the role of civil affairs in psyop and hao

7/28/2019 The Role of Civil Affairs in PSYOP and HAO

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CA B 95-85.107April 1996Annotated Briefing

The Role of Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations inHumanitarian AssistanceOperations

Adam B . Siegel

Center for Naval Analyses4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-1498

Copyright CNA Corporation/Scanned September 2006


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Approved for distribution: April 1996

Christine H. Fox, DirectorOperational Policy TeamPolicy, Strategy, and Forces Division

CNA's annotated briefings are either condensed presentations of the results of formal CNA studies that have been furtherdocumented elsewhere or stand-alone presentations of research reviewed and endorsed by CNA. These briefings representthe best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. They do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITEDFor copies of this document, call the CNA Document Control and Distribution Section (703) 824-2130


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The Role of Civil Affairsand Psychological Operationsin Humanitarian A ssistanceOperations (HAOs)by

AdamB. SiegelThe Center for Naval Analyses

The Center fo r Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a study to identify an danalyze alternative ways th e U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) might consider toimprove its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). Toachieve this objective, we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs inthe past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations;and (3) assessed th e relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes inorganization, education an d training, doctrine and documentation, and equipmentan d supplies. This study was co-sponsored by th e Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command (MCCDC) an d I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).

In some cases, meeting requirements does not necessarily imply that th eMarine Corps needs to have a specific capability, but it may mean that USMCforces need to know which organization has the key capability and how to accessthis particular type of augmentation. In terms of specific U.S. militarycapabilities, the subject of this briefing may provide th e preeminent example of aMarine Corps need to integrate outside capabilities to achieve mission success.This briefing discusses the role of civil affairs (CA) and psychologicaloperations (PSYOP) in HAOs, focusing on what this role means in terms ofactual requirements. The briefing presents an overview of general U.S. CA andPSYOP capabilities. I t discusses USMC CA an d PSYOP capabilities and whatthese capabilities mean for the ability of th e Marine Corps to conduct operations.It also suggests ways to integrate th e capabilities of the other services withMarine Corps units to more effectively cond uct operations.


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OverviewCivil affairs and HAOsPSYOP and HAOsWhere are the capabilities?USMC CA and PSYOP capabilitiesSome thoughts fo r the future

This briefing has five sections. The first briefly discusses th e role ofcivil affairs, outlining CA activities and tasks, with a focus on how thesemight differ in an HAO compared to what might be expected in a"traditional" military operation. The second section provides a similardiscussion of the role of psychological operations in HAOs. An overviewof U.S. CA and PSYOP capabilities is next, followed by a discussion ofMarine Corps capabilities an d experience in CA and PSYOP. The briefingconcludes with some ideas for the future both for the military as a wholeand, more specifically, for the Marine Corps.

Before embarking into the briefing, tw o subjects deserve briefconsideration. The first is a definition of HAOs and the second concernsthe reasons fo r combining CA and PSYOP in a single study.


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What is meant byHumanitarian AssistanceOperations?

This briefing examines th e role of CA and PSYOP forces in a wide rangeof missions. For purpose s of this briefing (and th e overall study), th e termhumanitarian assistance operations (HAOs) is expanded to capture a variety insituations. The reasons why this study examined this broader se t of missionswere examined in an earlier report. 1 For this briefing, the term HAO is meantto encompass operations in which support to a distressed civilian population isa critical element of the operation. Although many of the concepts of thisbriefing might be applicable in a domestic support operation, this briefingfocuses on operations outside the United States.

Recent examples of overseas HAOs involving Marines range from ProvideComfort (Turkey an d Northern Iraq, 1991), Sea Angel (Bangladesh, 1991),GTMO (Haitian refugees in Guantanamo Bay, 1992-1993), Restore Hope(Somalia, 1992-1993), Continue Hope (Rwanda, 1994), an d UpholdDemocracy (Haiti, 1994-1995).

1 . CNA Information Memorandum 334, A Chronology of U.S. Marine CorpsHumanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations, by Adam B. Siegel, September 1994. For adiscussion of types of POs and definitions, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM100-23, Peace Operations, December 1994.


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W hy combinecivil affairsandpsychological operations?

Before proceeding with th e briefing, let us examine th e reason fo r combining thesetw o activities in one study.A key aspect of HAOs is that they will be to a greater extent than so-called"traditional" missions (i.e., warfighting) civil-military operations (CMOs). Thismeans that interactions with civilians an d civilian organizations are more important, atleast relatively, than in what th e military perceives to be the case in more traditional

missions. Organizations th e military will interact with range from "allies," such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private vountary organizations (PVOs) or otherU.S. Government agencies; to "targets," civilians requiring aid, such as distressedcivilians following a major natural disaster. They can even include "threats," such ascriminals. CA an d PSYOP units are the reservoir of much of th e military's expertise indealing with civilians an d civilian organizations. And, within th e context of CMO, it isimportant to remember that CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive the additivefactor of integrated activity is greater than the su m of th e parts.CA and PSYOP forces have much in common. They are both leverage forces withrelatively low investments in terms of augmenting the force, they can achieve a lot.

They are both CMO-oriented. They are both force multipliers. And the keyrequirement for both is trained personnel. In principle an d in reality, CA and PSYOPare mutually supportive. With these factors in mind, we will now examine each in turn.


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Civil affairsandHAOs

Civil affairs include a number of activities and a range of expertise. Ingeneral, CA deals with th e relations between military forces and the civilianauthority and/or general population in an area of m ilitary operations. CA isalso a tool to help the military commander exploit th e civil dimensionwhether in traditional warfighting or in H AOs. CA is supportive in traditionalmilitary operations.The role of civil affairs shifts greatly from traditional w arfighting to HAOs.In a traditional mission, CA seeks to minimize th e effect that (1) th e civilianpopulace has on th e military operation, an d (2) th e military operation has onthe civilian populace. In an HAO, as in a post-conflict situation, CA personnelwill seek, to maximize the effect on the civilian populace in other words, howcan CA personnel leverage limited resources (whether military, governmental,or non-governmental) to achieve th e maximum positive result in the civiliancommunity. In warfighting, CA is a necessary, but adjunct, element of th eoperation. In an HAO, CA is a (i f not the) critical player and should be centralto much of th e planning and execution of operations.


