The RCN and the War in the Atlantic

RCN: established in 1910

--pre-war role: fisheries and coastal surveillance

--limited size due to inter-service rivalries and lack of political support

The Growth of the RCN

1939: 13 warships (six destroyers)/3,000 men

1945: 400 warships/100,000 personnel

Third largest Allied navy/third largest in the world

Is the whole story?

The Central Wartime Role

1941-1943 convoy escorts

1943-1945 hunting U-Boats

The Importance of the RCN

without convoy escorts, no convoys, no bomber offensive, no assaults in North Africa, and Italy, no D-Day, no victory.

The Challenge of the RCN

A different, wider role/outdated equipment– RCN was planning a “traditional navy” against air attack

and surface raiders

1940: Canadian destroyers are sent to help defend the Channel– Convoys vs. U-Boats was not a priority

– Plans for a conventional navy change as U-Boat threat develops

1941: Convoy duties begin

British and American discussions find the Royal Canadian Navy in charge of Western Atlantic

A role for which the Convoys and crews are unprepared

The Bad Time: July -December 1942

The Corvette: The basic ship of the RCN (Canadian built/Canadian

manned) small, and maneuverable: a jack-of-all-trades “cheap and nasties” 200 feet long: a “wet” ship crew: 85 Intended for inshore duty Ill-trained and unprepared crews

Sandy McClearn, “Flower Class: Corvette” http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/ww2/flower/

The Corvette’s Problems

Out of date equipment asdic (sonar); navigation (standard vs. gyro compasses); radio direction finding (radar) often

unavailable By 1943, new ships were being outfitted, but

not the ones on the water

ID #20928 Credit: National Archives of Canada / PA-115350

The Convoys Begin . . .Badly 23 June 1941 HX 133

– 58 ships protected by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes

– 6 ships lost

Confused tactics: to defend the convoys, or attack the U-Boats?

September 1941: SC 42– 64 ships protected by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes

– 16 ships lost vs. 14 U-Boats

– “most escorts are equipped with one weapon of approximate precision--the Ram”

November 1941: SC 52 returns to Canada– only convoy ever turned back by U-Boat threat during the

entire war

The Crisis of 1942

RCN role increases in the Atlantic

Royal Navy reluctant to share new technology, when technology is all important

The “Happy Time” (early 1942)– 100 Allied merchant ships sunk monthly

September 1942: Gulf of St. Lawrence closed to shipping

ONS 154

Christmas 1942

45 ships 600 miles due west of Ireland

5 Canadian escorts

27 December: contact with U-Boat Group ‘Spitz’ (20 U-Boats attack)

4 ships lost: 486 personnel lost

The End of the Beginning

The British ask the Canadians to withdraw their escorts for training.– A blow to Canadian pride

RCN forced to reevaluate a war fought largely by reservists.

The Canadian convoy escorts pulled out for further training

1943: The Battle of the Atlantic Turns

Increased air cover closes the Atlantic "gap" Better convoy tactics Better technology: "The hedgehog" German “shark” codes broken

– allows Allies to divert routes

1943-1945: The RCN hunts U-Boats

The RCN tries to build its “big fleet” but the Corvettes are still needed

The U-Boats are hard to find--and kill January-June 1943: 100 German U-Boats

sunk Canadian ships left out of the campaign that

would kill the U-Boats Not enough ships equipped for the hunt

U-Boat Kills by RCN

Between May 1943 and May 1945– 1943: 2

– 1944: 15

– 1945: 3

– Total 20

But how many convoys were saved from U-Boat attacks?

The Final Cost: Royal Canadian Navy

enlistments: 99 668 men; 6500 women 471 fighting vessels Convoy; anti-submarine warfare 24 vessels sunk 2024 fatal casualties

Further reading:

Marc Milner, “The Implications of Technological Backwardness: The Canadian Navy 1939-1945” in Milner, Canadian Military History: Selected Readings, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993: 298-312.

“Why was the RCN so poorly equipped?” (310)

What implications did this have?