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The Rationality of Renaissance Magic

Gregory W. Dawes

Belief in magic

is

widespread both in history an d

in

contemporary cultures. Can

such

belief

be regarded as rational

If so , in w hat way? An examination of the

magic

of Renaissance Europe enables us to distinguish three ways in which a belief can be

rational.

It

can be a) rationally defensible, g iven a p articular set of backgro und

beliefs, b) f o r m e d by

some reliable

weans, or c) the result of

procedures

that are

collectively rational. Distinguishing these differentform s o f rationality not only

helps us to understand magical thought;

it

also assists in the controversial task of

distinguishing magicfrom science.

Magic has often been regarded as a non-rational practice . Self-styled m odern

sceptics, of course, regard it as frankly irrational, and unworthy of further

consideration (except

in

order

to

debunk it). But psychologists and social

scientists are also inclined to define magic by reference to its irrationality. If

such beliefs are to be explained, they hold,

it

cannot be by reference to any

process of reasoning: they m ust arise from psychological and social factors.'

Some psychologists go so far as to hold that magical beliefs are pathological:

a sign that something has gone wrong with the functioning of our cognitive

powers. We find this idea in the American Psychiatric Association's widely

used Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders} DSM IV does not

classify belief in magic as itself a disorder, since

it

recognises that

it

'may be

a part of normal child development' .̂ But what it calls 'magical thinking ' is

used in the diagnosis of real pathologies, such as schizophrenia and paranoid

personality disorder. ^

Given the prevalence of magic in human history and culture,

anthropologists and historians are less inclined to regard belief in magic as

' Barry Singer nd Victor A. Benassi, 'O ccu lt Beliefs: Media D isto rtion s, Social Uncertainty,

and Deficiencies

of

Hum an Reasoning Seem

to be at the

Basis

of

Oc cult Beliefs',

American

Scientist

69 (1981), 49 -5 5 (p. 49).

^ Am erican Psychiat r ic Associat ion , Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders, 4th

edn (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) (hereafter DSM IV),

p

768. A similar attitude is

to

be found

in

Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge's

The Euture of Religion: Secularization, R evival, and Cult Eormation (Berkeley : Univers i ty

of

California Press, 1985 ), p. 31 . Stark and Bainbridge align themselves with Max W eber's

suggestion that

it

is only fallacious attributions of causality that should be described as



34

Gregory

W

Dawes

pathologiccJ. But they, too, have sometimes regarded it as in some sense

non-rational, an alternative to practices that we might think of as rationally

gro unded. Stanley Tambiah, for instance, makes use of a famous distinction

from the work of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857 1939). He argues that magic

represents a different kind of orientation to reality from that found in the

sciences, one that is 'participatory' rather than 'causal' ^ In her study of magic

in ecirly medieval Europe, Valerie Flint makes a similar claim, suggesting that

magic is a kind of'unreaso n'

:

In their attempt to fïnd a place for unreason deeper than, rather than this

side of, reason, the early Middle Ages in Europe display a good deal more

enlightenment about the emotional need for that magic which sustains

devotion and delight than does the post-ReFormation Western world.*•

On this view, magic is a response to our emotional needs rather than a

response to rational enquiry.

Tambiah may be righ t about the existence of distinct ways of perceiving

the world, although it is not clear they can be as clearly distinguished as he

suggests.' Similarly, Flint may be correct tha t there exists an emotional need

for the kinds of services that are offered by magicians. We might even agree

with the modern sceptics that people today are acting irrationally if they

believe in magic. But if belief in magic is a form of 'unreason' in our own

time,

it is no t clear this was always the case. After all, as Richard Kieckhefer

has argued, 'the rational principles seen as explaining the operation of magic

.. . were widely shcired in medieval culture '. The same can be said of the

magical theo ries that became popular in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

As we shall see, these, too , can be thought of

as

a (controversial) extension of

the best natural philosophy and theology of the day.

There is, however, a problem with these debates. It is that those who

engage in them rarely reflect on the differing senses in which a belief can

be described as rational. Historians have shown that magical beliefs can be

rational in the sense of being

rationally defensible

given other beliefs that are

widely accepted in the culture in question. But the fact that behef

in

magic is

rational in this sense does not mean that it is rational in others. In particular,

we should not assume that magical beliefs were rational in the same way

^

Stanley JeyarajaTambiah,

Magic Religion

and the Scope

of

Rationality (Cam bridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990), pp. 105-09.

^Valerie I. J. Flint,

The Rise of

Magic

in

Early Medieval Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1991), p. 4.



The Rationality of Renaissance Magic 35

as the theories of modern science or the taken-for-granted convictions of

everyday life. The aim of this article, therefore, is to set out three senses in

which a belief (or set of behefs) can be thought of

s

rational, with a view to

identifying the distinctive rationality of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century

European magical tradition.

efining Magic

Before embarking on this discussion,

a

few words about my subject would

seem

in

order. There have been many attempts

to

define magic and,

in

particular, to distinguish it from rehgion and from science .' If one thing has

emerged from these discussions,

it

is the recognition that clear d istinctions

are not always possible. Magic merges into both rehgion, on the one hand,

and science and technology, on the other. Take, for example, the collection

of ancient texts published in 1928 under the title

The Greek Magical

Papyri. '

While many of these tex ts would surely count as magical, others seem to be

simple herbal remedies for com mon ailments. These could be classified as

a form of folk science. Even those who accepted the efficacy of magic have

not always been clear about such matters. Medieval thinkers, for example,

found

it

difficult

to

distinguish

a

magical potion from

a

simple poison.

Closer to our period , Giovanni Pico della Mirándola (1463—1494) defmes

magic as 'the practical part of natural science','^ whue the

Magiae naturalis

(1558) of Giambatüsta Della Porta (c. 1535 1615) combines references to

occult powers with practical instruction regarding animal breeding and plant

husbandry.

Similar remarks can

be

made about

the

porous boundary betw een religion

and magic. When Moses and Aaron had their competition with the magicians

of Pharaoh (Exodus 7-9), the actions of both sides would have appeared to

a bystander to be indistinguishable. The biblical w riters distinguish the two

^ For a dated but s t il l usefu l overv iew, see M urray Wax and Rosal ie W ax, 'The N ot io n of

M a g i c ' , Current Anthropology,

4

(1963) , 495—518. For

a

m ore recen t d i scuss ion ,

see

Jesper So rensen ,

A

Cognitive Theory

of

Magic (L a n ha m , M D : A l t a M i r a / R o w m a n

Lit t lef ie ld , 2007) , pp , 9-30 ,

^ ^ Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die Griechischen Zauberpapyri, ed. and t rans . Kar l Preisendanz, 2

vols (Leipzig: B, G,T eub ner , 1928—31); English transla t ion:

The

Greek

Magical

Papyri in

Translation, including the D emotic Spells, ed, Hans D iete r Betz (Chica go: Un ivers i ty of

Chicago Press , 1986) .

Richard Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Cu lture,

1300-1500 (Berkeley : Univers i ty of Cal ifo rn ia P ress , 19 76) , pp . 49 -5 0 ,

P ico de l l a Mi rándo la , ' Conc lus iones mag icae numero XXVI secundum op in ionem



3 6 Gregorjr W Dawes

groups by reference to the source of their power, rather than the nattire of

their

deeds.

