1

SeanStarrsCityUniversityofHongKong

ISA-HKConference2017

MyISA-HKtalk,ThePacificCenturyisAnchoredintheUnitedStates:HowtheRiseof

theRestMarkstheEndoftheBeginningoftheAmericanCentury,isbasedonthefollowingforthcomingbookchapter:

• Starrs, Sean (Forthcoming 2017) The Rise of Emerging Markets Signifies the End of the Beginning of

the American Century: Henry Luce and the Emergence of Global Capitalism in Salvador Santino F. Regilme Jr. and James Parisot, eds. Global Cooperation or Conflict? The Rise of Emerging Powers and the Post-American World Order London & New York: Routledge.

AuthorBio:SeanKenjiStarrsisAssistantProfessorofInternationalRelationsintheDepartmentofAsianandInternationalStudiesattheCityUniversityofHongKong.HehaspublishedonAmericanhegemonyandthefutureofworldorderinInternationalStudiesQuarterly,NewLeftReview,andJournalofContemporaryAsia,amongothers.Acknowledgements:IthankMingtangLiuforresearchassistance,andtheHongKongUniversityGrantsCouncilforfunding,Grant#21615915

TheRiseofEmergingMarketsSignifiestheEndofthe

BeginningoftheAmericanCentury:

HenryLuceandtheEmergenceofGlobalCapitalism

FromthevantagepointofthegreatestWallStreetcrashsince1929,theensuing

2008-2009globalfinancialcrisis,theGreatRecession,theEurozonecrisis,

contrastedwiththecontinuedrapideconomicgrowthofmanyemergingmarkets,

mostofallChina,coupledwiththeirgrowingconfidenceinglobalgovernance—

HenryLuce’s(1941)visionofan“Americancentury”appearstobecrumblinginto

2

dust.Manycommentatorsassertthatthe2017inaugurationofPresidentDonald

Trumpmaysignifythefinalnailinthecoffinoftheliberalinternationaleconomic

order.Thischapter,however,arguessomethingverydifferent.Insteadofits

implosion,theAmericancenturyisonlynowbeingrealized,afterhalfacenturyof

growingpainsandchallenges.Thus,thefirstdecadesofthetwenty-firstcentury

markstheendofthebeginningoftheAmericancentury,aswearenowcloserto

HenryLuce’soriginalvisionthaneverbefore.Inordertounderstandthis,wemust

haveaclearconceptionofwhattheAmericancenturyissupposedtobe,howit

couldonlybepartiallyachievedpost-1945,withmanychallenges,andhowtherise

ofemergingmarketsandtheirintegrationintoglobalcapitalismispreciselyoneof

themaingoalsoftheAmericancentury.Unliketoomanycommentariesonchanging

worldorderthatfocusmostlyonthepresentandlinearprojectionsintothefuture,

wemustdelveintothepastandhaveabirds-eyeviewofthepost-1945worldorder

tounderstandhowtoconceptualizethepost-2008riseofemergingmarkets—and

whetherthiswillleadtoincreasingcooperationorconflict.

Therefore,thischapterreturnstoHenryLuce’svisioninthe1940sandin

SectionIsetsouttheparametersofwhatconstitutestheAmericancentury—and

weshallseethatitwasonlypartiallyrealizedfromthe1950sto2008.Thekey

componentsofLuce’svisionwereonlyreallyachievedbytheturnofthecentury

withthecollapseofstatecommunismasanalternativegrowthmodelandthe

capitalistriseofemergingmarketssincethe2000s.Weshallcompareandcontrast

thestarkdifferencesbetweenthefirstwaveofemergingmarkets(ortheThird

World)inthe1950sto1970swiththesecondwavepost-2008.Inshort,duringthe

3

firstwavetheychallengedWestern-dominatedcapitalism,butinthesecondwave

theyareintegratingwiththissameorder.AndasthefoundingeditorofFortune

Magazine,LucewasconcernedwithhowAmericanbusinesscouldinfluencethe

world,whatheconsideredtobethedrivingthrustoftheAmericancentury.Section

IIofthischapterwillthereforeinvestigatetowhatextentAmericanbusinesshas

benefittedfromthecapitalistriseofothers.WeshallseethatfarfromAmerican

declineandincreasingconflictwiththeriseofemergingmarketspost-2008,weare

nowclosertoLuce’svisionoftheAmericancenturythaneverbefore.

SectionI:HenryLuce’sVisionoftheAmericanCenturyand

itsPartialRealization1941-2008

WhileDeanAchesonandGeorgeKennan,amongotherUSstateplanners,actually

designedAmericanforeignpolicyinthe1940s,thischapterfocusesonHenryLuce

becauseheplayedaninfluentialroleinshapingeliteopinionatthetime,

popularizingtheconceptofthe“Americancentury”.Luceestablishedamedia

empirethatincludedwidelyreadmagazinessuchasFortune,Life,Time,andSports

Illustrated.HisseminalarticleinLifeMagazinepublishedinFebruary1941(1999),

TheAmericanCentury,wasacall-to-armsforhisfellowAmericanelitestoonceand

forallabandonwhathesawasthedisastrousAmericanpolicyof“isolationism”

sincetheendoftheGreatWar.Professingtheheightsofliberalcapitalistidealism,

LuceproclaimedthatthiswasagoldenopportunitytospreadAmericanbusiness,

4

culture,knowledge,andvaluesaroundtheworld,allowingtheworldtoshareinthe

Americandreamandprosperity,thegoodlifeofmassconsumerismanddemocracy.

Thiswasnotself-lessidealism,asLucearguedthatthisliberalinternationalism

wouldbeinthebestinterestsoftheUnitedStatesandAmericanbusiness,whilea

returntoisolationismwouldleadtofurtherchaos,war,andeconomiccatastrophe.

Thus,hecalleduponhisfellowAmericansto“acceptwholeheartedlyourdutyand

ouropportunityasthemostpowerfulandvitalnationintheworldandin

consequencetoexertupontheworldthefullimpactofourinfluence,forsuch

purposesasweseefitandbysuchmeansasweseefit”(Luce1999,165).

Luceproclaimedthatthepurpose“forAmericaandforAmericaalone[is]to

determinewhetherasystemoffreeeconomicenterprise…shallorshallnotprevail

inthiscentury”(1999,169).EspeciallyaftertheSecondWorldWar,theprimary

threattotheexpansionofcapitalismwasofcourseitsmainalternative,

communism,asledbytheSovietUnion.Asforthemeans,inLuce’spost-war

writings,heargued,“TheU.S.,possessingindustrialproductionroughlyequaltothat

ofalltherestoftheworld,isalonecapableofproducingandexportingthe

machineryandskills”thatarenecessarytorollbackwhatmanyAmericanelites

regardedastheincreasing“communization”oftheworld(1947,82).Theprimary

agentswiththisrolewerewhatLuceregardedas“battalionsforfreedom”:thegiant

Americancorporationsthatwould,beginningin1955,comprisetheannualFortune

500list,fromStandardOilofNewJersey(theprecursortotoday’sExxonMobil)to

FordandGeneralMotors,fromGeneralElectrictoIBMandsmallerfirmssuchas

GilletteSafetyRazor(1947,189).LucearguedthatiftheseAmerican“battalionsfor

5

freedom”followtheir“enlightenedself-interest”ratherthan“ruthlessexploitation”,

themoreprosperitytheyallowotherstohave,themoretheycanbuyAmerican

goods(1947,84).Thisisacrucialpointforconsideringthecurrentcapitalistriseof

emergingmarkets,asmanycommentatorsassumeazero-sumworldofothers

risingtherebycausingtheUStoautomaticallydecline.

