The

Psychic Life

of Power

Theories in Subjection

M

Judith Butler

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

Acknowledgments

S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s

S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a

© 1997 b y t h e B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s o f the

L e l a n d S t a n f o r d J u n i o r U n i v e r s i t y

P r i n t e d i n t h e U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a

C I P d a t a a p p e a r a t t h e e n d o f t h e b o o k

T h i s w o r k w a s g e n e r o u s l y s p o n s o r e d b y a H u m a n i t i e s R e ­

search F e l l o w s h i p f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a a t B e r k e ­

ley. I am grateful to those f r iends a n d col leagues w h o gave

i n c i s i v e readings o f s o m e o f the chapters: W e n d y B r o w n ,

W i l l i a m C o n n o l l y , D a v i d P a l u m b o - L i u , K a j a S i l v e r m a n , A n n e

N o r t o n , D e n i s e R i l e y , a n d H a y d e n W h i t e , a s w e l l a s the s tu­

dents w h o p a r t i c i p a t e d in " S o c i a l Subjects / P s y c h i c States" at

Berke ley . I t h a n k A d a m P h i l l i p s for his p e r m i s s i o n to r e p r i n t

o u r exchange f r o m Psychoanalytic Dialogues in this context. I

also t h a n k H e l e n Tartar for her m e t i c u l o u s , inte l l igent , a n d

t h o r o u g h g o i n g e d i t i n g , a n d G a y l e S a l a m o n for her assistance

w i t h the m a n u s c r i p t .

Contents

I n t r o d u c t i o n 1

1 S t u b b o r n A t t a c h m e n t , B o d i l y S u b j e c t i o n

Rereading Hegel on the Unhappy Consciousness 31

2 C i r c u i t s of B a d C o n s c i e n c e

Nietzsche and Freud 63

3 Subject ion, Resistance, R e s i g n i f i c a t i o n

Between Freud and Foucault 83

4 " C o n s c i e n c e D o t h M a k e Subjects o f U s A l l "

Althusser's Subjection 106

5 M e l a n c h o l y G e n d e r / R e f u s e d Ident i f i ca t ion 132

K e e p i n g I t M o v i n g

Commentary on Judith Butler, by Adam Phillips 151

R e p l y t o A d a m P h i l l i p s 160

6 P s y c h i c Incept ions

Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 167

N o t e s 201

Index 217

The Psychic L i fe of Power

Theories in Subjection

Introduction

W e s h o u l d t r y t o g r a s p s u b j e c t i o n i n i ts m a t e r i a l i n s t a n c e a s

a c o n s t i t u t i o n of subjects .

— M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , " T w o L e c t u r e s "

T h e s p l i t t i n g o f t h e subject , w i t h i n w h i c h t h e se l f a s p r e s e n t

t o i t s e l f i s o n l y o n e m o m e n t , a n d t h e c h a r g e d r e f l e x i v i t y o f

that m o m e n t , i s t h e p o i n t o f p u r c h a s e w i t h i n t h e subject o f

i ts s u b j e c t i o n . T h e p r o f o u n d a n d c o r p o r e a l g u i l t w i t h w h i c h

t h e subject i s i n v e s t e d a s t h e f e b r i l e u n d e r t o n e o f t h a t self-

c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h t u r n s o u t t o k n o w s o l i t t l e o f i t se l f , i s

d e c i s i v e i n s e c u r i n g t h e d e e p i n n e r c o n t r o l , w h i c h h a s b e e n

c a l l e d i n t e r p e l l a t i o n .

— F r a n c i s B a r k e r , The Tremulous Private Body:

Essays on Subjection

Subjection . . . T h e act or fact of b e i n g s u b j e c t e d , as u n d e r a

m o n a r c h o r o t h e r s o v e r e i g n o r s u p e r i o r p o w e r ; t h e state o f

b e i n g subject t o , o r u n d e r t h e d o m i n i o n o f a n o t h e r ; h e n c e

gen. s u b o r d i n a t i o n . . . . T h e c o n d i t i o n of b e i n g subject ,

e x p o s e d , or l i a b l e to; l i a b i l i t y . . . . Logic. T h e act of s u p p l y i n g

a subjec t to a p r e d i c a t e . —Oxford English Dictionary

A s a f o r m o f p o w e r , subject ion i s p a r a d o x i c a l . T o b e d o m i -

i l nated by a p o w e r externa l to oneself i s a f a m i l i a r a n d

a g o n i z i n g f o r m p o w e r takes. T o f i n d , h o w e v e r , that w h a t "one"

2 Introduction

is, one's v e r y f o r m a t i o n as a subject, is in s o m e sense d e p e n ­

dent u p o n that v e r y p o w e r i s q u i te another. We are u s e d to

t h i n k i n g of p o w e r as w h a t presses on the subject f r o m the out­

side, as w h a t subordinates , sets u n d e r n e a t h , a n d relegates to

a l o w e r order. T h i s is s u r e l y a fa ir d e s c r i p t i o n of p a r t of w h a t

p o w e r does. B u t if, f o l l o w i n g F o u c a u l t , w e u n d e r s t a n d p o w e r

as forming the subject as w e l l , as p r o v i d i n g the v e r y c o n d i t i o n

of its existence a n d the trajectory of its desire , then p o w e r is

not s i m p l y w h a t w e o p p o s e b u t also, i n a s t r o n g sense, w h a t w e

d e p e n d o n for o u r existence a n d w h a t w e h a r b o r a n d preserve

i n the be ings that w e are. T h e c u s t o m a r y m o d e l for u n d e r ­

s t a n d i n g this p r o c e s s goes a s f o l l o w s : p o w e r i m p o s e s i tself o n

us, a n d , w e a k e n e d b y its force, w e c o m e t o i n t e r n a l i z e o r ac­

cept its terms. W h a t s u c h an account fails to note, h o w e v e r ,

i s that the " w e " w h o accept s u c h t e r m s are f u n d a m e n t a l l y

d e p e n d e n t o n those t e r m s for " o u r " existence. A r e there n o t

d i s c u r s i v e c o n d i t i o n s for the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f a n y "we"? Subjec­

t i o n consists p r e c i s e l y i n this f u n d a m e n t a l d e p e n d e n c y o n a

d i s c o u r s e w e n e v e r chose b u t that, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , in i t iates a n d

susta ins o u r agency.

" S u b j e c t i o n " s igni f ies the p r o c e s s o f b e c o m i n g s u b o r d i n a t e d

by p o w e r as w e l l as the p r o c e s s of b e c o m i n g a subject. W h e t h e r

b y i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i n A l t h u s s e r ' s sense, o r b y d i s c u r s i v e p r o ­

d u c t i v i t y , i n F o u c a u l t ' s , the subject i s i n i t i a t e d t h r o u g h a p r i ­

m a r y s u b m i s s i o n t o p o w e r . A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t ident i f ies the

a m b i v a l e n c e i n this f o r m u l a t i o n , h e does not elaborate o n the

speci f ic m e c h a n i s m s o f h o w the subject i s f o r m e d i n s u b m i s ­

s ion. N o t o n l y does the ent i re d o m a i n o f the p s y c h e r e m a i n

l a r g e l y u n r e m a r k e d i n h is theory, b u t p o w e r i n this d o u b l e

v a l e n c e o f s u b o r d i n a t i n g a n d p r o d u c i n g r e m a i n s u n e x p l o r e d .

T h u s , i f s u b m i s s i o n is a c o n d i t i o n of subject ion, i t m a k e s sense

to ask: W h a t is the p s y c h i c f o r m that p o w e r takes? S u c h a

Introduction

project r e q u i r e s t h i n k i n g the t h e o r y o f p o w e r together w i t h a

t h e o r y of the p s y c h e , a task that has b e e n e s c h e w e d by w r i t e r s

i n b o t h F o u c a u l d i a n a n d p s y c h o a n a l y t i c o r t h o d o x i e s . T h o u g h

i t offers no p r o m i s e of a g r a n d synthesis , the present i n q u i r y

seeks t o e x p l o r e the p r o v i s i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s f r o m w h i c h each

t h e o r y i l l u m i n a t e s the other. T h e project ne i ther b e g i n s n o r

ends w i t h F r e u d a n d F o u c a u l t ; the q u e s t i o n o f subject ion, o f

h o w the subject i s f o r m e d i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n , p r e o c c u p i e s the

sect ion of H e g e l ' s Phenomenology of Spirit that traces the slave's

a p p r o a c h t o f r e e d o m a n d h is d i s a p p o i n t i n g f a l l i n t o the " u n ­

h a p p y consciousness ." T h e master, w h o at first a ppea r s to

be " e x t e r n a l " to the slave, reemerges as the slave's o w n c o n ­

science. T h e u n h a p p i n e s s of the consc iousness that emerges is

its o w n self-beratement, the effect of the t r a n s m u t a t i o n of the

master i n t o a p s y c h i c real i ty . T h e se l f -mort i f icat ions that seek

to redress the insistent c o r p o r e a l i t y of se l f -consciousness i n s t i ­

tute b a d conscience. T h i s f igure o f consc iousness t u r n e d b a c k

u p o n itself pre f igures N i e t z s c h e ' s account , in On the Genealogy

of Morals, not o n l y o f h o w r e p r e s s i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n f o r m the

o v e r l a p p i n g p h e n o m e n a o f consc ience a n d b a d consc ience , b u t

a lso o f h o w the latter b e c o m e essential to the f o r m a t i o n , p e r ­

sistence, a n d c o n t i n u i t y of the subject. In each case, p o w e r that

at first appears as e x t e r n a l , p r e s s e d u p o n the subject, p r e s s i n g

the subject i n t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n , assumes a p s y c h i c f o r m that

const i tutes the subject's sel f- identity .

T h e f o r m this p o w e r takes i s re lent less ly m a r k e d by a f igure

of t u r n i n g , a t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n oneself or even a t u r n i n g

on oneself. T h i s f igure operates as p a r t of the e x p l a n a t i o n of

h o w a subject is p r o d u c e d , a n d so there is no subject, s t r i c t l y

s p e a k i n g , w h o m a k e s this t u r n . O n the contrary , the t u r n a p ­

pears to f u n c t i o n as a t r o p o l o g i c a l i n a u g u r a t i o n of the subject,

a f o u n d i n g m o m e n t w h o s e o n t o l o g i c a l status r e m a i n s p e r m a -

4 Introduction

n e n t l y u n c e r t a i n . S u c h a n o t i o n , t h e n , appears d i f f i cu l t , i f not

i m p o s s i b l e , to i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o the a c c o u n t o f subject f o r m a ­

t i o n . W h a t o r w h o i s s a i d t o t u r n , a n d w h a t i s the object o f

s u c h a t u r n ? H o w is i t that a subject is w r o u g h t f r o m s u c h an

o n t o l o g i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n f o r m o f t w i s t i n g ? P e r h a p s w i t h the a d ­

vent o f th is f igure, w e are n o longer i n the business o f " g i v i n g

an account of the f o r m a t i o n of the subject." We are, rather,

c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the t r o p o l o g i c a l p r e s u m p t i o n m a d e b y a n y

s u c h e x p l a n a t i o n , one that faci l itates the e x p l a n a t i o n b u t also

m a r k s its l i m i t . T h e m o m e n t w e seek t o d e t e r m i n e h o w p o w e r

p r o d u c e s its subject, h o w the subject takes i n the p o w e r b y

w h i c h i t i s i n a u g u r a t e d , w e seem t o enter this t r o p o l o g i c a l

q u a n d a r y . W e cannot p r e s u m e a subject w h o p e r f o r m s a n i n ­

t e r n a l i z a t i o n i f the f o r m a t i o n of the subject i s in n e e d of ex­

p l a n a t i o n . T h e f igure t o w h i c h w e refer has not yet a c q u i r e d

existence a n d is n o t p a r t of a ver i f iab le e x p l a n a t i o n , yet o u r

reference c o n t i n u e s to m a k e a c e r t a i n k i n d of sense. T h e p a r a ­

d o x of subject ion i m p l i e s a p a r a d o x of re ferent ia l i ty : n a m e l y ,

that we m u s t refer to w h a t does n o t yet exist. T h r o u g h a f igure

that m a r k s the s u s p e n s i o n o f o u r o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s ,

we seek to account for h o w the subject c o m e s to be. T h a t th is

f igure is i tse l f a " t u r n " is, r h e t o r i c a l l y , p e r f o r m a t i v e l y spec­

tacular ; " t u r n " translates the G r e e k sense o f " t rope ." T h u s the

t r o p e o f the t u r n b o t h indicates a n d exempl i f ies the t r o p o l o g i ­

c a l status o f the gesture. 1 D o e s subject ion i n a u g u r a t e t r o p o l o g y

i n s o m e way , o r i s the i n a u g u r a t i v e w o r k o f t ropes necessar i ly

i n v o k e d w h e n w e t r y t o a c c o u n t for the g e n e r a t i o n o f the s u b ­

ject? W e w i l l r e t u r n t o this q u e s t i o n t o w a r d the e n d o f this

i n q u i r y w h e n w e c o n s i d e r h o w the e x p l a n a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a

par t ic ipates i n the m e c h a n i s m i t descr ibes , p r o d u c i n g p s y c h i c

t o p o g r a p h i e s that are c l e a r l y t r o p o l o g i c a l .

T h e scene o f " i n t e r p e l l a t i o n " offered by A l t h u s s e r i s one

Introduction

instance of this quas i - f ic t ive effort to g i v e an account of h o w

the s o c i a l subject i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h l i n g u i s t i c means. A l t -

husser 's d o c t r i n e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n c l e a r l y sets the stage for

F o u c a u l t ' s later v i e w s on the " d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n of the

subject." F o u c a u l t , of course, insists that the subject is not "spo­

k e n " into existence a n d that the m atr ic e s o f p o w e r a n d d i s ­

course that const i tute the subject are ne i ther s i n g u l a r n o r sov­

e r e i g n i n their p r o d u c t i v e ac t ion . Yet A l t h u s s e r a n d F o u c a u l t

agree that there is a f o u n d i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n in the process of

assujetissement. In A l t h u s s e r ' s essay " I d e o l o g y a n d I d e o l o g i ­

c a l State A p p a r a t u s e s , " the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the subject takes

p lace t h r o u g h language, as the effect of the a u t h o r i t a t i v e v o i c e

that hai l s the i n d i v i d u a l . In the i n f a m o u s e x a m p l e that A l t h u s ­

ser offers, a p o l i c e m a n hai ls a passerby on the street, a n d

the passerby t u r n s a n d r e c o g n i z e s h i m s e l f as the one w h o is

h a i l e d . I n the exchange b y w h i c h that r e c o g n i t i o n i s p r o f e r r e d

a n d accepted, i n t e r p e l l a t i o n — t h e d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n o f the

s o c i a l subject—takes place. S igni f icant ly , A l t h u s s e r does not

offer a c lue as to w h y that i n d i v i d u a l t u r n s a r o u n d , a c c e p t i n g

the v o i c e as b e i n g a d d r e s s e d to h i m or her, a n d a c c e p t i n g the

s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d n o r m a l i z a t i o n effected b y that voice . W h y

does this subject t u r n t o w a r d the v o i c e of the law, a n d w h a t i s

the effect of s u c h a t u r n in i n a u g u r a t i n g a s o c i a l subject? Is this

a g u i l t y subject a n d , i f so, h o w d i d i t b e c o m e g u i l t y ? M i g h t

the t h e o r y of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n r e q u i r e a t h e o r y of conscience?

T h e i n t e r p e l l a t i o n of the subject t h r o u g h the i n a u g u r a t i v e

address o f state a u t h o r i t y p r e s u p p o s e s n o t o n l y that the i n ­

c u l c a t i o n of consc ience a l r e a d y has t a k e n place , b ut that c o n ­

science, u n d e r s t o o d as the p s y c h i c o p e r a t i o n of a r e g u l a t o r y

n o r m , const i tutes a s p e c i f i c a l l y p s y c h i c a n d s o c i a l w o r k i n g o f

p o w e r o n w h i c h i n t e r p e l l a t i o n d e p e n d s b ut for w h i c h i t c a n

g i v e n o account . M o r e o v e r , the m o d e l o f p o w e r i n A l t h u s -

6 Introduction Introduction 7

ser's account attr ibutes p e r f o r m a t i v e p o w e r to the a u t h o r i t a ­

t ive voice , the v o i c e of s a n c t i o n , a n d hence to a n o t i o n of l a n ­

guage f i g u r e d a s speech. H o w are w e t o a c c o u n t for the p o w e r

o f w r i t t e n d i s c o u r s e , o r o f b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s c o u r s e , w h i c h c i r ­

culates w i t h o u t v o i c e o r s ignature? F i n a l l y , A l t h u s s e r ' s v i e w ,

u s e f u l as it is , r e m a i n s i m p l i c i t l y c o n s t r a i n e d by a n o t i o n of a

c e n t r a l i z e d state apparatus , one w h o s e w o r d i s its d e e d , m o d ­

e led o n d i v i n e a u t h o r i t y . T h e n o t i o n o f d i s c o u r s e emerges i n

F o u c a u l t i n part t o c o u n t e r the s o v e r e i g n m o d e l o f i n t e r p e l l a -

t ive speech in theories s u c h as A l t h u s s e r ' s , b u t also to take

account of the efficacy of d i s c o u r s e apart f r o m its i n s t a n t i a t i o n

as the s p o k e n w o r d .

Passionate Attachments

T h e insistence that a subject is pass ionate ly at tached to h is

o r her o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n has been i n v o k e d c y n i c a l l y b y those

w h o seek to d e b u n k the c l a i m s of the s u b o r d i n a t e d . I f a sub­

ject c a n be s h o w n to p u r s u e o r s u s t a i n his or her s u b o r d i n a t e d

status, the r e a s o n i n g goes, then p e r h a p s f inal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for

that s u b o r d i n a t i o n resides w i t h the subject. O v e r a n d against

this v i e w , I w o u l d m a i n t a i n that the at tachment to subject ion

i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the w o r k i n g s o f p o w e r , a n d that part o f

the o p e r a t i o n o f p o w e r i s m a d e clear in this p s y c h i c effect, one

of the m o s t i n s i d i o u s of its p r o d u c t i o n s . If, in a N i e t z s c h e a n

sense, the subject i s f o r m e d by a w i l l that t u r n s b a c k u p o n

itself, a s s u m i n g a ref lexive f o r m , then the subject is the m o ­

d a l i t y of p o w e r that t u r n s on itself; the subject is the effect of

p o w e r i n r e c o i l .

T h e subject w h o i s a t once f o r m e d a n d s u b o r d i n a t e d i s

a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d i n the scene o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . F o u c a u l t ' s

r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n as that w h i c h i s n o t o n l y

p r e s s e d on a subject b u t f o r m s a subject, that is, is p r e s s e d on

a subject by its f o r m a t i o n , suggests an a m b i v a l e n c e at the site

w h e r e the subject emerges. If the effect of a u t o n o m y is c o n ­

d i t i o n e d b y s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d that f o u n d i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n o r

d e p e n d e n c y i s r i g o r o u s l y r e p r e s s e d , the subject emerges in

t a n d e m w i t h the u n c o n s c i o u s . T h e F o u c a u l t i a n p o s t u l a t i o n o f

subject ion as the s i m u l t a n e o u s s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d f o r m i n g o f

the subject assumes a speci f ic p s y c h o a n a l y t i c va lence w h e n we

c o n s i d e r that no subject emerges w i t h o u t a pass ionate attach­

m e n t t o those o n w h o m h e o r she i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d e p e n d e n t

(even i f that p a s s i o n is "negat ive" in the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c sense).

A l t h o u g h the d e p e n d e n c y of the c h i l d is not political s u b o r d i ­

n a t i o n i n any u s u a l sense, the f o r m a t i o n o f p r i m a r y p a s s i o n

i n d e p e n d e n c y renders the c h i l d v u l n e r a b l e t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n

a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n , a t o p i c that has b e c o m e a p r e o c c u p a t i o n of

recent p o l i t i c a l d iscourse . M o r e o v e r , this s i t u a t i o n o f p r i m a r y

d e p e n d e n c y c o n d i t i o n s the p o l i t i c a l f o r m a t i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n

of subjects a n d b e c o m e s the m e a n s of their subject ion. I f there

is no f o r m a t i o n of the subject w i t h o u t a passionate at tachment

t o those b y w h o m she o r h e i s s u b o r d i n a t e d , t h e n s u b o r d i ­

n a t i o n p r o v e s c e n t r a l to the b e c o m i n g of the subject. 2 As the

c o n d i t i o n of b e c o m i n g a subject, s u b o r d i n a t i o n i m p l i e s b e i n g

in a m a n d a t o r y s u b m i s s i o n . M o r e o v e r , the des ire to s u r v i v e ,

"to be," is a p e r v a s i v e l y e x p l o i t a b l e desire . T h e one w h o h o l d s

o u t the p r o m i s e of c o n t i n u e d existence p l a y s to the des ire

t o s u r v i v e . " I w o u l d rather exist i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n t h a n n o t

ex is t " i s one f o r m u l a t i o n of this p r e d i c a m e n t (where the r i s k

of " d e a t h " is also possible) . T h i s i s one reason w h y debates

about the r e a l i t y of the s e x u a l abuse of c h i l d r e n t e n d to m i s ­

state the character of the e x p l o i t a t i o n . It is not s i m p l y that a

s e x u a l i t y is u n i l a t e r a l l y i m p o s e d by the a d u l t , n o r that a sexu­

a l i t y i s u n i l a t e r a l l y f a n t a s i z e d b y the c h i l d , b u t that the c h i l d ' s

8 Introduction Introduction 9

love, a l o v e that is necessary for its existence, is e x p l o i t e d a n d

a passionate at tachment abused.

L e t us c o n s i d e r that a subject is not o n l y f o r m e d in sub­

o r d i n a t i o n , but that this s u b o r d i n a t i o n p r o v i d e s the subject's

c o n t i n u i n g c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y . A c h i l d ' s l o v e is p r i o r to

j u d g m e n t a n d d e c i s i o n ; a c h i l d t e n d e d a n d n o u r i s h e d in a

" g o o d e n o u g h " w a y w i l l love , a n d o n l y later s t a n d a chance o f

d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a m o n g those he or she loves. T h i s is to say, not

that the c h i l d loves b l i n d l y (since f r o m e a r l y o n there i s d i s ­

c e r n m e n t a n d " k n o w i n g n e s s " o f a n i m p o r t a n t k i n d ) , but o n l y

that i f the c h i l d is to pers is t in a p s y c h i c a n d s o c i a l sense, there

m u s t be d e p e n d e n c y a n d the f o r m a t i o n of at tachment: there i s

n o p o s s i b i l i t y o f not l o v i n g , w h e r e l o v e i s b o u n d u p w i t h the

r e q u i r e m e n t s for l ife. T h e c h i l d does not k n o w t o w h a t he/she

attaches; yet the infant as w e l l as the c h i l d m u s t attach in

o r d e r t o pers is t i n a n d a s itself. 3 N o subject c a n e m e r g e w i t h ­

o u t this a t tachment , f o r m e d i n d e p e n d e n c y , b u t n o subject, i n

the c o u r s e of its f o r m a t i o n , c a n ever a f ford f u l l y to "see" it .

T h i s a t tachment in its p r i m a r y f o r m s m u s t b o t h come to be a n d

be denied, its c o m i n g to be m u s t consist in its p a r t i a l d e n i a l , for

the subject to emerge.

T h a t accounts i n part for the a d u l t sense o f h u m i l i a t i o n

w h e n c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the earl iest objects o f l o v e — p a r e n t s ,

g u a r d i a n s , s ib l ings , a n d so o n — t h e sense o f be lated i n d i g n a ­

t i o n i n w h i c h one c l a i m s , " I c o u l d n ' t p o s s i b l y l o v e s u c h a p e r ­

s o n . " T h e utterance concedes the p o s s i b i l i t y i t denies, estab­

l i s h i n g the "I" as p r e d i c a t e d u p o n that forec losure , g r o u n d e d

i n a n d b y that f i r m l y i m a g i n e d i m p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e "I" i s thus

f u n d a m e n t a l l y threatened by the specter o f this ( imposs ib le)

love ' s r e a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e m a i n s c o n d e m n e d to reenact that

l o v e u n c o n s c i o u s l y , r e p e a t e d l y r e l i v i n g a n d d i s p l a c i n g that

s c a n d a l , that i m p o s s i b i l i t y , o r c h e s t r a t i n g that threat to one's

sense of " I . " " T c o u l d not be w h o I am if I w e r e to l o v e in the

w a y that I a p p a r e n t l y d i d , w h i c h I m u s t , to pers is t as mysel f ,

c o n t i n u e t o d e n y a n d yet u n c o n s c i o u s l y reenact i n c o n t e m p o ­

r a r y life w i t h the m o s t terr ib le suf fer ing as its consequence."

T h e t r a u m a t i c r e p e t i t i o n o f w h a t has b e e n f o r e c l o s e d f r o m

c o n t e m p o r a r y l i fe threatens the " I . " T h r o u g h that n e u r o t i c

r e p e t i t i o n the subject p u r s u e s its o w n d i s s o l u t i o n , its o w n u n ­

r a v e l i n g , a p u r s u i t that m a r k s an agency, b u t n o t the subject's

a g e n c y — r a t h e r , the agency of a desire that a i m s at the d i s s o ­

l u t i o n of the subject, w h e r e the subject s tands as a b a r to that

desire . 4

If the subject is p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h forec losure , t h e n the s u b ­

ject i s p r o d u c e d by a c o n d i t i o n f r o m w h i c h i t is, by d e f i n i t i o n ,

separated a n d di f ferent iated. D e s i r e w i l l a i m a t u n r a v e l i n g the

subject, but b e t h w a r t e d b y p r e c i s e l y the subject i n w h o s e

n a m e it operates. A v e x a t i o n of desire, one that p r o v e s c r u c i a l

to subject ion, i m p l i e s that for the subject to pers is t , the s u b ­

ject m u s t t h w a r t its o w n desire . A n d for des ire t o t r i u m p h , the

subject m u s t be threatened w i t h d i s s o l u t i o n . A subject t u r n e d

against itself (its desire) appears , on this m o d e l , to be a c o n d i ­

t i o n of the pers istence of the subject.

To des ire the c o n d i t i o n s of one's o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n is thus

r e q u i r e d to pers is t as oneself. W h a t does i t m e a n to e m b r a c e

the v e r y f o r m o f p o w e r — r e g u l a t i o n , p r o h i b i t i o n , s u p p r e s s i o n

— that threatens one w i t h d i s s o l u t i o n in an effort, prec ise ly , to

pers is t in one's o w n existence? I t i s not s i m p l y that one r e ­

q u i r e s the r e c o g n i t i o n of the other a n d that a f o r m of r e c o g n i ­

t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d t h r o u g h s u b o r d i n a t i o n , b ut rather that one i s

d e p e n d e n t o n p o w e r for one's v e r y f o r m a t i o n , that that f o r m a ­

t i o n i s i m p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t d e p e n d e n c y , a n d that the p o s t u r e o f

the a d u l t subject consists p r e c i s e l y in the d e n i a l a n d reenact-

m e n t o f this d e p e n d e n c y . T h e " I " emerges u p o n the c o n d i t i o n

10 Introduction Introduction i l

that i t d e n y its f o r m a t i o n in d e p e n d e n c y , the c o n d i t i o n s of its

o w n p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e "I," h o w e v e r , i s threatened w i t h d i s r u p ­

t i o n p r e c i s e l y b y this d e n i a l , b y its u n c o n s c i o u s p u r s u i t o f its

o w n d i s s o l u t i o n t h r o u g h n e u r o t i c r e p e t i t i o n s that restage the

p r i m a r y scenarios i t not o n l y refuses to see b u t cannot see, i f i t

w i s h e s to r e m a i n itself. T h i s means, o f course , that, p r e d i c a t e d

on w h a t i t refuses to k n o w , i t i s separated f r o m itself a n d can

never q u i t e b e c o m e o r r e m a i n itself.

Ambivalence

T h e n o t i o n o f the subject has i n c i t e d c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h i n

recent theoret ica l debate, b e i n g p r o m o t e d by s o m e as a nec­

essary p r e c o n d i t i o n of agency a n d r e v i l e d by others as a s i g n

o f " m a s t e r y " t o b e re fused. M y p u r p o s e i s ne i ther t o e n u m e r ­

ate n o r to reso lve the c o n t e m p o r a r y instances of this debate.

