the riddle of existence

7/30/2019 The Riddle of Existence

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The Riddle of Existence

Author(s): J. L. Mackie and W. BednarowskiSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 50 (1976), pp.247-265+267-289Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106829 .

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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCEJ. L. Mackie and W. Bednarowski

I--J. L. MackieKant, in criticising what he calls the Ontological Proof ofthe Existence of God, makes at least three points. The firstis that 'If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicatewhile retaining the subject, contradiction results . . . Butif we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contra-diction . . .' A second is that '"Being" is obviously not a realpredicate'. A third is that 'Whatever, therefore, and howevermuch, our concept of an object may contain, we must gooutside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object'. Thesecond of these comes into Kant's argument to rebut anobjection to the first, that the concept of the ens realissimumis an exception to that first principle, that with this conceptalone the rejection of its object is in itself contradictory.Kantis arguing in effect that this concept is somehow improper.His third point then re-states the first in a way that refersmore plainly to this dismissalof the objection.The thesis that 'existence is not a predicate' has escapedfrom this context, and has often been affirmed,and less oftencriticised, simply as a logical thesis. I shall begin by soexamining it, but having done this I shall turn back toconsider what bearing my conclusions have upon the possi-bility of an ontological proof.Three reasons have been given for saying that existence isnot a predicate, or more cautiously, that (as Kant puts it)it is only a logical predicate, not a real predicate, or (asothers have put it) that it is only a grammatical predicate,not a logical predicate. The first reason, which was stressedby Hume as well as by Kant, is that existence is, as we mightsay, colourless. The addition of existence makesno differenceto a concept: a hundred real thalers are just like a hundredpossible or imagined thalers. Hume even says that 'The ideaof existence . . . is the very same with the idea of what weconceive to be existent.' This is certainly too strong, since

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248 I-J. L. MACKIEwe can take something which does exist and conceive orconsider the possibility that it should not exist and shouldnever have existed. Still, something true is hinted at by thesuggestion that existence is colourless: the difference thatexisting makes is not at all like the difference made by theaddition of or a change in an ordinary property. But thiswould certainly be no reason for denying that 'exists' is apredicate, and not a very clear reason for denying that it isa 'real' predicate.Secondly, it has been argued that 'exists' is not a realpredicate-which now seems to mean one that can be straight-forwardly predicated of individuals--on the ground that wecan refer only to existents. Consequently if 'A' is any expres-sion that is here used genuinely to refer, 'A exists' will bea kind of tautology: it will assert only what is already pre-supposed in the successful use of the expression 'A'. Similarly'A does not exist' will be a kind of contradiction, denyingsomething that is presupposed in its own use. Generally,all straightforward affirmative uses of 'exists' as a predicatewill be referential tautologies, and all negative ones will bereferential contradictions. David Pears, indeed, at one timeoffered, not as an argument for the thesis that existence isnot a predicate but as a 'fairly close minimal formulation'of it, the fact that such referential tautologies and contradic-tions are produced when the subject-phrase of a singularstatement referentially implies existence. Whereas for Kantthe thesis that existence is not a predicate was linked withthe claim that saying that such-and-such exists is nevertautological, for Pears it becomes the claim that it is alwaystautological when the subject-phrase has this referentialcharacter.It might be argued that we can refer to non-existents. Wecan, at least on the surface, refer to King Arthur as well asto King Alfred, to Pegasus as well as to Eclipse, to Mithrasas well as to Buddha. Consequently, of some item introducedby what looks like a singular referring expression we can saynon-tautologously that it exists or non-contradictorily that itdoes not. Pears admits this, and so offersnot the strong claimthat wherever 'A' is a genuinely referring expression, 'Aexists' is a tautology, but one weakened by several qualifica-



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 249tions, that this results if 'A' referentially implies existenceand unless the assertion and the implication are aboutdifferent worlds (e.g., real and fictional), or different times, ordifferent levels (e.g., physical objects and phenomena).It may be argued, however, that we cannot really refer tonon-existents and that what superficially appears to be suchreference is better analysed in another way. I shall come backto this question. What I want to argue now is that evenif we could refer only to existents this would not show that'exists' is not a real predicate which can be properly andtruly predicated of singular subjects. It is true that simplestatements of the form 'A exists' would then be uninterestingand conversationally pointless; but it is by now a wellrecognised error to infer from the fact that something isconversationally pointless that it is meaningless or ill-formed.Consider the perfectly sensible and probably true statement,'President Ford does not know that David Pears exists'. Thefact that in order to make this statement I have to refer toDavid Pears as well as to President Ford does not make thestatement as a whole tautologous or contradictory or evenconversationally pointless. What President Ford lacks is agenuine item of information. But in the noun-clause of thisstatement 'exists' is predicated of David Pears, and in a quitestraightforwardway. This noun-clause, moreover, must meanexactly what 'David Pears exists' would mean as a simplesentence; one of the many things that President Ford doesnot know is just what I can assert by saying 'David Pearsexists'. Since the complex sentence is well-formed andstraightforwardlymeaningful, so must be the simple sentence'David Pears exists'. Referential tautology, then, wouldappear to be only a superficial defect, and not in itself toyield any interpretation of the thesis that 'exists' is not areal predicate which would give that thesis any importance.However, this peculiarity can be pursued further. We haveseen that 'David Pears exists' is well-formed and meaningful.But, it might be argued, this sentence would be tautologicalif its logical form were what it appears to be, with 'exists'predicated of a singular subject. So its true logical form mustbe something different. This brings us to a third reason fordenying that existence is a predicate, which requires much



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250 I-J. L. MACKIEfuller examination. This is that 'exist(s)' is not a predicatebecause it is a quantifier. This is the view which is mostnaturally expressed by saying that 'exists' is only a gram-matical but not a logical predicate: its logical function, oncebrought properly to light, turns out to be that of what weknow as the existential quantifier. Anything that is conveyedby the grammatical use of 'exist(s)' as a predicate can bestated more lucidly, it is alleged, by an existentially quanti-fied formula. 'Atoms exist' is to be analysed as '(3 x) (x is anatom)'; 'Yetis do not exist' as '"( 3 x) (x is a yeti)'. On thisview, to say that 'exists' is not a logical predicate is to saythat there is a logical language, adequate for the formulationof everything we want to say, and clear in respects in whichordinary language is obscure, in which 'exists' is not apredicate, but in which the work done by the grammaticalpredicate 'exist(s)' in ordinary language is done rather bythe existential quantifier.It certainly appears that some assertions and denials ofexistence can be well expressed by the use of this quantifier.It is less obvious that all can be. Is the proposed logicallanguage adequate for the formulation of everything that wewant to say, or only for that of everything that (from somepoint of view) we ought to want to say? There is an obviousdanger of circularity if we appeal to the dictum that existenceis not a predicate in order to rule out as improper thingsof the sort that have been said in ontological proofs, andexplain and defend that dictum on the ground that every-thing we can properly want to say about existence can behandled by the existential quantifier. But we had betterleave these controversial examples aside, and first inquirewhether the existential quantifier copes adequately with allour ordinary uses of 'exist(s)'.Prima facie it does not. It works well for 'Atoms exist'and 'Yetis do not exist', where what is said to exist or notto exist is introduced by a general term; but 'David Pearsexists' or 'I exist' does not obviously or immediately trans-late into an existential quantification. At this stage it mayseem plausible to suggest that the verb 'exist' has two sensesor at least two different constructions. Predicated of a generalterm it serves as an ordinary language equivalent of the



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 251existential quantifier; but it can also be predicated ofsingular terms,and in this use it doessome differentjob.