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In HAOs, CA personnel or units provide expertise to help redirect th emilitary's warfighting capabilities to provide humanitarian assistance. Forexample, CA experts can identify problems in the civilian infrastructure fo rcombat engineers to help solve. CA also specializes in dealing with otherorganizations, such as local governments or relief organizations. In somecases, CA may include m ilitary forces carrying out activities or functions thatnormally are th e responsibility of local or indigenous governments, such asrestoring, providing, and /or managing public utilities an d public institutions.


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Civil affairsA command responsibilityRelations between military forces an d- Civilian autho rities- General populace

NotjustinHAOsMajor roles- Advice to commanders an d staffs- Assessments- Advice to civilian o rganizations

Civil Affairs is a command responsibility. 2 I t is the only major commandresponsibility in which commanders are not typically educated; CA is not anintegral part of any war-college curriculum. Few commanders of major unitsin any of the services have CA training. As far as could be determined, fo rexample, none of th e commanders in Haiti in October 1994 had such training.However, because of the number of HAOs in recent years, fa r more officershave now had on-the-job experience including the Chairman of th e JointChiefs of Staff (who commanded Provide Comfort in eastern Turkey an dnorthern Iraq). Despite this experience, the general lack of CA education andtraining means that trained CA personnel (typically found in Civil Affairsunits) play an important role in advising commanders an d staffs on civil-military operations.

CA personnel can also help the commander coordinate activities with non-military organizations, whether U.S, international, local, private, orgovernmental. If there is a large enough CA presence, they can man the CivilMilitary Operations Center (CMOC) an d other key nodes to provide th enecessary interface between th e military force and civilian organizations.

2. "Civil affairs is an inherent responsibility of the military commanders..." DODDirective 2000.13, "Civil Affairs," 27 June 1994. See also discussion in "Civil Affairs: AFunction of Command," Special Warfare, July 1995, pages 20-25.


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CA personnel play a key role in assessing facilities, public services, andother needs of th e civil sector at the outset of HAOs. These assessments bothquick-look, general surveys and detailed analyses by subject matter expertscan help guide the appropriate allocation of both military and civilian assets toaddress the most serious needs.In some cases, CA personnel will provide direct advice to the localgovernment or, in extreme cases, actually assume the role of running th esociety. The former might occur, for example, in a liberated area (e.g., Kuwaitfollowing Operation Desert Storm). The latter typically wo uld occur in a post-conflict situation in conquered enemy territory. In many ways, this is similar toconditions that might be found in an operation in a failed state for example,th e status of Somalia during Operations Restore Hope an d Maintain Hope.The balance between the requirement under international law as well aspractical necessity to assume governance of occupied territories contrastswith the policy-makers' an d military leadership's hesitancy to assumeresponsibilities fo r governing failed states, even though th e practical necessitymight be as strong.


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Civil affairs (2)Coordination a key role- Civil-Military Operations C enter (CMOC)- With NGOs, other government agencies, UN

HAO role similar to post-conflictresponsibilities- Helping run civilian society- Caring for d isplaced civilians

A leverage and multiplier asset

In most HAOs, the most important CA role will be coordination. As partof this, CA officers will typically man the CMOC, which is th e main locationfo r coordinating military assistance to other U.S. Government agencies andinternational organizations, as well as N GO s an d PVOs active in th eoperation. 3

As noted earlier, civil-affairs responsibilities in HAOs can resemble th eresponsibilities in th e post-conflict environment in occupied territory. In Haiti,fo r example, although CA officers did not "run" th e government, CAfunctional experts were placed throughout the government to improve th eeffectiveness of various ministries. Such functional experts can improve th epost-crisis transition from th e military as the lead agency to th e military and asa supporting player to th e en d of military involvement.

In many recent HAOs such as Operation Provide Comfort in easternTurkey and northern Iraq, Hurricane Andrew disaster relief in Florida, and theHaitian an d Cuban refugees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba the military hashoused and fed displaced civilians or refugees. Dealing with these distressedcivilian populations may involve creating tent cities an d essentially managing acivilian society. CA expertise makes such activities run much smoother.

3. The CMOC concept and terminology are changing, partly because of the differingexperiences in recent operations. No doubt coordination will remain a central CMO C functionand CA personnel will continue to provide the core of an "idealized" CMOC.


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Civil Affairs: requirementsTrained personnelIntegration with the unit and/or staffAppropriate and adequate intelligencesupportAdditional requirements can varytremendously by operation from a few CAadvisors to large numbers of CA personnelto run a civilian society

CA is a relatively low-cost leverage an d multiplier asset the presence ofwell-trained CA officers an d enlisted personnel can help a unit apply itsresources more effectively and more appropriately to CMO. The following aresome of th e requirements fo r that multiplier effect. To effectively conductcivil-military operations with CA requires, first of all, appropriately educatedand trained CA personn el. Three categories of personnel and responsiblitiesexist: CA generalists to conduct general surveys of infrastructure an d a civiliansociety's needs, an d handle basic coordination with civilian organizations;subject-area experts who can make detailed assessments of civilian sectors orhelp ru n a specific civilian agency; and planners and command staff, whichwill include both generalists and specialists. Specific personnel requirementswill vary across operations an d in th e different phases of an operation.

Another key element fo r successful CMO is integration of th e CApersonnel with th e appropriate deployed units and staffs. Although th e Armyis increasing the number of CA personnel assigned to units, in general anoperational unit (Marine or Army) will not have a substantial body of CAexpertise. Thus, CA units or individuals will augment operating units fo r aspecific operation. CA units usually have little integral operationalcapabilities. Their effectiveness relies on using their exp ertise to appropriatelyapply other assets whether military or civilian to meet civilian needs.

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Civil affairs, like all other parts of the military, require intelligencesupport to get the job done. The problem is that military (and other U.S.Government) intelligence is not accustomed to supporting CA. Haiti was awell-planned operation with a long lead time. Despite this, deployed militaryunits had little or no information on th e operations of the UN or NGOs inHaiti. This included no information on th e locations and contents of mostrelief warehouses many filled by U.S. taxpayer-supported programs untilafter they were looted several days into th e operation. Effective CAintelligence support would have allowed th e deployed CA personnel toarrange appropriate protection fo r these warehouses, which would havelessened or even prevented looting. This looting made internationaltelevision, lowered th e relief community's ability to deliver food to Haiti'sneediest citizens, and damaged th e operation's credibility.

The overall requirements fo r CA personnel vary from operation tooperation. Som e situations, such as short-term disaster relief, might benefitmost from a few CA personnel to provide advice to commanders and staffs.Other operations, such as th e ongoing refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay,might require long-term an d large-scale CA unit presence to help run acivilian community.