Rather, I p r o p o s e to take account of h o w a p a r a d o x r e c u r r e n t l y

s t ructures the debate, l e a d i n g i t a l m o s t a l w a y s to c u l m i n a t e in

d i s p l a y s o f a m b i v a l e n c e . H o w c a n i t be that the subject, t a k e n

to be the c o n d i t i o n for a n d i n s t r u m e n t of agency, is at the same

t i m e the effect of s u b o r d i n a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d as the d e p r i v a ­

t i o n of agency? I f s u b o r d i n a t i o n is the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y

for agency, h o w m i g h t agency b e t h o u g h t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the

forces of s u b o r d i n a t i o n ?

" T h e subject" i s s o m e t i m e s b a n d i e d about as i f i t w e r e inter­

changeable w i t h "the p e r s o n " o r "the i n d i v i d u a l . " T h e geneal­

o g y of the subject as a c r i t i c a l category, h o w e v e r , suggests that

the subject, rather t h a n be i d e n t i f i e d s t r i c t l y w i t h the i n d i ­

v i d u a l , o u g h t to be d e s i g n a t e d as a l i n g u i s t i c category, a p lace­

h o l d e r , a s t r u c t u r e in f o r m a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l s c o m e to o c c u p y

the site of the subject (the subject s i m u l t a n e o u s l y emerges as

a "site"), a n d they enjoy i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o n l y to the extent that

they are, as i t were , first establ ished in language. T h e subject

i s the l i n g u i s t i c o c c a s i o n for the i n d i v i d u a l to achieve a n d r e ­

p r o d u c e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , the l i n g u i s t i c c o n d i t i o n o f its existence

a n d agency. N o i n d i v i d u a l becomes a subject w i t h o u t first be­

c o m i n g subjected or u n d e r g o i n g "subject ivat ion" (a t r a n s l a t i o n

of the F r e n c h assujetissement). It m a k e s l i t t le sense to treat "the

i n d i v i d u a l " as an i n t e l l i g i b l e t e r m i f i n d i v i d u a l s are s a i d to ac­

q u i r e the ir i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y b y b e c o m i n g subjects. P a r a d o x i c a l l y ,

n o i n t e l l i g i b l e reference t o i n d i v i d u a l s o r the ir b e c o m i n g c a n

take p l a c e w i t h o u t a p r i o r reference to their status as subjects.

T h e s t o r y b y w h i c h subject ion i s t o l d is , i n e v i t a b l y , c i r c u l a r ,

p r e s u p p o s i n g the v e r y subject for w h i c h i t seeks to g i v e an ac­

count . O n the one h a n d , the subject c a n refer t o its o w n gene­

sis o n l y by t a k i n g a t h i r d - p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e on itself, that is,

b y d i s p o s s e s s i n g its o w n p e r s p e c t i v e i n the act o f n a r r a t i n g its

genesis. O n the other h a n d , the n a r r a t i o n o f h o w the subject

is c o n s t i t u t e d p r e s u p p o s e s that the c o n s t i t u t i o n has a l r e a d y

t a k e n place, a n d thus arr ives after the fact. T h e subject loses

itself to te l l the s t o r y of itself, b u t in t e l l i n g the s t o r y of i tsel f

seeks to g i v e an a c c o u n t of w h a t the n a r r a t i v e f u n c t i o n has

a l r e a d y m a d e p l a i n . W h a t does i t m e a n , then, that the s u b ­

ject, d e f e n d e d by s o m e as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of agency, is a lso

u n d e r s t o o d to be an effect of subjection? S u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n

suggests that in the act of o p p o s i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n , the subject

reiterates its subject ion (a n o t i o n s h a r e d by b o t h p s y c h o a n a l y ­

sis a n d F o u c a u l d i a n accounts) . H o w , t h e n , i s subject ion t o b e

t h o u g h t a n d h o w c a n i t b e c o m e a site of a l terat ion? A p o w e r

exerted on a subject, subject ion is nevertheless a p o w e r assumed

by the subject, an a s s u m p t i o n that const i tutes the i n s t r u m e n t

of that subject's b e c o m i n g .

1 2 Introduction Introduction 13

Subjection / Subordination

T h e d o u b l e aspect of subject ion appears to l e a d to a v i c i o u s

c i rc le : the a g e n c y of the subject appears to be an effect of its

s u b o r d i n a t i o n . A n y effort t o o p p o s e that s u b o r d i n a t i o n w i l l

n e c e s s a r i l y p r e s u p p o s e a n d r e i n v o k e it . L u c k i l y , the s t o r y sur­

v i v e s this impasse . W h a t does i t m e a n for the a g e n c y of a s u b ­

ject to presuppose its o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n ? Is the act of presuppos­

ing the same as the act of reinstating, or is there a d i s c o n t i n u i t y

b e t w e e n the p o w e r p r e s u p p o s e d a n d the p o w e r reinstated?

C o n s i d e r that i n the v e r y act b y w h i c h the subject r e p r o d u c e s

the c o n d i t i o n s o f its o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n , the subject e x e m p l i ­

fies a t e m p o r a l l y b a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y that be longs to those c o n ­

d i t i o n s , speci f ica l ly , to the exigencies of the ir r e n e w a l . P o w e r

c o n s i d e r e d as a c o n d i t i o n of the subject is necessar i ly not the

s a m e as p o w e r c o n s i d e r e d as w h a t the subject is s a i d to w i e l d .

T h e p o w e r that ini t iates the subject fai ls to r e m a i n c o n t i n u ­

ous w i t h the p o w e r that is the subject's agency. A s igni f icant

a n d p o t e n t i a l l y e n a b l i n g r e v e r s a l o c c u r s w h e n p o w e r shifts

f r o m its status as a c o n d i t i o n of agency to the subject's " o w n "

a g e n c y ( c o n s t i t u t i n g a n a p p e a r a n c e o f p o w e r i n w h i c h the s u b ­

ject appears a s the c o n d i t i o n o f its " o w n " p o w e r ) . H o w are w e

to assess that b e c o m i n g ? Is it an e n a b l i n g break, a b a d break?

H o w i s i t that the p o w e r u p o n w h i c h the subject d e p e n d s for

existence a n d w h i c h the subject i s c o m p e l l e d to reiterate t u r n s

against itself i n the c o u r s e o f that re i terat ion? H o w m i g h t w e

t h i n k resistance w i t h i n the terms o f re i terat ion?

S u c h a v i e w suggests that a g e n c y cannot l o g i c a l l y be de­

r i v e d f r o m its c o n d i t i o n s , that n o c o n t i n u i t y i s t o b e a s s u m e d

b e t w e e n (a) w h a t m a k e s p o w e r p o s s i b l e a n d (b) the k i n d s

of p o s s i b i l i t i e s that p o w e r assumes. I f in a c t i n g the subject

reta ins the c o n d i t i o n s of its emergence, th is does n o t i m p l y

that a l l of its agency r e m a i n s te thered to those c o n d i t i o n s

a n d that those c o n d i t i o n s r e m a i n the same i n e v e r y o p e r a t i o n

of agency. A s s u m i n g p o w e r is not a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d task of

t a k i n g p o w e r f r o m one p lace , t r a n s f e r r i n g i t intact , a n d t h e n

a n d there m a k i n g i t one 's o w n ; the act o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n m a y

i n v o l v e a n a l terat ion o f p o w e r s u c h that the p o w e r a s s u m e d

or a p p r o p r i a t e d w o r k s against the p o w e r that m a d e that as­

s u m p t i o n poss ib le . W h e r e c o n d i t i o n s o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n m a k e

p o s s i b l e the a s s u m p t i o n o f p o w e r , the p o w e r a s s u m e d r e m a i n s

t i e d t o those c o n d i t i o n s , b u t i n a n a m b i v a l e n t w a y ; i n fact, the

p o w e r a s s u m e d m a y a t once r e t a i n a n d resist that s u b o r d i n a ­

t i o n . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is not to be t h o u g h t of as (a) a resistance

that is really a r e c u p e r a t i o n of p o w e r or (b) a r e c u p e r a t i o n that

is really a resistance. It is b o t h at once, a n d this a m b i v a l e n c e

f o r m s the b i n d of agency.

A c c o r d i n g to the f o r m u l a t i o n of subject ion as b o t h the s u b ­

o r d i n a t i o n a n d b e c o m i n g o f the subject, p o w e r is , as s u b o r d i ­

n a t i o n , a set of c o n d i t i o n s that precedes the subject, ef fect ing

a n d s u b o r d i n a t i n g the subject f r o m the outs ide . T h i s f o r m u l a ­

t i o n falters, h o w e v e r , w h e n w e c o n s i d e r that there i s n o s u b ­

ject p r i o r to this effect. P o w e r not o n l y acts on a subject b u t ,

in a t r a n s i t i v e sense, enacts the subject i n t o b e i n g . As a c o n d i ­

t i o n , p o w e r precedes the subject. P o w e r loses its a p p e a r a n c e

of p r i o r i t y , h o w e v e r , w h e n i t i s w i e l d e d by the subject, a s i t u a ­

t i o n that g ives r ise to the reverse p e r s p e c t i v e that p o w e r is the

effect of the subject, a n d that p o w e r is w h a t subjects effect. A

c o n d i t i o n does not enable o r enact w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g present .

Because P o w e r is not intact p r i o r to the subject, the appear­

ance of its p r i o r i t y d i s a p p e a r s as p o w e r acts on the subject,

a n d the subject i s i n a u g u r a t e d (and d e r i v e d ) t h r o u g h this tern-

14 Introduction

p o r a l r e v e r s a l i n the h o r i z o n o f p o w e r . A s the agency o f the

subject, p o w e r assumes its present t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n . 5

P o w e r acts on the subject in at least t w o w a y s : first, as w h a t

m a k e s the subject p o s s i b l e , the c o n d i t i o n of its p o s s i b i l i t y a n d

its f o r m a t i v e o c c a s i o n , a n d s e c o n d , as w h a t i s t a k e n up a n d

rei terated in the subject's " o w n " ac t ing . As a subject o f p o w e r

(where "of" connotes b o t h " b e l o n g i n g t o " a n d " w i e l d i n g " ) , the

subject ec l ipses the c o n d i t i o n s of its o w n emergence; i t ecl ipses

p o w e r w i t h p o w e r . T h e c o n d i t i o n s not o n l y m a k e p o s s i b l e the

subject but enter i n t o the subject's f o r m a t i o n . T h e y are m a d e

present in the acts of that f o r m a t i o n a n d in the acts of the sub­

ject that f o l l o w .

T h e n o t i o n o f p o w e r a t w o r k i n subject ion thus appears i n

t w o i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e t e m p o r a l m o d a l i t i e s : first, as w h a t i s

for the subject a l w a y s p r i o r , o u t s i d e of itself, a n d o p e r a t i v e

f r o m the start; s e c o n d , as the w i l l e d effect of the subject. T h i s

second m o d a l i t y carr ies at least t w o sets of m e a n i n g s : as the

w i l l e d effect of the subject, subject ion is a s u b o r d i n a t i o n that

the subject b r i n g s on itself; yet i f subject ion p r o d u c e s a subject

a n d a subject is the p r e c o n d i t i o n of agency, then subject ion

is the a c c o u n t by w h i c h a subject b e c o m e s the g u a r a n t o r of

its res istance a n d o p p o s i t i o n . W h e t h e r p o w e r i s c o n c e i v e d as

p r i o r to the subject or as its i n s t r u m e n t a l effect, the v a c i l l a ­

t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o t e m p o r a l m o d a l i t i e s o f p o w e r ("before"

a n d "after" the subject) has m a r k e d m o s t of the debates on the

subject a n d the p r o b l e m o f agency. M a n y conversat ions o n the

t o p i c have b e c o m e m i r e d i n w h e t h e r the subject i s the c o n d i ­

t i o n or the i m p a s s e o f agency. I n d e e d , b o t h q u a n d a r i e s have

l e d m a n y to c o n s i d e r the issue of the subject as an i n e v i t a b l e

s t u m b l i n g b l o c k in s o c i a l theory. Part of this d i f f i cu l ty , I sug­

gest, is that the subject is i tself a site of this a m b i v a l e n c e in

w h i c h the subject emerges b o t h as the effect of a p r i o r p o w e r

Introduction 15

a n d as the condition of possibility for a r a d i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d

f o r m of agency. A t h e o r y of the subject s h o u l d take i n t o ac­

c o u n t the f u l l a m b i v a l e n c e of the c o n d i t i o n s of its o p e r a t i o n .

T h e r e is, as i t were , no c o n c e p t u a l t r a n s i t i o n to be m a d e be­

t w e e n p o w e r as e x t e r n a l to the subject, "act ing o n , " a n d p o w e r

as c o n s t i t u t i v e of the subject, "acted by." W h a t one m i g h t ex­

pect by w a y of a t r a n s i t i o n is, in fact, a s p l i t t i n g a n d rever­

sal c o n s t i t u t i v e of the subject itself. P o w e r acts on the sub­

ject, an a c t i n g that i s an e n a c t i n g : an i r r e s o l v a b l e a m b i g u i t y

arises w h e n one attempts t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the p o w e r

that ( t rans i t ive ly) enacts the subject, a n d the p o w e r enacted

by the subject, that is, b e t w e e n the p o w e r that f o r m s the sub­

ject a n d the subject 's " o w n " p o w e r . W h a t o r w h o i s d o i n g the

" e n a c t i n g " here? Is it a p o w e r p r i o r to the subject or that of

the subject i tself? At s o m e p o i n t , a r e v e r s a l a n d c o n c e a l m e n t

occurs , a n d p o w e r emerges as w h a t be longs e x c l u s i v e l y to the

subject ( m a k i n g the subject a p p e a r as i f i t b e l o n g e d to no p r i o r

o p e r a t i o n o f p o w e r ) . M o r e o v e r , w h a t i s enacted by the subject

i s e n a b l e d b u t not f i n a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y the p r i o r w o r k i n g o f

p o w e r . A g e n c y exceeds the p o w e r b y w h i c h i t i s enabled . O n e

m i g h t say that the p u r p o s e s o f p o w e r are not a l w a y s the p u r ­

poses of agency. To the extent that the latter d i v e r g e f r o m the

former , agency is the a s s u m p t i o n of a p u r p o s e unintended by

p o w e r , one that c o u l d not have b e e n d e r i v e d l o g i c a l l y o r h i s ­

tor ica l ly , that operates in a r e l a t i o n of c o n t i n g e n c y a n d r e v e r s a l

to the p o w e r that m a k e s i t poss ib le , to w h i c h i t nevertheless

belongs. T h i s is, as i t w e r e , the a m b i v a l e n t scene of agency,

c o n s t r a i n e d b y n o t e l e o l o g i c a l necessity.

P o w e r is b o t h e x t e r n a l to the subject a n d the v e r y v e n u e of

the subject. T h i s a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n m a k e s sense w h e n w e

u n d e r s t a n d that n o subject c o m e s i n t o b e i n g w i t h o u t p o w e r ,

but that its c o m i n g i n t o b e i n g i n v o l v e s the d i s s i m u l a t i o n of

i6 Introduction

p o w e r , a m e t a l e p t i c r e v e r s a l i n w h i c h the subject p r o d u c e d

by p o w e r b e c o m e s h e r a l d e d as the subject w h o founds p o w e r .

T h i s f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m of the subject is an effect of a w o r k i n g

o f p o w e r , a n effect a c h i e v e d b y r e v e r s a l a n d c o n c e a l m e n t o f

that p r i o r w o r k i n g . T h i s does not m e a n that the subject c a n

be reduced to the p o w e r by w h i c h i t i s o c c a s i o n e d , n o r does

i t m e a n that the p o w e r by w h i c h i t is o c c a s i o n e d is reducible

to the subject. P o w e r is never m e r e l y a c o n d i t i o n external or

p r i o r t o the subject, n o r c a n i t b e e x c l u s i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h

the subject. I f c o n d i t i o n s of p o w e r are to pers ist , they m u s t be

re i terated; the subject is p r e c i s e l y the site of s u c h re i terat ion ,

a r e p e t i t i o n that i s never m e r e l y m e c h a n i c a l . As the appear­

ance of p o w e r shifts f r o m the c o n d i t i o n of the subject to its

effects, the c o n d i t i o n s o f p o w e r ( p r i o r a n d external) a s s u m e

a present a n d f u t u r a l f o r m . B u t p o w e r assumes this present

character t h r o u g h a r e v e r s a l of its d i r e c t i o n , one that p e r f o r m s

a break w i t h w h a t has c o m e before a n d d i s s i m u l a t e s as a self-

i n a u g u r a t i n g agency. T h e r e i t e r a t i o n o f p o w e r not o n l y t e m -

p o r a l i z e s the c o n d i t i o n s o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n b u t s h o w s these c o n ­

d i t i o n s to be, not static s t ructures , b u t t e m p o r a l i z e d — a c t i v e

a n d p r o d u c t i v e . T h e t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n p e r f o r m e d b y r e i t e r a t i o n

traces the r o u t e b y w h i c h p o w e r ' s a p p e a r a n c e shifts a n d re­

verses: the p e r s p e c t i v e o f p o w e r alters f r o m w h a t i s a l w a y s

w o r k i n g o n u s f r o m the o u t s i d e a n d f r o m the outset t o w h a t

const i tutes the sense of a g e n c y at w o r k in o u r present acts a n d

the f u t u r a l expanse of the ir effects.

A l t h o u g h this s t u d y i s i n d e b t e d to F o u c a u l t ' s f o r m u l a t i o n

of the p r o b l e m of assujetissement in h is essays " T h e Subject of

P o w e r " a n d the " T w o L e c t u r e s " p u b l i s h e d i n Power/Knowledge,

as w e l l as to h is m a n y d i s c u s s i o n s of the subject o f des ire a n d

the subject of l a w in History of Sexuality, Volumes 1 and 2 a n d

Discipline and Punish? the f o r m u l a t i o n of the subject at issue

Introduction 17

resonates w i t h a larger c u l t u r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l p r e d i c a m e n t ,

n a m e l y , h o w t o take a n o p p o s i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n t o p o w e r that is ,

a d m i t t e d l y , i m p l i c a t e d i n the v e r y p o w e r one opposes . O f t e n

this p o s t l i b e r a t o r y i n s i g h t has l e d to the c o n c l u s i o n that a l l

agency here meets its impasse . E i t h e r f o r m s of c a p i t a l or s y m ­

b o l i c d o m i n a t i o n are h e l d to be s u c h that o u r acts are a l w a y s

a l r e a d y " d o m e s t i c a t e d " in a d v a n c e , or a set o f g e n e r a l i z e d a n d

t imeless ins ights i s of fered i n t o the a p o r e t i c s t r u c t u r e of a l l

m o v e m e n t s t o w a r d a future . I w o u l d suggest that no h i s t o r i ­

c a l o r l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s f o l l o w necessar i ly f r o m this p r i m a r y

c o m p l i c i t y w i t h s u b o r d i n a t i o n , b u t that s o m e p o s s i b i l i t i e s ten­

t a t i v e l y do. T h a t a g e n c y i s i m p l i c a t e d i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s n o t

the s i g n of a fatal s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n at the core of the subject

a n d , hence, further p r o o f o f its p e r n i c i o u s or obsolete char­

acter. B u t ne i ther does i t restore a p r i s t i n e n o t i o n of the sub­

ject, d e r i v e d f r o m s o m e c lass ica l l i b e r a l - h u m a n i s t f o r m u l a t i o n ,

w h o s e agency i s a l w a y s a n d o n l y o p p o s e d t o p o w e r . T h e first

v i e w character izes p o l i t i c a l l y s a n c t i m o n i o u s f o r m s o f fatal­

i s m ; the second, n a i v e f o r m s of p o l i t i c a l o p t i m i s m . I h o p e to

steer c lear of b o t h these a l ternat ives .

T h e subject m i g h t yet be t h o u g h t as d e r i v i n g its agency

f r o m p r e c i s e l y the p o w e r i t opposes , a s a w k w a r d a n d embar­

r a s s i n g as s u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n m i g h t be, e s p e c i a l l y for those

w h o be l ieve that c o m p l i c i t y a n d a m b i v a l e n c e c o u l d b e r o o t e d

out once a n d for a l l . I f the subject is neither f u l l y d e t e r m i n e d by

p o w e r nor f u l l y d e t e r m i n i n g o f p o w e r (but s i g n i f i c a n t l y a n d

p a r t i a l l y both) , the subject exceeds the l o g i c of n o n c o n t r a d i c ­

t i o n , is an excrescence of l o g i c , as i t were . 7 To c l a i m that the

subject exceeds e i ther/or is not to c l a i m that i t l i ves in s o m e

free z o n e o f its o w n m a k i n g . E x c e e d i n g i s not e s c a p i n g , a n d

the subject exceeds p r e c i s e l y that to w h i c h i t is b o u n d . In this

sense, the subject cannot q u e l l the a m b i v a l e n c e by w h i c h i t i s

r 18 Introduction

c o n s t i t u t e d . P a i n f u l , d y n a m i c , a n d p r o m i s i n g , this v a c i l l a t i o n

b e t w e e n the a lready-there a n d the yet - to-come is a crossroads

that rejoins every step by w h i c h i t is t r a v e r s e d , a re i terated

a m b i v a l e n c e at the heart of agency. P o w e r r e a r t i c u l a t e d is "re"-

a r t i c u l a t e d i n the sense o f a l r e a d y d o n e a n d "re"-ar t i cu la ted i n

the sense of done over, d o n e a g a i n , d o n e anew. W h a t r e m a i n

to be c o n s i d e r e d are: (a) h o w the f o r m a t i o n of the subject i n ­

v o l v e s the r e g u l a t o r y f o r m a t i o n o f the p s y c h e , i n c l u d i n g h o w

w e m i g h t re jo in the d i s c o u r s e o f p o w e r w i t h the d i s c o u r s e

o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ; a n d (b) h o w we m i g h t m a k e s u c h a c o n ­

c e p t i o n of the subject w o r k as a n o t i o n of p o l i t i c a l agency in

p o s t l i b e r a t o r y t imes.

Regulations of the Psyche

I f p o w e r w o r k s not m e r e l y to d o m i n a t e or oppress exist­

i n g subjects, b u t also to f o r m subjects, w h a t i s this f o r m a t i o n ?

O b v i o u s l y , p o w e r does not b r i n g p e r s o n s i n t o the w o r l d i n

a n y o r d i n a r y sense. F o u c a u l t l i n k s the f o r m a t i v e o r p r o d u c ­

t ive character o f p o w e r t o r e g u l a t o r y a n d d i s c i p l i n a r y regimes.

In Discipline and Punish, c r i m e p r o d u c e s a class of c r i m i n a l s ,

crafted b o d i l y i n the gesture a n d sty le o f i m p r i s o n m e n t . B u t

h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d this sense o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d craft­

ing? T h e f o r m a t i v e d i m e n s i o n o f p o w e r i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d

in a n o n m e c h a n i s t i c a n d n o n b e h a v i o r i s t i c f a s h i o n . I t does not

a l w a y s p r o d u c e a c c o r d i n g to a p u r p o s e , or rather, its p r o d u c ­

t i o n is s u c h that i t often exceeds or alters the p u r p o s e s for

w h i c h i t p r o d u c e s . 8 F o u c a u l t i s n o t o r i o u s l y t a c i t u r n o n the

t o p i c of the p s y c h e , b u t an a c c o u n t of subject ion, i t seems,

m u s t b e t raced i n the t u r n s o f p s y c h i c l ife. M o r e speci f ical ly , i t

m u s t be t raced in the p e c u l i a r t u r n i n g of a subject against itself

that takes p lace in acts o f se l f - reproach, conscience, a n d m e l -

Introduction 19

a n c h o l i a that w o r k i n t a n d e m w i t h processes o f s o c i a l r e g u l a ­

t i o n . A n d yet, i f w e refuse the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m that pos i ts

the separat ion of the p o l i t i c a l a n d the p s y c h i c , i t seems c r u ­

c i a l to offer a c r i t i c a l a c c o u n t of p s y c h i c subject ion in terms

of the r e g u l a t o r y a n d p r o d u c t i v e effects of p o w e r . I f f o r m s

o f r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r are s u s t a i n e d i n part t h r o u g h the f o r m a ­

t i o n of a subject, a n d i f that f o r m a t i o n takes p l a c e a c c o r d i n g

to the r e q u i r e m e n t s of p o w e r , speci f ica l ly , as the i n c o r p o r a ­

t i o n of n o r m s , t h e n a t h e o r y of subject f o r m a t i o n m u s t g i v e

an a c c o u n t o f this process o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n , a n d the n o t i o n of

i n c o r p o r a t i o n m u s t be i n t e r r o g a t e d to ascer ta in the p s y c h i c

t o p o g r a p h y i t assumes. H o w does the subject ion o f des ire r e ­

q u i r e a n d inst i tute the d e s i r e for subject ion?

I n c l a i m i n g that s o c i a l n o r m s are i n t e r n a l i z e d , w e have not

yet e x p l a i n e d w h a t i n c o r p o r a t i o n or, m o r e general ly , i n t e r n a l ­

i z a t i o n is, w h a t i t means for a n o r m to b e c o m e i n t e r n a l i z e d

o r w h a t h a p p e n s t o the n o r m i n the p r o c e s s o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n .

Is the n o r m first "outside," a n d does i t then enter i n t o a p r e -

g i v e n p s y c h i c space, u n d e r s t o o d as an i n t e r i o r theater o f s o m e

k i n d ? O r does the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f the n o r m c o n t r i b u t e t o

the p r o d u c t i o n o f i n t e r n a l i t y ? D o e s the n o r m , h a v i n g b e c o m e

p s y c h i c , i n v o l v e not o n l y the i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f the n o r m , b u t

the i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n of the p s y c h e ? 9 1 a r g u e that this p r o c e s s of

i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n fabricates the distinction between interior and ex­

terior life, o f fer ing us a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c a n d the

s o c i a l that differs s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m an a c c o u n t of the p s y c h i c

i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f n o r m s . M o r e o v e r , g i v e n that n o r m s are not

i n t e r n a l i z e d i n m e c h a n i c a l o r f u l l y p r e d i c t a b l e w a y s , does the

n o r m a s s u m e another character as a psychic p h e n o m e n o n ? In

p a r t i c u l a r , h o w are w e t o account for the des ire for the n o r m

a n d for subject ion m o r e g e n e r a l l y in t e r m s o f a p r i o r des ire

for s o c i a l existence, a des ire e x p l o i t e d by r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r ?

20 Introduction Introduction 21

W h e r e s o c i a l categories guarantee a r e c o g n i z a b l e a n d e n d u r ­

i n g s o c i a l existence, the e m b r a c e of s u c h categories, e v e n as

they w o r k in the service o f subject ion, i s of ten p r e f e r r e d to no

s o c i a l existence at a l l . H o w is it , then, that the l o n g i n g for sub­

ject ion, b a s e d on a l o n g i n g for s o c i a l existence, r e c a l l i n g a n d

e x p l o i t i n g p r i m a r y d e p e n d e n c i e s , emerges a s a n i n s t r u m e n t

a n d effect of the p o w e r of subjection?

To u n d e r s c o r e the abuses of p o w e r as r e a l , not the c r e a t i o n

or fantasy of the subject, p o w e r is often cast as u n e q u i v o c a l l y

externa l to the subject, s o m e t h i n g i m p o s e d against the sub­

ject's w i l l . B u t i f the v e r y p r o d u c t i o n of the subject a n d the

f o r m a t i o n of that w i l l are the consequences of a p r i m a r y sub­

o r d i n a t i o n , t h e n the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the subject to a p o w e r not

o f its o w n m a k i n g i s u n a v o i d a b l e . T h a t v u l n e r a b i l i t y qual i f ies

the subject as an e x p l o i t a b l e k i n d of b e i n g . I f one is to o p p o s e

the abuses of p o w e r ( w h i c h is not the same as o p p o s i n g p o w e r

i tself) , i t seems w i s e to c o n s i d e r in w h a t o u r v u l n e r a b i l i t y to

that abuse consists. That subjects are c o n s t i t u t e d in p r i m a r y

v u l n e r a b i l i t y does not exonerate the abuses they suffer; on the

contrary , i t m a k e s a l l the m o r e c lear h o w f u n d a m e n t a l the v u l ­

n e r a b i l i t y c a n be.