Someone might resist this suggestion that 'exist(s)'has twosenses by pointing out that the most obvious counterpart ofthe existential quantifier is not any use of 'exist(s)'but simply'There is' or 'There are'. But nothing much can be madeof this. 'Tame tigers exist' is an admissible equivalent of'There are tame tigers'. What is important is that howeverthis quantification is expressed, and perhaps modally varied,it calls for a general term to complete it. We say not 'Theremay be Old Nick' but 'There may be such a person as OldNick', not 'There may be the devil' but 'There may be adevil', where 'such a person as Old Nick' and 'a devil' aregeneral terms, whereas 'Old Nick' and 'the devil' would besingular referring terms.This feature of the 'there is' construction agrees well withFrege's view that statements of existence, like statements ofnumber, are assertions about concepts: existence is, afterall, a predicate but a second-order predicate. 'There areatoms' is equivalent to 'The concept atom is instantiated'.Yet there are apparent exceptions to the rule that 'there is'calls for a general term. 'Are there any good pubs in London?-There is the Mermaid.' 'There are women PrimeMinisters; there is Mrs. Gandhi.' It may be replied thatthese are only apparent exceptions, since there is alwayssome general term, some concept, in the neighbourhood:'There is the Mermaid' may be construed as elliptical for'There is at least one good pub in London, namely, theMermaid'. Such a construal is less satisfactoryfor our secondexample, since it yields redundancy: 'There are womenPrime Ministers; there is at least one woman Prime Minister,namely Mrs. Gandhi'. But what is true is that 'There is A',where 'A' is a singular referring term, is used only to specifyan individual which instantiates a concept in a context wherethe main topic is whether this concept is instantiated.But whatever we make of statements of the form 'There isA', we must take account of such forms as 'David Pearsexists', 'I exist', and 'This exists'-the last accompanied bysome gesture such as pointing. Should we accept these notonly as exemplifying a different grammatical construction



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252 I-J. L. MACKIEbut also as employing a sense of 'exist' distinct from thequantifier or second-order predicate one, or should weassimilate them to the latter? If we could so assimilate themwe should finish up with a lucid logical language in whicheverything we might want to say about existence, except forthe controversial materials of ontological proofs themselves,was adequately presented in terms of a quantifier only,existence as a predicate of individuals having been explainedaway. We might then reasonably dismiss all ontologicalproofs which make essential use of such a predicate as'merely a play on grammaticalform'.Where the subject 'A' in 'A exists' is a proper name, thosewho interpret proper names as condensed definite descrip-tions may seem to have available an easy method of assimila-tion. Thus Kneale suggeststhat 'Mr. Russell exists' may mean'There is one and only one man who wrote An Introductionto Mathematical Philosophy, etc., and is called Mr. Russell'.I think that there are good reasons (given, for example, byKripke) for being dissatisfied with this account of propernames, but that is too long a story to embark on now. I amalso inclined to appeal directly to my linguistic intuitions,and say that no similar expansion seems to me to expresswhat I mean by 'David Pears exists'. However, appeals tointuition are somewhat arbitrary. Rather more of an argu-ment can be supplied. Even if we leave proper names asideand stick to descriptions, there seems to be a differencebetween 'The sheltered bay we found yesterday exists' and'A unique sheltered bay that we found yesterday exists'. Itis only the latter that goes neatly into the Fregean existen-tially quantified form. But the former makes good sense.It can be defended, as above, against the complaint aboutreferential tautology by considering how it may be embeddedin another sentence: 'Hardly anyone else knows that thesheltered bay we found yesterday exists'. And unlike 'Aunique sheltered bay . . .' it seems obstinately to predicateexistence of an individual item to which reference is made,not simply to say that a certain concept is instantiated. Thedifference can be brought out by contrastsbetween the orderand scope of various operators. 'Hardly anyone else knowsthat a unique sheltered bay . . . exists' will be 'For most



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 253p, p does not know that (3 x) (Bx &c y) (By - y = x))',whereas 'Hardly anyone else knows that the sheltered bay ...exists' will be '(3 x) (Bx &cy) (By -- y = x) &cor most p, pdoes not know that x exists)'. But when we have thus allowedfor the difference in scope, we still need, in the latter formula,'exists' as a predicate applied to the individual variable 'x'.Similarly, no report of the instantiation of a conceptcaptures the force of 'I exist'. Again, 'This exists' seems tome to mean something simpler than Kneale's 'There is some-thing to which my token "this" has the deictic relation'.'This might not have existed' is not equivalent to 'Theremight not have been anything to which my token "this" hadthe deictic relation', since the latter possibility could havebeen realised even with this (whatever it is) in existence butelsewhere, and again the possibility of this's not havingexisted is compatible with my token's having the deicticrelation to something else. 'This might not have existed'would have to mean rather 'There is something such thatmy token "this" has the deictic relation to it and it was pos-sible that it should not exist', which again requires 'exist'as a predicate over and above the initial existential quanti-fication.It will be objected, however, that the quantifier theorycan supply this extra predicate: we can mechanically con-struct a concept the existential quantification of which willreplace the predication of existence of an individual. Thus'A exists' will become '( 3 x) (x = A)', 'I exist' will become'There is something which is identical with me', and 'This(exists but) might not have existed' will become 'There is anx such that x is identical with this and such that it waspossible that there would not be a y such that y = x', orperhaps 'There is an x such that my token "this" has thedeictic relation to x and such that it was possible that therewould not be a y such thaty = x'.

But this device is highly artificial. If I say that DavidPears exists, I seem to be saying something about this con-crete individual himself, not about the instantiation of theconcept is identical with David Pears. It seems that someonecould know or believe that David Pears exists without havingany knowledge or beliefs about identity.



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254 I-J. L. MACKIENor can this device cope happily with tensed existencestatements. We can say that something exists now, or has

existed, or will exist; but how are we to introduce tense into'(3 x) (x = . . . )'? It will not go into the identity relation:it is not possible for something to be identical with A at onetime but not at another, and when something ceases to existit is not because something ceases to be identical with it.So the tense distinctions must go into the quantifier '(3 x)':we must allow it to vary between 'There is now . .' and'There was . . .' and 'There will be .. .'. And already wehave abandoned the initially attractive programme of deal-ing with existence simply by means of the ordinary existen-tial quantifier, the counterpart of the universal quantifierwithin the predicate calculus.The view that existence reduces completely to quantifi-cation leads naturally to Quine's thesis that the ontologicalcommitments of a theory are shown exclusively by the rangeof its variables when it is expressed in quantificational form,and hence that no question of ontological commitment wouldarise for someone who dealt only with a finite universe ofnamed objects. But this is surely a reductio ad absurdum ofthis view. In positing each named individual as a genuineconstituent of the universe in its own right, not to be reducedor explained away, the holder of such a theory would beclaiming that it exists.There is another argument, put forward by Strawson,which I have been tempted to use in support of the viewthat existence can be a predicate of individuals, not merelya quantifier. Strawson begins by explaining what is essen-tially the Fregean theory in a slightly different way. Whenone says 'All/Most/ Many/Some/A few/No/At least onetame tiger(s) growl(s)' one is 'indicating (roughly) how biga slice of the membership of a presupposed class one is pre-pared to affirm to possess a certain characteristic', whereaswhen one says 'Many/Some/A few/No/At least one tametiger(s) exist(s)' one is 'indicating (roughly) how big one isprepared to affirm the membership of a non-presupposedclass to be'. On this understanding it is clear why one shouldnot be able to say 'All/Most tame tigers exist'; for 'all' and'most' require a presupposed class on which to operate.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 255'Exist(s)' in connexion with any of the quantifying adjectives'many', 'some', 'a few', 'no', 'at least one' does the job ofindicating the size of a non-presupposed class. This includessomething equivalent to the Fregean job of saying that aconcept is, or is not, instantiated, but it adds that we mayalso indicate the extent of such an instantiation. But Strawsonthen points out a class of exceptions to this theory. We cansay that most of the characters listed in the ClassicalDictionary existed (though some are mythical). That is,'Most . . . exist(ed)' can do a job closely analogous to thatdone by 'Most . . . growl'; it can assign a predicate, 'exist',to a roughly indicated proportion of a presupposedclass. Themain difference is that this will be a heterogeneous classembracing, say, real, fictional, mythical, and legendarypersons, such as may be listed in a dictionaryor mentioned ina novel or in a conversation.This argument turns upon and develops the point notedabove that we seem to be able to refer to non-existents-KingArthur, Pegasus, Mithras, and the like. If we can refer tosuch, we can group them along with existing individuals inheterogeneous classesand saysignificantly that some membersof such a class exist and some do not.