Luce’svision,then,wasfargranderthanmereinternationaltrade(albeithe

thoughtthatwasvitaltoo),butencompassedforeigndirectinvestmentleadingto

theestablishmentofaglobalmassconsumermarketopentoAmericangoods.In

otherwords,thefoundationofthecreationoftheAmericancenturyisthe

protectionandpromotionofglobalcapitalism,makingtheworldsafeforAmerican

businessto,inhismind,worktheirmagicbuildingglobalprosperity.Toachieve

this,theUSwouldreviveothercapitalisteconomies,whichwouldnotbecomea

threattotheUS,butaboonforallconcerned(aslongastheyremainedopen).For

example,likeotherAmericanelites,LucewasanearlyproponentofEuropean

integration.In1950hearguedthat,underthe“makeshiftslogan”of“integration”,

theUSshouldurge“theWesternEuropeanstocreateacommoneconomyof250

millionpeople…sothatinessentialrespectstheEuropeaneconomywillmore

closelyresembletheAmerican”(1950,60).Again,thiswas“enlightenedself-

interest”,asLuceassertedthata“virtuouscircle”wouldbecreatedbecausethe

“moreprosperousandcompetitiveisEurope,themoreprofitablyandfreelycan

EuropeandAmerica”dobusiness(1950,60).Giventherecenthistoryofthefirst

halfofthetwentiethcentury,thiswasaboldandindeedvisionaryclaimforan

Americanelitetomakein1950.

6

Insum,then,theAmericanCenturyistheprotection,promotion,and

expansionofglobalcapitalismunderAmericaninfluenceandleadership,deepening

globalcapitalistintegrationdrivenbyAmericancorporations.Themoreofthe

world’spopulationthatfallsunderthissphereofcapitalistinfluence,thegreater

thisvisionwillberealized.Thecapitalistriseofothersisasignofthesuccessofthe

AmericanCentury,notitsdownfall,aslongastheserisingcountriesareopento

Americanbusinessandinfluence,andareintegratedintothissystemofglobalmass

consumerism.

WhileLucewasunwaveringinthegrandiosityofhisvision,fromthevantage

pointofthe1940sheknewthathisAmericanCenturywouldbeatallorderto

implementacrosstheentireworld.Lucerecognizedthat“forpoliticalreasons,half

theworldisprobablyoutasafieldfordirectAmericaninvestment:Russiaandthe

Russian-dominatedcountriesofEasternEurope,northernChinaandManchuria,

mostofIndia,GermanyandJapan,Korea,andIndo-China”(1947,189-190).Infact,I

arguethatthese“political”challengeswouldonlyintensifyoverthenextseveral

decades.NotonlyweretherecommunistrevolutionsinChinaandCubathat

nationalizedandkickedoutcapitalistfirms,buttherewerealsoaslewofanti-

Western,nationalindependenceand/oranti-capitalistmovementsacrossAfrica,

Asia,andLatinAmericainthe1950sto1970s(Prashad2008).AsBruceCumings

putit,these“anti-colonialrevolutionsthathadwonorwerewinningpower

throughouttheThirdWorldgaveatoweringinfluencetoavarietyofThirdWorld

leaders(Mao,HoChiMinh,KimIlSung,PatriceLumumba,Castro,Quadaffi)that

wouldbeunimaginable[bytheturnofthecentury]”(Cumings1999,274).

7

TherewerealsocollectiveeffortssuchastheNon-AlignedMovement(NAM),

establishedfirstbyEgypt,India,Indonesia,Ghana,andYugoslaviain1961(with

originsinthe1955BandungConference,Indonesia)tochartanationalstate-led

developmentpath—andaNewInternationalEconomicOrder(NIEO)inthe1970s

—thatwasindependentfromboththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Parallel

toNAMwithsimilargoalsweretheformationsin1964oftheGroupof77(G77)in

theGeneralAssemblyoftheUnitedNationsandtheUnitedNationsConferenceon

TradeandDevelopment—bothofwhichalsosupportedtheNIEO.The

OrganizationforPetroleumExportingCountrieswasfoundedin1960inthecontext

ofrisingArabnationalismandsocialism,andspecificallytheattempttowrest

controlofdomesticoilproductionandpricesfromWesterntransnational

corporations(whatwerethencalledthe“SevenSisters”).

Inshort,inthedecadesfollowingLuce’sproclamationoftheAmerican

century,thebulkoftheEurasianlandmasswaseffectivelyclosedtoAmerican

businessandmuchoftherestoftheThirdWorldwasattemptingtodecouplefrom

theirdependenceuponWesterncapitalism.Fromthevantagepointofthe

contemporarycapitalistriseoftheBRICSandotheremergingmarkets,itisperhaps

easytoforgethowmuchofachallengetotheprevailingWestern-dominated

capitalistorderthisfirstwaveoftheriseoftheThirdWorldattemptedtopresent.

Indeed,combinedwitheconomicrecessionandstagflationintheUSitselfinthe

1970salongwithuncertaintyovertheinternationalmonetaryorderbecauseofthe

USunilaterallyendingthedollar-goldstandardin1971,manysawAmerican

8

hegemonyaseitheralreadyfinished(Kindleberger1969;Rosecrance1976;

Keohane1984;Cox1987)orinterminaldecline(Aminetal1982;Kennedy1988).

Ironically,despitetheconventionalwisdomonAmericandeclineinthe

1980s,bythatdecadetheThirdWorldchallengehadlargelycollapsed.Therewerea

varietyofreasonssuchasfragmentationasaresultofeconomiccrisisandtheir

implementationoftheIMF’sStructuralAdjustmentPrograms,which,alongwith

“neoliberalism”(Harvey2005)moregenerally,dismantledcorefeaturesofnational

state-leddevelopmentandimport-substitutionindustrializationwithprivatization

andliberalization.AlsoimportantwereaslewofAmericancovertandovertmilitary

interventionsincountriesthatsoughtanationallyindependentdevelopmentpath,

suchasIranin1953,Guatemalain1954,Congoin1961,Brazilin1964,Indonesiain

1965,Chilein1973,amongothers,nottomentiondroppingmorebombson

IndochinathaninWorldWarIIcombined(Blum2004).Moreover,theFirstWorld

wasultimatelyunabletopresentaunifiedfrontagainsttheUnitedStatestocreate

analternativemonetaryorder(Germann2014;Gowan1999),andtheUSdollar

remainsthedefactoworldcurrencytoday,asourceofimmensepowerforthe

UnitedStatestolivebeyonditsmeans(Cohen2015).Asaconsolation,theUShelped

toestablishbothinformalandformalforumsandinstitutions(suchastheWorld

EconomicForumin1971,theTrilateralCommissionin1973,theGroupofFivein

1974eventuallyleadingtotheGroupofSevenin1976,amongothers)tocollaborate

inwhatisnowcalled“globalgovernance”—thecollectivemanagementofglobal

capitalismbytheworld’selites.Andbythe1980stheUnitedStatesgrewoutofits

stagflation.

9

Nevertheless,eveninmuchoftheworldthatostensiblywasopenand

welcomingtoAmericandirectinvestment,giventhatthevastmajorityofthe

world’spopulationwasstillpeasants,Lucelamented,“businessactivitydoesnot

touchthemassofthepeopleortouchesthemsolittleastobeofnoimportance

eithertothemortobusiness”(1950,60).Therefore,LucearguedthattheUSmust

“getallthepeopleintheworld,orasmanyofthemaswecan,functionallyrelatedto

abusinesseconomy”,whichwould“meanavastReformationintheworld’swaysof

earningitsliving”(1950,60-61).Thiseffortwouldlaterbecalled“modernization”

(Rostow1960)and“internationaldevelopment”(Leys1999),andbythe1970swas

drivenbytheIMF(Chossudovsky1997)andWorldBank(Cammack2004),among

otherdevelopmentagencieswhethergovernmental,intergovernmental,or

nongovernmental.Nevertheless,livingstandardsinmanyThirdWorldcountriesin

the1980sand1990s,especiallyinAfricaandLatinAmerica,actuallydeclined.It

wasstillfarfromclearwhetherthemassesoftheThirdWorldwouldbesuccessfully

integratedintoglobalcapitalismasconsumers.

