the right to decide (it in transit #31)

The Right to Decide, the main protagonist of the catalan process

The Right To Decide issue #31 - October 2014

On November 9th the Catalan people will be called to vote on their political future. In the end, it will not be a referendum or a consultation, but instead a participatory process, given the Spanish government’s refusals to authorize a referendum organized by the State, or a consultation designed and carried out in accordance with Catalan laws. The Catalans’ right to decide will have to be expressed, therefore, through the only gap that remains in the narrow Spanish political will.

It is not the first time that the Catalan desire for doing things democratically has had to go to great lengths to become a reality. After the proclamation of the Republic in municipal elections that served as a plebiscite on the monarchy, the Catalans quickly got to work to draft a Statute. Only three months later, in the summer of 1931, the Catalans were called to vote in a referendum to approve it. But not the Catalan women, who didn’t have their right to vote recognized at the time. The solution they found was to organize a participatory process to collect women’s signatures. 595,205 votes in favor (a 99% of the census) and 400,000 signatures of adhesion to the Statute. Next to a referendum that was, in fact, unconstitutional, since there was not a republican constitution that endorsed it (which was passed in December of 1931), it was an avant la lettre participatory process, it was the way the Catalan people found at that time to exercise their right to decide and express their political will.

This is what we continue to call for today, and more explicitly since 2006, with the start of the latest cycle of Catalanism that is focused on the right to decide. In Catalonia, the right to decide became popular as a result of the Right to Decide Platform (PDD), through large-scale mobilizations and a later process of nonofficial consultations on independence organized by the civil society. Between 2006 and 2010, three large demonstrations took place in Barcelona. They brought together hundreds of thousands of citizens who demanded—literally—the right to decide of the Catalan people. The concept ‘right to decide’ was part of the slogans used in the three demonstrations. The practical exercise of this right was developed by the same civil society that, between 2007 and 2011, organized four waves of nonofficial referendums on independence, in which 885,000 citizens (15% of the population over 16 years old) from 551 towns (60% of the total) participated. These consultations were organized without any institutional support (in some cases, there was even opposition from some political forces) and required the help of thousands of volunteers.

The demand (and exercise) of the right to decide in Catalonia is a clearly bottom-up movement. In 2007, and for the first time, the former main opposing political party—currently forming the Catalan government, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya—accepted it in its political agenda. Since 2012, it has become the key idea at the center of the ‘National Transition.’ Regarding official institutions, three milestones can be highlighted in its political development: ‘Catalonia’s declaration of sovereignty and right to decide’ (23/01/2013), ‘National pact for the right to decide’ (26/06/2013), and the agreement for the holding of a consultation on November 9th, 2014 (13/12/2013), in which two questions will be presented: “Do you want Catalonia to becomes a state?”; if so, “do you want it to be an independent state?”

In Catalonia, the importance of the right to decide has left the right to self-determination on a political secondary level, although it is mentioned as a more traditional formula to defend the holding of a referendum on independence. In fact, since both vindications demand a referendum, they have often been considered synonyms. However, are these two terms really synonyms or, on the contrary, do they express different ideas and principles that should prevent us from using the right to decide as a mere aggiornamento of the right to self-determination? The right to decide most likely represents more of a Copernican shift. For starters, we face a new framework, a new framework for communication, and, at the same time, a new framework for thought, which explain an important part of the growing success of the Catalan sovereignty movement. As a framework for communication, it contributes to communicating that the Catalan people’s main desire is to express its will about a political future. Above all, it’s about having the right to vote. As a framework for thought, to start with, these demands are connected to a democratic idea and not a historical right that is attached to the nation, and thus are more connected to the present and the future and not to the past. Consequently, this demand for the right to decide has become one that crosses all social boundaries, allowing there to be a confluence of those who define Catalonia as a nation (more linked to the traditional demand for the right to self-determination) and those who do not share this view, as well as those who see this matter as irrelevant.

The role of the right to decide is so important that the enemies of the sovereignty process have ended up twisting its original meaning when they claim that the right to decide belongs to all Spaniards; or that Catalans already exercise this right every time they vote in ordinary elections. Spain’s Constitutional Court also used it in this sense when it ruled on the sovereignty declaration, stating that “a constitutional interpretation of the right to decide is possible.” However, the right to decide is not the right to consult or be consulted. Indeed, it is necessary to know the people’s opinion in order to make a decision and, in the current circumstances, this right must also be demanded. Even though it may be part of the “exercise of the right to decide,” stating an opinion and deciding aren’t the same thing. Expressed will should be able to materialize itself politically. In other words, so that it truly serves in order to decide.

Jaume López. Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

seven communities, one languageeurocatalan newsletter

EDITORIAL

The right to decide is not the right to self-determination, either. There is a precise, well-established concept for that in international law, which recognizes that decolonization processes must incorporate the right of former colonies to decide on their political future through a referendum. This concept is rarely questioned: no international forum would doubt that Western Sahara needs a self-determination referendum, just like nobody would claim that right for Catalonia. At least, not defined as it is in international legal terms.

