THE RICHMOND WAR (23 January 1991 - the present)

20 July 1991

a case study by H B Osborn (ECC Fieldworker - Natal).

CONTENTS1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. THE BACKGROUND 2*

3. THE WAR: S'

3.1 THE ATTACKS ON MAGODAS ’

3.1.1 The Questions begin 73.1.2 Third Force Involvement? £>3.1.3 The Refugee Question lO

3.2 INKATHA AND THE PEACE TALKS U

3.3 THE WAR COMES TO INDALENI If3.4 THE TABLES ARE TURNED /63.5 A SECOND ATTEMPT AT PEACE/f3.6 "NORMALITY" RETURNS (AND A 3RD ATTEMPT AT PEACE).£03.7 THE TERROR CAMPAIGN 2J

4. CONCLUSION 2 S

5 . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2. 8

A great deal of my time and energy has been devoted to the crisis in the Natal Midlands, particularly the townships around Richmond- such as Magoda and Indaleni. Following this, I felt that the area deserved a report of its own. There are other reasons too:1) Existing research into the area has been of a predominantly factual nature (1) and press coverage has been largely superficial- in that Natal newspapers have tended to present the violence as a series of vaguely related and anarchical battles with a minimum of underlying forces and dynamics. (2)2) In terms of fatalities it has proven to be one of the most violence-wracked areas in the country, with around 100 people killed since the beginning of the year (although official figures are lower).3) It is also a typical example of rural violence in Natal (especially the Midlands), in that it demonstrates the politicisation, exploitation and exacerbation of a previously territorially-based and low intensity conflict of a fairly long­standing nature (3).4) And finally, for the purposes of the ECC and other organisations involved in monitoring the role of the security forces on the ground, it reveals an interesting duality of roles on the part of the South African Police and Defence Force. The reasons for this will emerge during the course of this analysis.It should be noted at the outset that I make no secret of the fact that I have dealt more extensively with the ANC than the IFP over this issue, although this bias was forced upon me to a large extent by what would appear to be Inkatha1s suspicion of "independent monitors." (4) However, in the light of the one-sidedness of existing "information" on the area, this report is, at the very least, an alternative view.

To begin with, the violence of the area should be seen in the context of Natal and then the Midlands as an entire region, characterised as it is by the tension between, on the one hand, the growing politicisation of the youth and their mobilisation under the auspices of the ANC, and on the other, the threat that this poses for many chiefs, elders and indunas who are an integral part of tribal/traditional structures and conservative workers in the agricultural sector - who are being courted by the IFP. The relative success of the ANC in the greater Pietermaritzburg area (5) has spread fairly far into the areas previously labelled "rural," but which I prefer to call "semi-urbanised. " These are areas such as Richmond, Mooi River and Greytown, and to a lesser extent even some outlying and relatively small areas such as Estcourt and Mpumalanga.The ANC's "sphere of influence" could be said to extend in a roughly circular area of mobilised - as opposed to "organised" - support around Pietermaritzburg as a central point, and the towns/areas of Richmond, Elandskop, Mooi River and Greytown forming a crude circumference. (6) It is at these points where progressive organisation - specifically the ANC - has come up rather abruptly against a "last stand" effort by forces opposed to change. These range from the front-line troops, such as the chiefs, indunas, sangomas (7) and their supporters (who almost always are Inkatha supporters), through to some clandestine planning centres - which appear increasingly to be located in "murky areas of officialdom" and perhaps even in branches of the security forces, if we are to believe the newspaper reports which are emerging at this time.

THE NATAL MIDLANDS showing some of the areas most affected by recent violence.

The townships or "wards" around the relatively small town of Richmond are in fact large, sprawling semi-formal and informal settlements which are home to some 70 000-plus people. There has been an historic tension between, on the one hand, Indaleni and Magoda (which are better serviced and home to many "semi- skilled," skilled and profesional workers who travel to Richmond or even Pietermaritzburg every day, and on the other, N'kobeni (or eMkhobeni), Smozomeni and Pateni (which are more informal, more sparsely settled and home to many displaced, retrenched, temporary and full-time agricultural labourers who have been or are employed on white farms in the area.