ForthesereasonsaloneitisdifficulttoarguethattheAmericancenturywas

successfulasaglobalprojectuntilatleastthecollapseoftheThirdWorldchallenge

andtheopeningofChinabythe1980s,andthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991.

Henceitwasonlyinthe1990sthatcapitalismbecametrulyglobalizing,asthevast

majorityoftheworldbecameopentoAmericanbusinessandinvestment.AfterLuce

calledforthespeedyresolutionofnegotiationsfortheestablishmentofan

InternationalTradeOrganization(1947,83),duetoalackofconsensusitquickly

dissolvedintoaGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,andcouldonlybe

10

achievedhalfacenturylaterin1995withtheestablishmentoftheWorldTrade

Organization(WTO).Nevertheless,itwasnotyetclearinthe1990swhether

emergingmarketswereindeedemerging,especiallywithrobustmassconsumer

markets,whichatminimumrequireenoughworkerstohaveasteadyincome.

Rather,manycountrieswerestillstrugglingtogrowinthe1990s,withespecially

LatinAmericaandEastAsiaplaguedbyfinancialcrises,coupledwithRussiaand

muchofEasternEuropemiredinagreatdepression.Moreover,China’sintegration

withglobalcapitalismas“workshopoftheworld”wasstillinitsearlystages,with

itsexport-andurbanization-drivengrowthacceleratingrapidlyonlyafterChina

joinedtheWTOin2001,spurringthecommoditiessupercyclethatinturn

stimulatedtheriseofnumerousemergingmarkets(Starrs2014).

The2008WallStreetcrashandensuingglobalfinancialcrisisrevealedtwo

importantfeaturesoftheemergingtwenty-firstcenturyworldorder:1)Farfrom

havingdecoupled,emergingmarketswerebythendeeplyintegratedintoglobal

capitalismingeneralandWallStreetinparticular,asthecrisisrapidlyspread

aroundtheworld;and2)Emergingmarketswerefullycommittedtodrivingglobal

(capitalist)growthastheWestwasmiredincrisis(Cammack2012).China

especiallyledtherecoveryformanycountriesbyimplementingthesecondlargest

governmentstimulusaftertheUS,aswellasincreasingitsIMFquotaandbeing

activeinthenewlyresuscitatedG20.Chinaalsopushedfortheestablishmentofnew

non-Western-centricgatheringsandorganizations,suchastheBRICSSummitand

AsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank,theramificationsofwhichwillbediscussed

intheconclusion.

11

ThatChina’sgrowthbegantoslowfrom2013whileothermajoremerging

markets,suchasBrazilandRussia,havesincebeenmiredinrecession,shouldnot

detractfromthefactthatessentiallytheentireplanetisnow,post-2008,integrated

intoglobalcapitalism(Kiely2016),inawaythatvalidatesLuce’svisionofaworld

opentoAmericanbusiness.Thatthekeyproblemforemergingmarketsafterthe

endofthecommoditiessypercycleiswhethertheycanrestructuretheirpolitical

economiestowardssustainedconsumermarketgrowthsymbolizestheendofthe

beginningoftheAmericancentury.ButwhycallittheAmericancenturywhenthe

USappearstobeinrelativeeconomicdeclinevis-à-visemergingmarketsinthe

aftermathofthe2008WallStreetcrash?ThiswouldonlymakesenseiftheUS

continuedtobenefitdisproportionatelyfromtheconsolidationofglobalcapitalism

intothetwenty-firstcentury.Wemustnowturntothedata.

SectionII:AmericanCapitalandtheRiseofOthers—

InvestigatingtheData

RobertGilpin(1975)alreadyarguedinthe1970sthatasAmericancorporations

expandabroadthroughforeigndirectinvestment,theyspreadAmericanknowledge

andtechnology,allowingforeigncompetitorstocatch-uptherebydiffusingtheir

originalmarketdominance.Luce,however,assumedthattheUSwouldcontinueits

dominanceasothersbecomemoreprosperous,astheUSwouldbeabletobenefit

fromtheriseofothersbycreatingmorebusinessforAmericancorporations(his

12

“enlightenedself-interest”).Thus,afterdecadesofexpandinganddeepening

operationsabroadcoupledwiththeriseofEastAsia,haveAmericanfirmslosttheir

technologicaldominancetoforeigncompetition?

ThefollowingfourtablesattempttocompareAmericandominanceoverhalf

acenturyinfourbroadsectorsthatarecrucialforadvancedknowledgeand

technology:1)Auto&Parts;2)InformationTechnology;3)Aerospace&Heavy

Machinery;and4)Pharmaceuticals&SpecializedChemicals.Thereareavarietyof

metricstomeasurecorporatedominance,suchasassets,sales,andmarketvalue

relativetocompetitors,butinthefollowingtablesIchooserelativeprofit-sharesin

eachsectorbecauseaccumulationofprofitistheprimarygoalofcapitalistfirms—

andhighprofitmarginsoftenindicateadvancedknowledgeandtechnology(aswell

assuccessfulmarketing).Indeed,firmswillsometimessellordisinvest(ratherthan

grow)assets,shedemployees,andreduceproductioninordertoboostprofit.On

theotherhand,firmsmayalsotemporarilysufferreducedprofitorevenalosswhile

theyrestructureinordertoboostlong-termprofitability.Thelargestfirmsthatcan

sustainprolongedlossesmayhaveacompetitiveedgeoverfirmsthatcannotafford

totemporarilyreduceprofit.Hencethereisadegreeofarbitrarinesstoanysingle

metricandavarietyoffactorsmustbeconsidered,bothquantitativeandqualitative.

Furthermore,thereareanumberofdifficultieswhencomparingcorporate

competitivenessacrosstheworldsincethebeginningofthepost-warperiod.Most

ofall,welackconsistentandcomprehensivedatastretchingbacktomid-century.In

thefollowingtables,Idrawupontheannualcorporaterankingspioneeredand

compiledbyLuce’sveryownFortuneMagazine.Itsinternationalcorporatelistsby

13

profitonlybeginin1963,andonlyoftheworld’stop200industrialfirms(whereas

Fortune’sfirstlist,ofthetop500Americanfirmsbyrevenue,beginsin1955).The

followingfourtables,then,presenttherankingsbyprofitin1963and2016,the

latestyearatthetimeofwriting.Weshouldtakenote,however,thattheearlyyears

oftheannualrankingshaveanAmericanbias,sinceFortune’sAmericanstaffhad

easieraccesstocorporateannualreportsfromAmericanfirmsoverforeignfirms,

especiallythosebasedinnon-Englishspeakingcountries.Inaddition,accounting

standards—includinghowprofitiscalculated—varyandhavechangednumerous

timessince1963bothwithinasinglecountryandbetweendifferentcountries.

