the rise of mecca geopolitical factors

THB MUSLIM Wow Vol. LXXXV, No. 3-4 July-October, 1995

THE RISE OF MECCA: GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS

The commercial activity of Quraysh has long been considered to be a key factor in the rise of Islam at Mecca. The relevant thesis, whose fore- most proponent is probably W. Montgomery Watt, maintains that the profits of transit trade in luxury goods corrupted Meccan society. The corruption of old values became the impetus for the moralistic teachings of Muhammad, i. e., Islam. Among a younger generation of scholars, Patricia Crone has recently challenged this thesis on the grounds that the textual evidence does not substantiate a significant role for Quraysh in longdis- tance, transit trade. She contends that the Meccans carried on a largely local trade in humble products, not luxury goods.

It would seem possible that the sanctuary around the Ka(ba had a considerable effect on the growth of the settlement. However, there is no evidence, apart from Islamic canonical history, for the existence of a sanctuary of great renown or antiquity. The Islamic canon itself does not reveal much about the sanctuary before Quraysh settled in its environs (mid fifth century A. D. ). It maintains that the Ka(ba was founded by Ibrahim and Ismii(i1 (Abraham and Ishmael of the Bible) and was subsequently controlled by (Amaliq (Amalekites), Jurhum, and then Khuda , who were in turn dis- placed by Quraysh. Various sources suggest that the Banti Jurhum inhab- ited Western Arabia around the fourth century A.D.4 Thus, from the modern historical perspective, there appear to be considerable chronological gaps. Aside from this issue, there is no evidence that the Meccan sanctuary itself, in contrast to (Arafat and Mina nearby, was an object of pilgrimage prior to Islam.5 If one accepts the tradition of the Ka(ba on the basis of religious belief, such issues become irrelevant. Otherwise, the factor of the sanctuary remains but a plausibility.

As for the theses of Watt and Crone, they are well argued. However, both are limited by their methodology, which largely relies on critical

* This thesis is presented in a number of works: Irfu&mmmi’aI Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Mufiammad UI &-dn8 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956); Muhammad Prophe/ andS(8emm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), and Mu~ammad5Mecca (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989). A summary of it appears in ’Makka,’ 3ncycfopedh of hfam, VI (new

* hkxxn ?hde andthe h%e ofh’am (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). This approximate dating is derived by counting back five generations (30 years each) from

Mubammad to his ancestor Qqayy. who supposedly brought Mecca under the control of Quraysh.

ed.). pp. 145-6.

See W. Montgomery Watt, ’Djurhum,’ Gncyclo@iu offifam, I1 (new ed.), pp. 603-4. For further on this issue, see Crone, Mecrarn nade chapter eight.

333

334 THG MUSLIM WORLD

interpretation of the Q u r h and selected traditional works of Arabic his- toriography. The former, being scripture, conveys historical information largely by allusion. The latter contain inconsistencies, literary invention, anachronisms, and other problems which Crone, among other scholars, has noted The traditional Arabic sources contain fragmentary information about trade, but no coherent overview of economic conditions There is clearly a need to look beyond such sources and to supplement the philological approach by employing other disciplines Two in particular- geographic and geopolitical analysis-suggest themselves as being appli- cable to reconstruction of Meccan economic relations.

As the Ka'ba remains in its original location, one is not compelled to search for the site of ancient Mecca. The old city has gradually been sup- planted by the existing one. Moreover, one can safely assume that the general geographic setting has not changed sigdkantly. Some branch w%43 have undoubtedly altered course, but the following description is valid for both past and present. Mecca is situated in a hollow-the wide part of a north-south oriented w2d- bed, which cuts through barren foothills of the Sarat mountain chain. That locale is dominated by high mountains on the east, which rise to about 900 meters. The land surface in and around Mecca consists of bare rock or stony soil with patches of fine to coarse grain sand. The climate is hot, rainfallbeing scant and scarce. Occasion- ally heavy rains cause torrents in the wgd3and flooding of the low areas. The means of accessing water is one feature which has changed. Histori- cally, the local water supply used to derive from well-like pits which were fed by springs of Jabal <Arafiit. Mecca is now served by a modern system of public works.