/. etmZy itfro

f X / W W i f Z / A / /

U CHie? MAJKZZ.*! r+ou-Zg± I : | 0 0 O O O

THE RICHMOND WARDS OR TOWNSHIPS

The primary access to the out-lying areas is through Indaleni and in the case of N'kobeni, through Magoda as well. There have been allegations and counter-allegations traded between residents of the built-up areas and their country neighbours from the out-lying areas, over who assaulted or stole, harrased or murdered etc. Other than to say it is significant for understandig the division between these areas, the details are not important.What is significant I believe, is the tension between and within the out-lying areas themselves, such as that between Pateni and Smozomeni, and on some occasions between N'kobeni and Smozomeni. This dates back to 1988, when youths in Smozomeni began to align themselves with the UDF-supporting youth of Magoda and Indaleni. In so doing, they allegedly incurred the wrath of some fairly powerful players in that community, such as one Mr Paulos Vezi (Chief Dhlamini1s induna) from Pateni, who is also by all accounts, an avid IFP supporter. There is remarkably little information on the battles which which occured through 1988-90, but Mzwandile Mbongwe (ANC youth-chair in the area) says as many as 50 people died in those 2 - 3 years. In November 1990, the loose alliance between Pateni and N'kobeni was formalised against the youth which were now all situated in Magoda or Indaleni (ANC supporters having fled from Smozomeni). This was when N'kobeni residents were invited to attend an Inkatha rally at Pateni, organised by Mr Vezi and addressed by Chief Jerome Ndlovu from Ixopo (another strong IFP supporter).Around this time, a number of occurences indicated an increasingly militant reaction to ANC mobilisation of the youth. Some time towards the end of the year (accounts vary), an SADF member who was also allegedly an ANC sympathiser was murdered in Indaleni. Soon after, Midlands Convener for the ANC, Mr Harry Gwala, was allegedly fired upon while addressing a rally there.It was also around this time when an assasination attempt on Mr Peter Nkabinde (an ANC member and uncle to the ANC chair for the Richmond area - Mr Sfiso Nkabinde) took place at his home in Magoda. His attackers (who were N'kobeni residents), burst into the house and, according to police, opened fire on Mr and Mrs Nkabinde who were lying in bed. Mrs Nkabinde was wounded, but her husband was able to return fire, killing one of the gunmen (a Mr Mathathu Sindane) and wounding the other. The wounded man then attempted to flee, but collapsed outside, where ANC comrades took the R4 rifle he was carrying before the police arrived and arrested him (he was reported to be under police guard at Edendale Hospital). The ANC claim that they later handed the rifle to the police, on 6 April, but Lt Johan Meding of the CID at the local SAP station in the village denies that this is so. Meding also says that despite the fact that Mrs Nkabinde died some 5 months later (May 1991), never having left hospital after she was admitted with bullet wounds, her death was attributed to "natural causes," and so no murder charge arose. In fact not only is Meding unable to recall the surviving attacker's name, he is also not sure whether the man faces any charges at all.

3.1 THE ATTACKS ON MAGODA

On 22nd of January 1991, Sfiso Nkabinde received a letter from N'kobeni residents - addressed to the ANC at Magoda - demanding the return of the R4 rifle, saying that it was a "community weapon," and that the attackers had had no authority to use it since their actions had not been mandated by the community of N'kobeni. Very little time was allowed for consideration however, with the first attack - marking the beginning of the war in earnest- coming late the following afternoon - January 23. At least 4 people were killed in that attack, and thousands fled to Indaleni, some into the town of Richmond. About 50 homes were burnt by the impi which allegedly carried an Inatha flag and was singing songs about killing comrades, (8) at which point Inkatha Institute researcher, Mr Senzo Mfayela was claiming that the conflict was "non-political." (9)The reason given by N'kobeni residents for the attack, according to inter alia Mr Vusi Cele of the Indaleni branch of the IFP, was the "comrades' failure to return the rifle to its owners." (10) However the comrades feel that this was secondary; the main reason for the switching of attention from Msmozomeni to Magoda was the growth of the ANC there, as opposed to its virtual "extermination" in Smozomeni.At that stage, representations were made by the Rev. Roger Hudson of the Indaleni Mission to the local SAP station commander - a Lt Lombard - to place a vehicle and men between N'kobeni and Magoda to prevent further attacks via that route. It was to be the first of many fruitless attempts to get the security forces to form a barrier between the two areas.The next attack was launched 10 days later, on 3 February 1991. The attackers used the same route that the previous impi had, only this time Magoda residents claim they recognised Pateni residents among them. Nine people including a man of 60 years, are alleged to have been killed, although police put the figure at 6. About 20 people were wounded, either shot or stabbed, and more than 150 houses were torched, with ANC members' homes appearing to be specifically targetted. This time refugees left Magoda in thousands (figures soared to around 15-20 000 at that stage). Troop reinforcements were sent in from SADF headguarters in Pietermaritzburg (Group 9) , and I immediately set up a meeting with Major Schreeder of that unit. My aim was to plead for a temporary base of a sort between the two areas of N'kobeni and Magoda - but he was not able to give an undertaking to this effect, saying that the SAP had jurisdiction in the area, and that the SADF were only deployed in support of them. A number of fairly "high-profile" people, including Bishop Khoza Mgojo of the Methodist Church, made representations to the police for a vehicle to "stand off" at the point in guestion - to no avail. Only when Democratic Party MP for Mooi River, Mr Wessel Nel telephoned Minister Vlok were we able to achieve an undertaking on the part of the police, to place some

vehicles there. However even these were only present during daylight hours for about a week after the attack.

A g a i n s t th e b a c k d r o p o f a c o n t in g e n t o f S A P rio t c o n t r o l p o li c e m e n w h o * e r e m o n i t o r i n g M a g o d a y e s t e r d a y is th e b u r n e c - o u t s n e il o f a t ru c k d e s t r o y e d o n S u n d a y d u r in g th e la te s t w a v e o f v io le n c e m th e R i c h m o n d t o w n s h i p . Picture ay M A R K w i n g