H o w i s i t that the subject i s the k i n d o f b e i n g w h o c a n b e

e x p l o i t e d , w h o is, b y v i r t u e o f its o w n f o r m a t i o n , v u l n e r a b l e

to subjugat ion? B o u n d to seek r e c o g n i t i o n of its o w n existence

i n categories, terms, a n d n a m e s that are not o f its o w n m a k i n g ,

the subject seeks the s i g n of its o w n existence o u t s i d e itself,

in a d i s c o u r s e that is at once d o m i n a n t a n d indi f ferent . S o c i a l

categories s i g n i f y s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d existence at once. In other

w o r d s , w i t h i n subject ion the p r i c e o f existence i s s u b o r d i n a ­

t i o n . P r e c i s e l y a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h c h o i c e i s i m p o s s i b l e ,

the subject p u r s u e s s u b o r d i n a t i o n as the p r o m i s e of existence.

T h i s p u r s u i t is not choice , b u t ne i ther is i t necessity. Subjec­

t i o n e x p l o i t s the des ire for existence, w h e r e existence i s a l w a y s

conferred f r o m elsewhere; i t m a r k s a p r i m a r y v u l n e r a b i l i t y to

the O t h e r in o r d e r to be.

A s s u m i n g t e r m s o f p o w e r that one n e v e r m a d e b u t t o w h i c h

one i s v u l n e r a b l e , o n w h i c h one d e p e n d s i n o r d e r t o be, a p ­

pears to be a m u n d a n e subject ion at the basis of subject for­

m a t i o n . " A s s u m i n g " p o w e r i s n o s i m p l e process , h o w e v e r , for

p o w e r i s not m e c h a n i c a l l y r e p r o d u c e d w h e n i t i s a s s u m e d .

Instead, o n b e i n g a s s u m e d , p o w e r r u n s the r i s k o f a s s u m i n g

another f o r m a n d d i r e c t i o n . I f c o n d i t i o n s o f p o w e r d o not u n i ­

latera l ly p r o d u c e subjects, then w h a t i s the t e m p o r a l a n d l o g i ­

ca l f o r m that the a s s u m p t i o n of p o w e r takes? A r e d e s c r i p t i o n

of the d o m a i n of p s y c h i c subject ion is n e e d e d to m a k e clear

h o w s o c i a l p o w e r p r o d u c e s m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v i t y a t the same

t i m e as i t l i m i t s f o r m s of socia l i ty . In other w o r d s , to the ex­

tent that n o r m s operate a s p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a , r e s t r i c t i n g a n d

p r o d u c i n g desire, they also g o v e r n the f o r m a t i o n of the subject

a n d c i r c u m s c r i b e the d o m a i n of a l i v a b l e soc ia l i ty . T h e p s y c h i c

o p e r a t i o n of the n o r m offers a m o r e i n s i d i o u s r o u t e for r e g u ­

l a t o r y p o w e r t h a n e x p l i c i t c o e r c i o n , one w h o s e success a l l o w s

its tacit o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n the s o c i a l . A n d yet, b e i n g p s y c h i c ,

the n o r m does not m e r e l y reinstate s o c i a l p o w e r , i t b e c o m e s

f o r m a t i v e a n d v u l n e r a b l e i n h i g h l y speci f ic w a y s . T h e s o c i a l

categor izat ions that establ ish the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the subject to

language are themselves v u l n e r a b l e t o b o t h p s y c h i c a n d h i s ­

t o r i c a l change. T h i s v i e w counters an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a p s y ­

c h i c o r l i n g u i s t i c n o r m a t i v i t y (as i n s o m e v e r s i o n s o f the S y m ­

bol ic) that is p r i o r to the s o c i a l or sets constra ints on the s o c i a l .

Just as the subject is d e r i v e d f r o m c o n d i t i o n s of p o w e r that p r e ­

cede it , so the p s y c h i c o p e r a t i o n of the n o r m is d e r i v e d , t h o u g h

not m e c h a n i c a l l y o r p r e d i c t a b l y , f r o m p r i o r s o c i a l operat ions .

P s y c h i c subject ion m a r k s a speci f ic m o d a l i t y of subject ion.

22 Introduction

It does not s i m p l y reflect or represent b r o a d e r re lat ions of

s o c i a l p o w e r — e v e n a s i t r e m a i n s i m p o r t a n t l y t i e d t o t h e m .

F r e u d a n d N i e t z s c h e offer d i f f e r i n g accounts o f subject f o r m a ­

t i o n that r e l y o n the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f the n o r m . B o t h a c c o u n t

for the f a b r i c a t i o n of consc ience as the effect of an i n t e r n a l i z e d

p r o h i b i t i o n (thereby es tab l i sh ing " p r o h i b i t i o n " a s n o t o n l y p r i ­

vat ive , b u t p r o d u c t i v e ) . I n F r e u d a n d N i e t z s c h e , a p r o h i b i t i o n

o n a c t i o n o r e x p r e s s i o n i s s a i d t o t u r n "the d r i v e " 1 0 b a c k o n

itself, f a b r i c a t i n g an i n t e r n a l sphere, the c o n d i t i o n for self-

i n s p e c t i o n a n d ref lex iv i ty . T h e d r i v e t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself

b e c o m e s the p r e c i p i t a t i n g c o n d i t i o n of subject f o r m a t i o n , a

p r i m a r y l o n g i n g i n r e c o i l that i s t r a c e d i n H e g e l ' s v i e w o f the

u n h a p p y consc iousness a s w e l l . W h e t h e r the d o u b l i n g b a c k

u p o n itself i s p e r f o r m e d b y p r i m a r y l o n g i n g s , desire , o r dr ives ,

i t p r o d u c e s in each instance a p s y c h i c habi t of self-beratement,

one that is c o n s o l i d a t e d over t i m e as conscience.

C o n s c i e n c e is the m e a n s by w h i c h a subject b e c o m e s an

object for itself, re f lect ing on itself, e s t a b l i s h i n g itself as r e ­

f lective a n d reflexive. T h e "I" i s n o t s i m p l y one w h o t h i n k s

about h i m - or herself; i t i s d e f i n e d by this c a p a c i t y for r e ­

f lective se l f -re lat ion or ref lexiv i ty . F o r N i e t z s c h e , r e f l e x i v i t y i s

a consequence of conscience; s e l f - k n o w i n g f o l l o w s f r o m self-

p u n i s h m e n t . (Thus one never " k n o w s " oneself p r i o r to the r e ­

c o i l o f des ire in quest ion.) In o r d e r to c u r b desire , one m a k e s

of oneself an object for ref lect ion; in the course of p r o d u c ­

i n g one's o w n alteri ty , one b e c o m e s es tabl i shed as a ref lexive

b e i n g , one w h o can take oneself as an object. R e f l e x i v i t y be­

c o m e s the m e a n s b y w h i c h des ire i s r e g u l a r l y t r a n s m u t e d i n t o

the c i r c u i t of sel f-ref lect ion. T h e d o u b l i n g b a c k of des ire that

c u l m i n a t e s i n r e f l e x i v i t y p r o d u c e s , h o w e v e r , another o r d e r o f

des ire: the desire for that v e r y c i r c u i t , for r e f l e x i v i t y a n d , u l t i ­

mately , for subject ion.

Introduction 23

W h a t i s the m e a n s b y w h i c h des ire i s u n d e r s t o o d t o b e

c u r b e d , d o u b l e d b a c k , o r even p r o h i b i t e d ? Ref lect ion o n desire

absorbs des ire i n t o ref lect ion: w e w i l l see h o w this w o r k s i n

H e g e l . B u t there i s another o r d e r o f p r o h i b i t i o n , one w h i c h

falls o u t s i d e the c i r c u i t o f sel f-ref lect ion. F r e u d d i s t i n g u i s h e s

b e t w e e n r e p r e s s i o n a n d forec losure , suggest ing that a re­

pressed desire m i g h t once h a v e l i v e d apart f r o m its p r o h i b i ­

t i o n , b u t that forec losed desire i s r i g o r o u s l y b a r r e d , c o n s t i ­

t u t i n g the subject t h r o u g h a c e r t a i n k i n d of p r e e m p t i v e loss.

E l s e w h e r e I have suggested that the forec losure of h o m o ­

s e x u a l i t y appears to be f o u n d a t i o n a l to a c e r t a i n h e t e r o s e x u a l

v e r s i o n o f the subject. 1 1 T h e f o r m u l a " I h a v e never l o v e d "

s o m e o n e o f s i m i l a r g e n d e r a n d " I h a v e never l o s t " a n y s u c h

p e r s o n predicates the " I " o n the " n e v e r - n e v e r " o f that l o v e a n d

loss. I n d e e d , the o n t o l o g i c a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of heterosexual

" b e i n g " i s t r a c e d t o this d o u b l e n e g a t i o n , w h i c h f o r m s its c o n ­

s t i tut ive m e l a n c h o l i a , a n e m p h a t i c a n d i r r e v e r s i b l e loss that

f o r m s the t e n u o u s basis of that " b e i n g . "

S igni f icant ly , F r e u d ident i f ies h e i g h t e n e d consc ience a n d

self-beratement as one s i g n of m e l a n c h o l i a , the c o n d i t i o n of

u n c o m p l e t e d grief. T h e forec losure o f c e r t a i n f o r m s o f l o v e

suggests that the m e l a n c h o l i a that g r o u n d s the subject (and

hence a l w a y s threatens to unsett le a n d d i s r u p t that g r o u n d )

s ignals a n i n c o m p l e t e a n d i r r e s o l v a b l e grief. U n o w n e d a n d i n ­

complete , m e l a n c h o l i a is the l i m i t to the subject's sense of pou­

voir, its sense of w h a t i t c a n a c c o m p l i s h a n d , in that sense, its

p o w e r . M e l a n c h o l i a rifts the subject, m a r k i n g a l i m i t to w h a t i t

can a c c o m m o d a t e . Because the subject does not , cannot , reflect

on that loss, that loss m a r k s the l i m i t o f re f lex iv i ty , that w h i c h

exceeds (and condi t ions ) its c i r c u i t r y . U n d e r s t o o d as f o r e c l o ­

sure, that loss i n a u g u r a t e s the subject a n d threatens i t w i t h

d i s s o l u t i o n .

24 Introduction

C o n s i d e r e d a l o n g N i e t z s c h e a n a n d H e g e l i a n l ines , the s u b ­

ject engages i n its o w n s e l f - t h w a r t i n g , a c c o m p l i s h e s its o w n

subject ion, desires a n d crafts its o w n shackles , a n d s o t u r n s

against a desire that i t k n o w s to b e — o r k n e w to b e — i t s o w n .

F o r a loss to p r e d a t e the subject, to m a k e i t p o s s i b l e (and i m ­

poss ib le) , we m u s t c o n s i d e r the p a r t that loss p l a y s in subject

f o r m a t i o n . Is there a loss that cannot be t h o u g h t , cannot be

o w n e d o r g r i e v e d , w h i c h f o r m s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y for

the subject? Is this w h a t H e g e l c a l l e d "the loss of the loss," a

forec losure that const i tutes a n u n k n o w a b i l i t y w i t h o u t w h i c h

the subject cannot e n d u r e , a n i g n o r a n c e a n d m e l a n c h o l i a that

m a k e s p o s s i b l e a l l c l a i m s of k n o w l e d g e as one's o w n ? Is there

n o t a l o n g i n g to g r i e v e — a n d , e q u i v a l e n t l y , an i n a b i l i t y to

g r i e v e — t h a t w h i c h one n e v e r w a s able to love , a l o v e that fal ls

short of the " c o n d i t i o n s of existence"? T h i s is a loss n o t m e r e l y

of the object or s o m e set of objects, b u t of love ' s o w n p o s s i ­

b i l i t y : the loss of the a b i l i t y to love, the u n f i n i s h a b l e g r i e v i n g

for that w h i c h f o u n d s the subject. O n the one h a n d , m e l a n c h o ­

l i a is an at tachment that subst i tutes for an at tachment that is

b r o k e n , gone, o r i m p o s s i b l e ; o n the other h a n d , m e l a n c h o l i a

c o n t i n u e s the t r a d i t i o n of i m p o s s i b i l i t y , as i t were , that be longs

to the at tachment for w h i c h i t substi tutes.

T h e r e are, o f course , v a r i o u s w a y s of r e f u s i n g to l o v e , n o t

a l l o f w h i c h q u a l i f y a s forec losure . B u t w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n

a c e r t a i n forec losure of l o v e b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i ­

b i l i t y for s o c i a l existence? D o e s this not p r o d u c e a s o c i a l i t y

aff l icted b y m e l a n c h o l i a , a s o c i a l i t y i n w h i c h loss cannot b e

g r i e v e d because i t cannot be r e c o g n i z e d as loss, because w h a t

is lost never h a d a n y e n t i t l e m e n t to existence?

H e r e one m i g h t w e l l d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n (a) a n attach­

m e n t that is s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s a v o w e d a n d (b) a forec losure that

s t ructures the f o r m s that a n y at tachment m a y assume. In the

Introduction 25

latter case, the f o r e c l o s u r e m i g h t b e u s e f u l l y r e l i n k e d w i t h the

F o u c a u l d i a n n o t i o n o f a r e g u l a t o r y i d e a l , a n i d e a l a c c o r d i n g

t o w h i c h c e r t a i n f o r m s o f l o v e b e c o m e p o s s i b l e a n d others,

i m p o s s i b l e . W i t h i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , w e t h i n k o f s o c i a l s a n c t i o n

a s e n c o d e d i n the e g o - i d e a l a n d p a t r o l l e d b y the super-ego.

B u t w h a t m i g h t i t m e a n t o t h i n k o f s o c i a l s a n c t i o n a s w o r k i n g ,

t h r o u g h forec losure , t o p r o d u c e the p o s s i b l e d o m a i n i n w h i c h

l o v e a n d loss c a n operate? A s forec losure , the s a n c t i o n w o r k s

not t o p r o h i b i t e x i s t i n g des ire b u t t o p r o d u c e c e r t a i n k i n d s o f

objects a n d to.bar others f r o m the f i e l d o f s o c i a l p r o d u c t i o n . In

this way , the s a n c t i o n does not w o r k a c c o r d i n g to the repres­

sive h y p o t h e s i s , a s p o s t u l a t e d a n d c r i t i c i z e d b y F o u c a u l t , b u t

as a m e c h a n i s m of p r o d u c t i o n , one that c a n operate, h o w e v e r ,

o n the basis o f a n o r i g i n a r y v i o l e n c e . 1 2

I n the w o r k o f M e l a n i e K l e i n , g u i l t appears t o emerge, not

i n consequence o f i n t e r n a l i z i n g a n external p r o h i b i t i o n , b u t a s

a w a y of p r e s e r v i n g the object o f l o v e f r o m one's o w n p o t e n ­

t i a l l y o b l i t e r a t i n g v i o l e n c e . G u i l t serves the f u n c t i o n o f p r e ­

s e r v i n g the object of l o v e a n d , hence, of p r e s e r v i n g l o v e itself.

W h a t m i g h t i t m e a n t o u n d e r s t a n d g u i l t , t h e n , a s a w a y i n

w h i c h l o v e preserves the object i t m i g h t o t h e r w i s e d e s t r o y ?

As a s t o p g a p against a sadist ic d e s t r u c t i o n , g u i l t s ignals less

the p s y c h i c presence o f a n o r i g i n a l l y s o c i a l a n d e x t e r n a l n o r m

t h a n a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g des ire to c o n t i n u e the object one w i s h e s

dead . I t is in this sense that g u i l t emerges in the course of

m e l a n c h o l i a not only , a s the F r e u d i a n v i e w w o u l d have i t , t o

k e e p the d e a d object a l ive , b u t to k e e p the l i v i n g object f r o m

"death," w h e r e d e a t h m e a n s the d e a t h of love , i n c l u d i n g the

occasions o f s e p a r a t i o n a n d loss.

D o e s the K l e i n i a n v i e w suggest, t h e n , that the f u n c t i o n o f

l o v e c a n b e f u l l y e x p l a i n e d w i t h i n a p s y c h i c e c o n o m y that

carries n o s o c i a l l y s igni f icant res idue? O r i s the s o c i a l s i g n i f i -

26 Introduction Introduction 27

cance of g u i l t to be t r a c e d in a register other t h a n that of p r o ­

h i b i t i o n , in the desire for r e p a r a t i o n ? In o r d e r to preserve the

object f r o m one's o w n aggress ion, a n aggress ion that a l w a y s

a c c o m p a n i e s l o v e (as confl ict) , g u i l t enters the p s y c h i c scene

as a necessity. If the object goes, so goes a source of love . In

one sense, g u i l t w o r k s to t h w a r t the aggressive e x p r e s s i o n of

l o v e that m i g h t do in the l o v e d object, an object u n d e r s t o o d to

be a source of love ; in a c o u n t e r sense, h o w e v e r , g u i l t w o r k s

to preserve the object as an object of l o v e (its i d e a l i z a t i o n ) a n d

hence (via idea l i za t ion) to preserve the p o s s i b i l i t y of l o v i n g

a n d b e i n g l o v e d . A g g r e s s i o n — o r h a t e — i s not m e r e l y m i t i ­

gated, but r e r o u t e d against the one w h o loves, o p e r a t i n g as

the self-beratements of the s u p e r - e g o . 1 3 Because l o v e a n d ag­

gress ion w o r k together, the m i t i g a t i o n o f aggress ion t h r o u g h

g u i l t i s also the m i t i g a t i o n of love . G u i l t w o r k s , then, b o t h to

foreclose a n d to c o n t i n u e love, or rather, to c o n t i n u e l o v e (less

passionately, to be sure) as the effect of a forec losure .

K l e i n ' s scheme raises a n u m b e r of quest ions r e l a t i n g to the

r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n l o v e a n d aggress ion. W h y m i g h t one w a n t

d e a d the object of love? Is this a p r i m a r y s a d i s m that m i g h t be

e x p l a i n e d by recourse to a p r i m a r y d e a t h d r i v e , or are there

other w a y s to account for the des ire to v a n q u i s h w h a t one

loves? F o l l o w i n g F r e u d , K l e i n situates s.uch a des ire to v a n ­

q u i s h w i t h i n the p r o b l e m a t i c o f m e l a n c h o l i a , thus m a k i n g the

p o i n t that the desire to v a n q u i s h character izes a r e l a t i o n to an

object a l r e a d y lost: a l r e a d y lost a n d thus e l ig ib le for a c e r t a i n

k i n d o f v a n q u i s h i n g .

K l e i n l i n k s g u i l t t o w a r d the object w i t h the desire t o t r i ­

u m p h o v e r the object, a sense of t r i u m p h w h i c h , i f p u r s u e d too

far, threatens to d e s t r o y the object as a s o u r c e of love. Yet one

m i g h t c o n s i d e r that c e r t a i n f o r m s of l o v e e n t a i l the loss of the

object not o n l y because of an innate des ire to t r i u m p h , but be­

cause s u c h objects fa i l to q u a l i f y as objects of l o v e : as objects

of l o v e they a s s u m e a m a r k of d e s t r u c t i o n . Indeed, they m a y

threaten one's o w n d e s t r u c t i o n a s w e l l : " I w i l l b e d e s t r o y e d i f

I love in that way." M a r k e d for "death," the object is, as i t w e r e ,

a l r e a d y lost, a n d the desire to v a n q u i s h the object is p r e c i s e l y

the desire t o v a n q u i s h a n object w h i c h , i f l o v e d , w o u l d s p e l l

d e s t r u c t i o n for the one w h o loves.

C a n w e r e a d the w o r k i n g s o f s o c i a l p o w e r p r e c i s e l y i n the

d e l i m i t a t i o n of the f i e l d of s u c h objects, objects m a r k e d for

death? A n d is this part o f the i r rea l i ty , the m e l a n c h o l i c aggres­

s ion a n d the desire to v a n q u i s h , that character izes the p u b l i c

response to the d e a t h of m a n y of those c o n s i d e r e d " s o c i a l l y

dead," w h o d i e f r o m A I D S ? G a y p e o p l e , prost i tutes , d r u g

users, a m o n g others? I f they are d y i n g or a l r e a d y d e a d , let us

v a n q u i s h t h e m again. A n d c a n the sense o f " t r i u m p h " b e w o n

p r e c i s e l y t h r o u g h a p r a c t i c e o f s o c i a l d i f f eren t ia t ion i n w h i c h

one achieves a n d m a i n t a i n s "socia l ex is tence" o n l y b y the p r o ­

d u c t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e o f those s o c i a l l y dead? M i g h t one

not also r e a d the p a r a n o i a that s t ructures p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e on

s u c h issues as the i n v e r s i o n of that aggress ion: the des ire to

v a n q u i s h the d e a d other that, t h r o u g h a reversa l , comes to

m a r k that other as the threat of death , cast ing the other as the

( u n l i k e l y ) p e r s e c u t o r o f the s o c i a l l y n o r m a l a n d n o r m a l i z e d ?

W h a t is i t , t h e n , that is d e s i r e d in subjection? Is i t a s i m p l e

l o v e of the shackles , or is there a m o r e c o m p l e x scenar io at

w o r k ? H o w i s s u r v i v a l t o b e m a i n t a i n e d i f the terms b y w h i c h

existence i s g u a r a n t e e d are p r e c i s e l y those that d e m a n d a n d

inst i tute s u b o r d i n a t i o n ? O n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g , subject ion i s

the p a r a d o x i c a l effect o f a r e g i m e of p o w e r in w h i c h the v e r y

"condi t ions of existence," the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g as a

r e c o g n i z a b l e s o c i a l b e i n g , requires the f o r m a t i o n a n d m a i n t e ­

nance of the subject in s u b o r d i n a t i o n . I f one accepts S p i n o z a ' s

28 Introduction

n o t i o n that des ire i s a l w a y s the desire t o pers is t i n one's o w n

b e i n g , 1 4 a n d recasts the metaphysical substance that f o r m s the

i d e a l for desire as a m o r e p l i a b l e n o t i o n of s o c i a l b e i n g , one

m i g h t t h e n be p r e p a r e d to redescr ibe the desire to pers is t

i n one's o w n b e i n g a s s o m e t h i n g that c a n b e b r o k e r e d o n l y

w i t h i n the r i s k y t e r m s o f s o c i a l life. T h e r i s k o f death i s thus co­

extensive w i t h the i n s u r m o u n t a b i l i t y of the soc ia l . I f the terms

b y w h i c h "existence" i s f o r m u l a t e d , s u s t a i n e d , a n d w i t h d r a w n

are the act ive a n d p r o d u c t i v e v o c a b u l a r y o f p o w e r , t h e n to

pers is t i n one's b e i n g m e a n s t o b e g i v e n o v e r f r o m the start

to s o c i a l t e r m s that are never f u l l y one's o w n . T h e des ire to

pers is t i n one's o w n b e i n g r e q u i r e s s u b m i t t i n g t o a w o r l d o f

others that i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y not one's o w n (a s u b m i s s i o n that

does not take p lace at a later date, b ut w h i c h frames a n d m a k e s

p o s s i b l e the desire t o be). O n l y b y p e r s i s t i n g i n a l t e r i t y does

one pers is t i n one's " o w n " b e i n g . V u l n e r a b l e t o terms that one

never m a d e , one pers ists a l w a y s , to s o m e degree, t h r o u g h cate­

gories, names , terms, a n d c lassi f icat ions that m a r k a p r i m a r y

a n d i n a u g u r a t i v e a l i e n a t i o n i n soc ia l i ty . I f s u c h terms i n s t i t u t e

a p r i m a r y s u b o r d i n a t i o n or, i n d e e d , a p r i m a r y v i o l e n c e , t h e n

a subject emerges against itself in order , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , to be

for itself.

W h a t w o u l d i t m e a n for the subject t o desire s o m e t h i n g

other t h a n its c o n t i n u e d "soc ia l existence"? I f s u c h an existence

cannot b e u n d o n e w i t h o u t f a l l i n g i n t o s o m e k i n d o f death, c a n

existence nevertheless b e r i s k e d , d e a t h c o u r t e d o r p u r s u e d , i n

o r d e r t o expose a n d o p e n t o t r a n s f o r m a t i o n the h o l d o f s o c i a l

p o w e r on the c o n d i t i o n s of l i fe 's pers istence? T h e subject i s

c o m p e l l e d t o repeat the n o r m s b y w h i c h i t i s p r o d u c e d , b u t

that r e p e t i t i o n establishes a d o m a i n of r i s k , for i f one fails to

reinstate the n o r m " i n the r i g h t way," one b e c o m e s subject to

further s a n c t i o n , one feels the p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s of exis-

Introduction 29

tence threatened. A n d yet, w i t h o u t a r e p e t i t i o n that r i s k s l i f e —

i n its c u r r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n — h o w m i g h t w e b e g i n t o i m a g i n e

the c o n t i n g e n c y o f that o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e l y re­

conf igure the c o n t o u r s of the c o n d i t i o n s of l ife?

A c r i t i c a l analys is of subject ion i n v o l v e s : (1) an account of

the w a y r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r m a i n t a i n s subjects i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n

b y p r o d u c i n g a n d e x p l o i t i n g the d e m a n d for c o n t i n u i t y , v i s i ­

b i l i t y , a n d place; (2) r e c o g n i t i o n that the subject p r o d u c e d as

c o n t i n u o u s , v i s i b l e , a n d lo c a t ed i s nevertheless h a u n t e d b y a n

i n a s s i m i l a b l e r e m a i n d e r , a m e l a n c h o l i a that m a r k s the l i m i t s

of subject ivat ion; (3) an account of the i t e r a b i l i t y of the s u b ­

ject that s h o w s h o w agency m a y w e l l consist i n o p p o s i n g a n d

t r a n s f o r m i n g the s o c i a l terms b y w h i c h i t i s s p a w n e d .

A l t h o u g h s u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n c a n h a r d l y be the basis for an

o p t i m i s t i c v i e w of the subject or of a subject-centered p o l i t i c s ,

it m a y s t a n d as a p r o v o c a t i o n a n d as a c a u t i o n against t w o

f o r m s o f theoret ica l des ire: one i n w h i c h a s s u m i n g a n d stat­

i n g a "subject -pos i t ion" is the c o n s u m m a t e m o m e n t of p o l i t i c s ;

a n d another in w h i c h the d i s m i s s a l of the subject as a p h i l o ­

s o p h i c a l t r o p e u n d e r e s t i m a t e s the l i n g u i s t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s for

e n t e r i n g s o c i a l i t y at a l l . As m u c h as a p e r s p e c t i v e on the sub­

ject r e q u i r e s an e v a c u a t i o n of the first p e r s o n , a s u s p e n s i o n of

the "I" in the interests of an analys is of subject f o r m a t i o n , so

a r e a s s u m p t i o n of that f i rs t -person p e r s p e c t i v e is c o m p e l l e d

by the q u e s t i o n of agency. T h e analys is of subject ion is a l w a y s

double , t r a c i n g the c o n d i t i o n s o f subject f o r m a t i o n a n d trac­

i n g the t u r n against those c o n d i t i o n s for the s u b j e c t — a n d its

p e r s p e c t i v e — t o emerge.

A c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of subject f o r m a t i o n m a y w e l l offer a

better c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f the d o u b l e b i n d s t o w h i c h o u r e m a n ­

c i p a t o r y efforts o c c a s i o n a l l y l e a d w i t h o u t , i n consequence,

e v a c u a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l . Is there a w a y to a f f i r m c o m p l i c i t y

30 Introduction

as the basis of p o l i t i c a l agency, yet ins is t that p o l i t i c a l agency

m a y d o m o r e t h a n reiterate the c o n d i t i o n s o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n ?

If, as A l t h u s s e r i m p l i e s , b e c o m i n g a subject r e q u i r e s a k i n d

o f m a s t e r y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m s u b m i s s i o n , are there per­

h a p s p o l i t i c a l a n d p s y c h i c consequences t o b e w r o u g h t f r o m

s u c h a f o u n d i n g a m b i v a l e n c e ? T h e t e m p o r a l p a r a d o x of the

subject is s u c h that, of necessity, we m u s t lose the p e r s p e c t i v e

o f a subject a l r e a d y f o r m e d in o r d e r to account for o u r o w n

b e c o m i n g . That " b e c o m i n g " i s n o s i m p l e o r c o n t i n u o u s affair,

b u t a n u n e a s y p r a c t i c e o f r e p e t i t i o n a n d its r i s k s , c o m p e l l e d

yet i n c o m p l e t e , w a v e r i n g o n the h o r i z o n o f s o c i a l b e i n g .

Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection Rereading Hegel on the

Unhappy Consciousness

a f r e e d o m s t i l l e n m e s h e d i n s e r v i t u d e

— H e g e l , The Phenomenology of Spirit

The t r a n s i t i o n in The Phenomenology of Spirit f r o m the sec­

t i o n " L o r d s h i p a n d B o n d a g e " t o " T h e F r e e d o m o f Self-

C o n s c i o u s n e s s : S t o i c i s m , S k e p t i c i s m , a n d the U n h a p p y C o n ­

sc iousness" 1 is one of the least i n t e r r o g a t e d of H e g e l ' s p h i l o ­

s o p h i c a l m o v e m e n t s . P e r h a p s because the chapter o n l o r d s h i p

a n d b o n d a g e s e c u r e d a l i b e r a t i o n i s t n a r r a t i v e for v a r i o u s p r o ­

gressive p o l i t i c a l v i s i o n s , m o s t readers have neg lec ted to p a y

at tent ion to the r e s o l u t i o n of f r e e d o m i n t o se l f -enslavement at

the e n d of the chapter. Insofar as recent t h e o r y has c a l l e d i n t o

q u e s t i o n b o t h the a s s u m p t i o n of a p r o g r e s s i v e h i s t o r y a n d the

status of the subject, the d y s t o p i c r e s o l u t i o n of " L o r d s h i p a n d

B o n d a g e " has p e r h a p s r e g a i n e d a t i m e l y s igni f icance.

F o u c a u l t suggested that the p o i n t o f m o d e r n p o l i t i c s i s n o

r 32 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

longer to l iberate a subject, b ut rather to interrogate the r e g u l a ­

t o r y m e c h a n i s m s t h r o u g h w h i c h "subjects" are p r o d u c e d a n d

m a i n t a i n e d . A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t ' s v o c a b u l a r y o u g h t not t o b e

conf lated w i t h H e g e l ' s , h is c o n c e r n w i t h the d o u b l e - e d g e d i m ­

p l i c a t i o n s of subject ion (assujetissement: the s i m u l t a n e o u s form­

ing a n d regulating of the subject) is in s o m e w a y s p r e f i g u r e d

i n H e g e l ' s account o f the b o n d s m a n ' s l i b e r a t i o n i n t o v a r i o u s

f o r m s of e th ica l self-beratement. In Discipline and Punish, F o u ­

cault l i m i t s the efficacy o f p r i s o n r e f o r m : "the m a n d e s c r i b e d

for us, w h o m we are i n v i t e d to free, i s a l r e a d y in h i m s e l f the

effect of a subject ion [assujettissement] m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d

t h a n h i m s e l f . " 2 T h e b o n d s m a n i n H e g e l t h r o w s off the appar­

e n t l y external " L o r d " o n l y t o f i n d h i m s e l f i n a n e th ica l w o r l d ,

subjected t o v a r i o u s n o r m s a n d ideals . O r , t o p u t i t m o r e

precise ly , the subject emerges as an u n h a p p y consciousness

t h r o u g h the ref lexive a p p l i c a t i o n of these e thica l laws .

T h e p e r m u t a t i o n s o f se l f -enslavement that H e g e l descr ibes

appear to take the b o d y as w h a t m u s t be negated, m o r t i f i e d , or

s u b o r d i n a t e d to an ethica l d e m a n d . T h e " t e r r o r " that seizes the

b o n d s m a n w i t h h is r e c o g n i t i o n o f f r e e d o m appears t o c u l m i ­

nate i n the s i m u l t a n e o u s fabr icat ion o f e th ica l n o r m s a n d the

beratement o f the b o d i l y c o n d i t i o n of h i s o w n life. In this sense,

" T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " establishes a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n

sel f -enslavement as b o d i l y subject ion a n d the f o r m u l a t i o n of

s e l f - i m p o s e d ethica l i m p e r a t i v e s that pref igures N i e t z s c h e ' s

c r i t i q u e of the same in On the Genealogy of Morals a n d F o u ­

caul t ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of that c r i t i q u e . In the f o l l o w i n g c i t a t i o n

f r o m N i e t z s c h e ' s Genealogy of Morals, one can d i s c e r n a t e m p o ­

r a r y convergence b e t w e e n the f igures o f se l f -enslavement i n

H e g e l ' s " U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " a n d the m o r a l i z e d " m a n "

of consc ience in N i e t z s c h e : " T h i s instinct for freedom f o r c i b l y

m a d e l a t e n t . . . this i n s t i n c t for f r e e d o m p u s h e d b a c k a n d re-

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 33

pressed, incarcerated w i t h i n a n d f i n a l l y able t o d i s c h a r g e a n d

vent itself o n l y on itself: that, a n d that a lone, is w h a t the bad

conscience is in its b e g i n n i n g s . " 3

U n d e r s c o r i n g the p a i n f u l r e a l i z a t i o n that " l i b e r a t i o n " f r o m

external a u t h o r i t i e s does not suffice to in i t ia te a subject i n t o

f r e e d o m , F o u c a u l t d r a w s u p o n N i e t z s c h e a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r ,

u p o n the se l f - incarcerat ing m o v e m e n t that s t ructures m o d e r n

forms of re f lex iv i ty . T h e l i m i t s to l i b e r a t i o n are to be u n d e r ­

s t o o d not m e r e l y as s e l f - i m p o s e d b u t , m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y ,

as the p r e c o n d i t i o n of the subject's v e r y f o r m a t i o n . A c e r t a i n

s t r u c t u r i n g at tachment to subject ion b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n

o f m o r a l subject ivat ion. C o n s i d e r the e x p a n d e d text o f F o u ­

caul t ' s r e m a r k s o n the p r i s o n e r ' s subject ion, p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d ,

in Discipline and Punish: " T h e m a n d e s c r i b e d for us, w h o m we

are i n v i t e d to free, is a l r e a d y in h i m s e l f the effect of a sub­

ject ion [assujettissement] m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d t h a n h imsel f . A

' s o u l ' i n h a b i t s h i m a n d b r i n g s h i m t o existence, w h i c h i s i tself

a factor in the m a s t e r y that p o w e r exercises over the b o d y . T h e

s o u l is the effect a n d i n s t r u m e n t of a p o l i t i c a l a n a t o m y ; the

s o u l i s the p r i s o n of the b o d y . " 4

H o w p r e c i s e l y are w e t o r e a d this " i n h a b i t i n g " o f the b o d y

by the soul? C a n a r e t u r n to H e g e l h e l p us to r e a d it? W h a t are

the p o i n t s o f convergence a n d d i v e r g e n c e i n H e g e l , N i e t z s c h e ,

a n d F o u c a u l t o n the s t r u c t u r e o f subjection? H e g e l ' s account i n

" T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " pref igures a c r i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e

on ethica l p o s i t i o n s that not o n l y seek to i n s t i t u t e the d e n i a l or

sacrif ice o f b o d i l y l i fe, b u t that f a l l i n t o i n s t r u c t i v e p a r a d o x e s

w h e n they do. H e g e l s h o w s that i f the s u p p r e s s i o n o f the b o d y

r e q u i r e s a n i n s t r u m e n t a l m o v e m e n t o f a n d b y the b o d y , t h e n

the b o d y i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y preserved in a n d by the i n s t r u m e n t o f

its s u p p r e s s i o n . T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n pref igures the p o s s i b i l i t y o f

a convergence w i t h N i e t z s c h e a n , F o u c a u l t i a n , a n d , as we s h a l l

34 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 35

see, F r e u d i a n p e r s p e c t i v e s o n self-abasement, w h i c h H e g e l ' s

text, in the t r a n s i t i o n to S p i r i t , forecloses. T h e r e a d i n g that f o l ­

l o w s p u r s u e s the p a t h that H e g e l i n t r o d u c e s o n l y t o foreclose.

A r r e s t i n g the text p r i o r t o its r e s o l u t i o n i n t o S p i r i t , this i n q u i r y

seeks to k n o w w h e t h e r a s u p p r e s s e d l i n k w i t h a N i e t z s c h e a n

a n d F r e u d i a n account o f consc ience i s e m b e d d e d i n H e g e l ' s

chapter.

T h e first sec t ion of th is essay offers a r e a d i n g that accounts

for h o w this p a r a d o x o f b o d i l y subject ion i s f o r m u l a t e d i n

the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m " L o r d s h i p a n d B o n d a g e " t o " T h e U n h a p p y

C o n s c i o u s n e s s " in The Phenomenology of Spirit. In the s e c o n d

sect ion, I c o n s i d e r the restatements of that p a r a d o x i c a l f o r m u ­

l a t i o n i n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a n d F o u c a u l t i a n terms. W i t h o u t p r e ­

s u m i n g a d i rect l i n e of inf luence , I suggest b o t h that H e g e l ' s

i n s i g h t s i n " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " o n the i n e l u c t a b i l i t y

o f the at tachment of a n d to the b o d y in subject ion are re­

i terated i n F o u c a u l t i a n f r a m e w o r k s , a n d that the F o u c a u l t i a n

a c c o u n t of subject ion, despi te its s igni f icant m o v e s b e y o n d

d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c , r e m a i n s u n w i t t i n g l y te thered t o the H e g e l i a n

f o r m u l a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , H e g e l t a c i t l y p r e s u m e s that subjec­

t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d as a se l f -negat ing attachment a n d , in this

w a y , shares a n o p e r a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n w i t h the F r e u d i a n n o t i o n

o f l i b i d i n a l i n v e s t m e n t .

Hegel and the Production of Self-Enslavement

In H e g e l ' s Phenomenology, b o d i e s are a l m o s t never to be

f o u n d as objects of p h i l o s o p h i c a l ref lect ion, m u c h less as sites

o f exper ience , for b o d i e s are, i n H e g e l , a l w a y s a n d o n l y re­

ferred to i n d i r e c t l y as the encasement, l o c a t i o n , or s p e c i f i c i t y

of consciousness . By the t i m e we a r r i v e at the sect ion on the

u n h a p p y consc iousness , w e , the readers, have a l r e a d y e n c o u n ­

tered the l o r d a n d the b o n d s m a n , a n d w e have b e e n g i v e n

to u n d e r s t a n d these d i s c r e p a n t f igures as d i f f e r e n t i a l l y p o s i ­

t i o n e d w i t h respect t o b o d i l y l ife. T h e b o n d s m a n ap p e ars a s

a n i n s t r u m e n t a l b o d y w h o s e labor p r o v i d e s for the m a t e r i a l

c o n d i t i o n s o f the l o r d ' s existence, a n d w h o s e m a t e r i a l p r o d ­

ucts reflect b o t h the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the b o n d s m a n a n d the

d o m i n a t i o n of the master. In a sense, the l o r d p os ture s as a d i s ­

e m b o d i e d des ire for sel f-ref lect ion, one w h o not o n l y r e q u i r e s

the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the b o n d s m a n in the status of an i n s t r u ­

m e n t a l b o d y , b u t w h o r e q u i r e s in effect that the b o n d s m a n be

the l o r d ' s b o d y , but be i t in s u c h a w a y that the l o r d forgets or

d i s a v o w s h is o w n a c t i v i t y i n p r o d u c i n g the b o n d s m a n , a p r o ­

d u c t i o n w h i c h w e w i l l c a l l a pro jec t ion .

T h i s forget t ing i n v o l v e s a c lever t r i c k . I t is an a c t i o n by

w h i c h a n a c t i v i t y i s d i s a v o w e d , yet, a s a n a c t i o n , i t r h e t o r i ­

c a l l y concedes the v e r y a c t i v i t y that i t seeks to negate. To d i s ­

a v o w one's b o d y , to r e n d e r i t " O t h e r " a n d then to establ ish the

" O t h e r " as an effect o f a u t o n o m y , i s to p r o d u c e one's b o d y in

s u c h a w a y that the a c t i v i t y of its p r o d u c t i o n — a n d its essen­

t i a l r e l a t i o n to the l o r d — i s d e n i e d . T h i s t r i c k or ruse i n v o l v e s a

d o u b l e d i s a v o w a l a n d a n i m p e r a t i v e that the " O t h e r " b e c o m e

c o m p l i c i t w i t h this d i s a v o w a l . In o r d e r not to be the b o d y that

the l o r d p r e s u m a b l y is, a n d i n o r d e r t o have the b o n d s m a n

p o s t u r e as i f the b o d y that he is be longs to h i m s e l f — a n d not be

the orchestrated p r o j e c t i o n of the l o r d — t h e r e m u s t be a c e r t a i n

k i n d o f exchange, a b a r g a i n o r d e a l , i n w h i c h ruses are enacted

a n d transacted. In effect, the i m p e r a t i v e to the b o n d s m a n c o n ­

sists i n the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a t i o n : y o u b e m y b o d y for m e , b u t

d o not let m e k n o w that the b o d y y o u are i s m y body . A n i n ­

j u n c t i o n a n d contract are here p e r f o r m e d i n s u c h a w a y that

the m o v e s w h i c h guarantee the f u l f i l l m e n t o f the i n j u n c t i o n

a n d the contract are i m m e d i a t e l y c o v e r e d o v e r a n d forgotten.

36 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 37

A t the c lose o f the sect ion o n l o r d s h i p a n d bondage , the

b o n d s m a n labors a w a y in a r e p e t i t i v e f a s h i o n on objects that

b e l o n g to the l o r d . I n this sense, b o t h his l a b o r a n d h is p r o d u c t s

are p r e s u m e d f r o m the start to be other t h a n his o w n , e x p r o ­

p r i a t e d . T h e y are g i v e n a w a y p r i o r t o a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f g i v i n g

t h e m away, s ince they are, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , n e v e r the b o n d s ­

m a n ' s t o g ive . A n d yet, th is "contract" i n w h i c h the b o n d s ­

m a n subst i tutes h i m s e l f for the l o r d b e c o m e s c o n s e q u e n t i a l ;

the s u b s t i t u t i o n itself b e c o m e s f o r m a t i v e o f a n d for the b o n d s ­

m a n . A s the b o n d s m a n slaves a w a y a n d b e c o m e s a w a r e o f

h i s o w n s ignature on the th ings that he makes , he recognizes

in the f o r m of the arti fact that he crafts the m a r k i n g s of his

o w n labor, m a r k i n g s that are f o r m a t i v e o f the object itself. H i s

labor p r o d u c e s a v i s i b l e a n d leg ib le set o f m a r k s in w h i c h the

b o n d s m a n reads b a c k f r o m the object a c o n f i r m a t i o n of his

o w n f o r m a t i v e a c t i v i t y T h i s labor, this ac t iv i ty , w h i c h be longs

f r o m the start to the l o r d , is nevertheless ref lected back to the

b o n d s m a n as h is o w n labor, a l a b o r that emanates f r o m h i m ,

e v e n i f i t appears to emanate f r o m the l o r d .

C a n , then, the l a b o r ref lected b a c k be s a i d f i n a l l y to be the

b o n d s m a n ' s o w n ? R e m e m b e r that the l o r d has d i s a v o w e d h is

o w n l a b o r i n g b e i n g , h i s b o d y a s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f labor, a n d

has establ ished the b o n d s m a n a s the one w h o w i l l o c c u p y the

l o r d ' s b o d y for h i m . In this sense, the l o r d has contracted the

b o n d s m a n as a surrogate or subst i tute. T h e b o n d s m a n thus

be longs to the l o r d , b u t w i t h a k i n d of b e l o n g i n g that cannot

b e a v o w e d , for t o a v o w the b e l o n g i n g w o u l d b e t o a v o w the

s u b s t i t u t i o n a n d , hence, to expose the l o r d as b e i n g the b o d y

w h i c h the l o r d a p p a r e n t l y v e r y m u c h does not w a n t t o be.

H e n c e , it is as a subst i tute in the service of d i s a v o w a l that the

b o n d s m a n labors; o n l y b y m i m i n g a n d c o v e r i n g over the m i ­

m e t i c status of that labor c a n the b o n d s m a n appear to be b o t h

act ive a n d a u t o n o m o u s . I n d e e d , the object emerges as the ob-

ject i f icat ion of the b o n d s m a n ' s labor, a n d thus as an instance

of that labor, a c o n g e a l i n g a n d ref lect ion of that labor. B u t

w h a t , t h e n , does the object reflect? Is it the a u t o n o m y of the

b o n d s m a n ? Or i s i t the d i s s i m u l a t e d effect o f a u t o n o m y that

results f r o m the contract m a d e b e t w e e n l o r d a n d b o n d s m a n ?

In other w o r d s , i f the b o n d s m a n effects a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h a

m i m i n g o f the l o r d ' s b o d y , a m i m i n g w h i c h r e m a i n s h i d d e n

f r o m the l o r d , then the " a u t o n o m y " of the slave is the c r e d i b l e

effect of th is d i s s i m u l a t i o n . T h e object of labor thus reflects

the a u t o n o m y of the b o n d s m a n to the extent that the object,

too, covers over the d i s s i m u l a t i o n w h i c h is the a c t i v i t y of the

b o n d s m a n . I n h is w o r k , then, the b o n d s m a n d i s c o v e r s o r reads

his o w n s ignature , b u t w h a t i s i t that m a r k s that s ignature as

h is o w n ? T h e b o n d s m a n d i s c o v e r s his a u t o n o m y , b u t h e does

not (yet) see that h is a u t o n o m y is the d i s s i m u l a t e d effect of

the l o r d ' s . ( N o r does he see that the l o r d ' s a u t o n o m y is itself

a d i s s i m u l a t i o n : the l o r d effects the a u t o n o m y of d i s e m b o d i e d

re f lect ion a n d delegates the a u t o n o m y of e m b o d i m e n t to the

b o n d s m a n , thus p r o d u c i n g t w o " a u t o n o m i e s " that a p p e a r a t

the outset r a d i c a l l y to e x c l u d e one another.)

B u t here a q u e s t i o n emerges: D o e s the b o n d s m a n ' s a c t i v i t y

r e m a i n f u l l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y the d i s s i m u l a t i o n b y w h i c h i t i s

m o b i l i z e d ? Or does this d i s s i m u l a t i o n p r o d u c e effects that ex­

ceed the c o n t r o l or d o m i n i o n of the l o r d ?

I f the b o n d s m a n is to r e c o g n i z e the m a r k s m a d e on the

object as h is o w n , then that r e c o g n i t i o n m u s t take p l a c e

t h r o u g h a n act o f r e a d i n g o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b y w h i c h the m a r k s

(Zeichen) that the b o n d s m a n sees are s o m e h o w u n d e r s t o o d to

represent the b o n d s m a n . I t is not that the a c t i v i t y m u s t be w i t ­

nessed, b u t that the signs p r o d u c e d m u s t be r e a d as an effect

o f the ef fect iv i ty that designates the b o n d s m a n , m u s t in s o m e

38 Stubborn Attachment, Bodi ly Subjection Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 39

w a y be u n d e r s t o o d to refer r e t r o a c t i v e l y to the b o n d s m a n as

s ignatory . I f we are to u n d e r s t a n d the f o r m i n g of the object

as the i n s c r i b i n g of the b o n d s m a n ' s s ignature , the f o r m a t i v e

p r i n c i p l e of the object to be the f o r m a t i o n of his s ignature , t h e n

the b o n d s m a n ' s s ignature designates a d o m a i n of contested

o w n e r s h i p . T h i s i s his m a r k , w h i c h he c a n r e a d (we s h a l l let the

b o n d s m a n o c c u p y the site o f p r e s u m p t i v e m a s c u l i n i t y ) , a n d

so the object appears to b e l o n g to h i m . Yet this object m a r k e d

b y h i m , w h i c h has h is m a r k o n i t , be longs t o the l o r d , a t least

n o m i n a l l y . T h e b o n d s m a n signs, as i t were , for the l o r d , as a

p r o x y s ignatory, as a delegated subst i tute. T h u s the s ignature

does not seal o w n e r s h i p of the object by the b o n d s m a n , b u t

b e c o m e s the site for the r e d o u b l i n g of o w n e r s h i p a n d , hence,

sets the stage for a scene of contestat ion.

T h e m a r k o r s i g n o n the object i s not s i m p l y the p r o p e r t y

o f the b o n d s m a n — t h i s object w i t h his m a r k o n i t i m p l i e s for

h i m that h e i s a b e i n g w h o m a r k s th ings , w h o s e a c t i v i t y p r o ­

duces a s i n g u l a r effect, a s ignature , w h i c h is i r r e d u c i b l y his .

T h a t s ignature is erased w h e n the object is g i v e n over to the

l o r d , w h o s t a m p s i t w i t h his n a m e , o w n s i t , o r c o n s u m e s i t i n

s o m e way. T h e w o r k i n g of the slave i s thus to be u n d e r s t o o d

as a m a r k i n g w h i c h r e g u l a r l y u n m a r k s itself, a s i g n a t o r y act

w h i c h p u t s itself u n d e r erasure a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h i t i s

c i r c u l a t e d , for c i r c u l a t i o n here is a l w a y s a matter of e x p r o p r i a ­

t i o n by the l o r d . T h e slave, o f course , f r o m the start has b e e n

w o r k i n g for another, u n d e r the n a m e or s i g n o f s o m e other,

a n d s o has been m a r k i n g the object w i t h h is o w n s ignature

u n d e r a set of c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h that s ignature is a l w a y s

a l r e a d y erased, w r i t t e n over , e x p r o p r i a t e d , res igni f ied . I f the

b o n d s m a n w r i t e s over the s i g n a t o r y o f the l o r d , t e m p o r a r i l y

r e v e r s i n g the s u b o r d i n a t e p o s i t i o n of the p r o x y to the o r i g i ­

n a l , the l o r d r e a p p r o p r i a t e s the object b y w r i t i n g o v e r the s ig­

nature of the b o n d s m a n . W h a t emerges is less a p a l i m p s e s t i c

o b j e c t — l i k e K a f k a ' s t o p o g r a p h i e s — t h a n a m a r k o f o w n e r s h i p

p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h a set of c o n s e q u e n t i a l erasures.

S igni f icant ly , the b o n d s m a n nevertheless d e r i v e s a sense of

se l f - recogni t ion at the e n d of the chapter, b u t not by r e a d i n g

back his s ignature f r o m the object. A f t e r a l l , that s ignature has

been w r i t t e n over b y the s ignature o f the l o r d . H e r e c o g n i z e s

h i m s e l f in the v e r y forfe i ture of the s ignature , in the threat

to a u t o n o m y that s u c h an e x p r o p r i a t i o n p r o d u c e s . Strangely ,

then, a c e r t a i n s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n is d e r i v e d f r o m the r a d i c a l l y

tenuous status of the b o n d s m a n ; i t is a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h the ex­

per ience of absolute fear.

T h i s fear is a fear of a c e r t a i n loss of c o n t r o l , a c e r t a i n t r a n ­

sience a n d e x p r o p r i a b i l i t y p r o d u c e d b y the a c t i v i t y o f labor.

H e r e the l o g i c o f the b o n d s m a n ' s a c t i v i t y appears c u r i o u s l y to

converge w i t h that o f the l o r d . E a r l i e r i t s e e m e d that the l o r d

o c c u p i e d the p lace o f p u r e c o n s u m p t i o n , a p p r o p r i a t i n g a n d

e x t i n g u i s h i n g a l l that the b o n d s m a n m a d e . T h e b o n d s m a n , b y

contrast, a c h i e v e d the e x p e r i e n c e of se l f -ref lexiv i ty t h r o u g h

w o r k i n g o n a n d c r e a t i n g a n object that bore the m a r k s o f h i s

b e i n g , a n d thereby u n d e r s t o o d h i m s e l f as a b e i n g w h o f o r m s

or creates th ings w h i c h out last h i m , a p r o d u c e r o f p e r m a n e n t

things. F o r the l o r d , o c c u p y i n g the p o s i t i o n o f p u r e c o n s u m p ­

t i o n , objects w e r e t rans i tory , a n d he h i m s e l f w a s d e f i n e d as a

series o f t r a n s i t o r y desires. F o r the l o r d , then, n o t h i n g s e e m e d

t o last, except p e r h a p s his o w n c o n s u m i n g act iv i ty , h i s o w n

endless desire.

These t w o p o s i t i o n s , h o w e v e r , are not r a d i c a l l y o p p o s e d t o

one another, for each in a dif ferent w a y exper iences o n l y a n d

a l w a y s the loss of the object a n d , w i t h that loss, the e x p e r i e n c e

of a fearful transience. W o r k is, for H e g e l , a f o r m of desire ,

a f o r m w h i c h i d e a l l y suppresses the t r a n s i t o r y character o f

40 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

desire; i n his w o r d s , " w o r k i s des ire h e l d i n check, f leetingness

s taved off" (118/153). To w o r k on an object i s to g i v e i t f o r m ,

a n d to g i v e i t f o r m is to g i v e i t an existence that o v e r c o m e s

transi tor iness . T h e c o n s u m p t i o n of the object is the n e g a t i o n of

that effect of p e r m a n e n c e ; the c o n s u m p t i o n of the object is its

déformation. T h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y , h o w e v e r , requires

that f o r m e d objects be possessed rather t h a n c o n s u m e d ; o n l y

as p r o p e r t y do objects r e t a i n the ir f o r m a n d "stave off fleet­

ingness ." O n l y as p r o p e r t y do objects f u l f i l l the t h e o l o g i c a l

p r o m i s e w i t h w h i c h t h e y are i n v e s t e d .

T h e b o n d s m a n ' s fear, t h e n , consists in the e x p e r i e n c e o f

h a v i n g w h a t appears to be h is p r o p e r t y e x p r o p r i a t e d . In the

e x p e r i e n c e o f g i v i n g u p w h a t h e has m a d e , the b o n d s m a n

u n d e r s t a n d s t w o issues: first, that w h a t he is i s e m b o d i e d or

s i g n i f i e d i n w h a t h e m a k e s , a n d s e c o n d , that w h a t h e m a k e s i s

m a d e u n d e r the c o m p u l s i o n to g i v e i t u p . H e n c e , i f the object

defines h i m , reflects b a c k w h a t he is , i s the s i g n a t o r y text by

w h i c h he acquires a sense of w h o he is, a n d i f those objects are

re lent less ly sacr i f iced, then he is a re lent less ly se l f -sacr i f ic ing

b e i n g . H e c a n r e c o g n i z e his o w n s ignature o n l y a s w h a t i s c o n ­

stant ly b e i n g erased, as a pers istent site of v a n i s h i n g . He has

no c o n t r o l over w h a t he p u t s his n a m e to or over the p u r p o s e s

to w h i c h he seeks to fasten his n a m e . H i s s ignature i s an act

of self-erasure: he reads that the s ignature is his , that his o w n

existence appears to be i r r e d u c i b l y h is o w n , that w h a t i s i r r e -

d u c i b l y h is o w n i s his o w n v a n i s h i n g , a n d that this v a n i s h i n g

is effected by a n o t h e r — t h a t is, that this is a s o c i a l l y c o m p e l l e d

f o r m o f self-erasure. N o t o n l y does h e l a b o r for another, w h o

takes the y i e l d of h i s labor, but he g ives up h is s ignature for

the s ignature of the other, no longer m a r k i n g o w n e r s h i p of his

o w n labor i n a n y w a y .

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 41

T h i s e x p r o p r i a t i o n of the object does not negate the b o n d s ­

m a n ' s sense of h i m s e l f as a l a b o r i n g b e i n g , b u t i t does i m p l y

that w h a t e v e r he m a k e s , he also loses. T h e d e t e r m i n a t e t h i n g

that the b o n d s m a n m a k e s reflects the b o n d s m a n h i m s e l f as a

determinate t h i n g . B u t because the object is g i v e n away, he be­

comes that w h i c h c a n be forfe i ted. I f the object is the congeal­

i n g or f o r m i n g of labor, a n d i f the labor is that of the b o n d s ­

m a n , t h e n the d e t e r m i n a t e a n d t rans ient character o f the t h i n g

w i l l i m p l y the d e t e r m i n a t e a n d transient character o f the

b o n d s m a n . T h e l a b o r i n g b o d y w h i c h n o w k n o w s itself t o have

f o r m e d the object also k n o w s that i t is transient. T h e b o n d s m a n

not o n l y negates t h i n g s ( in the sense of t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e m

t h r o u g h labor) a n d is a n e g a t i n g ac t iv i ty , b u t he is subject to a

f u l l a n d f ina l n e g a t i o n i n death. T h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f d e a t h a t

the e n d of the chapter reca l ls the l i f e -and-death s truggle at its

b e g i n n i n g . T h e strategy o f d o m i n a t i o n w a s m e a n t to replace

the l i fe -and-death struggle . B u t in the ear l ier v e r s i o n death

h a p p e n e d t h r o u g h the v i o l e n c e o f the other; d o m i n a t i o n w a s

a w a y of f o r c i n g the other to d i e within the context of life.