Taking geo-coordinates 21 degrees 27 minutes North, 39 degrees 49 minutes East as the approximate location of the city, one can further as- sess its position within the surrounding region. Mecca lies about 85 kilometers from al-Shu'ayba on the Red Sea coast. That site was not developed as a port (as Jidda was later), yet it accommodated some kind of ship berthing and loadindoff-loading activity in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times7 Indeed, it is one of the very few places along the West Arabian coast which could have accommodated such activity. Both classical and pre-modern sources attest to the lack of safe anchorages along the coast

See her %ves on Homes: The Evofution of rbe fdmic Po/&(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chapter one; Albrecht Noth. Que&enkn?/>c.he Studen zu Tiemen, Formen, und Tendenzen h&5ALam5cher Geschik.htsk5erfieferung (Bonn: Selbstverlag des Orientdischen Seminus der Universitit, 1973); and John W. Jandora, TheMarrb From Medna., R Rew%om>t Study of L3e h a b Cbnquests(Clifton: Kingston Press, 1990), chapter five. ' See Gerald R. Hawting, 'The Origin of Jedda and the Problem of al-Shu'ayba,' Arabica 31 (1984), pp. 318-26. Hawting is unaware that the location of al-Shu'ayba is given in navigational charts and gazetteers. Many place names of ancient Arabia have survived into modern times.

THE RISE OF MECCA: GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS 335

and the risk of shipwreck due to sunken rocks and shoals8 Some 70 plus kilometers to the eastlsoutheast of Mecca is the town of Ta'if, which lies on the reverse slope of the Sarat mountain range. The town is situated on high-ground astride the route which runs north from the Yemen frontier. It appears that prior to Islam the trade route followed a similar headingg Otherwise, Mecca has an outlet to the east through the break in the Sariit chain made by wH&in the general vicinity of Madraka.

Given this geographic perspective, we can now consider possible reasons for the settlement at Mecca. Being in a hollow and distant from major crossroads, the site would have no intrinsic military value. Nor would the topography of its environment accommodate much aHiculture. None- theless, the site is somewhat sheltered by the surrounding heights and has a constant source of water. In these two respects, it is similar to the site of ancient Najrln, which is known to have been a termina! for major trade routes. Mecca too could have grown through commerce, albeit on a smaller scale. Indeed, it may well have served as an enfreputfor goods landed at al-Shu(ayba. Such goods could have been stored, staged, or processed there, consumed locally, or traded or consigned to people from al-Ta'if or from tribes beyond the Sarlt range. Goods accepted in exchange could have likewise been used at Mecca, traded to nearby settlements, or transshipped through al-Shu'ayba. Any such commerce, however, must have been mod- est in volume and value. As Crone has shown, there is no conclusive evidence that Mecca was a great trade center renowned for its wealth.'O It remains possible though that Meccan commerce, whatever its scale, surged as a consequence of geopolitical change.

Watt suggests this possibility as well. However, he focuses on trade between South Arabia and Syria, without considering that the critical commercial axis was elsewhere. Thus, his hypothesis does not withstand Crone's critique. Crone, though, is too hasty in dismissing the trade factor. Meccan merchants seemingly did benefit from the conflict between regional powers-not because they revived the overland route to Syria, as Watt suggests, but because they gained a greater share of the trade between Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and the Sassanid realm. That development can be traced to the collapse of Himyarite rule in South Arabia in the early sixth century A. D.

' See for example G. W. B Huntingford (trans), The Pcq>fus of /be Eryi'hracan 32.9 (London: HlLlyut Society, 1980). p. 32 (chapter 22) and Joseph Pitts et al., ?%r Red 528 and A @ m / G7unkies 8/ rbe C/arr of /be &lirven/un/h Ceni'ufj ed. Sir William Foster (London: Haklyut Society, 1949), pp. 65-6 and 179.