THE POLICE (TEMPORARY) CAMP AT MAGODA THE NATAL WITNESS: February 5, 1991

It was at this point, after the inundation of security force personnel into the area that the first allegations of bias on their part arose. For some as yet unexplained reason, the vast majority of SAP and SADF members were deployed in Magoda and Indaleni, where they set about cracking down on the people there - people who to all intents and purposes were the victims of the attacks and who also happened to be ANC supporters. Shortly after the attack, police descended on a group of 150 armed youths who had gathered to defend themselves, and confiscated all their weapons, claiming later that the group had been "marching in the direction of N'kobeni." (11) The comrades deny this. While many youths were arrested and charged with relatively minor offences such as possession of unlicenced fire-arms, no N'kobeni people had yet been charged or arrested. Allegations of Defence Forcewhippings/sjambokking, and police assault were widespread, (11) and the community began to guestion their failure to stop the second attack as the heavy police presence was reported to disappear from the area minutes before the attack.Refugees streaming out of the area (now numbering up to 2 0 000) also made accusations of harrasment by the police, saying that a number of Casspirs had tried to prevent them from leaving Magoda when another attack was rumoured to be iminent.Two days after the attack, impis from N'kobeni had occupied one of the abandoned houses in Magoda and were using it as an advance base. It was guite clearly the only occupied house in the area, and was in full view of the police vehicles parked at their temporary camp. When I approached the riot police there about it (see Natal Witness, 5 Feb -supra) they said they had no means of proving that the people in the house were the attackers.

But perhaps the most sinister development of all, was the sudden appearance of swastika-like AWB emblems, sprayed over ANC graffiti on a number of schools in Indaleni. A woman who wished to remain anonymous made claims to the effect that she witnessed "men in blue and brown uniforms" doing the spray-painting, and later driving away in a white 4X4 bakkie of the sort used by the Riot Unit on occasion. (13) A stenciled IFP slogan appeared on the same wall around that time, but I have not been able to confirm whether or not it was on the same night as the AWB signs appeared.The SADF was quick to refute allegations of participation on the part of its members, with Commandant Eddie Hall of Group 9 HQ in Pietermaritzburg saying: "Reports have it that there is a strong AWB presence in the town of Richmond. It has been alleged that a number of farmers ... have retaliated against the the ANC slogans which have been sprayed on the wall." (14) Colonel Swanepoel, officer commanding the same unit agreed that there had been reports that "people in blue and brown uniforms had been doing irregular things ... painting anti-ANC slogans - and that these people were actively taking part in specific incidents, but no substance to these allegations has been found." (15)Comrades also allege that their spies at N'kobeni had passed on information to the effect that a number of AWB camps had been held by local farmers - one in particular on the farm called N'kobeni (bordering on the township of the same name) and that police and soldiers had been there too, including Lt Meding of the Richmond CID. This farm is owned by the now retired Colonel Graham Bowles, previously officer commanding Group 9 in Pietermaritzburg. Meding confirmed that he had attended such a camp, but offered another explanation altogether, saying that local farmers had requested the security police to come and demonstrate the use of "terrorist weapons." According to his version, the farmers attended in their private capacity, or as members of the Umkomaas Commando (based in Richmond) - a kind of Dad's army for area-bound national servicemen who are issued with R1 rifles (which they are permitted to keep at their homes) and SADF uniforms. They apparently gather fairly regularly for shooting practice at the range on this particular farm, or for camps of this sort. He added that the AWB had arrived in full regalia, unannounced and uninvited, and had attempted to take over proceedings, which they were prevented from doing. Meding further says that they were however permitted to participate in the activities.This means that observers of the scene would have been treated to the sight of uniformed police and SADF members, along with plain- clothed security policemen and local farmers, all learning to fire AK 47 assault rifles with uniformed AWB "stormtroopers.11 Such an observer would have to be forgiven for suspecting the worst. When I last spoke to Meding about the question (Saturday the 2 0 July 1991) he informed me that the AWB in the area has recently disbanded itself. However information received from a local farmer indicates that there are a number of camps which are still being run, and that the AWB are alive and well. Another source close to

the AWB and who also wishes to remain anonymous, has told a local journalist that the AWB has gone on "exercises" into black areas, and that there are now permanent camps in the Richmond area. Who is to be believed?

Soldiers in suburbs 'normal’

'Third force’ in Magoda—claim

Witness Reporter THE Magoda township near Richm ond was reported to be quiet yesterday, fo l­lowing the latest wave o f v io len ce in which at least six people were killed and 150 hom es w ere burned down over the weekend.

There w ere reports that a sub-station was established in Magoda yesterday and a group o f SADF soldiers from the Cape Corps had moved into the area in an attempt to defuse the situation.

Ndaleni M ethodist minister Roger Hudson said residents w ere pleased with the establishm ent o f the sub-sta­tion.

ANC spokesman Shakes Cele said the root cause o f the problem in Ma­goda and other areas was apartheid and the only solution would be the com ­p le te eradication o f it.

“ History teils us that this v io len ce was not started by the ANC and som e o f our peop le will be used by the third force in ord er to make the v io len ce con ­tinue."

Sim ilarly, residents in the area hinted at the presence o f a “ third fo rce ” operating in Magoda and claim ed riot control policem en had been seen spraying AWB slogans on buildings in the area. P olice have den ied the allegations.

KwaZulu Legislative A ssem bley m em ber David Ntom bela said he had no knowledge o f any “ outside involve­ment” in the area.

Witness ReporterTHE sight o f South A frican D efence F orce soldiers patrolling the city’s residential suburbs is “ nothing to worry about” , a Natal com m and spokesman said yesterday.