However, I would reject this argument. The sense inwhich we can refer to non-existents is very different fromthat in which we can refer to existents. An ordinarysentenceof the form 'Fa' has as its truth-condition that the individualdenoted by 'a' should have the characteristic connoted by'F', and to refer to a will typically be to say things that wouldbe made true by a's satisfying what is said of it. But none ofthis applies to a sentence that is apparently of the form 'Fa'where a is a non-existent: we cannot in this sense refer toKing Arthur. What makes it possible to do what counts asreferring to King Arthur, is the persistence of a fairlycoherent though gradually developing body of legend inwhich stories are told of someone called King Arthur. Whatis actually going on is more accurately expressed if we say'It is traditionally narrated that there was a man called KingArthur and that he etc.' We can then say that there is alegendary character King Arthur, and so on, but this is to beunderstood just as a transformation from the previous sort



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 257instantiated, this is not what either of them literally says.Each of these still speaks of atoms, the things, not of theconcept. The instantiation analysis has some of the sameprima facie implausibility as a meta-linguistic analysis ofconditionals that makes 'If p than q' speak not about theoccurrences p and q but about the statements 'p' and 'q'.Also, there are constructions which bring together the'exist(s)' that applies to general terms and the 'exist(s)'that applies to individuals. 'At least one island volcanoexists, namely Stromboli.' That is, Stromboli exists and is anisland volcano, so an island volcano exists. This reasoningwill be immediately valid only if 'exists' has the same mean-ing in both places. If it were ambiguous, there would be onthe face of it a fallacy of equivocation, which would need toremedy it some further rule connecting the two varieties ofexistence. Similarly, (many) atoms exist because this atomexists, and that one, and so on. The truth of the matter is thatwhat is literally said in either case is said with an 'exist(s)'which is a predicate of individuals, though one way of usingthis entails or conveys that (or how extensively) a concept isinstantiated.We can, then, approach a unitary theory of the meaningof 'exist(s)' in the opposite direction. Linguistically, this wordis always a predicate of individuals. But it can be used in aspecial way so that it expresses quantification, so that the in-formation conveyed is that a certain general term or conceptis or is not instantiated, or how extensively it is instantiated.We do this by introducing individuals simply as possibleinstances of the general term in question, prefixed perhapsby a literally quantifying adjective such as 'many' or 'some'or 'at least one' or 'a few' or even 'no', and then saying ofthe individuals so introduced, in such quantity, that theyexist. In most cases it is obvious how this works; but with,for example 'no tame tigers exist', the procedure is para-doxical. It is as if we were asked to consider an empty setof tame tigers, then told that its members exist, and left toinfer that that is all that is to be said about the existence oftame tigers. Of course this way of thinking is incoherent.The logical structure of what is said can be given only bya negated existential quantification. But this is conveyed by



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258 I-J. L. MACKIEa linguistic device in which 'exist' is still treated as apredicate of individuals.

In the end, then all three reasons for saying that existenceis not a predicate, or not a real predicate, or not a logicalpredicate, or only a second-order predicate, not a predicateof individuals, fail. It is a predicate of individuals in ordinarydiscourse, its meaning conforms to that r61le,and this part ofordinary language cannot be wholly replaced by a logicallanguage in which 'exist(s)', or something similar, plays adifferent part. It is true that existential quantification isindispensable; but there are also some quite ordinary pur-poses for which 'exist(s)' as a predicate of individuals isindispensable.What, then, is existence? We have conceded that it iscolourless: an imagined thing might be just like a realthing-except that the latter exists. Also, we must preservethe link with quantification and instantiation: existing, wemay say, is that which individuals do which enables themto instantiate whatever concepts they conform to. But whatis this? Etymology may give us some hints. Existere isliterally to stand out. 'There is' is patently a weakened ver-sion of 'is there'. We use 'are found' as almost equivalent to'exist', not claiming that the things in question literally arefound, but only that they are in such a condition as to be inprinciple findable. All this suggests that the paradigm caseof existing is occupying a definite position or range of posi-tions in space and time.However, this is not a requirement for literal existence.So far as our concepts go, something that was not occupancyof space and time, but was somehow sufficiently like this,could still be real, literal, existence. If something not inspace and/or time could yet operate on spatio-temporal thingsin a causal way or in something analogous to a causal way,it would exist. The suggestion that God is not in space ortime does not in itself conflict with the belief that he quiteliterally exists; nor is the Kantian view that things in them-selves are not spatio-temporal an obstacle to their existing;nor is there any contradiction within the view that mindsexist but are not only not extended but not even located inspace.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 259This is literal, full-blooded existence. But in addition tothese there is a quite different extension of the concept of

existence. We can introduce a notion of minimal existence,so that wherever there is apparent reference to a person orthing in a story, legend, myth, or any such reasonablydefinitebody of discourse, we shall say that such a person or thingminimally exists. Existence in a novel, existence in myth,and so on are species of minimal existence. But here we needto tread warily. Mr. Micawber, the man, only minimallyexists; he exists in the story. But we can say (with Kripke)that there is-simply, absolutely, not merely in fiction-afictional character Mr. Micawber. This item, qua fictionalcharacter,exists in the full-blooded sense. We can take 'Thereis a fictional character X', and 'X, the person, exists mini-mally in fiction' as two different systematic transformationsof 'There is a work of fiction, narrating things about a personcalled X'-where the work of fiction exists quite literally;we may regard it as a universal, which exists in so far as itis instantiated, or perhapsas a collective particular, made upof its tokens and existing in a rather diffused way in spaceand time, and in a multiplicity of forms-on paper, in silentor audible readings, translatedinto various languages.Similarly even atheists can admit both that the ChristianGod, as a god or as a person, minimally exists, namely in thesystem of Christian thought, and also that God as a religiouscharacter exists in the full sense; there really is a religiouscharacter, God, in the same way that there really is a fictionalcharacter, Mr. Micawber. But neither of these admissionsgoes any way towardssatisfying the demands of theism.If we have fictional and religious characters and the like,simply existing as such, do we also need minimal existence?No, we do not need it, and of course this way of speakingis liable to mislead, it invites the mistaken interpretationthat there is after all a shadowyrealm in which there actuallyare such individuals. We must hold fast to the fact thatminimal existence is wholly parasitic upon the actualexistence of things which are not what is said minimallyto exist. Mr. Micawber, the man, minimally exists only inthat tokens of the book David Copperfield exist in the full-blooded sense and describe him and his doings. But though