T h e f a i l u r e of d o m i n a t i o n as a strategy re introduces the fear of

death, b u t locates i t as the i n e v i t a b l e fate of a n y b e i n g w h o s e

consciousness is d e t e r m i n e d a n d e m b o d i e d , no l o n g e r as a

threat p o s e d b y another. T h e b o n d s m a n verges o n this shatter­

i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f his o w n death i n the last p a r a g r a p h o f the

chapter, but h e recoi l s f r o m r e c o g n i z i n g death , a t taching h i m ­

self i n s t e a d to v a r i o u s attr ibutes of h i s o w n , t a k i n g up a p o s ­

ture of s m u g n e s s or s tubbornness , c l i n g i n g to w h a t appears to

b e f i r m about h i m s e l f , f i r m l y c l i n g i n g t o h i m s e l f , i n o r d e r not

to k n o w that d e a t h threatens e v e r y aspect o f his o w n f i rmness:

"since the ent ire contents of its n a t u r a l consc iousness have not

b e e n j e o p a r d i z e d , [Indem nicht aile Erfullungen seines naturlichen

42 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 43

Bewusstseins wankend geworden] d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g s t i l l in prin­

ciple attaches to it; h a v i n g a m i n d of one's o w n is s e l f - w i l l , a

f r e e d o m s t i l l e n m e s h e d i n s e r v i t u d e " (119/155).

T h e u n h a p p y consciousness emerges here i n the m o v e m e n t

b y w h i c h t e r r o r i s a l l a y e d t h r o u g h a r e s o l u t i o n o f s t u b b o r n ­

ness or, rather, t h r o u g h the a c t i o n b y w h i c h terror o f b o d i l y

d e a t h i s d i s p l a c e d by a s m u g n e s s a n d s tubbornness that, in the

next chapter , i s r e v a l u e d as r e l i g i o u s sel f-r ighteousness. T h i s

s a n c t i m o n i o u s self is n o t without terror : its r e f l e x i v i t y is self-

t e r r o r i z i n g . T h e b o d y w h i c h the b o n d s m e n e m b l e m a t i z e d a s

a l a b o r i n g i n s t r u m e n t is recast at the e n d of the l o r d s h i p a n d

b o n d a g e chapter as a transient object, subject to death. T h e rec­

o g n i t i o n of the b o d y ' s d e a t h is averted, h o w e v e r , for a m o d e of

l i v i n g i n w h i c h the b o d y i s ceaselessly d y i n g a w a y : hence, the

m o v e f r o m the s e r v i t u d e of the b o n d s m a n to that o f the u n ­

h a p p y consciousness . T h e b o n d s m a n takes the p lace o f the l o r d

b y r e c o g n i z i n g h is o w n f o r m a t i v e capacity , b u t once the l o r d

i s d i s p l a c e d , the b o n d s m a n b e c o m e s l o r d o v e r h i m s e l f , m o r e

speci f ica l ly , l o r d over his o w n b o d y ; this f o r m o f r e f l e x i v i t y

s ignals the passage f r o m b o n d a g e to u n h a p p y consciousness .

It i n v o l v e s s p l i t t i n g the p s y c h e i n t o t w o parts , a l o r d s h i p a n d a

b o n d a g e i n t e r n a l to a s ingle consc iousness , w h e r e b y the b o d y

is a g a i n d i s s i m u l a t e d as an alteri ty , b u t w h e r e this a l t e r i t y i s

n o w i n t e r i o r t o the p s y c h e itself. N o longer subjected a s a n

external i n s t r u m e n t o f labor, the b o d y i s s t i l l sp l i t off f r o m

consciousness . R e c o n s t i t u t e d as an i n t e r i o r a l i e n , the b o d y i s

s u s t a i n e d t h r o u g h its d i s a v o w a l as w h a t consc iousness m u s t

c o n t i n u e to d i s a v o w .

W h a t is the f o r m that this sel f-subject ion takes in the sec­

t i o n on the u n h a p p y consciousness? In the first instance, i t is a

f o r m of s tubbornness (eigensinnigkeit). It has a " m i n d of one's

o w n " o r " s e l f - w i l l , " b u t one w h i c h i s nevertheless s t i l l a f o r m

of s e r v i t u d e . C o n s c i o u s n e s s c l ings or attaches to itself, a n d

this c l i n g i n g to consc iousness is at the same t i m e a d i s a v o w a l

of the b o d y , w h i c h appears to s i g n i f y the t e r r o r of death , "the

absolute fear." T h e u n h a p p y consc iousness r e q u i r e s a n d en­

gages this at tachment by i n v o k i n g an i m p e r a t i v e . Its fear i s

a l l a y e d b y l e g i s l a t i n g a n e t h i c a l n o r m . H e n c e , the i m p e r a t i v e

to c l i n g to oneself i s m o t i v a t e d by this absolute fear a n d by the

n e e d to refuse that fear. I n a s m u c h as it is an ethical i n j u n c t i o n ,

this i m p e r a t i v e is the d i s a r t i c u l a t e d re fusa l of absolute fear.

T h e sect ion o n the u n h a p p y consc iousness e x p l a i n s the

genesis of the sphere of the e t h i c a l as a defense against the

absolute fear b y w h i c h i t i s m o t i v a t e d . T h e f a b r i c a t i o n o f n o r m s

out of (and against) fear, a n d the ref lexive i m p o s i t i o n of those

n o r m s , subjects the u n h a p p y consc iousness in a d o u b l e sense:

the subject i s s u b o r d i n a t e d to n o r m s , a n d the n o r m s are sub-

j e c t i v a t i n g , that is , they g i v e an e th ica l shape to the r e f l e x i v i t y

of this e m e r g i n g subject. T h e subject ion that takes p lace u n d e r

the s i g n of the e th ica l is a f l ight f r o m fear, a n d so is c o n s t i t u t e d

as a k i n d of f l ight a n d d e n i a l , a fearful f l ight f r o m fear that

covers its fear first w i t h s tubborness a n d t h e n w i t h r e l i g i o u s

sel f-r ighteousness. T h e m o r e absolute the e th ica l i m p e r a t i v e

becomes , the m o r e s t u b b o r n or eigensinnig the enforcement of

its law, the m o r e the absoluteness of the m o t i v a t i n g fear is at

once a r t i c u l a t e d a n d re fused. A b s o l u t e fear i s thus d i s p l a c e d

b y the absolute l a w w h i c h , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , r e c o n s t i t u t e d the

fear as a fear of the law.

A b s o l u t e fear w o u l d j e o p a r d i z e a l l d e t e r m i n a t e th ings , i n ­

c l u d i n g the d e t e r m i n a t e th ingness o f the b o n d s m a n . T h e f l ight

f r o m that fear, a fear of death, vacates the t h i n g l i k e character of

the subject. T h i s entai ls v a c a t i n g the b o d y a n d c l i n g i n g t o w h a t

appears t o b e m o s t d i s e m b o d i e d : t h o u g h t . H e g e l i n t r o d u c e s

s t o i c i s m as a k i n d of defensive c l i n g i n g , one that separates

r 44 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

the a c t i v i t y o f t h i n k i n g f r o m a n y content. F o r H e g e l , s t o i c i s m

w i t h d r a w s i n t o a subject ive a n d r a t i o n a l existence that has as

its h ighest a i m the absolute w i t h d r a w a l f r o m existence p e r se,

i n c l u d i n g its o w n . T h i s task t u r n s out to be se l f -refut ing, o f

course , insofar as e v e n sel f -refutat ion r e q u i r e s a pers istent self

t o enact the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m its o w n a n d other existences.

Because the c o n c e p t u a l act of n e g a t i o n a l w a y s p r e s u p p o s e s a

p o s i t i o n f r o m w h i c h that n e g a t i o n takes p lace , s t o i c i s m ends

up u n d e r s c o r i n g the v e r y p o s i t i v i t y o f the self that i t s o u g h t

t o deny. S k e p t i c i s m f o l l o w s u p o n s t o i c i s m for H e g e l because

s k e p t i c i s m b e g i n s b y p r e s u p p o s i n g the i n s u p e r a b i l i t y o f the

t h i n k i n g subject. F o r s k e p t i c i s m , the self is a p e r p e t u a l l y ne­

g a t i n g ac t iv i ty , a c t i v e l y r e f u t i n g the existence of e v e r y t h i n g as

its o w n c o n s t i t u t i v e act iv i ty .

S k e p t i c i s m negates the d o m a i n o f a l t e r i t y b y t r y i n g t o s h o w

that a n y g i v e n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f l o g i c a l necess i ty t u r n s i n t o its

o p p o s i t e a n d , hence, i s not w h a t i t is. T h e s k e p t i c traces a n d

focuses o n this constant v a n i s h i n g o f d e t e r m i n a t e a p p e a r a n c e

w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o account the d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c that orches­

trates a n d uni f ies these v a r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n s . H e n c e , n o t h i n g

i s w h a t i t is , a n d there i s n o l o g i c a l o r e m p i r i c a l g r o u n d ac­

cessible t o the s k e p t i c o n w h i c h the d o m a i n o f a l t e r i t y m i g h t

r a t i o n a l l y b e k n o w n . T h e s k e p t i c ' s t h i n k i n g b e c o m e s a f r a n ­

tic effort to m a k e e v e r y g i v e n d e t e r m i n a t i o n d i s a p p e a r i n t o

s o m e other one, so that this constant a p p e a r i n g a n d v a n i s h i n g

p r o c e e d s a c c o r d i n g t o n o o r d e r o r necessity. T h e s k e p t i c , l i k e

s o m e n e w his tor ic is ts a m o n g us, ends u p p r o d u c i n g c o n t r a ­

d i c t i o n for its o w n sake: s igni f icant ly , H e g e l argues that this

p r o d u c t i o n of chaos ( u n d e r s t o o d as ceaseless c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) is

pleasurable i n a s m u c h as the s k e p t i c is a l w a y s able to u n d e r ­

m i n e the p o s i t i o n o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o n e n t .

T h i s k i n d of p leasurable a n d incessant r e f u t a t i o n i s s t i l l a

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 45

f o r m of s tubbornness or eigensinnigkeit: " i t is in fact l i k e the

s q u a b b l i n g of s e l f - w i l l e d c h i l d r e n [eigensinniger Jungen] w h o by

c o n t r a d i c t i n g themselves b u y for themselves the p l e a s u r e [die

Freude] of c o n t i n u a l l y c o n t r a d i c t i n g one a n o t h e r " (126/162).

T h e s k e p t i c o v e r r i d e s his o w n c o n t r a d i c t o r i n e s s i n o r d e r t o

take p leasure i n f o r c i n g others t o w i t n e s s their c o n t r a d i c ­

t ions. B u t this p leasure , a f o r m of s a d i s m , is s h o r t - l i v e d , for

the s t u b b o r n a n d pers istent character of the s k e p t i c ' s efforts

w i l l doubt less b e c h a l l e n g e d w h e n the s k e p t i c encounters

another l i k e h imsel f . I f another s k e p t i c exposes the first s k e p ­

tic 's c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , then the first s k e p t i c is f o r c e d to take ac­

c o u n t o f his o w n c o n t r a d i c t o r i n e s s . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his

o w n c o n t r a d i c t o r i n e s s w i l l in i t ia te for h i m a n e w m o d a l i t y

o f thought . A t this p o i n t , the s k e p t i c b e c o m e s se l f -consc ious

o f the c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f h i s o w n n e g a t i n g a c t i v i t y

a n d the u n h a p p y consc iousness emerges as an e x p l i c i t f o r m of

e th ica l re f lexiv i ty .

In a sense, the c h i l d i s h a n d s t u b b o r n p l e a s u r e that the s k e p ­

tic takes i n w a t c h i n g another f a l l t u r n s i n t o a p r o f o u n d u n -

h a p p i n e s s w h e n he is, as it were , f o r c e d to watch himself f a l l i n t o

endless c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . H e r e the d i s t a n c e a f f o r d e d b y w a t c h ­

i n g seems essent ia l ly l i n k e d to the s a d i s m of the p l e a s u r e a n d

to the p o s t u r e of the s k e p t i c as one w h o exempts h i m s e l f

t h r o u g h v i s u a l d i s t a n c e f r o m the scene that he witnesses . T h e

sadist ic p l e a s u r e i n v o l v e d i n w a t c h i n g another b e c o m e s , i n the

m o d e of u n h a p p i n e s s , a d i s p l e a s u r a b l e w a t c h i n g of oneself. 5

W i t n e s s i n g i m p l i e s a m i m e t i c r e d u p l i c a t i o n of the self, a n d its

" d i s p a s s i o n " i s b e l i e d b y the p a s s i o n o f m i m e t i c i s m . T h e self

w h o s h o r e d u p its i d e n t i t y b y e n c o u r a g i n g others t o f a l l i n t o

c o n t r a d i c t i o n s u d d e n l y sees itself as one of those others; th is

v i e w i n g of oneself at a d i s t a n c e not o n l y ini t iates the u n h a p p y

consciousness b u t also inverts the s k e p t i c ' s p l e a s u r e i n t o p a i n .

46 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

T h e s a d i s m d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the other i s n o w t u r n e d b a c k o n

consciousness itself ( p o s t p o n i n g for the m o m e n t w h e t h e r the

p leasure i n s a d i s m i s also r e r o u t e d against consciousness) . A s

a d u a l s t ructure , the u n h a p p y consciousness takes i tself as its

o w n object o f s c o r n .

T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e l a b o r a t i o n of this s c o r n takes the f o l ­

l o w i n g f o r m : consc iousness i s n o w d i v i d e d i n t o t w o parts , the

"essent ia l" a n d "unchangeable ," o n the one h a n d , a n d the " i n ­

essent ia l " a n d "changeable," on the other. T h e w a t c h i n g self,

d e f i n e d as a k i n d of witnessing a n d scorning, di f ferentiates i tself

f r o m the self w i t n e s s e d as p e r p e t u a l l y f a l l i n g i n t o c o n t r a d i c ­

t i o n . T h i s w a t c h i n g b e c o m e s a w a y of reestabl ishing the v i s u a l

d is tance b e t w e e n a subject a loof f r o m the scene a n d the s u b ­

ject in c o n t r a d i c t i o n . In this case, h o w e v e r , the w i t n e s s i n g a n d

s c o r n i n g self cannot d e n y that the c o n t r a d i c t o r y self i s its o w n

self; i t k n o w s that the c o n t r a d i c t o r y self is itself, b u t in o r d e r to

shore u p a n i d e n t i t y over a n d against i t , i t renders this c o n t r a ­

d i c t o r y self i n t o an inessent ia l p a r t of itself. I t thus parts w i t h

itself i n o r d e r t o p u r i f y i tself o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n .

As a resul t , the u n h a p p y consc iousness berates itself c o n ­

stantly, sett ing up one part of i tself as a p u r e j u d g e a l o o f f r o m

c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d d i s p a r a g i n g its changeable part as inessen­

t i a l , a l t h o u g h i n e l u c t a b l y t i e d to it . S igni f i cant ly , the a c t i v i t y

that i n s k e p t i c i s m b e g i n s a s c h i l d i s h s a d i s m b e c o m e s refor­

m u l a t e d as e th ica l se l f - judgment in the context o f the u n h a p p y

consciousness: as a d u l t to c h i l d , then, the u n c h a n g e a b l e c o n ­

sciousness "passes j u d g m e n t " o n the changeable. I m p l i c i t i n

this d u a l s t r u c t u r i n g of the subject, h o w e v e r , i s the r e l a t i o n be­

t w e e n t h o u g h t a n d c o r p o r e a l i t y , for the u n c h a n g e a b l e w i l l be a

k i n d o f n o n c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h o u g h t , the p u r e t h o u g h t sought b y

the stoics, a n d the c o n t r a d i c t o r y d o m a i n w i l l b e that o f alter­

n a t i n g qual i t ies , the changeable d o m a i n o f appearance , w h a t

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 47

per ta ins t o the subject's o w n p h e n o m e n a l b e i n g . T h e c h i l d w h o

" w a t c h e s " i s t r a n s f i g u r e d i n t o the j u d g e w h o "passes j u d g ­

ment ," a n d the aspect o f the self on w h i c h i t passes j u d g m e n t

i s s teeped in the changeable w o r l d o f b o d i l y sensat ion.

U n h a p p y consc iousness seeks t o o v e r c o m e this d u a l i t y b y

f i n d i n g a b o d y w h i c h e m b o d i e s the p u r i t y o f its u n c h a n g e a b l e

part; i t seeks to c o m e i n t o r e l a t i o n w i t h "the U n c h a n g e a b l e in

its incarnate or e m b o d i e d f o r m . " To do this , the subject sub­

ordinates its o w n b o d y i n the serv ice o f the t h o u g h t o f the

unchangeable; th is s u b o r d i n a t i n g a n d p u r i f y i n g effort i s that

of devotion (Andacht). Yet, predic tab ly , this effort to d e p l o y

the b o d y i n the service o f t h i n k i n g the u n c h a n g e a b l e p r o v e s

i m p o s s i b l e . D e v o t i o n t u r n s o u t t o b e p u r e self- feel ing, w h a t

H e g e l d i s p a r a g i n g l y refers to as "the c h a o t i c j i n g l i n g of be l ls ,

or a m i s t of w a r m incense, a m u s i c a l t h i n k i n g " (131/168). As

self-feeling, i t is the fee l ing of the b o d y c o m p e l l e d to s i g n i f y

the t ranscendent a n d unchangeable , a fee l ing w h i c h never­

theless r e m a i n s e n s c o n c e d in the b o d i l y fee l ing that i t seeks

to t r a n s c e n d . I n d e e d , sel f- feel ing refers o n l y a n d e n d l e s s l y to

itself (a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i z e d f o r m of eigensinnigkeit), a n d so is

unable to f u r n i s h k n o w l e d g e o f a n y t h i n g other t h a n itself.

D e v o t i o n , then, w h i c h seeks t o i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e the b o d y i n

the service of the unchangeable , t u r n s o u t to be an i m m e r s i o n

in the b o d y that p r e c l u d e s access to a n y t h i n g else, i n d e e d , an

i m m e r s i o n that takes the b o d y to be the u n c h a n g e a b l e a n d so

falls i n t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n .

A l t h o u g h d e v o t i o n a ppea r s to be a f o r m of s e l f - i m m e r s i o n ,

it is a lso a c o n t i n u a t i o n of sel f-beratement as s e l f - m o r t i f i c a t i o n .

T h i s self-feel ing, p r e c i s e l y because i t does not r e a c h the u n ­

changeable, b e c o m e s itself the object o f d e r i s i o n a n d j u d g m e n t ,

m a r k i n g the c o n t i n u i n g i n a d e q u a c y o f the self in r e l a t i o n to

its t ranscendent measure . T h e t ranscendent i s w h a t i s a l w a y s

48 Stubborn Attachment, Bodi ly Subjection

m i s s e d , a n d so h a u n t s this consc iousness as a f igure of w h a t

is p e r m a n e n t l y inaccessible , forever lost. In the m o d e of d e v o ­

t i o n , t h e n , "consciousness . . . c a n o n l y f ind as a present r e a l i t y

the grave of its l i f e " (132/169-70). In a t r a n s p o s i t i o n of f ig­

ures, the b o d y s u r v i v e s , a n d a l l that is left of the t ranscendent

i d e a l is a "grave." W h e r e a s d e v o t i o n , t h e n , b e g i n s as an effort

to s u b o r d i n a t e the b o d y to a t ranscendent object, i t ends by

t a k i n g the b o d y , that is, sel f- feel ing, as its object of w o r s h i p ,

a n d l e t t i n g the u n c h a n g e a b l e s p i r i t die.

H e r e we m i g h t c o n c l u d e that a c e r t a i n f o r m of se l f -preoccu­

p a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d as a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e

eigensinnigkeit, const i tutes a n a r c i s s i s m of the subject that de­

feats the se l f -sacr i f ic ia l project of d e v o t i o n . T h e subject w h o

w o u l d s u b o r d i n a t e its b o d y t o a n i d e a l , c o m p e l its b o d y t o

e m b o d y a n i d e a l , f i n d s itself m o r e f u l l y a u t o n o m o u s f r o m that

i d e a l , o u t l i v i n g i t altogether. T h e co l lapse o f d e v o t i o n i n t o nar­

c i s s i s m , i f we can c a l l i t that, s ignif ies that there c a n be no f inal

l e a v e - t a k i n g o f the b o d y w i t h i n life. F o r c e d , then, to accept

this i n e l u c t a b i l i t y of the b o d y as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , a n e w f o r m

of the subject emerges, w h i c h is d i s t i n c t l y K a n t i a n . I f there is

a w o r l d of a p p e a r a n c e for w h i c h the b o d y is essentia l , t h e n

s u r e l y there i s a w o r l d o f n o u m e n a i n w h i c h the b o d y has n o

p lace; the w o r l d d i v i d e s u p i n t o be ings that are for-itsel f a n d

in-itself .

In a f o r m u l a t i o n that w i l l p r e f i g u r e K i e r k e g a a r d ' s Philo­

sophical Fragments, H e g e l c l a i m s that the u n c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d

s u r r e n d e r s o r r e n o u n c e s a n e m b o d i e d f o r m , that it , the i n -

itself, d e l i v e r s an e m b o d i e d v e r s i o n of itself i n t o the change­

able w o r l d to be sacr i f iced. T h i s reference to the f igure of

C h r i s t suggests that the u n c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d b e c o m e s e m ­

b o d i e d , b u t does so o n l y to be sacr i f iced or r e t u r n e d to the

u n c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d f r o m w h i c h i t came. A s a m o d e l for the

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 49

sacred l i fe, C h r i s t i s u n d e r s t o o d as an e m b o d i m e n t w h i c h i s

c o n t i n u a l l y i n the m o d e o f g i v i n g thanks . I n its des ire a n d i n

its w o r k , th is e m b o d i e d consc iousness seeks to g i v e t h a n k s for

its o w n l i fe, capacit ies , facult ies , abi l i t ies . These are g i v e n to

it; its l ife is e x p e r i e n c e d as a gift; a n d it l ives o u t its l i fe in the

m o d e of gratefulness. A l l o f its acts i t o w e s to another; its l ife

becomes u n d e r s t o o d as a k i n d of endless debt.

P r e c i s e l y because, o n the one h a n d , this l i v i n g b e i n g o w e s

its l i fe to another b e i n g , i t is not the seat or o r i g i n of its o w n ac­

t ions. Its a c t i o n is re ferred to a n o t h e r ' s a c t i o n ; thus, not b e i n g

the g r o u n d of its o w n a c t i o n , i t i s not r e s p o n s i b l e for w h a t i t

does. O n the other h a n d , its o w n act ions are t o b e c o n s t r u e d

as a p e r p e t u a l self-sacrifice by w h i c h the self proves or d e m o n ­

strates its o w n t h a n k f u l n e s s . T h i s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h a n k f u l ­

ness thus b e c o m e s a k i n d of se l f -aggrandizement , w h a t H e g e l

w i l l c a l l "the e x t r e m e o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y " (134/171).

T h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of the self as the o r i g i n of its o w n ac­

t ions m u s t b e p e r f o r m e d r e p e a t e d l y a n d c a n never f i n a l l y b e

a c h i e v e d , i f o n l y because the demonstration of r e n u n c i a t i o n is

itself a s e l f - w i l l e d a c t i o n . T h i s s e l f - w i l l e d a c t i o n thus r h e t o r i ­

c a l l y c o n f o u n d s p r e c i s e l y w h a t i t i s s u p p o s e d to show. T h e

self b e c o m e s an incessant p e r f o r m e r o f r e n u n c i a t i o n , w h e r e b y

the p e r f o r m a n c e , as an a c t i o n , c o n t r a d i c t s the p o s t u l a t i o n of

/«action that i t is m e a n t to s ignify. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , p e r f o r m a n c e

becomes the occasion for a g r a n d a n d endless a c t i o n that effec­

t i v e l y a u g m e n t s a n d i n d i v i d u a t e s the self i t seeks to deny.

T h i s consciousness , l i k e the stoic, seeks t o k n o w a n d s h o w

itself as a " n o t h i n g , " yet i n e v i t a b l y b e c o m e s a doing of n o t h ­

i n g . H e r e the p l e a s u r e w h i c h ear l ier a p p e a r e d t o b e l o n g t o

the c h i l d i s h s a d i s m of the s k e p t i c is t u r n e d on the self: this

" d o i n g of n o t h i n g , " H e g e l argues, f inds in " i ts e n j o y m e n t a

fee l ing o f wretchedness . " T h i s i n t e r m i n g l i n g o f p l e a s u r e a n d

50 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 5 i

p a i n results f r o m a r e n u n c i a t i o n of the self w h i c h c a n never

qui te a c c o m p l i s h that r e n u n c i a t i o n , w h i c h , as an incessant ac­

c o m p l i s h i n g , carr ies w i t h i t the p l e a s u r a b l e assert ion of self.

T h e se l f -absorpt ion of consc iousness does not translate i n t o

se l f -congratu lat ion or s i m p l e n a r c i s s i s m . Rather, i t appears as

negat ive n a r c i s s i s m , a n engaged p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h w h a t i s

m o s t d e b a s e d a n d d e f i l e d about it .

H e r e a g a i n the self to be r e n o u n c e d is f i g u r e d as a b o d i l y

self, a s " this a c t u a l i n d i v i d u a l i n the a n i m a l funct ions ." H e g e l

appears to i m p l y defecat ion as an object of s e l f - p r e o c c u p a t i o n :

"these [ a n i m a l funct ions] are n o longer p e r f o r m e d n a t u r a l l y

a n d w i t h o u t e m b a r r a s s m e n t , a s matters t r i f l i n g i n themselves

w h i c h cannot possess a n y i m p o r t a n c e o r essentia l s igni f icance

for S p i r i t ; ins tead , i t i s in t h e m that the e n e m y reveals h i m ­

self in his character is t ic shape, they are rather the object of

ser ious endeavor , a n d b e c o m e p r e c i s e l y matters o f the ut­

m o s t i m p o r t a n c e . T h i s enemy, h o w e v e r , r e n e w s h i m s e l f i n his

defeat, a n d consciousness , i n f i x i n g its at tent ion o n h i m , far

f r o m free ing itself f r o m h i m , r e a l l y r e m a i n s forever i n contact

w i t h h i m , a n d forever sees i tself a s d e f i l e d " (135-36/174). T h i s

"enemy," as it were , is d e s c r i b e d as "the merest p a r t i c u l a r of

the meanest character," one w h i c h serves, unfortunate ly , as an

object of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n for this " f a l l e n " consciousness . H e r e ,

consc iousness i n its f u l l abject ion has b e c o m e l i k e shit , lost i n

a sel f-referential anal i ty , a c i rc le of its o w n m a k i n g . In H e g e l ' s

w o r d s , "we have here o n l y a p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f i n e d to its o w n

self a n d its p e t t y act ions, a p e r s o n a l i t y b r o o d i n g over itself, as

w r e t c h e d as it is i m p o v e r i s h e d " (136/174).

R e g a r d i n g itself as a n o t h i n g , as a d o i n g of n o t h i n g , as an

e x c r e m e n t a l f u n c t i o n , a n d hence r e g a r d i n g itself as excrement ,

th is consc iousness effectively reduces itself to the changeable

features of its b o d i l y funct ions a n d p r o d u c t s . Yet, s ince i t i s

an e x p e r i e n c e of wretchedness , there is s o m e consc iousness

w h i c h takes stock o f these f u n c t i o n s a n d w h i c h i s n o t thor­

o u g h l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e m . S igni f icant ly , i t i s here, i n the

effort to dif ferentiate itself f r o m its e x c r e t o r y funct ions , i n ­

d e e d , f r o m its excretory ident i ty , that consc iousness rel ies on

a "mediator , " w h a t H e g e l w i l l c a l l "the pr iest . " In o r d e r to r e ­

connect w i t h the p u r e a n d the unchangeable , this b o d i l y c o n ­

sciousness offers up its e v e r y " d o i n g " to a pr iest or m i n i s t e r .

T h i s m e d i a t i n g agency rel ieves the abject consc iousness of its

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for its o w n actions. T h r o u g h the i n s t i t u t i o n o f

c o u n s e l a n d a d v i c e , the pr iest offers the reason for the abject

consc iousness 's act ions. E v e r y t h i n g that the abject c o n s c i o u s ­

ness offers, that is, a l l of its external i zat ions , i n c l u d i n g desire,

w o r k , a n d excrement , are to be c o n s t r u e d as offerings, as p a y ­

i n g penance. T h e pr iest inst i tutes b o d i l y se l f -abnegat ion as the

p r i c e of hol iness , e l e v a t i n g the r e n u n c i a t o r y gesture of excre­

t i o n to a r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e w h e r e b y the ent i re b o d y is r i t u -

a l i s t i c a l l y p u r g e d . T h e sanct i f i cat ion of abject ion takes p lace

t h r o u g h r i tua ls of fast ing a n d m o r t i f i c a t i o n [fasten uni kas-

teien]" (137/175). Because the b o d y cannot be f u l l y d e n i e d , as

the stoic thought , i t m u s t be r i t u a l i s t i c a l l y r e n o u n c e d .

