the regional commissions: a restrained view

The Regional Commissions: A Restrained ViewAuthor(s): Randy HamiltonSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1968), pp. 19-22Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/973574 .

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 19

1THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONS: A

RESTRAINED VIEW

RANDY HAMILTON Institute for Local Self Government Berkeley

THIRTY-FOUR STATES and slightly over 800 counties are now part of a new level of Amer- ican government-Regional Economic Devel- opment Areas. The baking of this new stria- tion in the marble cake of intergovernmental relations has taken place without critical ap- praisal in scholarly journals or texts. Few know what they are and fewer still know what they do.1

With one out of four counties in the United States and about three-fourths of the conti- nental states participating in this new form of federal-state partnership which hangs in an uncharted, extra-constitutional limbo "some- where between the federal and state levels," it might be useful to direct a cautious and critical view toward them.

The authority for the commissions is found in Title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, with the purpose of providing a coordinated approach to economic development problems which spill beyond state boundaries. The operation was conceived by President John F. Kennedy and drafted by former Commerce Undersecretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.

The emphasis of the Act on a regional system of economic development involves a note- worthy change in economic development philosophy. The law represents a shift from iden- tification and treatment of economic problems within established political jurisdictional lines to a policy of regional economic development which attempts to disregard them. The emphasis is now on an undefined "systematic utilization" of human, natural, and monetary resources to advance the growth of the nation "as a whole." In the alchemical process of creative federalism, "the 'problems' have become opportunities." 2

A year ago in San Francisco Ed Hearle posed some basic and fundamental problems in his excellent and frank paper to the National Conference on Public Administration. The broad categories of issues which were then unresolved were both institutional and economic. They still are.

With reference to institutional issues, no discernible progress has been made toward providing an "operational definition" for the specific role of the commissions. No intergovernmental resting place has been found for them in the galaxy of planning and economic development already underway within the defined geographic areas of the commissions. There has been no demonstration of a commission's ability to make important innovations or coordinate public investment. The modus operandi of a general-purpose, high-level bu- reaucrat (the federal co-chairman) has yet to be worked out, as must his power to rationalize and coordinate programs of federal depart- ments or agencies in the area as well as those of the states and units of local government.

The economic issues Mr. Hearle raised are no closer to resolution. As he predicted, if public investment is viewed as the central thrust of a commission's program, "far more than is known must become known about the relative impact of alternative investments on economic development," both physical and human. The cost/benefit ratios of the Mc- Namaragraph have yet to be calibrated in a way to evaluate investments in human capital versus physical and resource capital. While both goals are laudable and desirable and while there is concern to raise the aggregate personal income, Mr. Hearle noted that there is also concern about "reducing the proportion of the population within these regions whose incomes fall into the poverty class." The problem is that policy measures may "differ on which goal one may emphasize."

Mr. Hearle left us with advice that the commissions "bear watching both as a new instru- ment of economic development and as a new institution in intergovernmental relationships." This paper takes up the watch on the latter rampart.

The state "partners" in Economic Develop- ment Commissions are subject to the animal



20 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

farm theory of intergovernmental relations in which all are equal except the federal partner which is a little more equal than the states.

Organizing the Commission

The initiative for the formation of a Re- gional Economic Development Commission rests with the Secretary of Commerce of the United States. Regardless of any attempts at local regional problem solving or any desire for interstate coalitions concerning economic development, the Secretary of Commerce retains the sole right to designate an area as an economic development region, with, of course, the "concurrence" of the affected states.3 Fol- lowing this designation, the Secretary of Com- merce invites the states of the region to estab- lish a multistate regional commission. "It is expected that the Governors of these States would accept this invitation and appoint the state members and their alternates." '4

Even after the governors accept the invitation, nothing happens and no local initiative can be turned to the problems of the region without federal activity involving both the President of the United States and the Senate. The President nominates a federal co-chairman and alternate co-chairman whose confirmation is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The law provides that no action can be taken without the affirmative vote of the federal co-chairman. The commission cannot even formally call itself into existence, adopt bylaws, hire personnel, request funds, or "carry on any other activity," until the federal co- chairman is appointed, confirmed, and concurs.

