Furthermore, there was somevariation in benefits across villages that did participatein IPPK agreements. Buji for example claimed to havehad better deals and received higher fees than all theneighbouring Dayak communities at that time.


The second wave of IPPK agreements:Late 2000 until June 2003In late 2000, intervillage conflict eased when Bujiasserted its leadership over neighbouring villages toattempt to deal with contradictory adat forest claimsand the problems associated with movements ofpeople to claim logging benefits. Village heads met inBuji to discuss forest borders and allocate areas of adatforest. A system of identity cards was devised by thesubdistrict government and Buji village elders tomonitor the movements of people who relocated onlyto access the logging benefits negotiated by othervillages. Furthermore, a system of checking onagreements was agreed upon to avoid future conflict(see next section). Thus, the problems and conflictsthat arose in Sekatak in 1999–2000 led to some co-operation between all the villages making a claim toadat forest, with Buji as the ‘leader’ of all thesediscussions and negotiations. As a consequence, agreater number of villages in Sekatak started to makeagreements with IPPK companies and obtain accessto logging benefits (see Appendix). Of these, 178permits were distributed in Sekatak for an areatotalling 17,800 hectares among 20 (out of a possible21) villages with a ‘claim’ for adat forest, according tothe Forestry Office, Bulungan.

Apparently, however, at this time many land claimswere discussed if not completely finalized. The factthat many Dayak were dependent on Buji for schools,electricity, trade and other links with the ‘outsideworld’ perhaps contributed to a mutual understandingof the situation, particularly as many Dayaksettlements were relative newcomers to that part ofthe Sekatak river. Also, most of these communities hadnot been forced to move there by the government aspart of a formal ‘resettlement programme’, as was thecase in other areas of East Kalimantan, e.g. the villageof Respen Sembuak21, located opposite Malinau townin the district of Malinau. Furthermore, many of thenew IPPK concessionaires were allocated forest areasthat overlapped Buji’s land claim, a land claim thatappeared to be stronger than that of the Punan and

Berusu communities—perhaps because of the longhistory of the Tidung Bulungan people in Buji, whohave lived in a single location on the Sekatak river formany generations and claim much of the forest in thevicinity of the village. The Punan and Berusucommunities on the other hand have historically neverlived in the same location for more than a few years ata time.

The process of community-companynegotiationsEvidence for the new spirit of co-operation amongvillages in Sekatak comes from negotiations that tookplace between the communities and IPPK companiestowards the end of 2000. All the villages tended to beapproached independently, but after these preliminarydiscussions, representatives from the Dayak community(usually the village head and the tokoh masyarakat, orprominent community members) and from thecompany22, along with the subdistrict head, all met,typically in the meeting room at the house of the villagehead of Buji, before any final agreement was made.Therefore, all the communities that had expressed aninterest and had been approached by an ‘entrepreneur’or company representative were first asked to gathertogether to verify the adat forest claims. Then,negotiations proceeded with all proposed agreementsand areas to be logged overseen by the Buji village headand other prominent Buji community members.

Buji claimed that all the details of negotiationsbetween Buji and IPPK companies were made publicand that prior consultations were made withcommunity members in a public forum. Hence, abroad consensus was reached in the community beforethe final decision by the village head, village elders andother prominent community members. They couldnot say, however, whether this process had occurredin other villages in Sekatak as well.

This process whereby representatives of all communities

Later community experiences:IPPK agreements and collectiveaction

6


in Sekatak consulted with Buji community leadersduring the process of negotiations contributed anelement of security to these meetings in that there isno evidence of coercion or pressure from companiesduring these negotiations. Since Buji is at the centre oflogging (HPH) infrastructure in the area, it used thisas leverage in gaining cooperation from the rest of thevillages. For example, the transportation of wood fromBekiliu relies on a road that goes through Buji and theuse of a log pond that was claimed by Buji.Consequently, Bekiliu pays Buji a fee for the use of thesefacilities (Suramenggala et al. 2001).

The IPPK fees negotiated in Buji and other villages inSekatak appear to have a ‘fixed’ limit of aroundRp50,000/m3, the observed maximum negotiated. Onepossible explanation for this ceiling is that even a feeof Rp30,000/m3 is three times the amount being paidby the HPH to Buji. Another possible explanation isthat the district head of Bulungan, along with theforestry office, receives a special ‘tax’ for every cubicmetre of wood production23 in the district regardlessof where it is produced, what species is logged, andwhether the timber is exported or not. Consequently,according to an informant from the forestry office,the district head is obliged to provide a concessionarea within the boundaries of Bulungan. This suggeststhat the district head has the final say in whether ornot logging takes place in the district. However inSekatak, it seems that collective action by thecommunities could potentially stop logging in thisarea. If negotiations failed between the company andcommunity (e.g. if the community asked for ‘toomuch money’ or if conflict between the communityand the company became too difficult to manage),then the company would simply withdraw and bereallocated another concession area somewhere elsein Bulungan. This appears to indicate market powerin favour of companies in the district as a whole incontrast to the earlier indicators of communitieshaving more market power in Sekatak alone24.

Some villages negotiated with the company mainlyfor the development of public systems andinfrastructure in addition to some financial payments.These included education programmes,infrastructure, communal housing, and the provisionof health services. Other villages, including Buji,preferred to negotiate fees for timber harvested, eitherbecause they already had the social infrastructure theyneeded or wanted at that time, or because they didnot trust the IPPK companies to undertake suchdevelopments properly.

The community in Buji also indicated that acreagesand approximate locations of forests proposed by

IPPK companies were decided in advance by thecompanies and non-negotiable. The proposedconcession areas tended to be clustered in the sameareas of Sekatak (see below). However, the actualborders of the proposed logging areas on the groundwere negotiated and generally decided by thecommunity, as would make sense given the poorquality of most government maps, particularly at thedistrict level (Anau et al. 2001). Also, much of thespatial land planning undertaken in the past (usuallyby the provincial government) tended to be ignoredboth by the communities and by the district head.Thus, Buji negotiators insisted that IPPK companiessituate their operations away from rivers in order toreduce the impact of soil run-off.

Community–company logging agreements:negotiated outcomesIn Buji, the village head and other prominentmembers arranged for an official agreement orcontract to be drawn up for the transfer of adat forestto companies, which formalization was arranged andoverseen usually by a lawyer from Tarakan25. Bujiclaimed that this arrangement allowed for more timefor discussion and agreement with regards toformulating logging rules, such as concession bordersand replanting.

