the republic of trinidad and tobago in the high court...

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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Claim No. CV 2012-02169

BETWEEN

WINSTON NURSE

Claimant

AND

INSHANI M. BANDOO

(By her Lawful Attorney ADEISHA KARI BANDOO)

Defendant

Before the Honourable Justice Frank Seepersad

Appearances:

1. Mr. Winston Seenath instructed by Mr. Capildeo Pramsagar Maharaj Esq. for the

Claimant

2. Ms. Sherma instructed by Ms. Sharlene Jaggernauth for the Defendant

Judgment Delivered: 20th

March, 2014

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REASONS

1. Before the Court for its determination was the Claimant’s claim commenced by a Claim

Form and Statement of Case in which he sought the following reliefs:

a. A declaration that the Lease dated the 23rd

day of January, 2001, and

registered as No. DE200100240423D001 and the Supplemental Lease

dated the 22nd

day of September, 2001 and registered as No.

DE200102439192, respectively and made between the Claimant, as

Lessee of the one part and the Defendant, Inshani M. Bandoo, as Lessor,

of the other part is a valid and subsisting Lease.

b. A declaration that the notice to quit dated the 1st day of January, 2012,

purporting to determine the said Lease is bad in law and has not

determined the said Lease.

c. In the alternative relief from forfeiture.

d. A declaration that the Claimant has an absolute right without any

limitations or pre-emptive conditions to purchase the demised premises at

or for the price or sum of $300,000.00.

e. An order that the Defendant do sell to the Claimant the demised premises

at or for the price or sum of $300,000.00 pursuant to paragraph 4 (f) of the

said Lease and that the Defendant do execute the conveyance for the

demised premises within 7 days of the presentation of the deed of

conveyance to the Attorney-at-Law of the Defendant for execution. In

default of execution the Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court do

execute the said conveyance.

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f. An injunction restraining the Defendant whether by herself, her servant

and/or agent or howsoever otherwise from entering and/or re-entering the

said demised premises to take possession thereof.

g. An injunction restraining the Defendant whether by herself, her servant

and/or agent from interfering with the Claimant’s right to exclusive

occupation of the demised premises and/or the right to quiet enjoyment

thereof.

h. Costs.

i. Such further or other reliefs as to the Court may deem just.

2. The Defendant filed a Defence and Counterclaim and she claimed the following reliefs:

a. The Defendant was at all material times the owner of the demised

premises described in paragraph 2 of the Claimant’s Statement of Case.

b. The Defendant repeats paragraphs 1-48 of the Defence.

c. The Claimant has failed and/or refused to deliver up possession on the 1st

June 2012 and still remains in possession of the demised premises as a

trespasser.

d. By reason of the foregoing the Claimant has trespassed on the Defendant’s

lands since the 1st June 2012 and continues to do so.

e. Further, the Claimant without the Defendant’s written consent, alleges at

paragraph 10 of his Statement of Case, that he made certain structural and

other alterations to the said demised premises at a cost of $250,000.00.

Not only were these alterations and additions made without the written

consent of the Defendant, but they were made without the Defendant’s

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knowledge. The Claimant, in so doing, has breached the covenant

contained in Clause 2 (h) of the Principal Lease.

f. The said Clause 2(h) prevents the Claimant from making any structural or

other changes to the demised premises without the written consent of the

Defendant.

g. The letter dated 2nd

September 2000 signed by the Defendant, exhibited

and marked ‘C” in the Claimant’s statement of case does not provide the

requisite consent. It only applies to works done during the period 22nd

September 2000 and 23rd

September 2001. Thereafter it was rendered

invalid by the creation of the Principal deed of lease and the said Clause 2

(h) contained therein.

h. Only the works itemized in paragraph 10 of the Claimant’s statement of

case that were done in compliance with Clause 2 (d) of the Principal lease

are lawful. Clause 2 (d) provides that the Lessee/Claimant must keep and

maintain the said demised premises and all the fittings thereof including

all doors, windows, panes and fastenings, taps, washbasins, sewers basins

and seats, locks, and all sanitary apparatus and electrical fittings and

wiring in good and substantial repair and condition.

i. Consequent to the Claimant’s breaches aforesaid, the demised premises

have suffered damage as a result of the Claimant’s failure and/or refusal to

comply with the provisions of the Principal Lease.