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Psychological operationsandHAOs

Let us face facts: PSYOP has a public-relations problem. Manyorganizations and individuals from the UN to NGOs to journalists unfamiliarwith th e military hear the term an d an image from The ManchurianCandidate comes to mind. This image is not simply a distortion of reality b utit reflects a misunderstanding of th e role of PSYOP, especially in HAOs. Attrie core of current U.S. PSYOP thinking on HAOs is something far divorcedfrom th e propaganda that many outside th e PSYOP community might believe:truth is critical. No PSYOP officer should pu t something out in a campaignduring an HAO that he or she does not believe to be both true and truthful.Thus, rather than old-style propaganda, PSYOP in an HAO today is aninformational tool that can help in every phase of an operation.

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Psychological Operations"Non-lethal weapon" in the arsenalKey roles are informational- Inform public and counter rumors- Work to lower threat- Provide transparency

Good PSYOP/information policy cansmooth every phase of HAOMust be coordinated with wide range ofother organizations and activities

PSYOP is a tool for th e commander a "non-lethal weapon" in the arsenal.Its main role in HAOs is informational: to let th e civilian populace know whatis going on and to provide a factual counter to rumors that run rampant in suchhectic situations. Such information al activities can be as mundane (but critical)as providing information on th e time and location of food distribution or onhow to act safely when a helicopter lands in the vicinity.PSYOP also provides a tool to lower the threat to U.S. and allied forces,and to civilians, whether they are allied local government personnel or reliefworkers. The threat can be reduced in many ways. PSYOP can, for example,help th e local population understand an d support th e U.S. (and allied)operation. Such understanding and support will, hopefully, decrease publicsupport for any groups or individuals who may want to interfere with (o r evenattack) the involved military forces an d civilian groups. Also, PSYOP candeter threat groups because it can help make clear th e consequences ofattacking U.S. (or allied) forces. Such activities will enhance the safety ofmilitary personnel, humanitarian-relief workers, and the local population.

PSYOP can help in every phase of an HAO, from informing and preparingthe population for the entry of a military force, to keeping all target audiencesinformed of th e goals, activities, and progress of th e operation. It can also helpprepare the population for the eventual withdrawal of the military force. Suchtransparency in the operation will improve relations between the military forceand any involved civilian organizations.

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PSYOP requirementsTrained personnelIntelligence supportProduction and distribution capabilitiesIntegration as part of staff"Educated" commander

Coordination with other organizations which doesn't always occursmoothly is crucial fo r a successful PSYOP campaign. For example, oneU.S. agency released information that the U.S. military would be deliveringfood in northern Haiti at the start of Uphold Democracy. This was not,however, part of th e operational plan, and no food supplies were stocked forsuch distribution. Coordinating information policy with actual operations is akey requirement.

Besides coordination, there are at least five critical requirements fo rsuccessful integration of PSYOP into an HAO: trained personnel; adequate andappropriate intelligence; production an d distribution capabilities; integrationwith an operational staff; and a commander who understands and supportsPSYOP. First, and similar to CA, is the requirement fo r appropriately trainedpersonnel. This includes not only knowledge of PSYOP tactics and techniques,but also, fo r example, knowledge of how pamphlets disperse when droppedfrom a helicopter, as opposed to a plane, and, always critical, appropriatelanguage skills to communicate with target audiences.

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Intelligence support is also very important an d wide-ranging inrequirements. Again, like CA, many of the intelligence requirements falloutside the mainstream of U.S. intelligence collection. PSYOP requiresknowing, fo r example, who the primary communicators are in a population,what methods people use to communiate with each other, and the population'sgeneral needs and desires. The requirements are often quite specific, such asthe need to know about specific dialects or regional accents, so that tapes fo rloudspeaker teams are appropriate for the area in which they are broadcast.Also, intelligence must be able to track an d relay rumors in the civilianpopulation without delay so that PSYOP can just as rapidly prepare responsesto untruthful and dangerous rumors.

The ability to produce appropriate material an d distribute it is crucial toany PSYOP campaign. The required production equipment can includeprinting presses an d sound studios. Distribution methods may include usingaircraft fo r dropping pamphlets, loudspeaker teams fo r dealing with crowds,and temporary radio stations. In several operations, such as Continue Hope inRwanda, th e U.S. military even distributed small battery-powered radios sothat refugees could listen to the radio broadcasts that provided informationabout relief efforts.

PSYOP teams do not stand alone; they must integrate into the staff. A staffthat is unwilling to accept or cooperate with a PSYOP team will render thatteam ineffective. This brings us to the last requirement. A commander whodoes not understand th e importance of PSYOP to the overall operation willprobably create th e conditions fo r its failure. Commanders must understandthat, although PSYOP is an important tool in traditional warfighting, it may becritical in HAOs.

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CA and PSYO P:Where are the capabilities?

In th e U.S. military, both CA an d PSYOP assets are in relatively shortsupply. Almost all the CA an d PSYOP personnel are in th e Reserve Forces.With th e rash of operations short of war requiring CA and PSYOP support,those on active duty have been heavily taxed in recent years, literally movingfrom one operation directly to the next. For example, active-duty PSYOPpersonnel deployed to Haiti were withdrawn so that they could deploy withOperation United Shield, th e evacuation of UN forces from Somalia.Reservists then took over the responsiblities in Haiti. Although this mighthave had little effect on the operation, it is a good example of th e burdensplaced on th e active-duty portion of the CA and PSYOP forces.

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Where are the capabilities?Military:- All services have some capability, but- U.S. Army is the main resource:USACAPOC

Active-duty personnel are generalists Reservists are higher-ranking specialists

Civilian- Varied resources for both CA and PSYOP- USIA and AID/OFDA as examples

Other nations? International organizations?Each of the military services has at least some CA and PSYOP capabilities.In other words, almost every part of th e military can contribute to CAoperations or a PSYOP campaign in some manner. Navy ships can carry reliefsupplies to support CMO an d th e facilities aboard ship can help producematerial for a PSY OP campaign. Air Force aircraft deliver relief supplies but,more specifically related to PSYOP, they also can drop pamphlets. In addition,

USAF Reserve aircraft have broadcast (radio an d television) capabilities thatcan help the PSYOP message reach mass audiences. The Reserve Marine CivilAffairs Groups (CAGs) also have limited PSYOP capabilities, and other partsof the Marine Corps can help both CA and PSYOP activities.The center of U.S. military CA and PSYOP resources resides in the U.S.Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations C omm and (USACAPOC)in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This comman d includes th e only active-dutyCA unit (one battalion) an d PSYOP units (one "group," approximately abrigade in total size). However, The surge in HAOs in recent years hasstrained these assets. Most CA an d PSYOP personnel are in the Reserve

Forces. Active-duty CA (about 200 personnel) tend to be lower-ranking andgeneralists well-suited fo r immediate assessments an d fo r standing up aCMOC at the outset of an operation.