As can be seen in the Appendix, up until 21 December2000, the district head had issued permits oncompletely separate days for most villages involved innegotiations in Sekatak. On this date and afterwardsgroups of IPPK permits were issued at the same time.For example, on 21 December 2000, the villages ofBekiliu, Bunau Jalai, Kelincauan Kendari, Pentian,Pungit, and Terindak all received permits issued bythe district head. All six villages had an agreement witha single company, CV Wana Prima Mandiri. Soon after,on 29 December, the villages of Bambang, Buji, PunanDulau and Turung all had permits issued 2000. Thesevillages had negotiated with four different companies,one of which was CV Wana Prima Mandiri again. Thiscircumstance is significant because it suggests thatthere was an element of co-ordination among thevillages and companies with respect to IPPKagreements.

From 2001 to 2003, six IPPK companies (seeAppendix) have been operating continuously inSekatak on behalf of a total of nine villages. The districtgovernment made the first extension (perpanjanganI) to their permits by the district government on 19and 20 August 2002. The second extension(perpanjangan II) to all these permits was made on24 February 2003, thus allowing the companies tooperate in Sekatak for a third year. Again, these dates


reveal an element of coordination among theparticipating villages and companies, particularly afterthe discussions in 2001 to resolve all outstandingHPH–IPPK disputes in Sekatak. Apparently theremaining villages in Sekatak either had their IPPKsmoved by Bulungan’s district head, perhaps to an areaclaimed by a different village, or had exhausted theirland claim by the end of 2001 and hence had no moreforest containing commercially valuable timber withwhich to negotiate with IPPK companies26.

Buji claimed that its agreement with the six companieswas supposed to last a total of five years. Furthermore,the companies and all nine villages had sign up to thesame contract27 with the following main points:

1. Length of logging operations2. Quantity of wood to be extracted and area to be

logged3. Payment of fee to village head (advance payment

and per cubic metre)4. Logging rules5. Replanting of logged areas6. Social assistance7. Boundaries of ‘protection forest’8. Wood for gardens and village buildings9. Protection of burial grounds

Within the confines of this single contract there wasflexibility in the provision of social facilities andfinancial payments, which appeared to be dependenton the needs and demands of each individualcommunity and the size of the concession area. Forexample, Punan Dulau with a population ofapproximately 250 people negotiated a 1,500 hectaresIPPK with PT Bhakti Bumi Perdana in which thecompany agreed build 29 houses, an adat meetingroom and many other social facilities. The village ofTurung on the other hand, with a population of lessthan 100 people, negotiated a 600 hectares IPPK withCV Gunung Lestari in which the company promisedto provide a new roof for the adat meeting room andwood for other village buildings (Suramenggala et al.2001). The sum total of these ‘social benefits’ in Turungwas a lot less than in the larger village of Punan Dulau.Hence, it seems that the overall sum of social benefitsrose in proportion to the approximate size of thecommunity.

While the provisions for noncash benefits varied, cashbenefits for the villages and logging rules for the IPPKcompanies were the same. The advance paymentagreed upon was Rp250 million per village, to be paidin three instalments plus a fixed fee of Rp30,000 toRp50,000 per cubic metre depending on the woodspecies harvested. The higher amount tended to be

paid for meranti. None of the villagers were offeredjobs with the companies, apparently because villagershad no previous experience working in loggingoperations. Instead, all the IPPK workers werecontracted from outside the area, from both Tarakanand other places further away.

Villagers in Buji say that the negotiation of ‘adatborders’ has allowed them to divide up the concessionsinto different ‘blocks’, so that when one area has beenlogged the company must replant before moving onto the next ‘block’. This arrangement also may havehelped simplify the monitoring process that wasestablished by the communities (see below). IPPKregulations also insist on replanting, although precisedetails may be negotiated between communities andcompanies28.

For the six IPPK extensions issued in 2003, Bujiclaimed that an area of 1,500 hectares was agreed uponin two separate locations of Sekatak, although thepermits listed in the Appendix suggest an area of over4,000 hectares (and probably more due tounderreporting by the companies). In this discussionBuji did not ‘count’ the area that had already beenallocated to an HPH (whether operational or not),only the land that was newly allocated by the villageitself for logging activities. This suggests that Buji wasdiscriminating between the areas of its land claim thatlay inside and outside the HPH concession areas. Thediscrimination in forest areas may be an indication ofthe relative strengths of forest claim as perceived bythe village. A long history of HPH activity in Sekatakmay have resulted in Buji perceiving a stronger claimon forest outside the borders of the HPH concessionareas. Thus, IPPK activities situated within HPH areasmay not be as carefully regarded as those outside,particularly since a majority of Buji’s land claim hasalready been logged at least once by concessionaires.

The size of forest areas proposed and agreed upon forIPPK concessions in many of these cases does not seemto match the areas that appear on the IPPK permitand hence the records of the local forestry office. Forexample, an agreement between CV Malindo JayaSekatak and the villages of Keriting and Anjar Arifdescribed an area of 2,100 hectares in the vicinity ofthe two villages and on the site of land claimed byInhutani I/Intracawood. Records held by theBulungan Forestry Office stated that Malindo JayaSekatak was issued an IPPK permit on 16 August 2000for an area of 500 hectares, less than a quarter of whatwas actually agreed upon (see Appendix). Even if onewere to assume that the agreement between IPPKcompany and village also incorporated the areas onboth subsequent IPPK permit extensions, i.e. 500 plus


200 plus 200 hectares, then this total area, i.e. 900hectares, would still be much smaller than the areaagreed upon by the communities and company in2000. IPPK companies in East Kalimantan typicallyunderreport proposed concession areas in order to getaway with underreporting their wood productionfigures29 to government offices and hence pay less tax30

to the district government (see Palmer and Obidzinski2002). Alternatively, similar to Buji, it is possible thatmany of the villages in Sekatak have five-yearagreements with the companies, which would thenonly require a constant stream of IPPK permitextensions. Therefore, the agreed upon logging areawould almost certainly exceed the area of the permitfor any given year, although in Keriting and AnjarArif ’s agreement there is no contractual time frame.This agreement is effectively open, meaning that thecompany can log until it reaches 2,100 hectaresirrespective of how long this takes.