However, we can point to some legal grounds for the right to decide. In 2010 the International Court of Justice indirectly addressed this matter in its ruling on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, reiterating what the Supreme Court of Canada had ruled on the matter of Quebec, but taking it a step further. From the conclusions of this ruling, one could define the right to decide as a legitimizing political principle by which, if a political subject wishes to become a new state and can do so because it is viable and respects the basic rights of all its citizens, it should be allowed to go ahead, even if there is no colonial relationship, on condition that it’s a peaceful, democratic process and all attempts to reach an agreement with the state have failed.This principle is not grounded in the ICJ, which merely reflects it, but in the fact that in the 21st century there should be a formula to resolve such conflicts efficiently and without resorting to violence. In the 21st century no state should be seen as a moral principle that must be preserved. In the 21st century, the necessary interdependences, globalization and military stability allow us to exercise the ideal that national borders can be changed if that is the decision of the people, after considering the pros and cons. Fiction? Perhaps, for now. So was Locke’s right to rebellion that American revolutionaries exercised. Eventually, if we become a new state, the main argument to explain ourselves --and the main source of fundamental legitimacy for Catalan independence-- will be the right to decide.

Can Spain and Catalonia’s marriage be saved? Let the Catalans vote


Catalonia’s drive to break away from Spain hit a roadblock this week. Spain’s Constitutional Court on Monday agreed to hear Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s appeal contesting Catalonia’s plan for a Nov. 9 referendum on independence and suspended the regional vote. The court has five months to issue its final ruling. The Catalan government on Tuesday temporarily halted its campaign but said it would appeal the suspension and continue to push to let the people decide.

Until now, outsiders might have been tempted to compare Catalonia’s move with Scotland’s recent secession movement, in which voters rejected independence from Britain. But the two situations are strikingly different.

Scotland is small (8.4% of Britain’s population) and contributes just 9.5% of Britain’s gross domestic product. Catalonia is much bigger (16% of Spaniards live here), highly industrialized and disproportionately productive, contributing 19% of Spain’s GDP. Furthermore, only about 1% of Scots speak Gaelic, while about 85% of the people here speak Catalan. Also, the British political system fully embraces the Scots, as demonstrated by the fact that Britain has had a few Scottish prime ministers in recent history. The last Catalan prime minister of Spain served for five weeks in 1873.

But the main difference between the two situations is that the binding vote in Scotland had the blessing of the British government, but Madrid is vigorously fighting the proposed nonbinding referendum, calling it illegal. As a New Yorker who has lived in Catalonia for 20 years, I have seen the situation evolve. Although many Catalans have long nurtured dreams of independence, until recently only a few marginal cranks made a big deal of it. Even committed nationalists went about their prosperous lives more or less contentedly, regarding the rest of Spain as something between a nuisance and a joke.

But the landscape has changed dramatically since the financial crisis began several years ago. Rampant unemployment, government corruption and incompetence, and a huge fiscal deficit (the difference between what Catalans pay in taxes and what they get back in government funding) have radicalized many Catalans. Even the traditionally center-right party of Catalan leader Artur Mas, who is spearheading the independence movement, did not openly support independence until a few years ago.

Add to that a general sense that most Spaniards, far from appreciating the Catalans for contributing more than their fair share, actually despise and ridicule them. Catalans feel humiliated and are furious, and show up in enormous numbers at demonstrations for independence.

Both sides have their kooks. In the unionist camp, a few die-hard conservatives — who apparently haven’t heard that Franco no longer runs things — have called for sending in the tanks. I doubt that’s going to happen. The prime minister would not want to be remembered for starting the second Spanish Civil War in living memory.

On the separatist side, there’s a group of amateur (and entirely unaccredited) “researchers” who have published online articles “proving” that Cervantes, Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus, Albrecht Durer, Amerigo Vespucci, Marco Polo, Hernán Cortés, and a host of others were, contrary to what history books teach us, actually Catalans whose identities have been manipulated for centuries by wicked minions of the Spanish government.

Still, the vast majority of Catalans and Spaniards are reasonable people who want a peaceful solution. I have yet to hear anyone say that he would fight — let alone die — for either cause. And yet passions run high. Friendships break up over the issue and families are divided.

History has taught us that conflicts over nationalism can spin out of control. Successive Spanish governments have been unable to defuse the tension, having been in a bind for decades, if not centuries. Most Spaniards see concessions to Catalonia as a sign of capitulation, while most Catalans, not surprisingly, see the lack of concessions as a refusal to compromise. [...]

You can read the full article, here: http://lat.ms/10mboLh

First published in Los Angeles Times.

William Cole. University professor of humanities in Barcelona and an art and rare book dealer.