'̂ In a similar

way,

'demonic magic' in medieval and early m odern

Europe was regarded as a perversion of the true faith, punishable not m erely

because it was socially dangerous, but as a form of heresy.'* Even today it

can be difficult to distinguish religion and magic. When modern Roman

Catholics carry St Christopher medals in their cars, should we regard this as

an expression of religious devotion or a magical act?

In response to these diffictilties, recent scholarship has shied away from

broad definitions of magic, favouring detailed case stu dies . But in order to

pick out the phenomena to be studied, we require some working definition

of magic, however provisional. Here is mine. Magic is the attetnpt to bring about

tangible effects by means oj actions invoking occult powers whose efficacy is thought to

depend upon

theirJorm. W hen I say that magic invokes 'occu lt' pow ers, I mean

that such powers do not correspond to the intviitively accepted (and hence

obvious) mechanisms that we employ in tmderstanding everyday events. '* By

'actions whose efficacy is thought to depend on their fo rm ', I mean tha t such

actions are thought to operate by virtue of being signs.

This definition enables us to distinguish magic from both religion and

science. Magic can be distinguished from religion by reference to the tangible,

immediate, this-worldly effects that it seeks to bring about. The distinction

between magic and science is more difficult. It carmot be found in magic's

invoking of occult powers, for modern science also invokes powers that

remain occult (that is to say, 'hidden') even when they can be demonstrated

experimentally and described in precise, mathematical terms. But modern

science differs from magic in its understanding of the powers involved. In

particular, it rejects the idea that an occult power can be invoked by actions

'^ Jacob Neusner, 'Science and Magic, Miracle and Magic in Formative Judaism:The System

and t l ie Difference' , in

Religion Science and Magic in C oncert and in Conßict

eds Jacob

Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs, and Paul Virgil McCracken Flesher (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1989), pp. 61-81 (p. 74).

'* Michael D. Bailey, 'From Sorcery t o W itchcraft: Clerical C onceptions of Magic in the

U te r Middle Ages',

Speculum

76 (2001), 960-90 (pp. 969-70).

Michael D. Bailey, 'The Meanings of Magic',

Magic Ritual and Witchcraft

1 (2006), 1—23

(p .

5).

' ^ Sorensen ,

A CognitiveTheory of Magic

p . 35 .

This way of making the distinction is clearest in the work of Bronistaw Malinowski. See,

for example, his 'Magic, Science and Religion', in

Science Religion and Reality

ed.

Joseph N eedham (London : Sheldon Press, 1925), pp. 19—84 (p. 38) . A different way

of distinguishing magic from religion goes back to Emile Durkheim, who argued that

magic was practised by individuals rather than by a community. See Emile Durkheim,



The Rationality of

Renaissance

agic

37

or objects merely

by

virtue

of

their form. Scientists may believe

in

occult

powers, but they do not manipulate them by means of ritual and symbols.'

So much

for an

initial definition

of

magic.

A

second problem

is

that

there was more than one magical tradition

in

Renaissance and early modern

Europe. The first such tradition was that of popular magic. As

in

every age,

each town had its 'ctmning m en ' and 'wise w om en ', offering remedies for

comm on human problem s: ctires, forttme telling, the detection of treasure,

success in love, and the interpretation of dreams. The acceptability of popular

magic seems to have become more contested in

the

early modern period,

as Christian clergy made particular efforts to distance orthodox reUgion

from condemned magic. This distancing of orthodox religion from magic

may be connected with the burgeoning fears regarding witchcraft, which are

characteristic of this period. And of course witchcraft belief w ent hand-in-

hand with works on demonologv, since witches were thought to be in league

o. o o

with the devil.^ To these traditions of popular magic and demonology we

might add that of alchemy, if we consider alchemy to be a magical practice.

Finally tbere existed

a

tradition

of

what

is

sometimes called 'intellectual

m agic', practised by those who thought of themselves as philosophers.

While

all

these traditions

are

interesting,

my

focus will

be on

that

of

intellectual magic. This is the magic that was wri tten about and (one assumes)

practised

by

members

of

Europe's intellectual elite.

Key

figures here

are

Marsilio Ficino (1433 1499), Cornelius Agrippa (14 86 -15 35 ),

and

Phillip

Aureolus Theophrastus

von

Hohenheim, also known

as

Paracelsus

(1493-

1541).

Ficino

has

been described

as

'high m agic's grea test Renaissance

theoretician',^' Agrippa wrote

a

popular compendium

of

magic, while

Paracelsus

is

best known

for

his medical writings. (Agrippa

and

Paracelsus

have also achieved fame

in

more recent times

as

characters

on

chocolate

frog cards

in

the Harry Potter novels.) Such learned authors may well have

been magicians,

in

the sense that they practised the rituals about which they

wrote. But what is important here is that they theorised about them , offering

us accounts

of

what magic was and why,

in

their view,

it

was effective.

My

'* My definition

of

magic excludes judicial astrology

—

the attem pt

to

predict human affairs

by reference

to

the influence of the heavenly bodies

—

insofar as astrology seeks merely

to predict and not to control. But it includes astral m agic, understood as the attem pt to

capture and channel heavenly influence.

Keith Thom as,

Religion and the ecline qf Magic

(1971

Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985),

pp . 58—89; Stuart Clark, 'Witchcraft and Magic in Early Modern Culture',

in Witchcraft

and Magic

in

Europe: The Period

of

theWitch Trials eds

Bengt An kar loo

and

Stuar t Clark

(London: Athlone, 2002), pp. 97 -16 9 (pp. 11 6-2 1).



3 8

Gregory W Dawes

question wül

be

in what sense these theories

of

magic can

be

regarded

as

rational.

II.

Rational Belief

If the idea of a magical tradition reqtiires some clarification, so does that of

rationality. Some writers on magic employ unhelpfully broad concep tions of

rationahty.^^They may, for exam ple, speak

oí practical rationality:

the process

by which we choose particular means to achieve a desired goal.^^The prac tice

of magic can surely be rational

in

this sense. If peop le believe ritual actions

to be effective in bringing about a certain result, then if they want to achieve

that result it is reasonable for them to perform those actions.̂ ""^ But what I am

interested in here is the rationality of holding such beliefs in the first place.

Similarly, sociologists can talk about^unctionai

rationality

which refers to the

fact that a belief may function advantageously in a particular society, perhaps

by bringing about social cohesion or by relieving stress.^^ But this, too, bears

no relation

to the

question

of

whether individuals

are

acting rationally

in

holding such a

belief.

a) Rational Acts of Believing

discussing the rationality

of

belief in m agic, we also need

to

clarify

the

phrase 'rational belief for it could be used to refer to either the

content

of the

belief or the

act

by which someone believes it. When I say, 'belief in magic is

rational', do I mean that the

proposition

'magic is effective' is rational? Or do

I mean that a particular person is acting rationally in holding it? Is rationality a

property of propositions or of people?

Put

in

this way, the question practically answers

itself. It is

difficult

to

make sense of the idea that a proposition is rational.^* One can make sense of

the idea that a proposition is justified perhaps in the sense of being supported

by the available evidence. One might even think that people coun t as rational

agents only if their behefs

are

justified in this sense. Strictly speaking,

however,

it

is the act of forming or maintaining the behef that is rational, no t

^ ^ C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi,'The Problem of the Rationality of M agic', B ritish

Journal

cf

Sociology

18 (1967), 55-74 (p. 55).

^' Micha Buchowski, 'The Rationality of M agic', Philosophy of the Social

Sciences

18 (1988),

509 -18 (p. 513).