The distribution of benefits within villagesAlong with problems associated with land andproperty rights claims in many parts of EastKalimantan such as Malinau and Bulungan, anothermajor issue is the lack of transparency in thedistribution of IPPK benefits within villages (Limberg2003). Suramenggala et al. (2001) report that inBulungan there were many village and adat heads whodisplayed a lack of transparency during negotiationsand in receiving money from companies. Their studyalso recorded that community members perceivedIPPK fee payments as either not being ‘fairlydistributed’ or not received at all.

In Buji, records exist of lists of households in the villagethat had been allocated equal shares of payments thecompany made to the village head 31. The head ofhousehold had to sign off on the receipt of moneyfrom the village head. There were also records ofmoney set aside for scholarships for students to studyoutside the village and funds established for futurevillage developments32. One problem was that evenafter receiving a share of benefits, some villagers askthe company for more money once the contract hasbeen concluded, a situation that occurs in othervillages in Sekatak as well. Perhaps people did notreceive their full entitlement from their respectivevillage heads or village elites, or perhaps they did notfeel justly compensated in the first place. The formeris more likely to occur if a village head has chosen tokeep more of the financial benefits intended for thewhole community. In the case of Buji, however,records held by the village head showed that henegotiated for, and received separate fees as well ashaving received and distributed fees for the rest of thecommunity. These separate fees were counted as

administrative costs by Buji village head staff forconducting negotiations on behalf of the whole village.

Contract non-compliance and self-enforcementConflicts between villages and companies usuallybegan when a company, even after having alreadystarted production, failed to keep promises made to acommunity in the agreement. This failure on part ofthe companies to live up to the agreement is acommon situation throughout East Kalimantan (e.g.see Anau et al. 2001; Barr et al. 2001; Limberg 2003)and one encouraged by a complete lack of lawenforcement by local governments (Richards et al.2003). From 1999 up to the present, problemscontinued with both HPH and IPPK operations failingto comply with agreements they had entered into withcommunities in Sekatak33. Examples ofnoncompliance included incursions in protectionforest, nonpayment of fees and failure to replantlogged areas. In other cases, village building was notperformed as a result of it being calculated within thefee, although villagers claimed that they were notinformed of this provision when the agreement wasbeing negotiated.

Consequently, communities in Sekatak resorted toenforcing the agreements themselves, collectively, withperiodic checks to ensure that companies werecomplying with the terms of the contract. First,community members checked that the IPPKs werenot operating outside the boundaries of theconcession area (e.g. in protection forest). Second,community members checked the volume of woodbeing produced because underreporting by IPPKcompanies had long been suspected. Checks wereusually undertaken by counting the freshly cut timberstored in the log pond before transportationdownriver, the only method of timber transportationin Sekatak. Third, people checked that companies werereplanting the areas, or ‘blocks’, that had just beenlogged. People in Sekatak were assigned to check onthe companies’ activities every two weeks and reportback transgressions to the village head, usually the onein Buji.

When a company logged outside the concession area,the village head in Buji would first call the companyand the local government to try to resolve thesituation. The police would also be informed, althoughvillagers knew from previous experience that thepolice would always be paid off by the company whenproblems arose. Then the company would be given afew days to pay compensation of Rp5,000 per cubicmeter in addition to the normal fee for all wood takenfrom forest logged outside the agreed zone. If thepenalty was not paid, community members would


confiscate logging equipment, perhaps the machinesused to load logs onto the boats. This action had theeffect of completely shutting down companyoperations since there were no alternative means oftransporting timber out of Sekatak. Records held bythe village head in Buji included letters fromcompanies asking for the return of their equipment.Further noncompliance by the company usuallyresulted in it being asked to leave the area altogether.

Mediation and the role of local governmentBefore situations reached this stage, there weretypically periods of mediation and meetings to try toresolve these disputes. The subdistrict head wouldattempt to facilitate dialogue between the communityand company, along with government officials inTanjung Selor. But when these people were seen asspeaking on behalf of the company, the ‘facilitation’reportedly only made the situation worse(Suramenggala et al. 2001). Many of the officials inthese institutions had an intense (complicit)involvement in the chain of IPPK implementation,right up to the district head level. These networks ofoverlapping interests, from the Malaysian timberbuyers all the way to the bureaucrats in forestry offices,are prevalent in many forest areas in Indonesiaincluding East Kalimantan (Palmer and Obidzinski2002). There tended to be little involvement ofgovernment authorities at the provincial level. Thedistrict head had ultimate authority, although thecommunity perceived the head’s actions relating tothe settlement of conflicts to be ‘biased’ and suspectedthat the head may have been taking ‘special fees’ fromIPPK companies.

If discussions on the resolution of a conflict betweena company and a community reached deadlock, thecompany usually proposed a meeting with prominentcommunity members in Tarakan or Tanjung Selor torenegotiate the agreement and perhaps make a newone. This is a common approach which has also been

observed in Berau (Obidzinski 2003) and in Malinau(Limberg 2003) and in which accommodation isprovided, sometimes along with the provision of cash,alcohol and prostitutes. If a compromise was notreached and a ‘new agreement’ not made then thedistrict government would try to determine andresolve the problems between the two sides. In extremecases, the district head in Bulungan simply moved theIPPK company’s concession area elsewhere.

In Sekatak, where all the companies entered into thesame contract terms and hence had to comply withthe same rules and pay the same fees since 2001, thereappeared to be some kind of mechanism for when acompany leaves (because of either being shut downby the communities or being relocated by the districthead of Bulungan). Buji treated all the IPPK permitsas a ‘single concession area’ meaning that when oneof these companies left, the others on the contract werethen allowed to take over forest previously allocatedto the one that had just left. This possibly inducedcompetition for ‘good behaviour’ among theremaining companies on the contract34.

Since 2000, this ‘single area’ has been divided into twoareas with two companies operating in one area andfour in the other. Both of these areas were situateddownstream of villages, one to the northeast of Bujiwith a logging camp on the north side of the Sekatakriver, the other to the southeast of Buji. This area alsoincluded the log pond with Intracawood on the southside of the river. While both of these areas were stilloperational as of June 2003, it seems that in spite ofIPPK permit extensions being granted to all sixcompanies in February 2003, four of the companieshad already left either because of having completedoperations in the existing concession areas35 or becauseof being ‘closed down’ by the communities. As of June2003, there were only two IPPK companies still inoperation, one in each area, in addition to the HPHcompany, Intracawood.