FURTHER READING

The View from Catalonia


Over the past few years, the number of Catalans who wish for independence from Spain has skyrocketed. Until the early 2000s, a steady 10–15 percent supported independence; now, according to recent opinion polls, that percentage is closer to 50 (with 30 percent opposing and the rest either abstaining or offering no opinion). Support for independence does not wane even when those surveyed are told that it could result in exclusion from the European Union. And even those who don’t necessarily prefer a separate Catalonia agree that the question should be put to a vote: Four out of five Catalans favor holding a referendum, as do trade unions, most business associations, and hundreds of civil society organizations.

Many cite the global financial crisis as the proximate cause of Catalan discontent. From that point of view, the drive for independence is simply another manifestation of the populist movements sweeping across Europe. To be sure, the economic grievances that come from being a part of Spain may have persuaded many to support independence. But this is not their main motive. Instead, the desire to break away is a symptom of deep-rooted flaws in the configuration of the Spanish state.

For starters, Spaniards and Catalans disagree on the basic terms of the debate. Spain views itself as a pre-ordained historical enterprise, of which Catalonia is a mere appendage -- one of several parts of an unquestionable whole. Catalans, on the other hand, have always defined themselves as a nation, one with a long and successful run as an independent polity until it was absorbed by a more powerful state with substantially different cultural mores and structures of governance.

When Catalonia came under the rule of Spanish monarchs at the turn of the sixteenth century, an uneasy balance was established between the Catalan tradition of self-governance and the crown’s desire to wield absolute power over its possessions. What began as a political confederation among equals gave way to a gradual takeover of Catalonia by Spain. In 1714, as a result of war and occupation, all Catalan institutions were finally suppressed and Catalonia became, for all practical purposes, just another dependency of a global empire run from Madrid. Rather than building a multinational community in which diverse peoples could share a political structure while freely developing and enforcing their own rules -- as was the case, for example, in nineteenth-century Austria-Hungary, or as is the case in Switzerland today -- Spain has always chosen to pin its survival on a policy of imposition and uniformity. This has meant playing down, and ultimately denying, the national identity of Catalans.

SUBORDINATE TO SPAIN

Having struggled to preserve their collective identity against a relentless effort to water it down -- and, at some critical points in history, wipe it out -- Catalans’ place in Spain has never been a comfortable one. Conflicting interests and worldviews have been permanent features of this relationship. Following each of the two transitions to democracy that took place in twentieth-century Spain, Catalans hoped that it would be possible to work out an arrangement that would respect their interests and cultural identity. The establishment of a republican regime in 1931 involved the creation of an autonomous Catalan region. But that was cut short by Franco’s military coup in 1936. With Franco’s death and Spain’s second transition to democracy in the late 1970s, Catalans and Spaniards struck a deal that gave the former a degree of self-governance with respect to culture, language, and education. On paper, it sounded reasonable. But in practice, old tensions quickly reappeared: Catalan services, relying on resources allocated by Madrid, remained systematically underfunded, and the central government kept infringing on the powers that had been nominally transferred to Barcelona.

In 2005, the Catalan regional parliament, with the support of 88 percent of its members, put forward a revised self-government charter to better spell out the terms of its relationship with Spain and to protect the region’s political powers against the central government’s repeated encroachments. What Catalans saw as a carefully balanced proposal was heavily amended by the Spanish legislature and then ungraciously struck down by Spain’s politicized constitutional court. Worse, the charter provoked a fierce campaign in the Spanish media against so-called Catalan “insolidarity.”

In light of Spain’s reaction to this quasi-federal proposal, many Catalans gave up hope of reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement with Spain and began to seek new political alternatives. Beginning in fall 2009, Catalans started organizing, at the grassroots level, local referenda on independence. These were largely symbolic but nonetheless involved more than 800,000 voters, and would be followed by massive pro-independence demonstrations in July 2010, September 2012, and September 2013. With opinion polls consistently revealing a shift toward self-determination, Catalan politicians agreed to schedule a referendum for November 9, 2014, to find out the exact measure of support for secession.

International opinion tends to support this referendum, just as it has supported the one that will be held in Scotland this September or those that took place in Quebec a few years ago. Indeed, finding out where everyone stands would appear to be a necessary step to make an informed decision on how to proceed. And

By Carles Boix and J.C. Major. Sep 11th 2014


FURTHER READING

The Ins and Outs of the Independence Movement

yet the Spanish government has not granted the Catalan authorities the power to conduct what would be a non-binding referendum -- something that would be perfectly legal according to articles 92 and 150.2 of the Spanish constitution. The Catalan government has nevertheless decided to press ahead and organize a vote anyway, since Catalonia’s self-government charter grants the regional authorities the right to organize “popular consultations.” The Spanish government has vowed to take that decision to the constitutional court. If the constitutional court were to block Catalonia’s vote, the Catalan government would have two choices: to go ahead with the consultation on November 9, or to call for parliamentary elections, which would become a de facto referendum on independence. [...]

You can read the full article, here: http://fam.ag/1us1ra3

First published in Foreign Affairs.