Currently the main highway runs north from Abhl along the high-ground. In pre-Islamic times, the main route ran east of the mountains as far as Bisha and then angled back toward al- Ti'if. One can still travel that route along secondary roads

*

lo See M i ? h d ~ erpecially part two.


Prior to that turn of events, NajrW was the major hub for trans-Ara- bian trade." The goods of East Africa were ostensibly brought in small craft to various landing sites along the Tih&na coast (vicinity of modern al-Luhayya, Maydi, and Jiziin). From there they were transported overland to Naj ra , which also served as a transit point for South Arabian goods coming from $an%). Trans shipment continued northward either through the Wadi Tathlith or via the route Jurash-Tabala-Wadi Bisha. l2 (It is also likely that some East African goods were landed in the vicinity of modern alshuqayq, brought to Jurash, and then sent along the route through Bisha.) The goods of Central Arabia flowed south and west over those same routes.

As would be expected, the Himyarites expended considerable effort to police the routes through Central Arabia. They sent military expeditions all the way to Wadi Ma'sil (about 225 kilometers west of modern Riyadh). At least two such campaigns were commemorated by monument stones (inscriptions Ry 509 and Ry 510).13 One was conducted in the early fifth century A. D. during the coregency of Abo Karib Adad and his son Hasan Yuha)min and apparently aimed at establishing a military presence in that region. l4 The other was carried out in 516 A. D. for the purpose of helping colonists defend the area from Lakhmid encroachment. Actually the Lakhmids of al-Hira had been agitating local tribesmen of the Ma'add Con- federation.15Arab legend also attests to the efforts of Tubba' Hasan (Hasan Yuha)min) to counter the BanU Ma'add.

Although such expeditions were successful, Himyarite power had been in decline for some time-the result of foreign influence, factional in- fighting, and reduced demand for incense (in the Roman Empire). The

H. St. J. Philby has charted the extensive layout of the ancient city, which attests to its long lost importance. See h 8 b I h I &?.f8nds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 264- 9.

Jurash was located near modern AbhH, and TabHla was located near modern Qafat Bisha. The importance of these two towns is reflected in the fact that they receive special mention in traditional accounts of the Islamic conquest of Arabia. See al-Baladhuri, Futt&& al-Buld'n, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: B J. Brill, 1866), p. 59. " For text and commentary, see G. Ryckmans, 'Inscriptions Sud Arabes,' Le Mudon 66

I' Although some words are obscure, the text indicates that Ijimyarite forces conducted operations and encamped in the area of Ma'sil. Arab legend, in commemorating this event, somewhat exaggerates the expedition, making it an advance against al-HIra. See al-Tabari. lkhkh dRusu1 wa d-Muf& i. 749.

As for approximate dating, &ad ruled between 378 and 415 A.D. The coregency was probably instituted during the later years of his reign. There is some evidence that Hasan, who figures prominently in later Arab legend as Tubba' Hasan, ruled Ijimyar during mid century; I&!, i. 750,771-3, 775, 880-1, 890-1, 910, and 914-8.

l5 See W. Montgomery Watt, 'Ma'add,' Xncydopee0'r;O of Ltfam, V (new ed.), pp. 894-5. Ma'add is in the lineage of Nizllr and MuQar, which grouping included Quraysh, Kinha, T d m , Qays'AylHn, and other tribes of Central and Western Arabia.

(1953), pp. 303-10.


political autonomy of South Arabia came to an end when the Abyssinians invaded in 525 A.D. The Abyssinian action was prompted by the infa- mous massacre of the Christians of Najran and the destruction of their part of the city; The Abyssinians first installed a native client king, but a few years later, the House of Himyar lost the throne altogether when troops of the occupation force mutinied behind Abraha ibn al-Ashram. There ensued some fifteen years of conflict, as Abraha countered two invasions from Abyssinia, suppressed local resistance, and consolidated his control of South Arabia. Abraha eventually reconciled himself with the Abyssin- ian court and ruled as a client king. Meanwhile, the security of the north- eastern frontier had become tenuous. The Lakhmids spurred on their allies. The Himyarite outpost at Ma)sil apparently succumbed to force. Incessant Bedouin raiding disrupted trade between South and Central Arabia.