Decentralisation appears to have inadvertently givena large element of control and autonomy over foreststo local governments with resulting benefits tocommunities in Sekatak. However, from the start ofcompany–community negotiations in 1999 until the‘IPPK boom’ in late 2000 and the resolution of IPPK–HPH conflicts in 2001, there were many problems withforest land claims and participation in logging dealsamong villages. There was a high level of tensionamong communities in Sekatak resulting from village-to-village conflicts arising from overlapping landclaims, as well as tensions within villages stemmingfrom movements of people from village to village. Allthis discord was the consequence of independentlynegotiated agreements and the relativelyuncoordinated process of negotiations in Sekatak atthe time. Company noncompliance occurred in somecases and led to variation in community responses,which may have been partially dependent on whetheror not communities ‘sided’ with the IPPK against theHPH operations.

Since late 2000, increased cooperation among villagesseems to have allowed for resolution of some problemsrelated to land-use claims and competition over forestareas, although community property rights remainedweak. Also, since 2000 nearly all villages in Sekatakparticipated in negotiations for access to loggingbenefits. Hence, after 2000, increased participation andco-operation among villages almost certainly changedthe negotiation process relative to the earlier situation.Whereas before all participating communitiesnegotiated independently, the process changed to onewhere representatives of other communities gatheredtogether in Buji to discuss proposed IPPK deals.

This change in the negotiation process brought aboutby collective action may have also resulted in increasedcommunity control over the location of IPPKconcession borders and the terms of logging such asreplanting requirements. Relative to many other cases

already recorded in East Kalimantan, and particularlyin Bulungan, the contracted outcomes negotiated inSekatak contained more terms and rules for thecompanies and promised fees were situated at thehigher end of the scale. The linking together of allindividual IPPK contracts into a single frameworkcontract between the communities and companiesseemed to lead to less variation in promised benefitsamong communities. However, many of thecontracted outcomes (whether in terms of moneypaid, concession borders or other delimiters) may nothave been realised without the establishment of asystem of collective monitoring and contractenforcement.

In Indonesia as a whole, the absence of effective state-led enforcement with respect to forest governance (forexample, see Richards et al. 2003) has meant moreemphasis on the establishment of local systems ofenforcement such as the one in Sekatak. The systemwas simple, had a clear chain of reporting andconsequently appears to have been relatively successfulin keeping company transgressions, including theHPH, in check. However, as in many parts of EastKalimantan, the IPPK record of contractualcompliance in Sekatak is remarkably poor. The reasonswhy IPPK operators have consistently failed to respecttheir side of the contract probably are the desire tomaximise profits or some combination ofincompetence and negligence. The fact that companycompliance does not seem to have improved over timemay indicate a profit-maximizing strategy, althoughthe shutting down of numerous IPPKs in Sekatakmakes this point difficult to observe properly. It shouldalso be noted that while the IPPK companies havedifferent owners, the nature of business networks inEast Kalimantan36 might lead to them behaving morelike a cartel rather than competing firms. However,while there appeared to be little change in theincidence of company noncompliance over time, therehas been increased coordination among communities

Discussion7


to deal with the it. Buji claimed that in general itrefused to be drawn into compromising overcontractual obligations when community–companyconflicts arose and instead simply issued ultimatumsfor compensation before threatening to shut downoperations.

The village of Buji facilitated increased community-to-community cooperation. Buji is relatively large andwell-established, with a longstanding, large forest landclaim. It is also unique in that it is an influentialcommunity with dominance over all othercommunities in Sekatak. This dominance is due totrade links, location (near other villages and HPHinfrastructure) and influence with the subdistrictgovernment, amongst other things. It may also besignificant in attempting to explain collective actionin Sekatak that Buji is non-Dayak. Maybe Buji isrespected by the other villages in the area simplybecause it is ethnically unlike them. However, Buji isstill a community that has had similar negativeexperiences with HPH concessionaires both pre- andpost-1998. This experience may have helped the villagein learning how to deal with IPPK operators,particularly with respect to contractualnoncompliance. Buji also has a strong leader, who isthe main point of reference not only for his ownvillage, but for all the villages in the area. In addition,he has had experience in dealing with situations ofconflict and seems to have had the competence andability to prevent conflicts about land-use claims fromdeteriorating further in 2000 and 2001. From that timeonwards, he was well placed to push for collectiveaction by all villages in the area, leading to increasedco-operation with respect to IPPK negotiations andcontract enforcement. Since late 2000, there hasreportedly been a sharp dissipation of intercommunitytension in Sekatak.

Some aspects of negotiations observed in Sekatak havealso been observed elsewhere in East Kalimantan,where problems of overlapping and contradictoryforest land claims are common. Hence, where villagesare clustered relatively close together, share forest areasand may even have a history of co-operation, thereare cases of co-operative agreements and the sharingof logging benefits among communities. However, itseems that strong and relatively transparent localleadership is necessary to enable collective action towork properly. An example in the district of Beraushows how collective action among villages in a singlewatershed with strong local leadership set the agendaand led to a single agreement. They even opposedlogging, at least for a short period of time (Obidzinskipersonal communication; Palmer and Obidzinski2002), although this stance eventually broke down

following the acceptance by the leadership of a largefee from a coalition of the logging companies in thearea. Thus it seems that in many relatively poor villagesin East Kalimantan the sudden appearance in the localeconomy of large amounts of cash from IPPK dealsand rent-seeking by well-placed ‘village elites’ may helpexplain the success of collective action bycommunities.

Rent-seeking can adversely affect the processes ofnegotiations, company compliance and self-enforcement. Anecdotal evidence (e.g. Anau et al.2001) suggests that intracommunity problems areendemic in the entire province and that rent-seekingby ‘village elites’ is one of the main causes. Hence, whileit cannot be directly observed, rent-seeking can bedescribed as an ‘unproductive activity’ (e.g. Pearce inpress) in that it imposes costs that may well outweighthe financial gains. Conflicts within communities mayoccur not just because of the in-migration effects ofIPPK agreements. A general unhappiness amongstsome village groups over the process of negotiations(e.g. lack of participation), the terms of loggingagreements with companies and the distribution ofbenefits within villages can all lead to intracommunaltensions. All these problems can be caused orexacerbated by rent-seeking in the community, andpotentially undermine the effectiveness of collectiveaction taken by communities, whether taken bycommunities alone or by groups of communities asin the case of Berau. Collective action can be affectedfor example in terms of a breakdown in trust amongdifferent village groups and a breakdown in villagedecision-making. Therefore, where rent-seekingappears to be a serious problem, it would be importantto consider its impacts and costs when calculating theoverall benefits from postdecentralization loggingagreements.

