the rcn and the war in the atlantic. rcn: established in 1910 u --pre-war role: fisheries and...
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The RCN and the War in the Atlantic
RCN: established in 1910
--pre-war role: fisheries and coastal surveillance
--limited size due to inter-service rivalries and lack of political support
The Growth of the RCN
1939: 13 warships (six destroyers)/3,000 men
1945: 400 warships/100,000 personnel
Third largest Allied navy/third largest in the world
Is the whole story?
The Central Wartime Role
1941-1943 convoy escorts
1943-1945 hunting U-Boats
The Importance of the RCN
without convoy escorts, no convoys, no bomber offensive, no assaults in North Africa, and Italy, no D-Day, no victory.
The Challenge of the RCN
A different, wider role/outdated equipment– RCN was planning a “traditional navy” against air attack
and surface raiders
1940: Canadian destroyers are sent to help defend the Channel– Convoys vs. U-Boats was not a priority
– Plans for a conventional navy change as U-Boat threat develops
1941: Convoy duties begin
British and American discussions find the Royal Canadian Navy in charge of Western Atlantic
A role for which the Convoys and crews are unprepared
The Bad Time: July -December 1942
The Corvette: The basic ship of the RCN (Canadian built/Canadian
manned) small, and maneuverable: a jack-of-all-trades “cheap and nasties” 200 feet long: a “wet” ship crew: 85 Intended for inshore duty Ill-trained and unprepared crews
Sandy McClearn, “Flower Class: Corvette” http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/ww2/flower/
The Corvette’s Problems
Out of date equipment asdic (sonar); navigation (standard vs. gyro compasses); radio direction finding (radar) often
unavailable By 1943, new ships were being outfitted, but
not the ones on the water
ID #20928 Credit: National Archives of Canada / PA-115350
The Convoys Begin . . .Badly 23 June 1941 HX 133
– 58 ships protected by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes
– 6 ships lost
Confused tactics: to defend the convoys, or attack the U-Boats?
September 1941: SC 42– 64 ships protected by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes
– 16 ships lost vs. 14 U-Boats
– “most escorts are equipped with one weapon of approximate precision--the Ram”
November 1941: SC 52 returns to Canada– only convoy ever turned back by U-Boat threat during the
entire war
The Crisis of 1942
RCN role increases in the Atlantic
Royal Navy reluctant to share new technology, when technology is all important
The “Happy Time” (early 1942)– 100 Allied merchant ships sunk monthly
September 1942: Gulf of St. Lawrence closed to shipping
ONS 154
Christmas 1942
45 ships 600 miles due west of Ireland
5 Canadian escorts
27 December: contact with U-Boat Group ‘Spitz’ (20 U-Boats attack)
4 ships lost: 486 personnel lost
The End of the Beginning
The British ask the Canadians to withdraw their escorts for training.– A blow to Canadian pride
RCN forced to reevaluate a war fought largely by reservists.
The Canadian convoy escorts pulled out for further training
1943: The Battle of the Atlantic Turns
Increased air cover closes the Atlantic "gap" Better convoy tactics Better technology: "The hedgehog" German “shark” codes broken
– allows Allies to divert routes
1943-1945: The RCN hunts U-Boats
The RCN tries to build its “big fleet” but the Corvettes are still needed
The U-Boats are hard to find--and kill January-June 1943: 100 German U-Boats
sunk Canadian ships left out of the campaign that
would kill the U-Boats Not enough ships equipped for the hunt
U-Boat Kills by RCN
Between May 1943 and May 1945– 1943: 2
– 1944: 15
– 1945: 3
– Total 20
But how many convoys were saved from U-Boat attacks?
The Final Cost: Royal Canadian Navy
enlistments: 99 668 men; 6500 women 471 fighting vessels Convoy; anti-submarine warfare 24 vessels sunk 2024 fatal casualties
Further reading:
Marc Milner, “The Implications of Technological Backwardness: The Canadian Navy 1939-1945” in Milner, Canadian Military History: Selected Readings, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993: 298-312.
“Why was the RCN so poorly equipped?” (310)
What implications did this have?