^

E. E. Evans-Pritchard,

Witchcraft

Oracles and Magic among the zande (Oxford: Clarendon



The Rationality of Renaissance agic 39

the content

of

the behef

itself. It

follows that rationality

is a

characteristic

of persons (and perhaps inst itutions), but not of propositions. For stylistic

reasons, I shall continue to speak about 'rational belief. But the phrase should

be understood as referring

to

rational acts of believing.

b) Bounded Rationality

A further point needs

to be

made before launching into

the

historical

discussion.

It

is that human rationality is always

bounded

rationality.^* Human

beings are

not

omniscient beings, with un limited time and resou rces. They

need

to

form behefs

on the

Hy , with limited knowledge

and

under

the

pressure

of

having

to

make immediate decisions. They cannot,

in

practice,

ensure that all their beliefs form

a

coherent set, not merely

in

the sense

of

no t contradicting one another, but also in the sense of lending support to one

another.

If

this were

our

ideal

of

human rationality, then few,

if

any, agents

would count as rational. All

we

can hope

to

achieve

is the

greatest degree

of coherence

we can

achieve

in the

circumstances, even though that w ill

inevitably fall short of

a

certain philosophical ideal.

It follows that where people

end up,

when acting rationally, will

be

partly a product of where they sta rt. People will begin their reflection in

differing 'conceptual spaces', with differing inherited behefs and cognitive

resources.

If

we

did

have unlimited time

and

resou rces, these different

starting points would be unim portant. They would recede into insignificance

as rational agents presented with the same evidence converged on a com mon

view.' But since we

do not

have unlimited resources, the re is no guarantee

that such

a

convergence will occur. Equally rational agents presented with

the same evidence may fail

to

form the same beliefs

or

modify their existing

beliefs in the same

way.

If this

is

the case, then there is no answer to

the general

question, 'Were Renaissance thinkers acting rationally in believing in magic?'

The most we can do

is to

identify the factors that would enable us to judge

the rationality of

an individual s

beliefs.

i shall argue in Section III (c) that certain collective p rocedure s can also be described as

rational, but my focus here is on the rationality of individual acts of believing.

^ Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, 'Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of

Bounded Rationality', Psychological Review 103 (1996), 65 0-6 9 (pp. 650-5 1).

J o h n S. Wilkins, 'Are Creationists Rational?',

Synthese

178 (2011), 207-1 8 (pp. 211- 13) .



The Rationality of Renaissance Magic 41

Nattiral m agic was in this sense largely astral magic , if we understand 'astral'

to deno te all the heavenly bodies, not merely the stars.^'

It is tru e that Paracelsus, for instance, occasionally downplays the power

of

the

heavenly bodies, suggesting that they merely image what happens

on earth, or that they merely 'cook' rather than create the occult powers

into which the magician can tap . But even he speaks continually of astral

influence, which he regards as critical to the practice of his magical m edicine.

He beheves, for instance, that wounds can be more or less severe depending on

the heavenly constellation under which they are received.

̂

So his disparaging

remarks about astral influence do not indicate a rejection of this traditional

doctrine. What they may indicate is a rejection of astrological determinism,

for while Paracelsus believes in stellar influence, he also holds that 'the wise

man can dominate the stars and is not subject to t h e m '. ''

The causal mechanisms by which the heavenly bodies exerted their

influence were not always mysterious. Light and heat, for instance, were

obvious candidates, and most natural philosophers w ere agreed that light

produced heat, although how

it did so

was not immediately obvious.^*

Similarly, there was no agreement on the way in which the heavenly bodies ,

particularly the sun, produced heat. But that they did so was clear. Since heat

was one of the four Aristotelian primary qualit ies , it could easily be thought

of as an important means of bringing about earthly change. Intuitively, too ,

this made sense: we are all familiar with the way in which the heat of the stm

can make plants grow and help animals to flourish.

Yet alongside these familiar mechanisms, most natural philosophers

also accepted

the

existence

of

occu lt forces, forces that

we are

unable

to

perceive. These occtilt forces constituted the m ysterious influence

inßuentia)

that heavenly bodies were thought to exercise, the

inßuxus

that descended

I say astral rather than astrological , since the latter implies a kind of determinism that

not all writers on magic would accept.

^̂ W alter Pagel , Paracelsus: A Introduction

to

Philosophical Medicine

in the

E ra

of

the Renaissance

(Basel: Karger, 1958), pp. 68-69.

Pagel, p. 54

•PageUp. 71.

' ' Paracelsus , Die Bücher de Natura rerum (153 7) , book 6; see also Theophrast von Flohenheim,

genannt

Paracelsus,

Sämtliche

Werke,

ed .

Karl Sudhoff (M un ich /B er l i n :

R

O l d e n b o u r g ,

1922-33 ) (hereaf t e r Sämtliche Werke , 1 xi 378 ( re fe rences to the s tandard ed i t ion of

t he works

of

Paracelsus

are

provided

to

enable re ade rs

to

consu l t

the

full Latin t e x t) ;

English translat ion from Paracelsus: Essential Readings, t rans . Nicho las G oodr i ck -C larke

(Berkeley , CA: North At lan t ic , 1999) (hereaf ter Essential Readings ,

p. 185.



4 2 Gregory W Dawes

from them and which could pen etrate even dense and opaque bodies.'* As

we shall see, a few late m edieval thinkers denied the existence of such occtüt

powers, believing that m otion and light were all the heavenly influences that

were

required

^ But this scepticism does not seem to have been widespread.

There were too many puzzling phenomena — such as the magnetic power

of the lodestone — that were assumed to have some 'natural' cause, but for

which ordinary Aristo telian physics offered no explanation.''̂ *' There were

other phenomena — such as the formation of minerals in the depths of the

earth — for which appeals to light and heat seemed pointless, since they

occurred beyond the reach of such familiar forces.''^' O nce one a ttribu ted the

formation of such minerals to an occult heavenly

influentia,

it was a small step

to associate particular metals with the influence of particular planets: tin w ith

Saturn, lead with Jupiter, iron with Mars, and so on. ^^

(ii)

Words

and Rituals

A second set of background beliefs has to do v\dth the power of words and

rituals. Characteristic of Renaissance magic as of magic in all ages — is

the belief that certain rituals , accompanied by key words, have causal power.

They can bring about tangible effects merely by being performed, in the

right context and with the right intention. The idea that certain rituals and

utterances can have effects is not, of course, limited to the world of magical

thought

The performative power of utterances — their ability to bring about

new states of affairs — was a major tbeme of twentieth-century linguistic

philosophy, inspired by J. L. Austin's 1962 work.

How to Do Things with

Words. In the appropriate social setting, and when u ttered by tbe appropriate

speaker, words can indeed bring about a new state of affairs, at least in the

social world.This is why one should be careful about what words are uttered

at an auction .There is, however, nothing m ysterious about this kind of power,

which is simply a matter of social conven tion.

There is another kind of power a ttributed to words and rituals that is also

relatively uncontroversial. It is the psychological effect that rituals can have

on those who practise them. While apparently directed outwards, word and

rituals can work 'reflexively', as it were, working inwardly to alter the state

of mind of the agent. The psychological power of rituals was already noted

'«Grant , p . 611.

^ ^ t , pp. 613 -14 .



The Rationality of Renaissance agic 43

by Plato, ^^

and is

discussed

by

Francis Bacon (1561—1626).''^ Renaissance

writers

on

magic were

not

unaware

of

the psychological power

of

rituals.

