the republic of trinidad and tobago in the...

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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Claim No. CV2014-03884

IN THE ESTATE OF ROOPNARINE SINGH, also called SONNYBOY

ROOPNARINE SINGH, Deceased

BETWEEN

RAMLOGAN ROOPNARINE SINGH AND OTHERS

Claimant

AND

RALPH RAMJOHN

SABITA RAMNARINE

Defendants

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN N. MOHAMMED

Appearances:

Mrs. Deborah Moore-Miggins instructed by Ms. Neela Ramyad for the Claimant

Mrs. Amina Maaria Hasnain-Mohammed instructed by Ms. Andrea Orie for the First Defendant

______________________________________________________________________________

DECISION

______________________________________________________________________________

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BACKGROUND

1. Before this Court for resolution is a preliminary issue raised by the 1st Defendant at

paragraph [1] of his Defence filed on the 14th

January, 2015 whereby he contends that the

Claimant’s Statement of Case discloses no or no reasonable cause of action against him

and/or that the Claimant’s Claim against him is not maintainable and/or is premature

since the Claimant had neither a general nor limited grant of administration enabling him

to bring this Claim against the 1st Defendant.

2. The Claimant filed his Claim Form and Statement of Case on the 21st October, 2014. In

his Claim Form, the Claimant stated that as follows:

“By order of the Learned Judge Ricky Rahim dated 9th

day of May, 2014, the Claimant

was appointed the Representative Claimant of the Estate of Roopnarine Singh also called

Sonnyboy Roopnarine Singh (hereinafter “the deceased”) for the purposes of bringing an

action to safeguard the interest of the estate in inter alia, all that property known as No.

1314 SS Erin Road, Penal Trinidad”.

3. The Claimant then went on to claim the following forms of relief against the Defendants,

with the relief sought against the 1st Defendant being:

a. A Declaration that the deceased was a tenant of the 1st Defendant having occupied

properties situate at 1314 Erin Road, Penal, Trinidad (hereinafter “the said lands”)

commencing in or around 1960.

b. A Declaration that the said tenancy was still subsisting at the date of the death of the

deceased.

c. A Declaration that by virtue of the death of the deceased the tenancy now accrues to

the estate of the deceased.

d. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant acted in breach of the tenancy agreement with

the deceased by returning the cheque dated 10th

January, 2014 in the sum of fifteen

hundred dollars proffered to him as rent on behalf of the deceased.

e. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant acted wrongfully in accepting rent from the 2

nd

Defendant, the former cohabitational spouse of the deceased.

f. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant acted unlawfully in purporting to put the 2

nd

Defendant in possession of the said lands.

g. An injunction restraining the 1st Defendant, his servants and/or agents or howsoever

otherwise from denying the existence of a tenancy in favour of the deceased and/or

his estate.

h. An Order that the 1st Defendant do revoke the permission and/or license granted to

the 2nd

Defendant to enter into possession of the lands in default of which an order

revoking the said permission of the 1st Defendant.

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i. An Order that the 1st Defendant do recognize the deceased’s estate as entitled to the

tenancy and grant vacant possession of the said lands to the Claimant on behalf of the

estate of the deceased.

j. An Order for possession of the said lands.

k. Damages.

l. Interest.

m. Costs and/or further relief.

4. As against the 2nd

Defendant, the Claimant claims the following forms of relief:

a. A Declaration that the 2nd

Defendant is not entitled to enter and remain upon the said

lands.

b. A Declaration that the 2nd

Defendant is not entitled to construct on the said lands

and/or to continue to construct thereon.

c. A Declaration that the 2nd

Defendant has trespassed on the said lands.

d. A Declaration that the agreement dated 24th

February, 2010 between the deceased and

the 2nd

Defendant terminating the cohabitation relationship between them is valid.

e. A Declaration that the said agreement dated 24th

February, 2010 has been fully

complied with by the deceased and by virtue thereof there has been full and final

settlement of all claims of the 2nd

Defendant against the deceased and/or his estate.

f. An injunction restraining the 2nd

Defendant, her servants and/or agents or howsoever

otherwise from entering and/or remaining on the said lands and/or from constructing

thereon.

g. An Order that the 2nd

Defendant do demolish and remove all construction on the said

lands and restore the said lands to its original condition.

h. An Order that the 2nd

Defendant do vacate the said lands.

i. Possession of the said lands.

j. Damages.

k. Interest.

l. Costs and/or other relief.