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USMC CA and PSYOPcapabilities and experiences

Within th e context of overall military capabilities, th e Marine Corps CAand PSYOP assets are limited. The tw o USMCR CAGs total less than 30 0Marines, not all fully trained. The CAG s also have a small PSYOP element;enough to aid PSYOP planning an d some loudspeaker teams. DeployedUSMC units typically a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special OperationsCapable) (MEU (SOC)) or, in some circumstances, a Special Purpose MarineAir Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) essentially have little integral CA orPSYOP capability. As noted earlier, every military unit can play a PSYOP orCA role. Attack helicopters can perform PSYOP by flying low over an unrulycrowd for deterrence or intimidation. These same helicopters could haveloudspeakers attached to broadcast a PSYOP message about th e location an dactivities of a relief organiz ation's feeding centers.

Throughout a MA GT F are elements with CA capabilities, such asengineers who can help restore public services (as Marine engineers did innorthern Iraq, Bangladesh, and Haiti, for example) an d transportation assetsthat can help deliver relief supplies. I t is the very robustness of th e U.S.military's capabilities in this regard that often leads to involvement in disasterrelief an d other HAOs. Besides these capabilities developed for warfighting,but appropriate or useful in an HAO trained CA and PSYOP personnel canprovide th e expertise to appropriately apply the military's resources. This iswhere th e Marine Corps may have a shortfall.

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USMC CA and PSYOPLimited CA and PSYOP assets- All in the Reserve Forces- CA units all in the Reserve Forces- CA units have sm all PSYOP elements- Some active-duty Marines PSYOP-trainedRecord in recent operations- Provide Comfort in Turkey an d Iraq- SPMAGTF CARIB in Haiti- Vigilant Warrior, Kuwait- United Shield, Somalia Withdrawal

In terms of civil affairs, the Marine units are in th e Reserve Forces. 4 About300 Marine Reservists (one-third officers) are split between the 3rd CAGs onthe West Coast, which supports I and III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs),and 4th CAG on the East Coast, which supports II MEF. Marine CA units arein th e Reserves partly because Marine CA has focused on the warfightingmission to minimize civilian interference with military operations and theeffect of military operations on civilians. For such warfighting missions, th eMarine Corps would have the time and authority to call up Reserve Forces tosupport th e mission. Thus, fo r warfighting missions, th e fact that th e CAGsare in th e Reserves does not create an obstacle for timely commitment. Also,because CA is partly responsible fo r providing liaison between the MarineCorps and civilian communities, Reserve status improves the CAGscapabilities. As Reservists, th e CAG personnel have one foot in the civilianworld and the other in th e Marine Corps. Thus, th e USMCR CAG personnelmight be more able to more effectively coordinate than active-duty personnel.Resources are also an issue. CAG units are heavy in overhead a lo t ofofficers whose expertise is not necessarily needed on a daily basis. Thus,having Marine CA in the Reserves might be the most appropriate, as well asthe most cost-effective, arrangement.

4. As of March 1996, 50 active Marine officers were CA qualified, with an additionalmilitary occupation speciality (AMOS) of 0107, Civil Affairs Officer.5. As of May 1995, 3rd CA G had a T/O of 16 7 (50 USMC officers and 111 enlisted; 4USN officers and 2 enlisted) with 129 actually assigned. O f these 129, 104 were considered tobe fully MOS qualified. 20


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The challenge in HAOs is to integrate these Reserve elements withdeployed and deployable MAGTFs (from SPMAGTF to MEF deployments) sothat this CA and PSYOP expertise is available when required. This has notalways been the case in recent years. For example, in Uphold D emocracy, noMarine CA Reservists were activated to support S PMA GT F CARIB.SPMAGTF CARIB had no CA support during exercises in August an dSeptember 1994. U.S. Army CA an d PSYOP teams joined SPMAGTFCARIB only days before the operation began.

Marine PSYOP assets are even more limited. Each CAG has only a smallPSYOP element, which is focused on PSYOP planning (though the CAGs areacquiring a limited amount of PSYOP equipment, specifically, tacticalloudspeakers fo r mounting on helicopters or vehicles). In recent years, th eMarine Corps has been sending more Marines to th e John F. Kennedy SpecialWarfare School at Fort Bragg to receive PSYOP training. Although notPSYOP experts, th e officers with PSYOP as a secondary specialty will helpimprove the ability to plan PSYOP as part of a MEU (SOC)'s operations, andwill ease the integration of a PSYOP team (whether USA, USAR, or USMCR)into a command as an operation gets under way.

Recent operations have had a range of success in terms of USMC CA andPSYOP support to deployed Marine forces. In Haiti, for example, SPMAGTFCARIB had essentially no CA publications on hand for planning CMO; didnot receive CA and PSYOP augmentation until just a few days before goinginto Haiti; and, according to both SPMAGTF CARIB and USACAPOCpersonnel, had problems integrating these teams. Although the SPMAGTFCARIB conducted a number of effective (and even innovative) CMO actions,6others such as a feeding program where Haitians rioted 7 were not assuccessful. It seems reasonable to conclude that SPMAGTF CARIB wouldhave had a more effective CMO capability with a more robust an d earlier CAand PSYOP presence.

6. These included restoring the long-dormant electrical pow er system in conjunction witha PSYOP campaign explaining that the Marines could keep the lights on only if the streetsremained calm; and a street-cleaning program that sparked a city-cleaning in Cap Haitien.7. The feeding program in Ca p Haitien in September 1994 is surrounded by somecontroversy. The SPMAGTF CARIB commander an d the Commander, Amphibious TaskForce (CATF), agreed that they needed to do something to aid the local population and agreedon a feeding program using USN supplies no longer needed for refugee support. Perhaps dueto the late CA presence, SPMAGTF CARIB had a difficult time contacting and coordinatingwith local NGO/PVOs. USA CA personnel and OFDA representatives later complained thatthe food distribution should not have occurred outside the already established NGO/PVOstructure, that the distributed food was inappropriate, and that the food was given to the wrongHaitians.