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260 I-J. L. MACKIEit is both dispensable and dangerous, the concept of minimalexistence can be used, once we have learned to handle itwith care, to clarify such arguments as St. Anselm's onto-logical proof.Is mathematical existence only another species of minimalexistence? Or should we say that numbers simply andabsolutely exist? This is a large and controversial questionon which I can only touch. But it is not settled merely bythe fact that it is very convenient to admit variables thatrange over numbers and to quantify existentially with regardto them. Speaking within the legend, we could quantifywith regard to Knights of the Round Table. We can say,first, that many numbers exist as universals do, in so faras they have instances: the number seven exists simply inthat there are seven-membered sets, and this is full-bloodedexistence. But over and above this, there is a well-developedrealm of mathematical discourse. Within this, number-termsno doubt started as quantifiers corresponding to the first fewpositive integers-'There are five sheep in that pen'-butprogressive systematic extensions have not only introduceddifferent kinds of numbers-fractional, negative, irrational,imaginary-but have also introduced number-individualswithin the system. So within this system there is apparentreference to numbers as individuals which is confident andseems precise. There is also apparent collective reference tonumbers-for example the real numbers-even thoughbeing non-denumerably many they could not be all individu-ally named or described. So all numbers-real, complex,transfinite, the lot-exist within the system, that is, mini-mally exist. We can also say that just as the fictional characterMr. Micawber, qua fictional character, exists in the full-blooded sense, so numbers, qua mathematical entities, existin the full-blooded sense. There really are mathematicalentities just in that there really is a system which speaksabout numbers: the former statement is merely a trans-formation of the latter. But apart from this, and apart fromthe above-mentioned point that numbers considered asuniversals full-bloodedly exist in so far as they are instan-tiated (for example by n-membered classes, ratios of onequantity to another, and so on), I see no ground for assigning



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 261to numbers generally full-blooded as opposed to merelyminimalexistence.And theirminimalexistence s, asalways,whollyparasitic. t is howthe appropriate hingsare in spaceand time that enablesus to refer to the real, or imaginary,numbers,no less than to theman,Mr.Micawber.Let us now return to the OntologicalArgument.Haveour criticismsof the thesis that existenceis not a predicatedone away with the main reasonfor denying that such anargumentcan be sound? I think not. There is a truth ofwhich Kant's first and third points are admittedlyobscureformulations,which can survivethe rejectionof his second.We can do all that mattersnot by denyingthat 'exist(s)' sa predicate,but by noting just what sortof predicate t is.The general question is whether there is, or can be, adefinition which ensuresthe actual existence of the thingdefined,or a conceptwhich cannot fail to be instantiated,or a possibilitywhich entails its own realisation.Let us takethe first two of these together.It might seem that there aretrivial (and theologicallyuninteresting)examples that fillthis bill. If we define Nature, say,as 'Whatever here is', isit not logicallyinevitablethat Nature exists?No, this wouldfollowonlywith the proviso hatsomethingexists.Of course,we know that this provisois satisfied.But the certaintyofthe conclusiondependson this knowledge,not whollyuponthe proposeddefinition. The same holds for the certaintythat any conceptof the form '. . . is either F or not F' isinstantiated.In neither case does the definitionor conceptaloneguarantee xistenceor instantiation.Kant'sprinciple is that whatever a definitionor conceptincludes,it is alwaysa furtherquestionwhethersomethingexists to satisfy the definition, to instantiate the concept.Everyonewill admit that the principleholds in most cases;what is controversials whetherit holds in all, and in parti-cular whether the definition of an ens realissimum s anexception to it. What the defenderof an ontologicalproofholdsis that we have a conceptof an X, or of the X, or candefine a term 'X', such that it will be self-contradictoryosay 'An X doesnot exist'or 'The X doesnot exist'.He mayarguethis rathercrudely,asDescartesdoes,or in the subtlerstyle favouredby St. Anselm and his imitators. It was to



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262 I-J. L. MACKIEblock all such moves that Gassendi and Kant and their fol-lowers propounded the now discredited thesis that existenceis not a predicate. Our problem is whether such moves arestill blocked by our revised account of existence.The point of the discredited thesis was to rule out asimproper either the explicit or the implicit inclusion ofexistence in a concept or a definition. Even on our revisedview, the explicit inclusion would still be rather strange.The charge of colourlessness still stands: existence does notcontribute to the determination of a sort of thing. But I donot see that this makes the explicit inclusion of existence ina definition improper. Implicit inclusion is still moredefensible; it is conceivable that there might be a sort thatrequired existence. No doubt the onus of showing that thereis such a sort rests heavily on the proponent of an ontologicalproof. But at the moment we are considering whether thevery possibility of such a proof can be ruled out in advance,and it is not clear that there could not be a sort that requiredexistence. Let us suppose, then, that we can find a generalterm 'X' such that Xness explicitly or implicitly includesexistence. Does it follow that 'An X does not exist' is self-contradictory? This sentence is ambiguous. If it presupposesan actual X and goes on to say that it does not exist, thenindeed it is doubly contradictory, since the X must exist tobe actual and then further must exist in order to be an X.But if the sentence means rather 'No Xs exist', then there isno contradiction. This is Kant's first principle, that if wereject subject and predicate alike there is no contradiction.This principle still holds; it does not need the support ofthe thesis that existence is not a real predicate, or that it isnaughty to include existence in a definition. But it does reston the fact that there is an existential quantifier, the negationof which can be applied to any concept at all.Consequently if the atheist, St. Anselm's fool, says 'The Xdoes not exist' where an X is something than which nothinggreater can be conceived, he is in trouble; his predicatedenies what is presupposed twice over in his subject, 'the X'.But if he has the concept only of an X, even of a unique X,he is all right; he can still say coherently 'There is no X'.What is more, even if the fool uses the concept the X, so



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 263that he cannotcoherently ay 'The X doesnot exist',we canstill say 'No Xs exist'. But it is here that there comes themost ingenious, but fallacious,twist in St. Anselm'sargu-ment, the claimthat if the X which thefool conceives xistedonly in his mind, and not in realityalso,what he conceiveswould not really be the X. In our terminology,since thisX would exist only minimally,it wouldnot be an X, some-thing than whichnothing greatercan be conceived.But thisargumentmistakenly reats minimal existenceas the actualexistence of an inferior sort of entity. Once we see thatminimal existence, existence 'in the fool's mind', is just amannerof speaking,that it is wholly reducible to the factthat the fool hassuchandsuchconcepts,we see alsothat thefool can have the concept,the X, nothing less-his thoughtis accuratelyexpressedby his use of the phrase'that thanwhichnothinggreatercan be conceived'-and yet theremaybe no such thing.We can coherently aythat the X, nothingless, minimally exists, exists in the fool's mind, but onlyminimally exists, there is really no such thing, though thefoolhimselfcannotcoherently aythis.In short,we havegeneral groundsfor rejecting any onto-logical proof of this sort. Even if existencewere somehowincludedin a definitionor concept,we couldstill coherentlydeny that there was anything that actually satisfiedthedefinition or instantiated the concept. What this amountsto is that with our revised accountof existencewe can stillget all the advantagesof the instantiationtheorywithoutthe claimswhichwereembarrassing ecausetheywerefalse.Or, what comesto much the same thing, we can adheretoKant's first principlewithout getting involved in the diffi-culties of hissecond.

