the response to the laura d’amato · the laura d’amato, a 96 121 dwt (deadweight tonne) oil...

THE RESPONSE TO THE

Laura D’AmatoOIL SPILL

REPORT OF THEINCIDENT ANALYSIS TEAM

Australian MaritimeSafety Authority

AMSA

i

Laura D’Amato - Incident Analysis Team Report

Response to the Laura D’Amato

oil spill

Report of the Incident Analysis Team

April 2000

Report by the Incident Analysis Team into the response by the National Plan toCombat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and other Noxious and HazardousSubstances, to the oil spill from the Laura D’Amato in Sydney Harbour NSW on3 August 1999.

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CONTENTS

Page

Preface iii

Executive Summary iv

Incident description 1

The response: initial and overall effectiveness 9

Planning: adequacy and effectiveness of incident response plansand their implementation 12

Personnel and equipment 15

Adequacy and effectiveness of wildlife rescue and rehabilitation 19

Environmental advice and support 21

Occupational health and safety issues 24

Administrative support services 26

Relationships among parties involved in the incident 29

Contingency plans: national, State and local 32

List of recommendations 34

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference 36

Appendix 2 Glossary 38

iii


PREFACE

Following the oil spill from the Laura D’Amato in Sydney Harbour on 3 August 1999 twoinquiries were undertaken to investigate the circumstances surrounding the cause of theoil spill. One investigation was established by the NSW Minister for Transport under theNSW Marine Pollution Act 1987 to determine the reasons for the spill and whether anycorporation or individuals were responsible for the spill and should be prosecuted. Thesecond investigation undertaken by the Marine Incident Investigation Unit (MIIU) inthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau was established under the provisions of theNavigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, of the Navigation Act 1912. The purpose ofthe MIIU investigation was to identify the factors contributing to the incident so as toassist in preventing similar incidents in the future.

An Incident Analysis, the subject of this report, was undertaken under general terms ofreference adopted by the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and OtherNoxious and Hazardous Substances Advisory Committee in 1998. An Incident AnalysisTeam was established in September 1999 to undertake a comprehensive analysis of themanagement of the incident from an oil spill response perspective and to asses anydeficiencies in the National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and otherNoxious and Hazardous Substances or in the actual response. The terms of reference forthe Incident Analysis including details of the Analysis Team are at Appendix 1.

Members of the Incident Analysis Team attended key debriefing sessions of the mainorganisations involved with the response, conducted personal interviews anddiscussions with many of the people involved with the response and with communityand environmental groups.

Any comments or criticisms in the report must be read in a constructive sense. As withany analysis of an emergency incident it is essential to ensure that the lessons learnedare used to improve arrangements and plans in readiness for any future incidents.

The Incident Analysis Team greatly appreciates the response of the many individualsand organisations who provided written reports and made time available for informalinterviews and discussion.

Michael JulianChairIncident Analysis Team

14 April 2000

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On 3 August 1999 the Laura D’Amato, a 96 121 DWTItalian registered oil tanker, was berthed alongside atthe Shell Gore Bay terminal in Sydney discharging itscargo of Murban light crude oil. Between 1826 and 1850hours an estimated 250 to 300 tonnes of cargo waspumped into Sydney Harbour from the ship throughan open sea valve system. These sea valves are normallyclosed. This was the largest ship sourced oil spill inSydney Harbour.

The prevailing conditions of a southerly wind and floodtide confined the majority of the oil to Gore Cove andBalls Head Bay, thus restricting the movement of theoil throughout the Harbour.

Rapid reaction by the Sydney Ports Corporation dutyoperational crew and the Shell Gore Bay terminal staffhad the vessel surrounded by boom by 1910 therebyminimising the spread of oil.

By 1930 hours the Sydney Ports Corporation oil spillresponse Incident Control Centre at Moores Warehouse,Millers Point was operational, with the IncidentCommander in position and the overall IncidentController mobilised soon after.

The Master of the Laura D’Amato reported that the spillwas 14 cubic metres in size. However, estimates late inthe evening by the Shell Gore Bay terminal staff showedthat the spill could have been between 80 and 300 cubicmetres. It was on this basis that Shell mobilised its ownstaff and contractors, including additional responseequipment and personnel from the industry’s centralstockpile at the Geelong based Australian Marine OilSpill Centre. The range of spill size was not formallycommunicated to the Incident Commander at the time.

During the night it became clear from observations ofthe extensive oil movement in the harbour that asignificantly larger quantity than 14 cubic metres of oilhad been spilt, confirming a higher spill size, possiblywithin the range estimated by Shell. It was then thatthe Incident Commander mobilised National Planresources directly from other NSW ports and interstatefrom Brisbane, Melbourne and Canberra through theAustralian Maritime Safety Authority.

Oil recovery operations using 5 Marco oil spill recoveryvessels, a boat mounted brush skimmer, a number ofdisk and weir skimmers together with a variety of boomtypes and shore flushing equipment was used on a dailybasis up to 14 August 1999. Spot cleaning of foreshorescontinued until 20 August 1999.

Overall, a very high proportion of the spilt oil wasrecovered. Of the 250 - 300 tonnes spilt, an estimated

120 - 150 tonnes of oil was lost through evaporation andof the remaining oil 90 percent was recovered.

Not surprisingly the location and size of the spill in oneof the world’s most well known harbours createdmassive media interest both locally and internationally.

The Incident Analysis Team found that the response waseffective and well executed. The end result of ‘a cleanharbour’ with no reported signs of environmentaldamage is a clear testament to the success of theresponse operation and how it was managed.

Nevertheless there are lessons that can be learned fromthis incident and areas where improvements can bemade. These have been identified in order for animproved National Plan response to any future incident,particularly one that may be of a considerably largersize.

Some 18 recommendations have been made, mostly ofan operational nature. It needs to be recognised thatthe issues giving rise to the recommendations did notmaterially affect the overall outcome of the incident.However, they could do so in a more complex or largerspill with more environmentally sensitive issues to bedealt with.

There are three main areas arising out of this incidentthat are worthy of further consideration by the NationalPlan Advisory Committee.

Firstly, the need to hasten the implementation of theNational Plan Oil Spill Response Incident ControlSystem and to issue guidelines on the structure to beused in ICCs during the remainder of theimplementation phase. Such guidelines shall make itclear that a common national approach to this matter isnecessary so that those providing a response role willbe familiar with the response structure anywhere inAustralia.

Secondly, the need to adopt a policy which clearly spellsout that spill sizes should be estimated using allappropriate techniques and the estimated figures shouldbe immediately communicated to all interested parties,including the public. The upper amount should be usedas a ‘worst case scenario’ in planning the response.

Thirdly, the importance of having unified managementof an incident with a single Incident Control Centre. Inthis case, the split responsibilities between the IncidentControl Centre at Moores Warehouse and the ShellOperational Centre at Gore Bay Terminal causedunnecessary confusion and uncertainty about use ofresources, what operational requirements had beencompleted and what remained to be undertaken.

Executive Summary

1


INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

The Laura D’Amato, a 96 121 dwt (deadweight tonne) oil tanker owned byD’Amato Armatore and registered in Italy was berthed alongside No. 1 berthat the Shell terminal at Gore Bay, Sydney, discharging its cargo of Murbanlight crude oil. At approximately 1826 hours the Shell Shore Officer noticedan offensive smell and on investigating observed oil in the water in thevicinity of the stern of the vessel. All cargo discharge pumping was stoppedat 1836 hours. However, oil release continued through open sea valves untilapproximately 1850 hours when the valves were closed.

Between 1840 and 1845 hours calls were made by Shell’s Gore Bay terminalstaff to the Sydney Ports Corporation (SPC) ‘duty operational crew’ based atthe Moores Warehouse depot advising the spill and the need for assistance.Between 1847 and 1852 hours the duty crew mobilised two vessels withAustpol Lite and GP 500 foam filled fence and buoyancy booms andproceeded to the Gore Bay terminal. Shell terminal personnel with theassistance of SPC were also deploying boom to contain the oil, while otherstaff alerted Shell senior management.

Formal notification of the spill to Sydney Ports Harbour Control was madeby the cargo agents Barwil at 1850 hours, advising that the Master of theLaura D’Amato estimated the spill at 10 to 14 cubic metres. Harbour Controlimmediately commenced its pre-planned emergency call-out procedures.

The wind at that time was from the south, and a flood tide was runningwhich resulted initially in most of the oil being pushed into Gore Cove andBalls Head Bay.

At 1844 hours the NSW Fire Brigade’s Sydney Communications Centrereceived the first of some 600 calls via the ‘000’ emergency network fromresidents, mainly north of the harbour, complaining of a strong gas smell.The furthest was from Hornsby, 15 kilometres away.

The NSW Fire Brigade dispatched a number of units to ascertain the locationof what was thought to be a major gas leak. By 1902 hours it was thoughtthat the ‘gas’ was possibly coming from the Gore Bay terminal. The firstunits arrived at the Shell Gore Bay facility at 1913 hours and commencedinvestigating the source of the smell. By 1927 hours the NSW Fire Brigadehad ascertained the source as the oil spill at the Gore Bay terminal, and, withthe police, set up a forward operational base in the Shell Gore Bay terminalOperations Centre.

Tuesday 3 August 1999

1

Laura D’Amato at Gore Bay

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By 1910 hours the vessel was enclosed by boom, by 2040 hours a secondcontainment boom, GP 500 boom, was deployed from Manns Point to BallsHead across the inner part of Gore Cove, and by 2242 a third boom enclosedthe outer Gore Cove.

The NSW Fire Brigade was concerned about the flammability of the oil, thepossible risk of explosion, and the ship perhaps catching fire. Shell personnelprovided the NSW Fire Brigade with the relevant Material Safety Data Sheetfor Murban crude. By 2000 hours the HAZMAT unit arrived and continuedto monitor the area for the remainder of the night. Gore Bay terminal staffalso used their own equipment to test continually for explosive mixtures,establishing that there was a low risk of either fire or explosion.

It was coincidental that the spill site and source of the strong odour wereclose to the Gore Hill studios of ABC TV, whose ‘The 7.30 Report’ compereKerry O’Brien mentioned the smell and the oil spill at the Gore Bay Terminal.That early television coverage alerted several key personnel in Sydney andothers interstate. The coverage prompted the Australian Marine SafetyAuthority (AMSA) Environment Protection Group (EPG) duty officer totelephone Sydney Harbour Control. After several attempts the EPG dutyofficer made contact at 2005 hours and was informed of the 14 cubic metrespill and that the vessel had been boomed-off.

Under the Sydney Ports Marine Services Procedures and which integratewith the NSW Disaster Management Structure, this type of incident falls intothe category Single Agency Supported Response. Such a response ismanaged by the Sydney Ports Incident Commander, a position filled by theSydney Ports Corporation General Manager Port Services. Under the NSWState Disaster Management Organisation the Incident (Oil Spill) Commanderreports to the Emergency Operations (Oil Spill) Controller. The designatedEmergency Operations (Oil Spill) Controller, referred to as the IncidentController, is currently the Chief Executive of the NSW WaterwaysAuthority.

The Incident Commander, who was at home, was notified of the incident at1905 hours and drove to Moores Warehouse, the nominated Sydney IncidentControl Centre (ICC) arriving at 1920 hours. The Incident Controller, whoheard on television about the oil spill and telephoned the IncidentCommander just before 2000 hours to seek confirmation, arrived at the ICCat 2020 hours. Between 1925 and 2030 hours other personnel arrived to jointhe response and to set up and operate the ICC.