5. An Appearance was entered on behalf of the 1st Defendant on the 10

th November, 2014

with the 2nd

Defendant entering an Appearance on the 27th

November, 2014. The 1st

Defendant filed his Defence on the 14th

January, 2015. The Claimant then filed a Notice

of Application on the 3rd

March, 2015 seeking default judgment against the 2nd

Defendant.

6. By Court Order dated the 8th

May, 2015 the Claimant was granted permission to file and

serve a Reply to the 1st Defendant’s Defence on or before the 22

nd May, 2015. The Court

further stated, inter alia, that thereafter, it would embark upon the preliminary point

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raised in paragraph [1] of the 1st Defendant’s Defence (the point currently engaging the

Court in this Ruling). The Claimant filed his Reply on the 22nd

May, 2015.

7. In accordance with the Court’s directions, written submissions on the preliminary point

were filed on behalf of the 1st Defendant on the 12

th June, 2015. The Claimant then filed

his response to those submissions on the 3rd

July, 2015. Thereafter, on the 16th

July, 2015

the 1st Defendant filed his submissions in reply to the Claimant’s submissions of the 3

rd

July, 2015.

PRELIMINARY POINT

8. The 1st Defendant contends that the Claimant’s Statement of Case discloses no or no

reasonable cause of action against him and/or that the Claimant’s Claim against him is

not maintainable and/or is premature since the Claimant had neither a general nor limited

grant of administration enabling him to bring this Claim against the 1st Defendant.

First Defendant’s position

9. According to the 1st Defendant, the Claimant in his Claim contends that the deceased’s

interest as a tenant of the subject property survived his death and now vests in his estate.

The 1st Defendant says that in this regard, he has been sued as the owner and landlord of

the said property and the 1st Defendant further contends that the Claim was purportedly

brought pursuant to the May 2014 Order of Rahim J.

10. The First Defendant contends that the Claimant’s Statement of Case discloses no or no

reasonable cause of action against him and/or that the Claimant’s Claim against him is

not maintainable and/or is premature since at the time of its commencement, the Claimant

had neither a general nor a limited grant of administration of the deceased’s estate,

enabling the Claimant, on behalf of the estate, to bring a claim against him and that the

May 2014 Order relates only to the Second Defendant.

Claimant’s position

11. The Claimant admits that the May 2014 Order (of Rahim J.) does not specifically name

the 1st Defendant as the party against whom the action should be brought. However, the

Claimant advances the argument that the Court has the power and/or the discretion to

confer on a party the right to act as a representative party in relation to an estate

notwithstanding the fact that that party does not have a grant of letters of administration.

This, the Claimant submits, was actually the substance of the May 2014 Order.

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12. The Claimant states that he has set out a compelling case against the 1st Defendant in both

the Statement of Case and in the Reply as required by Part 8 of the Civil Proceedings

Rules 1998 (as amended) (“CPR”). Save for paragraph [1] of the Defence, it is the

Claimant’s contention that the 1st Defendant has not taken issue with the substance of the

Claimant’s case, thus suggesting that there are substantive issues to be tried between the

parties. According to the Claimant, having regard to the pleaded facts, it would frustrate

and render unenforceable any Order that the Claimant may obtain against only the 2nd

Defendant in this matter.

13. In light of the foregoing, the Claimant states that the Court has a discretion under CPR

Rule 26.8 to put matters right and the power to appoint a Representative Claimant is one

that involves the simple exercise of a Court’s discretion. According to the Claimant, the

Court may therefore exercise the power to apply the overriding objective and order that

the 1st Defendant remain as a Defendant to the Representative Claimant’s action and that

the matter do proceed against the 1st Defendant as well as the 2

nd Defendant. The Court,

the Claimant says, can do so on the basis of the facts pleaded by both parties in this case.

14. The Claimant contends that the issue is therefore not about whether the Claimant has the

right to commence proceedings on behalf of the deceased’s estate when he does not have

a grant but rather, it is about whether the Court should seek to give effect to the

overriding objective of the Rules having regard to the fact that a Court has already

appointed the Claimant as a Representative Claimant for the purpose of bringing the

action, albeit against another Defendant.