Indeed,increasinginternationalstandardizationinaccountingandreportingrulesis

oneaspectofglobalization,nottomentiontheintroductionofcapitalismitselfin

ChinaandtheformerSovietUnion.Theserankingsarealsoaffectedbycurrency

fluctuationsasnon-USvaluesareconvertedtoUSdollars.Forexample,in1994with

sharpyenappreciation,the“salesof94Japanesecompanies[ontheGlobal500list]

wentupindollars,downinyen”(Fortune1994,143).Therearealsovastly

divergentratesofinflationacrosstimeandcountries.

Moreover,therehasobviouslybeensignificanttechnologicaldynamismsince

1963,creatingentirelynewsectors,markets,andbusinesses,whilealsodestroying

ordiminishingthecompetitivenessofotherfirmsorentireindustries.In1963,for

example,canningfirmssuchasAmericanCanandContinentalCancouldstillmake

similarprofittoaerospacefirmssuchasLockheedAircraftandMartinMarietta,all

between$41millionand$50million.TheUnitedStateshadbeendominantinthe

canningindustrysincethenineteenthcentury,butthefactthatthisAmerican

14

dominancehasdissipatedsincetheearly1960sdoesnotnecessarilyindicatelost

Americancompetitivenessatthetechnologicalfrontier.Rather,itistheindustry

itselfthathaslostcompetitivenessastechnologicaladvancementaccelerated,

reducingthecanningindustrytolowvalue,lowtechnologystatus(textilesis

anotherexample).This“creativedestruction”(Schumpeter1994)isespeciallythe

caseinwhatconstitutesthemostadvancedtechnologiesatanygiventime,

informationtechnologybeingoneofthekeyexamples(helpingtopropel

globalizationitself).Thus,thefollowingsectorsaremeanttobesufficientlybroadto

accountforsignificanttechnologicaldynamismoverthepasthalf-century,including

withinasinglefirmsuchasGeneralElectric,whichhasshifteditscoresectorsfrom

householdappliancestoairplaneenginesandotherheavymachineryoverthis

period.

[insertTable1here]

WebeginwiththeAuto&Partssector,asTable1revealsthetop10firmsin

theworldbyprofitin1963and2016,andtheiraggregatenationalprofit-shares.

TheerainwhichtheAmericanprofit-sharecouldbeastaggering93%ofthetopten

firmsinAuto&Partsiscertainlylonggone.SotooistheutterdominanceofGeneral

Motors(GM),morethantripletheprofitofitsnearestcompetitor,Ford.Afterhalfa

century,theglobalautosectorismuchmoregeographicallyfragmented,with

Japanese,German,andAmericanfirmsrepresentingtheleadingnationalities,and

ChineseandSouthKoreanfirmsroundingoutthetopten.Theexponentialincrease

oftheprofitsofJapaneseandGermancarmakersinthisperiodisalsostaggering,

from173timeslargerforDaimler(fromaprofitof$54millionin1963to$9.345

15

billionin2016)to642timeslargerforToyota(from$30millionto$19.264billion

inthesameperiod).Ofcourse,someproportionofthisincreasewillbeaccounted

forbycurrencyfluctuationsandinflation.Regardless,clearlynon-USfirmshave

benefittedfromtheexpansionanddeepeningofglobalcapitalistproductionand

consumptionoverthepasthalf-century,as70%ofToyota’sand85%ofDaimler’s

salesin2015wereconductedoutsidetheirhomecountry(author’scalculations

fromUNCTAD2016,AnnexTable24).

Nevertheless,despitemuchturbulenceoverthedecadesthathasseenthe

riseanddeclineofBritish,French,Italian,Swedish,andothercarmakers,coupled

withtheriseofNortheastAsianfirms,GMisstillthenumbertwofirmbyprofitin

2016andFordisstillnumberfour(downfromsecondin1963).Moreover,31%of

GM’sand38%ofFord’ssalesin2015wereoutsideoftheUnitedStates(author’s

calculationsfromUNCTAD2016,AnnexTable24),implyingthattheyhavealso

benefittedfromtheexpansionanddeepeningofglobalcapitalistproductionand

consumption.Indeed,GM’sJanuary2017marketshareinChina,theworld’slargest

automobilemarketbyvolumesince2009,is14%,secondonlytoVolkswagen’s

19%,andequaltothetopthreeChinesebrandscombined:Changan,Geely,and

GreatWall(author’scalculationsfromChinaAutoWeb2017).In2014,theFord

Focuswas“China’sbest-sellingcar”(Mitchell2014).AlsonotethatwhileSAIC’s

2016profitistheseventhlargestintheworld,itsjointventureswithGMand

Volkswagenaccountfor95%ofitssales,withitsownbrandcarsaccountingfor3%

(SAICMotor2016,14).

[insertTable2here]

16

Table2presentsthetoptenfirmsinInformationTechnology.Thissectorhas

beenoneofthemostdynamicoverthepasthalfcentury,notonlydrivingthe

informationtechnologyrevolutionthathasunderpinnedglobalizationbutalso

creatingentirelynewsub-sectorsandmarkets,aswellasdestroyingothers.Hence

weshouldexpectahighdegreeofsectoralchurn,whichiswhatweseeinTable2as

thereisonlyonefirmthatisonbothtoptenlistsseparatedby53years:IBM,from

largestprofitin1963slippingtofourthin2016.Indeed,IBMistheonlyfirminthe

toptenof2016thatevenexistedin1963(SamsungElectricIndustries—which

restructuredasSamsungElectronicsin1988—wasfoundedin1969,albeitits

primaryowner,theSamsungGroup,wasfoundedin1938).Therefore,giventhe

revolutionarychangesinandbythissectoroverthepasthalf-century,includingtoa

significantdegreedrivingtheriseofNortheastAsia,itisastoundingthatthe

Americanprofit-shareisrelativelythesamein1963(86%)asin2016(80%).This

AmericandominanceisallthemoreremarkablewhenconsideringthattheUSdollar

againstabasketofmajorcurrencieshasdevaluedbyaboutathirdoverthisperiod

(FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis2017),therebyincreasingtherelativevalueof

non-USprofit-sharesagainsttheUSwhenconvertedtodollars.Anditshouldnotbe

surprisingthatthesectorthatlargelydevelopedthetechnologytopropel

globalizationhasalsobenefitedgreatlyfromglobalization.Forexample,65%of

Apple’s,90%ofSamsungElectronics’,54%ofAlphabet’s(Google’sholding

company),53%ofIBM’s,54%ofMicrosoft’s,and55%ofOracle’ssalesare

conductedinforeigncountries(author’scalculationsfromUNCTAD2016,Annex

Table24).

17

[insertTable3here]

Table3revealsanotherimportantsectorforadvancedtechnology:

AerospaceandHeavyMachinery.TheAmericanprofit-sharehasdeclinedbyovera

fifth,from84%in1963toastilldominant66%in2016(despitetheUSdollar

depreciatingbyathird).Moreover,GeneralElectric(GE)sufferedalossof$6.126

billionin2016largelyduetorestructuring(Fortune2016,26:GeneralElectric).In

contrast,GE’sprofitin2015was$15.233billion,morethandoubleitschief

competitorSiemens’profitof$7.288billionin2015.ThecorrespondingAmerican

profit-shareofAerospaceandHeavyMachineryin2015was76%whileGermany’s

was13%(author’scalculationsfromFortuneGlobal500(2015))—asmallchange

from84%in1963.Moreover,despiteGE’ssteep2016lossofover$6billion,

investorsseemtobelievethatGE’srestructuringwillbesuccessfulasitsshareprice

increased25%inthatsameyear(Fortune2016,26:GeneralElectric).Allofthisis

tosaythatwhiletheAmericanprofit-shareinAerospaceandHeavyMachineryhas

declinedoverthepasthalf-century,Americanfirmscontinuetodominatethetop

tenofthissectorwithmorethantwo-thirdsoftheprofit.Firmsinthissectorhave

alsobenefittedfromglobalization,as77%ofSiemens’,55%ofGE’s,and45%of

UnitedTechnologies’saleswereconductedabroad(author’scalculationsfrom

UNCTAD2016,AnnexTable24).