The NSW Fire Brigade were requested to provide a liaison officer at the ICCat 1945 hours, by 2041 a NSW Fire Brigade Inspector was located at the ICC.

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The Incident Controller arranged for members of the State National PlanTechnical Working Group (TWG) to meet at the Department of Transport’sKent Street Incident Support Centre at 0630 hours the following morning.This included personnel from Port Kembla and the Port of Newcastle.

Following discussions among the NSW Fire Brigade, Ambulance Officers atthe scene and the Department of Health, it was agreed to release thefollowing advice to the public about the smell:

May cause irritation to the throat, however, no long-term effects to beexpected. People with concerns should remain indoors and any personsuffering an increase in asthma symptoms or other respiratory problemsshould seek further medical advice.

At 2200 hours AMSA’s General Manager Maritime Operations telephoned theIncident Controller to seek advice on the extent of the spill and whetherNational Plan assistance was required. The Incident Controller indicated thatat that stage National Plan assistance was not required but might be requiredwhen the full extent of the spill was known. The situation was to be reviewedovernight and, if circumstances changed, assistance would be sought.

At 2300 hours the ICC mobilised the Caltex Kurnell Refinery’s brushskimmer equipped oil response vessel Botany Protector to assist.

At about 2300 hours Shell personnel at the Gore Bay Terminal using variousmethodologies estimated the spill at between 80 and 300 cubic metres,compared with the advice of the ship’s Master of 10 to 14 cubic metres.

By 2330 hours skimming activity in Gore Gove had commenced using one ofSPC’s National Plan Marco oil spill recovery vessels (OSRVs), the Anadara.

At midnight Shell mobilised the oil industry’s Geelong based AustralianMarine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), on stand-by since being alerted shortlyafter the spill. AMOSC selected a range of equipment and despatched it bytruck. Two technical personnel were also sent to assist.

At 0005 hours the crane barge Poolya was also deployed to recover oil with itsbrush skimmer and 7000 litre storage tank. At 0200 hours an SPC NationalPlan Marco H28 OSRV from Botany Bay also began recovering oil.

Shell personnel commenced oil recovery operations using a Komara 12K discskimmer and a twin drum skimmer.

At about 0300 hours oil was evident as far east as Blues Point, and it wasclear the spill was much larger than the 14 cubic metres estimated by theship’s Master, and supporting estimates by Shell of a higher amount. TheIncident Commander decided more assistance was required. At 0420 hours acall was made to Port of Newcastle for marine crew to assist in boomdeployment and to bring a Komara skimmer. The Port of Newcastle alsodecided to bring a GP 500 boom, which was mounted on a trailer and readyfor immediate departure.

Wednesday 4 August 1999

Oil and oiled debris collected byMarco oil spill recovery vessel

Botany Protector transitting oilsheen to discharge recovered oil

Botany Protector dischargingrecovered oil

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By 0432 hours some 5500 litres of oil/emulsion had been recovered.

At 0500 hours AMSA’s EPG Duty Officer was contacted with advice that thespill could be as much as 300 cubic metres. At 0515 the Incident Commandercontacted AMSA’s EPG Duty Officer requesting National Plan assistance. Itwas agreed that two or three additional OSRVs and personnel to operatethem were required. In a later call to AMSA it was agreed that two MarcoOSRVs be brought in from interstate and assistance with the responseorganisation structure would be required, that is, planners, supervisors,aerial surveillance and media relations. It was agreed that AMSA wouldprovide that support from its own staff, who are members of the NationalResponse Team.

AMSA discussed equipment requirements with Queensland Transport. Itwas agreed to dispatch two H28 Marco OSRVs with four personnel. A furtherMarco OSRV was put on stand-by in Melbourne pending the result of thefirst aerial surveillance flight.

AMSA made arrangements with Emergency Management Australia (EMA)for two RAAF aircraft to be used to transport the two Marco OSRVs fromBrisbane. Based on advice given to AMSA it was estimated these could be inthe water recovering oil by 1500 hours that day. It was agreed later in the daythat there was a requirement for the Melbourne Marco OSRV and that itwould be transported overnight by road.

At 0700 hours the first aerial surveillance flight over Sydney Harbourrevealed a significant concentration of oil in Balls Head Bay extending toGoat Island, and patches in the northern end of Lavender Bay. Heavy sheenwas observed from Cockatoo Island to the Opera House.

Information gathered from this flight was used later in the day to estimatethe quantity of oil on Sydney Harbour to be in the region of 120 tonnes. Thiswas the figure used by the ICC for response planning purposes. Themethodology used in estimating surface oil was as recommended by theInternational Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF), using theformula of 1mm of black oil over 1 square kilometre in area equates to 1000cubic metres.

It was agreed that surveillance flights would be undertaken at 0700 hours,1100 hours and 1700 hours each day. Debriefing sessions were held an hourafter each flight to give ICC personnel the latest intelligence and provide theopportunity to make ‘strategic comments’.

At 0700 hours an interview with the Incident Controller was conducted onChannel 9’s ‘Today’ show.

At 0800 hours the Botany Protector commenced skimming operations inDarling Harbour before working toward Berrys Bay. The fire tug Ted Noffs

was used to break up the sheen in the area east of Kirribilli Point.

Media interviews with NSWMinister for Transport, Carl Scully

and State Incident Controller(Chairman State Marine Oil

Pollution Committee) Matt Taylor

Marco OSRV maintenance atMoores Warehouse wharf

Surveillance briefing at MooresWarehouse ICC

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6


The on-water recovery operations were divided into five sectors:

– Gore Cove, with Shell being made responsible utilising Shell and AMOSCresources;

– Balls Head Bay, with SPC using National Plan as well as its ownequipment;

– Greenwich Point to Balls Head, with recovery operations undertaken byCaltex using the Botany Protector,

– east of Balls Head, the SPC’s firefighting and emergency tug Ted Noffsused to herd oil for two Marco OSRVs to recover; and

– west of Greenwich Point, the Waterways harbour cleaning service vesselsused to collect oil and break up sheen.

A key strategy in the overall response was the segmentation of foreshores forassessment and clean-up purposes.

During the morning, response personnel arrived at Moores Warehouse ICCfrom other NSW ports as well as AMSA National Response Team (NRT)members from the ACT.

Representatives of the media were also arriving at the ICC in large numbers.

Other NRT members from Victoria and Queensland arrived in the afternoonand early evening. A representative of the Maritime Safety Authority of NewZealand arrived the following morning.

AMSA forwarded to the ICC the Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills(ADIOS) weathering model which indicated the Murban crude wouldweather consistently in the first few hours with a residue of around 40 percent after a few days. Evaporation would be about 50 per cent over the firstfew hours, and natural dispersion could be as high as 25 per cent.

During the day oil recovery operations continued while the responseorganisation structure was established, the first ‘outline’ being posted atabout 1400 hours, a more complete version at about 1900 hours.

Overnight, oil recovery operations continued on a 24hour basis.

Thursday 5 August 1999 Aerial surveillance flights identified considerable free-floating emulsified oilalong the shoreline of the northern harbour coastline as well as in Rose Bayand as far east as South Head, patches were also along the Darling Harbourwharves. There remained large concentrations of oil within the boomed areasat Gore Cove.

There were around 20 reported sightings of oiled birds, and some marineinvertebrates had been cleaned and released. The NSW National Parks andWildlife Service (NPWS) advertised a dedicated contact telephone numberfor reports of oiled birds and marine fauna.

During the day oil recovery operations and foreshore assessment continued.Three Marco OSRVs operated in Lavender Bay while two other Marco OSRVsand the Botany Protector continued recovery in Gore Cove.

Oil spill response craft atMoores wharf

Foreshore assessment briefing atMoores Warehouse ICC

On-site media briefing

AMSA, ITOPF and SPC personnelat HMAS Waterhen

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The first of the ITOPF representatives arrived to monitor the response onbehalf of the vessel’s P & I Club and to provide advice in the cleanupoperation.

At the end of Thursday it was reported that 85 tonnes of oil-water mixturehad been recovered.

Friday 6 August 1999 The ICC reinforced its earlier decision to minimise the use of absorbentmaterials where possible because of its concern regarding disposal. However,limited approval was given for their use in isolated areas.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and NPWS continuedqualitative survey of the foreshores of the Lane Cove River and affected areasof the northern harbour coastline. Also, the EPA in collaboration with theCentre for Environmental Impacts of Coastal Cities (EICC) at the Universityof Sydney studied the short-term ecological impacts of the spill. EICCalready held relevant data for the affected sites, pre-dating the spill.

Meanwhile a contingency plan for the departure of the Laura D’Amato wasbeing developed.

Three Marco OSRVs continued to operate in Berrys Bay and two in BallsHead Bay.

The afternoon surveillance flights showed the situation had improvedsignificantly. Emulsified oil along the northern harbour coastline wasbreaking down and producing extensive rainbow sheen. The amount of free-floating oil in the worst-affected areas of Gore Cove, Gore Bay, Balls HeadBay and Lavender Bay had greatly reduced.

Foreshore clean-up continued along the northern coastline, with the NSWFire Brigade flushing the foreshores of Gore Bay and at HMAS Waterhen.

The two Marco OSRVs operating in the Balls Head Bay area adjacent toHMAS Waterhen recovered 21 tonnes of black oil.

Saturday 7 August 1999 Surveillance flights indicated a vast improvement on the previous day.The volume of sheen had reduced considerably, and only minor pockets ofmousse were seen east of the Harbour Bridge.

Operations focused on the Balls Head Bay area with four Marco OSRVs, onein Lavender Bay. Four foreshore assessment and clean-up teams continuedto operate along the northern coastline of the harbour but focused majoreffort on Gore Bay and Balls Head Bay.

Divers inspected the hull of the Laura D’Amato and removed small patches oftrapped oil in preparation for the ship’s departure.

The sustained southerly wind throughout the response changed to anortherly late on Saturday. The forecast change prompted some respondersto volunteer to operate late Saturday night to early Sunday morning toremove as much remaining oil on the water in the vicinity of HMAS Waterhenas possible. Using two Marco OSRVs and a static skimmer they successfullyrecovered 40 cubic metres of oil and water-in-oil emulsion (mousse).

Emulsified oil

Oil surrounding naval vessels atHMAS Waterhen

Extensive sheen, Sydney Harbour

Emulsified oil

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Sunday 8 August 1999 The ICC established a shoreline sign-off group to signify foreshores as clean,comprising the EPA, NPWS, SPC, NSW DOT and ITOPF. The NSW FireBrigade continued assisting with a crew of 24 undertaking foreshore cleaningsouth of HMAS Waterhen and in the Balls Head Bay area. Foreshore cleaningof sandy beaches was suspended while a more appropriate technique wasdeveloped.

Foreshore cleaning assessment and cleaning teams reported all areas exceptthe Gore Cove and Balls Bay areas clear of oil and oily debris.

On-water oil recovery continued with four Marco OSRVs and three staticskimmers operating in the Balls Head Bay and Gore Cove, and one MarcoOSRV in Lavender Bay.

On the wildlife side a fifth oiled cormorant and a second fairy penguin werecleaned at the Taronga Zoo.

The last surveillance flight of the day reported that most of the oil in BallsHead Bay had been removed. Skimming operations over the previous24 hours had recovered approximately 100 tonnes of oil and mousse.