15. Referring to the May 2014 Order of Rahim J, the Claimant contends that it shows on the

face of it that the Rahim Court was satisfied that the interest of the estate of the deceased

in the subject property needed to be protected, that a Representative Claimant of the

estate of the deceased should be appointed (and it did so), that the purpose of making this

appointment was to safeguard the interest of the estate of the deceased, that an action was

to be brought by the appointed Representative Claimant and that on the face of the facts

before it the action needed to be brought against the 2nd

Defendant. The Claimant alleges

that none of these factors has changed and in fact, that they are even more relevant in

relation to the 1st Defendant. The Claimant suggests that had the Rahim Court’s attention

been drawn to the 1st Defendant’s actions as pleaded in the Statement of Case it would

have easily made the Order that he be included as a Defendant.

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ISSUES

16. As I see it, the main issues which fall to be determined are as follows:

a) Whether the Claimant was entitled to bring the Claim against the 1st Defendant?

b) If not, whether the Claim against the 1st Defendant should be struck out?

LAW AND ANALYSIS

a) Whether the Claimant was entitled to bring the Claim against the 1st Defendant?

17. It is not in dispute that the May 2014 Order of Rahim J. appointed the Claimant as a

Representative Claimant for the purpose of bringing an action against Sabita Ramnarine

(the 2nd

Defendant) in order to safeguard the estate of the deceased. The Order was so

circumscribed with the 1st Defendant falling outside of its ambit. The Claimant contends

that had the Court’s attention been drawn to the 1st Defendant’s actions, it would have

made a similar order relating to the 1st Defendant. This, however, amounts to nothing

more than mere speculation on the Claimant’s part. Rahim J. would have considered

certain evidence before him in arriving at his May 2014 Order directed at the 2nd

Defendant. It cannot be said, with any degree of certainty, how Rahim J. would have

construed the 1st Defendant’s alleged actions and how he would have weighed any

evidence before him as it related to the 1st Defendant. Accordingly, the Claimant’s

submission that Rahim J. would have made a similar order relating to the 1st Defendant

does not assist in advancing his claim that the Court may make an order appointing him a

representative claimant for the purpose of bringing an action against the 1st Defendant.

18. Having established that the May 2014 Order does not provide for the Claimant’s bringing

of a Claim against the 1st Defendant, the question to be resolved is, whether, in the

absence of such power being conferred thereby, the Claimant had the locus standi to

bring the Claim in question against the 1st Defendant.

19. From the facts alleged in the Claimant’s Claim Form and Statement of Case it is clear

that the Claimant has sought to bring an action for the benefit of the deceased’s estate,

since the crux of his argument is that the tenancy in question survived the death of the

deceased and consequently, the 1st Defendant was wrong to accept the 2

nd Defendant as a

tenant.

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20. Section 10(4) of the Administration of Estates Act Chap. 9:01 provides, inter alia, that

on the death of any person all his estate shall vest in law in the Administrator General

until the same is divested by the grant of Probate or Letters of Administration to some

other person or persons.

21. Applying the law to the instant matter, after death, any interest the deceased may have in

the disputed property would be vested in the Administrator General until the same is

divested by a grant of letters of administration. It is not in dispute that the Claimant has

not obtained letters of administration of the deceased’s estate. In fact, there is no evidence

to suggest that any such application for such a grant has even been made by him.

22. A string of English cases have considered whether a plaintiff (Claimant) had title to sue

on behalf of the estate of a deceased where proceedings were commenced prior to the

grant of letters of administration being issued.

23. In Ingall v. Moran [1944] 1 All ER 97 the plaintiff issued a writ in an action claiming to

sue in a representative capacity as administrator of his son’s estate, but he did not take

out letters of administration until nearly two months after the date of the writ. The Court

of Appeal held that the action was incompetent at the date of its inception by the issue of

the writ.

24. Scott L.J., stated as follows in his judgment:

“It is true that when he got his title by the grant of administration he prima facie became

entitled to sue, and could then have issued a new writ, but that was all...The old writ was

in truth, incurably a nullity. It was born dead, and could not be revived. If that

conclusion is right it follows equally that the statement of claim was not delivered in any

action recognized by the Rules of the Supreme Court, and all subsequent proceedings in

the supposed action...were likewise nugatory, for, if the action and the pleadings were

bad, there was no valid action before the learned judge to try and it is our duty to say

so....” [Emphasis mine]