AND the Defendant counterclaims:

i. That the Claimant immediately quit and deliver up possession of

the Defendant’s premises being the property situate at Lot 50

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Kernahan Trace, Chin Chin Road, Cunupia, in the Island of

Trinidad;

ii. That the Claimant restore the demised premises to its original state

as far is practical and reasonable in the circumstances;

iii. Arrears in rent in the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars

($2,500.00);

iv. Mesne profits at a rate of two thousand five hundred dollars

($2,500.00) per month from the 1st day of June 2012 until delivery

or possession;

v. Damages for trespass;

vi. Interest pursuant to Section 4 of the Supreme Court of Judicature

Act;

vii. Costs;

viii. Such further and or other relief the Honourable Court may deem

fit.

3. Summary of Undisputed facts

a. The Defendant is the owner of the subject property which comprises 2480.9m2 of

land and a building thereon situate in the Ward of Cunupia (the subject property).

b. On or about the 23rd

January 2001 the Defendant leased the subject property for a

term of 20 years to the Claimant (the Principal lease).

c. The Principal lease was amended by a Supplemental lease dated 22nd

September

2001 (the Supplemental lease).

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d. The Claimant took possession of the subject property prior to the execution of the

Principal lease and has remained in possession thereof and operates an elderly

persons home from the subject property.

e. Clause 4 (f) of the principal lease provided:

a. That the Lessee shall have an option to purchase the said demised

premises at and for the sum of three hundred thousand dollars

($300,000.00) at any time during the term of lease.

f. Clause 4 (g) of the said Principal lease further provided that two months prior to

the determination of the lease the Lessor can exercise an option to renew the lease

for a further period of 5 years, the rent being negotiable.

g. Clause 3 of the Supplemental lease provided that either party could terminate the

lease by serving a six months notice in writing, however, the notice could only be

given after the expiration of 10 years from the date of commencement of the

Principal lease. The right to issue same could not be extended to the Lessor’s

executor, administrator or successor in title, and further, the said clause was

without prejudice to Clause 4 (f) of the Principal lease.

h. Clause 5 of the supplemental lease provided:

a. If the Lessee should accept the option to purchase the said demised

premises then the Deed of Conveyance shall be executed by the Lessor in

favour of the Lessee and/or to whom (including a company), that he may

direct.

i. By Notice to Quit dated and served on the 1st January, 2012 the Defendant sought

to determine the lease.

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j. By letter dated 29th

March, 2012 the Claimant wrote to the Defendant and sought

to exercise the option to purchase the property for $300,000.00

Summary of the Claimant’s Case

4. The Claimant filed a witness statement and his evidence was to the effect that when he first

saw an advertisement in relation to the subject property it was for the rental, lease or sale of

same. On or about 22nd

September 2010 he said he obtained the consent from the Defendant

to start construction on the subject property and took possession of same. Thereafter the

Principal and Supplemental leases were executed. At all times he understood Clause 4 (f) to

be an option to purchase and that he acted in reliance of same and effected repairs, additions

and improvements to the property and expended $250,000.00 on the subject property. He

testified that by letter dated 29th

March 2012 he sought to exercise the option to purchase.

Summary of the Defendant’s Case

5. The Defendant filed a witness statement on her own behalf and witness statements were also

filed on behalf of her daughter Adeisha Bandoo and Mr. Roy Goomansingh, a valuator.

The Defendant’s witness statement

6. The Defendant stated that the subject property was family property and it has been her

family’s possession for over 70 years. She further testified that it was never her intention for

the property to be sold and that she first agreed to rent the subject property to the Claimant on

the 10th

August 1998, thereafter she left for the United Kingdom in 2001 to pursue a career as

a nurse.

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7. Due to her departure to the United Kingdom, she said the Claimant asked for a formal lease

which was prepared by his Attorney and which she executed. She said that she made it very

clear that all structural changes to the subject property could only be effected with her

consent and that any changes to the property had to be capable of being removed.

8. She further stated that she indicated to the Claimant prior to the execution of the Principal

Lease, that if she ever decided to sell the subject property, the Claimant would be given the

first option to purchase, but she never agreed to give to the Claimant the right to buy the

property whenever he wished regardless of whether she wanted to sell same.

9. She said that when the Principal Lease was executed, she understood Clause 4 (f) of the

Principal lease to mean that an option to purchase would only arise in the event that she took

a decision to sell same. The Defendant said that the Claimant subsequently asked for the

Principal lease to be amended to provide for termination of the lease by the issue of a 6

month notice, after 10 years of the lease being in force.