[insertTable4here]

Table4presentsanothersectorthathasseenahighdegreeoftechnological

andcompetitivedynamism,withonlytwofirmsinthe1963listremaininginthe

2016list(Procter&GambleandDowChemical).Technologicaladvanceshavebeen

18

especiallyprominentinthesub-sectorofbiotechnologysincethe1980s(when

GileadSciencesandAmgenwerefounded,thenumberoneandninefirmbyprofitin

2016).Moregenerally,pharmaceuticalshaveriseninimportanceintheFortune200

intermsofprofitabilityrelativetoothersectors,suchasautomobilesasseenin

Table1.Concomitantly,therehasbeenadecliningimportanceinindustrial

chemicalsforadvancedtechnologyandprofitability,withDowChemicaltheonly

relevantfirmremaininginthetoptenin2016from1963(incidentally,retainingits

sixthplaceacrossthosetwoyears).DrivingsomeofthesechangesareBritishand

especiallySwissfirms,thelatteraccountingforaquarteroftheprofitin

Pharmaceuticals&SpecializedChemicals.Nevertheless,similartowhatwesawin

Aerospace&HeavyMachinery,Americanfirmsstillcollectivelydominatethetop

tenwitha63%profit-sharein2016,despitedecliningoveraquarterfrom87%in

1963.Unsurprisingly,thissectorhasalsobenefittedfromglobalizationintermsof

foreignasaproportionoftotalsales,especiallySwiss(Novartis’98%andRoche’s

99%)andBritish(GlaxoSmithKline’s94%)firms,butalsoAmerican,from63%for

Procter&Gambleand56%forPfizertoJohnson&Johnson’s49%andAmgen’s20%

(author’scalculationsfromUNCTAD2016,AnnexTable24).

Thenextfourtablesexhibitthesamesectorsandfirmsasthepreviousfour

tables,butpresentthethreelargestnationalownershipsharesofeachofthetopten

firmsin2016,aswellasthethreelargestaveragenationalownershipsharesofthe

topteninaggregate.Thefollowingfourtablesrevealanaspectofglobalizationthat

islittlecommentedupon:theincreasingliberalizationoffinancesincethe1980s(in

largepartdrivenbytheUS)aroundtheworldhasallowedAmericaninvestorsto

19

collectivelyownsizablesharesofnon-USfirmsbytheearlytwenty-firstcentury.

Thus,eveniftherelativeaggregatedominanceoftheAmericanprofit-sharesin

certain(butnotall)sectorsislessoverwhelmingthanhalfacenturyago,American

investorsownnotonlyfirmsbasedintheUnitedStates,butalsoincreasinglyfirms

basedoutsideoftheUnitedStates.Thisaspectofglobalizationhassignificant

implicationsforthecontinuedcentralityoftheUnitedStatesinglobalcapitalism,as

weshallseebelow.Butfirst,letusinvestigatetowhatextentAmericaninvestors

ownthetoptenfirmsineachofthesefouradvancedsectors.

[insertTable5here]

Table5revealsdiversityintheconcentrationofnationalownershipshares,

fromahighof98%ChineseownershipoftheChinesestate-ownedenterpriseSAIC

MotortothewidelygeographicallydispersedownershipofDaimler.AllChinese

state-ownedenterprisesaremajorityChinesestate-owned(inthecaseofSAIC

Motor,theChinesestateowns88%).Alsonotethepredominantaggregate

ownershipofAmericaninvestorsofAmericanfirms(87%ofGMand85%ofFord),

aswellastheconsiderableAmericanownershipofGerman,Korean,andJapanese

carmakers—rangingfromalmostafifthtooverathird.Thus,onaverageAmerican

investorsown35%ofthetopeightfirmsinAuto&Parts(theownershipstructures

oftheninthandtenthfirmsareunavailableduetonotbeingpubliclylisted).Thisis

thelargestnationalaggregatesharebyalmost300%,andsignificantlylargerthan

the25%Americanprofit-shareofthetopeightinthissector.Bycontrast,the

Japaneseprofit-shareof35%ofthetopeightisnotmatchedbytheaverage

Japaneseownershipof9.6%,northeaverageGermanownershipof8.1%despite

20

theGermanprofit-sharebeing24%.Thisindicatesthatintermsoftheglobalization

ofthecorporateownershipoftheworld’stopcarmakersin2016,American

investorshavebenefittedmorethananyothernationality.Similarly,notethe

nationalasymmetryinownershipshares,asAmericaninvestorsownmuchmoreof

foreigncapitalthanforeigninvestorsownofAmericancapital.

[insertTables6,7&8here]

Table6revealsthataverageAmericanownershipinInformationTechnology

isevenmorepredominantat72%,morethantentimesitsnearestrivalofSouth

Koreawith7%.Again,Americanfirmshaveanoverwhelmingconcentrationof

Americanownership,from79%ofCiscoto87%ofAlphabet.Incontrast,non-US

firmshavelessconcentratednationalownership,eveniftheKoreanshareof

SamsungElectronicsisstilldominantat63%.Americaninvestors,however,

collectivelyown18%ofSamsungElectronicsand42%ofTaiwanSemiconductor,

whereasTaiwaneseinvestorsownlessthanaquarterofthelatterdespitebeing

basedinTaiwan.Table7revealsthatAmericanownershipoffirmsinAerospace&

HeavyMachineryisevenmorepronouncedthatinpreviouslydiscussedsectors,

withanaverage88%AmericanownershipofthetopsevenUS-basedfirms.Ofthe

remainingthreenon-USfirmsinthetopten,Americaninvestorscollectivelyown

theleadingnationalshareinSiemens(32%versusGermany’ssecondlargestshare

of20%)andAirbusGroup(39%versusFrance’s22%),whileAmericanownership

ofFujiHeavyIndustriesisalmostafifth(thesecondlargestshare).Likewise,Table

8demonstratesthedisproportionateAmericanownershipofthetop

Pharmaceuticals&SpecializedChemicalsfirms,including43%oftheSwissfirm

21

Novartisand41%oftheBritishfirmGlaxoSmithKline—albeittheAmericanshare

ofRocheGroupisminisculeat0.6%whiletheSwissshareisoverwhelmingat93%.

TheaverageAmericanownershipofthetoptenis67%,morethanfivetimeslarger

thanitsnearestnationalrival,Switzerland’s13%.

Thereisanimportantcaveat,however,toTables5-8.Theylisttheaggregate

nationalityofcorporateowners,gleanedfromtheBloombergProfessionaldatabase.

Thisdatabaselistsallknownshareholdersofeachcorporation,bothindividually

andinaggregatebynationality.Theshareholdersofthesecorporationsrangefrom

individualpersonsandfamiliestoinvestmentfirms(ofmanytypes),other

corporationstothestate—theirnationalityisbasedontheircitizenshipfor

individualsandtheirlegaldomicileforfirms.Theshareholdersthatareinvestment

firms,however,managethewealthofmanyindividuals,andtheseindividualscould

befromaroundtheworld.Forexample,whileGoldmanSachsislegallydomiciledin

theUnitedStatesandthusgiventhenationalityof“American,”itmanagesthe

wealthofindividualsfrommanynationalities,implyingthatcorporateownership

byGoldmanSachsdoesnotnecessarilyexclusivelyequatewiththecorporate

ownershipofAmericanhouseholds.WallStreetfirmsdonotpubliclyreleasethe

identityoftheirclients,sotheproportionoftheirclientsbeingAmericanorany

othernationalityisunknown.