Monday 9 toFriday 13 August 1999

The Laura D’Amato departed Gore Bay at 1300 hours on Monday 9 August,escorted to Sydney Heads by SPC response vessels and under aerialobservation. The vessel cleared the Heads without incident at 1400 hours.

Foreshore cleaning continued and was gradually signed-off as clean by theshoreline sign-off group. Some spot cleaning and on-water recoverycontinued, and gradual demobilisation, including equipment cleaning.

The estimated size of spill was 250 tonnes. Approximately 130 tonnes wererecovered by skimming, 120 tonnes lost to evaporation.

Saturday 14 toFriday 20 August 1999

Shoreline ‘spot’ clean-up continued in isolated areas, particularly in thevicinity of HMAS Waterhen, and between Gore Cove and Balls Head on anas-required basis.

By 20 August all foreshore and beach ‘sign-off’, except for Berrys Island, hadbeen completed. Equipment was progressively cleaned and returned to base,with boom cleaning at Gore Bay terminal finally completed by27 September 1999.

Berrys Island is a recreational amenity area, which required it to be totallyclean without the use of aggressive cleaning techniques. Final sign-off wasachieved 30 September 1999.

Overall 557 persons from 32 organisations were involved in the responseoperation.

Clean up of Berry Island Reserveusing pumps and booms.

Laura D’Amato departure fromSydney

Equipment washdown,Moores Warehouse

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THE RESPONSE:

initial and overall effectiveness

2

As soon as alerted, SPC and Shell implemented apre-planned response. SPC duty operational crewat Moores Warehouse were notified atapproximately 1845 hours by Shell Gore Bayterminal staff and by 1852 hours two vessels loadedwith Austpol Lite and GP 500 foam filled fence andbuoyancy booms were on their way to Gore Cove.Shell terminal staff alerted Shell seniormanagement.

When Sydney Ports Harbour Control were advisedof the incident they immediately commenced theirpre-planned emergency call-out procedure. TheABC’s ‘The 7.30 Report’ was the alert medium formany people; however key response people alertedby Sydney Ports Harbour Control and the PortServices team responded quickly. The ICC wasoperational by 1930 hours.

By 1900 hours both SPC and Shell teams wereproceeding independently in planning theirresponses. Booms were installed ahead of thevessel, protecting Gore Cove, and around the vessel,by 2000 hours, and by 2130 hours across fromManns Point to Balls Head enclosing Balls HeadsBay. A third boom of GP500 was laid later in theevening, and by 2330 hours skimming with a MarcoOSRV had commenced to recover oil outside theboomed area.

In initial discussions between AMSA and theIncident Controller at 2200 hours it was agreed thatNational Plan assistance could be made available.However, based on the Master’s reported 14 cubicmetres oil spill, assistance was not required at thatstage.

Details of response strategies and overall personneland equipment requirements were not discussedbetween Shell and the Incident Commander at thisstage. In addition, a range of possible spill sizes up300 cubic metres was estimated by Shell Gore Bay

terminal staff at about 2300 hours, however thisrange was not formally communicated to either theIncident Controller or the Incident Commander atthe time. However, SPC personnel involved in theNSW official investigation were made aware ofShell’s estimates and relayed this information to theIncident Controller and Incident Commander ontheir return to the ICC later that night.

Shell made direct arrangements with AMOSC foradditional resources to be provided.

Overnight, additional personnel were requestedfrom the Newcastle and Port Kembla PortsCorporations.

National Plan assistance from AMSA was sought at0515 hours the following morning when it wasagreed that additional Marco OSRVs and operatingpersonnel were required. In addition it was alsoagreed that additional personnel were required toassist in ICC operation.

A helicopter was based nearby the ICC to helpmonitor the spill movement, and was usedfrequently throughout each day to assess oilmovement, the fate and effect of the oil, direct oilrecovery operations and to assist planning thecontinued response.

There was commensurate scaling-up of requiredresources. The Marco OSRVs from Queenslandarrived in the evening of 4 August supplementingthe two SPC Marco OSRVs plus the BotanyProtector brush skimmer from Caltex. A furtherMarco OSRV was transported by road from Victoriaarriving overnight it was ready for operation earlyon the 5 August 1999.

The above equipment was in use daily with somenight use until 14 August after which the dailyresponse requirement reduced to spot cleaning.

10


Comment

The initial rapid response by the SPC dutyoperational crew and the Shell Gore Bay Terminalpersonnel booming off the vessel in a short timeframe is to be highly commended, their joint actionsclearly averted a larger response requirement.

SPC’s initial planning was based on the Master’sreport of 14 cubic metres. It was not untilobservations were made at about 0300 hours, of oilextending outside the boomed area and as far asBlues Point, that the Incident Commander was ableto confirm the spill was much larger than had beenreported by the ship’s Master and was likely to bewithin the range estimated by Shell.

It would have been expected that Shell personnel andthe Incident Commander would have discussed andagreed the appropriate response strategy on Tuesdaynight. This would have established a clearunderstanding between the main players on likelyspill size, equipment and personnel resourcesrequired and from where these would be sourced.

It is essential that the estimated amount of oil spilt is

correctly advised as early as possible at least to key

response personnel, if not the public at large.

Concern was expressed by most people interviewed

that the approximate 300 cubic metres figure

estimated by Shell at 2300 hours should have been

promulgated at the time and used as the ‘worse case

scenario’ by all concerned.

The Incident Analysis Team is of the view that it is

more appropriate to promulgate the upper estimated

spill amount to all concerned, including the public. If

further calculations or actual experience prove a

lower amount this will be more easily explainable

than the converse. From a media perspective this is

also a better strategy.

Because of the delay in formally communicating the

estimated upper spill size, the need for additional

equipment and assistance from the National

Response Team (NRT) was not recognised early

enough.

INCIDENTCONTROLLER

INCIDENTCOMMANDER

MEDIASTAFF OFFICERSUPPORT

ICC Records &Management

Photographicrecords

OPERATIONS

• Shell Gore Bay

• On-water recovery

• Harbour foreshorecleanup

• HelicopterSurveillance

• Support vessels

SUPPORTTechnical Specialists

• NSWFB

• NPWS• OH&S

• EPA

PLANNING

• Action

• Strategies

• Intelligence• Management

Overview

ADMINISTRATION& LOGISTICS

• Transport

• Welfare

• Maintenance

• Communications• Finance

• Records

Incident Control Centre organisational structure

11


With the exception of the names of the IncidentController and the Incident Commander, no nameswere initially set against ICC roles. The initialcommand structure ‘appeared confused and fairlychaotic’, according to key observers. The ICCorganisational structure was slow to becomeestablished and was not adequately dealt with untilthe afternoon of Wednesday 4 August, and notposted until 7 p.m. on that day. The IncidentController commented on the need for key ICC rolesto be pre-planned.

While complying with the Sydney Ports MarineServices Procedures the ICC structure did not accordwith the National Plan Oil Spill Response IncidentControl System (OSRICS). This led to someuncertainty by those ICC personnel who were notfamiliar with the Sydney Ports Marine ServicesProcedures. While SPC personnel were aware of thenew system, formal advice to implement the transitionwas not sent to SPC until December 1999.

The Incident Analysis Team recognises that NPAC hasset a three year implementation period for OSRICS,essentially to allow sufficient time for the numerouscontingency plans to be updated. Accordingly SPCcannot be criticised for not having utilised the newsystem in this incident. However when an incidentrequires assistance from personnel from otherorganisations both within the State as well asinterstate a more standard national approach isrequired.

For many of those involved in the response this wastheir first experience at dealing with an actual oil spill,consequently there was need for additional ‘on sitetraining’, particularly in foreshore cleaning andwildlife rescue.

It needs to be recognised that the issues discussedabove did not materially effect the overall outcome ofthe incident. Perhaps a few hours less in foreshorecleanup could have been achieved, however this ispurely speculative. However, they could have done soif the spill had been larger or of a heavier oil resultingin a more complex response with moreenvironmentally sensitive issues to be dealt with.

Despite the issues discussed above, the initial andoverall response was very effective, and the outcomewas particularly good, with 90 per cent ofrecoverable oil being recovered.

Issues to be addressed

• The full implementation of the National Plan OilSpill Response Incident Control System (OSRICS),including training should be speeded up. NPACshould issue guidelines on the response structureto be used during the remaining period ofimplementation.

• In similar incidents to this one there should beearly and close contact between the oil companyand the State Marine Pollution Controller to planthe strategic approach to the response anddetermine the required equipment and personnelresources.

• When spill size estimates are thought to be largerthan first advised, the company involved mustwithout delay provide appropriate information tothe State Marine Pollution Controller and IncidentController.

• Incident Control Centres (ICCs) should have theNational Plan Oil Spill Response Incident ControlSystem (OSRICS) structure permanentlydisplayed on a whiteboard or similar, so thatindividuals’ names at the four functional headslevel can be added quickly in the early stages ofthe incident.

12


PLANNING:adequacy and effectiveness of incident response plans,and their implementation

3

As expected, in the initial phase of any response theresponse planning process is informal, urgent andfocused first on assessing the incident, followed bydecisions on strategy and then the initial mobilisationof resources. In this case the initial planning duringthe first few hours occurred by a process of siteinspection (difficult in the dark) and telephonediscussions among such parties as the IncidentController and the Incident Commander, andbetween Shell at Gore Bay and AMOSC. AMSA didnot become directly involved until some ten hourslater. In the early stages of the incident there was noresponse planning discussions held between Shelland SPC/ICC.

The first formal planning document issued by theIncident Commander from the ICC was atapproximately 0600 hours on Wednesday 4 August.The document took the form of a combined SituationReport and Response Action Plan. The reportconcisely and clearly set out the background to theincident, including a sketch of the boom deployment,outlined the responsibilities and actions by sector,and set out the status of resources.

At 0800 hours a Situation Report was prepared basedon the surveillance flight made at first light. Actualinformation about the extent and location of thespilled oil was included, and the contents of theSituation Report effectively became the ResponseAction Plan for the rest of the day.

During the morning of Wednesday 4 August the SPCplanning resources were supplemented by AMSA andPort Kembla Port Corporation personnel. The three-person team produced the required Response ActionPlans throughout the response. Also in the PlanningSection was an intelligence (aerial surveillance) roleprovided by AMSA as well as a managementoverview of the process provided by the NSW FireBrigade. A representative of NSW DOT also played avaluable role in preparing Situation Reports.

The Planning Team produced the Response ActionPlans twice daily initially from Thursday 5 Augustand daily later in the response. The plans, each nomore than two pages, covered such items assurveillance, priorities, actions, issues and additionalresources. Additional specific plans were alsoprepared:

– Site Health and Safety Plan;

– Vessel Departure Plan;

– Foreshore Inspection and Termination of Clean-up;and

– Decommissioning Equipment.

The Planning Team obtained the information itrequired by direct contact with the Operations andForeshore Sections, together with surveillanceinformation obtained during the ‘briefing’ sessions.As the Response Action Plans were typicallyprepared for the briefing sessions, new surveillanceinformation often required significant revision to theplans. That fact resulted in the perception that theplanning process was at times reactive rather thanproactive.

The first Response Action Plan nominated ‘Shell toundertake response in the Gore Cove area utilisingboth Shell and AMOSC resources’. Accordingly Shellundertook that activity, planning and resourcing thatpart of the clean-up.