10. The Defendant testified that she developed a friendship with the Claimant and she had the

Supplemental lease prepared and executed. She further testified that the purpose of the six

month notice was to accommodate the Claimant’s restoration of the subject property to its

original condition, if she decided to terminate the lease.

11. The Defendant further stated that she understood Clause 3 of the Supplemental lease to mean

that she would first have to offer to sell the subject property to the Claimant before he could

purchase same. The Defendant disputed that the Claimant did all the work that he alleged

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and said that he paid the sums due under the lease late and that he did not obtain her consent

for major structural work that he undertook. As a result she caused a Notice to Quit dated 1st

June 2012 to be prepared and served on the Claimant, so as to terminate the lease.

The evidence of Adeisha Kari Bandoo

12. The Court found that the evidence of this witness provided very little assistance. At all times

the witness only acted on the instructions of her mother, the Defendant, and she played no

direct role in the preparation of or the execution of the leases nor did she have any direct

interaction with the Claimant that could be viewed as being material and relevant to the facts

that are in issue.

The evidence of Roy Goomansingh

13. Mr. Goomansingh, a licensed valuator and surveyor gave evidence that he conducted a

valuation of the subject premises which he valued at $1,000,000.00. He placed a value of

$600,000.00 on the land and $400,000.00 on the building. He further valued a structure

measuring 688 sq. metres that is attached to the side of the building comprising 3 bedrooms,

and bathrooms at $120,000.00. The value stated by him was given as at July, 2013.

The issues

The first issue to be determined is the effect of Clause 4 (f) in the Principal deed and its

correlation if any, with Clauses 3 and 5 of the Supplemental lease.

14. The Claimant submitted that the relevant clauses simply vested in him the right to purchase

the subject property during the time period specified in the lease for the price of three

hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00). The Defendant stated that it was never her intention

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or understanding that the Claimant would have such a right and that her intention, was that if

she ever decided to sell the subject property, the Claimant would be given the option to buy

same and that this position was clearly communicated to and understood by the Claimant.

15. The Court formed the view that Clause 4 (f) of the Principal lease had to be read in

conjunction with Clauses 3 and 5 in the Supplemental lease. The Court also considered the

dicta of Green JA at paragraph 141 in the Imperial Oil Limited v. Young 1998, 167 NHd &

P.E.I.R. 280 where he said:

“the words chosen by the parties to express the agreement must therefore be read

against the Court’s understanding of the reasonable expectations of the parties

being from the extrinsic evidence forming the factual matrix of the transaction. It

is that information which breathes life into express language of the agreement and

allows the Court to interpret the language in a way which will facilitate not

frustrate the reasonable expectations of the parties.” He went on to quote from

Waldrons at page 100 and said: “A reasonable expectation need not mean that all

the implications must be spelled out in the minds of promisee. All promises even

though we called them express promises contain elements of implications. So it is

a part of the objective theory of contract formation that reasonable expectations

would be protected even though the promisee had not subjectively directed her

mind to the particular circumstances that in fact arise.”

16. At page 144 Green JA went on to state:

The traditional test for implication of terms namely the test of business efficacy

stemming from the case of Moorcock (1889) 14PD64 and the test of the obvious

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inference judged by the officious bystander, who would answer “of course” to the

question as to whether a particular arrangement not expressed was intended to be

part of the arrangement are, in a sense manifestations of a desire to facilitate the

achievement of the reasonable expectations of the parties objectively determined

from the language used in the context of their negotiations. It is of course not the

subjective expectations of one party which should be protected, rather it is the

reasonable expectation shared by the parties or held by one party and of which the

other was aware or ought to have been aware was the basis of the conclusion of

the transaction. The determination is judged on the basis of what reasonable

persons in the contracting milieu faced and what the parties could be said to have

expected”.

17. It is clear from the authorities, that when interpreting a contract the Court must give effect to

the plain, clear meaning of the words in the contract and the intention of the parties is to be

gathered from the whole of the agreement. The circumstances at the time of the making of

the contract, must be considered to determine the parties’ contractual intentions, and this

intention should be assessed objectively, and it is the reasonable expectations of reasonable

persons that are relevant.