Marsiho Ficino, in particular, has a sophisticated understand ing of the power

of the imagination (the

vis imaginativa).^^

It would

be

wrong

to

assxune, however, that Renaissance thinkers

regarded

an

altered state

of

mind as

the only

effect

of

magical ritua l. They

believed that magical rituals could have a physical effect, above and beyond

their psychological

or

social effects. Cornelius Agrippa,

for

instance, relates

a story about female sorcerers

who can

turn

men

into beasts

of

burden

for

as

long

as

they need

to do

their work.*^* Those

who

tell this story,

including Agrippa, did not regard these women's magical powers as merely

psycholog ical. Similarly, Ficino speaks about the celestial power of various

stones. The agate-stone, he writes, can be used

to

draw down the power

of

Mercury to improve vision, while the eagle-stone can draw down the power

of Luna and Venus

in

order

to

bring about speedy deHvery

in

childbirth.'^*

While Ficino may believe

the

effect

of

such stones

to be

partly mediated

by the power

of

the imagination,

it

remains

an

effect that is brought about

by celestial powers. The power

of

the heavenly bodies, Ficino assumes, can

operate in ways that are independent of human consciousness. Such powers

are

an

objective fact about the world, into which we can tap but which are

not dependent on us.

(Hi) The D octrine

of

Signatures

A third

set of

wddely held doctrines that could be drawn upon

in

support

of magic

are

those regarding what

we

might call 'effective resem blances'.

This belief found its most influential historical expression in the doctrine of

signatures: the appearances of things can offer a key to their h idden (occtilt)

causal prope rties. As Paracelsus w rites, 'the re is nothing that nature has not

o, laws, 933A- B.

^

Bacon,

The dvancement o f Learning

(160 5) , I I. 11 .3 .

* ' D.

P.

W alker, Spiritual an d Demonic Magicfrom Ficino to Campanella (19 58 ; Un iver s ity Park :

Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 76.

'̂ ^ Agrippa, De occulta

phiîosophia,

1.41, 45; English translation: Henry Cornelius Agrippa,

Three

Books

of Occult Philosophy w ritten hy H enry

Cornelius

Agrippa ofNettesheim,

t rans .

J F

[probably John French], ed. DonaldTyson (1651;

St

Paul, M N: Llewellyn Publications,

1993) (hereafter Occult Philosophy), pp. 122, 135.

Incidentally, while A grippa cites St Augustine in sup port of this story, he fails to mention

that Augustine

(D e

civitate

dei,

XVI11.18) does not believe it Augustine argues that if



4-4 Gregory W Dawes

signed in such a way that m an m ay discover its essen ce'

. ^ ̂

And N ature h ere is ,

ultimately, the Creator.

It is not God's will that all He has created for the benefit of man and

has given him as his own should remain hidden. ... And even if He did

conceal some things. He left nothing unmarked, but provided all things

with outward, visible marks, with special traits

—

just as a man w ho has

buried a treasure marks the spot in orde r that he may find it again.̂

I t is Paracelsus, too, who offers us a concise summary of this doctrine:

'everything that is w ith in ' , he w rite s , 'can be know n from what is w ith o u t ' . ' '

This is true of human beings as well as of other objects in the natural world.

Their inner character is revealed in their externa l ap pe ara nc e.

The doctrine of signatures is not unrelated to that of celestial influence,

for the stars and planets are often thought to be responsible for both hidden

po w er and ex tern al sign. We find this idea, altho ugh less clearly exp ressed , in

Agrippa's De occulta philosophia (1533) :

All stars have their peculiar natures, properties, and conditions, the seals

and characters whereof they produce through their rays even in these

inferior things, viz. in elem ents, in stones, in plan ts, in animals, and in their

members, w^hence everything receives from an harmonious disposition,

and from its star shining upon it, some particular seal, or character stamped

upon it, which is the significator of that star, or harmony, containing in it

a particular v irt ue .

hus for instance, the 'bay-tree, the lote- tree, and the marigold are solary

plants ' ,^* having a particular relation to the sun, and we know this because

they display the character of the sun in their roots. In this way, the doctrine

of signatures combines a belief in occult and mysterious powers with a claim

about how they are to be discovered. W hile the w orld 's hidden p ow ers

are

hid de n, they are also manifest, in th e sense that they can be 'rea d off

the appearances of things by those with the skill to do so. But it does raise

an important question, which has to do with the theory of knowledge.

^' Paracelsus,

Astronomia magna

(1538), book 10;

SamtlicheWerke, I

xii

9 1;

English translation

from

Paracelsus, Four Treatises together with Selected W ritings,

eds and t r ans . George Rosen ,

He nry E. Siger ist , C. Lil ian Tem kin , and G rego ry Zi lbo org (Birm ingham , AL: Class ics

of Medicine Library , 1988) (hereaf ter Four Treatises), u, 1 9 5 .

' Paracelsus , Die 9 Bücher de Natura rerum, book 6 ; SamtlicheWerke, xi 39 3; t ranslat ion f rom

Four

Treatises,

I i , 194 .

' ' Paracelsus , Von hirifallenden Siechtagen der Mutter Hysterie) \530); SamtlicheWerke,] \m 3 4 3 ;

translat ion from Four

Treatises,

i i , 194 .




45

Particularly when the letters of the book of nature are not easuy read, how

can the magician come to know of

its

occult powers?

iv) Macrocosm and Microcosm

To answer that question, writers on magic could turn to another widely held

doctrine, that of macrocosm and microcosm. According to this doctrine

o

the human being represents the universe in miniature, both reflecting and

containing in his own person the p roperties of the cosmos at large. As

Agrippa writes , 'Go d ., . created man after his image; for as the world is the

image of God, so man is the image of the world; ... therefore he is called

the M icrocosm, that is the Lesser World' . T he human being is a microcosm

because he is a composite being , having an astral nature as well as a terrestrial

natu re.'* It follows, as Paracelsus w rites, that

all heavenly orbits, terrestrial nature, watery properties and airy essence

inhere in him. The nature of all fruits of the earth and all mineral ores

of water, all the constellations, and the four winds of the world are in

him. What is there upon earth whose nature and power does not reside

within man?

While the traditional, Aristotelian and Ptolemaic, cosmology made a sharp

distinction between the heavenly quintessence (fifth essence) and the four

earthly elements, this doctrine blurs that distinction by claiming that the

human being contains elements from bo th realms.' It is because the human

being is a microcosm, containing in himself all the powers of the universe,

that he can both come to know and tap into those powers in order to bring

about tangible effects. The privileged position of human beings means they

can master the powers in question. If a person fails to master these external

powers (such as those of the stars) and allows himself

[sic]

to be dominated

by them, it is because he forgets that he 'has the whole firmament hidden

within him self .**

v) Daemons and Demons

A final potential source of magical power, frequently discussed by at least

the opponents of

m agic,

was demonic or (more precisely) daemonic. It was

widely believed, by magicians and their opponents alike, that there existed

Agr ippa , De occulta philosophia, 111,36; Occult Philosophy, p . 5 79 .

'^ Pa ge l , Parace/sus, p. 65 .

P a r a c e l s u s , Opus paramirum (1531) , book 4 ; Sämtliche Werke, I ix 30 8; translat ion from

Essential Readings, p . 98 .