25. Luxmoore L.J. had this to say:

“It is, I think, well established that an executor can institute an action before probate of

his testator’s will is granted, and that, so long as probate is granted before the hearing of

the action, the action is well constituted, although it may in some cases be stayed until the

plaintiff has obtained his grant. The reason is plain. The executor derives his legal title to

sue from his testator’s will. The grant of probate before the hearing is necessary only

because it is the only method recognized by the rules of court by which the executor can

prove the fact that he is the executor...An administrator is of course, in a different

position, for his title to sue depends solely on the grant of administration. It is true that,

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when a grant of administration is made, the intestate’s estate including all choses in

action, vests in the person to whom the grant is made, and the title thereto then relates

back to the date of the intestate’s death, but there is no doubt that both at common law

and in equity, in order to maintain an action the plaintiff must have a cause of action

vested in him at the date of the issue of the writ.”[Emphasis mine]

26. Luxmoore LJ went on to state that -

“...It is true that a person who ultimately becomes an administrator may start

proceedings in the Chancery Division for the protection of an intestate’s estate, and can

obtain in a proper case interim relief by the appointment of a receiver pendente grant,

but in all such cases the person who institutes such proceedings has a beneficial interest

in the intestate’s estate, for he would not obtain a grant unless he had such an interest

either as heir at law or as one of the next of kin or as a creditor. I have no doubt that the

plaintiff’s action was incompetent at the date when the writ was issued and that the

doctrine of the relation back of an administrator’s title to his intestate’s property to the

date of the intestate’s death when the grant has been obtained cannot be invoked so as to

render an action competent which was incompetent when the writ was issued.

27. From Ingall v. Moran, the general position at common law appears to be that a person

who is not an executor or who has not obtained letters of administration of the deceased’s

estate may not bring an action for the benefit of the estate. Not being entitled to do so, it

follows that the action would be bad as having been brought by someone with no title to

do so. It appears that in equity, a person who has a beneficial interest in the intestate’s

estate could commence proceedings for the protection of an intestate’s estate and could,

in the proper case, obtain interim relief by the appointment of a receiver pendente grant.

28. In his Statement of Case, the Claimant herein indicated that he is the eldest son of the

deceased, Roopnarine Singh and that the deceased died intestate. This was not challenged

by the 1st Defendant. Accordingly, by virtue of his status as a son of the deceased, the

Claimant constitutes a beneficiary to his estate. However, the action brought was not one

seeking to appoint a receiver pendente grant. Accordingly, this qualification of the

general position discussed in Ingall v. Moran does not apply here.

29. Ingall v. Moran was followed in the Court of Appeal case of Millburn-Snell and

Others v. Evans [2011] EWCA Civ 577. In that case the Claimants were the daughters

of Timothy Millburn who died intestate. The Claimants brought a claim purportedly on

behalf of his estate, though they had not obtained a grant of letters of administration. The

Defence argued that with neither a will nor a grant, the claim was fatally flawed and

ought to be struck out. The lead judgment of the Court was delivered by Rimer L.J. who

stated that -

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“I regard it as clear law, at least since Ingall, that an action commenced by a claimant

purportedly as an administrator, when the claimant does not have that capacity, is a

nullity.” That principle was recognised and applied by this court in Hilton v. Sutton

Steam Laundry... and Burns v. Campbell...” [Emphasis mine]

30. Rimer L.J. went on to say that -

“In my judgment, the flaw in their case is exposed by the decision in Ingall. What that

case decided, by a decision binding upon us, is that a claim purportedly brought on

behalf of an intestate’s estate by a claimant without a grant is an incurable nullity.

Subject only to whatever Part 19.8(1) may empower, it follows that the claim the

appellants issued was equally an incurable nullity. The logic of Mr. Oakley’s submission

is however that the force of Part 19.8(1) is to confer a jurisdiction upon the court to turn

such a nullity into valid proceedings which may be pursued to judgment.

I am unable to accept that and, in agreement with the judge, consider that Part 19.8(1)

has no application to the present case. The appellants’ invocation of Part 19.8(1) was

responsive to the defendant’s strike out application. Logically however, if they are right

about Part 19.8(1), they could (indeed should) promptly after issuing their claim form

have applied to the court for an order that the nullity they had thereby conceived should

have life breathed into it by way of an order that they be appointed to represent the estate

of the deceased intestate and the claim permitted to proceed to trial. The reason that any

such application should and would have failed is because Part 19.8(1) does not, in my

view, have any role to play in the way of correcting deficiencies in the manner in which

proceedings have been instituted. It certainly says nothing express to that effect and I see

no reason to read it as implicitly creating any such jurisdiction. It is, I consider,

concerned exclusively with giving directions for the forward prosecution towards trial of

validly instituted proceedings when a relevant death requires their giving...It appears to

me clear that it is no part of the function of Part 19.8(1) to cure nullities and give life to

proceedings such as the present which were born dead and incapable of being revived.