During the initial phase of the incident the ClydeRefinery Manager together with other Gore BayTerminal managers initiated Shell’s oil spill responseactivities. This included activation of the Shell CrisisTeam, obtaining additional interstate resources andsecuring local Clyde Refinery contractor resources toundertake oil spill recovery operations.

Shell also mobilised personnel and equipment fromthe industry’s central oil spill response facility,AMOSC in Geelong.

13


After the first 12 hours, planning was carried out bythe 24 hour shift working Response OperationsManagers and the deputies.

In the early stages of the incident Shell experiencedconsiderable difficulty with crowd and media controlin the vicinity of the Gore Bay Terminal. Of particularconcern was photographers taking flash photographsin areas close to heavy oil contamination.

Comment

At all times it was recognised that planning is a veryimportant part of a successful response activity. Therequired plans were well produced and of great use.

An essential component in an Incident ControlSystem is that the planning process is centred roundmeetings of the response management team, in thiscase consisting of the Incident Commander, advisersand key personnel who report to the IncidentCommander. At the meeting information isexchanged, strategies proposed, and action agreed.The management process is separate to the necessaryprocess of briefing interested parties.

The role of the planning section is to propose strategyand then to translate agreed strategy into sufficientlydetailed plans.

It is recognised that each response management teamhas the flexibility to set up the planning process thatworks for it. However, in this case while the threeresponse sections regularly discussed their ideas andplans with the Incident Commander there were noformal management meetings of the section headswith the Incident Commander as a managementteam, separate from the briefing meetings.Consequently the Planning Team was somewhatoutside the strategy development process.

For most of the response the Planning Team workedin a small office on a different floor from theoperational response personnel, mainly for theconvenience of access to a network printer andtelephone. The separation, particularly from theoperational personnel sometimes frustrated theplanning and operational process.

The Planning Team found it valuable to be able toparticipate directly in surveillance flights.

The team commented that the availability oftemplates of simple forms would have assisted theplanning process.

The National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Planenvisages a single response management structure.This structure can accommodate separate operatingareas, but implies a single planning section. In thiscase there was a separate ‘SPC’ response and a ‘Shell’response. There was recognition that there had to beclose liaison at senior management level, this liaisonwas achieved by the Industry Adviser role beingcarried out by the Clyde Refinery Manager.

However, particularly at the early stages of theresponse, there appeared to be no close liaison atplanning and operations levels. It showed in the factthat the Response Action Plans beginning onThursday 5 August called repeatedly for deploymentof the high capacity Desmi weir skimmer in the ShellGore Bay area.

Planners were not aware of the status of that activity,in particular the reason the equipment was not inservice. In addition the Response Action Plans werenot received by Shell at Gore Bay. At the end of theday the success of the response was not affected, butit was a source of frustration along the way.

The National Plan envisages that the provision ofresponse resources from interstate should becoordinated by AMSA. As was its right, Shelldirectly mobilised AMOSC to assist in the Shellresponse. The mobilisation was arranged withoutfirst consulting the Incident Commander, and alsowithout AMOSC’s advising AMSA at the time ofmobilisation. The mobilisation of AMOSC also tookplace before the Incident Commander called forassistance through AMSA. Initial uncertainty wastherefore created in AMSA as to the scale of theincident and the resources that might be required.

Comments were made by a number of key ICCpersonnel of the difficulty in tracking responseequipment and personnel movements. Difficulty wasalso experienced receiving and recording progressand completion reports. These factors impactedacross the Planning, Operations, and theAdministrative and Finance and Logistics Sections.

14


The tracking of response equipment and personnel isa key element in any major oil spill response as is theneed for all key personnel to be fully aware of whathas been achieved and what remains to be done.While the recording on status boards is laborious andtime consuming it cannot be achieved if theinformation is not provided in a timely andorganised way. This issue has been a constant innearly all oil spill incidents in Australia.

It is recognised that the Incident Command Systemutilised in the USA uses a vast array of forms andreporting procedures which go far beyond what isrequired in Australia, particularly with the limitedICC personnel available. A more specific computersystem with only a few essential forms for trackingpersonnel and equipment as well as operational tasksset and completed and designed to Australianrequirements would provide significant benefits ininformation exchange.


• The four key units, Planning, Operations,Logistics and Finance/Admin should all bephysically close to each other and have suitablecomputer, telephone and administrative supportresources.

• Separate oil spill response organisations shouldnot be set up. If a forward base is required whenan incident is remote from the ICC, there shouldbe strong links between the forward base and theICC.

• When supporting a State/NT pollution incident,AMSA is organising interstate personnel andequipment, and an affected oil company ismobilising AMOSC directly, there should be earlyand close contact between AMSA and AMOSC toensure that appropriate decisions are being madeon the amount and type of resources required.

• NPAC should research designing a nationalcomputerised oil spill management system tohandle all written operational and administrativecommunications, track equipment and personnelresources, etc. In the meantime a simple ICCOperations and Procedures manual should bedeveloped.

Response planning, ICC, Moores Warehouse

Response activity, Moores Wharf

Oiled yacht, Sydney Harbour

15


PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT4

SPC in setting up the ICC and initiating the responseduring the evening of 3 August 1999 soughtpersonnel and equipment resources from Sydneyand Botany, based on the reported 14 cubic metresspill size. During the night visual observations of theextent of the spill clearly indicated a larger spill andthat additional personnel and equipment resourceswould be required. These were obtained from PortKembla, Port of Newcastle, Brisbane, Melbourne andCanberra and included members of the NationalResponse Team (NRT).

Shell initially used personnel and equipment fromthe Gore Bay terminal as well as personnel from theClyde Refinery. Shell alerted AMOSC in Geelong,putting them on stand-by. Following the calculationsthat indicated a spill size of up to 300 cubic metresShell sought additional equipment resources fromAMOSC.

Personnel

Personnel used in the incident came from some 32organisations, however the majority were from SPC,NSW Fire Brigade, Shell, NSW NPWS, and the NSWState Emergency Service.

The NSW Fire Brigade initially attended at the ShellGore Bay terminal to ascertain the source of apurported gas leak and to provide fire and rescueservices in the event of these being required. Havingarrived on scene the NSW Fire Brigade personnelassisted Shell with boom laying and the HAZMATteam assisted with monitoring for explosivemixtures. The NSW Fire Brigade mediaspokesperson also dealt with the initial mediainquiries regarding the strong odour.

In the evening of the first day the Incident Controllercalled a meeting of the newly formed TWG for 0630hours the following day at the NSW DOT offices inKent Street, Sydney. After an initial delay it wasdecided that members of the TWG should beincorporated in the ICC at Moores Point Warehouse.

On the second and subsequent days NSW FireBrigade personnel were made available to assist

mainly in foreshore assessment and clean upoperations. A Superintendent and an Inspector wereappointed to the ICC to provide a technical supportrole and a third Fire Brigade officer oversighted theOccupational Health and Safety function.

While a significant number of persons telephoned inoffering their assistance as volunteers, none wererequired or utilised. However, on one occasion therewas confusion when 20 volunteer State EmergencyService personnel arrived to assist in foreshore cleanup operations, even though the ICC had been advisedpreviously that additional assistance was not required.

Overall 526 persons were involved in the responsefrom 31 organisations as shown below.

Organisations Number

Australian Maritime Safety Authority 9Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre 2Axiom Industries 6Brisbane Port Authority 1Caltex Refineries NSW 7Collex 20Environment Protection Authority 11FS Cranes 1Grays Diving Services 7International Tankers Owners Pollution Federation 2Marine Board of Victoria 1Moss Australia 1National Parks and Wildlife Service 34New Zealand Maritime Safety Authority 1Newcastle Ports Corporation 8NSW Department of Transport 4NSW Fire Brigade 47Oil Check 1Port Kembla Ports Corporation 1Queensland Department of Transport 3Salvation Army 20Shell Refining (Aust) P/L 156Skilled Maritime Services Victoria 1Stannards 23State Emergency Service 18Sydney Helicopters 2Sydney Ports Corporation 94University of Sydney 1Water Police 14Waterways Authority 28Gardiner Perrott 2

TOTAL 526

16


Equipment

The Marco OSRVs as well as a boat mounted brushskimmer and some disk skimmers together with avariety of boom types and shore flushing systemswere the major response and recovery items ofequipment used in the incident.

Radio communications were undertaken using SPCmodified National Plan UHF system utilisingmodern hand-held sets. Some modifications weremade to the helmet microphone communicationssystem used by the helicopter surveillance crewduring the incident which improved clarity ofmessages received.

Shell vessels had difficulty communicating with SPCand the Marco oil recovery vessels were found to bevery noisy, adversely affecting operator ability to usethe radio communications equipment.

A communication problem, resulting in someconfusion, arose in regard to an ‘availability’ enquirydirect from personnel at the Taronga Zoo tocolleagues in New Zealand for water heatingequipment to wash oiled wildlife which wasfollowed by a formal request to AMSA. When AMSAchecked with the ICC the ICC was not aware of therequest. It turned out that this equipment was notrequired and was not sent.

A number of difficulties were experienced withbooms and boom deployment. In particular not usingshore line barrier boom and not providing a seal atthe interface between booms and the shoreline. Thisallowed quantities of oil to escape. Egress of oil at theconnectors between different types and sizes of boomalso occurred. Some booms had twists in them. Alsobooms were not monitored or adjusted following atidal change. In some cases excessive lengths of boomwere used and incidents of boom being laid acrossthe top of another were observed. Some boomsappear to have been laid with insufficient anchoringto hold them out of traffic lanes resulting in thembeing overrun by passing vessels, particularly atnight due to lack of visibility.

Comment

Good use was made of available personnel from theinitial stages of the response. The fact that the initialresponse decisions in respect of equipment andpersonnel were made on the basis of a spill of 14 cubicmetres resulted in a delay of approximately 7 hours inrequesting National Plan equipment and theactivation of personnel from the NRT.

As in previous incidents with a similar spill size, theneed for personnel to work closely and in cooperationwith each other was again clearly demonstrated to allconcerned. In an overall context there was good

Use of Marco oil spillrecovery vessel.

17


cooperation among all response personnel, althoughthere was some indication of reluctance of SPCpersonnel to respond to requests from NRTsupervisors, preferring to work through normal linemanagement, this resulted in operational difficulties.

It is noted that the newly formed NSW National PlanExecutive Committee (NPEC) was not called to meetyet the NSW TWG was requested to meet but wassubsequently incorporated into the ICC. Commentwas made that the NPEC should have met.

It is the view of the Incident Analysis Team that theNPEC and its subordinate TWG would not normallymeet during an oil spill response. The NPEC andTWG are charged with managing State National Planactivities during ‘peace time’. Certainly members ofthe two groups may have a role to play within theICC. However, it is the ICC’s responsibility under thedirection of the Incident Controller to manage thespill response, not the NPEC.

Apart from a delay of a few hours in the delivery oftwo Marco OSRVs from Brisbane all other equipmentwas available when required. The delay of the RAAFC130s was not explained; however, it is notconsidered to have affected response effectiveness.

National Plan equipment, which includes Sydneybased SPC equipment as well as equipment fromother ports in NSW, Queensland and Victoria and alsoAMOSC was in a general sense very effective andachieved a satisfactory outcome.

The Marco OSRVs, which are designed for this type ofresponse, were particularly effective anddemonstrated their worth as Australia’s primaryinshore on water recovery equipment.