' Char les We bster , Paracelsus: Medicine, Magic, and (New Haven , CT:



4 6

Gregory W Dawes

spiritual beings having preternatural powers on whose assistance a magician

could call. This belief is

not

merely

a

product

of

Christianity;

it is

already

found among

the

practitioners

of

popular magic

in

antiquity. The Greek

magical papyri,

for

instance, include spells that are thought

to

work

in an

apparently mechanical fashion. But they also contain spells that are supposed

to work by invoking intelligent spiritual beings, namely gods or daemons.

Most early modern writers on magic make a distinction between natural

and demonic magic. Moreover, the vast majority condemn demonic magic,

even if they defend natural mag ic.

he

problem for the defenders of

magic

is

that the botindary between the tw o was far from clear. It was widely believed

that angelic intelligences m oved the planets, after all, and the m edieval world

was full

of

spirits, some of whom were benign bu t o thers m alevolent. Even

the very term 'demon'

is

here problematic,

for in

everyday usage

it

refers

only

to a

malevolent spirit.

It is

less misleading

to

use the term 'daemon',

the Latinised form

of

the Greek SaipfOV

daimôn),

for

among Renaissance

thinkers, particularly the Neoplatonists, daemons were not always regarded

as harmful

or

malevolent.'' Such thinkers drew upon the ancient idea that

there existed daemons that were good spirits and sources

of

inspiration

or

protection. Indeed,

in

Renaissance thought the ancient daemons

are

often

assimilated

to the

Christian angels. The problem was that although

not all

daemons were evil,

it

was dangerous to invoke a daemon, since even

if

your

intentions were good, you might end up with

an

evil one. For this reason,

cautious religious thinkers condemned all magic, since

it

so often seemed to

rely on demonic power.

b) Rationally Formed Beliefs

It follows that there were plenty

of

resources

in

Renaissance culture from

which one could construct

a

defence

of

magic. But

a

second and stronger

sense of the phrase 'rational belief has

to

do with how beliefs are formed.

There are two possibilities he re. Belief

in

magic may be formed as a result of

argum ents, being the product of conscious inference from some body of data.

Such a belief wotild count as rational

if

the arguments are good ones, even

when

the

premises

are

false and

the

conclusion mistaken.* ' Alternatively,

* Brian P. Copenhaver, How to Do Magic, and Why: Philosophical Pres criptions ', in

The Cambridge Companion t Renaissance Philosophy,

ed.

James H ank ins (C amb r idge :

Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 137- 69 (p. 163).



The Rationality of

Renaissance agic

4 7

such a behef

may

be produced by some other mechanism, reliance on which

would norm ally count as rational.

i) Inferential Beliefs

Let me start with the first of these: the situation in which a behef is formed

or maintained

as a

result of a conscious process of inference. M ost commonly,

that inference will be of an explanatory kind: there wul be some puzzling fact

about the world of which the belief in question seems the best, or perhaps

the only plausible, explanation. In everyday life, for example, I might see a

broken vvdndow, note that the new television is missing, and form the beHef

that my house has been burg led. But similar inferences are found in science.

A physicist, for instance, might wdtness tracks in a cloud chamber and infer

that the best explanation of those tracks is the existence of a subatomic

particle. ^Those who value evidence and argumen t, particularly m odern

self

styled sceptics, are inchned to regard this as the paradigmatic kind of rational

believing. Perhaps it is. But as we shall see in a m om en t, relatively few of ur

beliefs, even our scientific behefs, are formed in this way.

Did Renaissance thinkers believe in magic

as

the restilt of some conscious

process of inference, one that we m ight judge to be rational? It is, of course ,

difficult to say what gives rise to a person s belief as distinct from the reasons

he or she might offer in its defence. When defending magic, writers of this

period could point to the existence of occult powers, belief in which was

seen as warranted by puzzling phenomena, such as magnetism. But behef

in occult powers is not identical with belief in magic. One could accept the

existence of occult powers but deny our abüity to tap into them. So even if

the existence of such powers was regarded

as

the best available explanation of

some phenomenon, it did not foflow that magic would be effective.

In fact, it seems that belief in the power of magic itself was rarely, if ever,

defended as the bes t available explanation of otherw ise puzzling phenom ena.

Perhaps the nearest we come to a rationahty of

this

kind is in the writings of

Paracelsus. Not only does Paracelsus compare his medical procedures vsdth

those of the trad itiona l. Galenic medicine that

he

opposes. He also argues that

his remedies are be tter than those proposed by traditional m edicine because

they are based on experien ce.

s

he w rites,

every physician must be rich in knowledge, and not only of that which is

written in books; his patients should be his book, they will never mislead

him. .. . But he who is content with mere letters is like a dead man; cind



48

Gregory

W

Dawes

he is hke

a

dead

physician. As a

man and

as a

physician, he

kills his

patient.

Not even a dog killer can learn his trade from books, but only from

experience. And how much more true is this of

the

physician *"'

One could regard this attitude as 'empirical',*^ if by this term one

means nothing m ore than a reliance on first-hand experience as opposed to

a priori

a rgum ent o r the authority of books. It may even stem from the same

'constructive scepticism' about the power of reason that led seventeenth-

century natural philosophers to tu rn to experiment.*"' But it is hardly empirical

in our modern sense.''*" With the work of Paracelsus, we are still a long way

from the later scientific ideal of quantifiable, controlled experiments that

could, in principle, be rep licated by anyone. W hen Paracelsus referred to

experience, he was not talking about a knowledge of the world that stems

from cautious experimentation." He was talking about a kind of intuitive

knowledge: one that does not rely on conscious reasoning and which leads

one to grasp the inner essence of things.*'

Reasoning from empirical evidence is not, of course, the only way in

which to form beliefs by way of inference. One could also form a behef in

magic by way of reasoning from other behefs, such as the belief in demons,

angels, occult powers, or the doctrine of the microcosm. As we have seen,

the world of Renaissance and early modern thought contained plenty of

resources for arguments of this kind, which w ere freely used by defenders of

magic. Marsiho Ficino, in his famous defence, could even deploy theological

arguments. He noted, for example, that three magi were the first to adore

the Christ child and that Jesus's disciples themselves enjoyed knowledge of

occult powers.*"' But of course a person may produce arguments in defence

*̂

Paracelsus, Das Buch Paragranum (1565);

SamtlicheWerhe 1

viii 70; English translation from

Paracelsus: SelectedWritings ed. Jolande Jacobi, trans. Norb ert Gu terman, 2nd edn (New

York: Pantheon, 1958), p. 50.

*̂ N icholas G oodrick-C larke, 'Intro du ctio n', in Essential Readings, pp. 1

— 7

(p. 24); Pagel,

Paracelsus, p. 53 .

'"̂ Pagel,

Paracelsus p. 51 ;

on the 'construc tive scepticism' of the age, see Richard H . Popkin,

The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2003), pp. 112-27; and Keith Hutchison, 'What Happened to Occult Qualities

in the Scientific Revolution?',

¡sis

73 (1982), 233-53 (pp. 248-50).

* * Pagel, Paracelsus p. 65; Harald Burger, 'Deutsche Sprachgeschichte

und

Geschichte der

Phi losophie ' , in Sprachgeschichte: ein Handhuch zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache un d ihrer

rforschung eds W erner Besch, Anne Betten , Oskar R eichmann, and Stefan Sonderegger,

2nd edn (Berlin: W alter de Gru yter, 1998), pp. 18 1-92 (p. 185).

Webster,

Paracelsus

pp. 154, 156-57.



The Rationality of

Renaissance

Magic 49

of

position that is being held on other grounds. There is httle evidence that

Renaissance thinker

s^r/ned

the ir belief in magic as

result of such inferences.