“ Everything is norm al. We are not ex­pecting any trouble in these areas. It is to act as a precautionary measure

against people who are thinking o f com mitting a crim e," the spokesman said.

The spokesman said soldiers doing camps were responsib le for the patrols in the Group Nine (Pieterm aritzburg) area as “ it is relatively quiet in the black townships . . . and we have the force levels to do so” .

The Natal Witness, February 11, 1991

The roughly 20 000 refugees at this point either sought shelter with friends and family in Indaleni, or they resorted to the only other real option, which was to locate themselves in the relatively quiet and secure area of the streets of Richmond. White residents, or at least their official representatives in the form of the Town Board, were not terribly sympathetic. The Town Clerk issued and distributed a pamphlet to local residents saying that they were not to accomodate Magoda residents on their property as they were "causing sanitation problems." He further said that the SAP had informed him that the area was "under control" and that refugees would now be safe to return.The local Indian community however demonstrated a sensitivity and generosity which earned them much praise from the displacees, donating tents, food and clothing. But their efforts were thwarted by the local Civil Defence Force which began pulling down tents after claiming that refugees were moving out, when in fact the number was growing as renewed attacks were launched by the impis in Magoda. DP MP Mr Pierre Cronje also attacked the police and Civil Defence Force for "distorting" figures in saying that the number of refugees in the Richmond area had dropped to 80. Mr Cronje claims that the number had grown to many thousands, and that more were streaming in as renewed attacks occured. (16)The white local authority were eventually able to rid themselves of the problem of refugees, although some individual residents continued to accomodate people in garages and servants' quarters. The responsibility for housing the refugees then fell to the ANC (in the absence of any other option), and the regional branch made arrangements for those who did not have relatives in Natal with whom to stay, to be accomodated at Kwakhote, in Edendale near Pietermaritzburg. Eventually some 3 000 men, women and children were staying here in squalid, overcrowded and dilapidated buildings.Later, around the beginning of April, when fighting broke out again, there was a new wave of refugees who tried - for.the sake of personal security - to situate themselves on an empty plot of land opposite the SADF Headquarters in the town, but they were forcibly removed from there, and the army erected a barrier of razor-wire around the plot to keep them off.The most effective measures to combat the refugee crisis though, were the product of admirable work by the Richmond Town Board aother concerned parties, who put pressure on the Natal Provincial Administration to provide shelter of a sort. Eventually an area was cleared between Indaleni and the town of Richmond and tents were erected, water and electric flood-lights provided and refugees moved in. An ex Durban City Councillor, Mr Higginson and his wife kindly volunteered to run it. As of 2 0 July 1991, the camp was occupied by about 500-700 refugees, comprising both ANC and Inkatha supporters. My information is that there are many more ANC supporters residing there (despite the "official" boycott), although Mr Kim Hodgson of the Inkatha Institute disagrees with me.

t (

The Inkatha Institute again denied that the clashes were political, with Mr Mfayela saying: "these people have been fighting over different issues since 1986, why now is it suddenly ANC/Inkatha?" (17) However it was quite clear that the Institute was in touch with the people on the ground at the time, since Mr Siya Nkehle, another researcher at the Institute, told me later that he had instructed Mr Ndodi Thusi (the Indaleni leader of the IFP) to tell Mr Vezi to stop the attacks. If it is true that Mr Vezi was behind the attacks, and it would seem that Mr Nkehle believed so, then the question of how he knew this arises.In any event, Mr Vezi - if he was behind the attacks, and indeed if he did receive any instruction of that sort - did not seem to heed it. The attacks became bolder and eventually the impis were launching daring attacks - in the face of a heavy security force presence - deep into Indaleni with apparent impunity (see below - The War comes to Indaleni at 3.3).The Inkatha forces at this time began to take control of more and more areas into Indaleni, reportedly returning to N'kobeni or Pateni on each occasion, laden with looted furniture and other winnings from the hundreds of vacated houses. What is significant here is that while these sorts of victories were being won, Inkatha seemed uninterested in peace talks. Numerous attempts to first identify and then locate the Inkatha leaders proved fruitless, until the police were called in and they somehow managed to establish contact. The local clergy were requested to play a facilitating role which they did, notably the Rev Roger Hudson of the Indaleni Mission and Rev John Green of the Anglican Church - finally getting the parties to sit down and talk. Some progress was made at this first meeting, with Inkatha leaders undertaking to look into the question of looted belongings and ongoing attacks.On that occasion the parties appeared to be satisfied when they left the meeting, but the N'kobeni attacks continued.The Inkatha delegation unfortunately never attended any of the three meetings scheduled after that time, and their failure to do so was interpreted by most as a reluctance to negotiate away the gains that they had made. Mr Vezi did make it known however, that the Inkatha delegation would be prepared to talk to Indaleni residents if they were represented by the chief, Mzwandile Majozi of Indaleni, as he was the "true leader." (18) Majozi, who has been linked to the IFP through his induna, Mr Ndodi Thusi (the leader of the IFP in Indaleni) went on to say that the insistence that he lead the Indaleni delegation was based on the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes "which guaranteed that the existing tribal structures would remain intact until negotiations are completed." (19) This would have led to the ludicrous situation in which both (opposing) delegations would have been led by Inkatha people. My criticism of this scenario and the Inkatha Institute's argument that the fighting was not between the ANC and Inkatha, but territorially-based, was unfortunately not well received by them, and my relationship with IFP people in the area seems to have