The course of events in Central Arabia is reflected in the famous Murayghan Inscription (Ry 506). l6 This memorial records that Abraha sent his frontier forces on campaign against the Banti (Amir and the Banti Ma(add in 552 A.D. Troops from Kinda formed one column; troops from Murad and Sacd formed another. The two columns apparently advanced north, in mutual support, between Wadi Tathlith and Wadi Bisha. At least one of them fought through to the territory of Haliban. There, Abraha (or possibly his representative) made some political agreement with the La- khmid regime and then withdrew his troops.

As the MuraygBn Inscription has been the subject of numerous stud- ies, it would do well to digress here and clarify my own interpretation by way of critique. Starting with textual analysis, the critical issue is iden- tification of the two relevant place names-hbd, questionable vocalization, and /hlbd, vocalized Haliban. So far, G. Ryckmans’ suggestive association of ltrbnl with Turaba has generally been taken for granted. 17As Turaba is located about 130 kilometers southeast of al-Ta’if, it would seem that the operational area at issue includes the Hi&. Haliban, however, is located in Central Arabia, some 375 kilometers northeast of Turaba. There is thus a problem of distance, which seemingly underlies various subse- quent linguistic and historical analyses.

In analyzing the inscription, J. Ryckmans and Beeston both break the word string in line 6 at /k&@‘ The E o f /wm&d/begins a separate sen-

~~

For initial publication and commentary, see G. Ryckmans, ’Inscriptions Sud Arabes, ‘ pp. 275-84. For further commentary, see J. Ryckmans. ’Inscriptions Historiques Sabtennes.’ Le Muspbn66 (1953), pp. 339-42; A. F. L. Beeston, ’Notes on the Murayghtin Inscription,’ Buleth d the &hodof Of~entdandAhcan Stu&eslC (1954). pp. 389-92; and Sidney Smith, ’Events in Arabia in the 6th Century A.D. ,’ hi2 , pp. 435-37.

l’ ’Inscriptions Sud Arabes,’ p. 282. One exception is J. Ryckmans. who views ltrbd as an anomaly: ’Inscriptions Historiques SabCennes.’ p. 341.

I* The transliteration is /whfgw /w’sfw Av&nmrv4‘& Avn.&/mkn /b/l/bn/! The reading of /w&nmw/and the meaning of A d a r e both problematic. There is no agreement among G. R Y C ~ M S . J. Ryckmans, Beeston, and Smith.


tence, not an embedded clause. Thus, the troops of Kinda, Murad, and Sa'd are dissociated from events at Haliban. Abraha's expedition is seen to involve actions in two operational areas, which are a considerable distance apart. In turn, the hypothetical presence of one force in the Hijaz suggests association with the legendary Expedition of the Elephant against Mecca. Hence, Kister, following Altheim and Stiehl, makes a case that the expedition of 552 A.D. and the Expedition of the Elephant were one and the same event.19 His reading of 4 l b d a s Huluba , a site in the Yemen, buttresses the argument, as it places the whole campaign of 552 A.D. in the westkouthwest of Arabia. Conrad further defends the one expedition thesis by attempting to reconcile the attendant chronological problems. 2o

Such derivative theories go far beyond the internal evidence of the inscription. Indeed, the association of h b d w i t h Turaba is faulty on both linguistic and practical grounds It is untenable linguistically since &bn/ has no marker for feminine grammatical gender. The word k r b d i s more likely a variant form of Tarban, as there are many cases where Semitic cognates have variation of emphatic and non-emphatic consonants. More- over, Jabal Tarbw (21 degrees 19 minutes North, 43 degrees 52 minutes East) lies along a direct line of march from Tathlith to Halibgn. The location of the memorial stone in the Tathlith area is significant in this regard. The citation of two commanders suggests that it was situated near a garrison of some of the units involved. The hypothesis of action at Turaba should therefore be rejected. It would have those forces make a detour of several hundred kilometers, considering that the final objective was Haliban.