In spite of the empowerment and autonomy evidentin Sekatak it was clear that villagers still did not feelthey had a lot of choice in deciding whether to acceptnew logging deals or not. Current politicaluncertainties in the country, the haphazard nature ofthe recent political changes and weak property rightsappear to affect people’s perceptions of independenceand autonomy. The fact that large areas of forest inSekatak are still designated HPH areas may act as anincentive for these communities to continue tonegotiate logging deals on their own terms for as longas possible. Furthermore, economic uncertainties andincreasing cash demand in Sekatak do seem to affectdecision making with regard to logging deals. Also,while there seems to have been some provision forreducing local damage through negotiation, e.g. withthe establishment of logging borders and replanting


requirements, it is highly unlikely that all ecologicalcosts have been sufficiently internalized through thesedeals37. However, the lack of similarly high cash-earning alternatives to logging is likely to result in moreforests being negotiated over and transferred tologging operators in the near future. Since 1999, 10,000

to 20,000 hectares in total have been logged by bothHPH and IPPK concessionaires in the 100,000hectares claimed by Buji. The remaining 30,000 to40,000 hectares is spread among six different areas offorest in Sekatak.


At this point in time, decentralization changes haveundoubtedly led to a higher capture of logging rentsby communities in Sekatak and hence significantlyaltered the distribution of financial benefits fromlogging since 1998. These changes have resulted invariation among villages of benefits from loggingagreements made with companies. This variationseems to be dependent on the processes of negotiation,company contract compliance and communityenforcement. In Sekatak from 1999 until 2000, anumber of communities were negotiating withcompanies independently with varying contractualand actual outcomes. Overall, these negotiations ledto variations in social benefits and fees, as well asintercommunity and intracommunity conflicts arisingfrom forest land claims and the movements of peopleto secure logging benefits in other villages. Thesituation of IPPKs in HPH areas led to further conflictthat confused the forest land claim issue even more.Given all these problems, it seems that somecommunities benefited from these logging deals atleast financially and in spite of widespread companynoncompliance.

Conflicts over forest borders and benefit sharingamong villages led to the assertion of leadership byBuji over the other communities in Sekatak. Thisleadership and the increased cooperation amongcommunities resulted in the formation of a singlecontract that linked together several IPPKs andcommunities. Nearly all communities in Sekatak wereincluded in this contract, which ensured a moreequitable outcome for communities. Furthermore, a

simple system of monitoring and contractenforcement by all communities participating in theagreement was established to deal with incidents ofcompany noncompliance. These events wereinfluenced by experiences during the first wave of IPKnegotiations in 1999 as well as experiences with theHPH companies in Sekatak, both before and afterdecentralization. The relatively transparent leadershipand influence of Buji was significant in enabling thisprocess of cooperation among villages and sustainingit over time. Overall, the experience of Sekatak seemsto imply that local collective action has improved localbenefits from decentralization. A more transparentand coordinated process of negotiations wasimplemented for all participating communities andthere has been a lower incidence of community-to-community conflict since late 2000. While companynoncompliance was still widespread as of June 2003,the coordinated system of monitoring andenforcement ensured that something was always doneabout it.

The case of Buji suggests that prior experience withconflict, strong leadership and coordinated action canlead to better benefits for communities. It also suggeststhat strategic points of leverage for communities existwhen they can establish systems to monitor companyactivities in logging areas, log production and therehabilitation of logged areas. In the absence of othermeans to protect the interests of local communitiesand to enforce the law, the development of capacitiesfor such collective action and self-enforcement seemto be promising areas of further work.

Conclusions8


Endnotes

1 Engel et al. (2003) demonstrate how bargainingbetween community and company would be theoutcome if the community were able to exertproperty rights over the forest, however vaguelydefined or uncertain these rights might be by law.

2 Prior benefits associated with use of the forest, e.g.,the gathering of forest products such as rattan orrubber, may also be lost as a consequence of loggingactivities. However, the larger the value of thestanding forest as perceived by the community, themore likely the community will opt to prevent anyform of logging, as has been observed in at leastone area of East Kalimantan (Engel et al. 2003).

3 This larger body of research is being undertaken byDeterminants and Effects of Alternative Institutionsfor Natural Resource Management in DevelopingCountries, a research group based at the Center ofDevelopment Research, University of Bonn and incollaboration with the Center for InternationalForestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. All research isfunded by the Robert-Bosch Foundation.

4 The reasons why Bulungan passed legislationrelating to IPPK and not HPHH permits are notcompletely understood. One may be that theprovincial government has to sign off on HPHHpermits whereas IPPK rules only require that thenegotiating parties make direct arrangements withthe district head. Hence, the issuance of IPPKs mayhave required less bureaucracy, time and dealingswith the provincial government of East Kalimantan.Also, IPPK regulations in Bulungan clearly state thatforest clearance should be followed by plantationdevelopment or agricultural activities by the permitowner, in lieu of any formal reforestation tax to thegovernment. Thus, it is possible that the districtgovernment of Bulungan adopted IPPK legislationin order to encourage plantation development oncethe forests were cleared of commercially valuable

timber. On the ground and in practice, however,there has been very little to differentiate betweenHPHH and IPPK activities, and the terms HPHHand IPPK are used interchangeably in many areasof East Kalimantan.

5 But as is the case in many other districts, almostall companies obtain ‘an IPPK’ for an area far largerthan 100 hectares, e.g. for 1,000 hectares, thecompany would receive 10 permits. Also, permit‘extensions’ (perpanjangan) were typical and hencemost IPPK permits would be valid for a period ofat least two years instead of just one.

6 Since 1999, thousands of IPPK permits have beenissued in East Kalimantan, with concessionscumulatively covering hundreds of thousands ofhectares of forest land (Barr et al. 2001; Palmerand Obidzinski 2002; Obidzinski 2003).

7 For example see Obidzinski (2003) for Berau,Suramenggala et al. (2001) for Bulungan andLimberg (2003) for Malinau.

8 Many of these actors, particularly the governmentofficials, charge special ‘administrative fees’ fortheir ‘services’. These fees are known locally as‘pungutan liar’ or ‘wild tax (levy)’. SeeSuramenggala et al. (2001) for more.