suffered as a result. (20)In any event, the ANC flatly refused to comply with Vezi's demands, with Nkabinde saying, "our chief is not recognised by Magoda or Indaleni residents and so he cannot be represented at the meeting, They can kill us, but we will never take him back." (21)At this point (13 February 1991), comrades who had gathered in Indaleni attacked Chief Majozi's house there. The chief's induna, one Mr Ndodi Thusi, is the IF? leader for the area of Indaleni, and although Inkatha support in Indaleni was thin on the ground (my research reveals that despite the Inkatha Institute's claims of extensive following in the area, not more than 10% of Indaleni residents support the IFP (23)), they constituted then, as they do now, a relatively powerful military force. This is simply by virtue of the considerably superior firepower at their disposal, with "bodyguards" to the chief being appointed by Mr Thusi (these were private individuals who had aligned themselves with Inkatha) (24), and issued with Rl and G3 rifles via the Kwa Zulu Police (who are not stationed in the area) with the stated aim of "protecting Kwazulu Government property." It is perhaps worth noting that the Kwazulu Government owns no land or buildings or any other property of any sort in the area, although they administer several schools there.

IOC

°/ 'o

83

50m L:

X12

SAN C

PEd.ae.VEQ A G G ££S S O R _

AN INFORMAL OPINION POLL CONDUCTED DURING MARCH AND APRIL (25)

At the time of the attack on his house, Chief Majozi had fortunately fled to Richmond, where he was being accomodated at the Richmond Police Station, and so he escaped injury although his house was gutted by fire after petrol-bombs and hand grenades were thrown at it.The most remarkable aspect of this attack is that the SAP were on the scene within 2 0 minutes of the beginning of the attack - which is a considerably shorter response time than any recorded during the Inkatha attacks on Magoda. (26)

3.3 THE WAR COMES TO INDALENIAfter refugees were ordered out of Richmond by the local white authorities, who quoted the police as saying that the area was under control and therefore safe for the refugees to return, there does appear to have been an influx of people returning to Magoda. This number is probably in the region of about 1 000 people, although Mrs J Nzimande of Magoda township says: "Many of us did not believe the police when they said it was safe to go back, so when they threw us out of Richmond we tried to find other places to go - like Durban. But some people had nowhere else to go, they had to return to Magoda." (22)On March 6 another Inkatha attack was launched from N'kobeni into Magoda. Six houses were burnt, including that of ANC chairman Sfiso Nkabinde. Another ANC member whose house was targetted - a Mr Siphiwe Ntinga - survived an AK 47 and petrol-bomb attack by an impi which was the first to invade Indaleni. The same impi had earlier stood at the gates of the Methodist Mission, and according to Rev Roger Hudson, shouted "away with the comrades." Rev Hudson was giving shelter to about 400 refugees on the premises, and refused to hand them over to the impi, as he was "sure they were going to kill them." The police were alerted at this point, and managed to intercept the impi while they were attacking Mr Ntinga's house, thus almost certainly saving his life. Mr Ntinga then says the impi made its way down to Chief Majozi's house, and he asked the police to arrest them. He was escorted to Majozi's house by the SAP, where he "positively identified" 3 attackers, whom the police took into custody. However, after being held for questioning they were released - and I have not been able to obtain any record of prosecutions arising therefrom. (26)For the remainder of that month the attacks into Indaleni by N'kobeni and Pateni residents continued, aided by Inkatha supporters in Indaleni. Having nowhere else to go, many of the youths who were defending the area had to withdraw to KwaKhote, near Pietermaritzburg, where they joined thousands of other refugees, mostly women and children.For the remainder of the month of March, people continued to flee Indaleni. Having been denied shelter in the white areas, most fled to Pietermaritzburg and Kwa Khote, while others went to Durban and the coastal townships. The number of displacees from both Indaleni and Magoda around this time rose to an unprecedented 50 000 people, with Magoda 100 % depopulated, and Indaleni around 60 %. The last of the 11 schools in the area (Ndala High) closed on March 15, with "impis ruling the night." (28)Perhaps the most significant event during that time, was the experience of a young Natal Witness journalist, Mr Craig Urquhart, on March 22. He was attempting to interview Chief Majozi, but upon arriving at the chief's house, was asked to leave by "men in civillian clothes, who said they were members of the SADF." When he asked if they were from Military Intelligence, they allegedly became very aggresive, and "cocked their rifles provocatively."