Similarly, the identity of Haliban should not be taken for granted. It is quite possible that the name refers to an area, as does al-Aflaj and al- Yamma, rather than the settlement itself. Thus for /hlbn/ of the text, one might understand 'the territory of H a l i b h ' The bounds of that region are of course unknown. However, it may well have extended 60 to 70 kilometers south of the town of Haliban. In that case, there should be no question at all of the coherence of lines 5 and 6 of the inscription, which allude to fighting 'in a wgd-on the route to Tarban' in juxtaposition with fighting 'at Haliban.'

The multiple objective theory is not well supported by external evidence either. Multiple column movements were indeed part of South Ara- bian military practice. However, Abraha's forces would have advanced along parallel or convergent routes of march, since the territories of Ma(add

M. J. Kister, 'The Campaign of HulubBn: A New Light on the Expedition of Abraha,' Le

5o Lawrence I. Conrad, 'Abraha and Muhammad: Some observations Apropos of Chronology and Literary Topoiin the Early Arabic Historical Tradition,' Bufleh of /he &hoof of Orien/al ~ndAhc-n S/udes50 (1987), pp. 225-40.

M . s & L J ~ ~ (1965), pp. 425-36.

21 See Jandora, The March From M d k , p. 26.


and <Amir were ostensibly contiguous. Moreover, the kind of campaign envisioned by Sidney Smith, Kister, and Conrad would have required a general mobilization of forces The Murayghan Inscription does not refer to such a mobilization. There is no mention of Himyarite or Abyssinian contingents, which one would expect from analogy with Abraha's inscription on the Ma)rib Dam (CIH 541, 24ff).=The return to garrison (lines 8- 9) further indicates that the Haliban Campaign was limited in aim-a punitive expedition against restive tribes. Thus, it could have been the same undertaking which Procopius saw as an irresolute effort on the part of Abraha to enter the Byzantine-Persian War on the side of the former.23

The above evidence reveals that the campaign of 552 AD. was limited to Central Arabia. What then of Mecca and Quraysh? Stira 105 of the Qur'h makes a brief cryptic allusion to 'men of the elephant /4542,4 a/- &',' Various exegetical works have expanded those few lines into the well-known story of Abraha's punitive expedition against Mecca. The story has some variants, but they all develop the theme of religious rivalry between Abraha's Christian regime and the cult of the Ka(ba at Mecca. In the end, Abraha's army is struck with smallpox through Allah's interven- tion, and the expedition founders.

Apart from the exegetical literature, various Arabic historical, philological, and biographic works describe the threat to Mecca and other re- lated events Their accounts are seemingly inconsistent with regard to many details. For example, the provocation for Abraha's military action was the desecration or destruction or looting of a church, the last in con- junction with the robbery of Abraha's grandson. As for the desecration, it was perpetrated by a man of Khath'am, a man (or men) of Kinllna, an ally of Quraysh, or some Arabs. There are likewise disparities concerning the composition of Abraha's force and its subordinate leadership. Moreover, dating schemes for the expedition vary by a span of 18 years. Such inconsistencies may be inevitable though. It is significant that Muqatil's 72hx? mentions that there were two expeditions against Mecca. One was supposedly conducted at the behest of the King (Negus, Najashi) of Abys- sinia. However, the amount and contrariety of relevant details defy even

An English translation (based on M. Fakhry's copy of the inscription) is included in Smith, 'Events in Arabia,' pp. 43741.