9 The less formal Indonesian word for this individualis calo, which carries derogatory overtones. He isperceived mainly as an opportunist.

10 From the Dutch Commanitaire Vennootschap,meaning a limited partnership, among investors,brokers/dealers and various contractors.

11 According to Suramenggala et al. (2001), the villagehead and the adat head usually negotiated separate‘royalty payments’ from the company, which in


Bulungan was reported to be in the region ofRp6,000 to 12,000/m3 of wood production. Insome cases this payment is perceived as another‘administrative fee’ by village head and adat headfor conducting the logging deal on behalf of therest of the village.

12 But this group only becomes a legitimate tool inorder to obtain the permit and start up operations.Suramenggala et al. (2001) note that there is noevidence that these groups have actuallyundertaken any kind of activities. The reportfurther notes that group members were typicallyunaware that their signatures were in fact necessaryfor becoming permit owners and instead werebeing used to allow people from outside thecommunity to become owners of the IPPK permit.

13 According to the Bulungan IPPK regulations, thepermit owner is supposed to be a village co-operative, but instead is usually someone local whowill represent the interests of the company and thevillage elite at the same time. Thus, within thisframework the permit owner would technically bean ‘employee’ of the company. This is whysignatures and identities of the village head, otherimportant village representatives and the‘representative farming group’ are so important inallowing companies access to community forests,because then the ‘permit holder’ does not legallyhave to be someone from the village.

14 Proof of this claim comes in the form of lists oflogging equipment sent by the companies to thevillage of Sekatak Buji.

15 Cabang Dinas Kehutanan or the Provincial ForestryService.

16 Typically large concessions, the permits for whichare still allocated and controlled by the centralgovernment in Jakarta.

17 Izin Pemanfaatan Kayu, or Wood UtilizationPermit, typically for forest clearance and plantationdevelopment.

18 The others are PT Bina Lestari (47,000 ha, alsocovering forest in Sesayap) and PT KaryasaKencana (13,525 ha in Sekatak). Both wereoperational in 2001 but had ceased by June 2003.

19 Typically, HPH operations would remove only treesof diameter 50 cm or greater. An agreement betweenCV Malindo Jaya Sekatak and the villages of Keritingand Anjar Arif stipulated that the company pay a

fee of Rp200,000 per cubic metre for all logs of sizegreater than 50 cm. Discussions revealed that thevillages never received that sum because there wereno logs of that size left in the IPPK concession areaafter the past logging there by a HPH company. Thissuggests that before decentralization less logging ofsmaller trees occurred. The logging of smaller treesby IPPKs may cause even greater damage to theforest as more tree cover is removed, which couldimply an environmental cost associated withdecentralization. Villagers claim that forest damagehas become worse since the onset of IPPK in 1999.The biggest complaint was related to river levels(increased flooding in the wet season and too lowin the dry season) and the poorer quality of riverwater (from increased soil run-off). Thus, there wassome awareness of the local impacts of logging,which has been reinforced by experiences that somemembers have had outside the area, e.g. when peoplefly over logged-out areas of East Kalimantan.

20 IPPK operations tend to be far cheaper to operate,require a lower payment of formal taxes and entailless bureaucracy (see for example Obidzinski andSuramenggala 2000).

21 ‘Respen’ means Resettlement penduduk orpopulation.

22 Buji claimed not to deal with ‘entrepreneurs’, onlythe head of the IPPK company, e.g. the person whonegotiated on behalf of CV Malindo Jaya Sekatakfor an agreement with the villages of Keriting andAnjar Arif was a Peter Lukito, a ‘Director’ of thecompany. This person was also the IPPK permitholder. It should be noted however, that many ofthese ‘CV’ were in fact composed of no more thana few people.

23 According to the informant, every company paysfees of Rp5,000 to the district head and of Rp3,000to the district local government for every cubicmetre of production.

24 In theory, if all communities in Bulungan were ableto act collectively, this could give market power tocommunities in the whole district. The districthead would then find it very difficult to find a newconcession area for the company. In practice, thesize of Bulungan and the remoteness of many ofthe communities would probably make collectiveaction on this scale rather difficult.

25 Some villages arranged for the transfer of their adatforest using only an oral agreement with fewformal rules, as occurred in Berau (Palmer and


Obidzinski 2002), Bulungan (Suramenggala et al.2001) and Malinau (Anau et al. 2001). Many ofthese villages received only the advance payment(uang panjar fee), which could be demanded beforeoperations commenced. The remainder ofcompany promises typically went unfulfilled.

26 According to a forestry office informant, at leastone village in Sekatak that had already negotiatedaway its land claim in 2000 has tried to ‘tax’ thelog boats when they passed this village on theirway downstream. It is unclear whether this actionwas taken in order to compensate the village forlogging impacts that occurred upstream.

27 Note that there are separate agreements, althoughthey tend to be drawn up in order to assist thecompany in obtaining the IPPK permit from thedistrict government. All these separate agreementswere collectively part of a single frameworkcontrolled by Buji. In discussions, Bulunganforestry officials said that they were completelyunaware that all the IPPK permits issued forSekatak were in fact linked together in a singleagreement.

28 In Sekatak, the establishment of fruit gardens andjati or teak plantations was negotiated into theIPPK contracts.

29 The practice of underreporting is well-established.Discussions with a forestry office informantrevealed that regular checks of the log pond inSekatak showed that IPPK companiesunderreported log production to the local forestryoffice y by a factor of between 2 and 3. It seemsthat while these companies could deceivegovernment officials, they may have been more‘truthful’ with communities with respect to the sizeof proposed concession areas. Communities inSekatak may be better placed to tell the differencebetween 500 and 2,100 hectares. The forestry officeinformant also added that when forestry officialscomplain of company underreporting, they wereusually overridden by orders from the office of thedistrict head.

30 If timber is to be exported from Bulungan, IPPKcompanies are supposed to pay Rp165,000 percubic metre for meranti and Rp100,000 per cubicmetre for other species to the local government. Iftimber is not to be exported, then the companiesare supposed to pay the ‘IPPK tax’ of Rp65,000 percubic metre for meranti and Rp50,000 per cubicmetre for other species.

31 Remittances were paid into the village head’s bankaccount in Tanjung Selor before being distributedamong community members. Apparently at leastone in five households in Buji had a bank account.