On March 24 Inkatha held a "peace rally" in Indaleni in which Chief Majozi invited displacees to return to their homes, but denounced "outside involvement in the area," in particular that of the ANC's Midlands branch. He then introduced the guest speaker, Mr David Ntombela, Inkatha leader and Kwazulu MP from Elandskop. Mr Ntombela was in fact the person to qualify the chief's invitation, saying that returnees would first be required to report to the chief before re-occupying their homes. He also warned that "youngsters in the area had "better behave themselves since the area belongs to Kwazulu." (29) He is also alleged to have said that if youths wanted to join the ANC then they should not bother coming back, but should "return to the Tanskei." (3 0) The ANC responded angrily in the press, (31) but Ntombela later denied that he had said this. (32)

3.4 THE TABLES ARE TURNED.The ANC in any event, decided to "take the chief up on his offer" (33) and on the 2 6 March, I was contacted by Mr John Jeffrey, of the ANC's Regional Executive Committee, and asked to monitor the return of an "advance group of comrades" who would effectively be "testing the waters." He also informed me that he had been in touch with Brigadier Jonker of the SAP in Pietermaritzburg, and informed him of the plans.The next day, March 27, 1991, I drove up to Pietermaritzburg and met with ANC leaders, then followed the busses from KwaKhote out to Richmond. As we were entering Indaleni, a shot was fired from some nearby trees, and myself and the comrades I was with, took cover. When it seemed safe to do so, I drove back to the town of Richmond with Nkabinde, to meet with Lt Lombard on the question of security (or the lack of it). He informed me that he had not been informed about the return of the comrades, despite Jeffrey's communication with Jonker. In any event, I pleaded with him to provide some type of armed escort for those returning to their homes. He assured us that we would encounter security forces in the area, and that we should simply aproach them for help. When I questioned this, and requested him to radio for an escort, he replied that it was the SADF who were in the area, and that they were in radio contact with the army headquarters based at the other end of the town of Richmond. He undertook to ' communicate my concerns to them, at which point Nkabinde and myself returned to the mission.Upon my return to Indaleni and the mission, where the comrades were gathered, there was a single police van with 2 black policemen in it, observing the scene. However they simply drove off soon afterwards, and so I went to the mission to telephone Lt Lombard again. He told me that vehicles were on their way to the scene. Satisfied, I then left for a meeting in Durban (for which I was already late), but encountered no sign of security forces on my way out.I am informed that they never arrived, and the first Inkatha attack on "Cuba," where the comrades were grouped, took place soon after nightfall - about 7:45, March 27. Comrades were taken by surprise, and two youths were killed before the group could run away. The comrades informed me later that a decision was then taken to dig up a number of arms caches, which they had "hoped not to have to use." The arms were located at eMaswazini (34), above the mission. It was here that they regrouped, and set up an ambush for the Inkatha impis which were in pursuit. However they discovered that some of their caches had been found, and were only able to locate a number of "qwashas," or home-made guns.The impis which pursued them broke into two groups. The Pateni and N'kobeni impi, allegedly led by Mr Vezi, approached from the road past the mission (the south-east), while the Indaleni impi, allegedly led by Cele, Mtolo and Shelembe, cirled around to the north and approached from the direction of the Hella Hella road.

Both impis met up with each other at the point of the ambush, with the comrades opening fire on the combined group and killing 3 Inkatha people, 2 from the N'kobeni and Pateni group, and another from the Indaleni impi.The impis then retreated to the chief's house, with the comrades in hot pursuit. It was then that the police arrived, and the comrades fled - not back to eMaswazini - but in the direction of the timber plantation to the south-east (35), where they had buried two AK 47's and "a number" of hand grenades a month earlier.It was here that the comrades "dug themselves in," digging a comprehensive network of trenches designed to ensure maximum defence capability. They were there for 3 6 hours while the impis gathered together the biggest attacking force yet seen in the Richmond area, alleged to comprise some three hundred men armed with R l's, R 4's, G 3's and AK 47's, and many hand-guns. They entered the plantation around 07h00 on the morning of March 29, where they were engaged by the comrades in a fire-fight of unprecedented proportions, and which later became known as the "Battle of the Forest."The comrades were however too well entrenched - the battle lasted a mere 6 minutes, with the Inkatha force sustaining heavy losses and being forced to fall back. A total of 23 Inkatha supporters died there in the forest, and another 3 Were shot as the group fled in the direction of Majozi's house; while the comrades suffered no losses whatsoever. Inkatha casualties would have been considerably higher, had it not been for the timeous arrival of the police. The comrades then withdrew back to the forest where they buried their weapons.For the next two to three days however, the "victory" of the battle of the forest was eclipsed by some comrades who went on a killing spree which can only be described as "vengeful and excessive in the extreme." While some of the youth attacked strategic points held by Inkatha, eventually forcing them to retreat to N'kobeni, other comrades turned their attention to easier targets, in particular, residents who had "collaborated" with Inkatha during their occupation of Indaleni. People who had joined Inkatha during that period were seized and despite desparate pleas that they had been forced to join, were summarily executed. Police put the figure at about 21, but my information is that the real figure is closer to thirty.While frustration at the lack of security force success in stemming the earlier Inkatha attacks is understandable - the ANC in the area lost a great deal of the moral high ground which they had held up to that point - through what was rightfully perceived as a massacre of genocidal proportions.Police arrested some 3 5 comrades over this period, and held them without bail for about 2 months. Most agree however, that the police conducted the arrests indiscriminately, allowing many of the perpetrators to go free while charging some people who were clearly innocent. All but three were eventually released and charges

dropped as a result of "lack of evidence" - according to the police.From a strategical analysis of the fight for control of Indaleni, it should be noted that the area is vulnerable to attack - especially if the defending forces are widely deployed and thus fragmented.Just as the roving Inkatha impis were able to strike against individual houses and small areas of "under-defended" territory, so was the band of comrades which moved at night and retreated into the vast timber plantations during the day - able to strike with devastating effect at the sparsely occupied Indaleni. The remainder of the Inkatha supporters were forced - by April 2 - to retreat to N'kobeni, with the ANC regaining control of Indaleni. But a valuable lesson had been learnt by both sides - viz. as in most cases of township conflict, any large territory (and Indaleni is fairly extensive by most standards) is easier to attack than defend. It was a lesson which Inkatha and/or other anti-ANC forces were to use with devastating effect in the months to come.