Wasi. 20. Procopiur may have had any number of reasons for hir negative commentary. He was hardly objective in recording the events of Arabia. See Irfan Kawar, 'Procopius and Arethas,' Bp8m%wkde 22~?~dn250 (1957), pp. 362-82.

the Gc~acz~C lad MXhy of be Oriit15 (1972), pp. 61-73. Note, in particular, references to NdJy8t d - h h n d the works of Mughultly, al-Tabari, al-ZurqlnI, Ibn Habib, rl- Bayhaqi. Ibn Hishim, Muqltil, aI-Zubryr ibn BakkAr, aI-Azraqi, AbO Nubym, a~-'p~barsi, and al-Balidhuri; see also Kister, 'The Campaign of ljulubin.' pp. 427-31.

See M. J. Kister. 'Some Reporta Concerning Mecca From Jahiliyya to Islam,' /orc/na/ of

340 THe MUSLIM WORLD

this explanation. They seem rather to reflect a sustained effort on the part of the Abyssinian client kingdom of South Arabia to impose control over the Sarlt Lands.

Many source discrepancies would be resolved by reconstructing that effort as several operations rather than as an expedition or two. Thus, Abraha’s army fought the Banti Khath‘am and then recruited them for operations against other tribes In one campaign, Nufayl ibn Habib al- Khathhni along with his men, and Munabbih ibn Ka(b al-Hilrithi along with his, joined forces led by Abraha In another, al-Taqd al-Khathhi and his men joined forces led by Shamir ibn Maq$id. (Abraha himself may have gone on campaign. However, the sources often seem to use his name metaphorically to symbolize his regime. ) Muhammad ibn Khuza(i, Abraha’s Viceroy for the Arabs of the SarBt Lands, was with the army during one operation. He was later killed in a confrontation with the Banti Kinana, and that incident may have led to further military action.

Abraha’s first immediate objective was evidently to impose control so as to suppress the lawlessness in the region. Besides the above-mentioned offenses, al-Baladhuri’s Ans& recalls another incident whereby some merchants of South Arabia were robbed at Mecca. This same account further relates that Abraha had the wherewithal to restrict or embargo the trade of the city. Thus, it seems that his second immediate objective was to secure, regulate, and probably tax trade. One may further deduce that Abraha had troops in place to enforce his will. In this regard it is significant that numerous accounts of pre-Islamic Mecca attest to the presence of Abyssinian and Himyarite settlers in and around the city. Al-Azraqi claims that they were remnants of Abraha’s expeditionary force.25 How- ever, one might also conjecture that they were disbanded garrison troops and/or their offspring. Troops stationed at Mecca would have been very well placed to police the local markets and recurrent fairs as well as to support similar posts at al-Shdayba and al-Ta’if.

There is yet other evidence that Abraha’s ’presence’ at Mecca was no transient event. According to al-Bal%dhuri, his forces took hostages from Quraysh (as well as from Thaqif of al-Tii)if). Some of those hostages, al- Hiirith ibn (Alqama among them, were evidently in Abraha’s capital for some time. They established themselves in the local trade network, sending goods to their home town of Mecca. Moreover, the Qur’anic reference to ’men of the elephant’ suggests nothing more than that Abraha’s dynasty lost its hold on Mecca. There is no indication as to the duration of his presence there. That dimension was added by exegetes, who made Abraha’s military undertaking into a relatively quick reversal. They thereby os-

25 Ak’hVMabks (Mecca: Matlbi’ DHr al-Thoqua, 1385/1%5), pp. 147-8.


tensibly sought to promote the theme of the inviolability of the Meccan sanctuary.

Having dismissed the exegetical account, the question remains as to what justified Abraha’s military endeavors in the Sarat lands. It would seem that control of trans-Arabian trade was at stake. Since he left control of Central Arabia (the Ma’sil-Halibih area) to the Lakhmid regime, Abraha could not dictate the flow of trade as the kings of Himyar had once done. The Banti Tamim came to dominate the region. Like their predecessors, they left their mark in the Wadi Ma’sil-a rock drawing with the simple inscription It seems, though, that they abandoned the old link to the south and extended their commercial and cultural relations to the west. Thus, shaykhs of Tamim became leaders of the seasonal fairs near Mecca, judges at (Uke, and officials in pilgrimage rites at %afat and Mini€.27 Being clients of the Lakhmids, the Banti Tamim undoubtedly fa- cilitated the flow of trade between al-Hira and the camp site which eventually became the famous market of cukiz. From that point, others carried on the trade, as the Central Arabian route connected two ways with the Abyssinian realm-via Mecca and al-Shu(ayba over sea routes to Abyssinia proper and probably South Arabia as well, via al-TH’if and Tabala over the land route to Sari%'.