18. In this case, the Court found that the Claimant was evasive and not forthright in responding

to questions in cross-examination. On a balance of probabilities, the Court accepted the

evidence given by the Defendant as to the discussions that occurred between her and the

Claimant and the position that she had maintained prior to and subsequent to the execution of

the leases. The Court accepted the evidence of the Defendant that it was never her intention

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to sell the subject premises and that in the event that she elected to do same, it would be first

offered to the Claimant. The Court also accepted the Defendant’s evidence that this position

was communicated to the Claimant and therefore found as a fact that both parties were aware

of this position. Consequently the wording in Clauses 4 (f), 3 and 5 of the Principal and

Supplemental leases must be interpreted in a way that does not frustrate the expectation of

the parties.

19. If the clear intention of the parties was that the right to purchase was a unilateral right to be

exercised by the Claimant, then in the view of this Court, Clause 5 of the Supplemental lease

would not have been worded in the manner in which it was. Clause 5 says, “if the lessee

should ACCEPT the option to purchase” it does not say if the lessee exercises his right to

purchase, or any other language that will suggest that it was a further reinforcement of the

parties’ position that the Claimant would have unilateral right to purchase the subject

property for the price of $300,000.00 during the term of 25 years created by the Principal

lease.

20. The Principal lease also made provisions for the property, if reverted to the Defendant, to be

placed in the same condition as it was when it was initially leased. The Court also noted that

while there is no set formula as to how an ‘option’ should be worded, Clause 4(f) falls far

short of what the recognized case law has acknowledged to be reasonable provisions, terms

and conditions that govern an option to purchase. No valuation report was obtained prior to

the execution of the lease, and the Court finds it difficult to accept on a balance of

probabilities, that it could have been the reasonable expectation and intention of the parties to

reserve a purchase price of $300,000.00 for a period of 25 years. Such a scenario seems

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improbable especially having regard to the evidence that is before the Court from Roy

Goomansingh, who is an expert, and whose evidence is that the subject property is now

worth $1,000,000.00 not taking into account the value of the annex.

21. The Court considered the effect of the clear and plain meaning of the words contained in the

Principal and Supplemental leases and also considered the agreement between the parties, as

well as the circumstances that operated at the material time so as to determine their

contractual intention.

22. Having accepted the Defendant’s evidence on a balance of probabilities, and having found as

a fact that the Claimant was aware at all material times that the intention of the Defendant

was not to sell her property. The Court is of the view, that upon an application of the

objective test as suggested by the authorities, a reasonable persons placed in the situation that

the parties would have been placed in when the leases were executed, would have understood

that the arrangement entered into was not an arrangement that gave to the Claimant the

unilateral right to purchase whenever he choose to during the tenure of the lease, for the price

of $300,000.00, but was simply a position by the parties that in the unlikely event that the

Defendant decided to sell, the subject property would be offered for sale to Claimant at that

price. The implication and application of the aforesaid position to the provisions contained

in the Principal and Supplemental Leases is necessary to give effect to actual understanding

and expectation of the parties.

23. A reasonable person could understand the rationale behind this type of arrangement entered

into by the parties, the Defendant was going to England to train and possibly migrate and

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there was some level of uncertainty as to her future, and so what she wanted was to have the

subject property rented. The Court did not accept the Claimant’s evidence that there was an

advertisement to sell the subject premises before he rented same and there was no evidence

before the Court of any such advertisement. As stated earlier, the Court accepted the

evidence of the Defendant, that it was never her intention to sell the subject property. The

Claimant wanted to enter into an arrangement that had some level or degree of security for a

fixed time period because he had a company called Tree Palms, and he obviously had

intentions of developing, which he eventually did, a home for elderly persons. Accordingly,

he did not want a month to month arrangement, he wanted a lease arrangement, and he

understood the Defendant’s position to be that an option to purchase was given to him to

purchase the property, if it was to be sold.

24. The Court on the evidence finds that the Defendant never offered the subject property for

sale to the Claimant, and therefore his request by the letter in March 2012 is null, void and of

no effect. The Defendant therefore does not have a right to purchase the property for

$300,000.00. The Court wishes to point out that the position advanced by the Claimant in

relation to the ‘option to purchase’ is in the view of this Court implausible, highly

improbable and completely inconsistent with the market reality in relation to the value of

Real Property. The Claimant’s position does not take into account the fact that the value of a

property can (and in this case it has) significantly appreciate over time, and the position

adopted by the Claimant seems patently unfair and may very well amount to an

unconscionable bargain (though the law as it relates to unconscionable bargain was not

addressed or pleaded in this case).