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Integration of CA and PSYOP with deployed MEU (SOC)s has beenproblematic elsewhere, as during Provide Comfort, where th e Marine CAaugmentees, who were already active-duty because of Operation Desert Storm,did not join with th e 24th MEU (SOC) until well after CMO activities hadbegun with Marines involved in providing assistance to Kurdish refugees.The 3rd CAG has developed a program of assigning a liaison officer(LNO) to all MEU (SOC)s. This LNO is responsible for arranging CA andPSYOP training fo r an d support to th e MEU (SOC). Partly because of th esuccess of this program, th e 3rd CAG supported I MEF's deployment fo rVigilant Warrior (the response in October 1994 to Iraqi movements towardKuwait) and to Somalia for the withdrawal of UN personnel (Operation UnitedShield, February-March 1995). This small team (two Marines) providedplanning support an d liaison between USACAPOC elements an d th e 15thMEU (SOC). The Vigilant Warrior/United Shield deployment derived from the

LN O program and the MEU (SOC)'s familiarity with th e CAG's activities andcapabilities.

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PSYOP is th e criticaldeep-strike w eapon" in HAOs;CA helps target PSY OPand is a critical"close-in w eapon"

The CA and PSYOP roles in HAOs can be considered in a number ofways. One of th e most interesting combines insights from two officers whocommanded U.S. forces in the Cap Haitien region of Haiti in fall 1994: th ecommander of SPMAGTF CARIB, Colonel T.S. Jones, USMC, an d thecommander of th e 2d Brigade of th e 10th Mountain Division, Colonel JamesDubik, USA. For Col. Jones, activities to help the civilian community werecritical he saw that guaranteeing civilian security and improving th e generalpopulation's welfare were necessary to guarantee force security. Theapplication of CA concepts and the conduct of civil-military operations lay atthe core of Col. Jones' approach. For Col. Dubik, information was his criticalammunition, PSYOP was his means to deliver th e round on target, an d civilaffairs helped PS YOP deliver the right information to th e correct audience.

In other words, PSYOP is th e critical deep-strike weapon in humanitarianassistance an d peace operations. Civil-affairs expertise can help ensure thatPSYOP delivers the right round on the right target. Civil-military operationsare a key tactical weapon for force security, and CA expertise will lead towardmore effective CMO.

8. This reflects the colonels' comments about their approach to operations in the CapHaitien region. Neither Col. Dubik no r Col. Jones ignored the other side of the equation. Col.Dubik wa s heavily involved in the Civil Affairs mission meeting with local leaders to helprestart a judicial system for example. Col. Jones did not ignore the PSYOP mission, butcombined his aggressive CMO actions with the PSYOP campaign.

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If PS Y OP is th e critical"deep-strike weapon" in HAOs; an dif CA helps target th e PS Y OP

an d is a critical "close-in weapon,"the questions are:

How to be better "armed?"How to provide better "targeting?

CA and PSYOP are mutually supportive; a synthesis of their activities isgreater than the sum of their parts. The challenge is to more effectivelyemploy these leverage forces in the HAOs that th e United States will, almostsurely, engage in in th e coming years.

The slides that follow discuss general CA and PSYOP issues and providerecommendations in doctrine, organization, and training that could imp rove theability of USMC units to use CA and PSYOP effectively in HAOs.

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Some thoughtsfor the future

The following slides present some concepts fo r attention or change. Thefirst slide addresses ov erall issues that are not solely of Marine Corps concern.The second slide discusses an issue at national policy level that is not withinthe cognizance of the Marine Corps and perhaps not even within theDepartment of Defense. This issue the blacklisting of "nation building"has, however, important implications for HAOs an d is important fo runderstanding th e context in which the Marine Corps will use CA and PSYOPassets in HAOs.

The following three slides focus on U.S. Marine Corps issues, providingboth recomendations fo r action and for consideration.

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Overall issues4 - Does th e U.S. military have enough active-

duty CA and PSYOP forces?+ If CA is a comm and responsibility, whatcommanders are receiving CA education?+ How can interagency coordination beimproved?+ Differing service concepts even within th e

same operation need to be addressed

The first question seems obvious, and this briefing is not the first place thisissue has been raised. Recent experience makes one wonder whether thecurrent active/Reserve mix for CA and PSYOP units still makes sense. Theseunits are in high demand for th e type of operation that the U.S. military hasconducted in recent years. If th e active/Reserve mix is not changed, the abilityto use Reserve assets will need improvement.Viewing this issue from another angle, we can question how much of thisis a "self-inflicted" problem, especially fo r the active-component CA elements.These forces are heavily committed to training programs around th e worldwhich, when combined with real-world contingencies, overtax them. Active-duty CA personnel have been withdrawn from contingency operations(replaced by Reserve Forces) to redeploy for such exercises. CA trains hardand, when combined with contingencies, this leads to a potentiallyoverwhelming operational and personnel tempo (OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO).One option maybe to cu t down on overseas CA training especially duringcontingency operations. This option, however, could have a number of seriousimplications: the overseas training with indigenous populations is crucial todeveloping the necessary expertise in dealing with civilians an d civil-sectorneeds. In addition, these training evolutions an d exercises support national-policy objectives as on e form of delivering aid and improving relations aroundthe world.

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Another serious question relates to training commanders fo r the commandresponsibility for CA, which is not taught (other than in a short lecture or as anelective course) at any of th e major military command an d staff colleges.Educating commanders in CA will probably improve their effectiveness in HAOs.CA should be added to th e curriculum at all higher-level command an d staffcolleges. A brief overview of CA and CMO should occur earlier in an officer'scareer, preferably before the junior officer joins an operational unit.

The need fo r better coordination between the U.S. military, U.S. Governmentagencies, and other organizations involved in HAOs has been raised in many otherforums. Poor coordination can destroy a PSYOP campaign and can make CAactivities less effective (or even ineffective). PSYOP and CA need aggressiveinteragency coordination both before and during an operation. As part of thiscoordination, th e interagency process requires a means to ensure that th e variousagencies will abide by agreements and will be held accountable if they do not.The process becomes even more difficult in a coalition or UN operation, where th ecoordination is not solely with other U.S. Government agencies.A number of recent operations have shown that different commanders an ddifferent services can have, not surprisingly, different conceptions of CMOs.Examples of this include building tent cities fo r displaced civilians to differentstandards during the Hurricane Andrew relief activity. In Haiti, Marinesconducted four separate food distributions, whereas th e Army's approach was that"soldiers don't touch food that's an NGO responsibility." Different approachesmight be reasonable an d appropriate but they deserve examination. The jointdoctrine on humanitarian assistance now being developed may help clarify such

issues.