The rise of Mecca, and likewise al-TH’if, can be clearly traced to the shift in trade patterns during the 6th century A. D. It is hardly coincidental that both towns emerge in the light of history at approximately the same time. As for Mecca in particular, its association with the Abyssinian world is well attested by vivid allusions to the sea and the use of Ethiopic loan words in the Qur)iina One also notes that many Arabic seafaring terms are loan words from Ethiopic. Apart from the tradition regarding al-Harith ibn ‘Alqama, other Arabic sources reveal that Meccan commercial ties with both Abyssinia proper and the Abyssinian client state of South Arabia were established during Abraha’s reign.29 Again, the authenticity of cer- tain details is questionable. However, the relative dating itself does not appear to be literary invention.

From the above evidence, it would seem that, by taking both Mecca and al-TIi>if, Abraha regained considerable control over trans-Arabian trade. In turn, the people of Mecca very Iikely benefited from the security af-

See G. Ryckmane, ’Inscriptions Sud Arabes,’ pp. 44-5. For further, see M. J. Kister. ’Mecca and Tunim (Aspects of Their Relations),‘fourna/of

&e 8co~omk md&ddHistofy of theOhmt8 (1965), pp. 146-55. a See respectively W W. Earthold, ‘Der Koran und Das Meer,’ &~ts&iZ du Awtschen

Moqed%dk~5m & d ! d t 8 3 (1929), pp. 37-43, and Arthur Jeffery, T6eFom& VocBbUjiply of the Qu/&? (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1938).

See references to HIshim ibn ‘AM ManHf, (AM al-MuttHlib, and Hisham ibn al-Mughlrs in Kister, ’Some Reports Concerning Mecca,’ pp. 61, 63, 64-6 and 74-6 and in Crone, Meccan Zkade, pp. 120-1.


forded by Abraha’s government. Contrary to Ester’s argument, the demise of that regime did not help to expand the trade of Mecca or the stand- ing and influence of Quraysh.30 Rather, it led to a series of small conflicts whereby Quraysh and E n m a contended against various tribes of Qays (Ayla for local dominance-the so-called War of Fij&.31

Indeed, Abraha’s subjugation of the Sariit lands, to include Mecca, may have created a secure trade zone of sorts which was advantageous to Quraysh. The Banii Makbztim were the preeminent clan of Quraysh from Abraha’s reign to the Hijra.32 According to various traditions, their fortunes were seemingly linked to the South Arabian state. Among the men of Makhziim who carried on trade in or with South Arabia were four sons of al-Mughira ibn (Abdullah-Hish%n, Abii Rabi<a, al-Walid, and al-Fiikih, (Abdullah ibn Abi Rabea, and(Umaa ibn al-Walid. 33 H i s h a ibn al-Mughira and other Qurayshi merchants were in San‘iP when Abraha summoned them regarding the church desecration incident previously mentioned. Hishm also spent time in Najriin, as did his brother al-Walid, who at his death remembered his debt to a bishop there. Moreover, Makhziim was said to have close financial ties and common enterprises with Thaqif. The sons of al-Mughira and others like them presumably brought wealth into Mecca. The sources do not address this subject per se. However, tradition at least recalls that Hish- ibn al-Mughira committed considerable resources to Quraysh’s war effort in the conflict known as Fijar al-Barriid. 34 By then, Mecca had become a ”free’ city.