Mas fights to keep catalan alliance whole before deadline


It’s decision time for Artur Mas.

The Catalan President has to make up his mind by tomorrow whether to hold a vote on independence from Spain in defiance of the Constitutional Court or to duck a head-on collision in favor of a plan B, Francesc Homs, the regional government’s spokesman, said last week. Mas is due to speak at 10 a.m. today.

The separatist leader is trying to hold together a disparate alliance ranging from anarchists to executives, industrialists to greens as Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy blocks the one course of action they all agree on: Holding a ballot on Nov. 9. While Mas has alternative plans for delivering Catalans the vote he’s promised, he risks losing political momentum if he changes course, or even just attempts to fudge the issue.

“Mas is trying to keep everyone on board, without leaving anyone behind, and that’s difficult,” said Albert Pont, chairman of Cercle Catala de Negocis, a pro-independence business lobby.

Should Mas opt against a head-on clash, he can call a regional election instead and use that as a de-facto referendum, Carles Viver i Pi-Suner, a former Constitutional Court judge who is advising Mas’s government, said yesterday.

Mas and his allies resolved on Oct. 3 to push ahead with their preparations for the non-binding vote to keep up the pressure on Rajoy and satisfy the expectations of their supporters. Still, Mas has said he won’t break the law to hold the vote, while his strongest ally, Esquerra Republicana’s Oriol Junqueras, has called on Catalans to use civil disobedience if Rajoy refuses to budge.

Pro-Spain Demonstration

Catalonia, a region of 7.4 million people in the northeast corner of the Iberian peninsula, is Spain’s largest economic region, boasting a 193 billion-euro ($244 billion) economy, about the same size as Scotland’s, where voters last month opted to remain part of the U.K. Output per head in Catalonia is 17 percent above the European Union average, whereas in Spain as a whole, it’s 5 percent below.

While the pro-secession parties seek to reach agreement on their next move, the unionists led by Societat Civil Catalana held a demonstration in Plaza Catalunya in downtown Barcelona on Oct. 12 to mark Spanish National Day with about 38,000 people attending, according to Barcelona city hall.

Spread Widening

Increasing tensions between the governments in Barcelona and Madrid have been incorporated into the price of Catalan bonds. The yield on Catalan bonds maturing in February 2020 jumped 20 basis points to 2.68 percent since Oct. 3 when Mas said he plans to push ahead with his preparations for the vote. The spread over Spanish debt widened by 19 points to 166 points, the biggest gap since Jan. 2014.

While the Oct. 12 gathering was peaceful, a bus bringing demonstrators into the city was attacked, Oscar Uceda, head of the Lleida chapter of Societat Civil Catalana, said in an interview. Two people boarded the bus insulting the passengers and after they were ejected a group of about 12 people threw rocks breaking the vehicle’s windscreen, he said.

In the same city, 162 kilometers (101 miles) from Barcelona, the offices of Ciutadans, another anti-independence party, were vandalized for second time in a week, the group said on Twitter.

Whatever option he picks, Mas will be seeking to retain the backing of the three other party leaders in his alliance, and Junqueras in particular, to protect himself from the political fallout. Junqueras, who finished second in the 2012 regional election, has opened a lead over Mas in recent polls by taking a more aggressive pro-independence stance. [...]

You can read the full article, here: http://bloom.bg/1t6WFdn

First published in Bloomberg.

Esteban Duarte


FURTHER READING

Catalonia shifts on secession


With a referendum on independence blocked by objections from Madrid, Catalonia’s leader sald Tuesday that the Spani&h ragion would go ahead next monlh with a nonbindig vote on secession.

In his latest act of defìance toward Madrid, Artur Mas, the Catalan leader, called off his push for a secession vote next month but announced that the regional Catalan government would instead urge its citizens to take part in a looser, nonbinding consultation on the same date. He added that his government had the right to organize such an expression of popular will and that doing so would not violate Spanish law.

“We bave sufficient strength to do what we said we would do, whfcn is to consult the people of Catatonia,” Mr. Mas said at a teievised news conference. “There will be ballot boxes and papere” on Nov, 9, he added.

His alternative pian is less likely to push Spain into a constìtutional crisis, even if it creates, at least for now, further uncertainty and continues to be opposed by the government of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. An informai ballot would also struggle to receive the International legitimacy that Mr. Mas had hoped to achieve with a vote.

In coming weeks, Mr. Mas also faces a challenge in keeping other pro-independence parties aligned with his governing Convergence party. “We contìnue to go forward, but at the moment not as united as 10 days ago”, he said.

Mr.Mas, a late but staunch convert to secessionism, has been trying to lead Catatonia toward independence without being held responsible for provoking an unprecedented crisis for Spain. Catalonia, Spain’s economic powerhouse, has been pushing for a vote on secession that the central government has vowed to block. Mr. Rajoy is also counting on the support of Spain’s Constitutional Court.