Finally, let us look brieflyat the third sort of ontologicalproofwhich was mentionedabove but left aside: can therebe a possibilitywhich entails its own realisation?Alvin Plantinga has offered a variant of the ontologicalargument along these lines. After developing,in the nowfashionablestyle, an accountof de re modalities n termsofpossible worlds, he defines unsurpassable greatness so thatsomething s unsurpassablyreat,in anypossibleworld,onlyif that thing exists in every possible world and has maximal



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264 I-J. L. MACKIEexcellence (power, knowledge, moral perfection) in everypossible world. He then puts forward the vital premiss thatunsurpassable greatness is possibly exemplified-that is, thatthere is a possible world in which it is exemplified. Fromthis it follows that what exemplifies unsurpassable greatnessin that possible world exists and has maximal excellence inevery possible world, including the actual one. Hence thereis in the actual world something omnipotent, omniscient,and wholly good (and necessarilyso, since it has these featuresin every possible world), that is, God.

If we allow the framework within which this argument isdeveloped, the system of realistically interpreted possibleworlds, this argument is valid. But, even with this frame-work, there seems to be no reason why we should acceptthe vital premiss. Plantinga himself mentions an alternativepremiss, that no-maximality is possible, from which it followsjust as cogently that there is (necessarily) no God. Whyshould the one premiss be any more acceptable than theother? Of course, neglecting for the moment little difficultieslike the Problem of Evil (for which Plantinga has indeedoffered a solution, though I think a quite unsatisfactoryone)we might say that we do not know that unsurpassablegreat-ness is not exemplified, that is, its exemplification isepistemically possible. But in neither case does it follow thatthe property is de-re-possiblyexemplified, that it exists in apossible world. Both Plantinga's argument and its atheisticrival then, though valid, are unsound, in that no good reasonhas been given for accepting the vital premiss of each. Thatis, we can imagine a kind of possibility which entails its ownrealisation, but then the question remains whether it is areal possibility, whether there actually is a possibility of thissort. That it is epistemically possible that there should besuch is not enough. With this kind of construction, as withthe others discussed above, the question 'Is there such athing?' remains unsettled.I conclude, then, that there is a general objection to allforms of ontological proof, and an objection on which Kantput his finger, and that this objection survives and standsout more clearly when it is freed from embarrassing entangle-ment with the doctrine that existence is not a predicate andcannot therefore be included in a definition or concept.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 265BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Throughout this paper I have made extensive use of the following works:J. Barnes, The Ontological Argument (London, 1972).I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (A 592-602, B 620o-630).W. C. Kneale, "Is Existence a Predicate?" in Aristotelian Society Supple-mentary Volume 15 (1936), reprinted in Readings in Philosophical Analysised. H. Feigl and W. Sellars (New York, 1949).D. F. Pears and James Thomson, "Is Existence a Predicate?" in PhilosophicalLogic, edited P. F. Strawson (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford,1967).A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974).W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York, 1969).P. F. Strawson, "Is Existence Never a Predicate?" in Freedom and Resent-

ment (London, 1974).B. Miller, "In Defence of the Predicate 'Exists' " in Mind vol. 84, No. 335(July, 1975).I have also made many changes, and I hope improvements, in response tocriticisms by M. G. J. Evans of an earlier draft.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCEJ. L. Mackie and W. Bednarowski

II-W. BednarowskiThere are three topics which Mackie discusses in his paper,namely:

(1) Do we need existential propositions?(2) What sort of concept is existence?(3) Ontologicalproof.I agree with the general tenor or tendency of what he says.Some of the differences I will point out when particulartopics are discussed.Existence has been discussed in many ways and in manycontexts. The most articulate ways to talk about existence

seem to be two:(a) to talk about ideas, concepts, judgments or generallyabout mental phenomena (if concepts are necessarily mentalphenomena); this way of talking is connected partly withthe theory of mind of the philosophers concerned (forinstance, Descartes, Spinoza, or Hume, although it is notclear what Hume's theory of mind is);(b) to talk about verbal expressions in which 'existence'or 'exist' occur, or about expressions which are somehowconcerned about or connected with existence.The first way seems to be more difficult and to requirephenomenological analysis, which may be complicated ifone wants, like Husserl, to discuss pre-verbaljudgments andso on. Nevertheless I will need to say something about thisside of the problem later.Linguistic expressions,on the other hand, are more identi-fiable in their articulation, more determined, tangible, andI am inclined to limit the discussion, as much as possible,to language. It is a result of this inclination that I formulatethe first question as:Do we need existential propositions?



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268 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIThis question can be taken in a stronger or in a weakersense.In the weaker sense, what we are asking is: can one con-struct a language without existential propositions? What ismeant here is: a language which is sufficient to describe allobjects we want to describe, and to make all assertions wewant to make about them, without utilising existential pro-positions. A language with existential propositions would beregarded as being an alternative language, but not a neces-sary one.The assertion that we don't need existential propositions,if taken in the stronger sense, amounts to saying thatexistential propositions are somehow wrong propositions,which either need to be reformulated (e.g., in Frege, interms of instantiation) or, in extreme cases, don't have anymeaning whatsoever.What Mackie says in parts of his paper dealing with thesetopics amounts to rejection of the stronger sense and also

(perhaps only partly) of the weaker sense of the assertionwhat we don't need existential propositions.I am largely of the same opinion as Mackie and I shouldlike to add some further discussion of some attempts toconstruct a language without existential propositions. Itwill turn out that either:(a) we have a language, to whose vocabulary 'existence'or 'to exist' does not belong, but 'existence' or 'to exist' isinvolved in the rules of the language,

or(b) 'existence', 'to exist' do not belong to theory but tometa-theory; or, to state the matter otherwise, existentialstatements are second order statements; here several versionsare possible, e.g., (i) existential statements even in theirordinary form are second order statements [although rulesof language is a clearer idea here]; (ii) existential statementsin ordinary form are elliptical and have to be translated intostatements of some other form. When so translated they willbe immediately seen to be second order statements.Without entering into discussion concerning the second



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 269version one can make one remark here, namely that suchtranslations seem to be artificial and arbitrary.One can askhere a general question put by Wittgenstein: what righthave we to translate?We will now consider three languages which appear toexclude existential propositions, languages which we cancall respectively Platonic, Aristotelian and Boolean.Let us take firsttwo contentions of Plato:

(a) to exist is to partakein ideas;(b) negation is otherness.Let us further change the firststatement into:

(c) to exist is to have a characteristic.A simple model for negation as otherness is the relationof a coloured object to colour-predicates.For instance, if an

object 0 is not red, then a disjunction must be true, namely:O is blue or 0 is green or 0 is yellow, etc.Accepting (b) and (c) as rules we get a language in which,in regard to any existing object, some affirmativestatementsattributing a property to it must be true, and in whichnegation understood as otherness confines true negativestatements to existing objects. One cannot talk in thislanguage about non-existing objects because:(1) If a statement of the type: "O is f" is true, O beingan object and f a characteristic,then, accordingto (c) O mustexist.(2) If "O0s f" is false, then "O is not f" is true and thismeans that O has some other characteristic than f and inconsequence O is an existing object.(3) If "0 is not f" is true, the O has some other charac-teristic than f and ashaving a characteristicO exists;(4) If "0 is not f" is false, then 0 has the characteristicfand is an existing object.Someone may claim that one can talk about non-existingobjects in Platonic language, namely, in this language pairsof contradictory statements will be false about non-existing