Public criticism of the need to bring equipment frominterstate was indicative of the lack of understandingin the community of the National Plan arrangements.The transport arrangements were effective, but itmight have been prudent in the case of the of the twoBrisbane Marco OSRVs, to consider whether roadtransport would have been more appropriate than airin the circumstances.

It was mentioned that one additional Marco OSRV, asa spare, in case of breakdown, could have beenprovided.

There was a strong suggestion of the need to evaluatethe offloading of recovered oil from the MarcoOSRVs, this gave rise to two areas of concern. Firstlywhere vacuum trucks are to be used, to avoidunnecessary delays planners should consider bettercoordination of vacuum trucks to meet vesselsadjacent to operating areas rather than vesselstracking unnecessary distances to meet trucks.Secondly the need to re-examine the Marco OSRVpumping arrangements used to discharge recoveredoil in circumstances where vacuum trucks are notavailable.

There seemed some confusion as to the appropriateuse of the SPC Desmi weir skimmer, and its delayeduse until Saturday 7 August at the HMAS Waterhennaval base, where it was reported very effective inrecovering a considerable mix of oil and water.

The modified National Plan radio system in use bySPC requires further evaluation for use interstate butappears very promising. Its primary advantage overthe existing system was the ability to work theNational Plan frequency in simplex or duplex modes,and having the SPC frequency available.

The ability of Shell (which has an SPC radio located inits Gore Bay Operations Centre) to better integrateradio communications with SPC vessels should beexamined.

There is a demonstrated need to identify a suitablelocation on the Marco OSRVs to house portableradio/telephone equipment, and/or investigate theuse of the ‘headset/ear-mike’ arrangementsuccessfully trialed in the helicopter.

Oil contained in booms at HMAS Waterhen, 500 metres eastof the spill point.

18


Comment was made that the National Plan infraredcamera or cold-light iridescent tubes could have beenused to help identify oil movement at night.

It appeared that no one was appointed to monitor orinspect booms for efficiency, position or damage.Better use could have been made of anchor systemsincluding anchor marking buoys. It appeared thatsome SPC personnel believed that it was acceptablepractice to drive across booms.

Shell personnel at Gore Bay advised that thepermanent boom mooring fixtures within the areawhich falls under the responsibility of Shell assistedsignificantly in quickly securing boom. They pointedout that consideration should be given to providingsimilar features outside the Shell area in Gore Coveand the adjacent Berry Island.

A considerable advantage to the response throughoutthe operation was the SPC night-shift personnelrefuelling and maintaining watercraft ready forservice at first light. This was a very effective use ofnight shift personnel.


• NPAC should review NATPLAN hand-held radiocommunications equipment to take advantage ofSPC initiatives, and review the use of specialheadsets for use in helicopters and possiblyalongside noisy machinery such as Marco OSRVs.

• Shell to examine how to better integrate Gore Bayradio communications with SPC

• Consideration be given to providing additionalpermanent boom mooring fixtures in Gore Goveoutside Shell’s area of responsibility.

• Capability of the oil discharge pumps in MarcoOSRVs to be examined.

• SPC personnel should undergo further training inboom deployment and monitoring. The trainingshould highlight the need to check boomdeployment and anchoring mechanisms to ensureoptimal use of booms including shoreline sealing,particularly after changes in tide and or winddirection, and the correct procedure for gettinginside the boomed area.

Response activity

19


ADEQUACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF WILDLIFE RESCUEAND REHABILITATION

5

Wildlife rescue operations were handled by theNPWS and rehabilitation was undertaken usingexisting resources by staff at the Taronga Zoo.Wildlife injury was low, only 16 oiled birds caughtand cleaned. Two Cormorants died. Other oiled birdswere sighted at various times but could not becaught.

NPWS undertook nightly patrols looking for nativewater rats at various locations. Concern for thatspecies led to a shore-flushing operation to minimiseany risk of adverse effects. Night patrols in the Manlyarea also observed Fairy Penguins leaving the waterat night and returning to their burrows. Only twoPenguins required cleaning. Sea Hares (large marinesnails) were collected from oiled areas and relocatedat clean sites.

Approximately 25 personnel and four vessels wereused in this component of the response.

A qualitative survey by EPA ecologists of the mostheavily oiled areas indicated little evidence of theimmediate mortality of intertidal animals.

The NPWS set up a special telephone number for thepublic to report injured wildlife. More than 300 callswere received.

The NPWS was invited to attend the TWG meeting at0630 hours on 4 August 1999 and when the TWGmoved to the ICC at Moores Warehouse the NPWSofficer assumed a technical advice role in the ICC.

No specific role is nominated for NPWS within theNSW Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan. TheEnvironment and Scientific Coordinator (ESC)nominated by the EPA has a duty to coordinatewildlife rescue and rehabilitation through NPWS andto arrange access to spill sites for NPWS.

NPWS personnel were uncertain about the ICCstructure and whether there should be recognition ofNPWS in its own right.

The respective roles of EPA and NPWS in oil spill

response and the treatment of wildlife and items of

cultural significance in the NSW Marine Oil Spill

Contingency Plan areas also appeared uncertain.

It was suggested that NPWS had insufficient

resources for the various locations and that the NSW

Fire Brigade could have assisted.

Comment

The NSW Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan

includes provision for an Agriculture and Animal

Services Functional Coordinator and also refers to

the Agriculture and Animal Services Functional Area

Supporting Plan. However, there does not appear to

be a documented role for the NPWS in oil spill

response, the situation including the role expected of

the NPWS needs to be clarified with NPWS.

The Incident Analysis Team notes that following the

Iron Baron incident the National Plan Advisory

Committee recommended that the States and the

Northern Territory introduce oil-spill wildlife

rehabilitation plans. NSW does not yet have such a

plan, see further comment in Chapter 10

Contingency Plans.

Rather than as a Support Technical Specialist

reporting to the Incident Commander, the NPWS

officer would more appropriately be located in either

the Planning or Operations Section of the response

structure. Whichever it is, there should be improved

integration and communication about wildlife and

rehabilitation activities in both Planning and

Operations Sections. A review of this aspect should

recognise that NPWS is also responsible for National

Park Heritage Sites.

Comment was made that the level of awareness of

the environmental consequences of oil spills by

many staff involved in the wildlife response was

20


minimal and this may have been the first time they

had been confronted by this type of incident.

Apart from the organisational issues and trainingneeds identified above, the wildlife rescue andrehabilitation response, while somewhat limited indemand, was adequate and effective.


• Section 10.13 of the NSW Marine Oil SpillContingency Plan should be reviewed to clarifythe role of NPWS in an oil spill response, with aview to including NPWS in the Plan.

• The NSW Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan andthe Incident Control Response Structure shouldbe reviewed to improve the interaction betweenand clarify the respective roles of the EPA andNPWS with regard to wildlife rescue andrehabilitation.

Decontamination station

Vacuum truck removingrecovered oil fromMarco OSRV

21


Initial on-scene response

The EPA representatives, on learning of the spill fromboth the EPA emergency ‘pollution line’ and SydneyPorts Harbour Control on the evening of Tuesday 3August 1999, attended the Shell Gore Bay terminaland provided information to the respondingorganisations, Shell and the NSW Fire Brigade. Theproperties of the oil and its effects on the environmentand on human health were critical issues at this stage.

At 2230 hours EPA personnel were invited to attendthe NSW National Plan TWG at 0630 hours thefollowing morning and were later requested, alongwith other members of the TWG, to join the ICC.

On their arrival at the ICC the two EPArepresentatives, who attended as Environment andScientific Coordinators (ESCs), like others, expected tobe assigned tasks in accordance with the OSRICS.They anticipated working in the Environment Unithelping the planning and operations sections andproviding specific scientific advice to the IncidentCommander when required. Instead, they werepositioned to one side as Support Technical Specialistsadvising all team members.

One ESC is an ecotoxicologist, the other a marineecologist. They saw their priorities not so much asEPA representatives but as members of the responseteam. They contributed in a number of ways,including providing scientific input, arranging tomonitor the effects of the oil on the marineenvironment, helping develop shoreline cleaningtechniques, coordinating oily waste disposal, andagreeing protocols for boat-cleaning and signing-offshorelines with local councils. They also helped NSWNPWS coordinate wildlife rescue and rehabilitation.

The ESCs made use of AMSA’s Environment andScientific Adviser through telephone requests on arange of issues, including information on thecharacteristics of the oil and its likely weatheringobtained from the ADIOS Weathering Model. In theirview the likely risk to the environment in thisparticular oil spill did not warrant having the AMSAAdviser on site.

Environmental issues

Queries from boat owners relating to the cleaning ofoil stained watercraft were received early. There wassome initial confusion following publicrecommendations by the EPA that all pleasure craftbe taken out of the water to be cleaned. The issuewas later resolved after undertaking field trials usingdifferent cleaning products to identify products andtechniques likely to be successful, and afterdiscussions with the Australian representative of theinsurer. EPA subsequently agreed that some vesselscould be cleaned while in the water. This informationwas made available for SPC to promulgate via the1800 information line.

Some operational practices and decisions influencedthe environmental outcome of the response. Forexample lack of boom monitoring and in onereported case an environmentaly sensitive foreshorearea was unprotected by boom. Special attention wasgiven by the ICC to booming sensitive resource areaswithin the Gore Gove area, which includesmangroves and seagrasses, and the early booming ofthe water intakes of the Sydney Aquarium andTaronga Zoo.

A foreshore clean-up plan setting environmentalgoals was developed by the ESC’s. Foreshoreassessment and cleaning operations were sectoredand undertaken by four teams comprising NSWNPWS, NSW Fire Brigade, NSW Waterways andNewcastle Ports personnel. Use was made of theNSW Oiled Shoreline Assessment Field Book in bothtraining personnel and recording operations.Assistance and advice in foreshore cleaningtechniques were provided also by ITOPF personnel.

Trials of various foreshore-cleaning techniquesranging from aggressive high-pressure blasting togentle washing were undertaken.

ENVIRONMENTAL ADVICE AND SUPPORT6

22


Disposal of waste

The need to dispose of oily waste, both as liquid andsolid, arose early in the incident. The ICC issuedstrict guidelines that efforts should be made tominimise solid waste by not using sorbents. Othertypes of oily waste were stored in skips and, afterapproval by local authorities, were land-filled.

Liquid waste, mostly in the form of an oil-watermixture, was returned to the spill vessel Laura

D’Amato.

Environmental monitoring

Various studies of the marine environment, includinginter-tidal zones and beaches in the vicinity of GoreCove, commenced in the early 1990s and were beingundertaken at the time of the spill by the Universityof Sydney’s Centre for Environmental Impacts ofCoastal Cities (EICC) .

Environmental monitoring was undertaken usingtwo approaches: firstly, documenting the extent ofoiling and determining the level of impact in variousareas to guide response priorities and, secondly,assessing and documenting the extent ofenvironmental damage and evaluating anyrestoration requirement.

The extent of oiling was undertaken as part of theforeshore assessment, and the level of impactassessed qualitatively by a team of scientists fromEPA. The team found little obvious immediateimpact on biological assemblages.

Assessing environmental damage was through twomain projects:

• Samples of bivalves to determine the extent ofbio-accumulation of hydrocarbons were collectedby EPA personnel shortly after the spill and againa few weeks later to determine whether the levelof contamination had declined to backgroundlevels; and

• The EICC gathered data on the immediate effectsof oil exposure on biological assemblages on theconstructed rock walls around Berrys Island.