These background behefs seem to have made more plausible

behef

in

magic

that was formed on other g rounds.

ii) Basic Beliefs

What were those o ther grounds? There are two other ways of forming beliefs

that are often regarded as rational. The first gives rise

to

what philosophers

call 'basic'

or

'non-inferential' beliefs. These are formed spontaneously as

a

result

of

being placed

in a

particular situation. The best-knovni instance

is

that

of

a behef that we form as

a

result

of

sense perception. My belief that

there is

a

coffee cup on my desk, for instance, was not formed as a result of

evidence

or

argum ent. Undoubtedly,

it

does involve some sort

of

cognition,

perhaps matching

the raw

sensory stimuli with learned categories such

as

'coffee cup'. But the cognition involved is generally

unconscious:

the belief in

question is not formed as a resu lt of any

reflective

process of inference.' The

same may be said of beliefs that arise from memory. These, too , are formed

spontaneously, no t as a result of conscious inference and argument.

It is at least possible that behefs about magic might have been formed in

the same way, spontaneously, as

result of

sense

perception. This could occur

in situations

in

which the individuals

in

question had witnessed phenomena

that they perceived to be the result of magical operations. Benvenuto Cellini

(1500 1571),

for

example,

the

Florentine artist

and

goldsmith, relates

a

story of such an occasion. Cellini had fallen in love with a Sicüian girl, whose

mother had (wisely, one suspects) tried to rem ove her from his influence.

In

an effort to ensure they were reunited, Cellini calls upon an acquaintance,

a

priest who was familiar with magical arts. They went

to

the Colosseum

by

night, where by means of various elaborate ceremonies, the priest conjured

up

a

host

of

dem ons, the sight

of

which terrified everyone involved.

It

was

so impressive that

the

priest later invited Cellini

to

engage with him

in

consecrating a book

to

the devil', with the aid of which they could become

rich through treasure hunting.

This whole account may, of course, be fictional, but even if it is, Cellini

clearly intended

it to be a

plausible fiction.

It

is, after all, included

in his

autobiography. But if it is reliable record , it shows an educated person of the

Renaissance relating experiences that

he

himself a ttributed

to

magical powers.

On the idea of unconscious cog nition, see Rhianon Allen and A rthu r S. R eber, ' Unconscious



50

Gregory

W

Dawes

What is important here is that there is no indication that Cellini engaged

in any conscious process of theorising, weighing up potential explanations

of the phenom ena he was experiencing. Rather he perceived them , in some

immediate fashion,

as

magical. More precisely, he perceived them as the

workings of a powerful, demonic magic. If this is tru e, then Cellini s belief in

magic may have been a form of

hasic

or

non iriferential

belief

Of such a belief it makes little sense to ask if we are rational in forming

it. After all, we do not in any sense

choose

to form such a belief: we have

no choice, but do so spontaneously. But we can ask if a person is acting

rationally in continuing to hold a belief that is formed in this way. common

view ctmong philosophers is that non-inferential beliefs arising from sense

perception enjoy a kind of

prima

Jade justification. ̂ Acceptance of such

beliefs is , as it were, rational until further no tice , that is to say, untu we

have reason to doubt them . There are times when we do have good reasons

to doub t them , to assume that our senses are deceived or are malfunctioning.

But we are entitled to accept the deliverances of our senses unless we have

such reasons. On this view, people who witness what appear to be magical

operations are acting rationally in taking what they see at face value, unless

they have reason to question it.

The question then becom es whether those who v\dtnessed what appeared

to be magical operations had reason to doubt the evidence of their senses.

There are two kinds of reasons that might cause a rational agent to entertain

such doubts. The first is based on

a posteriori

reasoning, and derives from the

observation that magiccil rituals repeatedly fail to bring about their claimed

effects. If this is the case, then it

is

unlikely that what

I

am witnessing

is ,

in fact,

a magical operation. It is more likely to be the result of deception or illusion.

The second is based on

a priori

reasoning. If my background beliefs are such as

to make successful magic highly improbable, then a similar conclusion should

be drawn. In this situation, too, it seems more likely that the phenomena in

question have a non-magical cause.

Let me begin with the first of these: the

a posteriori

reasoning. On the

assumption that magical rituals are, in fact, ineffective, we might think that

Renaissance and early m odern thinkers should

have

realised this. Notoriously,

however, practitioners of magic have ways of accounting for apparent failures,

which do not call into question the general efficacy of their rituals. Witch

doctors, for example, might explain the failure of their practices by arguing

that they were countered by further acts of witchcraft. But even setting this



The Rationality cxf Renaissance Ma gic 5

aside, the inefficacy of m agic wa s by n o m ean s an easy thing t o establish in a

world that lacked controlled experiments and clinical tr ials.

In any case, magic sometimes works: it brings about its desired effects.

It may do so, for instance, in ways that we would think of as psychologically

me diated and therefore natural.^^ As on e anthropologist w rite s , peo ple do

occasionally die of witchcraft . . . and they are some tim es healed by faith P^

Ftir thermore, magic r i tuals are of ten accompanied by medicinal or dietary

remedies, as in the work of Ficino. Even if the ritual remedies had no

psychological effect on their own, these other measures may have influenced

the outc om e. Since no attem pt was ma de to el iminate such confotmding

factors , as we w ould call th em , i t m ust have been n o s imple m atter to decide

if magical r ituals did or did not w ork .

W hat abo ut the secon d kind of evidence for scepticism: that based on a

priori reasoning Irom background beliefs? Once again, the background beliefs

of this period offer little reason for scepticism. A ra tional agent of the twe nty-

first ce ntury w ho w itnesses wh at appears to be a successftil m agical op eratio n

surely has reasons for d ou bt.T ho se rea sons have to d o with a be t ter know ledge

of the way in which the world operates, or ( if one prefers) a different set of

background beliefs. But the thinkers of the Renaissance period occupied a

very different conceptual universe from our own.

These differences should not, however, be overstated. Even some who

shared these background beliefs were sceptical about magic. As we shall see

shortly, scepticism abo ut m agic w as a Uve possibüity in th e societies in w hich

Ficino, Agrippa, and Paracelsus w ro te. So while there w ere back grou nd

beliefs that lent support to belief in magic, there were other backgrotmd

beliefs that might lead one to be sceptical. I t might be argued that those

who expressed such scepticism were acting more rat ionally than those who

did not .

Hi) Belief on Testimony

I shall com e back to the reason s for scepticism in a m o m en t.T he re

is,

however,

another way of forming beliefs. In addition to behefs formed on the basis of

iriference and those formed spontaneously as the result of experience., there is a

third category, that of belief on the basis of testimony. I t i s impor tant to note

how significant this ca teg ory is. W e may, for ex am ple , believe that science is

based on exp erim en tal ev idence and careful reasoning. T he re will surely be

peo ple for wh om this is tr u e, at least some of the tim e. But for non -scientists

(or for scientists themselves outside of their own field) beliefs about science



5

Gregory W Dawes

are much more likely to be based on testimony. I believe, for example, that

the equation e = mc^ represents the rate at which m atter can be converted into

energy. But I do not believe this as a result of following the reasoning that

gave rise to it. I believe it on the testimony of those whom I judge to have the

requisite knowledge and skills. Such behef may fall short of a certain ideal —

it would, perhaps, be better if

I

could follow the reasoning for myself

—

but it

does not seem to be irrational.