In ordinary circumstances, there is no reason why anyone with a legitimate interest in

bringing a claim on behalf of an intestate’s estate should not first obtain a grant of

administration and so clothe himself with a title to sue. I am unable to interpret Part

19.8(1) as providing an optional alternative to such ordinary course.” [Emphasis mine]

31. Millburn-Snell followed the ruling of the Court in Ingall and concluded that subject to

whatever Part 19.8(1) (of the UK Civil Procedure Rules) may empower, the claim

issued would in effect be an incurable nullity. Part 19.8(1) of the UK CPR provides that-

“1) Where a person who had an interest in a claim has died and that person has no

personal representative the court may order –

(a) the claim to proceed in the absence of a person representing the estate of the

deceased; or

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(b) a person to be appointed to represent the estate of the deceased.”

32. Part 19.8(1)(b) of the UK CPR is similar in content to rule 21.7(1) of the Civil

Proceedings Rules 1998 ( as amended) of Trinidad and Tobago which provides as

follows:

“(1) Where in any proceedings it appears that a dead person was interested in the

proceedings then, if the dead person has no personal representatives, the court may make

an order appointing someone to represent his estate for the purpose of the proceedings”.

Thus, it may be said that the ruling of the Court in Millburn-Snell as it relates to Rule

19.8(1) of the UK CPR would be equally applicable here in Trinidad and Tobago with

respect to Rule 21.7(1), with the said section applying to proceedings which were validly

instituted in the first place and not applying so as to give life to, or revive proceedings

which were dead at the outset.

32. In his submissions, the Claimant argued that the court has a discretion under CPR Rule

26.8 “to put matters right” and that the power to appoint a Representative Claimant is one

which involves the simple exercise of a Court’s discretion. Rule 26.8 concerns the

general powers of the Court to rectify matters where there has been an error of procedure.

However, Rule 26.8(1) expressly delimits the ambit of the Rule by providing that “this

rule applies only where the consequence of failure to comply with a rule, practice

direction or court order has not been specified by any rule, practice direction or court

order”. Thus, Rule 26.8 is inapplicable in the instant case as there is no issue of a failure

to comply with a rule, practice direction or Court order. Moreover it is my view that the

power to correct an error of procedure is not so wide and ought not to be construed as

including the power to provide an alternative course to first obtaining title to sue.

33. With respect to the appointment of a representative claimant, even if such was in fact the

correct course of action for this Court to consider, the Claimant has not advanced any

evidence before this Court to support his application to be so appointed1.

Rule 21.1of the CPR provides that -

“21.1 (1) This rule applies to any proceedings other than proceedings falling within rule

21.4 where five or more persons have the same or a similar interest in the

proceedings.

(2) The court may appoint -

(a) one or more of those persons; or

(b) a body having a sufficient interest in the proceedings,

to represent all or some of the persons with the same or similar interest.

1Rule 21.2(3) of the CPR requires that an application for such an order be supported by evidence.

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(3) A representative under this rule may be either a claimant or a defendant.”

34. There is no evidence that there are at least five persons who have the same or a similar

interest in the proceedings, as required by Rule 21.1(1). Simply claiming that had the

Rahim Court known about the actions of the 1st Defendant he would have made a similar

Order (to the May 2014 Order appointing the Claimant as a representative claimant for

the purpose of bringing an action against the 2nd

Defendant) is clearly not sufficient. I

agree with the 1st Defendant insofar as he submits that the application and the evidence

upon which that Order was made, do not form part of the instant proceedings and the 1st

Defendant was not a party to that application.

35. In light of all of the foregoing, I am of the view that the decision of the Court in Ingall v.

Moran applies in the instant case and I accordingly conclude that the Claim which the

Claimant brought purportedly on behalf of the deceased’s estate, done without a grant,

amounts to an incurable nullity. Without a grant, the Claimant was incompetent to bring

the action, having no title to sue. I accordingly find that the Claimant was not entitled to

bring the Claim against the 1st Defendant.