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270 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIobjects. But as long as one preserves the law, that if a givenstatement is false its negation is true, to claim that twocontradictory statements are false implies that two contra-dictory statements are true, and in consequence, that non-existing objects have characteristics.Turning now to the Aristotelian language we can say thatAristotle accepts with Plato that whatever exists is qualified,i.e., has a property. But, instead of negation as otherness,Aristotle accepts a pure negation, i.e., 'O0 s not red', meansonly that it is not the case that 0 has the property red, anddoes not mean or imply that O has any other colourpredicate, if we remain confined to our model, or anypredicate whatsoeverif we don't.It is clear that in the Aristotelian language affirmativepropositions attributing a property can be true only aboutexisting objects, whereas a negative proposition can be trueabout an existing object, namely, when the object does notpossess the characteristic which is denied in this statement,but also about non-existing objects, because non-existingobjects don't possessany characteristics.Thus in Aristotelian language, if a proposition of the type"0 is red" is true, then the object O exists. But if the fore-going proposition is false or if "0 is not red" is true, theexistence of the object O is left undetermined.If the foregoing version of the Aristotelian language isaccepted one can have an interesting corollary concerningAristotelian syllogistic. Usually people maintain, I thinkfollowing Lukasiewicz, that in Aristotelian syllogistic noempty terms are allowed. In consequence Aristoteliansyllogistic is confined to statements about existing objects.It is true that Aristotelian syllogistic works if empty termsare excluded. But it is not true that it works only if theyare.In modern logic, i.e., in the calculus of predicates,existence is presupposed for the truth of particular proposi-tions, whereas the universal ones can be true also about non-existing objects. But in the version of the Aristotelianlanguage which I presented existence is connected with trueaffirmative propositions not with particular propositionsThere are two remarksconcerning this point:



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 271(a) Aristotelian syllogistic works also on the assumptionthat existence is connected with true affirmative proposi-

tions;(b) it seems that it is an historical fact, that Aristotlehimself treated his syllogistic in this way.As we have seen, for Aristotle non-existing objects have nocharacteristics.But there is another possibility, namely, thatnon-existing objects have all characteristics. Starting withtwo assertions from Boolean algebra concerning emptyclasses,namely:

(i) the empty class is unique.(ii) the empty class is included in everyclass,we can reformulate these assertionsas:

(A) there is no possibility of distinguishing betweennon-existing objects;(B) non-existing objects have all characteristics.Accepting (A) and (B) we have what we may call aBoolean language, in which about non-existing objects allpropositions attributing properties to them are true. On theother hand, about existing objects some affirmativeproposi-tions attributing properties to them are true, but some arefalse, and in consequence some negative ones are true. Thusin this language existence is connected with the truth ofnegations, not with the truth of affirmations. It is due to

the fact that existing objects not only possess some charac-teristics but also don't possesssome others, that it is possibleto make distinctions between them.To two groups of objects so far discussed,namely, existingones and non-existing ones, one may add an infinite beingor absolute object. Such an object may seem to be very muchtoo metaphysical for positivists. But every kind of objectis metaphysical and metaphysics is the central domain ofphilosophy. The anti-metaphysical standpoint of positivismgives me a somewhat paradoxical feeling of emptiness andclaustrophobia.Now let us see how the absolute object can be accom-modated into Aristotelian and Boolean languages respec-tively.



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272 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIIn the Aristotelian scheme, about non-existing objectsonly and all negations are true. About an existing finite

object some affirmations and some negations are true. Itseems to remain that, about the absolute object, only and allaffirmationsare true.On the other side, in the Boolean scheme, or rather in thescheme which is a modification of the Boolean scheme, aboutnon-existing objects only and all affirmationsare true. Aboutan existing finite object, in the same way as in theAristotelian scheme, some affirmations and some negationsare true. It seems to remain that, about the absolute objector the absolute reality, only and all negations are true.It is noteworthy that in these systems, which are builton three elements, non-existence, existence and absoluteexistence, and within which non-existence is homogeneousin the sense that, about it, either only and all negations aretrue, or only and all affirmationsare true, it turns out thatabsolute existence, in contrast to the entirely positive orentirely negative character of non-existence, is entirely posi-tive or entirely negative respectively.We have criteria for deciding, in regard to ordinaryexisting objects, which characteristicsthey possessand whichthey do not. We don't speak very much about absoluteobjects. Which characteristics non-existing objects possess isarbitrary or conventional. From this point of view bothAristotelian and Boolean language are on the same level.But there is some difference. Most (perhaps all) affirmativepropositions about existing objects are such that when theyattribute some characteristic to an object they excludesome other characteristic. For example soft excludes hard,made of wood excludes made of iron, etc. Now affirmationswhich are true about non-existing objects don't produce thisexclusion and are therefore different from affirmationswhichare true about existing objects.

Thus as far as this point is concerned Aristotelian languageis less artificial.It is also worth noticing that the view according to whichthe absolute object or reality has all characteristicsis reminis-cent of coincidentia oppositorum of Nicolaus Cusanus; andthe view, that absolute reality has no characteristics isreminiscent of theologia negativa.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 273We have sketched three languages within which existenceor existential statements do not belong to the language itself

but existence is involved in the rules of language or in themeta-theory, in the following way: one's particular view ofthe character of existing and non-existing objects is whatdetermines which kinds of propositions are true about themand conversely, by knowing which kinds of propositionsattributing a property are true about a given object oneknows whether the object in question exists or not. Andthese matters,as to what determines the truth of propositions,and as to how propositions are to be interpreted, are mattersappropriate to a meta-theory or to rules of language. Thusexistence or existential statements are not eliminated; theyare simply not statements on the lowest level. But they areindispensable for understanding or interpreting the signifi-cance of statements of the language.I come now to Frege. As I said, for Aristotle existentialstatements should be second-orderstatements, although it isnot clear what sort of statements they are; i.e., are they state-ments within the language or are they rules of the languagedetermining the assessmentof truth values.Frege tells us clearly what existential statements are:they are statements about concepts. What they tell us abouta particular concept is that the concept has instances whenthe existential statement is affirmative,or that the concepthas no instances, when the existential statement is negative.Thus for instance the statement:x existsactually means

the concept X has instances.That a given concept has instances is a mark of that conceptand in this way existence is not a characteristic of thosethings which are the instances.Concepts, as Frege says, are objective. In Die Grundlagender Arithmetik p. 35 we read; "I distinguish what I callobjective from what is handleable or spatial or real. The axisof the earth is objective, so is the centre of gravity of thesolar system, but I should not call them real in the way theearth itself is real." Frege adds: what is objective is not



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274 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIcreated by thought but only recognized or apprehended bythought. Thus for Frege concepts are not mind-dependent;they have independent existence, although they are not'handleable or spatial or real'.Frege's approachhas these two features:

(1) first it consists of getting rid of existential statementsby reducing them to property attributing (qualifying) ones,although this qualifying applies to concepts;(2) existential statements are never about something thatdoes not exist, because they are always about concepts andconcepts do exist.Naturally, if there are such entities as Frege's concepts, forinstance when the statement

unicorns don't existis true, it is also true that the concept Unicorn has noinstances. But the equivalence of the two statements:

x existsand

the concept X has instancescan be easily denied by those who don't accept the existenceof Frege's concepts.There are several difficulties in Frege's position. Mackie iskind to Frege and tries to avoid some of these difficulties bymaintaining that what Frege is saying is only that the twostatements:

x existsand

the concept X has instancesare equivalent. But what Frege's view amounts to is thatstatements of the type

x existssomehow don't have their own meaning; if they have anymeaning at all it is somehow what the statements of the type



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 275the concept X has instances

mean.And this is one of the implausibilities of Frege's position,namely, that there are statements, which don't have theirown meaning, which somehow have the meaning of otherstatements. It is not even the case that they have the samemeaning as these corresponding statements. They oddlyenough indicate or refer to meanings of these other state-ments. It will require a long analysis to state more exactly

what the relation between these two statements could be.The second implausibility is this: ifx exists

really meansthe concept X has instances

andx does not exist

really means that the concept of X has no instances, one canask how it is possible that people who were not instructed byFrege could understand existential statements of the typex existsand

x does not exist.If they did, this seems to imply, that one can understand astatement without knowing what its meaning is.The third implausibility pointed out also in Mackie'spaperis that the statement

Lions existwould be most naturally taken as being about lions and notabout concepts. Here one can repeat again Wittgenstein'squestion:

What right have we to translate?I will mention one oddity more of Frege's treatment ofexistential statements. In Grundlagen p.65 Frege says:



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276 II--W. BEDNAROWSKI"Affirmationof existence is in fact nothing but denial of thenumber nought".