The eight men whose names the President has submitted to the Senate for nomination as federal co-chairman thus far have all been Democrats and all have what may be called euphemistically "a political background."

After the commission is organized and the governors have selected a state co-chairman and alternate from among their number, for the remainder of the commission's life, affirmative actions of the commission must have a dual approval-a majority vote of the governor members and the "yea" vote of the federal co-chairman. The commissions cannot exist without a federal co-chairman and they cannot

take any action or make any program, policy, or project decision without his specific approval. This is so even if the state members unanimously agree on a decision, policy, program project, plan, or action. A unanimous state desire falls by the wayside without the affirmative vote of one federal employee. In current federalese this is not called a veto power over the governors; it is simply a requirement for concurrence.

It would thus appear that one co-chairman is not only more equal than the other co-chairman, but slightly more equal than the combined vote of all the governor-commissioners in this new federal-state partnership arrangement.

The concurrence requirement can quite pos- sibly lead to some scepticism with reference to the advertised "wide degree of latitude in formulating approaches to problem solving." 5 The federal co-chairman is directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director of Economic Development who, in turn, is responsible to the Secretary of Com- merce. It may be reasonable to conclude that Administration philosophy might prevail over state wishes. That this should not be viewed without caution is illustrated by the fact that it is the intention of the Administration to make the commissions the "main planning agency" in the region and that in the process of so doing, "the Commission should review the capital budgets of major state and local government units within the region." 6 Pre- sumably these would have to be satisfactory to the federal co-chairman as a quid pro quo for his affirmative vote in any commission project or program.

The currently applicable interpretation of the basic law requires that the office of the federal co-chairman be in Washington. Con- sequently, his day-to-day activities take place hundreds or perhaps thousands of miles from the scene. The rationale is interesting. "One of the most important tasks of the Regional Commissions will be to formulate strategy for the economic development of the region and to follow through to see that this strategy is implemented. Since a major portion of such strategy . . . is expected to be implemented through Federal programs (either existing or proposed), there is merit in locating the plan-



INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 21

ning and programming functions close to where the means of implementation lies." 7 One may choose to read the last clause "close to where the real power of the, intergovernmental arrangement lies."

The administrative merit in locating the office of the pivotal person close to where the problem lies or central to the region in which he is working (if for no other reason than the increased citizen participation in the processes of this new level of government) appears to have been overlooked. It would seem axio- matic that intimacy with regional problems and viable solutions for them might vary directly with the distance from them. It is the view of the President, however, that this administrative style for the regional commissions is the finest example in creative federalism of "the states and the federal government working to the best advantage of the people."

The frosting on the marble cake appears in the form of another administrative requirement that the regular meetings of the Regional Eco- nomic Development Commissions be held in Washington. Thus, the equal governor partners in the Four Corners Regional Commission from Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah must travel 5,000 miles to attend a regular meeting of their "regional" agency. The arrangement smacks a wee mite of the Roman style of public administration coupled with the civics lesson dictum "quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem"-"what pleases the Prince has the power of law."

The staff hired by a commission is responsible only to the commission. They are neither federal or state employees but presumably employees of a bureaucratic hierarchy "some- where between the federal and state levels."

The commissions are not even free to adopt their own administrative budgets, suited to their own regional conditions and needs. Un- der the law, the Secretary of Commerce must approve the administrative budget of each commission before it is adopted, whether the governors will or not. As part of his authority in that regard, the federal partner has decided that "rather than having each commission build up its own administration capability," 8

(which to a local government-oriented public administrator seems like a fairly worthwhile

endeavor), administrative and support services are provided to all commissions on a cen- tralized basis by ladies and gentlemen boun- tiful in the Department of Commerce. These services include: space maintenance, procure- ment and purchasing, supply management, mail and messenger, transportation, library, graphics, printing and reproduction, publications, auditing, accounting, payroll, budgeting and financial reporting, employee recruitment, job classification, personnel record keeping, organization and methods, contracts, legal and public information.