In its fastings a n d m o r t i f i c a t i o n s , the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s ­

ness denies itself the p leasures of c o n s u m p t i o n , f i g u r i n g p e r ­

haps that i t w i l l foresta l l the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the e x c r e m e n t a l

m o m e n t . A s se l f - inf l icted b o d i l y acts, fast ing a n d m o r t i f i c a t i o n

are ref lexive act ions, t u r n i n g s of the b o d y against itself. At the

l i m i t s of this s e l f - m o r t i f i c a t i o n a n d self-sacrifice, the abjected

consc iousness appears to g r o u n d its a c t i o n in the c o u n s e l o f

the pr iest , a n d yet this g r o u n d i n g m e r e l y conceals the ref lexive

o r i g i n s of its s e l f - p u n i s h m e n t .

A t this j u n c t u r e H e g e l departs f r o m w h a t has b e e n the pat­

tern of e x p l a n a t i o n , in w h i c h a self-negating p o s t u r e is u n d e r -

52 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

s c o r e d as a posture, a p h e n o m e n a l i z a t i o n that refutes the nega­

t i o n i t seeks to inst i tute . In the p l a c e of s u c h an e x p l a n a t i o n ,

H e g e l asserts that the w i l l o f another operates t h r o u g h the self-

sacr i f i c ia l act ions of the peni tent . In effect, self-sacrif ice is n o t

r e f u t e d t h r o u g h the c l a i m that self-sacrifice is itself a w i l l f u l

a c t i v i t y ; rather, H e g e l asserts that in self-sacrifice one enacts

a n o t h e r ' s w i l l . O n e m i g h t expect that the peni tent w o u l d b e

s h o w n t o b e r e v e l i n g i n h imsel f , s e l f - a g g r a n d i z i n g , narc iss is ­

t ic , that his s e l f - p u n i s h m e n t s w o u l d c u l m i n a t e in a p leasurable

assert ion of self. B u t H e g e l eschews this e x p l a n a t i o n a n d thus

breaks w i t h the pat tern o f e x p l a n a t i o n i n the chapter i n favor

of a r e l i g i o u s s o l u t i o n in S p i r i t .

I n d e e d , at this j u n c t u r e one m i g h t w e l l i m a g i n e a set of

c l o s i n g t r a n s i t i o n s for " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " differ­

ent f r o m the ones H e g e l s u p p l i e s , a set that is, nevertheless,

p e r h a p s m o r e p r o p e r l y H e g e l i a n t h a n H e g e l h imsel f . T h e p e n i ­

tent d i s c l a i m s his act as h is o w n , a v o w i n g that another ' s w i l l ,

the pr iest ' s , operates t h r o u g h h is self-sacrifice, a n d , further,

that the pr iest ' s w i l l i s d e t e r m i n e d b y G o d ' s . Ins ta l led thus

in a great c h a i n of w i l l s , the abject consc iousness enters i n t o

a c o m m u n i t y of w i l l s . A l t h o u g h its w i l l i s determinate , i t i s

nevertheless b o u n d to the pr ies t ' s ; in this u n i t y , the n o t i o n o f

S p i r i t i s first d i s c e r n e d . T h e m e d i a t o r or pr iest counse ls the

peni tent that his p a i n w i l l b e r e p a i d w i t h e v e r l a s t i n g a b u n ­

dance, that his m i s e r y w i l l b e r e w a r d e d w i t h e v e r l a s t i n g h a p ­

piness ; m i s e r y a n d p a i n i m p l y a f u t u r e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o

the ir opposi tes . In this sense, the m i n i s t e r re formulates the

d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l a n d establishes the i n v e r s i o n of va lues as

a n absolute p r i n c i p l e . W h e r e a s i n a l l o f the ear l ier e x a m p l e s

o f se l f -negat ion p leasure w a s u n d e r s t o o d to inhere in p a i n

(the p l e a s u r a b l e a g g r a n d i z e m e n t of the stoic, the p leasurable

s a d i s m of the skept ic) , p l e a s u r e i s here t e m p o r a l l y r e m o v e d

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 53

f r o m p a i n , f i g u r e d a s its f u t u r e c o m p e n s a t i o n . F o r H e g e l , this

eschato log ica l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the p a i n o f this w o r l d i n t o

the p leasure of the next establishes the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m self-

consc iousness t o reason. A n d sel f -consciousness 's r e c o g n i t i o n

of itself as part of a r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y of w i l l s effects the

t r a n s i t i o n f r o m sel f -consciousness t o S p i r i t .

B u t w h a t are w e t o m a k e o f this f i n a l t r a n s i t i o n , c o n s i d e r i n g

the i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n o f p leasure a n d p a i n i n the t r a n s i t i o n s

that p r e c e d e it? Before the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the " m e d i a t o r " a n d

the "priest ," the chapter on the u n h a p p y consc iousness ap­

pears to p r o c e e d as i f i t c o n t a i n e d a t renchant c r i t i q u e of e t h i ­

c a l i m p e r a t i v e s a n d r e l i g i o u s ideals , a c r i t i q u e w h i c h pre f ig­

ures the N i e t z s c h e a n ana lys i s that emerges s o m e s i x t y years

later. E v e r y effort to r e d u c e itself to i n a c t i o n or to n o t h i n g ,

t o s u b o r d i n a t e o r m o r t i f y its o w n b o d y , c u l m i n a t e s i n a d v e r ­

tent ly in the production of se l f -consciousness as a p l e a s u r e -

s e e k i n g a n d s e l f - a g g r a n d i z i n g agent. E v e r y effort to o v e r c o m e

the b o d y , p leasure , a n d agency p r o v e s to be n o t h i n g other

t h a n the assert ion of p r e c i s e l y those features of the subject.

Post-Hegelian Subjections

T h e N i e t z s c h e a n c r i t i q u e o f e th ica l n o r m s , p r e f i g u r e d i n

" T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " a n d a r t i c u l a t e d i n N i e t z s c h e ' s

On the Genealogy of Morals a n d Daybreak, has r e c e i v e d m o r e

recent r e f o r m u l a t i o n in F o u c a u l t ' s Discipline and Punish. B o t h

H e g e l ' s p o s i t i o n a n d those i n s p i r e d b y N i e t z s c h e m i g h t also

b e u s e f u l l y c o m p a r e d w i t h F r e u d ' s c r i t i q u e o f the genesis

of m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e s in Civilization and Its Discontents. R e c a l l

that for H e g e l e th ica l i m p e r a t i v e s first e m e r g e in a defensive

response to absolute fear, a n d their emergence m u s t be c o n ­

s t r u e d as a p e r m u t a t i o n a n d refusal of that fear. T h i s absolute

54 Stubborn Attachment, Bodi ly Subjection

fear w a s the fear of death, hence a fear c o n d i t i o n e d by the

f inite character o f the b o d y . T h e e th ica l re fusal a n d s u b o r d i ­

n a t i o n of the b o d y m i g h t then be u n d e r s t o o d as a m a g i c a l

effort to p r e e m p t that ex is tent ia l negat ion . M o r e o v e r , the i d e a l

o f r a d i c a l sel f-suff iciency i s j e o p a r d i z e d b y the b o d y ' s p e r m e ­

a b i l i t y a n d d e p e n d e n c y . In this sense, e x c r e t i o n i s not the o n l y

" a n i m a l f u n c t i o n " that w o u l d s igni fy " d e f i l e m e n t " for this s u b ­

ject. T h e re p e ate d efforts to sacrif ice the b o d y w h i c h b e c o m e

repeated assert ions of the b o d y are also efforts to d e f e n d i t

against e v e r y t h i n g that " j e o p a r d i z e s " it , w h e r e to be in " jeop­

a r d y " denotes a danger s l i g h t l y less d i r e t h a n death , a k i n d

o f p e n e t r a t i v e p a r o x y s m that i m p l i e s b e i n g m o v e d o r s h a k e n

s e x u a l l y " t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h " (durch und durch angesteckt).

O n e c o u l d t h e n see i n the v a r i o u s f o r m s o f sel f-beratement a n d

s e l f - m o r t i f i c a t i o n t y p o l o g i z e d i n " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s ­

ness" a préf igurat ion of n e u r o s i s a n d p e r h a p s a lso a speci f ic

m o d a l i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l p a n i c . 6

We m i g h t t h e n r e r e a d the m o b i l i z i n g fear that i s b o t h re­

fused a n d r e r o u t e d b y the e th ica l i m p e r a t i v e i n t e r m s o f the

feared " e x p r o p r i a b i l i t y " of the b o d y . I f the b o n d s m a n ' s labor­

i n g a c t i v i t y c o u l d b e e x p r o p r i a t e d b y the l o r d a n d the essence

o f the b o n d s m a n ' s b o d y b e h e l d i n o w n e r s h i p b y that l o r d ,

then the b o d y const i tutes a site of contested o w n e r s h i p , one

w h i c h t h r o u g h d o m i n a t i o n o r the threat o f d e a t h c a n a l w a y s

b e o w n e d b y another. T h e b o d y appears t o b e n o t h i n g other

t h a n a threat to the project of safety a n d self-suff iciency that

g o v e r n s the Phenomenology's trajectory. T h e a n a l p r e o c c u p a ­

t i o n that d i r e c t l y precedes the ascendance i n t o a r e l i g i o u s c o n ­

cept o f an afterlife suggests that b o d i l y p e r m e a b i l i t y c a n o n l y

b e r e s o l v e d b y escape i n t o a n afterlife i n w h i c h n o b o d i e s exist

at a l l . T h i s a f f i r m a t i o n of the absolute n e g a t i o n of the b o d y

c o n t r a d i c t s a l l the ear l ier efforts to s u b o r d i n a t e or master the

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 55

b o d y within l i fe, efforts w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d in the asser t ion of

the i n e l u c t a b i l i t y o f the body . W h e r e a s other r e l i g i o u s n o t i o n s

t u r n e d o u t to be s u r r e p t i t i o u s w a y s o f reassert ing the b o d y ,

this one appears e x e m p t f r o m the d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l that i t

resolves.

P s y c h o a n a l y s i s theor izes the f a i l u r e to m a i n t a i n the subjec­

t i o n of the b o d y a l o n g l ines p a r a l l e l to these ear l ier d i a l e c t i c a l

reversals. T h e r e p r e s s i o n of the l i b i d o i s a l w a y s u n d e r s t o o d

as itself a l i b i d i n a l l y i n v e s t e d r e p r e s s i o n . H e n c e , the l i b i d o is

not a b s o l u t e l y negated t h r o u g h r e p r e s s i o n , b u t rather b e c o m e s

the i n s t r u m e n t o f its o w n subject ion. T h e repress ive l a w i s

not e x t e r n a l to the l i b i d o that i t represses, b u t the repress ive

l a w represses to the extent that r e p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s a l i b i d i ­

n a l a c t i v i t y . 7 F u r t h e r , m o r a l i n t e r d i c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y those that

are t u r n e d against the b o d y , are themselves s u s t a i n e d by the

b o d i l y a c t i v i t y that they seek to c u r b :

An idea . . . which belongs entirely to psychoanalysis and which

is foreign to people's ordinary way of thinking . . . it tells us that

conscience (or more correctly, the anxiety which later becomes con­

science) is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to begin with ,

but that later that relationship is reversed. Every renunciation of in­

stinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh

renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance. 8

A c c o r d i n g t o F r e u d , t h e n , the s e l f - i m p o s e d i m p e r a t i v e s o f c o n ­

science are p u r s u e d a n d a p p l i e d p r e c i s e l y because they are

n o w the site of the v e r y sat is fact ion that they seek to p r o ­

h i b i t . In other w o r d s , p r o h i b i t i o n b e c o m e s the d i s p l a c e d site

of sat is fact ion for the " i n s t i n c t " or des ire that is p r o h i b i t e d ,

an o c c a s i o n for r e l i v i n g the i n s t i n c t u n d e r the r u b r i c o f the

c o n d e m n i n g law. T h i s is, of course, the source of the f o r m of

c o m e d y i n w h i c h the bearer o f the m o r a l l a w t u r n s o u t t o

56 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

be the m o s t ser ious transgressor of its precepts ( H a w t h o r n e ' s

D i m s d a l e , T o m S t o p p a r d ' s m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r ) . Because this

d i s p l a c e d sat is fact ion i s e x p e r i e n c e d t h r o u g h the a p p l i c a t i o n

of the law, that a p p l i c a t i o n is r e i n v i g o r a t e d a n d intens i f ied

w i t h the emergence o f every p r o h i b i t e d desire. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n

does not seek to obl i terate p r o h i b i t e d desire; on the contrary,

p r o h i b i t i o n seeks t o r e p r o d u c e p r o h i b i t e d desire a n d b e c o m e s

intens i f ied t h r o u g h the r e n u n c i a t i o n s i t effects. T h e "afterl i fe"

o f p r o h i b i t e d desire i s in the p r o h i b i t i o n itself, w h e r e the p r o ­

h i b i t i o n not o n l y sustains, b u t is sustained by, the des ire that it

forces the subject to renounce . In this sense, then, r e n u n c i a t i o n

takes p lace through the v e r y desire that is r e n o u n c e d , w h i c h is

to say, the desire is never r e n o u n c e d , b u t b e c o m e s p r e s e r v e d

a n d reasserted i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e o f r e n u n c i a t i o n .

N i e t z s c h e m a k e s a s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t , d e p l o y i n g a d i a l e c t i ­

ca l s t r u c t u r e not u n l i k e H e g e l ' s , in h is c r i t i q u e o f the ascetic

i d e a l in On the Genealogy of Morals. T h e i n e l u c t a b i l i t y of the

b o d y i n " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " para l le l s the i n e l u c t ­

a b i l i t y o f " i n s t i n c t " i n F r e u d a n d that o f the w i l l i n N i e t z s c h e .

F o r N i e t z s c h e , the ascetic i d e a l , u n d e r s t o o d as a w i l l to n o t h ­

ingness, i s a w a y of i n t e r p r e t i n g a l l suf fer ing as g u i l t . A l t h o u g h

g u i l t w o r k s to d e n y a specif ic k i n d of object for h u m a n wants ,

i t cannot obl i terate the w a n t i n g character o f h u m a n s . A c c o r d ­

i n g to the dictates of g u i l t , then, " m a n h a d o n l y to want s o m e ­

t h i n g — a n d t o b e g i n w i t h , i t mat tered not w h a t , w h e r e t o , o r

h o w he w a n t e d : the will itself was saved." T h e ascetic i d e a l , v e r y

m u c h l i k e H e g e l ' s u n h a p p y consciousness , i s t o b e u n d e r ­

s t o o d , then, as:

that hatred against everything human, even more, against everything

animal, everything material, this disgust with the senses, w i t h rea­

son itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this desire to get away

from all semblance, change, becoming, death, wish, desire itself—the

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 57

meaning of al l this is a w i l l to nothingness, a w i l l running counter

to life, a revolt against the most fundamental presuppositions of life;

yet it is and remains a w i l l ! . . . rather than want nothing, man even

wants nothingness! 9

I do not m e a n to suggest that F r e u d ' s h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c

n o t i o n o f i n s t i n c t , H e g e l ' s inchoate body , a n d N i e t z s c h e ' s w i l l

are s t r i c t l y equiva lent . Yet I do w a n t to suggest that these three

t h i n k e r s c i r c u m s c r i b e a k i n d o f d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l w h i c h cen­

ters on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u l l or f i n a l ref lexive s u p p r e s s i o n

o f w h a t w e m i g h t l o o s e l y c a l l "the b o d y " w i t h i n the confines

of life. I f the s u p p r e s s i o n of the b o d y is i tself an i n s t r u m e n t a l

m o v e m e n t o f a n d b y the b o d y , then the b o d y i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y

p r e s e r v e d i n a n d b y the i n s t r u m e n t o f its s u p p r e s s i o n . T h e self-

defeat ing effort o f s u c h s u p p r e s s i o n , h o w e v e r , not o n l y leads

to its o p p o s i t e — a se l f -congratu latory or s e l f - a g g r a n d i z i n g as­

s e r t i o n o f desire , w i l l , the b o d y — i n m o r e c o n t e m p o r a r y for­

m u l a t i o n s i t leads to the e l a b o r a t i o n of an i n s t i t u t i o n of the

subject w h i c h exceeds the d i a l e c t i c a l f r a m e by w h i c h i t i s

s p a w n e d .

In H e g e l , the s u p p r e s s i o n o f b o d i l y l ife i s s h o w n to re­

q u i r e the v e r y b o d y that i t seeks to suppress ; in this sense,

the b o d y i s p r e s e r v e d i n a n d b y the v e r y act o f s u p p r e s s i o n .

F r e u d u n d e r s t o o d this d i f ferent ly i n his ana lys i s o f neuros is

as a k i n d of l i b i d i n a l a t tachment to a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h never­

theless t h w a r t s l i b i d i n a l grat i f i cat ion. W h e r e that t h w a r t i n g

const i tutes a r e p r e s s i o n , the s p l i t t i n g off of i d e a t i o n f r o m af­

fect, n e u r o s i s o r s y m p t o m f o r m a t i o n f o l l o w s . O n e m i g h t r e a d

H e g e l ' s references to eigensinnigkeit or s tubbornness as i l l u s ­

t r a t i n g the process o f s p l i t t i n g a n d defense i n the f o r m a t i o n

of neuros is . That H e g e l refers to this " u n h a p p i n e s s " as a k i n d

of s t u b b o r n at tachment suggests that, as in neuros is , the e t h i ­

ca l r e g u l a t i o n o f b o d i l y i m p u l s e b e c o m e s the focus a n d a i m

5» Stubborn Attachment, Bodi ly Subjection

o f i m p u l s e itself. In b o t h cases, we are g i v e n to u n d e r s t a n d an

at tachment to subject ion w h i c h is f o r m a t i v e of the ref lexive

s t r u c t u r e o f subject ion itself. T h e i m p u l s e o r b o d i l y e x p e r i e n c e

w h i c h w o u l d b e negated, t o r e t u r n t o H e g e l , i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y

preserved by the v e r y a c t i v i t y of negat ion .

W e c a n see i n b o t h H e g e l a n d F r e u d a c e r t a i n re l iance o n a

d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l b y w h i c h a b o d i l y exper ience , b r o a d l y c o n ­

s t r u e d , c o m e s u n d e r the censor of the l a w o n l y to reemerge as

the s u s t a i n i n g affect of that law. T h e F r e u d i a n n o t i o n of sub­

limation suggests that d e n i a l or d i s p l a c e m e n t of p l e a s u r e a n d

des ire c a n b e c o m e f o r m a t i v e of c u l t u r e ; h i s Civilization and Its

Discontents thus l a i d the g r o u n d for M a r c u s e ' s Eros and Civili­

zation. T h e i n a d v e r t e n t l y p r o d u c t i v e effects of s u b l i m a t i o n in

the f o r m a t i o n of c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s a p p e a r to exceed the d i a l e c ­

t i c a l r e v e r s a l b y w h i c h they are generated. W h e r e a s for M a r -

cuse, the d r i v e s , or eros a n d thanatos, p r e c e d e the r e g u l a t o r y

i m p e r a t i v e s b y w h i c h they are r e n d e r e d c u l t u r a l l y l i v a b l e , for

F o u c a u l t , the repress ive hypothes is , w h i c h appears t o i n c l u d e

w i t h i n its s t r u c t u r e the m o d e l o f s u b l i m a t i o n , fai ls t o w o r k

p r e c i s e l y because r e p r e s s i o n generates the v e r y p leasures a n d

desires i t seeks to regulate. F o r F o u c a u l t , r e p r e s s i o n does not

act on a p r e g i v e n f i e l d of p l e a s u r e a n d desire; i t const i tutes

that f i e l d as that w h i c h is to be r e g u l a t e d , that w h i c h is a l w a y s

p o t e n t i a l l y o r a c t u a l l y u n d e r the r u b r i c o f r e g u l a t i o n . T h e re­

p r e s s i v e r e g i m e , as F o u c a u l t cal ls it , requires its o w n self-

a u g m e n t a t i o n a n d p r o l i f e r a t i o n . A s s u c h , this r e g i m e requires

the f i e l d of b o d i l y i m p u l s e to e x p a n d a n d prol i ferate as a m o r ­

a l i z e d d o m a i n , s u c h that i t w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y have fresh m a t e r i a l

t h r o u g h w h i c h t o art iculate its o w n p o w e r . H e n c e , r e p r e s s i o n

p r o d u c e s a f i e l d o f i n f i n i t e l y m o r a l i z a b l e b o d i l y p h e n o m e n a

i n o r d e r t o faci l i tate a n d r a t i o n a l i z e its o w n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .

H e r e w e see that F o u c a u l t departs f r o m the k i n d o f d i a l e c t i -

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 59

ca l r e v e r s a l w e f o l l o w e d i n H e g e l . I n F o u c a u l t , the s u p p r e s s i o n

o f the b o d y not o n l y r e q u i r e s a n d p r o d u c e s the v e r y b o d y i t

seeks to suppress , i t goes fur ther by e x t e n d i n g the b o d i l y d o ­

m a i n t o b e r e g u l a t e d , p r o l i f e r a t i n g sites o f c o n t r o l , d i s c i p l i n e ,

a n d s u p p r e s s i o n . In other w o r d s , the b o d y presumed by the

H e g e l i a n e x p l a n a t i o n i s i n c e s s a n t l y p r o d u c e d a n d p r o l i f e r a t e d

in o r d e r to e x t e n d the d o m a i n o f j u r i d i c a l p o w e r . In this sense,

the res tr ic t ions p l a c e d on the b o d y not o n l y require a n d produce

the b o d y t h e y seek to restr ict , b u t proliferate the d o m a i n of the

b o d i l y b e y o n d the d o m a i n targeted b y the o r i g i n a l r e s t r i c t i o n .

In w h a t m a n y have c o m e to see as a f i n a l l y U t o p i a n gesture

i n F o u c a u l t , this p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f the b o d y b y j u r i d i c a l r e g i m e s

b e y o n d the terms of d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l is a lso the site of p o s ­

sible resistance. T h e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c d i s c o u r s e that w o u l d de­

scr ibe a n d p a t h o l o g i z e r e p r e s s e d des ire ends u p p r o d u c i n g a

d i s c u r s i v e i n c i t e m e n t t o des ire: i m p u l s e i s c o n t i n u a l l y f a b r i ­

cated as a site of confess ion a n d , hence, p o t e n t i a l c o n t r o l , b u t

this f a b r i c a t i o n exceeds the r e g u l a t o r y a i m s by w h i c h i t i s gen­

erated. In this sense, c r i m i n a l codes w h i c h seek to cata logue

a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e n o r m a l c y b e c o m e the site for a contesta­

t i o n o f the concept o f the n o r m a l ; sexologists w h o w o u l d clas­

sify a n d p a t h o l o g i z e h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n a d v e r t e n t l y p r o v i d e the

c o n d i t i o n s for a p r o l i f e r a t i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n of h o m o s e x u a l

cul tures .

W i t h i n the H e g e l i a n f r a m e w o r k , the subject, w h i c h spl i ts

itself off f r o m its b o d y , r e q u i r e s that b o d y in o r d e r to sus­

t a i n its s p l i t t i n g a c t i v i t y ; the b o d y to be s u p p r e s s e d i s thus

m a r s h a l l e d i n the serv ice o f that s u p p r e s s i o n . F o r F o u c a u l t ,

the b o d y to be r e g u l a t e d i s s i m i l a r l y m a r s h a l l e d in the ser­

v i c e o f s u p p r e s s i o n , b u t the b o d y i s not c o n s t i t u t e d p r i o r to

that r e g u l a t i o n . On the contrary , the b o d y i s p r o d u c e d as an

object of r e g u l a t i o n , a n d for r e g u l a t i o n to a u g m e n t itself, the

6o Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

b o d y is proliferated as an object of r e g u l a t i o n . T h i s p r o l i f e r a t i o n

b o t h m a r k s off F o u c a u l t ' s t h e o r y f r o m H e g e l ' s a n d const i tutes

the site of p o t e n t i a l resistance to r e g u l a t i o n . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y

o f this resistance i s d e r i v e d f r o m w h a t i s unforeseeable in p r o ­

l i f e r a t i o n . B u t t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w a r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e c o u l d

p r o d u c e effects w h i c h are not o n l y unforeseeable but c o n s t i ­

tute resistance, i t seems that we m u s t r e t u r n to the q u e s t i o n of

s t u b b o r n at tachments a n d , m o r e prec ise ly , to the p lace of that

at tachment in the s u b v e r s i o n of the law.

A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t c r i t i c i z e s F r e u d ' s h y p o t h e s i s o f repres­

s i o n , h e i s i n d e b t e d t o this t h e o r i z a t i o n i n h is o w n a c c o u n t o f

the p r o d u c t i o n a n d p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f the r e g u l a t e d body . In p a r ­

t i c u l a r , the l o g i c o f subject ion i n b o t h H e g e l a n d F r e u d i m p l i e s

that the i n s t r u m e n t of s u p p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s the n e w s t r u c t u r e

a n d a i m of desire , a t least w h e n subject ion p r o v e s effective.

B u t i f a r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e r e q u i r e s the p r o d u c t i o n of n e w

sites of r e g u l a t i o n a n d , hence, a m o r e t h o r o u g h g o i n g m o r a l -

i z a t i o n of the b o d y , t h e n w h a t i s the p lace of b o d i l y i m p u l s e ,

desire, a n d at tachment? D o e s the r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e not o n l y

p r o d u c e desire, b u t b e c o m e p r o d u c e d by the c u l t i v a t i o n of a

c e r t a i n at tachment to the r u l e of subject ion? If p a r t of w h a t

r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e s do is to c o n s t r a i n the f o r m a t i o n a n d at­

tachments of desire , t h e n it seems that f r o m the start a c e r t a i n

d e t a c h a b i l i t y of i m p u l s e is p r e s u m e d , a c e r t a i n i n c o m m e n s u ­

r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n the c a p a c i t y for a b o d i l y attachment, on the

one h a n d , a n d the site w h e r e i t i s c o n f i n e d , on the other. F o u ­

caul t appears to p r e s u m e p r e c i s e l y this d e t a c h a b i l i t y of desire

i n c l a i m i n g that i n c i t e m e n t s a n d reversals are t o s o m e degree

unforeseeable, that they have the capaci ty , c e n t r a l to the n o t i o n

of resistance, to exceed the r e g u l a t o r y a i m s for w h i c h they w e r e

p r o d u c e d . I f a g i v e n r e g i m e cannot f u l l y c o n t r o l the i n c i t e ­

m e n t s that i t nevertheless p r o d u c e s , is that in part the result

Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 61

of a resistance, at the l e v e l of i m p u l s e , to a f u l l a n d f ina l d o ­

m e s t i c a t i o n b y a n y r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e ?

W h a t H e g e l i m p l i e s i n " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " i s

not m e r e l y that m o r a l w r e t c h e d n e s s cannot b e c o h e r e n t l y sus­

t a i n e d , that i t i n v a r i a b l y concedes the b o d i l y b e i n g that i t

seeks to deny, but that the p u r s u i t of wretchedness , the attach­

ment to w r e t c h e d n e s s , i s b o t h the c o n d i t i o n a n d the p o t e n ­

t i a l u n d o i n g of s u c h subject ion. I f w r e t c h e d n e s s , agony, a n d

p a i n are sites or m o d e s o f s tubbornness , w a y s o f a t t a c h i n g to

oneself, n e g a t i v e l y a r t i c u l a t e d m o d e s of re f lex iv i ty , t h e n that

is because they are g i v e n by r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e s as the sites

avai lable for at tachment , a n d a subject w i l l attach to p a i n

rather t h a n not attach at a l l . F o r F r e u d , an infant f o r m s a

p l e a s u r e - g i v i n g at tachment to a n y e x c i t a t i o n that comes its

way, e v e n the m o s t t r a u m a t i c , w h i c h accounts for the f o r m a ­

t i o n of m a s o c h i s m a n d , for some, the p r o d u c t i o n of abject ion,

reject ion, w r e t c h e d n e s s , a n d so on as the necessary p r e c o n d i ­

t ions for love . T h e gesture o f reject ion c a n b e c o m e m a s o c h ­

i s t i c a l l y e r o t i c i z e d o n l y because i t is a gesture. A l t h o u g h the

rejecting gesture's a l l e g e d p u r p o s e i s to t h w a r t an o n c o m i n g

desire, it nevertheless appears as a gesture, thus making itself

present a n d l e n d i n g itself to b e i n g r e a d as a k i n d of o f fer ing or,

m i n i m a l l y , presence. P r e c i s e l y because the gesture of re ject ion

is, i t r h e t o r i c a l l y denies the threat of w i t h d r a w a l that it never­

theless p u r p o r t s to signify. F o r the infant , the presence or de-

t e r m i n a c y of that object, no matter h o w p e r s i s t e n t l y reject ing,

is nevertheless a site of presence a n d e x c i t a t i o n a n d , hence, is

better t h a n no object a t a l l . T h i s t r u i s m is not far f r o m N i e t z ­

sche's l i n e that the w i l l w o u l d rather w i l l n o t h i n g n e s s t h a n not

w i l l at a l l . In b o t h cases, the des ire to des ire is a w i l l i n g n e s s to

desire p r e c i s e l y that w h i c h w o u l d foreclose desire, i f o n l y for

the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g to desire.

