the refugee surge in europe: economic challenges
TRANSCRIPT
The Refugee Surge in Europe:The Refugee Surge in Europe:Economic Challenges
Bergljot Bjørnson Barkbu, IMF
LSE Institute of Global Affairs and OrtygiaBusiness School Conference on
‘Managing Migration – Solutions beyond g g g ythe Nation State’
Siracusa, April 18-19
European Department
Asylum applications at historic highsFACTSAsylum applications at historic highs
Asylum applications in the EU (i th d )
1 200
1,400
(in thousands)
End of the
Civil warin Syria
Yugoslav W
800
1,000
1,200 the Cold War
in SyriaWars
400
600
0
200
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
The numbers in perspective 2
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Source: Eurostat.
Surge in mid-2015Surge in mid 2015
First-time asylum applications in the EU (in thousands)
140160180
(in thousands)
100120140
20162015
406080 2016
2014
020
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug.Sep. Oct. Nov.Dec.
2010
Source: Eurostat.
3The numbers in perspective
Uneven impact across countriesUneven impact across countries
First-time asylum applications, 2015
14161820
1 000
1,200
1,400 Total applicants, thousands
Applicants per 1,000 inhabitants (RHS)
8101214
600
800
1,000
2468
200
400
00EU-28 DEU HUN SWE ITA AUT FIN DNK GRC LUX
Source: Eurostat
4The numbers in perspective
Increasing numbers reflect conflictsIncreasing numbers reflect conflictsFirst-time applications in the EU, by country of origin
(in tho sands)
300
350
400 (in thousands)
150
200
25020102015
50
100
150 2015
0Syria Afghanistan Iraq Pakistan Eritrea
Source: Eurostat
5The numbers in perspective
Refugees integrate more slowlyg g yEmployment relative to native workers
(in percent)
0<6 6-10 11-20 >20
Years since arrival in country
-10
-5
-15
-10
Other immigrants: Role of language skills
-25
-20 Other immigrants: Conditional gapRefugee: Role of language skillsRefugee: Conditional gap
We proxy the refugee experience using that of immigrants from refugee-sending countries, based on the European Social Survey
6Empirical evidence on labor market integration
Reliance on social benefits is highergSocial benefits as main source of income, relative to natives
(in percent)
20
25 Other immigrants: Role of language skillsOther immigrants: Conditional gapRefugee: Role of language skillsRefugee: Conditional gap
15
g g p
5
10
0<6 6-10 11-20 >20
Years since arrival in country
7
Years since arrival in country
Empirical evidence on labor market integration
We proxy the refugee experience using that of immigrants from refugee-sending countries, based on the European Social Survey
Wage gaps are largeg g p g
20
Immigrant wage gap: Distribution of estimate across studies
14161820
8101214
2468
0-90% -80% -70% -60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0%
Note: Histogram of migrant wage gap conditional on observables based on 75
8
Note: Histogram of migrant wage gap, conditional on observables, based on 75 estimates across 9 studies on earnings assimilation of immigrants in the US, Canada and Europe.
Empirical evidence on labor market integration
Net fiscal contribution depends on agep gGermany:
Present value of expected future net fiscal contributions, b
300
400
by age group (thousands of euro, generational account approach, base year = 2012)
100
200
300 NativesMigrants
-100
0
100
-300
-200
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Empirical evidence on fiscal contribution
Source: Bonin (2014).
Growth effect positive, but unevenGrowth effect positive, but unevenImpact on Output Level
(deviation from baseline, in percent)
0.5
0.6 Germany Germany slow integrationEUEU l i t ti
0.3
0.4EU slow integration
0 1
0.2
0.3
0
0.1
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
10
Source: IMF estimate.
Simulation results
Speed of integration affects unemploymentSpeed of integration affects unemploymentImpact on Unemployment Rate
(deviation from baseline, in percentage)
0.3
0.35 Germany Germany slow integrationEUEU l i t ti
0.2
0.25EU slow integration
0.1
0.15
0
0.05
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
11
Source: IMF estimate.
Simulation results
Integration crucial for public financesIntegration crucial for public financesImpact on Government Debt/GDP
(deviation from baseline, in percentage points)
1.41.61.8 Germany
Germany slow integrationEUEU l i t ti
0.81
1.2. EU slow integration
0.20.40.60.8
-0.20
0.2
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
12
Source: IMF estimate.
Simulation results
Labor market integrationLabor market integration
Prompt integration of refugees into labor
• Lower barriers to work eligibility during application period
p g gmarkets is key to favorable economic impact
• Lower barriers to work eligibility during application period
• Provide language and job search training early
• If high entry wages a concern:If high entry wages a concern:
• Temporary wage subsidies for employers
• Temporary, targeted exceptions to minimum wages?
• Tackle inactivity traps by reducing marginal taxes on low-wage workers or tapering social benefits gradually upon entering employmentg p y
13Policy recommendations
P d t k tProduct markets
Ease avenues to self employment Ease avenues to self-employment and facilitate skill recognition
• Simplify regulatory and administrative procedures for new firms
• Provide start up support and reduce effective • Provide start-up support and reduce effective protection for incumbent firms
• Accelerate skill recognition, provide targeted t i itraining
14Policy recommendations
Housing and mobilityHousing and mobility
Mobility to high labor demand areas requires Mobility to high-labor-demand areas requires affordable housing
• Tackle bottlenecks to low-cost housing (e.g., land use regulation, construction permits)
• Financial incentives to build social housing• Financial incentives to build social housing• Facilitate access to basic financial services• Full geographical mobility of accepted asylum Full geographical mobility of accepted asylum
seekers, within and between countries?
15Policy recommendations
Fi l liFiscal policy
How should the short term fiscal costs How should the short-term fiscal costs related to refugees be handled?
• Many EU countries have limited fiscal space but…
• Most countries should be able to absorb the i di t fi l t ithi th i SGP t timmediate fiscal cost within their SGP targets.
• Allow temporary deviations from SGP targets on a case-by-case basis. Caveat: There are major operational issues.
16Policy recommendations