EICC commented on the responsible approachadopted by EPA in allocating some remote areaswhere cleaning was deemed unnecessary so thateffective comparison monitoring could beundertaken.

EPA also undertook an assessment of marine life(mussels) on Goat Island to ascertain hydrocarboncontent. After a restoration period, the results will becompared with samples taken some distance fromthe spill area.

Washing down oilyforeshore at Berry IslandReserve.

23


Comment

Closer involvement of the ESCs in decision makingfor laying and the ongoing maintenance of the boomswould have helped restrict potential environmentaldamage. Had they been more closely linked to thePlanning and/or the Operations Section, that mighthave been the case.

Despite initial uncertainty associated with thereporting structure, advice and decision on thedisposal of solid waste was well managed. Promptadvice was given on appropriate wrapping so thatthe waste effectively contained the liquid oil withoutspillage.

With respect to foreshore cleaning, the pragmaticapproach of the ESC’s in permitting more intensivecleaning of one section of Berrys Island foreshorewith a public access requirement is considered asensible outcome.

Planning foreshore cleaning might have been helpedby having available pre-formed documentationbased on an analysis of the layout of various areas ofSydney Harbour. Such documentation could havebeen used to feed back information to the ICC to helpfuture planning operations.

The foreshore clean-up could have been improvedhad better use been made of SPC’s shoreline cleanupguidelines. Delays occurred when disagreementsover techniques arose and had to be resolved bycleaning trials.

Greater use of assistance and advice from AMSA’sEnvironment and Scientific Adviser, together withquicker intelligence on the nature of the spill, mighthave helped the early stages of setting up therequired level of response from an environmentalperspective. It might also have helped in theprovision of environmental advice.

Environmental outcome was positive, showing littledamage to animals - molluscs and limpets, forexample, where data were available before and afterthe spill.

Closer liaison among all agencies involved inshoreline clean-up is suggested, to ensure all

personnel are aware of the task and how it should beperformed. Concern was expressed at over-vigorousshoreline cleaning, where trampling can push oilbelow the ‘redox’ level where it is not subject tobacterial action. The oil can later seep up, beremobilised and cause secondary pollution. Therewas also an incident in an area not boomed andwithout oil recovery equipment operating wherehosing down of the foreshore prematurely caused oilto enter the water before recovery operations wereavailable.

Certain areas were left uncleaned so that the effectsof clean-up and natural cleansing over time could begauged. The move was widely accepted as a positiveenvironmental initiative.

The shoreline ‘sign-off system’ with local councilsworked well. It gave the ‘customers’ the opportunityto comment on the outcome, to the benefit ofresidents. The last to sign-off was North SydneyCouncil on 30 September 1999 in respect of BerrysIsland amenity beach, due to its recreational use.


• The role and responsibilities of the ESC’s withinthe NSW response team structure should bereviewed so that integration with the Planning andOperating Sections is improved and their advice isavailable for the full range of operational activitiesfrom the earliest possible stage.

• Sate/NT procedures during a spill response forenvironmental monitoring and sampling programs ofthe areas affected by the oil spill should be reviewedto provide the most appropriate scientific advice infuture incidents.

• Guidelines on foreshore cleaning techniques fordifferent shoreline types in tropical and subtropicalareas of Australia should be further developed toassist shoreline clean-up personnel. Additionaltraining of personnel in shoreline cleaning techniquesshould be provided.

• Techniques and approved cleaning agents for useon oiled recreational craft while afloat, depending ondifferent oil types, should be established.

24


OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES7

Initially the key agencies involved in the incident,SPC and Shell, operated under their own standingoccupational health and safety (OH&S)arrangements.

During the evening of Wednesday 4 August 1999 theoverall response organisation structure wasformalised, including a role with responsibility tocoordinate OH&S aspects of the response. The rolewas filled by a NSW Fire Brigade officer.

An overall Site Health and Safety Plan was preparedand issued on Thursday 5 August. The scope of thisplan included organisation, responsibilities, hazardsand risks as well as an incident report form andemergency response procedures. The final summarypage of the plan covered details of the oil, hazardinformation, first aid actions and safe workingpractices on boats, including the wearing of lifejackets. An induction program was put in place andeach person issued with a copy of the National PlanOH&S leaflet and the summary page from the overallplan. Safety issues were a standing agenda item atthe briefing sessions.

A NSW Fire Brigade person carried out a rovingaudit brief during the response.

Shell continued to manage the OH&S aspects of itsresponse using established terminal procedures,which included induction of personnel, clearancearrangements for work execution, limits to potentialsources of ignition, and the ‘Take 5’ procedures forteam evaluation of new tasks. An overall OH&SCoordinator with a roving audit brief was alsoappointed.

The quality of the air near the spilled oil wasmonitored. Concentration of vapour in the airremained well below the explosive limit, though forthe first half-day the level of benzene was significant,and personnel working near the oil wore canistermasks.

During the response the failure of a bow door on alanding vessel resulted in four persons entering thewater. In another incident one person was taken tohospital for observation after slipping and striking aknee.

Overall there were three minor injuries with only onerequiring medical treatment.

Comment

That only three relatively minor injuries occurredduring this incident is an excellent outcome for aresponse directly involving 557 personnel, and acredit to the planning and safe working practicescarried out by all parties.

The issue of on water oil recovery continuing at nightgives rise to a number of issues, in particular theincreased risks to personnel. The dangers ofrecovering oil in a marine environment at night arewell recognised and the activity is usuallyminimised. On this occasion some night work wascarried out without incident, close to shore-basedsupport and with adequate lighting.

Activities associated with modern day society andthe location of oiled beaches close to heavilypopulated areas resulted in shoreline clean-up teamshaving to watch out for and deal with used syringes.A significant number of used syringes were collectedand disposed of.

In the first few days of the response field supervisorsexperienced difficulty firstly in obtaining sufficientlifejackets and when these were available enforcingthe wearing of them by marine crews. The use ofpersonal safety equipment such as lifejackets andprotective clothing requires strong emphasis in sucha response.

The fact that the majority of the clean-up wascomplete within a week meant that there was norequirement for change-out of personnel. As is

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typical and expected during such a response, manypersonnel worked long hours and there is a risk thataccidents may be caused by fatigue. The workinghours of employees is the responsibility of theemploying agency, and it appears that not all havepolicies in place to ensure their employees getadequate rest.

The initial rapid response by SPC personnel inbooming off the ship is commendable. However, thepersonnel involved did not appear to check thesafety risks of oil inflammability and toxic fumesbefore laying boom. While it is appreciated that thevapour was blowing away from the boom-layingoperation, there was potential for the personnel to beput at risk.


• Before booming or other response operationscommence close to the source of the spill,supervisors should ensure that there is no risk topersonnel of explosion or inhaling toxic fumes.

• NPAC as well as individual agencies should havepolicies in place to ensure that in major pollutionresponse operations their employees get adequaterest.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES8

The ICC finance, administration and logisticsactivities were undertaken primarily by SPC financeand administrative staff with the assistance of anAMSA officer located at the Moores Warehouse. Theywere able to utilise established SPC finance andpurchasing systems.

According to the ICS organisational chart used in theincident the Finance and Administration function isshown as separate from the Logistics function.However, according to the personnel who worked inthese areas, the functions were combined into onesection. This occurred as a result of there being noformally appointed Logistics Officer.

It would also appear that in the initial stages of theresponse there was no clearly identified manager ofthe ICC, which resulted, during the first day, ininformation not being formally received ordistributed to the appropriate response team sectionheads at the earliest possible opportunity.

Optimum use of available office equipment was notachieved with some cases of reported inadequacyand some equipment not operating as required eg.:

– insufficient telephone handsets in the initialstages;

– insufficient whiteboards to display tasks and/orrequests which would allow other team membersto be aware of requirements and respondaccordingly;

– insufficient STD lines; and

– difficulties with computer network.

The constant use of mobile telephones causedfrustration due to the varying ringing tones and userstalking louder than when they use a landline phone.

Provision and flexibility of computers also presenteddifficulties. Many people had brought their ownlaptop computers, however only one laptop could beconnected to a printer at a time. Problems also arose

when it was found that discs prepared on the lap-tops could not be used as the A: drives on the SPCnetworked computers had been disabled, resulting ininformation prepared for briefing and for forwardingto other sections being unavailable.

In the early stages of the incident the Finance/Admin/Logistics team experienced difficulty inobtaining information from the field on taskscompleted, movement of personnel and equipment.A reported incident of information being delayed ingetting to the Logistics Section regarding the need forspare parts for one of the Marco OSRVs resulted inoperational delays to one of these vessels.

The provision of a radio to the Finance,Administrative and Logistics Section helped toovercome this communication deficiency to someextent.

The need to develop more formal systems forcommunicating activities, decision-making andexpenditure, particularly on major items, wasmentioned.

Cost-tracking and recording was helped by SPCfinance staff being on site early while informationwas fresh.

The established relationship of the SPCadministration personnel with suppliers assistedgreatly in requests for services and supplies beinghandled promptly with supply staff willing to assist,particularly outside normal hours.

While catering was generally adequate, commentswere made about ICC operations personnel having toundertake shopping visits and preparing meals,particularly breakfast. The quality of some mealsreceived criticism.

In the initial stages of setting up the ICC no securityarrangements were in place at the MooresWarehouse. Consequently, unauthorised personnel,

27


particularly from the media, were able to gain accessto the ICC. Even after a security company had beenhired to manage security on going difficulties wereexperienced identifying who had been authorised toenter the ICC.

The location within the Moores Warehouse of theFinance, Administrative & Logistics Section raisedcriticism from a number of personnel both in andoutside this section because of the difficulty theyexperienced communicating with the Operations andPlanning Sections. As well as the difficultyexperienced working in individual offices rather thanin an open area more conducive to operationalactivity and being aware of what others in the teamare doing.

As the incident progressed it became increasinglydifficult for some of the SPC finance andadministrative personnel to undertake their own SPCworkload as well as perform tasks in the ICC. Somefound it necessary to perform their normal dutiessimultaneously with their spill response duties whileothers would leave the ICC at the end of the day andthen go to their office to complete SPC work. In effectthis resulted, at times, in insufficient staff to performall the required duties.

The SPC administrative personnel operated the 1800telephone service, set up to enable the public toobtain updates on the progress of the response.

Comment

Despite some of the points mentioned above, thefinance and administrative aspects of the incidentwere well handled. This was borne out by thefavourable comment made by the ITOPFrepresentative regarding the finance and purchasingrecording system used.

The Finance and Administrative personnel wereassisted by their familiarity of the surroundings. Thegood relationships SPC has with their suppliers aswell as the immediate access to SPC warehouseholdings also contributed to services and materialsbeing provided promptly even outside normal officehours.

It may prove beneficial to review procedures for anyfuture incident remote from Sydney, where SPCpersonnel are likely to be involved. The delay inresupplying from the Sydney warehouse and wherethe relationship with suppliers are not be wellestablished, it may be necessary to establish lines ofcredit to ensure timely delivery of supplies andservices.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report it is critical toensure the response structure is established as earlyas possible and that key personnel are appointed assoon as the ICC is established.

With regard to issues relating to office equipment it isunderstood that SPC has already addressed this issuehowever it is important for possible future incidentselsewhere in Australia that adequate officeequipment be provided to the ICC. It is not necessarythat a vast array of telephones, fax machines andphoto copiers be permanently located at ICC’s aslong as a system is in place to quickly hire in thisequipment as soon as it is required.