Given such conditions, one might be par- doned for taking a somewhat restrained view of an intergovernmental partnership in which the chief executives of American states in conclave assembled lack the power to buy a pencil or scratch pad without federal approval and assistance. There are also additional im- plications in a commission's dependence on a federal department for "publications" and "public information" services-i.e., "government by press release."

Dependence on Commerce Department

A commission's dependence on the Depart- ment of Commerce is not confined to administrative support. The Department's Office of Regional Economic Development Planning cov- ers another base with its mandate to "provide information and planning assistance to the Regional Economic Development Commis- sions."

The commissions are required to present their "plans and proposals to the Secretary of Commerce who will have them reviewed by the federal agencies before submitting them to the President for such action as he may deem desirable."' Thus, even with the (1) "concurrence" of the federal co-chairman, (2) approval of the Secretary of Commerce, and (3) clearance by other federal agencies of the particular plans and problem solutions to advance regional economic development, the President retains ultimate veto powers over the work and desires of the "equal" partners in the "regional" commissions.

In evaluating the functions of the commissions, it is apparent that they presently possess



22 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

the muscle of the 97-pound weakling in the "before" pictures of a Charles Atlas advertise- ment. While they can analyze problems and devise overall strategies, they have no way of implementing them. Until they develop administrative and budgetary power to execute programs (which can be done only if they become truly regional rather than federal), the bullies in various administrations-federal, state, and local-can continue to kick sand in their faces with impunity.

A restrained and cautious view of the Re- gional Economic Development Commissions shows them to be but a facade of intergovernmental cooperation. They provide window- dressing for federally created, federally fi- nanced, federally operated and controlled new instruments and levels of government some- thing more akin to a unitary than a federal system of intergovernmental relations. Barring changes in the game's rules, the state partners will merely follow suit in an intergovernmental game in which all of the trump cards are held in one hand. One wishes there had been more public disceptation concerning the commissions four years ago; and, one hopes that there will be more in the next four months as their budgets and roles are reviewed by Congress.

Footnotes

1. (1) New England Regional Commission, a compact between the United States and the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp- shire, Rhode Island, and Vermont; (2) The Ap- palachian Compact between all or part of 12 states and the United States; (3) The Ozarks Regional Commission, a compact concentrating on 125 contiguous rural counties in Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma; (4) The Upper Great Lakes Regional Commission, embracing 119 counties in northern Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin; (5) The Coastal Plains Regional Com- mission covering 150 counties in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; (6) The Four Corners Regional Commission comprising 92 Rocky Mountain counties in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah; (7) The Delmarva Eco- nomic Development District covering 14 counties in the eastern shore area of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.

2. Guidelines for Program Formulation for Regional Action Planning Commissions, U. S. Department of Commerce, Office of Regional Economic De-

velopment, Washington, D. C., 1966 (hereafter referred to as Guidelines).

3. A region is defined on the basis of common geographic, cultural, historical, and economic relations and it is one which has "lagged behind the whole Nation in economic development." Some of the lags mentioned in Title V of the Act are: low income, high unemployment, slow growth, out-migration, or inadequate facilities. The touch- stones are common relationships and economic lag.

4. Guidelines. 5. Multi-state Regional Planning: A Strategy for

National Growth Through Regional Development, U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington, 1966.

6. Guidelines (italics added). 7. Ibid. 8. Guidelines. 9. Ibid.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: GUIDES

TO DEVELOPMENT

WILLIAM D. CAREY U.S. Bureau of the Budget

DESPITE THE PRETENTIOUSNESS of this topic, I do not plan to pontificate about the new federalism. Like most people, I see the future with fewer certainties than I had when the grass was green and the grain was yellow. My view is that the public business today is in a stage of exceptional fluidity, and because of this the public manager's first responsibility is to have an open mind, and his second is to want passionately to understand the meanings -not the forms-of his changing world. Even the term "public administration" itself is a handicap to the extent that it conjures up a catechism of rights and wrongs that instruct us on how to do our work.

The hard and terrible truth is that we age and cling to axioms and Bible texts while the ground under us shakes and trembles. Politics and government-like humanity-have their own cycles and each generation must develop its own wisdom. The difficulty is that it is so



the regional commissions: a restrained view

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