Whatwedoknow,however,isthatoftheworld’s$168trillionoftotal

householdwealth(excludingprimaryresidence)in2015,only$9.8trillion,or6%,is

managedoffshore,inacountryotherthanthehousehold’sdomicile,accordingto

BostonConsultingGroup(2016,11).Ofthis$9.8trillionofoffshorewealth,

22

Americanhouseholdsonlyaccountfor$700billion,whichisaround1%oftotal

Americanhouseholdwealth.Inotherwords,99%ofAmericanhouseholdwealth

(excludingprimaryresidence)ismanagedbyUS-domiciledfirms—namely,Wall

Street.ThelargestrecipientofoffshorewealthisSwitzerland,holdingjustundera

quarterofthe$9.8trillion,followedbytheUKandtheCaribbean(Boston

ConsultingGroup2016,12).Hence,evenifspecificinvestmentfirmssuchas

GoldmanSachsmightmanageahighershareofforeignwealththanothers,in

aggregate,theoverwhelmingmajorityofwealthmanagedbyinvestmentfirmsis

ultimatelyownedbythosedomiciledinthatfirm’snation—withtheexceptionsof

wealthmanagersbasedintheCaribbean,Luxembourg,Singapore,Switzerland,and

otheroffshorecenters,whichpredominantlymanagethewealthofnon-citizens

(BostonConsultingGroup2016,11).Thus,because94%oftheworld’stotal

householdwealthof$168trillionismanagedonshorebyfirmsofthesame

nationalityastheirclients,itissafetoassumethattheaggregateAmerican

ownershipsharesoftheworld’stopcorporationsexhibitedinTables5-8indeed

overwhelminglyrepresentstheownershipsharesofAmericanhouseholds,andso

onformostnationalownershipshares(exceptforoffshorewealthcentersledby

Switzerland)—eveniftheexactproportionsareunknown.

[insertFigure1here]

Tofurtheremphasizethispoint,Figure1presentsthenationalsharesofthe

world’smillionaires(thoseindividualswithanetworthofUS$1millionormore,

includingprimaryresidence),asaproxyfortheworld’scapitalists.Despite

AmericanGDPaccountingfor“only”24%ofworldGDPin2015(author’s

23

calculationsfromWorldBank2016),Americancitizensaccountforawhopping

46%oftheworld’smillionaires.Thisshockinglyhighproportionmakessensewhen

weunderstandthatAmericancapitalistsownnotonlyAmericancapital,which

remainsgloballydominantafterthe2008-2009globalfinancialcrisis(Starrs2013),

buttheglobalizationofcorporateownershiphasallowedAmericanstoowncapital

basedaroundtheworld,includingevenincreasinglyChineseSOEs(Starrs2017).

Moregenerally,Figure1revealsthecontinuednationalconcentrationofglobal

wealth,whichIargueisareflectionofthecontinuednationalconcentrationof

corporatedominance,asseeninTables1-4.

Insum,acrossthefouradvancedsectorsinvestigatedinTables1-4,

AmericanfirmscontinuetocollectivelydominateinInformationTechnology,

Aerospace&HeavyMachinery,andPharmaceuticals&SpecializedChemicals,with

over60%profit-sharesin2016.Indeed,despitegreatdynamismandcreative

destructioninInformationTechnology,theproportionofAmericandominancehas

barelychangedfrom86%in1963to80%in2016,especiallywhenconsideringthat

theUSdollardepreciatedbyathirdacrossthatperiod.Americanfirms,however,

havelosttheircollectivedominanceinAuto&Partssincetheearly1960s,with

intensecompetitionfromespeciallyGermanandJapanesecarmakers.Anumberof

majorindustrialcountrieshaveattemptedtoprotectandpromoteanindigenous

automobileindustryoverthedecades,asectorthatistraditionallyseenas

symbolizingadvancedindustrialprowess.Thishasresultedinthegeographic

diffusionoftechnologyandcompetitiveness,especiallytoEastAsia.Nevertheless,

GMandFordarestillsecondandfourth,respectively,largestcarmakersbyprofitin

24

2016—remaininggloballycompetitiveoverthepasthalfcentury,ifnolonger

dominant.

Regardless,itshouldbenotedthattheautosectoritselfhasdiminishedin

importanceintermsofprofitandmorebroadlyasadriverofadvancedindustrial

growth,aselectronicsandsoftwarebecomethemostimportantcomponentsto

differentiatetwenty-firstcenturycars.In1963,thetotalprofitofthetoptenAuto&

Partsfirmswas2.7timeslargerthanthetotalprofitofthetoptenInformation

Technologyfirms.By2016,thisratioreversed,withthetotalprofitofthetopten

firmsinInformationTechnologybeing2.1timeslargerthaninAuto&Parts.

Similarly,in1963thetotalprofitofthetoptenfirmsinPharmaceuticals&

SpecializedChemicalswashalfthatofthetopteninAuto&Parts,andin2016itwas

44%largerthanAuto&Parts.InthesemoreimportantsectorsbyprofitAmerican

firmscontinuetocollectivelydominate.

Moreover,theglobalizationofcapitalhasalsoentailedtheglobalizationof

corporateownership,andespeciallytheglobalizationofAmericanownershipoftop

corporationsfromaroundtheworld.Tables5-8notonlyrevealtheoverwhelming

concentrationofAmericanownershipofAmericanfirms,butalsosizablesharesof

foreignfirms,oftenrangingfromafifthtomorethantwo-fifthsofSwiss-based

NovartisandTaiwan-basedTaiwanSemiconductor.Noothernationalitycomes

closetothismagnitudeofAmericancorporateownership,andisalittlecommented

uponaspectofhowAmericaninvestorsintheageofglobalizationhavebenefitted

fromincreasingliberalizationoffinancialmarketsandcapitalcontrolsaroundthe

world.Thisisatleastpartiallyreflectedinthecontinuedconcentrationofglobal

25

capitalistwealthintheUnitedStates.Figure1showsthatin2015,American

millionairesconstituted46%oftheworld’s,despiteAmericansaccountingforonly

4.4%oftheworld’spopulationasopposedto6.4%in1945(thesupposedheightof

Americanhegemony),and24%oftheworld’sGDP(downfromroughlyhalfin

1945).Ihavearguedelsewhere(Starrs2013)thatAmericaneconomicpowerhas

notdeclined,ithasglobalized—andthisiskeytounderstandingthedecades-long

realizationoftheAmericancenturywiththeriseoftheBRICSintheeraof

globalization.

Conclusion:Post-2008istheBeginningoftheEndofthe

AmericanCentury

InthecontextofincreasingChineseconfidenceandinfluenceintheglobalpolitical

economyafterthe2008-2009globalfinancialcrisis,itmayseemstrangetoargue

thattheAmericancenturyisonlynowbeingrealized.Butoncewerecognizethat

China(alongwiththerestofthe“ThirdWorld”)haslongsinceabandoneditsanti-

capitalistresistanceandisnownegotiatingthetermsofitsintegrationintoglobal

capitalism,withitsdomesticmarketmoreopentoAmericanbusinessandinfluence

thaneverbefore,wearemuchclosertoLuce’svisionoftheAmericancenturythan

atanypointduringitssupposedheightintheimmediatepost-warperiod.Inthe

1950sand1960s,evenifChinawasopentoAmericanbusiness(whichofcourseit

wasnot),today’sfarmoreprosperousChineseconsumermarket(ifstilllimitedand

26

rifewithinequality)ismuchmorebeneficialtoAmericancorporateintereststhana

vastpeasantsocietylargelyuntouchedbymassconsumption.Aswesaw,thisis

preciselywhatLuceenvisionedinthe1940sasadistantgoal,tointegratethe

world’speasantsocietiesintoglobalcapitalismasworkersandconsumers,which

onlytrulybecamerealizedbythe2000swiththecapitalistriseoftheBRICSand

otheremergingmarkets(Cammack2004,2012)—toanextentsurelybeyondthe

dreamsofeventheeveroptimisticLuce.