From experiences in other incidents, as well as thisone, there are considerable advantages in havingdedicated ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ fax machines as well ashaving a fax machine solely for the use of the MediaLiaison Unit. Provision of sufficient telephones willnot only avoid the disruption of mobile phones butwill also permit the recording of all telephone calls inthe ICC, providing such a recording device is locatedin the ICC. This may prove beneficial should anylegal action be taken or a more significant inquiryestablished.

Networking of computers, use of visitor’s lap- topsand the availability of printers should be reviewedby the States and the NT on an ICC by ICC basis. IfICC’s are fitted with analogue dial out facilities thiswill assist NRT personnel communicating with thehost ICC personnel and with email to their parentorganisation.

Larger common areas, provided they are properlyfitted out with equipment, would be better suited toteamwork than individual offices.

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Adequate means of communicating field clean-upand other response activities including equipmentand personnel movements, not only to the Financeand Administration / Logistics Section but to all ICCmanagers, should be provided. In this incident it isnoted a hand held radio was provided to theAdministration section. This aspect deserves furtherinvestigation in conjunction with the use of radio foroperational purposes as mentioned elsewhere in thisreport.

A system of standard forms for recording suchactivities as personnel on site, sending and receivingfaxes and ordering equipment would provide anessential paper trail and history, and help costing.Such a move coupled with closer liaison amongLogistics, Operations and Administration/Financewould make cost tracking easier.

While the Administrative staff performed their tasksin an entirely satisfactory manner, given thecircumstances in which they were working, it isnoted they had not undertaken the National Plan OilSpill Administration Workshop. It may provebeneficial for them to do so in two respects. Firstlyusing the benefits of the experienced gained in thisincident reviewing the course content andrecommending any improvements and secondlyidentifying issues already provided in the coursewhich might help them in any future incident.

Comment was made by a number of personnelworking in the ICC of insufficient personnel toefficiently and effectively operate the ICC. This is anoften repeated criticism in National Plan responses.Queensland has managed to overcome this difficultyin utilising State Emergency Service personnel torecord operational information, answer telephonesand maintain filing systems.


• In future incidents the work areas allocated to thevarious sections of the National Plan Oil SpillResponse Incident Control System (OSRICS)within the ICC and their relative locations to eachother should be planned according to theiroperational needs and to enable personnel tocommunicate easily with each other.

• A contingency plan should be prepared to quicklyacquire additional telephones, fax machines,photocopiers and other office equipment requiredby the ICC in a major incident.

• Computer facilities at ICC’s in all States and theNT be reviewed to ensure networking availability,provision of analogue dial out facilities forvisitor’s laptops and access to printers by visitor’slaptops.

• Further steps be taken to ensure ICC’s areprovided with adequate numbers of staff tooperate the ICC.

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The main parties involved in the incident were SPCand Shell with assistance and input from andinvolvement by 30 other organisations, ranging fromthose representing the ship to many State andCommonwealth National Plan agencies.

The Shell Clyde Refinery Manager was responsiblefor managing Shell’s input to the response and madeearly contact with the Incident Controller andmaintained close contact throughout the incident.

The Refinery Manager continued in day to dayrefinery management responsibilities and was onlyable to spend limited time at the ICC particularlyattending media conference briefings.

The primary nominated Shell Industry Adviser wasnot able to be contacted when the incident occurredconsequently Shell nominated a Geelong basedLiaison Officer to the ICC early in the response.

Shell was particularly mindful of the community inthe vicinity of the Gore Cove terminal, in Greenwich,and provided several letterbox drops during theincident to keep local residents informed.

At the political level the pollution response cameunder the NSW Minister for Transport. Despitebeing interstate when the incident occurred, theMinister maintained a high profile, particularly inmedia briefings, as the Government minister withsole responsibility for overseeing the response. Moreimportantly the Minister fulfilled a key role keepingthe Premier and ministerial colleagues advised ofprogress, particularly those whose departments werealso involved in the response for example EPA,NPWS and the NSW Fire Brigade.

The NSW Fire Brigade initially became involvedthrough ‘000’ calls because of the vapour smell.However the ICC alerted the NSW Fire Brigade’s

South Regional Zone at 1945 hours requesting aliaison officer be appointed to the ICC, this officerarrived at 2025 hours. The NSW Fire Brigadeestablished a role both in assisting foreshore clean-up and in assisting in the management of the ICC.

The media played a vital role in communicatingto the public what was going on. They were trying tofind reasons for the spill and to identify theresponsible party, as well as interpreting theresponse strategy for the public. The ‘high profile’location created far greater media interest thanprevious oil spills.

The NSW Fire Brigade issued the first media releaseon the evening of the spill to advise the public aboutthe vapour smell and possible health risks.

Public Affairs personnel of SPC and NSWWaterways were jointly responsible for the ICCmedia function. However, there was a delay of some12 hours from the time of the oil spill in organisingthe media function and establishing regular mediaconferences. Media conferences were conducted atMoores Warehouse at set times, selected to meet thedifferent deadlines of print and television. Some 1828radio stories, 288 television reports and hundreds ofcolumn-inches of newspaper stories were generated.

Comment

Overall there were good relationships among thevarious parties involved in the response, most of thekey personnel having worked together previously inState and National Plan exercises.

The Incident Controller wished to place on record hisappreciation for the dedication and assistanceprovided by all organisations and personnelinvolved in the response, particularly the supportgiven by the Incident Commander.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PARTIES INVOLVEDIN THE INCIDENT

9

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The National Plan envisages a role of IndustryAdviser. This predesignated representative of theaffected oil company liaises with the State MarinePollution Controller providing company resources tothe response and linking the response to thecompany crisis management activities. However, theprimary nominated Shell Industry Adviser, who hasconsiderable National Plan experience was notcontactable.

In this incident the Industry Adviser role waspartially filled by the Shell Clyde Refinery Managerwho established a good relationship with theIncident Controller. However, because of otherrefinery management responsibilities was not able tobe continually available in the ICC.

As a result, Shell appointed a Liaison Officer whosemain activities involved the liaison between the ICCand the Shell response centre at Gore Bay. However,the effectiveness of this arrangement was less thanoptimum due to the lack of personnel continuity inthis role and inappropriate recognition of this role inthe ICC response structure.

The split operational response centres (Shell’s at theGore Bay Terminal and the ICC at MooresWarehouse) resulted in a lack of understanding at theoperational level of what each was doing and whatresources were available, resulting in somefrustration between the two groups. Betterintegration of the Shell response function and itspersonnel into the ICC would have greatly improvedthe relationships.

The relationship between the NSW Fire Brigade as asupport agency and the response organisation wasgenerally good. However, one area of the NSW FireBrigade was concerned that it was not aware that theFire Brigade had been formally notified of theincident, as a result there was confusion within NSWFire Brigade of their expected role. The NSW FireBrigade is aware that SPC is the combat agency onState waters, but an incident such as this one whichhas an impact on the community in the adjoiningNSW Fire Brigade district it is essential that all

agencies liaise fully to bring about propercoordination of activities.

It is a matter of significance that the role of the NSWFire Brigade in oil pollution response is not spelt outin the NSW Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan.

The NSW Fire Brigade Media Liaison Officer did agood but difficult job in handling most mediaconcerns during the first night of the incident. In themorning of the second day the ‘media frenzy’ wasnot well managed. However, relationships with themedia improved considerably when arrangementswere announced for providing information to themedia, including the holding of media conferences atfixed times.

Good use was made of media conferences, enablingall media outlets to be provided with the latestinformation from key personnel and ask questionsfor a set time each day. In particular, the availabilityof the Incident Controller ensured the IncidentCommander was left to get on with the job of theresponse. While the Incident Controller wasinvariably always available to undertake mediainterviews, there were times when a suitableoperational person to deputise for the IncidentController in media interviews would have been anadvantage.

Media personnel contacted by the Analysis Teamwere complimentary about the overall mediafunction and the good cooperation afforded them bythe ICC media team. This included taking them outon the harbour to show response equipment andwhat was being done. The daily 2 p.m. mediaconference was particularly good for televisioncoverage. Print media representatives commented onthe difficulty at times of obtaining verification offacts.

An initiative in an oil pollution response incident inAustralia much welcomed by the media, thecommunity and environmental groups was the useby Shell of the Shell website to promulgate mediareleases and other relevant information.

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The Greenwich Village Community Group werecomplimentary about Shell’s informative publicstatements in particular the ‘letter box drops’ tohomes in the vicinity of the Gore Bay Terminal, whichkept residents up to date with the progress of theincident.

The Community Group expressed their concern thatan emergency evacuation plan for people living inclose proximity to the Gore Bay Terminal needs to bedrawn up by the appropriate authorities. Such a planwill provide confidence and make it quite clear to allconcerned what they should do in any possible futureincident where evacuation becomes necessary.

The shipowner P&I Club’s representative commentedfavourably on the acceptance by ICC personnel of theITOPF representatives as part of the response teamand stated that they were kept fully informed.


• In light of the introduction of the Incident ControlSystem, NPAC should review and emphasise therole of the ‘Industry Adviser’ in the ICC.

• Only a single Incident Control Centre beestablished in oil spill response incidents and tobe responsible for coordinating all responseoperations.

• The NSW National Plan Executive Committeeshould determine the role of the NSW FireBrigade in oil pollution response on State waters.

• NPAC should take into account the value ofutilising a website to promulgate incidentinformation to the public, community andenvironmental groups.

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The National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea byOil and other Noxious and Hazardous Substances(the National Plan) has as its objectives:

– a national contingency plan for preparedness andresponse which includes the organisationalrelationship of the various organisations involved,whether public or private;

– an adequate level of pre-positioned spill-combating equipment, commensurate with therisk involved, and programs for its use;

– a comprehensive national training program tofamiliarise personnel at all levels with therequirements of planning and responding to theneeds arising from an oil or chemical spill. Theprogram includes conducting frequent exercises;

– detailed national, State, local and industry plansand communications arrangements for mobilisingresources and responding to an oil or chemicalpollution incident;

– an awareness by governments, media and thecommunity of the limitations inherent in aresponse to a major oil or chemical spill.

These objectives provide the framework against whichthe effectiveness of current plans can be measured.

At the outset it should be understood, in the contextof the Laura D’Amato spill, there were several plansbeing used. The National Plan, the New South WalesMarine Oil Spill Contingency Plan (the NSW Plan)which incorporates ‘ A Subplan of the NSW StateDisaster Plan’ (Displan) which includes Sydney PortsMarine Services Procedures. In addition there was thesite specific Shell Gore Bay Emergency ManagementProcedures Manual, Section 4 - Emergency Procedures- Oil Spill.

The NSW Plan aims to:

– provide an effective system for reporting,assessing and responding to a marine oilpollution incident or a potential incident;

– ensure that the NSW Government’s resources areintegrated with the National Plan and effectivelymobilised in the event of a major oil spill in ornear NSW State waters;

– institute procedures to minimise the impact onthe natural and socioeconomic environment of thearea; and

– define the division of responsibilities.

The Sydney Ports Marine Services Procedures dated10 March 1997 define the SPC Response ManagementStructure and its integration into the NSW DisasterManagement Structure. The Procedures list threetypes of response; Single Agency Response, SingleAgency Supported Response and EmergencyResponse. It was determined early in the incidentthat the Laura D’Amato oil spill came under the SingleAgency Supported Response defined in theprocedures as:

‘a response to an operation where additional support

is provided through the disaster management

structure but the incident is competently controlled

by the designated combat authority’

While the new response system OSRICS began anAustralia-wide three-year implementation in January1999, there has been slow progress in itsimplementation. While information on the newsystem was provided to the States and NT duringmid 1999, formal training packs were not circulateduntil October 1999. Consequently OSRICS had notbeen incorporated into the various NSW contingencyplans prior the incident.