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25. If the Court’s interpretation and application of the law as it related to the effect of Clause 4

(f) is flawed and the said clause did in fact confer to the Claimant a right to purchase the

subject property notwithstanding the Defendant’s unwillingness to sell same, the next

issue(s) to be considered, are

(i) whether the lease arrangement was properly determined by service of notice

dated 1st January 2012 and

(ii) whether the Claimant could exercise the option to purchase pursuant to Clause 4

(f) (assuming that the Clause did in fact infer upon him the unilateral right to

purchase, which this Court found that it did not) after the service of the said

notice to quit.

26. The parties clearly by virtue of Clause 3 of the Supplemental lease agreed to an exit position

which was to be exercised only after ten years by the service of 6 months notice. There was

no requirement that the reasons why the notice was issued must be advanced. It is not in

dispute on the evidence that a notice dated 1st January 2012 was issued, and the Court on the

evidence found that the said notice was served on the said date. The Court also considered

that the issue as to the date on which the said notice was served was not pursued in the course

of the trial. The notice, would have in the view of this Court effectively determined the lease

arrangement between the parties.

27. The Law with respect to options to purchase is quite clear, in that, the option must be

exercised during the time specified in the option to purchase clause. If the Court is wrong on

its interpretation of Clause 4 (f) and its implication of terms so as to give effect to the

reasonable expectation of the parties, and the said clause really created an option to purchase,

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then that option had to be exercised by the Claimant, during the life and validity of the lease.

The service of the notice brought the lease arrangement to an end and therefore any option to

purchase created by Clause 4 (f) could no longer have been exercised by the Claimant.

28. Upon service of the notice, the lease arrangement was determined and the Claimant could no

longer avail himself of any right to purchase, provided that same existed under Clause 4(f).

Accordingly, the Claimant is still therefore not entitled to purchase the subject property for

$300,000.00, the lease arrangement having been duly determined. The Claimant must

therefore vacate the subject property.

29. Over a ten year period, work was done to the subject property and some of the work done

was work that was consistent with the Claimant’s obligation to keep the premises in a good

state of repair. The Court found as a fact that no structural work of a fundamental nature was

effected prior to the end of 2011. The Court accepted the Defendant’s evidence in relation to

the work done prior to 2011 to the effect that, what was done was the enclosure into 3

sections of a portion of the building, and the said enclosures would have been easy to remove

and restore. The Court found as a fact that at the end of 2011, portions of the existing

structure were in fact removed, and that substantial work was thereafter effected by the

Claimant, with respect to the erection of a three bedroom annex.

30. The Court accepted the Defendant’s evidence that shortly after observing the said work, the

notice was sent. The Court had to consider the effect of the written document in 2000 where

a blanket approval was given by the Defendant to the Claimant and the Court had to

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reconcile that hand written note with the provisions contained in the leases that stipulated that

any work to be done had to be undertaken with a written consent of the Defendant.

31. The Court accepted the evidence of the Defendant that the hand written note was done at a

time when the Claimant wanted to move to the premises, and that he needed to use it for his

office. This position is more probable and plausible than the position advanced of the

Claimant. That handwritten note was done prior to the parties entering into the Principal and

Supplemental leases. The provisions as contained in the leases therefore governed the

arrangement between the parties in so far as the Defendant’s consent for structural work had

to be obtained by the Claimant. The Claimant would have been in breach of terms and

conditions of the lease arrangement as at end of 2011 when he sought to construct the annex,

this breach would have enabled the Defendant the right to terminate the lease arrangement

and to take possession, this however was not the case set out and pleaded by the Defendant.

32. Having regard to the Court’s findings of fact and its application of law, the Claimant is not

entitled to the order for specific performance sought and the Defendant is entitled to vacant

possession of the premises. The Court however on the evidence cannot disregard the fact

that the subject premises is used by the Claimant as a residence for elderly persons. The

Claimant’s evidence was to the effect that persons who are currently in occupation of rooms

at the subject premises do so on a monthly basis with a rent being paid somewhere in the

region of $2,000.00 - $2,200.00. There was no evidence to the contrary and the Defendant

did not join issue with the said statements and so the Court accepted the Claimant’s evidence

in this regard. The Court formed the view that reasonable time had to be given to the

Claimant to vacate the subject premises since it is not only the Claimant but all the elderly

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persons who are there, who would have to make alternative arrangements for alternative

accommodation.