36. I wish to echo the words of Lord Neuberger MR in Millburn-Snell at this juncture, as I

believe them to hold true in this case. The learned judge stated as follows:

“Arguments such as that which the defendant successfully raised before the judge in this

case are never very attractive, and one of the purposes of the CPR is to rid the law of

unnecessary technical procedural rules which can operate as traps for litigants.

However, whatever one’s views of the value of the principle applied and approved in

Ingall v. Moran [1944] KB 160, it is a well-established principle, and, once one

concludes that it has not been abrogated by CPR Part 19.8, it was the judge’s duty to

follow it, as it is the duty of this court, at least in the absence of any powerful contrary

reason. The need for consistency, clarity and adherence to the established principles is

much greater than the avoidance of a technical rule, particularly one which has a

discernible purpose, namely to ensure that an action is brought by an appropriate

claimant.”

(b) Whether the Claim against the 1st Defendant should be struck out?

37. Part 26.2(1)(c) of the CPR provides that the court may strike out a statement of case or

part of a statement of case if it appears to the court that the statement of case or the part to

be struck out discloses no grounds for bringing or defending a claim.

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As was stated above, this Court finds that the Claimant was not entitled to sue as he did,

having no title to do so and Rules 21.1, 21.7 and 26.8 do not assist the Claimant here for

the reasons stated above.

38. In his submissions, the Claimant argued that the action is still maintainable if the Court

gives effect to the overriding objective as set out in the CPR and this would enable the

Court to deal justly with the matter. He submits that the Court can do so by ordering that

the 1st Defendant be included or retained as a party against whom the action should be

brought having regard to the issues arising in both the Statement of Case and the

Defence. The 1st Defendant has argued that the overriding objective is wholly irrelevant

here as the issue for determination before this Court does not involve either the exercise

of any discretion given to it by the Rules nor the interpretation of the meaning of any

Rule.

39. Though the CPR may not apply directly to the issue as to whether the Claimant was

entitled to sue, the power to strike out a statement of case is governed by Rule 26.2 of the

CPR and so, in applying that rule, regard ought to be paid to the overriding objective

which in turn requires the Court to deal with cases justly. The Claimant has argued that

his Claim is maintainable and the Court may order that the 1st Defendant be included or

retained as a party against whom the action should be brought, having regard to the issues

arising in both the Statement of Case and the Defence.

40. The Claimant has brought an action having no locus standi to sue and accordingly, he has

no grounds for bringing the Claim. In much the same way that the Claimant would have

purportedly adduced evidence so as to be named the Representative Claimant for the

purpose of bringing an action against the 2nd

Defendant, he could have similarly done so

in relation to the 1st Defendant before the Rahim Court, but for whatever reason failed to

do so. He also made no attempt to seek to obtain letters of administration to the

deceased’s estate. He then sought to bring an action against the First Defendant under the

guise of the power provided by the May 2014 Order and now claims that his action is

nonetheless maintainable and the Court can make an Order including or retaining the 1st

Defendant as a party. Bearing in mind the foregoing, to seek to have the Court exercise

any power to convert an action which had been ex initio a nullity into one which is

competent to proceed to trial would not be just.

41. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the Claimant’s Statement of Case against the

1st Defendant ought to be struck out pursuant to Part 26.2(1)(c) of the CPR.

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42. Having regard to all of the foregoing, this Court orders as follows:

ORDER

1. That the Claimant was not entitled to bring this claim against the 1st Defendant.

2. That, accordingly, the Claimant’s Claim Form and Statement of Case against

the 1st Defendant shall be struck out pursuant to Rule 26.2(1)(c) of the CPR

1998.

3. The Claimant shall pay the costs of the 1st Defendant to be assessed in

accordance with Part 67.11 of the CPR in default of agreement.

4. Consequently, where there is no agreement on the issue of costs the 1st Defendant

shall file and serve a Statement of Costs for assessment on or before the 30th

October, 2015.

5. Thereafter, the Claimant shall file and serve Objections, if any, on or before 23rd

November, 2015.

6. Upon receipt by the Court of the Statement of Costs as ordered in clause 4 of this

order, a date for the assessment of costs will be fixed before this Court and the

parties will be notified accordingly.

Dated this 30th

day of September, 2015

___________________

Robin N. Mohammed

Judge

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