How is this statement to be understood? We know theDuns Scotus-Sigwart-Russellview that negations are second-order statements because they are rejections of attemptedaffirmations.Is Frege suggesting here that positive existentialstatements are rejections of the most universal negativeexistential statement, which perhaps implies that universalnothingness is logically prior to something existing? If thisis his view one can wonder what kind of epistemological andpsychological theory has to be adopted to make this positionplausible.Now we turn to an attempt to get rid of existential pro-positions altogether, namely, by means of quantifiers. It isclaimed here not only that the so-called existentialpropositions are somehow wrongly formulated propositions(existence is not a predicate) but also, that no reformulationis needed as these existential propositions have no r6le toplay.The attempt to get rid of existential propositions by meansof quantifiers is connected both with Kant and Frege. It isin agreement with Kant, that 'existence' or 'exist' is not alogical predicate and it shares the feature of Frege's viewthat existential propositions, whether affirmation or negative,are always about something existing, In Frege's view it wasconcepts, in this case (in the case of the attempt we arediscussing) it is values.Here also existential propositions are reduced to qualifyingones. Thus:

lions existis rendered as

( 3 x) x is a lionand

unicorns don't exist(x) ~(x is a unicorn).

The first thing about this theory is that it does not seemto manage to get rid of existence or rather existential



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 277statements,because the existence of values is assumed [to existis to be a value of a variable]. Secondly, there is somethingodd about those statements which are supposed to replacenegative existential statements.'( 3 x)' is called an existential quantifier and even if oneinsists on reading it as 'for some x' and not 'there is an xsuch that', the existential aura is about it. Further, thestatement

(3 x) x is redcan be true only if there are red objects, or only if there aretrue statements of the type:

this is redor

this is an object and it is red;or something else on these lines (something similar). Onecan of course use always ' (x)' instead of '(3 x)' but state-ments quantified in this way can also be true only ifcorrespondingobjects exist.However if one translates the statement:

the devil does not existinto:

(x) e(x is the devil)this implies, that by whatever value x is replaced in thepropositional function:

x is the devilthe result will be always a false proposition. But if 'x' isreplaced by 'the devil', we get:

the devil is the deviland to regard this as a false statement some further assump-tions are needed and the question is, how far suchassumptions are arbitrary.One of such assumptions is that x has a determinedrange: it ranges over a set of objects accepted as existing.



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278 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIBut this assumption creates a new trouble. Suppose theso-called universe consists of four objects: a platform and,on the platform, a tree and John and Michael. SupposeJohn says:

God existsand Michael says

God does not existand he says that this, if properly stated, amounts to:

(x) - (x is God)with 'x' ranging over four objects mentioned. In consequenceMichael saysfurther:

God does not exist, because:you are not God and I am not God and the tree is notGod and the platform is not God.

However the trouble with Michael's argument is that, ifby 'God' John means a being which is transcendent to theworld, infinite, omnipotent and the rest, Michael's conjunc-tion will be true even if God does exist. In fact, Michael'sconjunction is a refutation of the statement:

One of the four following objects, John, Michael, thetree and the platform, is God.To make it a refutation of the statement 'God exists' onehas to add:

and this is all that exists,nothing exists except these four objects

or something on these lines.Michael's interpretation ofGod does not exist

as (x) e-(x is God)and x ranging over four existing objects, led to the conjunc-tion, which is a refutation of the following disjunction:

John is God or Michael is God or the tree is God or theplatform is God.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 279It is obvious that John would not agree that the foregoingdisjunction is equivalent to, or is the proper interpretation of,

his statement:God exists,the more so as most likely he would regard the disjunction asbeing false and trivially false.The attempt to get rid of existential statements by meansof quantifiers consisted of two moves:

(1) making the subject of the existential proposition apredicate in a qualifying proposition,(2) in the case of negative existential statements the intro-duction of a determinate range for quantifiers.

In general both these moves require a considerable carein handling. One can illustrate this by the following example.Suppose there is a man in love with Carmencita. Supposefurther he is in the room alone and thinks 'Carmencita isnot hereI' If one is allowed to shift subject into the predicate,one would reformulate his statement as:No object here is Carmencita.As Carmencita is a person the above statement will berendered as

No person here is Carmencita.As he is the only person here, he can sayI am not Carmencita.Suppose he now thinks:

I wish she was here.It looks that following his previous formulation he can say,or has to say:

I wish I was she.It seems that such a logo-analysis renders more astonishingresults than Freud's psycho-analysis.The idea of existencePlato says (Theaetetus, 184b-187a):

(1) existence is not a sense quality;(2) existence is not given in perception.



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280 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIIf one identifies perception with experience, as Plato seemsto be doing, it follows that:

(3) existence is not given in experience.To account for the idea of existence Plato says that:

(4) the idea of existence is due to the activity of thesoul itself.For Plato our knowledge contains two kinds of elements:ideas of sense qualities received by means of bodily sense-organs and concepts like number, existence, similarity,identity and so on, which are directly grasped by the souland not merely indirectly via sense organs.The question arises how the idea of existence is related toexistential statements. Usually one would maintain that'exist' or 'has existence' is the predicate in the existentialstatements. This presupposes that there is a distinctionbetween ideas and judgments. The distinction in questionwas, for instance, maintained by Descartes. For Descartesideas are representations in the intellect whereas judgmentsare connected with the will.

Unfortunately, when Descartes discussed ideas in con-nexion with arguments, even important arguments forestablishing dualism, he did not manage always to make itclear where the dividing line is. And this perhaps partlyexplains how it is possible for Spinoza to deny that thereis any difference between ideas and judgments. ThusSpinoza says that every idea is a judgment.As far as the idea of existence is concerned a real complica-tion is due to Hume. In the Treatise, I (Everyman'sLibrary,p. 71) we read:

(1) The idea of existence, then, is the very same withthe idea of what we conceive to be existent.(2) Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent.Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; andthe idea of a being is any idea we please to form.