AndAmericanfirmshavecertainlybenefittedfromtheriseofaglobal

consumerclass,ashavefirmsfromothercapitalistpowers,includingincreasingly

China.Indeed,itisthismutualinterestbetweentheworld’scapitalistpowersin

expandinganddeepeningglobalcapitalismthatinlargepartexplainsitsdurability

sincethemiddleofthepreviouscentury(PanitchandGindin2012).Luce

recognizedthismutualinterestinthe1940sinregardstoEuropeandtheUS,but,

aftermanychallengesovertheensuingdecadesasoutlinedabove,thisstructural

alignmentofcapitalistinterestisonlynowtrulyglobalwiththecapitalistriseand

integrationoftheformerThirdWorld.ThecontrastbetweentheeffortsoftheNon-

AlignedMovementinthe1960sand1970stodecouplefromWesterncapitalism

withtheeffortsoftheBRICSandespeciallyChinatodaytointegratewithglobal

capitalismisremarkable.

Ofcourse,therearestilldisagreementsoverthetermsofemergingmarket

integrationandglobalgovernanceremainsacontestedandevolvingprocess

(Parisot2013).Mostnotably,Chinaisseekingtoincreaseitsinternationalinfluence

byestablishingnon-Western-centeredinternationalorganizationstoprovide

27

infrastructurefunding—namely,theNewDevelopmentBank(orcolloquially

knownasthe“BRICSBank”)in2014andtheAsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank

(AIIB)in2015.ThelatterwasespeciallyseenasadirectchallengetoAmerican

hegemonyandtheBrettonWoodsinstitutions.In2015,despiteAmericanpressures

toeschewmembership,aslewofWesterncountries,beginningwithGreatBritain,

joinedtheAIIB—markinganembarrassingdiplomaticflopfortheUnitedStates.

ButaftertheinitialhubbuboversupposedAmericandeclinehadsubsided,whatis

notableishowcarefultheAIIBistonotappeartothreatentheBrettonWoods

institutions.Article1.1oftheAIIB’sArticlesofAgreementstatesthatitseeksto

“workinclosecollaboration”(ratherthanchallenge)prevailingmultilateral

institutions(AIIB2015),andvariousannouncementshavebeenmadeofareasand

projectsinwhichtheAIIBandBrettonWoodsinstitutionswillcooperate(AIIB

2017).Moreover,boththeAIIBandBRICSBankwilldispensefinancinginUSdollars

ratherthananyothercurrency,andthedevelopmentcontractswillpresumablybe

opentobiddingfrominternationalfirms(notexclusivelyChineseSOEsasinmostof

itsbilateraldevelopmentprojects).Hence,eventhoughitisstillearlydays,itseems

likelythattheAIIBandBRICSBankwillhelptofurtherintegrateemergingmarkets

intoglobalcapitalism(anddeepeningtheglobalroleoftheUSdollar),giving

especiallyChinaaroleininternationalinfrastructurefinancing,andnormalizing

theirincreasedparticipationinglobalgovernance.

Meanwhile,Chinaisstillarobustmember(includingfinancialdonor)ofall

themajorinternationalorganizationscreatedundertheaegisofAmerican

hegemony,perhapsmostnotablytheIMFandWTO.ThatXiJinpingmadeChina’s

28

firstpresidentialaddressatthe2017WorldEconomicForuminDavos,Switzerland

(establishedin1971duringtheheightofandpartiallyasaresponsetotheriseof

theThirdWorldchallenge),andusedhisaddresstodefendglobalizationand

economicopenness,isastarkrealizationofhowfarthedesireforThirdWorld

decouplinghastransformedintoembracingandevendefendingglobalcapitalism.

Lucewouldhavebeenproud,andthistransformationiscertainlyintheinterestsof

Americanbusiness.

Thisstarkdifferencebetweenthefirstandsecondwavesoftheriseofthe

ThirdWorldhalfacenturyagoandtodayalsopointstotheflexibilityofAmerican

hegemony.Thebeliefintheimportanceofmaintainingandexpandingglobal

capitalismfortheAmericannationalinteresthasremainedrelativelyconsistentfor

Americanelitessince1945(havingvanquished“isolationists”withthedestruction

ofWorldWarII).Thus,theUShasalsobeenrelativelyflexibleinitshegemony

(comparedtoprevioushegemons).ThisisespeciallythecaseintheAmerican

capacitytointegrate(orco-opt)risingpowersintoacollectivemanagementof

“globalgovernance”.TheestablishmentoftheG7inthe1970sandG20post-2008

areprimeexamples.Infact,thisAmericanflexibilityextendstoencouragingthe

veryriseofitspotentialrivals,whetherJapanandWestGermanyintheearlypost-

warperiodorChinatoday—aslongasthesecountriesallowtheexpansionof

Americanbusinessandinfluencewithintheirborders(eventhiscanbeflexible,as

theUStoleratedJapaneseprotectionismfordecades,inordertoreviveJapanese

capital).

29

AgenuinechallengetoAmericanhegemonywouldbeifothercountries

movedtodecouplefromtheAmerican-centeredsystem,inordertocarvean

alternativeregionalorworldorder.ThattheLatinAmericanchallengeofthe2000s

ledbythelatePresidentChavezofVenezuelawasneverabletodecouplefromthe

Americansystemdespitetheirbesteffortsrevealshowtallataskthisis.TheSoviet

Unioncametheclosesttoposingsuchathreatforseveraldecades,butitsremnants

havenowembracedglobalcapitalism,alongwithwhatusedtobecalledtheThird

World.Thefragmentationanddepoliticizationofthelatterinto“developing

countries”and“emergingmarkets”isbynowsothoroughthatwetakeforgranted

theirembracingofanddesiredintegrationwithglobalcapitalism.Capitalistsofthe

worldhaveunitedunderthebannerofglobalization,spurringastructural

alignmentofclassinterestinmaintainingtheAmericancentury.

Ifsystemicchangewilllikelynotcomefromtheworld’scapitalistclasses,

thenwhatoftheworld’sworkingclasses?Politicalshockwavesrippledthrough

2016withtheBrexitvoteinJuneandtheelectionofDonaldTrumpinNovember,

botheventsofteninterpretedasthecriesorangeroftheworkingclassagainst

decadesofglobalization.ContrarytoLuce’sassumptions,whatisintheinterestsof

bigbusinessisoftennotcompatiblewiththeinterestsoftheworkingclass,with

profit-orientedpolicesandpracticesleadingtosoaringinequality,precarious

employment,andcontinuedenvironmentaldegradation.WhatLucedidcorrectly

surmise,however,isthattheAmericanlifestyleofmassconsumerismandthe

anesthesiaoftheAmericandreamcouldbeeffectiveantidotestoworkingclass

unitychallengingcapitalism.Clearlynationaldiversityandlocalizationsremain,but

30

wearecloserthanevertospreadingAmerican-stylemassconsumerismacrossthe

world,agreatboonforAmerican,aswellasmanyforeign,corporations—aswellas

agreatdistracterandcoopterfortheworkingclassesoftheworld.Nevertheless,

historyisstillbeingwritten,andtheemergenceofworkingclasseswiththe

capitalistriseofemergingmarketsmaycreatenewopportunitiesforinternational

solidarityandresistance,asmorepeoplerealizethenegativeeffectsofcapitalist

globalization(BondandGarcia2015).Itisallthemoreimportanttounderstand,

then,theincreasingemergingmarketcooperationinexpandinganddeepening

globalcapitalismpost-2008.Afteramulti-decadedetourdowntheroadof

attemptingtodecouplefromWesterncapitalism,thecapitalistriseofemerging

markets—farfromaneclipse—signifiesonlytheendofthebeginningofthe

Americancentury.