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Is nation building evil?Nation building: Trying to remake a societyinto the U.S. imageNation assistance: Helping a society getback on its feetCivic assistance: The DOD component ofnation assistance

A broad policy question related to CA also needs reexamination. "Nationbuilding," along with "mission creep," 9 has achieved the status of an evilitem a four-letter wo rd in policy-making fo r HAO s. At the outset of UpholdDemocracy, it was almost a mantra from the White House down to the JointTask Force (JTF) spokesman, and even individual soldiers, to emphasize thatU.S. forces were not involved in nation building in Haiti. President Clinton se tthe tone in his 15 September 1994 television address. He emphasized that "TheAmerican people should know that our soldiers will not be involved inrebuilding Haiti or its economy." The president sets policy, and this was thepath followed in Operation Uphold Democracy.

This policy guidance, however, is at fundamental odds with requirementsfo r long-term mission success. The overall interagency mission in thisoperation was to leave behind a functioning society so that thousands ofHaitians would not flee to th e United States. To succeed for the long termrequired assistance to the civil sector; not doing so risked ultimate failure. Themilitary component of this assistance was greatly restricted by the statementson nation building and the drive to avoid mission creep. Limiting militaryinvolvement in the civic sector early in an HAO lessens the potential fo rachieving lasting success. Many of th e early restrictions were later lifted as theneed fo r military involvement became clear.9. For a discussion of misconceptions over mission creep and an alternative way to thinkof the problem, see CN A Research Memorandum 94-74, Requirements for HumanitarianAssistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies, by Adam B. Siegel,February 1995


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The military was and is not necessarily th e most appropriate organizationto conduct civil-sector assistance. In the absence of other efforts, however, themilitary may have to take th e lead an d will certainly play a role. In Haiti,many CA officers (and others in th e military) were frustrated as soon as theyhad completed their assessments of Haiti's infrastructure. The injunctionagainst nation building meant that the military couldn't act to rectify identifiedproblems and there were no other organizations that could effectively work onthese problems at least not in th e short term. And many of the injunctions onthe activities of U.S. forces were changed as th e operation progressed and thegaps became more evident. For example, the U.S. military did not conductroad- and school-building programs in Haiti in fall 1994; it became a criticalpart of th e mission fo r U.S. forces by mid-1995, when there were far lesseffective forces remaining.

This requirement is not limited to Haiti; assistance to the civil sector is acore element of a path toward long-term success in many of these situations,whether we look to Panama following Operation Just Cause, to northern Iraq inOperation Provide Comfort, or to Bosnia in Operation Joint Endeavor. Theearly months of Joint Endeavor have seen similar frustrations within th e U.S.military an d with other (typically civilian) organizations with progress in thecivic sector. In an HAO such as Haiti or Bosnia, th e military might achieve allassigned tasks an d this might become meaningless if th e civic sector is notadequately supported an d developed.

The current anathema to using the term "nation building" to describeoperations, and the failure to understand th e implications of this policy choice,handicaps operational success. Many of th e activities an d approachesappropriate for CA units fall into the category of nation building.

The commander should be able to work in the civil sector, as this is one ofthe weapons in his arsenal to improve force protection an d to help withachieving long-term success. As Col. Jones advocated, improving th e people'sfeeling of security an d sense of well-being improved the security for theMarines in the Cap Haitien region. Thus, even at th e tactical level,commanders need the flexibility to take actions for force security actions thatthe prohibitions against nation building might make them feel restrained fromconducting. Solving civil-sector problems could be critical to long-termmission success as well. Dealing with civil sector problems policing, th ejudicial system, governm ent services should have been central to th e overalloperation in Haiti. To have long-term success in HAOs requires some form ofassistance to the civil sector and, at th e moment, the rhetorical problems withnation building seem to hamper this.

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Clearer definitions might provide a way around this problem: the term"nation assistance" is already extant in joint literature an d seems moreappropriate to describe what U.S. forces will be involved in . If we think ofnation building as trying to rebuild a country in th e U.S. image (e.g., Germanyand Japan following W orld War II), nation assistance is helping a nation reachth e status of a functioning society so that U.S. military intervention an dsupport is no longer required. The term "civil assistance," used in th e DODDirective on Civil Affairs, is a subcomponent of nation assistance. Civilassistance includes "activities undertaken by DOD components that areprimarily designed to aid the civil sector." Nation assistance is the interagency(and international) integration of efforts to help a society ge t back on its feet.Civil assistance is the DOD component of that effort.

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The Marine Corps shouldInvolve USMCR CA Groups in M EU (SOC)workups an d other trainingPlan, coordinate, and request USM CR CAparticipation at the earliest momentEnsure appropriate documentation with allunits especially M EU (SOC)sRewrite FM FM 7-34: MAGTF Civil Affairs

Just as the general defense community has important CA and PSYOPissues to address, the Marine Corps also has such issues. Some seem ready fo raction and others are raised fo r consideration. Based on this analysis of th erole of CA and PSYOP forces in HAOs, the capabilities of USMC fo r CA andPSYOP, an d a review of experiences in recent operations, th e following arerecommended for action.First, and perhaps most important, MEU (SOC) workups should includeinteraction with th e appropriate USMCR CAG and, if possible, USACAPOC,so that when an HAO occurs th e MEU (SOC) commander an d staff couldintegrate CA and PSYOP augmentees more easily. In recent years, 3rd CAGhas established training an d liaison relationships with all deploying MEU(SOC)s and the MEFs it supports. When such an HAO looks likely, Marineunits should ask for augmentation at the earliest possible moment. Theseaugmentees can then start helping th e Marine unit accomplish missionobjectives sooner rather than later. Further integrating the CAGs with th e threeMEFs and the deploying MEU (SOC)s will lead to implementation of th efollowing recommendations.