In both quotations the distinction between ideas and judg-ments is somehow blurred. But the first quotation seems toindicate that only in the case of what we conceive to be



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 281existent, is the idea of existence and, if one may say so, ideaof the object, one and the same. However, in the secondquotation is stated unambiguously that:Whatever we conceive we conceive to be existent.Mackie points out that this certainly goes too far. Perhapsone can defend Hume here by saying that he is simplypointing out a psychological fact, or alleged psychologicalfact, that representations or ideas are always of things as ifthey existed. But we are not allowed to claim, that whateverwe conceive, exists. And Hume says op. cit., p. 96:

But as it is certain there is a great difference betwixtthe simple conception of the existence of an object andthe belief of it, and as this difference lie not in the partsof composition of the idea which we conceive, it follows,that it must lie in the manner in which we conceive it.His hypothesis concerning the manner in question is:

that it is only a strong and steady conception of anyidea, and as such approaches in some measure to animmediate impression.Can we infer from these quotations that there is a secondsense of existing, which is not 'in the parts or composition ofthe idea which we conceive'? It seems that existential state-ments employ this second sense.It is not clear whether this different manner, or different'feeling', as Hume also says,is the reason or cause for assertingexistence or whether this manner is the meaning of existence.The 'manner' or 'feeling' rather belongs to our way ofconceiving than to the objects conceived. Thus the causalversion seems to be more acceptable. In such a case howeverthe idea of existence (in the second sense) would share thefate of all the other 'subjective' ideas, i.e., the ideas which,for Plato, were ideas of intellect. For such ideas Hume giveshis 'empirical' explanation, which consists simply of indicat-ing how the non-existing mind operates in accordance withthe laws of non-existing causality. And thus it appears thatHume is not very helpful in explaining the riddle ofexistence.Let me now turn to Kant.



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282 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIAccording to Kant the concept of ioo possible, or thoughtof, thalers does not differ from the concept of 100 real or

existing thalers. This reminds us of Hume's:To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it asexistent, are nothing different from each other. Thatidea [i.e., of existence] when conjoined with the idea ofany object, makes no addition to it.

Mackie dealt with these views on the idea of existence whenhe was talking about the colourlessness of existence and Idon't feel any need to add anything here.As we have seen, according to some formulations of Hume,whatever we conceive we conceive as existing, but we are notentitled to saythat everything so conceived exists. So it seemedthat some other sense of existence was needed to account forthe fact that someof the conceived objectsdo exist. Hume talkshere of different manners of conceiving, belief, feeling,strength of representation. What sort of existential statementcan be based on that? It does not look as if the existence of anobject is the manner of its representation. What is requiredis some sort of concept or predicate which applies to objectsand not to representations of them. It does not seem that wecan find clear formulations concerning this point in Hume'stexts.It looks at first sight as though a clear account of thesituation is to be found in Kant. Kant agrees with Platothat our knowledge of so-called real (as opposed to ideal)objects consists of sense-elements and intellect-elements andmaintains that these elements together constitute theexperience. Existence is an intellect-element, an a prioriconcept, a category.There are two features of Kant's conception of existenceas a category that I intend to pay some attention to.Categories for Kant are forms of thinking, so that

(1) existence is a formal concept.Furthermore existence belongs to the group of modality,along with possibility and necessity. Thus:

(2) existence is a modal concept.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 283I will begin with modality. We have here three or threepairs of categories:

possibility-impossibility,existence-non-existence,necessity-contingency.

The question is where the existence of so-called real objectsor phenomena (as opposed to ideal objects) in fact belongs.One can say that existence is a category applied to actualexperience. But Kant says that to exist is to be an objectof possible experience. So it seems to be a puzzle here:why is existence possibility and not actuality?Kant's motive is the same as Berkeley's: the transitionfrom esse = percipi to esse = percipi posse. Existence, realityis relative to experience, but not limited to actual experience.But what is the relation between actual and possibleexperience? Kant's category of existence seems to belong toactual experience. How does one come across possibleexperience? If by inference according to the rule:A b esse ad possevalet consequentia,then two remarkscan be made here:

(i) The rule only allows us to infer that what was actuallyexperienced was possible to be experienced. One can wonderwhat is achieved by such an inference, but anyhow it does notlead us out of the circle of actual experience. What is neededis an inference to possible experiences which so far were notactual, or never will be actual.(2) Even if one can go outside of the circle of actualexperience, it remains that existence is never given directlybut always inferred. And this is a strange peculiarity of theidealistic idea of reality, which, apart from Berkeley andKant, is also exhibited in Mill's conception of matter as

permanent possibility of perception, in Husserl's idealismand in such idealistic conceptions as mind being just adisposition.Turning now to existence as a formal concept, as somethingwhich belongs to the form of objects, I will mention only:(1) Ingarden's Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus, in Festschrift, Edmund Husserl zum 70.



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284 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIGeburstag gewidmet, (Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie undPhenomenologische Forschung, Halle 1929), where distinc-tions are made between material, formal, and existentialontology. These distinctions were elaborated later in DieStreit um die Existenz der Welt.

(2) Sartre's violent protest in his NAUSEA against theview that existence is a formal concept.Ontological proofOntological proof of God's existence is a priori proof. Itis proof from the concept of God or more exactly, from theconcept of God as ens realissimum or as ens perfectissimum.Cosmological, physico-teleological and Descartes' anthropo-logical proofs are proofs from 'effects', and thus contain aposteriori elements. Frege says that the distinction betweena priori and a posteriori, analytic and synthetic concerns thejustification for making the judgment. When a proposition iscalled a priori or a posteriori, analytic or synthetic, it is ajudgment about the ultimate ground upon which rests thejustification of its truth (cf. Frege, Grundlagen, p. 3). Thejustification is the proof. If the proof rests exclusively ongeneral logical laws, which themselves neither need noradmit of proof, the truth is analytic.Ontological proof is not analytic in the foregoing Fregeansense; its validity rests ultimately on the analysis of theconcept of God. Now I am inclined to claim that there arenot any valid proofs concerning things (objects) which restsolely on the meaning of a relevant word or on the contentof a relevant concept. This is a big claim and cannot besettled in a short space. But it seems to be possible to showthat some particular statements, which are regarded as truemerely on the ground of the content of the concepts or of themeanings of words involved, if one wants to call them true atall, are true in a very disappointing way.What is established by the ontological proof? That

(a) God existsor only a bit of analytic theology (if there is such a thing),namely,

(b) only the existing God is a genuine God; the non-existing God is an impostor.



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THE RIDDLE OF EXISTENCE 285Or, more seriously:

(b') the concept of God involves existence.I believe that none of these statements is established bythe ontological proof. Ontological proof is similar to othercases where the truth of some specific statements is claimedto be based simply on the meaning of the words involved oron the definitions. Let us consider three examples:(1) all bachelors are unmarried,(2) all blue unicorns are blue,(3) all square circles are circular.

I don't know how far (i) is analytic, a priori and necessary.But if it is, this is not due merely to the meaning of the word'bachelor' or due merely to the definition of bachelor. And(1) is not analytic in the sense that it is a statement whosetruth is solely due to logical principles. On the other hand, ifits truth were based merely on the meaning of words or onthe definition, one would be inclined to claim that (,) and (3)are also analytic.Let us begin by examining the argument in regard to (2).One can formulate it provisionally as:(2') (x) (x is a blue unicorn =df x is a unicorn SCx is blue) C(x) (x is a blue unicorn Z x is blue)

In the antecedent we have a symbol of definitionalequivalence, namely '= d1'. Now some people maintain thatdefinitions are neither true nor false, and if one accepts thisone has to decide whether the consequent in (2') is or is notimplied by the antecedent and one has to decide this in alogic which has more values than two. This is a complicationwhich is irrelevant for our problem and I will replace thedefinitional equivalence '=df' by simple equivalence '='.The new formulation obtained in this way is, as matter offact, more favorable for the view that (2) is an analyticallytrue statement. The new formulation is as follows:

(2") (x) (x is a blue unicorn x is a unicorn Scx is blue) D(x) (x) is a blue unicorn = x is blue).



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286 II-W. BEDNAROWSKIIf the two statements on both sides of the equivalence sign aretrue the equivalenc

the riddle of existence

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