33. In this regard the Court felt that an appropriate, fair and reasonable time period, would be a

period of six months and issued a Stay of Execution of six months, so as to enable the

Claimant to make proper alternative arrangements.

34. The final issue that the Court had to address is whether or not any compensation ought to be

paid to the Claimant for the works effected by him on the subject property. For a period of

ten years some minor work was done and that is not in dispute. The Claimant tiled

bathrooms to the main structure, he erected a tank stand and put in tanks. The Defendant

never objected to the said work, although no official request in writing seeking her consent

was made.

35. The Court found as a fact that the parties had a good relationship and notwithstanding the

terms and conditions contained in the leases, as between themselves, the parties varied terms

of the arrangement as time went along so much so that lease payments were varied upwards

and at the time the notice was sent, $2,500.00 per month was paid. There was some degree

of informality that governed this relationship. This informality must have been as a result of

the good relationship that existed between them.

36. The difficulty that faced the Court, is that none of the work that was undertaken for the

period 2001 to the latter part of 2011 was properly itemized by the Claimant, nor were values

apportioned to same. The Court had absolutely no information before it that could assist it in

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the determination of the value of the said work. The Claimant simply said that he spent

$250,000.00 on all the work he did, and he did not furnish the Court with any documentary

evidence in support of this position, nor did he adduce any oral testimony from any other

witness, such as a builder, to support his contention. The Court did have before it the

evidence of Mr. Goomansingh, and the Court accepted his valuation of the annex structure

built by the Claimant in sum of $120,000.00. The Claimant brought no evidence by way of

bills, receipts or any other documentary evidence that could have assisted in the

determination of the value of that annex, nor did he by viva voce evidence give evidence as

to the amount of monies he spent in the hardware or on labour with respect to the

construction of the annex.

37. On a balance of probabilities the Court therefore held that the value of the annex erected by

the Claimant is $120,000.00. All the work done by the Claimant prior to 2011 would have

been undertaken pursuant to his obligation to keep the property in a good state of repair or to

enable his operation of an elderly home, and therefore no award of compensation is made in

relation to same. In accordance with his obligation to restore the subject property in

accordance with the terms of the leases, all items such as the tanks, stands, and any other

addition which can be removed without doing structural damage to the subject property,

ought to be removed by the Claimant. The work of a cosmetic nature such as the tiling cannot

result in the payment of compensation, especially when there is no evidence as to the value

of same, and in any event the Claimant would have realized a commercial benefit from this

investment, as it would have facilitated the operation of his business.

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38. Although no written permission was obtained, and there were breaches of the conditions of

the lease arrangements, having regard to the course of dealings between the parties over a 10

year period, and given the fact that the Defendant knew, having gone to the property, and

having said in evidence that both she and her daughter were aware that an old aged home was

in operation, the Defendant has to compensate the Claimant for the value of the annex that

was erected ,which has improved the value of the subject property.

39. The Court therefore holds, that the Defendant would have to compensate the Claimant in the

sum of $120,000.00 for the value of that annex structure which cannot now be easily

removed. The figure of $120,000.00 however, had to be set off as against the mesne profits

to which the Defendant would have been entitled in the monthly sum of $2,500.00 for the

period April, 2012, when the last rent was received to the date of this judgment which was

delivered on the 20th

March, 2014.

40. The sum of $57,500.00 therefore has to be deducted from the $120,000.00. The Defendant

therefore was ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of $62,500.00, as compensation for the

value of the annex structure. For the six month period from the 20th

March 2014, if the

Claimant elected to continue to remain in possession of the subject premises he was ordered

to continue to pay monthly rent in the sum of $2,500.00 until the subject property is vacated

on or before 30th

September, 2014.

41. The Court therefore issued the following orders:

1. The Claimant is to deliver up to the Defendant vacant possession of the premises situate

at 50 Kernahan Road, Chin Chin Road, Cunupia on or before the 30th

September, 2014.

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2. The Defendant is to pay to the Claimant the sum of $62,500.00 on or before the 30th

June,

2014.

3. Interest shall accrue on the said sum at the statutory rate from the 30th

June, 2014.

4. Each party to bear their own respective legal costs

…………………………………..

FRANK SEEPERSAD

JUDGE

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