Mr. Mas and Mr. Rajoy bave been at loggerheads for two years, initially over fiscal issues. But tensions came to the fore late last month when Mr. Mas signed a decree approving the Nov. 9 vote. Mr. Mas contends that his position had been made untenable by Mr. Rajoy’s refusal to talk, even after Scotland rejected independence from Britain in a referendum in September.

Mr. Rajoy’s government has stead-fastly refused to allow Catalans to vote on independence and, if anything, has been emboldened by the failure of the Scottish push for secession.Earlier Tuesday, Mr. Rajoy described the cancellation of the Catalan vote as “excellent news,” He said at an economic conference in Madrid that “Spain is a democracy and an advanced country, and to comply wtth the law is an ob-ligation for everybody.”

But Mr. Mas later sought to dampen Mr. Rajoy’s celebration.

“There are people who say they have excellent news, but excellent news sometimes lasts only a few hours” Mr. Mas said. He added that his government had “competencies in terms of consultation” of its citizens, without specifying how his latest plan could be deemed legal by Spanish courts.

Mr. Mas must now hope a nonbinding ballot can generate sufficient popular enthusiasm amid discord among the main secessionist parties and without guarantees of its legatity from the gov-ernment of Spain.

But the possibiltty that Mr. Mas will switch to a longer-term strategy to achieve an independent Catalonia, by calling for new elections for the regional Parliament» raises the prospect that Mr. Rajoy will end up facing a Catalan Parliament controlled by more hard-line secessionist politicians than Mr. Mas.

Mr. Mas changed tack on Tuesday after a long, tense meeting with other secessionist politicians on Monday, in which he failed to gain their support for his consultation plan. After that meeting, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, a left-wing secessionist party that has the second-largest representation in Catalonia’s Parliament, issued a statement suggesting tnat it wanted new elections to move swiftly toward a unilateral declaration of independence.

“I don’t consider what happened yesterday as the burial of the consensus in Catalonia,” Mr. Mas said. “The real adversary isn’t within Catalonia, but it is the Spanish state, which is doing everything possìbie to deny us the right to vote.” [...]

You can read the full article, here: http://bit.ly/1x1D1EG

First published in International New York Times.

Raphael Minder


FURTHER READING

First the Scots, Now the Catalans


The Scots and the Catalans are both ancient European cultures that became part of larger political entities centuries ago but retained distinct identities. Both are today witnessing a strong wave of nationalism and longing for self-rule. There is a major difference, however, in how this is being played out in their respective countries.

The Scottish referendum last month, like the Quebec referendums before it, demonstrated that if people are allowed an open debate and a democratic vote on self-determination, they may well choose to stay in the broader polity. Spain’s hard line on Catalan nationalism demonstrates the opposite: If national ambitions are frustrated, they will only get stronger, more passionate and potentially more dangerous.

The Scottish referendum was watched closely in Spain, but from different perspectives. The Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, made no secret of his opposition to Scottish independence and suggested he would block an independent Scotland from entering the European Union. Catalan nationalists focused on the process itself as evidence that voting on self-determination is a legitimate right.

On Sept. 11, a week before the Scottish referendum and on the 300th anniversary of the fall of Barcelona in the War of the Spanish Succession, hundreds of thousands of Catalans formed a seven-mile-long “V” for “vote” in Barcelona, the regional capital. And soon after the Scottish vote, on Sept. 18, the Catalan Parliament voted overwhelmingly to formally ask Madrid for a self-determination vote be held Nov. 9. It would ask two questions: “Do you want Catalonia to be a state?” and “if so,” “Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state?” [...]

You can read the full article, here: http://nyti.ms/1Gfypjw

First published in The New York Times.

The New York Times


OPINION

Catalan president calls off poll but vows to hold consultation


Artur Mas, the Catalan president, has called off his government’s controversial plan to hold an independence referendum on November 9, but vowed to push ahead with an alternative, less formal popular consultation on the same date.

“The referendum cannot take place in accordance with the decree that Isigned”, Mr. Mas told a press conference in Barcelona yesterday, signalling the first significant climbdown bu a leading actor in the long-simmering political conflict between the prosperous northern region and the government of Spain.

His move follows days of fierce debate among political leaders in Catalonia, which has been rocked by rising calls for a historic break with the rest of the country.

Mr. Mas and his allies were hoping to emulate Scotland by offering regional voters a referendum on independence. But his plan has faced firm opposition from the central government in Madrid and was suspended by Spain’s constitutional court late last month. [...]

You can read the full article in the Financial Times.

First published in Financial Times.

Tobias Buck.


OPINION

First Scotland, Now Spain


Like the Scots, the Catalans want a referendum on independence. Unlike the British, the Spaniards aren’t inclined to let them have it. This is a mistake, and Spain’s leaders need to show some unwonted statesmanship by making a vote possible -- even as they campaign for union.

Catalonia’s local government has scheduled a referendum for Nov. 9, but on Tuesday Spain’s Constitutional Court suspended it. This is the same court that issued a ruling four years ago -- in a case also brought by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s Popular Party -- that gutted a 2006 Spanish law granting Catalonia more autonomy.