As it happens, testimony seems to have been the most common basis

for belief in magic during the Renaissance. Brian Copenhaver, for example,

refers to what he calls the doxographic evidence for m ag ic . This consisted

of documents that were wddely beheved to be ancient, dating back to

Hermes Trismegistus or Z oroaster or M oses, of which the orpus Hermeticum

translated by Ficino was the best-known collection. Such documents were

thought to embody a ptisca or antiqua

theologia,

which gave the practice of

magic an ancient and venerable lineage. The appeal to doctunents of this

kind is particularly p rom inen t in the work of Agrippa, which repeatedly cites

ancient authors and reports of magical operations.

Were Agrippa and his contem poraries acting rationally in accepting such

reports? As I noted a moment ago, there is nothing intrinsically irrational

about believing something on authority, partictilarly if we have reason to

regard the authority in question as rehable. But, as David Htime writes, a

wise man .. . proportions his behef to the evide nc e , and this may involve

taking a critical attitude to repor ts of extraord inary events. It would be clearly

anacbronistic to expect the thinkers of this period to have the critical attitude

of the modern historian. But was it possible for them to doubt the evidence

of the many docum ents that apparently witnessed to magical effects?

iv) Scepticism about Magic

It seems that it was, for alongside the many Renaissance thinkers who

believed in m agic, there also existed a num ber of

sceptics.

Wben faced wdth

reports of marvellous events

{miiabilia),

at least some Renaissance thinkers

were p repared to question them . Already in the fourteenth century, Nicolas

Oresme (c. 1320—1382) complained about the excessive credulity of many

5 Brian

P.

Cop enhave r, Did Science Have a Renaissance? , fas, 83 (199 2), 38 7- 40 7 (p. 396);

Copenhaver, Na tural Magic, He rm etism , and Occultism in Early M odern Science , in

Reappraisals of the Scientific R evolution, eds David C. Lindberg and Ro be r t S . W estma n

(Camb ridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 261-3 01 (p. 275).

* See the preface to Eicino s

Pimander

cited in Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt,



The Rationality <xf Renaissance Magic

53

of his contem poraries. Even many holy m en and theologians, he writes, have

been too quick to believe reports of extraordinary events: If you ask how

they know [something to be

true],

they can give no bette r response than a

simple wom an'.'

Oresme was, perhaps, ahead of his tim e. But in the fifteenth century a

growing number of thinkers display a new sense of the past, which includes

a critical attitude towards reports of past even ts.''The most famous example

was Lorenzo Valla (1 406-1 45 7), who in 1440 exposed the so-called

Donation

of

Constantine

as an eighth-century forgery by pointing to the 'various

contradictions, impossibilities, stupidities, barbarisms, and absurdities' that

docum ent contains. W riters on magic, too , can exhibit something of this

new sensibihty. In his

Disputations Against Divinitary Astrology

(1496) , for

example, Pico della Mirándola criticises no less a figtire than Roger Bacon for

his tmcritical acceptance of authorities. '

This scepticism was no t merely about the doctunents that spoke of magic.

There existed thinkers who were sceptical about the very possibüity of magic.

Religious thinkers, of

course,

often condemned m agic, on the grotmds that it

involved interaction with

demons.

But such scepticism did not necessarily cast

doubt on the efficacy of

magic,

for it

was wddely believed that demons cotild

bring about effects that were 'praeter naturam' ('preternatural'), outside of

the ordinary operations of nature. ^ But it is no t the theological criticism of

magic that interests me here; it is scepticism about the very possibility of

magic. Luden Febvre famously argued that it was not possible to be an atheist

in the sixteenth century. ^ But whatever the truth of Febvre's claims about

religion, it was certainly possible to be a sceptic about m agic.

Noteworthy here are those thinkers who doubted the very existence

of the occult powers to which theorists of magic appealed. I have already

mentioned O resme's criticism of

the

credtility of his contem poraries. But on

at least one occasion, Oresm e denies that the re is any need to posit occult

' 'Si queras quomodo scitis hoc , ipsi non plus respo ndeb unt quam simplex m uli er' , cited

in

LynnThorndike, A History

o f

Magic and Experimental

Science 8

vols (New York: Colum bia

University Press, 192 3-58 ),

m

(1934), 453 .

' ' Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense

o f

the Past (London: Edward Arno ld, 1949), pp.

7,

50—76.

Lorenzo Valla, On

the

Donation

of

Constantine (144 0), trans. G.

W.

Bowersock (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp.

8-9

' Pico della Mirándola, Disputations

1.64—66,

cited

in

Farmer, Syncretism in theWest p.

144.

^Anthony Ossa-Richardson, 'Pietro Pomponazzi

and the

Rôle

of

Nature

in

Oracular

20



54

Gregory W Dawes

heavenly influences, arguing that the effects of the heavens on the ea rth can all

be accounted for by reference to manifest qualities.***

s

he w rites,

in order to explain action or production in these inferior beings and their

diversity one ought not to posit any qualities or influence in the heavens

other than light and motion ... thus ... heaven brings about whatever

effects [it brings about] through its form or essence by means of

its

light

and motion and not through other unknown qualities, which are called

influences.*^

While this attitude is unusual, Oresme was not the only one to make such

suggestions. Writing at a later date, Alessandro Achillini (1463—1512)

attributed the formation of metals in the earth not to occult influence, but

to the power of heat. * While the denial of occult astral influence did not

rule out the possibility of magic (which could appeal to other powers) , it did

undercut a central pillar of Renaissance magical theory.

Other authors of the period expressed scepticism about demonic

magic. W hue n ot denvinp the existence of demons, Oresm e cast doubt on

their abuity to bring about tangible effects. ' He also calls into question the

efficacy of the spells that are thought to summon dem ons, citing as evidence

the diversity of the invocations that are employed in different places or by

different sects.** So while Oresm e does not deny the possibility of

magic,

he

is inclined to reduce all magic to natural m agic. In this respect, he anticipates

the more radical arguments of

an

author closer to our period, namely Pietro

Pomponazzi (1462-1525). Pomponazzi offered Aristotelian arguments that

called into question, not just the power of demons to bring about tangible

effects, but their very existence.*** It is difficult to know how widespread such

scepticism was, for the denial of the existence of demons was hazardous in a

world in which Church authorities frequently spoke about demonic power.

But such authors show that it was certainly possible to entertain doubts about

magic.

What

is

striking

is

that even those who wrote about magic we re, at times,

capable of expressing scepticism about

its

power.The best-known example is,

once again, C ornelius Agrippa. The same Agrippa w ho wrote the

De occulta

philosophia

also auth ored the

De inceititudine et vanitate

scientiarum

declamatio

^ ^

T h o r n d i k e ,

Magic and Experimental Science

III , 414.

* ' N i c o le O r e s m e ,

^uaestio contra divinatores

horoscopios (1 370 ) , c i ted in G ran t ,

Planets Stars

and Orbs

p. 61 3, n. 177 (translation author's ow n).

'' Achillini, íifeer de orbibus (1494), cited in Grant, p. 614.



The Rationality

cJRenaissance Magic 55

invectiva

(15

27).

In

this work, he seems to renounce many of his earlier beliefs,

casts doubt upon many ancient authorities, and describes magic as nothing

but

a

m ixture

of

Idolatry, Astrology, and superstitious Physick'.'^^

It is not

clear whether Agrippa's purpose in penning the

De vanitate

(as

it

came to be

known) was serious, playful,

or

perhaps prophylactic:

a

defence against the

charge of having written in support of

magic.