32 In Buji up to Rp25,000 per cubic metre was setaside for village developments such asimprovements to village administration (e.g.purchase of computers) and the village schools.In 2003, Bulungan’s district government rankedBuji second in the district for ‘best use of IPPKmoney and village development’. This ranking wasbased on business activities, quality ofadministration, village activities, leadership etc.

33 The general impression is that for many people inSekatak it is difficult to infer which experience was‘worse’—HPH or IPPK.

34 The firms on this particular contract have differentowners. However, a relatively small number ofindividuals own many IPPK companies, e.g. CVPrima Wana Mandiri and CV Prima Wana Bakti,which although being the ‘same company’ operatein different subdistricts, Sekatak and Sesayap,respectively. If all the companies were owned bythe same person, noncompliance could be viewedas a profit-making strategy. Some firms wouldbenefit from noncompliance and there would beno real loss if another firm belonging to the sameowner took over the concession area.

35 While the IPPK permit extensions were grantedin February 2003 in theory to allow for anotheryear of operations, some of the companies possiblyonly needed a few more months in order to finishexisting concession areas. These permits were notissued in order to establish new concessions.

36 See McCarthy (2000) and Obidzinski (2003) forexamples in Aceh.

37 For example, where there has been extensivelogging in old, previously logged HPH areas, IPPKlogging may have disturbed the process of forestregeneration and caused greater environmentaldamage leading to impacts on the gathering ofother forest products such as rattan. In additionto these local externalities, there are also nationaland global externalities, since individuals outsidethe immediate locality may also suffer theconsequences of forest conversion, e.g. the loss ofexistence or passive-use values (Krutilla 1967) andvalues relating to climate change (see for exampleRamirez 2000).


Agrawal, A. 2001 Common property institutions andsustainable governance of resources. WorldDevelopment 29(10): 1649–1672.

Anau, N., Iwan, R., van Heist, M., Limberg, G., Sudana,M. and Wollenberg, E. (2001), Negotiating morethan boundaries: conflict, power and agreementbuilding in the demarcation of village borders inMalinau. Center for International ForestryResearch, Bogor, Indonesia.

Baland, J.M., and Platteau, J.P. 1996 Haltingdegradation of natural resources: is there a role forrural communities? Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations (FAO) andClarendon Press, Oxford.

Barr, C. and Resosudarmo, I.A.P. 2002Decentralisation of forest administration inIndonesia: community livelihoods and economicdevelopment. Center for International ForestryResearch, Bogor, Indonesia.

Barr, C., Wollenberg, E., Limberg, G., Anau, N., Iwan,R., Sudana, M., Moeliono, M. and Djogo, T. 2001The impacts of decentralisation on forests andforest-dependent communities in Malinau District,East Kalimantan. Decentralisation and Forests inIndonesia Series: Case Study 3. Center forInternational Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Engel, S., López, R. and Palmer, C. 2003 Community-industry contracting over natural resource use ina context of weak property rights: the case ofIndonesia. Keynote presentation to EAAEWorkshop on Contracts in Agriculture,Copenhagen, June 19–21, 2003. Paper to theAnnual Conference of the International Society ofNew Institutional Economics in Budapest,Hungary, September 2003. Submitted toEnvironmental and Resource Economics.

Krutilla, J. 1967 Conservation reconsidered. AmericanEconomic Review 57: 777–786.

Limberg, G. 2003 Hutan, desentralisasi dan suku.CIFOR Report. Center for International ForestryResearch, Bogor, Indonesia.

McCarthy, J.F. 2000 Wild logging: state agency, districtnetworks of power and interest, and biodiversityconservation in south Aceh, Sumatra. AsiaResearch Centre, Murdoch University, Australia.

Obidzinski, K. 2003 Logging in East Kalimantan,Indonesia: the historical expedience of illegality.Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam.

Obidzinski, K. and Suramenggala, I. 2000. Acomparison of costs and expenses for HPH, IPPKand illegal logging. Mimeo, Yayasan PionirBulungan, East Kalimantan, Indonesia.

Ostrom, E. 1990 Governing the commons: theevolution of institutions for collective action.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Palmer, C. and Obidzinski, K. 2002 Case studyprepared for the report: ‘Higher internationalstandards or rent-seeking race to the bottom? Theimpacts of forest trade liberalisation of forestgoverance.’ Food and Agriculture Organisation(FAO) and the International Institute forEnvironment and Development (IIED). ProjectGCP/INT/775/JPN. Mimeo, Center forDevelopment Research, Bonn, Germany.

Pearce, D.W. In press. Environment and economicdevelopment. Edward Elgar Publishing,Cheltenham, UK.

Ramirez, O.A. 2000 The carbon cycle and the value offorests as a carbon sink: a tropical case study. In:Dore, M. and Guevara, R. (eds.) Humandimensions of sustainable forest management andglobal climate change, 111–156. Edward ElgarPublishing, Cheltenham, UK.

Richards, M., Palmer, C., Young, C.F., and Obidzinski,K. 2003 Higher international standards or rent-seeking race to the bottom? The impacts of foresttrade liberalisation of forest governance. Reportprepared for the Food and AgricultureOrganisation (FAO) and the International Institutefor Environment and Development (IIED). ProjectGCP/INT/775/JPN.

References


Suramenggala, I., Sutisna, I.H., Saragih, I.B., Samsu,Ngau, Y. (2001) Evaluasi dampak IPPK terdahapfisik hutan, pendapaten masyarakat danpermerintah kabupatan bulungan. Yayasan PionirBulungan, East Kalimantan, Indonesia.

Wollenberg, E., and Kartodihardjo, H. 2002 Devolutionand Indonesia’s new forestry law. In: Colfer, C.J.P.and Resosudarmo, P. (eds.) Which way forward?

People, forests, and policymaking in Indonesia, 81–109. Resources for the Future, Center forInternational Forestry Research (CIFOR) and theInstitute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

Yasmi, Y. 2003 Understanding conflict in the co-management of forests: the case of BulunganResearch Forest. International Forestry Review5(1): 38–44.