62 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection

T h e q u e s t i o n , then, that H e g e l a n d F r e u d w o u l d a p p e a r

to pose for F o u c a u l t is w h e t h e r this t e r r a i n of " s t u b b o r n at­

t a c h m e n t " does not i n s o m e w a y f igure i n the scenarios o f

subject ion that he descr ibes . To w h a t extent does a r e g u l a t o r y

r e g i m e e x p l o i t this w i l l i n g n e s s to at tach b l i n d l y to w h a t seeks

to suppress or negate that v e r y at tachment? A n d to w h a t ex­

tent does the at tachment that a r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e requires

p r o v e to be b o t h its c o n s t i t u t i v e f a i l u r e a n d the p o t e n t i a l site

of resistance? If des ire has as its f i n a l a i m the c o n t i n u a t i o n of

i t s e l f — a n d here one m i g h t l i n k H e g e l , F r e u d , a n d F o u c a u l t a l l

back to S p i n o z a ' s conatus — then the c a p a c i t y of desire to be

w i t h d r a w n a n d t o reattach w i l l const i tute s o m e t h i n g l i k e the

v u l n e r a b i l i t y of e v e r y strategy of subject ion.

Circuits of Bad Conscience Nietzsche and Freud

Nie tzsche offers a v i e w of consc ience as a m e n t a l a c t i v i t y

that not o n l y f o r m s v a r i o u s p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a , b u t i s

i tself formed, the consequence of a d i s t i n c t i v e k i n d of i n t e r n a l ­

i z a t i o n . I n N i e t z s c h e , w h o d i s t i n g u i s h e s conscience f r o m b a d

conscience, the w i l l i s s a i d t o t u r n b a c k u p o n itself. B u t w h a t

are w e t o m a k e o f this strange l o c u t i o n ; h o w are w e b e i n g

a s k e d t o i m a g i n e a w i l l s u c h that i t reco i l s a n d redoubles u p o n

itself; a n d h o w , m o s t p e r t i n e n t l y , i s this f igure b e i n g offered as

a w a y to art iculate the k i n d of r e f l e x i v i t y c e n t r a l to the o p e r a ­

t i o n o f b a d conscience? F r e u d w i l l use a s i m i l a r la ng u a g e i n

w r i t i n g o f the f o r m a t i o n o f conscience, e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n t o

p a r a n o i a a n d n a r c i s s i s m . H e descr ibes consc ience a s the force

of a desire — a l t h o u g h s o m e t i m e s a force of a g g r e s s i o n — a s it

t u r n s b a c k on itself, a n d he u n d e r s t a n d s p r o h i b i t i o n , n o t as a

l a w e x t e r n a l to desire, b u t as the v e r y o p e r a t i o n of des ire as

i t t u r n s o n its o w n p o s s i b i l i t y . W h a t sense d o w e m a k e o f the

f igure that emerges in the context of b o t h explanat ions , that of

a w i l l that t u r n s b a c k on itself, that of a des ire that t u r n s b a c k

o n itself? W e m u s t ask not o n l y h o w this f igure o f r e c o i l i n g a n d

64 Circuits of Bad Conscience Nietzsche and Freud 65

r e d o u b l i n g becomes centra l t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g b a d conscience,

but w h a t this f igure suggests about the b o d i l y p o s i t i o n or d i s ­

p o s i t i o n e n c o d e d i n the s t r u c t u r e o f ref lexiv i ty . W h y does a

b o d y d o u b l e d over on itself f igure w h a t i t m e a n s to be a self-

c o n s c i o u s sort of be ing?

T h e n o t i o n that m o r a l i t y i s p r e d i c a t e d on a c e r t a i n k i n d of

v i o l e n c e i s a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r , but m o r e s u r p r i s i n g i s that s u c h

v i o l e n c e f o u n d s the subject. M o r a l i t y p e r f o r m s that v i o l e n c e

a g a i n a n d a g a i n in c u l t i v a t i n g the subject as a ref lexive b e i n g .

T h i s is, i n par t , w h a t l e d N i e t z s c h e t o reflect that m o r a l i t y

is a k i n d of i l lness . If this t u r n i n g on oneself c a n be c a l l e d a

k i n d o f v i o l e n c e , i t cannot s i m p l y b e o p p o s e d i n the n a m e o f

n o n v i o l e n c e , for w h e n a n d w h e r e i t i s o p p o s e d , i t i s o p p o s e d

f r o m a p o s i t i o n that p r e s u p p o s e s this v e r y v io lence . I do not

w i s h s i m p l y t o u n d e r s c o r e the a p o r e t i c s t r u c t u r e i n v o l v e d i n

the a s s u m p t i o n of m o r a l i t y , n o r s i m p l y to a f f i r m the genera l ­

i z e d v i o l e n c e i n a n y a n d a l l m o r a l p o s i t i o n i n g , a l t h o u g h b o t h

ins ights , f u r n i s h e d by d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , f o r m a p o i n t o f d e p a r ­

ture for w h a t I seek to do. Rather, I w o u l d suggest that the

subject w h o w o u l d o p p o s e v i o l e n c e , e v e n v i o l e n c e to itself, i s

itself the effect of a p r i o r v i o l e n c e w i t h o u t w h i c h the subject

c o u l d not have e m e r g e d . C a n that p a r t i c u l a r c i rc le b e b r o k e n ?

H o w a n d w h e n does that breakage o c c u r ? A n d w h a t emerges

as a s igni f icant p o s s i b i l i t y in w h i c h the subject loses its c l o s e d

c o n t o u r , the c i r c u l a r i t y of its o w n ref lexive c losure? A p u r e

w i l l , o n t o l o g i c a l l y intact p r i o r t o a n y a r t i c u l a t i o n , does not

s u d d e n l y emerge as a p r i n c i p l e of se l f -augmentat ion a n d self-

a f f i r m a t i o n that exceeds the b o u n d s o f a n y a n d a l l r e g u l a t o r y

schémas. Rather, the f o r m a t i v e a n d f a b r i c a t i n g d i m e n s i o n o f

p s y c h i c l ife, w h i c h travels u n d e r the n a m e o f the " w i l l , " a n d

w h i c h i s u s u a l l y associated w i t h a r e s t r i c t i v e l y aesthetic d o ­

m a i n , p r o v e s centra l t o r e f a s h i o n i n g the n o r m a t i v e shackles

that n o subject c a n d o w i t h o u t , b u t w h i c h n o subject i s c o n ­

d e m n e d to repeat in exact ly the same way.

M y i n q u i r y concerns a pers istent p r o b l e m that emerges

w h e n we t r y to t h i n k the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a w i l l that takes i tself

as its o w n object a n d , t h r o u g h the f o r m a t i o n of that k i n d of re­

f lex iv i ty , b i n d s itself t o itself, acquires its o w n i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h

ref lexiv i ty . To w h a t extent is this a p p a r e n t sel f-bondage f u l l y

or e x c l u s i v e l y se l f - imposed? Is this strange p o s t u r e of the w i l l

in the service of a s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n that r e q u i r e s the p r o d u c ­

t i o n of the subject a consequence or an e x p r e s s i o n of b a d

conscience? I s u p p o s e that those w h o seek to r e d e e m N i e t z ­

sche by c l a i m i n g that he can be i n v o k e d in the serv ice o f the

e thica l m i g h t t h i n k that the o n l y a l ternat ive w o r s e t h a n b a d

conscience is its o b l i t e r a t i o n . B u t r e m e m b e r that N i e t z s c h e not

o n l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n the e t h i c a l a n d m o r a l i t y , b u t asks

about the value of m o r a l i t y , thus i n s t a t i n g a v a l u e by w h i c h

m o r a l i t y m i g h t be assessed, b u t s u g g e s t i n g as w e l l that this

assessment, this v a l u a t i o n , m a y not be r e d u c i b l e to m o r a l i t y .

I take i t that the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of N i e t z s c h e w i t h the ques­

t i o n of ethics is, i n d e e d , a q u e s t i o n because N i e t z s c h e a n d v a r i ­

ous f igures w i t h i n the C o n t i n e n t a l t r a d i t i o n have b e e n f o u n d

g u i l t y b y assoc iat ion w i t h i r r e s p o n s i b l e acts a n d events. W h a t

w i l l be the response to these charges? To take the s ide of the

e th ica l , t o relate each a n d e v e r y t h i n k e r t o the ethical? O r w i l l

this be an o c c a s i o n to t h i n k the p r o b l e m a b i t m o r e careful ly ,

to c o n t i n u e to pose the e th ica l as a q u e s t i o n , one w h i c h c a n n o t

b e freed o f its c o m p l i c i t y w i t h w h a t i t m o s t s t r o n g l y o p p o s e s ?

W i l l this , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , b e c o m e a t i m e i n w h i c h w e reflect

u p o n the m o r e p e r v a s i v e d i m e n s i o n s o f c o m p l i c i t y a n d w h a t

m i g h t be d e r i v e d f r o m s u c h a v e x e d r e l a t i o n to p o w e r ?

I u n d e r s t a n d the des ire to resituate N i e t z s c h e w i t h i n the

e t h i c a l d o m a i n as an effort to c o u n t e r the car icature , w i t h i n

66 Circuits of Bad Conscience Nietzsche and Freud 67

c o n t e m p o r a r y c r i t i c i s m , o f N i e t z s c h e a s one w h o o n l y de­

s t roys the d o m a i n of va lues ( w h e r e that d e s t r u c t i o n is not itself

a s o u r c e of v a l u e , or a v a l u e in i tsel f) . I w a n t i n s t e a d to sug­

gest that N i e t z s c h e offers us a p o l i t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o the f o r m a ­

t i o n o f the p s y c h e a n d the p r o b l e m o f subject ion, u n d e r s t o o d

p a r a d o x i c a l l y not m e r e l y as the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of a subject to

a n o r m , b u t as the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a subject t h r o u g h p r e c i s e l y

s u c h a s u b o r d i n a t i o n . Indeed, to the extent that b a d consc ience

i n v o l v e s a t u r n i n g against oneself, a b o d y in r e c o i l u p o n itself,

h o w does this f igure serve the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n of the subject,

a n d h o w m i g h t w e u n d e r s t a n d this m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l s u b ­

ject ion, w i t h o u t w h i c h no p r o p e r subject emerges? I w a n t to

suggest that, a l t h o u g h there is no f ina l u n d o i n g of the ref lexive

b i n d , that p o s t u r e of the self bent against itself, a pass ionate

d e r e g u l a t i o n of the subject m a y p e r h a p s p r e c i p i t a t e a t e n u o u s

u n r a v e l i n g of that c o n s t i t u t i v e k n o t . W h a t emerges i s not the

u n s h a c k l e d w i l l o r a " b e y o n d " t o p o w e r , b u t another d i r e c ­

t i o n for w h a t i s m o s t f o r m a t i v e in p a s s i o n , a f o r m a t i v e p o w e r

w h i c h is at once the c o n d i t i o n of its v i o l e n c e against itself, its

status as a necessary f i c t i o n , a n d the site of its e n a b l i n g p o s s i ­

b i l i t ies . T h i s recast ing o f the " w i l l " i s not , p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g ,

the w i l l o f a subject, n o r is i t an effect f u l l y c u l t i v a t e d by a n d

t h r o u g h s o c i a l n o r m s ; i t is, I w o u l d suggest, the site at w h i c h

the s o c i a l i m p l i c a t e s the p s y c h i c i n its v e r y f o r m a t i o n — o r , t o

be m o r e precise , as its v e r y f o r m a t i o n a n d f o r m a t i v i t y .

C o n s i d e r the g e n e r a l c l a i m that the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n of the

subject c o m p e l s a passionate a t tachment to r e g u l a t i o n , a n d

that this f o r m a t i o n o f the w i l l takes p l a c e in p a r t t h r o u g h the

a c t i o n of a r e p r e s s i o n . A l t h o u g h one is t e m p t e d to c l a i m that

s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n i s s i m p l y i n t e r n a l i z e d , t a k e n f r o m the out­

s ide a n d b r o u g h t into the p s y c h e , the p r o b l e m i s m o r e c o m ­

p l i c a t e d a n d , i n d e e d , m o r e i n s i d i o u s . F o r the b o u n d a r y that

d i v i d e s the o u t s i d e f r o m the i n s i d e i s in the p r o c e s s o f b e i n g

i n s t a l l e d , p r e c i s e l y t h r o u g h the r e g u l a t i o n of the subject. T h e

r e p r e s s i o n i s the v e r y t u r n i n g back o n i tself w h i c h the pas­

sionate a t tachment t o subject ion p e r f o r m s . H o w c a n a w i l l b e

e n t i c e d to m a k e s u c h a t u r n ? A r e we to t h i n k that t u r n as an

i n t e r n a l b e n d i n g of the p s y c h e against i tself? I f so, w h y is i t

f i g u r e d as a b o d y that t u r n s on a n d against i tself? A r e the p s y ­

c h i c a n d the somat ic a r t i c u l a t e d t h r o u g h one another i n s u c h

a w a y that the f i g u r a t i o n of the first is i m p l i c a t e d i n v a r i a b l y

in a chiast ic r e l a t i o n to the second? C l e a r l y , w h a t is at stake

i s s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n a n d dif ferent f r o m a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n

a n external d e m a n d offered b y r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r a n d a n i n ­

terna l r e c o i l reg is tered as its s e c o n d a r y effect. If p r e s u p p o s e d

in the v e r y n o t i o n of the subject is a pass ionate at tachment to

subject ion, then the subject w i l l not emerge save as an e x e m ­

p l i f i c a t i o n a n d effect of this at tachment. I h o p e to s h o w , first

t h r o u g h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f N i e t z s c h e , t h e n in r e l a t i o n to F r e u d ,

h o w the v e r y n o t i o n of re f lex iv i ty , as an emergent s t r u c t u r e of

the subject, is the consequence of a " t u r n i n g b a c k on itself," a

repeated self-beratement w h i c h comes t o f o r m the m i s n o m e r

of "conscience," a n d that there is no f o r m a t i o n of the subject

w i t h o u t a passionate a t tachment to subject ion.

S igni f i cant ly , N i e t z s c h e attr ibutes a creat ive or f o r m a t i v e

p o w e r t o conscience, a n d the act o f t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n one­

self is not o n l y the c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the s u b ­

ject, b u t the c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of f i c t i o n , f a b r i c a t i o n ,

a n d t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n . I n d e e d , N i e t z s c h e r e m a r k s that b a d c o n ­

science fabricates the s o u l , that expanse of i n t e r i o r p s y c h i c

space. If the subject is u n d e r s t o o d as a k i n d of necessary f ic­

t i o n , t h e n i t is a lso one of the first ar t i s t ic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s

p r e s u p p o s e d b y m o r a l i t y . T h e art ist ic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f b a d

conscience exceed the p u r v i e w of the subject; i n d e e d , t h e y

68 Circuits of Bad Conscience

w i l l c o m e t o i n c l u d e " a l l i m a g i n a t i v e a n d i d e a l p h e n o m e n a , "

i n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t u a l t h i n k i n g , f igurat ive w r i t i n g , a n d the c o n ­

jec tured fables a n d m y t h s w h i c h c o m p o s e the v a r i o u s r e t r o ­

spect ive i m a g i n i n g s of genealogy. In this sense, the c o n d i t i o n

o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n w r i t i n g appears t o b e the b a d

conscience for w h i c h i t seeks to g i v e an account .

N i e t z s c h e offers a n a r r a t i v e that seeks to account for this

f o r m a t i o n , b u t h is n a r r a t i v e w i l l b e aff l icted f r o m the start b y

the v e r y conscience that i t seeks to u n c o v e r for us. T h e c l a i m

that conscience is a f i c t i o n is not to be c o n f u s e d w i t h the c l a i m

that consc ience is a r b i t r a r y or d ispensable ; on the contrary , i t

i s a necessary f i c t i o n , one w i t h o u t w h i c h the g r a m m a t i c a l a n d

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l subject cannot exist. B u t i f its f ic t ive status

does not d i s p e l its necessity, h o w are we to construe the sense

of that necessi ty? M o r e precise ly , w h a t does i t m e a n to say

that a subject emerges o n l y t h r o u g h the a c t i o n of t u r n i n g b a c k

on itself? If th is t u r n i n g b a c k on oneself is a t rope , a m o v e ­

m e n t w h i c h is a l w a y s a n d o n l y figured as a b o d i l y m o v e m e n t ,

b u t w h i c h n o b o d y l i t e r a l l y p e r f o r m s , i n w h a t w i l l the neces­

s i t y of s u c h a f i g u r a t i o n consist? T h e t r o p e appears to be the

s h a d o w of a b o d y , a s h a d o w i n g of that b o d y ' s v i o l e n c e against

itself, a b o d y in s p e c t r a l a n d l i n g u i s t i c f o r m that i s the s i g n i ­

f y i n g m a r k o f the p s y c h e ' s emergence.

C o n s i d e r e d g r a m m a t i c a l l y , i t w i l l s e e m that there m u s t first

be a subject w h o t u r n s b a c k on itself, yet I w i l l argue that there

is no subject except as a consequence of this v e r y ref lexiv i ty .

H o w c a n the subject b e p r e s u m e d a t b o t h ends o f this p r o ­

cess, e s p e c i a l l y w h e n i t is the v e r y f o r m a t i o n of the subject for

w h i c h this process seeks t o g i v e a n account?

If, in F r e u d , consc ience is a passionate at tachment to prohi­

bition, an at tachment w h i c h takes the f o r m of a t u r n i n g b a c k

on oneself, does the f o r m a t i o n of the ego take p lace as the sed i -

Nietzsche and Freud 69

m e n t e d resul t o f this p e c u l i a r f o r m o f re f lex iv i ty? T h e n o u n

f o r m "ego" w i l l t h e n re i fy a n d m a s k the i terated a c c u m u l a t i o n

o f this ref lexive m o v e m e n t . O f w h a t i s this r e f l e x i v i t y c o m ­

p o s e d ? W h a t i s i t that i s s a i d t o t u r n b a c k u p o n w h a t ? A n d

w h a t c o m p o s e s the a c t i o n of " t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n " ? I w a n t to

suggest that this l o g i c a l c i r c u l a r i t y i n w h i c h the subject a p ­

pears at once to be p r e s u p p o s e d a n d not yet f o r m e d , on the

one h a n d , o r f o r m e d a n d hence not p r e s u p p o s e d , o n the other,

i s a m e l i o r a t e d w h e n one u n d e r s t a n d s that i n b o t h F r e u d a n d

N i e t z s c h e this r e l a t i o n s h i p o f r e f l e x i v i t y i s a l w a y s a n d o n l y f ig­

u r e d , a n d that this f igure m a k e s n o o n t o l o g i c a l c l a i m . T o refer

to a " w i l l , " m u c h less to its " t u r n i n g b a c k on itself," is a strange

w a y to speak, strange because i t f igures a process w h i c h can­

not b e d e t a c h e d f r o m o r u n d e r s t o o d apart f r o m that v e r y f i g u ­

r a t i o n . I n d e e d , for N i e t z s c h e , the w r i t i n g o f s u c h f igurat ions ,

a n d f i g u r a t i o n i n genera l , are p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f the " i d e a l a n d

i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a " w h i c h are the consequences o f b a d

conscience. H e n c e , w e d o n o t c o m e t o k n o w s o m e t h i n g about

b a d conscience w h e n we c o n s i d e r the strange f igure o f reflex­

i v i t y that N i e t z s c h e offers us. We are, as i t were , caught up in

the l u r i n g effects of b a d conscience at the v e r y textua l m o m e n t

w h e n w e seek t o k n o w w h a t , prec ise ly , this b a d conscience is.

I f i t i s c r e d i t e d w i t h b e i n g the g r o u n d of f i g u r a t i o n , yet c a n

itself o n l y be f i g u r e d — i n d e e d , f i g u r e d as that g r o u n d — t h e c i r ­

c u l a r i t y w h i c h m i g h t b e l a m e n t e d f r o m a l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e

c o n c e r n e d w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g clear sequence b e c o m e s the c o n ­

s t i t u t i v e feature of b a d conscience, c o n s i d e r e d b o t h as a f igure

a n d as the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y for f i g u r a t i o n itself.

T h e a p p a r e n t c i r c u l a r i t y of this account reappears in a re­

la ted set o f q u a n d a r i e s . W h a t m o t i v a t e s the w i l l to t u r n b a c k

on i tsel f? D o e s i t t u r n b a c k on itself u n d e r the p r e s s u r e o f

an external force or law, u n d e r the a n t i c i p a t e d or r e c o l l e c t e d

70 Circuits of Bad Conscience

force o f p u n i s h m e n t ? O r does this p e c u l i a r f o r m o f r e f l e x i v i t y

take p l a c e p r i o r to, o r i n s o m e other f o r m o f c o m p l i c i t y w i t h ,

a set of e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d d e m a n d s ?

To c l a r i f y this last p o i n t i t is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o n s i d e r the

thesis that p u n i s h m e n t precedes conscience, a n d that c o n ­

science c a n be u n d e r s t o o d as the u n p r o b l e m a t i c i n t e r n a l i z a ­

t i o n o f p u n i s h m e n t , its m n e m o n i c trace. A l t h o u g h there are

c l e a r l y textua l m o m e n t s i n w h i c h N i e t z s c h e appears t o b e

a r g u i n g for s u c h a t e m p o r a l p r i o r i t y o f p u n i s h m e n t to c o n ­

science, there are also c o m p e t i n g v i e w s i n N i e t z s c h e w h i c h

c a l l this s e q u e n t i a l account i n t o q u e s t i o n .

I f the w i l l in N i e t z s c h e is at its m o s t p r o d u c t i v e — t h a t is, its

m o s t c o n s c i e n t i o u s — w h e n i t i s t u r n e d b a c k u p o n itself, t h e n i t

appears that the s e v e r i t y of consc ience is l i n k e d to the s t r e n g t h

o f the w i l l o f w h i c h i t i s c o m p o s e d . S i m i l a r l y , for F r e u d , the

s t r e n g t h of consc ience i s n o u r i s h e d p r e c i s e l y by the aggress ion

that i t forb ids . In this sense, t h e n , the s t rength of consc ience

correlates ne i ther w i t h the s t r e n g t h of a p u n i s h m e n t r e c e i v e d

n o r w i t h the s t r e n g t h of a m e m o r y of a p u n i s h m e n t r e c e i v e d ,

but with the strength of one's own aggression, one w h i c h is s a i d to

have v e n t e d itself external ly , b u t w h i c h n o w , u n d e r the r u b r i c

of b a d conscience, is s a i d to vent itself in ternal ly . T h i s latter

v e n t i n g is a lso at the same t i m e a fabr icat ing: an i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n

w h i c h is p r o d u c e d or fabr icated as the effect of a s u b l i m a t i o n .

T h i s c i r c u l a r i t y ap p e ar s to break the l i n e o f c a u s a l i t y or i n ­

t e r n a l i z a t i o n u s u a l l y conjectured b e t w e e n a n external o r h i s ­

t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f p u n i s h m e n t a n d a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f the

m n e m o n i c trace o f that p u n i s h m e n t i n the f o r m o f conscience.

B u t i f consc ience i s s e l f - d e r i v e d i n this way , a n d n o t d e r i v e d

u n i l a t e r a l l y f r o m a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f a n external o r h i s t o r i c a l

p u n i s h m e n t , i s there s o m e other w a y to u n d e r s t a n d its func­

t i o n in the p r o c e s s of s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n ? Is i t p o s s i b l e to u n d e r -

Nietzsche and Freud 71

s t a n d the force o f p u n i s h m e n t o u t s i d e o f the w a y s i n w h i c h i t

e x p l o i t s a narc iss i s t i c d e m a n d , or, to p u t i t in a N i e t z s c h e a n

v e i n , i s i t p o s s i b l e to u n d e r s t a n d the force of p u n i s h m e n t out­

s ide o f the w a y s i n w h i c h i t e x p l o i t s the w i l l ' s a t tachment t o

i tself?

To c l a i m that there is a pass ionate at tachment to subject ion

appears to p r e s u p p o s e that there is first a p a s s i o n , a n d that its

a i m i s t o attach t o s o m e k i n d o f object. I n N i e t z s c h e , there w i l l

emerge a q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r this p r i m a r y p a s s i o n , th is w i l l ,

precedes the at tachments b y w h i c h i t i s k n o w n , o r w h e t h e r its

at tachments p r e c e d e its pass ions or a c q u i r e their pass ionate

character o n l y after an at tachment i s a s s u m e d . (It m a y i n v a r i ­

ably b e b o t h , p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e set o f t e m ­

p o r a l trajectories. In s o m e w a y s , we m i g h t see this q u e s t i o n as

p e r v a d i n g the debates b e t w e e n L a c a n i a n a n d object-relat ions

construa ls o f F r e u d . )

Nietzsche's Account of Bad Conscience

N i e t z s c h e ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of b a d conscience in On the

Genealogy of Morals is i n t r o d u c e d in sect ion 16 of the sec­

o n d essay. A t first, the r e l a t i o n o f th is n o t i o n t o the n o t i o n

of consc ience i n t r o d u c e d ear l ier in the same essay is unc lear .

C o n s c i e n c e i s i n t r o d u c e d v i a the a n i m a l w h o i s b r e d t o k e e p

p r o m i s e s , a n d i n r e l a t i o n t o the " s o v e r e i g n " m a n . T h e one w h o

m a k e s a n d k e e p s h is p r o m i s e i s one w h o "has b r e d i n h i m s e l f

a . . . f a c u l t y " o p p o s e d to forgetfulness, n a m e l y , a m e m o r y ,

w h i c h b e c o m e s "a memory of the will."1 H e r e N i e t z s c h e refers

to an " i m p r e s s i o n " that is a c t i v e l y s u s t a i n e d by a desire, one

w h i c h i s n o t forgotten, b u t w h i c h , i n b e i n g a c t i v e l y r e m e m ­

b e r e d , p r o d u c e s the p r o t r a c t e d c o n t i n u i t y o f the w i l l . B u t this

i m p r e s s i o n i s n o t spec i f ied . A n i m p r e s s i o n f r o m w h e r e ? I n the

72 Circuits of Bad Conscience Nietzsche and Freud 73

service o f w h a t ? N i e t z s c h e t h e n insists that the one w h o m a k e s

p r o m i s e s w i l l not a l l o w a n y t h i n g t o i n t e r r u p t the process b y

w h i c h a n o r i g i n a l statement, " I w i l l " o r " I s h a l l d o this," c u l m i ­

nates in the d i s c h a r g e o f the d e s i g n a t e d act. T h e one w h o t r u l y

p r o m i s e s w i e l d s the p o w e r of the s o v e r e i g n to enact w h a t he

says, to b r i n g i n t o b e i n g w h a t he w i l l s . In other w o r d s , the

p r o m i s i n g b e i n g establishes a c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n a statement

a n d a n act, a l t h o u g h the t e m p o r a l d i s j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n the

t w o i s a c k n o w l e d g e d as an o p p o r t u n i t y for the i n t e r v e n t i o n of

v a r i o u s c o m p e t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d accidents . In the face o f

these c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d accidents , the w i l l c o n t i n u e s t o p r o ­

d u c e itself, to labor on itself in the serv ice of m a k i n g of itself

a c o n t i n u i t y , w h e r e that c o n t i n u i t y , that " l o n g c h a i n of w i l l , "

a s N i e t z s c h e p u t s it , establishes its o w n t e m p o r a l i t y over a n d

against a n y other w h i c h m i g h t seek to c o m p l i c a t e or q u a l i f y its

e x e c u t i o n . T h i s p r o m i s i n g b e i n g i s one w h o stands for h i m s e l f

t h r o u g h t i m e a n d w h o s e w o r d c o n t i n u e s t h r o u g h t i m e , one

" w h o gives [his] w o r d as s o m e t h i n g that can be r e l i e d on be­

cause [h]e k n o w [ s ] h i m s e l f to be s t r o n g e n o u g h to m a i n t a i n i t

i n the face o f a c c i d e n t s " (60/294). T h i s p r o t r a c t e d w i l l , w h i c h i s

se l f - ident ica l t h r o u g h t i m e a n d w h i c h establishes its o w n t i m e ,

const i tutes the m a n o f conscience. ( O d d l y e n o u g h , this i d e a l o f

the eff icacious speech act p r e s u p p o s e d b y p r o m i s i n g i s u n d e r ­

cut b y N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n n o t i o n o f the s i g n c h a i n , a c c o r d i n g t o

w h i c h a s i g h i s b o u n d to s i g n i f y in w a y s that estrange the s i g n

f r o m the o r i g i n a t i n g i n t e n t i o n s b y w h i c h i t i s m o b i l i z e d . A c ­

c o r d i n g to the h i s t o r i c i t y o f the s i g n c h a i n , i t w o u l d be i m p o s ­

s ible to k e e p a p r o m i s e , because i t w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e to safe­

g u a r d a s i g n f r o m the v a r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l acc idents b y w h i c h its

m e a n i n g i s a u g m e n t e d in excess o f its o r i g i n a t i n g intentions.)

