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TRADITIONAL APPROACHES to the decision-making process have employed analytical

models that generate and compare options based onweighted features. This is often referred to as multi-attribute decision making. The deliberate proceduresdeveloped by the Armed Forces for operationalplanning�the Joint Operational Planning and Ex-ecution System (JOPES)�represent a systematicapplication of this approach.1 Figure 1 illustrates thebasic components in this approach to the decision-making process.

Recent studies in real-world settings, includingtactical commanders in field environments, haveled to a different model of the decision-makingprocess.2 These studies of naturalistic decisionmaking (NDM) have resulted in the developmentof the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model.3The RPD model asserts that decision makers drawupon their experience to identify a situation asrepresentative of or analogous to a particularclass of problem. This recognition then leadsto an appropriate course of action (COA), eitherdirectly when prior cases are sufficiently similar,or by adapting previous approaches. The decisionmaker then evaluates the COA through a processof �mental simulation.� Figure 2 illustrates thebasic structure of the RPD model both in its sim-plest version and when the decision maker eval-uates options through use of mental models.

In general, RPD reflects the ubiquitous influenceof analogy in human perception and problem solv-ing.4 Such analogical thinking has demonstratedboth its positive and negative effects at the highestlevels of national security decision making.5 Theemergence of this new model of decision makinghas direct implications for issues such as training forcommand, evaluating the expertise of commandersand designing decision-support systems.6 The modelsuggests markedly different decision-support sys-tems, focusing on accurate situation assessmentand case-based reasoning (recalling similar cases)as opposed to the feature-based comparison ofoptions inherent in systems such as JOPES.

However, one must recognize that both the ana-lytic and the recognitional modes of decision mak-

The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD)model asserts that decision makers draw upon

their experience to identify a situation asrepresentative of or analogous to a particularclass of problem. This recognition then leads toan appropriate course of action (COA), either

directly when prior cases are sufficiently similar,or by adapting previous approaches. The

decision maker then evaluates the COA througha process of �mental simulation.�

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67MILITARY REVIEW l November-December 2000

ing are desirable and, indeed, complementary. Infact, studies of decision making in natural settingshave demonstrated that decision makers employRPD and analytic strategies at different times, de-pending on the problem situation, their level of ex-perience and other factors.7

Figure 3 compares the strengths and weaknessesof the two strategies. The strengths of each approachessentially mirror the weaknesses of the other. Asa result, optimal decision making tends to involvesome combination of both modes. For example, inoperations planning, initial COAs may be generatedby the commander based on analogous situations(RPD-based decision making), and the COAs canthen be assessed (by the staff) via analytic methods.Conversely, once the staff generates COAs for thecommander via analytic methods, recognitional de-cision making may influence the commander�s se-lection of the one(s) to implement. Figure 4 illus-trates these �mixed� modes of military planning,indicating the interdependent and complementarynature of the two approaches.

Decision-Making Modelsand the Levels of War

Factors characterizing naturalistic decision-making environments include:l Time pressure/constraints.

l Ill-structured problems.l Uncertain, dynamic environments.l Shifting, ill-defined or competing goals.l Multiple event-feedback loops.l High stakes.l Knowledge-rich environments.l High decision complexity.8

Each of these factors is present to varying degreesin military planning at the strategic, operational andtactical levels. In general, the strategic and opera-tional levels certainly allow more time and tend tohave greater resources for the planning process andthereby favor analytic planning to a greater degree.However, such factors as the increasing pace ofwarfare, extended battlespace, ability to mass effectsand target strategically, near-instantaneous sharingof situational information and the increasing politi-cal sensitivity associated with even tactical actionsare causing these levels to merge.9

The emergence of this new model ofdecision making has direct implications for

issues such as training for command, evaluatingthe expertise of commanders and designing

decision-support systems. . . . Both the analyticand the recognitional modes of decision making

are desirable and, indeed, complementary.