All deploying Marine units should have documentation to support potentialCMO involvement. This should include Joint, Marine, and Army doctrinalpublications on CA and PSYOP, and lessons-learned documents. Much of thismaterial is available on CD-ROMs, therefore it would not require muchstorage space to have the documentation available fo r all deployed Marineunits. The tw o USMCR CAGs should be responsible fo r developing th edocument packages for the MEFs that they support.31


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As part of this documentation effort, FMFM 7-34 should be updated toreflect Marine Corps operational experience in recent years. Among othersubjects, the updated doctrine should provide more discussion of coordinatingMarine efforts with other organizations especially civilian to support th ecivil sector. The current doctrine does not, for example, discuss CMOCs,which are crucial in HAOs. Nor does it discuss th e OFDA DARTs. TheOFDA DART is likely to be a critical player in any HAO involving USMCforces. It will work with the CA element to provide a liaison between Marine(and other U.S. military) forces and the relief community.A rewritten FMFM 7-34 should also provide guidance on how to rapidlyintegrate CA and PSYOP augmentees (whether USMCR, USA active-duty, orUSAR personnel) to an already deployed unit as it responds to or is engaged in

a contingency operation. This updating should also be coordinated withdoctrinal changes at USACAPOC, which has the DOD lead for CA/PSYOPdoctrine.

Also, during th e revision process, the Marine Corps should considerwhether the CA officer should become a special staff officer (with the CMOCas th e element he commands), rather than reporting to the G-3/S-3. In someHAOs, where dealing with the civil sector and/or disaster relief is the mainfocus of the operation, having the CA officer as one of th e commander'sprincipals may be more appropriate. E ither way, it is critical for th e operationsofficer and the CA/CMOC to coordinate their activities.

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The Marine Corps should+ Increase Marine Corps officer education in

civil affairs an d civil-military op erations- Should occur at all steps in the training

program: from Basic School throughCommand & Staff College4 - Continue training Marines in PSYOP as asecondary speciality+ Improve coordination with USACAPOC

Just as th e general DOD educational community should providecommanders with more CA education, so too should th e Marine Corps. Theissue is not simply civil affairs, but th e broader area of civil-militaryoperations. Currently, M arine officers and senior non-commissioned officers(NCOs) receive limited exposure to the responsibilities that international lawplaces on a military force in terms of treatment of civilians (e.g., on abattlefield). This exposure takes place in the Law of W ar courses at the Basicand Amphibious Warfare Schools, the Command and Staff College, and theStaff NCO Academy. Education in this material should be broadened toprovide Marine officers and senior NCOs with a background in th e difficultproblems of using a military force to support a civil sector. As CMO is acommand responsibility, th e Command and Staff College in Quantico seems tobe the most logical place for Marine officers to be provided more in-deptheducation on civil affairs and civil-military operations.

Having active-duty Marines with some PSYOP training provides avaluable augmentation to deployed Marine forces. The Marine Corps shouldcontinue sending Marines for basic PSYOP training an d should expand thisprogram. PSYOP training should be tracked as part of an officer's career, andwhen enough officers have had such training, all deploying MA GT FCommand Elements (CEs) should have such an officer.

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A benefit of conducting CA training in USMC schools and exposing moreactive-duty Marines to PSYOP (and perhaps CA) training is greater exposureof the USACAPOC community to Marines, and increasing Marine awarenessof the roles and capabilities of CA/PSYOP forces. USACAPOC is the centerfor CA an d PSYOP in th e U.S. military, an d USACAPOC personnel willsupport Marines in real-world operations (whether or not USMCR CAGelements are present). Interaction between Marine units and Army CA andPSYOP personnel whether in educational settings or exercises shouldimprove integration of USACAPOC personnel with USMC units in real-worldoperations.

In addition to these recommendations fo r action, the analysis suggests thatthe Marine Corps should consider whether to undertake a number of othersteps. These include, fo r example, th e possibility of creating an active-dutyCA unit. This analysis does not support undertaking such a step, but theimportant role CA plays in HAOs and the seeming epidemic of such operationsindicates that the Marine Corps should consider whether it requires active-dutyCA elements. The following slide outlines these recommendations fo rconsideration.

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The Marine Corpsshould consider whether toCreate a secondary specialty in civil affairsfo r elements typically deployed withM EU (SOC)sRequest USACAPOC deployment withMEU (SOC)sHave active-duty Civil-Affairs units

The Marine Corps should also consider a number of other, harder issues.For example, another way to provide MEU (SOC)s with a broader CAcapability would be to make CA a secondary responsibility of part of thedeployed force, perhaps part of the Command Element (CE). For example, th eAir-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team might be anappropriate group fo r this responsibility, as their basic responsibilities includecoordination (between supporting and supported units), an d ANGLICO teamsalso frequently exercise with and support non-U.S. forces (thus, they arefamiliar with dealing with groups outside the U.S. military). This team couldbe responsible fo r holding th e necessary CMO documentation an d couldprovide commanders with limited CA capabilities until augmentees arrive.ANGLICO teams are well-prepared by their general responsibilities to handlea major CA responsibility coordinating activities with other governmentagencies and relief organizations in the CMOC.

ANGLICO teams are, like many other Marine units, heavily tasked thusthey might not be the most appropriate element. Artillery units may also be anappropriate element to assume CMO as a secondary responsibility. In manyHAOs, artillery is not used, which means that these units might be available forother commitments. Educating some USMC artillery officers in CA couldprovide the MEU (SOC) commander with an important stop-gap CAcapability. Whether ANGLICO, artillery, or some other element, preassigninga basic CA responsibility to a MEU (SOC) element could lead to moreeffective CMOs in the time between initial commitment of th e force and th earrival of augmenting USMCR or USACAPOC CA an d PSYOP personnel.

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Access to Marines with CA training could be critical fo r a MEU (SOC)involved in a time-urgent operation. The U.S. Army's JF K Special WarfightingCenter and School in Fort Bragg has a 2-week course on CMO. Sending moreMarine officers an d senior NCOs to this course could provide the basiceducation required to provide a MEU (SOC) with a stop-gap CA capabilityuntil CAG or USACAPOC personnel can be deployed.The Marine Corps may want to consider requesting USACAPOC presence

on MEU (SOC) and SPM AG TF deployments. Associated with this would be adecision that Marine Corps CA units, which would remain in the Reserves, areintended for warfighting (such as Operation Desert Storm) or extended low-intensity conflicts (such as the Vietnam War). With th e OPTEMPO stressesUSACAPOC personnel are already facing, this might not be a realistic optionin any event.

A different approach to providing Marine forces with more CA capabilitieswould be to create an active-duty Marine CA capability an d to detail CAofficers to deployed Marine Corps units (such as M EU (SOC)s an dSPMAGTFs). Marine CA expertise would thus be more easily available toMarines forces conducting HAOs. The costs of creating active-duty elementsduring a period of downsizing might remain prohibitive. Improvingintegration of th e tw o CAGs with deployable and deployed USMC units mightbe the most efficient way to achieve th e desired result.