Village Company Size (ha) Date IPPK issued HPH area

Sekatak Buji CV Raya Bhakti 500 21/09/1999 Inhutani ICV Surya Ramadhan 2,000 29/12/2000 Inhutani ICV Surya Ramadhan 1,300 22/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Surya Ramadhan 900 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknown

Turung CV Gunung Agung Lestari 600 29/12/2000 IntracawoodCV Gunung Agung Lestari 375 20/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Sengon Agung Jaya Pratama 600 20/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Gunung Agung Lestari 250 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknownCV Sengon Agung Jaya Pratama 550 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknown

Pungit CV Wana Prima Mandiri 525 22/10/1999 Inhutani ICV Wana Prima Mandiri 700 09/10/2000 Inhutani ICV Wana Prima Mandiri 1,000 21/12/2000 IntracawoodCV Wana Prima Mandiri 280 21/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Wana Prima Mandiri 94 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknown

Pentian CV Wana Prima Mandiri 450 22/10/1999 Inhutani ICV Wana Prima Mandiri 500 09/10/2000 Inhutani ICV Wana Prima Mandiri 1,000 21/12/2000 IntracawoodCV Wana Prima Mandiri N/A 19/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Wana Prima Mandiri 167 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknown

Keriting/ CV Malino Jaya Sekatak 500 16/08/2000 Inhutani IAnjar Arif CV Malino Jaya Sekatak 200 22/08/2002 (Ext I) unknown

CV Malino Jaya Sekatak 200 24/03/2003 (Ext II) Inhutani I

Ambalat CV Rizky Putri Melati 1,200 09/11/2000 Inhutani ICV Rizky Putri Melati 799 22/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Rizky Putri Melati 799 24/03/2003 (Ext II) Inhutani I

Maritam CV Gunung Agung Lestari 600 13/11/2000 Inhutani ICV Gunung Agung Lestari 600 20/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Gunung Agung Lestari 600 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknown

Kendari CV Wana Prima Mandiri 1,000 21/12/2000 IntracawoodCV Wana Prima Mandiri 495 21/08/2002 (Ext I) unknownCV Wana Prima Mandiri 293 24/03/2003 (Ext II) unknown

Sekatak CV Mutiara Utama 400 16/08/1999 Inhutani I

Bengala CV Mutiara Utama 500 30/08/2000 PT. AbindoButani Lestari

Kelising CV Raya Bhakti 500 17/07/2000 Inhutani I

Ujang CV Kayan Lestari 800 13/11/2000 Inhutani I

Tenggiling CV Kayan Lestari 800 13/11/2000 Inhutani I

Bekiliu CV Sengon Agung Jaya Pratama 1,000 21/12/2000 Intracawood

Bunau Jalai CV Wana Prima Mandiri 1,000 21/12/2000 Intracawood

Kelincauan CV Wana Prima Mandiri 1,000 21/12/2000 Intracawood

Terindak CV Wana Prima Mandiri 1,000 21/12/2000 Intracawood

Bambang CV Kayan Lestari 600 29/12/2000 Intracawood

Punan Dulau PT Bakti Bumi Perdana 1,500 29/12/2000 Inhutani I

Buong Baru CV Sengon Agung Jaya Pratama 844 24/12/2003 unknown

Source: Cabang Dinas Kehutanan (CDK) Bulungan Selatan (1999, 2000) and Forestry Office, Tanjung Selor, Kabupaten Bulungan,Kalimantan Timur (2003).Notes: For permits issued in 2002 and 2003, the locations of concession areas are unknown.‘Ext I’ denotes a first extension to the IPPK permit and ‘Ext II’ denotes a second extension.

IPPK permits issued by Bulungan Forestry Office, August 1999–February 2003

Appendix

24 Collective action and benefits from IPPK: A case study from Sekatak, East Kalimantan - Charles Palmer

Related CIFOR publications

Case Study 1. McCarthy, J.F. 2001. Decentralisation, local communities and forest management in Barito

Selatan District, Central Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Case Study 2. McCarthy, J.F. 2001. Decentralisation and forest management in Kapuas District, Central

Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Case Study 3. Barr, C., Wollenberg, E., Limberg, G., Anau, N., Iwan, R., Sudana, I.M., Moeliono, M., and

Djogo, T. 2001. The Impacts of decentralisation on forests and forest-dependent communities in Malinau

District, East Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Case Study 4. Casson, A. 2001. Decentralisation of policymaking and administration of policies affecting

forests and estate crops in Kutai Barat District, East Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research,

Bogor, Indonesia.

Case Study 5. Casson, A. 2001. Decentralisation of policymaking and administration of policies affecting

forests and estate crops in Kotawaringin Timur District. Central Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry

Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Case Studies 6 and 7. Potter, L. and Badcock, S. 2001. The effects of Indonesia’s decentralisation on

forests and estate crops: Case study of Riau province, the original districts of Kampar and Indragiri Hulu.

Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Case Study 8. Soetarto, E., Sitorus, M.T.F. and Napiri, Y. 2001. Decentralisation of administration, policy

making and forest management in West Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor,

Indonesia.

Case Study 9. Obidzinski, K. and Barr, C. 2002. The effects of decentralisation on forests and forest

Industries in Berau District, East Kalimantan. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Others

Anau, N., Iwan, R., van Heist, M., Limberg, G., Sudana, M. and Wollenberg, E. 2002. Negotiating More than

Boundaries: Conflict, Power and Agreement Building in the Demarcation of Village Borders in Malinau, 131-

156. In: Technical Report Phase I 1997-2001. ITTO Project PD 12/97 Rev.1 (F) Forest, Science and Sustainability:

The Bulungan Model Forest. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Casson, A. and Obidzinski, K. 2002. From New Order to Regional Autonomy: Shifting Dynamics of Illegal

Logging in Kalimantan, Indonesia. World Development 30(12):2133-51.

Resosudarmo, I.A.P. 2003. Shifting Power to the Periphery: The Impact of Decentralisation on Forests and

Forest People. In: Aspinall, E. and Fealy, G. (eds.) Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation

and Democratisation, 230-244. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Oka, N.P. and William, D. 2004. The Policy Dilemma for Balancing Reforestation Funds. Decentralisation

Brief. No. 1. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.

Colfer, C.J.P. and Resosudarmo, I.A.P. (eds). 2002. Which Way Forward: People, Forests and Policymaking in

Indonesia. Washington, Resources for the Future.

CIFOR's forest governance programme examines the process of making and implementing decisions about forests and forest people to promote the participation and empowerment of disadvantaged groups; the accountability and transparentcy of more powerful groups, and democratic, pluralistic processes that support fair representation and decision making among all groups.

the role of collective action in determaining the benefits...

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