Catalonians have been bitter ever since, and the Popular Party has made the situation worse by stonewalling Catalan demands and engaging in other provocations. (An education minister once issued a call to “Hispanicize” Catalan children.) Support for independence in Catalonia has grown to more than 50 percent, according to several recent polls, from as little as 15 percent in 2007 -- and it’s unlikely to fall with yesterday’s ruling. The drive for independence has not been stopped.

To avoid a potential spiral of civil disobedience or even violence, Rajoy should go to Catalonia and acknowledge, in person, the mistakes his party has made. For the next steps, he need only look across the sea to the north. He should offer a fresh start to negotiations on greater autonomy for Catalonia and more control of its tax revenues. As U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron might tell him, Rajoy will probably have to make these concessions anyway to keep his country together.

Rajoy should also be open to constitutional reform that would decentralize powers and include a procedure to allow Spain’s regions to vote on secession. This wouldn’t necessarily have to be on the extraordinarily generous terms that Cameron agreed to for Scotland, but it would have to create a potential route for Catalans to conduct at least a nonbinding referendum on their status. Even engaging in such negotiations may lead Catalonians to abandon their referendum for now, if they believe a legal route to vote on independence will eventually become available.

In the meantime, Rajoy and other officials in the central government should begin a campaign to show Catalans (as well as Basques and Galicians) why they are better off in Spain. One of the benefits of Scotland’s two-year referendum campaign was that both sides had the chance to push and test their arguments. [...]

You can read the full article, published in Bloomberg View, here: http://bv.ms/1vwHTBU

PHOTOGRAPHER: RAFA RIVAS/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

First published in Bloomberg View.

Bloomberg View. Oct 1st 2014


OPINION

Catalonia, navigating through friendly international waters


Catalonia is navigating its way through ‘friendly, yet concerned international waters’. The Catalan sovereignty process is simultaneously viewed with great concern and sympathy by most Western states. The English-speaking media, both American and British, have excelled themselves thanks to their appreciation of the Catalan independence movement: seeing it as a peaceful mass-movement, driven by a profound democratic yearning, in what they identify as a popular democratic struggle. Meanwhile, the more skeptical, con- tinental European media have been a big help to the Catalan process when they have covered, in a balanced and objective manner, Spain’s fiscal and economic imbalances which currently make the state untenable. This lack of financial sustainability in Spain’s current structure is indeed of great concern to the governments of Western nations.

So far, not a single Western leader has expressed support for maintaining the Spanish status quo. In reference to Catalonia, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius declared, ‘It’s a problem that needs sorting out’. Numerous other European dignitaries have appealed for dialogue and a settlement between Catalonia and Spain. Yet none of them has argued in favour of maintaining the current structure of the Spanish state. Neither have they stated that the Catalan people do not have a right to express themselves democratically in a referendum. In other words, not one Western leader has fully subscribed to the Spanish government’s position. In summary, while the Spanish establishment defend the status quo (to continue ‘milking the Catalan cow’), Western governments long for reform to overcome the current financial and internal imbalances. They also long for changes to certain Spanish policies which they hold as being responsible for the infeasibility of Spain servicing its public debt in the long-term and for the falling-out between Catalonia and Spain. This is without going too deeply into the issue of the Catalan people’s democratic right to participate in a referendum, which, as has been mentioned, no one outside Spain’s borders questions for a minute.

The international community’s reaction to the Catalan process is a feeling of great concern with respect to Spain, rather than questioning the economic viability of an independent Catalonia. It also feels great sympathy towards a democratic Catalan nation. How- ever, there is a third key element that makes the situation all the more critical: the Catalan government and media have expressed a desire for the nation to retain its membership of two major international organizations: the European Union and NATO. Not a single party in the Catalan parliament has explicitly asked to leave the European Union, though many would prefer it to ease its austerity policies. Within the pro-independence majority in the Parliament of Catalonia (the four parties and coalitions that agreed on the date and the question to be put to the vote), only one (the CUP, on the extreme left) believes that Catalonia could do without the European Union. Mem- bership of NATO goes without saying, or rather it would do if it weren’t for a spokesperson from the organization’s headquarters in Brussels who let slip that Catalonia would cease to form a part of NATO if it declared itself independent against the will of its parent state (Spain). It would therefore need to reapply for admission. Since NATO’s popularity has never been very high in Catalonia, it is a great example of how scaremongering could end up making imaginary problems real.Fortunately, an independent Catalonia’s membership of NATO is not in dispute. Catalonia’s membership of the European Union (EU) is at the centre of the tug-of-war debate surrounding sovereignty, however. The alarmists have managed to make an impression. Those that fall into this camp include the Government of Madrid, the major Spanish political parties and certain members of the European Commission (Xosé Ma- nuel Durao Barroso, Viviane Reding, Joaquín Almunia and Michel Barnier). They take it for granted that if Catalonia were to declare independence it would find itself outside the EU, in spite of the fact that European treaties make no mention of the possibility of ‘internal expansion’. Nevertheless, Joaquín Almunia has previously been quoted as saying that, ‘it would be dishonest to state categorically that Catalonia would be excluded from the European Union’. Moreover, another part of the European Commission is immune to pressure from the Spanish government and is either remaining silent or is actively making friendly statements about Catalonia. One example is the Austrian Commissioner Johannes Hahn, who declared that the situation arising from a declaration of independence ought to be studied ‘calmly’.