During this time I liased with the police, the Inkatha Institute and the ANC - and was finally assured by the ANC leadership, notably Sfiso Nkabinde, that "they had brought the comrades under control." With this assurance I went back to the Inkatha Institute and managed to secure Siya Nkehle's and Senzo Mfyaela's support for the idea of peace talks. They presumably gave the go- ahead for Majozi, who had been approached by the SAP, to participate in dialogue with the ANC leaders. Police attempted to facilitate discusssions (April 3) , but this time the ANC required a mandate from the community, with Nkabinde saying he would call a mass meeting on the following Sunday, and Majozi walking out.After some pursuasion the Regional Peace Implementation Committee (also known as the 4 - a side, consisting of 8 Natal leaders from both the ANC and Inkatha agreed to take up the issue at regional level, but both sides were unable to convince their followers to meet. In my opinion this demonstrates the weakness of middle- level leadership in attempting to address local and localised issues. It became clear then, that any meaningful or lasting peace settlement would have to eminate from and be executed by people on the ground.On Sunday, the 7 April, the meeting did indeed take place. Addressed by Midlands ANC chair, Mr Harry Gwala - and monitored by a security force presence of an awesome size (3 6) - the meeting of about 2 000 community members failed to reach consensus on the issue of peace talks. In the light of Inkatha1s apparent prepardeness to negotiate, this was a tragedy. One wonders if the deaths which were to follow could perhaps have been averted, had the ANC consolidated its position on the need for peace, and engaged Inkatha in talks. But just as Inkatha had been reluctant to compromise its position of power earlier on, so the ANC was afraid to bargain now that it had regained control.

X.U

Z-O

3.6 "NORMALITY" RETURNS.During the rest of the month of April and some of May, Indaleni was under the almost exclusive control of the ANC supporters in the area. One exception to this however, was the strategically significant junction at the entrance to Magoda, between the chief's house and the mission above it.This junction, through which one has to pass en route to greater Indaleni, eMaswazini, Townlands, Magoda and Msmozomeni - was controlled by the Indaleni-based Inkatha members. Although they only numbered about 11, they were heavily armed with G3 ' s and R l's, which they carried openly. From this point they were able, to a large extent, to control access to and from the area, and numerous residents alleged harrasmentand assaults by theses people- on the basis of suspected sympathy for the ANC.But it was not only by virtue of the fire-power at their immediate disposal which ensured their capacity to hold the junction. It must be remembered that they faced overwhelming odds in the form of some 500 (also well-armed) comrades, and the only reason that they were able to hold the area was because of the police sub­station which had been created directly opposite the IFP leader, Mr Ndodi Thusi's house (which also housed the impi in some barracks on the premises) about fifty metres from the junction. (37)It has been my consistent argument (and that of many others (38)), that the effect (we are not certain about the purpose) of the police station in that particular locality was to ensure that the IFP people located there could continue to control the junction as a strategic point - thus preventing literally thousands of refugees from returning to their homes. A French Television, and later a BBC TV crew which were taken through the aea by PACSA (39) worker Mark Butler and Father Jabulani Mtolo (a Catholic priest who hails from the area) were harrased by these people. Later in May, participants in the Albert Lutuli Foundation tour hosted by Mr Pierre Cronje of the Democratic Party (MP) were witness to this armed group outside the police sub-station, and soon afterwards they disappeared. It is not known who issued orders to that effect.After they disappeared though, refugees began streaming back into the area and re-occupying their homes.

3.7 THE TERROR CAMPAIGNThe events of the following weeks however, were to neutralise any progress made towards normalisation. In fact the pattern of events which began to reveal itself during the latter part of May, and June and July confirmed for myself and a number of other observers at least, that there was a clear intention behind the attacks which occured during that period - namely to destabilise and cause maximum disruption to life in the area. This is because each and every attempt to restore some semblance of normality was countered with violent action by people - some known, others still unidentified - who we can presume have a vested interest in ongoing chaos.The first event was on May 27, when the first pension payout to elderly Indaleni residents in months took place above the mission. Pensioners had gathered to receive their pay-outs, some having brought their sons and grand-sons to give them pocket money, as they were comrades who had been living in the plantations, or high up at eMaswazini without food - except for the little that the ANC was able to bring in every two to three days.While people were standing outside the area, a number of men drew up in a vehicle. They alighted and opened fire on the group of people. Two youths were killed and an old woman wounded. Some twenty witnesses have identified Inkatha members Mr Mtolo and Mr Shelembe as leading the attackers, and firing the shots.When, after statements were given to the police and they failed to arrest the attackers, Mr Nkabinde met with the local CID. He tells me he was informed by them that they could not arrest the alleged killers since they were breadwinners and they were also protecting their homes and families against the comrades.The ANC immediately called for a protest march to the Richmond Police Station, to call for the arrest of the "warlords." This took place on Thursday May 30, and went off without any problem, with the police accepting the memorandum handed to them by ANC representatives and "promising to look into the matter." (40)Both Shelembe and Mtolo were arrested a few days later and remain in police custody, awaiting trial.It is important to note that these arrests were the first of any Inkatha supporters which "stuck," ie. it appears that they will go to trial. In this respect the May murders marked a turning point in the follow-up actions of the police. One hopes that the sudden renewal of media interest in the area did not have anything to do with the "about-turn" in police action, but when only ANC supporters were in prison at the time, and no one had been charged for the many murders of ANC supporters up until that point - one has to wonder.The following Sunday morning, June 2, a group of comrades were digging the graves for the burial (that afternoon) of the two who had been killed earlier in the week. They had fortunately located an armed guard above the road, while they were working in the