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BibliographyThis briefing relies on a wide range of sources, with an emphasis onstudy of recent operations involving civil affairs and psychologicaloperations. The selective bibliography below focuses on CA/PSYOPpublications. In addition to these items, major contributors to theinformation and concepts in this briefing include the author's experiences with both U SA and US MC forces during Operation UpholdDemocracy (Haiti, fall 1994); studies of other HAOs (see, for example, documentation in this author's CNA Research Memorandum 94-74, Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations:Insights from, Seven, Case Studies, March 1995, and the references in CNAInformation Memorandum 334, A Chronology of U S M C HumanitarianAssistance and Peace Operations, September 1994); interviews withUSMC, USA, DOD, French Army, and British Army CA and PSYOPpersonnel; and US MC, USA, andJoint lessons-learned databases.

U S Government DocumentsAir-Land-Sea Applications (ALSA) Center, Multiservice Procedures fo rHumanitarian Assistance, final draft multiservice document,

March 1994HQ, Department of the Army (HQ DOA), Field Manual (FM) 33-1,

Psychological Operations, Washington, D.C., 31 July 1987HQ DOA and HQ USMC, FM 33-1/Fleet Marine Force Manual

(FMFM) 3-53, Psychological Operations, 18 February 1993HQDOA,FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, 11 January 1993HQDOA, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, December 1994Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs,

27June 1994

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DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, 4 December 1975Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and I

Marine Expeditionary Force, Fleet Marine Forces (FMF), EmeraldExpress '95 Conferen.ee Report: IntegratingMilitary & Civilian Efforts inHumanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations, Camp Pendleton, CA ,9-14 April 1995

HQUSMC, FMFM 7-34, MAGTF Civil Affairs, 11 July 19914th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Building Bridges:

Commander's Guide to Face-to-Face Communication, undated4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Capabilities Hand

book, July 19934th Psychological Operations Group (A), Psychological Operations Staff

Officer's Guide, September 1993Joint PSYOP Task Force United Shield, Psychological Operations Cam

paign, Plan, undatedJoint Staff, Joint Pub 3-53, Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine, Wash

ington, DC, 30 July 1993Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-57 (Proposed), Doctnne for Joint Civil Affairs,

Joint Staff, Washington, D C, October 1993 draftJoint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for

Peace Operations, Fort Monroe, VA, 28 February 1995Col Michael Kromm, USMCR, 3rd Civil Affairs Group, MAGTF Civil

Affairs: Command Bri^f, 2 May 19959th Psychological Battalion (Airborne), 4th PSYOP Group,

Commander's Guide to Tactical Psychological Operations, Fort Bragg,NC, April 1993

GenJohn M. Shalikashvili, USA, CJCS, Psychological Operations Supportfor Operation Provide Comfort, March 1994

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United States Special Operations Command, Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J9, Psychological Operations inPanama During OperationsJust Cause and Promote Liberty, MacDill AirForce Base, Florida, March 1994

Maj.Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, Director of Operations, UnifiedTask Force Somalia, Psychological Operations in Support of OperationRe-store Hope, 9 December 92-4M ay 1993, 4 May 1993

Books, studies, and articlesRudoph C. Barnes, Jr., "Legitimacy and the Lawyer in Low-Intensity

Conflict (LIC): Civil Affairs Legal Support," Army Lawyer,October 1988, pages 5-9

Carl Berger and Howard C. Reese, A Psychological Operations Bibliography, Special Operations Research Office, The American University,May 1960

Lt. Col. Charles P . Borchini, USA, and Mari Borstelmann, "PSYOP inSomalia: The Voice of Hope," Special Warfare, October 1994,pages 2-9

"Civil Affairs: A Function of Command," Special Warfare, July 1995,pages 20-25

Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War, A Symposium, Fort Bragg, NC, U.S.Army Special Warfare Center and School, October 25-27 1991

John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, editors, Winning th e Peace: TheStrategic Implications ofMilitary Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks, PA,Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990

Capt. Kevin Dougherty, USA, "Why Civic Actions and Security CannotBe Separated," Special Warfare, January 1994, pages 34-38

William E. Daugherty, editor, A Psychological Warfare Casebook,Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958

Murray Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare,Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1959

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Col. Thomas A. Timmes, USA (ret.), "Military Psychological Operations in the 1990s," Special Warfare, January 1994, pages 19-21

Col. Alexander M Walczak, USA, Conflict Termination ransitioningfrom Warrior to Constable: A Primer, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U S ArmyWar College, 15 April 1992

Maj. Philip S. Yang USA, Psychological S trategics for Low-Intensity Conflict,Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), LangleyAir Force Base, VA, October 1988

William P . Yarborough and Stanley Sandier, "Psychological Operations," Encyclopedia of th e American Military, vol. Ill, John E. Jessup,ed., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994, pages 1445-1470

John J. Zygiel, Jr., "View of Civil Affairs in the LIC (Low-IntensityConflict) Arena," Military Review, August 1986 , pages 58-61

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Related CNA studiesNewett, Sandra L. etal. Sum m ary ofRequirements for Humanitarian Assis

tance Operations, Apr 1996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-155)Newett, Sandra L. , et al . Emerald Express '95: Analysis Report, Apr 1996,

(CNA Research Memorandum 95-156)Dworken,Jonathan T. Improving Marine Coordination with ReliefOrgani

zations in Humanitarian Operations, Aprl996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-161)

Newett, Sandra L., et al. Planning for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Aprl996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-151)

Smith, Karen D. Command and Coordination in Humanitarian AssistanceOperations, Apr 1996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-165)

LaMon, Kenneth P . Training Requirements for Humanitarian AssistanceOperations, Apr 1996 (CNA Annotated Briefing 95-83)

Geis, Mark. Logistics andEngineering RequirementforHumanitarian Assistance Operations, Apr 1996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-152)

Keefer, Linda S. Legal Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Aprl996 (CNA Annotated Briefing 95-84)Dworken, Jonathan T. Measures ofEffectiveness for Humanitarian Assis

tance Operations, Apr 1996 (CNA Research Memorandum 95-166 )Siegel, Adam B., et al . The U.S. Marine Corps and Domestic Operations:

Insights on Requirements, Apr 1996 (CNA Annotated Briefing 95-86)McGrady, Katherine A.W., et al . CNA's Humanitarian Assistance Opera

tions Game: A Summary Report, Nov 1995 (CNA Information Memorandum 392)

Siegel, Adam B. Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and PeaceOperations-.Insights from Seven Case Studies, Mar 1995 (CNA ResearchMemorandum 94-74)