But there is no need to decide

this question here. What is important is that

it

constitutes fiirther evidence

that there existed reasons

for

doubting

the

efficacy

of

magic.

It

could

be

argued that those who faued

to

take such reasons seriously failed

to

act

as

rationally as those who did.

(c) ollective Rationality

Traditional definitions

of

rationality have assumed that

it is an

attribute

of

individuals

or of

the decisions made

by

individuals. So

far in

this article

I

have done the same. More recently, however, some philosophers have begun

working with

a

broader understanding.

On

this view, rationality involves

the employment of those procedures that reliably give rise to true belief. Note tha t

'reliably' here means

for the

most p art ' rather than 'always'. O utside

of

simple deductive reasoning, no procedures of this kind will be Infallible.

If

we adopt a broad definition of this kind, then

it

becomes clear that rational

belief-forming procedures can be

social

rather than m erely

individual.

i) Science as Social Process

This is certainly true of the modern sciences, which are successful not

merely because they employ particularly reliable forms of reasoning or good

experimental m ethods.

key factor in their success is that their practitioners

are organised into particular kinds of communities, which have distinctive

procedures. David Hull, for example, highhghts two collective processes

that con tribute to the success of science . The first is that of granting credit,

particularly to those who can claim priority in proposing an idea. Scientists

gain credit not only by pubhcation, but by the number of times their

^

Henry C ornelius Agrippa,

The Vanity of Arts and Sciences,

trans, James Cottrell (London:

j

C,

for

Samuel Speed, 1676), p, 127,

' I have singled out the work of David Hull merely as an exam ple. Othe r ph ilosophers w ho

have contributed

to

this discussion

are

Helen

E.

Longino Science as Social Knowledge:

Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry

(Princeton,

Nj:

Princeton University Press,

1990) ) , Phi l ip Ki tcher

Tbe Advancement

of

Science: Science without

Legend

Objectivity

without Illusions

(New York: Oxford University Press, 199 3)),

and

Miriam Solomon



5 6 Gregory W Dawes

publications are both cited and used by others. Gaining credit for priority

might encourage secrecy, but in fact credit can be gained only by making

public one's data and by citing the works of others (which in turn extends

their c red it). The im portance of gaining credit m ight also encourage fraud,

but scientific commtmities are generally severe on those who offer fraudulent

restilts. It follows that if scientific fraud is comparatively ra re, it is not because

scientists are particularly virtuous, but because of the collective procedtires

of their com munities.

The second major mechanism is that of collective checking, a process by

which others attempt to replicate and verify published results. This restilts in

a degree of objectivity. This objectivity arises, not merely from the fact that

scientific theories can be inter-subjectively tested,'^ but from the fact that

they have been through a communal process of testing. As Htill write s,

the objectivity that matters so much in science is not primarily a

characteristic of individual scientists, but of scientific communities.

Scientists rarely refute their own pet hypotheses, especially after they have

appeared in print, hut that is all right.Their fellow scientists will he happy

to expose these hypotheses to severe testing.

For the same reason, science 'does not require that scientists be tmbiased'

it

requires only 'that different scientists have different biases'.*^

To H ull's two m echanisms, we may add a third Scientific commtmities are

so constituted that they can engage in what computer scientists call 'parallel

processing' . The y can ptirsue independent and even mutually contradictory

lines of research, without needing to worry about their consistency. This

means that the norms of rationality within a collective project may be

different from those that wotild apply to an individual working alone . A

solitary individual might not be acting rationally in purstiing a hypothesis

that seems highly unlikely to produce results. But a scientist, who belongs to

a com munity of researchers, can feel free to pursue such a line of inquiry, in

the confident expectation that o thers will pursue m ore apparently promising

lines of inquiry.'''

'2 Karl R. Popper, The Logic ofSdentißc Discovery (19 35; London: Routledge, 20 02), p. 22.

David L. Hu l l ,

Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual

Development

of

Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 4.

'^ Hull, p. 22.




57

(ii) Collective Rationa litj in the Rena issance

The birth of modern science is customarily dated to the seventeenth century,

for it was that century which saw the rise of the scientific institutions that

embodied such processes.'' One thinks, for instance, of the

Accademia dei

Lincei, with w^hich Galileo was associated, which was founded in 1609, the

Royal Society in Britain, founded in 1660, and the

Académie des Sciences

in

France, founded in 1666. But at least some of these social processes pre-

existed the seventeenth century. When Galileo applied for the chair of

mathem atics at Bologna in 1587, his propositions on centres of gravity w ere

sent for review to Giuseppe Moletti (1531-1588), the holder of a similar

chair at the University of Padova.'^ It seems, then, that in late medieval

universities there existed at least an informal and occasional process of peer

review.

If early modern nattiral philosophy benefited from tbis collective scrutiny,

what we might call 'the science of magic' seems to have lacked it. Many

theorists of magic

—

thinkers such as Paracelsus or Giordano Bruno (1548—

1600) spurned the establisbed institutions of learning. They were 'wayward

geniuses and intellectual vagabonds','' working and publishing outside of the

universities. It is true that other theorists of mapic did belong to institutions

of learning.' ^ But even when they did, the ctdture of magic (like that of

alchemy) valued secrecy rather than

publicity.

'' Tbe preface to Agrippa's

De occulta philosophia

includes a letter from his teacher Abbot Trithemius of

Sponheim (146 2—1516) advising

him

' to communicate vulgar secrets to vtilgar

friends, but higher secrets to higher, and secret friends only'.' ^ This was, of

course, in one sense pretence, for these words are fotind in the preface of a

published book. But there w ere reasons why a magus might be cautious about

publication. Even among the intellectual elite, 'imprisormient and execution

were real demgers facing those interested in magical practices'.' ' It foflows

' Naom i Ore skes and Erik M. Conway , Merchants qf Doubt How a Handful qf Scientists Obscured

the T ruth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming

(New York: Bloomsbury , 20 10 ) ,

pp. 268 -69 .

^^ W. R. L ai rd , ' In t rod uc t io n ' , in The Unfinished Mechanics of Giuseppe M oletti: An Edition and

English Translation o f his Dialogue on Mechanics

(1576) , ed . and t rans . Lai rd (Toronto :

University ofToronto Press, 2000), pp. 3-62 (p. 40).

''^ Th orn dik e,

Magic and Experimental Science,

V, 12 7.

Benedik Lang, Unlocked Books: Manuscripts of Learned Magic in the M edieval Libraries of Central

Europe (Un iversity Park: Pennsylvania State U niversity Press , 2008), pp . 268—69.

'**' Peter J. Erench,

yo/in

Dee The World of an Elizabethan Magus (Lo ndon: Routledge & Kegan

Paul, 1972), pp. 81-82.



C o p y r i g h t o f P a r e r g o n i s t h e p r o p e r t y o f A u s t r a l i a n & N e w Z e a l a n d A s s o c i a t i o n f o r M e d i e v a l

& E a r l y M o d e r n S t u d i e s a n d i t s c o n t e n t m a y n o t b e c o p i e d o r e m a i l e d t o m u l t i p l e s i t e s o r

p o s t e d t o a l i s t s e r v w i t h o u t t h e c o p y r i g h t h o l d e r ' s e x p r e s s w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . H o w e v e r , u s e r s

m a y p r i n t , d o w n l o a d , o r e m a i l a r t i c l e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l u s e .

the rationality of renaissance magic

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