Regarding the Abyssinian retreat from Mecca, it may have been dic- tated by the Sassanid invasion of South Arabia or by the outbreak of smallpox, which seems to underlie the ’miracle of the birds’ motif. Whatever the case, the fact remains that the Persians conquered and colonized South Arabia. They eventually opened an overland route running from Najran toward al-Yamma and then northward to the Euphrates frontier. 35 The

See ‘Some Reports Concerning Mecca,’ pp. 75-6. For a synopsis of events and bibliography, see J. W. Fiick, ’Fidjgr,’ Encyclopedk offifam,

I1 (new e d ), pp. 883-4. 12 See Martin Hinds, ’Makhziim,’ ficydo@k of fk”, VI (new ed.), pp. 137-140. One

detects in the ~OUICCS a deliberate effort on the part of traditionists to downplay the status and deeds of MakhzQm while aggrandizing the House of Umayya and the House of Hashim. Such literary distortion is consistent with later political developments. However, it poses many anomalies and thus obscures the role of Mecca in the rise of Islam. A serious relook of early Islamic History is in order.

33 For relevant references, see IGster, ’Some Reports Concerning Mecca,’ pp. 64, n. 5 and 74, n. 3 and Crone, M m n Zkmk, pp. 120-1, M. 69-74.

34 See Ibn Habib, d-Munammag ed. Khurshid Ahmad m i q (Cairo: ‘Alam al-Kutub, 1985/ 1405). p. 131. ’’ See d-Tabui. i. 984. For further, see Crone, Mcccao 7ka& pp. 48-49 and 88; note, in particular. references to tuIq aLRa&,


Persians used that route for official caravans, which carried silver and other high value commodities to Ctesiphon. It is plausible, but not con- firmed, that this route was used for general commerce as well. If so, such use may have diverted some trade from al-Ta’if. However, it would hardly have affected Mecca (apart from the interests of Makhztim) as that town was part of another network.

Having traced the rise of Mecca as a transit point for east-west trade, there remains one key question. What were the main commodities of Meccan commerce? Crone’s study exhaustively deals with this issue. She concludes that the commodities most often associated with Meccan trade were leather in various forms, clothing, animals, and miscellaneous food stuffsM ’It is clear. . . . our sources took Meccan trade to have been a trade in leather above all.’ She finds it unlikely, though, that the Meccans could have ’founded a commercial empire. . . on the basis of hides and skins.’ Crone’s assessment derives from consideration of relative value; she ought to have considered the factor of demand as well.

Meccan fortunes may well have derived from trade in hides, skins, and other animal parts From the end of Abraha’s reign (ca 570 A.D. ) to the beginning of the Hijri era (622 A.D.), the Sassanid and Byzantine empires were at war from 572 to 591 and from 606 to 616. During these periods of conflict the demand for leather and horn would have risen considerably, as both products were used for a wide array of military equipment. Items made of leather included rawhide thongs, scabbards, saddles, saddle bags, bridles, horse armor, belts, straps, fasteners, bow cases, shields, jerkins, and body armor (to include lamellar cuirasses, cheek and neck guards, and greeves). Items made of horn included body armor, corselets, and bows.

Any sustained surge in demand, even for such products, could easily have led to an increase in wealth overall, some growth in population, and a bigger distinction between rich and poor. The relative degree of change is not addressed in the sources. However, it is likely that traditional values and ethics were compromised, if not abandoned, by many people. There would thus have emerged the very conditions which are reflected in the Qurh.

In sum, the rise of Mecca can be traced to the following factors. The demise of the Himyarite kingdom led to disruption of the NajrZin-Ma’sil trade axis The consequent shift in trade patterns along with Abraha’s subjugation of the Sariit Lands brought Mecca and its people into a region- wide network of markets. Lastly, conflict between the Byzantines and

ss [bid, pp. 87-108.


Persians led to surge demand for leather, which was the main commodity of Meccan trade.

Fayettevir;l/e, NoHh &oha JOHN W. JANDORA

the rise of mecca geopolitical factors

Documents

clarendon

transit trade

montgomery

mecca

sanctuary

evidence

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