cemetry below it. A vehicle with "taped over number-plates" stopped near where they were and opened fire - killing two comrades and wounding another. At that point the comrades who were guarding the cemetry opened fire and claim to have hit - possibly killed - two of the attackers. Police records however do not make mention of any fatalities in that particular attack however, and comrades I have spoken to since, say that comrades were wounded, not killed in that attack.

Mbongoleni Mtolo, nephew to the warlord of the same name, had a "close shave" while digging graves for two of his comrades allegedly killed by his uncle and other IFP supporters earlier in the week, the bullet in fact passed through the hat he was wearing - leaving a furrow in his scalp.

Again there was an influx of a massive contingent of security force personnel, but a relatively tranquil period followed.The next natural step towards normality, especially in the light of the peaceful period of about three weeks, was for peace talks to occur. Only this time it was the Inkatha people who approached Sfiso Nkabinde, who undertook to call a meeting of the local branch of the ANC, which then gave its approval. The initial meeting was scheduled for Thursday, June 20, but was postponed at the request of the Inkatha delegation to Monday, June 24, as they had "not been able to make up a delegation of seven people at such short notice, especially since two of our leaders are in jail." (41)The ANC decided to "use the delay to consult with the community," and called a mass meeting for Sunday, June 23. However the talks were nearly scuttled by the killing of a comrade, Thunsi Majozi, on Friday June 21. There is still confusion about how he died - some claimig that he had been abducted by police and taken to Chief Majozi's house (he was related to the chief) where he was killed, others saying that he was killed by "white people" and others, (the majority) saying that they were not sure who to believe.At the Sunday meeting, which I was asked to address, I made whatI thought was a fairly strong case for talks, saying that without such negotiations and hopefully a resolution, the conflict was likely to drag on indefinately. Of the 2000-odd people attending, none opposed the idea of talking to Inkatha, despite initial

misgivings based on the recent killing of Thunsi Majozi. All were in favour of meeting with Inkatha the following day.The massacre which occured that night is now well-known. Only on Monday morning though did the full extent of the killings emerge. Sixteen people, (42) mostly old men, and some children (including a two year old) had been shot and stabbed and killed. The killings occured at three different locations in the township, well spaced out as if for maximum effect. According to witnesses, the killers had banged on doors, shouting "Open up for Inkatha!" (43) before opening fire on occupants of the houses attacked. Some of the victims had been mutilated, with limbs and other body parts having been severed - presumably for the purposes of "muti."Immediately high-level police officers converged on the area, including Brigadier Jonker, who was to investigate claims of police involvement which had emerged.The allegations of security force involvement remain, in the opinion of the ANC, unaddressed. What is the substance of these allegations?1) Firstly two comrades who were on guard below the mission station have made statements to the effect that they saw two 4X4 police vehicles off-loading heavily armed people near Townlands, where one of the attacks in which five youths died, took place. They say the vehicles then left the scene.2) This statement is confirmed by a woman who independently saw two "vans" off-loading people, and has also made a statement to that effect.3) A comrade who was also in the house with five of his friends, and the only survivor of that particular attack, one Biezwe Mbanjwe, says in his statement that he heard English being spoken, and that his attackers wore police (riot or reservist) camoflauge jackets. He dived out of the window after being stabbed twice, and was was shot in the leg as he fled into the darkness.4) Objectively it is possible to say that there was a reasonably heavy security force presence in the townships at the time, and if, as the statements allege, the killers were in vehicles, there is validity in the asking why they were not apprehended.5) Mr Pierre Cronje was contacted in Pietermaitzburg that night by residents of Indaleni who had heard gun-fire, but when he telephoned the police, who were in contact with patrols and camps in the area, they said they that "all was quiet."6) Spent cartridges, and some live ammunition was found on the scene. All were Armscor manufactured R 1 rifle rounds (7.62 calibre), although they were of a fairly old vintage (1979) .The police investigation team were not able to confirm that there had been any vehicles involved, and when they made the 13 arrests in connection with the killings, they said that the information

Collection Number: AG1977

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN (ECC)

PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers Research Archive

Location:- Johannesburg

©2013

LEGAL NOTICES:

Copyright Notice: All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Disclaimer and Terms of Use: Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only.

People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate,

distorted or untrue. While these digital records are true facsimiles of paper documents and the information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be accurate and reliable, Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand has not independently verified their content. Consequently, the University is not responsible for any errors or

omissions and excludes any and all liability for any errors in or omissions from the information on the website or any related information on third party websites accessible from this website.

This document is part of a collection held at the Historical Papers Research Archive at The University of the

Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.