Such alarmist talk (with no historical precedent, and no support from European treaties thanks to the fact that they can be interpreted in multiple ways) has had an effect on Catalan public opinion. This is precisely because Catalan public opinion holds membership of the European Union in high regard. Such great appre-ciation is not the result of any form of ‘economic self-interest’, as Catalonia has always been a net contributor to the EU’s coffers, since joining the organization in 1986. The Catalan people’s high regard for the European Union (and the Roman and Carolingian Europe in particular) is similar to the respect one has for the land upon which one walks: without it one would be nothing. Furthermore, up until now the European structure has been Catalonia’s only guarantee of a robust and reliable democratic frame-work. It provides a bulwark against Spain’s fragile democracy, with a coup on February 23rd 1981 and a Constitutional Court of dubious legitima-cy, which overturned the 2010 Statute of Catalonia, which had previously been voted on and approved by the Catalan people in a referendum. A majority of Catalans still hope that mediation by the European Union will finally make it possible for them to exercise their democratic right to decide their own future; a right presently denied them by the Spanish government and parliament. For the Catalan people, the European Union has tra-ditionally guaranteed their cultural, economic and political survival.

Martí Anglada. Catalan Internationa View.


IN DEPTH

Catalonia’s loyalty to the international organizations to which it belongs undoubtedly helps project a general feeling of calm in the midst of the sovereignty process, particularly in the western area that surrounds it. This makes the scaremongering all the more pernicious, short-sighted and above all irresponsible for wishing to undermine the foundations of these western alli- ances with Catalonia. The French and German governments (the two EU heavyweights) have done well to main- tain a relative, expectant silence on the Catalan sovereignty process. Future relations should not be harmed, whatever the outcome. France cannot ignore the fact that Catalonia is increasingly on its side, with the high speed rail link to Toulouse, Marseille, Lyon and Paris and ever-closer ties in the supply of such essentials as water and electricity. The French always have in mind the map of France favoured by Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin (prime ministers at the time of Louis XIII and Louis XIV) and briefly attained by Napoleon, with Catalonia annexed within French territory. Obviously, we are not looking at annexation, but it appears as if France views Catalonia the same way it sees Belgium, as a close, perpetually- friendly nation and a loyal neighbour at all times.

Germany, for its part, sees Catalonia from two viewpoints: business and culture. The former focuses on the fact that 55 percent of German companies established on the Iberian Peninsula (both Spain and Portugal) are based in Catalonia, between Barcelona and Tarragona. The cultural viewpoint has numerous components: the success of German translations of contemporary Catalan writers, such as Jaume Cabré, Albert Sánchez Piñol and Quim Monzó, Catalonia’s invitation to participate in the Frankfurt Book Fair and the performance of the Bayreuth Festival at the Liceu de Barcelona on the 200th anniversary of the birth of Richard Wagner (the only such performance to take place outside Germany).

When the Catalan independence movement is seen from without, it reveals unexpected perspectives. It is highly attractive from the standpoint of complex national and regional circumstances in Europe such as Scotland, which wishes to retain Queen Elizabeth as its head of state and sterling as its currency; Flanders which wants a minimal confederation with Wallonia within a Belgian framework; and even South Tyrol, a German- speaking region which is historically Austrian, which has belonged to Italy since 1918 with the name Alto Adige. The case of Catalonia has a great deal to contribute to the resolving of such complex problems: on numerous occa- sions, Catalonia’s president, Artur Mas, has proposed that a Catalan state could conduct its foreign policy directly with Brussels and its defence policy with one of its two immediate neighbours: France and Spain. The Catalan case could thereby help to encourage the search for new political and administrative alternatives which hither-to have not been seen in the European Union. They would operate in a more flexible, diverse framework than at present, with more subtle gradients between states: similar to German reunification at the time of Bismarck, when territo- ries of the central government of the Second Empire had various intensities of dependency.

Certain sectors of the German academic world, especially those composed of economists, also view the Catalan sovereignty process as an opportunity for greater economic dynamism in a southern Europe which has been so affected by the current crisis. Accordingly, stagnation within the economic structures of the large southern Eu-ropean countries may receive a boost of competitiveness and innovation with the emergence of smaller, more agile industrial countries such as Catalonia. Catalonia is navigating, then, through uncharted, yet ultimately friendly, waters.