LEADERSHIP

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68 November-December 2000 l MILITARY REVIEW

In addition, technology is driving the levels closerin terms of the capability and ease of applying thetwo methods. For example, the situational under-standing now available at higher echelons and thecommensurate ability to visualize the battlespaceallow recognitional decision making to a degree

not feasible in the past. Conversely, real-time orfaster-than-real-time decision-aiding technologiesallow COA analyses at the tactical level to a degreenot possible previously, enabling more effectiveanalytic planning and replanning. As a result ofthese factors, these two complementary modes ofdecision making will likely become increasinglyinterwoven and interdependent. Selecting the domi-nant mode of operations will depend on both situ-ational factors, such as time constraints and size/makeup of staff, and personal ones, includingdecision-making style, level of expertise andmanagement style.

ImplicationsSignificant implications of the merging levels of war

and the supporting technologies affect training andsystems design. In the training arena, commanders

Technology is driving the levels of war closerin terms of the capability and ease of applying thetwo methods. . . . The increasing pace of warfare,extended battlespace, ability to mass effects and

target strategically, near-instantaneous sharingof situational information and the increasing

political sensitivity associated with even tacticalactions are causing these analytical and

recognitional levels to merge.

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and staff personnelmust be trained to em-ploy both analytic andrecognitional decision-making strategies appro-priately, either singly orin some integrated form.This dual application willrequire changes to cur-rent training practice,which emphasizes ana-lytic planning.10 With re-gard to systems, futuremilitary planning anddecision-aiding systemsmust be flexibly de-signed to support bothdecision-making modes.This design will requiredatabases and decisionaids that can interactive-ly adapt to the desiredmode and display meth-odologies optimized toselect and format infor-mation compatible withthe task at hand and thepreferred strategy.

The importance of in-corporating such capa-bilities has been mostclearly demonstrated inpast failures to designsystems to be compatiblewith the information-processing and decision-making characteristics ofthe operator or user. Forexample, in-depth analy-ses of the incident in thePersian Gulf involvingthe shooting down of an

Tyl

er

Wir

ken

rates, and the �comprehension capability of users,which has remained almost static for thousands ofyears.�12

Similar problems have been identified in signifi-cant incidents in the nuclear power industry, suchas Three Mile Island.13 Emerging approaches todecision making offer the potential for increasedunderstanding of such errors and for mitigating thefactors that contribute to them.

In-depth analyses of the incident in the Persian Gulfinvolving the shooting down of an Iranian commercial airliner by theUSS Vincennes identified a number of key problems with the designof the human-system interfaces that contributed to the error. . . .A human-machine mismatch occurs between modern computer

systems, which can process and display information at phenomenalrates, and the comprehension capability of users, which has

remained almost static for thousands of years.

Iranian commercial airliner by the USS Vincennesidentified a number of key problems with the de-sign of the human-system interfaces that contributedto the error. One author discussing the Vincennesincident maintains that �the system was poorlysuited for use by human beings during rapid mili-tary action.�11 He says a human-machine mismatchoccurs between modern computer systems, whichcan process and display information at phenomenal

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NOTES

Thomas H. Killion is the acting deputy director for Research, Office of the Assis-tant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, Washington,D.C. He received a B.S. from St. Mary�s College, Minnesota, and an M.S. and a Ph.D.from the University of Oregon. He is a graduate of the US Naval War College. His previ-ous positions include executive assistant to the director, US Army Research Labora-tory, Washington, D.C.; advanced technology team leader for the Unmanned AerialVehicles Joint Project, Washington, D.C.; and principal scientist in electronic com-bat training for the Operations Training Division, US Air Force (USAF) Human Re-sources Laboratory (now the Aircrew Training Division, USAF Armstrong Labora-tory), Williams Air Force Base, Arizona. His article �Army Basic Research Strategy�appeared in the March-April 1997 edition of Military Review.

1. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Operational Planning, NWP-11(Revision F), Draft, November, 1989; Headquarters, United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff Action, FMFM 3-1, May, 1979; and US Army Command andGeneral Staff College, Command and Staff Decision Processes, CGSC StudentText 101-5, January, 1994.

2. Gary A. Klein, �Strategies of Decision Making,� Military Review, (May 1989),56-64; and Gary A. Klein and Roberta Calderwood, �Decision Models: Some Les-sons From the Field,� IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,September-October, 1991, 1018-1026.

3. Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, Eduardo Salas and John S. Pruitt, �Establishingthe Boundaries of a Paradigm for Decision-Making Research,� Human Factors,(June 1996), 193-205; and Gary A. Klein, Naturalistic Decision Making: Implica-tions for Design (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Crew Station ErgonomicsInformation Analysis Center, 1993).

4. Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard, Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

5. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of His-tory for Decision Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

6. MAJ John F. Schmitt, �How We Decide,� Marine Corps Gazette, (October1995), 16-20; and LTC George E. Rector Jr., �Leadership and Decisionmaking,�Marine Corps Gazette (October 1995), 21-23.

7. Gary A. Klein, �Strategies of Decision Making,� Military Review (May 1989)56-64; Gary A. Klein, �Recognition-Primed Decisions� in W. Rouse, ed., Advancesin ManMachine Systems Research, Vol. 5 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc, 1989),47-92.

8. Janis A. Cannon-Bowers, Eduardo Salas and John S. Pruitt, �Establishingthe Boundaries of a Paradigm for Decision-Making Research,� Human Factors(June 1996), 193-205.

9. Douglas A. Macgregor, �Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War,� Param-eters (Winter 1992-93), 33-47.

10. MAJ John F. Schmitt, �How We Decide,� 16-20.11. William P. Gruner, �No Time for Decision Making,� U.S. Naval Institute Pro-

ceedings (1990), 39-41.12. Susan G. Hutchins, Principles for Intelligent Decision Aiding, Technical Re-

port 1718 (San Diego, CA: Naval Command, Control and Ocean SurveillanceCenter), 14-15.

13. Jens Rasmussen, On Information Processing and Human Machine In-teraction: An Approach to Cognitive Engineering (Amsterdam: North Holland,1985).

14. Bradley Graham, �Army Trying Out Electrons to See If It Can Get Smallerand Faster: 2-Week Dry Run in the Mojave Desert Ends in Something of a Draw,�Washington Post, 31 March 1997, A4.

The computer applique system is atactical intranet that provides commanders with

situational awareness, the ability to see onvideo displays the location of forces in the field,artillery postures, aviation and air defense activ-ity, intelligence estimates, supply levels, weather

reports and even live news broadcasts. Bytouching a keyboard, a commander can directtroop movements or order fire, and a gunner on

the battlefield can relay reports or requests.

Less dramatic, but no less significant, is the Armyexperience at the National Training Center (NTC),Fort Irwin, California, with a Force XXI AdvancedWarfighting Experiment (AWE). The AWE was toassess the impact of advanced digitization, technol-ogy and newly developed doctrine on the capabili-ties of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (theArmy�s Experimental Brigade) in engagements withthe NTC�s Opposing Force (OPFOR). Results of theAWE demonstrated both the advantages and limi-tations of state-of-the-art digital communicationstechnology. As Graham describes it, �At the coreof the new design is what the Army calls its com-puter applique system, a tactical intranet that pro-

vides commanders with situational awareness, theability to see on video displays the location of forcesin the field, artillery postures, aviation and air de-fense activity, intelligence estimates, supply levels,weather reports and even live news broadcasts. Sim-ply by touching a keyboard, a commander can di-rect troop movements or order fire, and a gunneron the battlefield can relay reports or requests.

Army planners expect the tactical intranet to haveprofound implications for the rhythm and tactics ofbattle. For instance, the ability to know the locationof friendly and enemy forces as a fight unfoldsshould permit advancing infantry units to dispersemore widely and move more quickly across a battle-field, accelerating the pace of battle. In turn, thisspeed will require commanders to revise cumber-some procedures for issuing orders, which now in-volve the time-consuming preparation of staff esti-mates and options.�14

To assure these advanced information technolo-gies provide maximum benefit to the user, the Armyneeds to incorporate the types of adaptive decision-aiding capabilities discussed above. These technolo-gies will achieve their optimal effectiveness only ifthey are compatible with the cognitive capabilitiesand limitations of the commanders, staff and soldierswho will use them. MR