CONTINGENCY PLANS:

National, State and local

10

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During the incident the NSW Plan and the SydneyPorts Marine Services Procedures were usedsimultaneously by a number of personnel. While theIncident Controller was in no doubt about whichplan was being used (the SPC Marine ServiceProcedures) the situation was not as clear to others.

A NSW wildlife plan as envisaged by NPAC and theNational Plan, indicating roles for NPWA, EPA andother related organisations has not been developed.

It would appear that those responsible for dealingwith the media were not aware of the Oil SpillResponse Media Management Procedures issued bythe Office of Marine Administration on4 December 1998.

Comment

The main issue requiring comment with regard toContingency Plans is the uncertainty of thoseresponding to the spill knowing which plan wasbeing used.

While references to the various plans are contained inthe three plans mentioned above the plans are notintegrated.

Relationships between plans, particularly the ShellGore Bay Terminal Plan, SPC and State Plan are notidentified.

SPC has an excellent system of proceduraldocuments and checklists as part of its local plan.However, it is not clear whether the system was inuse at the time of the incident.

While it is clear that the National Plan, the NSWMarine Oil Spill Contingency Plan and the SPCMarine Service Procedures were adequate for thisspill, steps are required to integrate the various plansand make it quite clear under which circumstanceseach should be used.

It is understood the NPWS have been requested tocomplete a NSW wildlife rescue and rehabilitationplan but due to resource problems within the servicethis has not eventuated.


• The NSW National Plan Executive Committeeshould bring its oil spill contingency plans up todate, recognising the National Plan Oil SpillResponse Incident Control System (OSRICS) andensure the various State, Port and Terminal plansfully integrate.

• The NSW Marine Oil Spill Contingency Planshould be upgraded to include a wildlife rescueand rehabilitation plan.

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1. The full implementation of the National Plan Oil Spill Response Incident Control System, includingtraining should be speeded up. The National Plan Advisory Committee should issue guidelines on theresponse structure to be used during the remaining period of implementation. (p 11)

2. Spill sizes should be estimated using all appropriate techniques and the estimated figures should beimmediately communicated to all interested parties. When spill size estimates are found to be largerthan first advised, the company involved should provide the revised figure to the State MarinePollution Controller and Incident Controller without delay. (p 11)

3. Incident Control Centres should have the National Plan Oil Spill Response Incident Control Systemorganisational structure permanently displayed on a whiteboard or similar, so that individuals’ namesat the four functional heads level, can be added quickly in the early stages of the incident. (p 11)

4. The work areas in the Incident Control Centre allocated to the four functional units, Planning,Operations, Logistics and Finance/Administration should be planned according to their operationalneeds but should be located close to each other to enable personnel to communicate easily with eachother. (p 14 and p28)

5. Management of an oil spill response should be undertaken from a single Incident Control Centre,separate response organisations should not be set up for areas under oil industry jurisdiction. If aforward base is required when an incident is remote from the Incident Control Centre, there should bestrong communication links between the forward base and the Incident Control Centre. (p 14 & p 31)

6. When supporting a State/NT pollution incident, AMSA is organising interstate personnel andequipment, and an affected oil company is mobilising AMOSC directly, there should be early and closecontact between AMSA and AMOSC to ensure that appropriate decisions are being made on theamount and type of resources required.(p14) Likewise there should be early and close contact betweenthe oil company and the State Marine Pollution Controller for the same reasons. (p11)

7. The National Plan Advisory Committee should research designing a national computerised oil spillmanagement system to handle all written operational and administrative communications, trackequipment and personnel resources etc. In the meantime a simple Incident Control Centre Operationsand Procedures manual should be developed. (p 14)

8. The National Plan Advisory Committee should review National Plan hand-held radio communicationequipment to take advantage of the Sydney Ports Corporation’s initiatives and review the use ofspecial headsets for use in helicopters and possibly when alongside noisy machinery such as in MarcoOil Spill Recovery Vessels. (p 18)

9. The National Plan Advisory Committee as well State/NT agencies should have policies in place toensure that during a major pollution response operation their employees obtain adequate rest. (p 25)

10. The National Plan Advisory Committee should, in light of the introduction of the Incident ControlSystem, review and emphasise the role of industry and other advisers in the Incident ControlCentre.(p 31)

RECOMMENDATIONS11

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11. The National Plan Advisory Committee should further develop guidelines on foreshore cleaningtechniques for different shoreline types in tropical and subtropical areas of Australia ie for NSW and allother States and the Northern Territory. Additional training of personnel in shoreline cleaning techniquesshould also be provided. (p 23)

12. The National Plan Advisory Committee should take into account the value of utilising an Internet Websiteto promulgate incident information to the public, community and environmental groups. (p 31)

13. State/NT procedures used during a spill response for environmental monitoring and undertakingsampling programs of the areas affected by the oil spill should be reviewed to provide the mostappropriate scientific advice in future incidents.(p 23)

14. State/NT National Plan Committees should obtain Environment Protection Agency approval fortechniques and cleaning agents to be used to clean oiled recreation craft while afloat. (p 23)

15. State/NT and industry supervisors should ensure before booming or other response operations commenceclose to the source of a spill that there is no risk to personnel of explosion or inhalation of toxic fumes. (p 25)

16. State/NT National Plan Committees should review arrangements at Incident Control Centre’s to ensure (p28):

(i) computer arrangements permit networking and provision of analogue dial out facilities for visitorlaptops and access to printers by visitor laptops

(ii) contingency plans in place to quickly acquire additional telephones, fax machines, photocopiers andother office equipment required in the Incident Control Centre

(iii) provision of adequate personnel to operate the Incident Control Centre

17. The NSW National Plan Executive Committee should undertake a review of the NSW Marine Oil SpillContingency Plan to:

(i) clarify the role of NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service in an oil spill response and to improvethe interaction between the respective roles of the Environment Protection Agency and NSWNational Parks and Wildlife Service (p 20)

(ii) clarify the role of the Environment and Scientific Coordinator with a view to locating this position inthe Environment Unit so as to provide improved communication between the Planning andOperations Sections (p 23)

(iii) ensure appropriate guidelines on shoreline clean-up strategies are available for future spills inconjunction with the NPAC Recommendation 11.

(iv) determine the role of the NSW Fire Brigade in oil pollution response (p31)

(v) recognise the National Plan Oil Spill Response Incident Control System (p 33)

(vi) ensure full integration of the various port and terminal plans with the State plan (p 33)

(vii) include a wildlife rescue and rehabilitation plan.(p 33)

18. Sydney Ports Corporation personnel should undergo further training in boom deployment andmonitoring. The training should highlight the need to check boom deployment and anchoringmechanisms to ensure optimal use of booms including shoreline sealing, particularly after changes in tideand or wind direction , and the correct procedure for getting inside the boomed area.(p 18)

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National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil andOther Noxious and Hazardous Substances

National Plan Response to the Laura D’Amato Pollution Incident

Aim:, To undertake a comprehensive analysis of the pollution response to the loss of oil from the Laura D’Amato

in Sydney on 3 August 1999, in accordance with the Terms of Reference for the National Plan AdvisoryCommittee adopted on 11 September 1998.

Assessment Team Membership: The assessment team is to comprise persons with expertise in response to ship-sourced marine pollution incidents and related matters, but who had no role in the Laura D’Amato incident.

Members of the assessment team are:

• Mr Michael Julian, Executive Manager,International Relations, Australian Maritime Safety Authority ( Chairman)

• Captain Kerry Dwyer, Marine Consultant

• Mr Don Blackmore, Manager,Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre, Industry Representative

• Mr Murray Fox, General Manager Navigation & Environment,Sydney Ports Corporation, NSW State Nominee

Terms of Reference:

Analyse the management of the incident from the oil pollution response perspective and assess any deficienciesin the National Plan arrangements or in the actual response to the Laura D’Amato incident. In this context:

1. Assess the response with particular reference to:

(i) the call out procedures used and the effectiveness of the initial and subsequent response;

(ii) the suitability and accessibility of National Plan equipment

(iii) availability and timeliness of response personnel;

(iv) the decisions made in respect of calls for equipment and personnel in regard effectiveness andtimeliness;

(v) the adequacy and effectiveness of the wildlife rescue and rehabilitation response;

(vi) the adequacy and effectiveness of incident response plans and their implementation;

(vii) the adequacy of the management of Occupational Health and Safety issues;

(viii) the adequacy of the administrative support, environmental advice and support, and other relatedactivities;

(ix ) the interaction with the media and other interested parties.

APPENDIX 1

Terms of Reference

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2. Assess the involvement of the various parties to the response from the viewpoint of appropriateness,timeliness and adequacy. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the inter-relationship betweenthe parties involved in the incident response.

3. Within the context of this incident, assess the National, State and local contingency plans and report on theadequacy of each.

4. Provide recommendations for improvements and initiatives based on the lessons learned from the incident.

As far as is practicable, the assessment team or member(s) thereof should attend the various debriefingsessions to be carried out by relevant agencies and bodies involved in the incident and consider the writtenreports of the various entities in the response

A draft written report on the findings and recommendations of the analysis is to be submitted to the 13thsession of the National Plan Advisory Committee to be held on 19 October 1999.

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APPENDIX 2

Glossary

ADIOS Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills( Data base which provides information on weathering andevaporation rates of various types of oil)

AMOSC Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre(The oil industry’s major response facility in Geelong)

AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority(Self funded Commonwealth government safety agency, responsible forcombating pollution in the marine environment)

EMA Emergency Management Australia(Commonwealth government agency responsible for coordinatingassistance in an emergency)

EPA Environment Protection Authority( NSW State government agency)

EPG Environment Protection Group(Section within AMSA responsible for National Planoperational requirements)

ESC Environment and Scientific Coordinator

ICS Incident Control System

ICC Incident Control Centre

ITOPF International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation(Group of international experts in oil pollution response who attend on siteat incidents world-wide on behalf of shipowners their P&I Club insurers andthe International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds. Among other things,they provide advice on response techniques and the likely admissibility ofclaims for compensation)

National Plan National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and otherNoxious and Hazardous Substances

NPAC National Plan Advisory Committee(Committee chaired by AMSA and made up of all States/NT,shipping, oil and exploration industries and other relevantCommonwealth agencies)

NPEC National Plan Executive Committee(New NSW National Plan State Committee)

NPWS NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service

NSW New South Wales

NSW DOT New South Wales Department of Transport

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NRT National Response Team(Group of Commonwealth, State/NT and industry personnel

identified as having the skills and ability to assist in pollution response)

OH&S Occupational Health and Safety

OSRICS Oil Spill Response Incident Control System

OSRV Oil Spill Recovery Vessel

P&I Club Protection and indemnity insurers

SPC Sydney Ports Corporation

TWG Technical Working Group(Sub group of the NSW State National Plan Committee)

UHF Ultra High Frequency

Terms Used

Gore Bay Name used by Shell associated with the area of theShell terminal within Gore Gove

Mousse An mixture of sea water droplets suspended in oil

the response to the laura d’amato · the laura d’amato, a 96 121 dwt (deadweight tonne) oil...

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