Martí Anglada: Former foreign news editor at TV3 (Catalonia Television). He has been foreign correspondent in the Middle East, Italy and Great Britain (1977-1984) for the Barcelona newspaper La Vanguardia and United States (1987- 1990), Brussels and Berlin (2009-2011) correspondent for TV3. He has also been an international political com- mentator. His books include Afers no tan estrangers [Not So Foreign Affairs] (Editorial Mina, 2008), Quatre vies per a la independència: Estònia, Letònia, Eslovàquia, Eslovènia [Four Ways To Independence: Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia] (Editorial Pòrtic, 2013) and La via alemanya [The German Way] (Brau Edicions, 2014).

First published in Catalan International View.

The main future challenges for the language


The long term vitality of Catalan and its normalization in some sectors and areas is not completely guaranteed, in spite of its relative recuperation which has its maximum expression in Catalonia. There is a large disparity between accredited opinions about this question, even if we leave to one side the various legal and social contexts of the language. The advance or lack of progression of its official recognition, the existence or lack of strong policies which encourage its use everywhere and the attitude of its speakers will determine the vigour and the normal unfolding of the language in front of Spanish, French and Italian.

The official recognition of the Catalan language in the four European states where it is spoken, its political promotion and social use vary depending on the region. The range of its status spans from its exclusive official nature in the independent principality of Andorra, to its various degrees of recognition in the Aragon Strait, the Murcian ‘Carxe’, the Sardinian Alguer and French Northern Catalonia, passing through its co-official nature with Spanish in Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and the Valencian region.

Even these three autonomous communities have generated their own linguistic policies, which is strongest in Catalonia, timid in the Islands and limited in the Valencia region where, in spite of scientific backing, in some mediums, the negation of the unity of the language, which is known as ‘Valencian’ still exists. The new Catalan Statute, which went to referendum in 2006, and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal establish the citizen’s duty to know the language. Internationally, Catalan is not official in the European Union (EU), in spite of its demographical and cultural weight; it can only be used in the ministers’ councils where there are representatives of the Catalan speaking Spanish regions and at the Committee of Regions, although the citizens can use it in their communications with the communitarian institutions.

Of the 13 million inhabitants in its domain, more than 9 million know it quite well and a little more than half speak it on a regular basis. The regular speakers of Catalan and Spanish form collectives of similar dimensions in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands; in contrast, in the Valencian counties where Catalan is spoken, it has retreated and only a third of the population used it: it is often restricted to a private use, it is not very present in the large cities and it has almost completely disappeared from Alicante. It is the everyday language of seven out of ten inhabitants of the Aragon Strait and of four out of ten of Andorra, but of only 14% of those from Alguer and 6% of those from Northern Catalonia. Furthermore, it is the 88th language of the world in spite of the Spanish and French attempts to eliminate it since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in spite of the divergent postures of the implicated governments.

The Catalan, Valencian and Balearic linguistic policies, which are not coordinated, have increased the official presence of the autochthonous language with more or less success, both in schools and the administration, especially regional or local ones; the Principality has been the region where this bid has been the firmest. In the private sector, especially in the Balearics and the Valencian region, Catalan continues to be very weak in the economical, labour, scientific, technological and commercial fields. In spite of observable advances, it is a minority in television and the national press, in the cinema, music and literature – in this case, in spite of the strong editorial industry and a quite considerable creative level. It has a similar presence on the radio and at the theatre in the Principality and good health on the internet, where it has its own domain (.cat) and it is the 23rd language. In spite of this, we cannot speak of a communicative space in Catalan that surpasses the regional and state frontiers.

Other non-political circumstances also affect the future of Catalan. Its outstanding usage remains on the street and, especially, in the urban regions and amongst the young, in contrast to the official world, where its use is falling in favour of Spanish, which is the opposite to that which occurred during Franco’s regime. Not even in Catalonia, where the normalising effort has been the most visible, has the process concluded or had absolute effect. The overwhelming presence of Spanish, French and Italian, which are stronger, and have more recognition, due to various motives (political, economical, historical, demographical, etc.), halts the advance of the social use of Catalan and even affects its lexical and grammatical genuineness.

The future of Catalan depends, amongst other factors, upon the increase and co-ordination of governments’, businesses’ and entities’ offer, but also, and especially on the Catalan speaking or non-Catalan speaking institutions and people who want to, and can perceive the language in another way. To live with lasting guarantees, it will be necessary that the whole of society give it a consideration that makes it attractive by associating it with modernity and social progress, and, in parallel, a status that makes it necessary. In the collective marriage which was born from the first decades of autonomy, and without vigorous public, private and civic action that reinforces it, the practise and success of individual linguistic militancy will continue to be limited.

First published in Culturcat.

ISSN: 2014-9093 | Legal deposit: B. 2198-2013

Culturcat - Generalitat de Catalunya


OUR CULTURE OUR HISTORY

the right to decide (it in transit #31)

Recruiting & HR

catalan processthe right

catalan people

catalan government

catalan desire

catalan women

catalan laws

political forces

political agenda