References

Amin,Samir,GiovanniArrighi,AndreGunderFrank,ImmanuelWallerstein,eds.

1982.DynamicsofGlobalCrisis,NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress.

AsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank.June29,2015.“ArticlesofAgreement.”

<https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-

agreement/basic_document_english-bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf>(March28,

2017).

31

AsianInfrastructureInvestmentBank.February9,2017.“AIIBandIFCSignISDA

MasterAgreementtoExpandInfrastructureInvestmentsinAsia.”NewsandEvents.

<https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2017/20170209_001.html>(March

28,2017).

BloombergProfessional.(BloombergTerminalaccessedJuly-August2016at

MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology).

Blum,William.2004.KillingHope:U.S.MilitaryandCIAInterventionsSinceWorld

WarIIMonroe,ME:CommonCouragePress.

Bond,PatrickandAnaGarcia,eds.2015.BRICS:AnAnti-CapitalistCritique,Chicago:

HaymarketBooks.

BostonConsultingGroup.2016.“GlobalWealth2016:NavigatingtheNewClient

Landscape.”<https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/financial-

institutions-consumer-insight-global-wealth-2016/>(March28,2017).

Cammack,Paul.2004.“WhattheWorldBankMeansByPovertyReduction,AndWhy

ItMatters.”NewPoliticalEconomy9,2:189-211.

Cammack,Paul.2012.“TheG20,theCrisis,andtheRiseofGlobalDevelopmental

Liberalism.”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,1:1-16.

32

ChinaAutoWeb.February17,2017.“MostPopularPassengerVehiclesinJanuary

2017.”<http://chinaautoweb.com/2017/02/most-popular-passenger-vehicles-in-

january-2017>(March28,2017).

Chossudovsky,Michel.1997.TheGlobalisationofPoverty:ImpactsofIMFandWorld

BankReforms,London:ZedBooks.

Cohen,Benjamin.2015.CurrencyPower:UnderstandingMonetaryRivalry,Princeton:

PrincetonUniversityPress.

Cox,Robert.1987.Production,Power,andWorldOrder:SocialForcesintheMaking

ofHistory,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

CreditSuisse.2015.“GlobalWealthReport2016.”<https://publications.credit-

suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=F2425415-DCA7-80B8-

EAD989AF9341D47E>(March28,2017).

Cumings,Bruce.1999.“TheAmericanCenturyandtheThirdWorld.”Diplomatic

History23,2:355-370.

FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis.2017.“TradeWeightedU.S.DollarIndex:Major

Currencies.”<https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TWEXMANL>(March28,2017).

33

Fortune.July1963.“Fortune500.”FortuneMagazine68,1:178-182.

Fortune.August1963.“The200LargestForeignIndustrialCompanies.”Fortune

Magazine68,2:140-141.

Fortune.July25,1994.“TheGlobal500IndustrialCorporations.”Fortune.130,2:

143-146.

Fortune.July2015.“Global500.”<http://fortune.com/global500/2015/>(March

28,2017).

Fortune.July2016.“26:GeneralElectric.”

<http://beta.fortune.com/global500/general-electric-26>(March28,2017).

Fortune.July2016.“Global500.”<http://beta.fortune.com/global500/>(March28,

2017).

Germann,Julian.2014.“State-LedorCapital-Driven?TheFallofBrettonWoodsand

theGermanCurrencyFloatReconsidered”NewPoliticalEconomy19,5:769-789.

Gilpin,Robert.1975.U.S.PowerandtheMultinationalCorporation:ThePolitical

EconomyofForeignDirectInvestment,NewYork:BasicBooks.

34

Gowan,Peter.1999.TheGlobalGamble:Washington’sFaustianBidforWorld

Dominance,London:Verso.

Harvey,David.2005.ABriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,NewYork:Oxford.

Kennedy,Paul.1988.TheRiseandFalloftheGreatPowers:EconomicChangeand

MilitaryConflictFrom1500to2000,London:FontanaPress.

Keohane,Robert.1984.AfterHegemony:CooperationandDiscordintheWorld

PoliticalEconomy,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Kiely,Ray.2016.TheRiseandFallofEmergingPowers:Globalisation,USPowerand

theGlobalNorth-SouthDivideLondon:PalgraveMacMillan.

Kindleberger,Charles.1969.AmericanBusinessAbroad:SixLecturesonDirect

Investment,NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Leys,Colin.2009.TheRiseandFallofDevelopmentTheory,Bloomington,ID:Indiana

UniversityPress.

Luce,Henry.June1947.“TheU.S.SituationandtheU.S.Opportunity.”Fortune

Magazine35,6:81-85,187-192.

35

Luce,Henry.February1950.“TheReformationoftheWorld’sEconomies.”Fortune

Magazine38,2:59-63.

Luce,Henry.1999.“TheAmericanCentury.”DiplomaticHistory23,2:159-171.

Mitchell,Tom.June12,2014.“ForeignCarmakersMilkChina’sCashCow.”The

FinancialTimes<https://www.ft.com/content/80e143e6-f15b-11e3-9fb0-

00144feabdc0>(March28,2017).

Panitch,Leo,andSamGindin.2012.TheMakingofGlobalCapitalism:ThePolitical

EconomyofAmericanEmpire,London:Verso.

Parisot,James.2013.“AmericanPower,EastAsianRegionalismandEmerging

Powers:InorAgainstEmpire?”ThirdWorldQuarterly34,7:1159-1174.

Prashad,Vijay.2008.TheDarkerNations:APeople’sHistoryoftheThirdWorld,New

York:NewPress.

SAICMotor.2016.“AnnualReport2015”

<http://www.saicgroup.com/english/images/investor_relations/annual_report/20

16/6/7/1C117E345F254379966260F97C5D9353.pdf>(March28,2017).

36

Schumpeter,Joseph.1994.Capitalism,Socialism,andDemocracy,NewYork:

Routledge.

Rosecrance,Richard.1976.“Introduction”RichardRosecrance,ed.Americaasan

OrdinaryCountry:U.S.ForeignPolicyandtheFuture,Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.

Rostow,Walt.1960.TheStagesofEconomicGrowth:ANon-CommunistManifesto,

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Starrs,Sean.2013.“AmericanEconomicPowerHasn’tDeclined—ItGlobalized!

SummoningtheDataandTakingGlobalizationSeriously.”InternationalStudies

Quarterly57,4:817-830.

Starrs,Sean.2014.“TheChimeraofGlobalConvergence.”NewLeftReview87:81-96.

Starrs,Sean.2017.“TheGlobalCapitalismSchoolTestedinAsia:Transnational

CapitalistClassvsTakingtheStateSeriously.”JournalofContemporaryAsia.

OnlineFirst:1-18.

UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment.June21,2016.“AnnexTable

24.TheWorld’sTop100Non-FinancialMNEs,RankedbyForeignAssets,2015.”

WorldInvestmentReport2016.

37

<http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-

Tables.aspx>(March28,2017).

WorldBank.2016.“Databank.”<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>

(March28,2017).