I n sect ion 3 , w h i c h f o l l o w s this d i s c u s s i o n , N i e t z s c h e r e c o n ­

s iders this i d e a l i z a t i o n o f the p r o m i s i n g a n i m a l a n d asks h o w

a m e m o r y can be created for a w i l l . T h i s r e t u r n s us to the ques­

t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the status of the " i m p r e s s i o n " that is a c t i v e l y

r e a n i m a t e d a n d r e l i v e d , a n d w h i c h , i n a n d t h r o u g h its r e a n i ­

m a t i o n , establishes the p r o t r a c t e d c o n t i n u i t y o f the w i l l . "If

s o m e t h i n g i s t o stay i n the m e m o r y , i t m u s t b e b u r n e d i n ; o n l y

that w h i c h n e v e r ceases to hurt stays in the m e m o r y " (61/295).

A n d w e then l e a r n o f the " t e r r o r " that f o r m e r l y a t tended a l l

p r o m i s e s . Is this " terror ," t h e n , to be c o n s t r u e d as the " i m p r e s ­

s i o n " that w o r k s a s the m n e m o n i c d e v i c e w h e r e b y the w i l l

m a k e s itself r e g u l a r a n d ca lculable? B y sect ion 4 , N i e t z s c h e

poses the q u e s t i o n of b a d conscience e x p l i c i t l y , b u t c o n t i n u e s

to treat i t as i f i t w e r e q u i t e separate f r o m conscience itself. He

asks: H o w d i d "that other ' somber t h i n g , ' the c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f

g u i l t , the ' b a d conscience, ' c o m e i n t o the w o r l d ? " (62/297). But

is it other? Is there a w a y for the w i l l to b e c o m e regular , to be­

c o m e the p r o t r a c t e d c o n t i n u i t y w h i c h u n d e r w r i t e s the p r o m ­

ise, w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g subject to the l o g i c of b a d conscience?

W e l l - k n o w n d i s c u s s i o n s o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n debt a n d

g u i l t f o l l o w (62-63/297-98) , in w h i c h the f a i l u r e to r e p a y a

l o a n a w a k e n s the des ire for c o m p e n s a t i o n i n the credi tor , a n d

i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d on the debtor. T h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f m o r a l ac­

c o u n t a b i l i t y to the d e b t o r thus r a t i o n a l i z e s the desire of the

c r e d i t o r to p u n i s h the debtor. W i t h that n o t i o n o f "account­

a b i l i t y " emerges a w h o l e p a n o p l y o f m o r a l l y saturated p s y ­

chic p h e n o m e n a : i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , e v e n c e r t a i n vers ions o f the

w i l l itself. B u t the des ire t o p u n i s h c a n n o t b e f u l l y a c c o u n t e d

for b y the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the b r o k e n contract . W h y does the

c r e d i t o r take p l e a s u r e i n the i n f l i c t i o n o f in jury , a n d w h a t f o r m

does that p leasure take w h e n i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d i n the m o r ­

a l i z e d a c t i o n b y w h i c h the c r e d i t o r h o l d s the debtor m o r a l l y

accountable a n d p r o n o u n c e s h i m g u i l t y ? W h a t strange c o n ­

s u m m a t i o n o f p l e a s u r e takes p l a c e in that a t t r i b u t i o n o f g u i l t ?

74 Circuits of Bad Conscience Nietzsche and Freud 75

T h i s a c c o u n t o f h o w the a t t r i b u t i o n o f g u i l t or ig inates i s n o t

yet the f o r m a t i o n o f b a d consc ience ( w h i c h w o u l d , o f course,

be the se l f -a t t r ibut ion or s e l f - i n f l i c t i o n of gu i l t ) . I t p r e s u p ­

poses that a contract has b e e n b r o k e n , a n d the existence of the

contract p r e s u p p o s e s the i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o m i s i n g . I n d e e d , the

d e b t o r i s one w h o fails t o k e e p h is p r o m i s e , p r o t r a c t h is w i l l ,

a n d d i s c h a r g e his w o r d i n the e x e c u t i o n o f a n act.

T h e p u n i s h m e n t o f the d e b t o r thus p r e s u p p o s e s the m o d e l

o r i d e a l o f the p r o m i s i n g a n i m a l , yet th is p r o m i s i n g a n i m a l

c o u l d not c o m e i n t o b e i n g w i t h o u t the i m p r e s s i o n s o f terror

p r o d u c e d b y p u n i s h m e n t . T h e p u n i s h m e n t o f the d e b t o r a p ­

pears to e m e r g e in response to an in jury , the debt b e i n g cast

as that injury, b u t the response takes on a m e a n i n g that ex­

ceeds the e x p l i c i t p u r p o s e o f a c h i e v i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n . F o r the

p u n i s h m e n t i s p le asur ab le , a n d the i n f l i c t i o n of i n j u r y i s c o n ­

s t r u e d as a s e d u c t i o n to l i fe (66-67/301-2) .

I f this c o m p l i c a t e d scene animates the credi tor , h o w do we

u n d e r s t a n d the f o r m a t i o n o f b a d consc ience i n the debtor?

N i e t z s c h e w r i t e s , " P u n i s h m e n t i s s u p p o s e d to have the v a l u e

o f a w a k e n i n g the fee l ing o f g u i l t i n the g u i l t y p e r s o n ; one

seeks in i t the a c t u a l instrumentum of that p s y c h i c a l r e a c t i o n

c a l l e d ' b a d conscience, ' ' s t ing of c o n s c i e n c e ' " (81/318).

B u t N i e t z s c h e takes his d is tance f r o m this f o r m u l a t i o n ,

s ince not m e r e l y p s y c h i c react ions , b u t the p s y c h e itself i s

the i n s t r u m e n t o f this p u n i s h m e n t . T h e i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f i n ­

s t i n c t — w h i c h takes p lace w h e n the i n s t i n c t does not i m m e d i ­

ately d i s c h a r g e as the d e e d — i s u n d e r s t o o d to p r o d u c e the s o u l

or the p s y c h e i n s t e a d ; the p r e s s u r e exerted f r o m the w a l l s o f

soc ie ty forces a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n w h i c h c u l m i n a t e s i n the p r o ­

d u c t i o n of the s o u l , th is p r o d u c t i o n b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d as a p r i ­

m a r y ar t i s t ic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , the f a b r i c a t i o n o f a n i d e a l . T h i s

f a b r i c a t i o n appears to take the p lace of the p r o m i s e , the w o r d

a c t u a l i z e d as d e e d , a n d to e m e r g e on the c o n d i t i o n that the

p r o m i s e has b e e n b r o k e n . B u t r e c a l l that the e x e c u t i o n of the

d e e d w a s not w i t h o u t its fabr icat ions: one effect o f the p r o m ­

ise is to p r o d u c e an "I" w h i c h m i g h t s t a n d for itself across

t i m e . T h u s , the f a b r i c a t i o n of s u c h an "I" i s the p a r a d o x i c a l r e ­

sult o f the p r o m i s e . T h e " I " b e c o m e s c o n t i n u o u s w i t h its d e e d ,

but its d e e d is, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , to create the c o n t i n u i t y of itself.

B a d conscience w o u l d b e the f a b r i c a t i o n o f i n f e r i o r i t y that

attends the b r e a k i n g of a p r o m i s e , the d i s c o n t i n u i t y of the w i l l ,

but the " I " w h o w o u l d k e e p the p r o m i s e i s p r e c i s e l y the c u l ­

t i v a t e d effect o f th is c o n t i n u o u s f a b r i c a t i o n of i n f e r i o r i t y . C a n

there e v e n be a p r o m i s i n g b e i n g , one w h o is able to d i s c h a r g e

w o r d s i n t o deeds, w i t h o u t the b a d consc ience w h i c h f o r m s

the v e r y " I " w h o m a k e s g o o d his w o r d t h r o u g h t i m e , w h o has

a m e m o r y o f the w i l l , a n d for w h o m the p s y c h e has a l r e a d y

b e e n p r o d u c e d ?

N i e t z s c h e descr ibes " b a d consc ience i n its b e g i n n i n g s " a s

the "instinct for freedom f o r c i b l y m a d e la tent" (87/325). B u t

w h e r e is the trace of this f r e e d o m in the s e l f - s h a c k l i n g that

N i e t z s c h e descr ibes? I t i s to be f o u n d in the p l e a s u r e t a k e n in

af f l ic t ing p a i n , a p l e a s u r e t a k e n i n af f l ic t ing p a i n o n oneself

in the service of, in the n a m e of, m o r a l i t y . T h i s p l e a s u r e in af­

f l i c t i o n , a t t r i b u t e d ear l ier to the credi tor , thus becomes, u n d e r

the p r e s s u r e of the s o c i a l contract , an i n t e r n a l i z e d p leasure ,

the j o y o f p e r s e c u t i n g oneself. T h e o r i g i n o f b a d conscience is ,

thus, the j o y t a k e n in p e r s e c u t i n g oneself, w h e r e the self perse­

c u t e d does n o t exist o u t s i d e the orb i t of that p e r s e c u t i o n . B u t

the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of p u n i s h m e n t is the v e r y p r o d u c t i o n of the

self, a n d i t i s i n this p r o d u c t i o n that p l e a s u r e a n d f r e e d o m are

c u r i o u s l y located . P u n i s h m e n t i s n o t m e r e l y p r o d u c t i v e o f the

self, b u t this v e r y p r o d u c t i v i t y of p u n i s h m e n t is the site for

the f r e e d o m a n d p leasure o f the w i l l , its f a b r i c a t i n g a c t i v i t y .

7 6 Circuits of Bad Conscience Nietzsche and Freud 77

As a p e c u l i a r d e f o r m a t i o n of a r t i s t r y ( w h i c h is, o f course ,

i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m its p r i m a r y f o r m a t i o n ) , se l f -conscious­

ness i s the f o r m the w i l l takes w h e n i t i s p r e v e n t e d f r o m

s i m p l e e x p r e s s i o n a s a d e e d . B u t i s the m o d e l b y w h i c h a n i n ­

st inct or a w i l l expresses or d ischarges itself in a d e e d in a n y

sense p r i o r to this s e l f - t h w a r t e d e x p r e s s i o n of b a d conscience?

C a n there be a m o d e l o f p r o m i s i n g that does not f r o m the first

p r e s u p p o s e b a d conscience? T h e n o b l e i s d e s c r i b e d ear l ier as

one for w h o m his w o r k i s "an i n s t i n c t i v e c r e a t i o n a n d i m p o s i ­

t i o n of f o r m s . . . the m o s t i n v o l u n t a r y a n d u n c o n s c i o u s artists

[that] there are" (86/325). T h e s o u l is p r e c i s e l y w h a t a c e r t a i n

v i o l e n t a r t i s t r y p r o d u c e s w h e n i t takes i tself as its o w n object.

T h e s o u l , the p s y c h e , i s n o t there p r i o r to this ref lexive m o v e ,

b u t this ref lexive t u r n i n g o f the w i l l against itself p r o d u c e s i n

its w a k e the m e t a p h o r i c s of p s y c h i c life.

If we u n d e r s t a n d the s o u l to be the effect of i m p o s i n g a

f o r m u p o n oneself, w h e r e the f o r m i s t a k e n t o b e e q u i v a l e n t

to the s o u l , t h e n there c a n be no p r o t r a c t e d w i l l , no " I" that

s tands for itself t h r o u g h t i m e , w i t h o u t this s e l f - i m p o s i t i o n o f

f o r m , this m o r a l l a b o r i n g o n oneself. T h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y a r t i s ­

t ic p r o d u c t i o n of b a d conscience, the p r o d u c t i o n of a " f o r m "

f r o m a n d o f the w i l l , i s d e s c r i b e d b y N i e t z s c h e a s "the w o m b

o f a l l i d e a l a n d i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a " (87/326). B a d c o n ­

science i s fabricated, b u t i t i n t u r n i s c r e d i t e d w i t h the fabr i ­

c a t i o n of a l l i d e a l a n d i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a . Is there, then,

a n y w a y t o a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a r t i s t r y precedes

b a d consc ience or is its resul t? Is there a n y w a y to postu late

s o m e t h i n g before this " t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itsel f" w h i c h i s the

t r o p i c f o u n d a t i o n o f the subject a n d a l l art is try , i n c l u d i n g a l l

i m a g i n a t i o n a n d c o n c e p t u a l l ife?

I f b a d conscience originates i m a g i n a t i v e a n d i d e a l p h e ­

n o m e n a , then i t i s d i f f icul t to i m a g i n e w h i c h o f N i e t z s c h e ' s

f a b u l o u s g e n e a l o g i c a l t e r m s w o u l d not f i n a l l y b e a t t r ibutable

to this b a d conscience. I n d e e d , his project of o f fer ing a geneal­

o g y o f b a d conscience a ppea r s t o f o u n d e r w h e n the v e r y t e r m s

he w i l l use to account for this f o r m a t i o n t u r n out to be the

effect o f this f o r m a t i o n itself. E l s e w h e r e he w i l l refuse, for i n ­

stance, to accept the n o t i o n of the w i l l as a c o n c e p t u a l g i v e n .

In Beyond Good and Evil, he w r i t e s , " w i l l i n g seems to me to

be . . . s o m e t h i n g complicated, s o m e t h i n g that is a u n i t o n l y as a

w o r d . " 2 O n c e w i l l i n g is e levated to the status of a p h i l o s o p h i ­

c a l concept , he w r i t e s , i t is of necess i ty a k i n d of f i c t ion . T h e

same w o u l d c l e a r l y h o l d for the n o t i o n o f " i n s t i n c t , " a n d also

for the effort to account c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y or s e q u e n t i a l l y for

h o w a n y t h i n g c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m the w i l l , o r the w i l l f r o m

a n y t h i n g else: "one s h o u l d use 'cause' a n d 'effect' o n l y as p u r e

concepts , that is to say, as c o n v e n t i o n a l f ic t ions for the p u r p o s e

o f d e s i g n a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n — n o t for e x p l a n a t i o n . " 3 I n

On the Genealogy of Morals, he reiterates that c o n c e p t u a l i z a ­

t i o n emerges f r o m the g e n e a l o g y of t o r t u r e as the p r o m i s e of

a c e r t a i n escape: concepts , he w r i t e s , are an effort to g a i n r e ­

lease f r o m a torture. Is the v e r y c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s of On

the Genealogy of Morals i m p l i c a t e d in this d e s c r i p t i o n , a n d is

N i e t z s c h e ' s text t h e n an effort to escape f r o m the tor tures of

b a d conscience, a l t h o u g h i t owes its l i fe, as i t were , to that v e r y

source?

I f a l l " i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a " are the resul t o f this v i o l e n t

i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n , i t f o l l o w s that the g e n e a l o g i c a l a c c o u n t w i l l b e

one of these p h e n o m e n a , a n a r r a t i v e effect of the n a r r a t i v e it

seeks to t e l l . T h e u n m a s k i n g of the n a r r a t i v e i s its r e m a s k i n g —

inev i tab ly . Indeed, i t seems that the v e r y c r e a t i v i t y one seeks

to o p p o s e to the i n h i b i t i o n of s t rength is f u n d a m e n t a l l y d e -

78 Circuits of Bad Conscience

p e n d e n t o n that v e r y i n h i b i t i o n . I n this sense, r e p r e s s i o n a p ­

pears t o u n d e r w r i t e o r guarantee b o t h the b e i n g w h o p r o m i s e s

a n d the w r i t e r o f f i c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t u a l f ict ions s u c h as

genealogy. T h e u n i t y o f w i l l a t t r i b u t e d t o the p r o m i s i n g i s i tsel f

the effect of a r e p r e s s i o n , a forgetfulness, a n o t - r e m e m b e r i n g

o f the satisfactions w h i c h a p p e a r t o p r e c e d e r e p r e s s i o n , a n d

w h i c h r e p r e s s i o n m a k e s sure w i l l not a p p e a r aga in .

Freud, Narcissism, and Regulation

In this f ina l sect ion, I w o u l d l i k e to r e t u r n to the p r o b l e m of

s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n , not as a c t i n g on a p s y c h e , but as c o m p l i c i -

tous in the f o r m a t i o n of the p s y c h e a n d its desire . To that e n d ,

I p r o p o s e a d e t o u r t h r o u g h F r e u d ; the N i e t z s c h e a n resonances

i n his c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f consc ience w i l l b e c o m e clear.

T h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f repress ion 's p r i m a c y b r i n g s u s d i r e c t l y

to F r e u d , a n d to a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the p r o b l e m of p u n ­

i s h m e n t i n r e l a t i o n t o the f o r m a t i o n o f consc ience a n d s o c i a l

subject ion. I f this subject ion is not m e c h a n i s t i c , not the s i m p l e

effect o f a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , t h e n h o w c a n w e u n d e r s t a n d the

p s y c h i c engagement w i t h subject ion i n a w a y that does n o t d i s ­

j o i n the d i s c o u r s e o f sel f-subject ion f r o m the p r o b l e m o f s o c i a l

r e g u l a t i o n ? H o w c a n c u l t i v a t i n g a narc iss i s t i c a t tachment t o

p u n i s h m e n t b e the m e a n s b y w h i c h the p o w e r o f s o c i a l r e g u ­

l a t i o n e x p l o i t s a narc iss i s t i c d e m a n d for sel f-ref lect ion w h i c h

is indi f ferent to its occas ion?

T h i s s u g g e s t i o n of n a r c i s s i s m is, I w o u l d suggest, a l r e a d y

a t w o r k i n N i e t z s c h e . T h e ascetic i d e a l , u n d e r s t o o d a s a w i l l

to nothingness , is a w a y of i n t e r p r e t i n g a l l suf fer ing as g u i l t .

W h e r e a s g u i l t w o r k s to d e n y a speci f ic k i n d of object for

h u m a n wa n t s , i t c a n n o t obl i terate the w a n t i n g character o f

h u m a n s . A c c o r d i n g t o the dictates o f g u i l t , then, " m a n h a d

Nietzsche and Freud 79

o n l y to want s o m e t h i n g — a n d to b e g i n w i t h , i t m a t t e r e d not

what , w h e r e t o , or h o w he w a n t e d : the will itself was saved"

(162/411).

In his analys is o f neuros is , F r e u d u n d e r s t o o d this dif fer­

ently, as a k i n d of l i b i d i n a l a t tachment to a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h

has as its p u r p o s e the t h w a r t i n g of l i b i d i n a l grat i f i ca t ion .

W h e r e that t h w a r t i n g const i tutes a r e p r e s s i o n , the r e p r e s s i o n

is s u s t a i n e d by the l i b i d o that i t seeks to t h w a r t . In n e u r o ­

sis, the e th ica l r e g u l a t i o n of b o d i l y i m p u l s e b e c o m e s the focus

a n d a i m o f i m p u l s e itself. H e r e w e are g i v e n t o u n d e r s t a n d a n

at tachment to subject ion w h i c h is f o r m a t i v e of the ref lexive

s t r u c t u r e o f subject ion. T h e i m p u l s e w h i c h w o u l d b e negated

is i n a d v e r t e n t l y preserved by that v e r y n e g a t i n g act iv i ty .

W e c a n hear a resonance o f N i e t z s c h e w h e n F r e u d de­

scribes the process b y w h i c h l i b i d o c o m e s u n d e r the censor

of the l a w o n l y to reemerge as the s u s t a i n i n g affect of that

law. T h e r e p r e s s i o n o f the l i b i d o i s a l w a y s to be u n d e r s t o o d

as itself a l i b i d i n a l l y i n v e s t e d r e p r e s s i o n . H e n c e , the l i b i d o is

not a b s o l u t e l y negated t h r o u g h r e p r e s s i o n , b u t rather b e c o m e s

the i n s t r u m e n t o f its o w n subject ion. T h e repress ive l a w i s

not e x t e r n a l to the l i b i d o that i t represses, b u t the repress ive

l a w represses to the extent that r e p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s a l i b i d i ­

n a l ac t iv i ty . F u r t h e r , m o r a l i n t e r d i c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y those that

are t u r n e d against the b o d y , are themselves s u s t a i n e d by the

b o d i l y a c t i v i t y that they seek to c u r b .

T h e desire to desire is a w i l l i n g n e s s to des ire p r e c i s e l y w h a t

w o u l d foreclose desire , i f o n l y for the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g

to desire . T h i s des ire for des ire i s e x p l o i t e d in the process of

s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n , for i f the t e r m s b y w h i c h w e g a i n s o c i a l rec­

o g n i t i o n for ourse lves are those by w h i c h we are r e g u l a t e d and

g a i n s o c i a l existence, then to a f f i r m one's existence is to c a p i t u ­

late t o one's s u b o r d i n a t i o n — a s o r r y b i n d . H o w p r e c i s e l y this

80 Circuits of Bad Conscience

narc iss i s t i c at tachment to at tachment i s e x p l o i t e d by m e c h a ­

n i s m s of s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n is i n a d v e r t e n t l y m a d e clear in a set

o f specula t ions that F r e u d offers on the r e p r e s s i o n of h o m o ­

s e x u a l i t y a n d the f o r m a t i o n o f consc ience a n d c i t i z e n s h i p . I n

" O n the M e c h a n i s m o f P a r a n o i a , " h e l i n k s the s u p p r e s s i o n o f

h o m o s e x u a l d r i v e s t o the p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l feel ing. A t the

e n d o f that p iece , h e r e m a r k s that " h o m o s e x u a l d r i v e s " h e l p

to const i tute "the s o c i a l ins t incts , thus c o n t r i b u t i n g an erot ic

factor to f r i e n d s h i p a n d c o m r a d e s h i p , to esprit de corps a n d to

the l o v e o f m a n k i n d i n g e n e r a l . " 4 A t the c lose o f the essay " O n

N a r c i s s i s m , " he m i g h t be r e a d as s p e c i f y i n g the l o g i c w h e r e b y

this p r o d u c t i o n of s o c i a l fee l ing takes place. T h e "ego-ideal ,"

he wr i tes , has a s o c i a l s ide: " i t is a lso the c o m m o n i d e a l of

a f a m i l y , a class or a n a t i o n . It not o n l y b i n d s the narc iss is t ic

l i b i d o , b u t also a cons iderable a m o u n t of the p e r s o n ' s h o m o ­

s e x u a l l i b i d o , w h i c h i n this w a y b e c o m e s t u r n e d b a c k i n t o the

ego. T h e d issat is fact ion d u e to the n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t of the i d e a l

l iberates h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o , w h i c h i s t r a n s f o r m e d into sense

o f g u i l t (dread o f the c o m m u n i t y ) . " 5 T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f

h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n t o g u i l t a n d , therefore, i n t o the basis o f s o c i a l

fee l ing takes p lace w h e n the fear o f p a r e n t a l p u n i s h m e n t be­

c o m e s g e n e r a l i z e d as the d r e a d of l o s i n g the l o v e of f e l l o w

m e n . P a r a n o i a i s the w a y i n w h i c h that l o v e i s cons is tent ly

r e i m a g i n e d a s a l w a y s a l m o s t w i t h d r a w n , a n d i t is, p a r a d o x i ­

cal ly , fear o f l o s i n g that l o v e w h i c h m o t i v a t e s the s u b l i m a t i o n

or i n t r o v e r s i o n of h o m o s e x u a l i t y . Indeed, th is s u b l i m a t i o n i s

not qu i te as i n s t r u m e n t a l as i t m a y s o u n d , for i t is not that one

d i s a v o w s h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n o r d e r t o g a i n the l o v e o f f e l l o w

m e n , b u t that a c e r t a i n h o m o s e x u a l i t y can o n l y be a c h i e v e d

a n d c o n t a i n e d through this d i s a v o w a l .

A n o t h e r p lace i n F r e u d w h e r e this b e c o m e s v e r y c lear i s

the d i s c u s s i o n of the f o r m a t i o n of consc ience in Civilization and

Nietzsche and Freud 81

Its Discontents, w h e r e it t u r n s o u t that the p r o h i b i t i o n against

h o m o s e x u a l i t y w h i c h consc ience i s s a i d to enact or ar t icu late

f o u n d s a n d const i tutes conscience itself as a p s y c h i c p h e n o m e ­

n o n . T h e p r o h i b i t i o n against the desire is that des ire as i t t u r n s

b a c k u p o n itself, a n d this t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself b e c o m e s the

v e r y i n c e p t i o n , the v e r y a c t i o n o f w h a t i s r e n d e r e d ent i tat ive

t h r o u g h the t e r m "conscience."

F r e u d w r i t e s in Civilization and Its Discontents "that c o n ­

science (or m o r e correct ly , the a n x i e t y w h i c h later b e c o m e s

conscience) is i n d e e d the cause of i n s t i n c t u a l r e n u n c i a t i o n to

b e g i n w i t h , b u t that later the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s r e v e r s e d . E v e r y

r e n u n c i a t i o n of i n s t i n c t n o w b e c o m e s a d y n a m i c s o u r c e o f

conscience a n d e v e r y f resh r e n u n c i a t i o n increases the latter 's

sever i ty a n d i n t o l e r a n c e . " 6

A c c o r d i n g t o F r e u d , t h e n , the s e l f - i m p o s e d i m p e r a t i v e s that

character ize the c i r c u l a r r o u t e o f consc ience are p u r s u e d a n d

a p p l i e d p r e c i s e l y because t h e y are n o w the site of the v e r y sat­

i s f a c t i o n that they seek to p r o h i b i t . In other w o r d s , p r o h i b i t i o n

b e c o m e s the o c c a s i o n for r e l i v i n g the i n s t i n c t u n d e r the r u b r i c

o f the c o n d e m n i n g law. P r o h i b i t i o n r e p r o d u c e s the p r o h i b i t e d

desire a n d b e c o m e s i n t e n s i f i e d t h r o u g h the r e n u n c i a t i o n s i t

effects. T h e "afterl i fe" of p r o h i b i t e d desire takes p lace t h r o u g h

the p r o h i b i t i o n itself, w h e r e the p r o h i b i t i o n not o n l y sustains ,

b u t is sustained by the des ire that it forces into r e n u n c i a t i o n .

In this sense, t h e n , r e n u n c i a t i o n takes p lace t h r o u g h the v e r y

desire that is r e n o u n c e d : the des ire is never r e n o u n c e d , b u t

b e c o m e s p r e s e r v e d a n d reasserted i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e o f r e ­

n u n c i a t i o n .

T h i s e x a m p l e leads u s b a c k t o the t rope w i t h w h i c h w e

b e g a n , the f igure of consc ience as t u r n i n g b a c k on i tself as i f

i t w e r e a b o d y r e c o i l e d on itself, r e c o i l e d at the t h o u g h t of its

desire , for w h o m its des ire i s s y m p t o m a t i z e d as that p o s t u r e

82 Circuits of Bad Conscience

of r e c o i l . C o n s c i e n c e is thus f i g u r e d as a b o d y w h i c h takes

itself as its object, f o r c e d i n t o a p e r m a n e n t p o s t u r e of nega­

t ive n a r c i s s i s m or, m o r e precise ly , a n a r c i s s i s t i c a l l y n o u r i s h e d

self-beratement ( then, m i s t a k e n l y , i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a n a r c i s s i s ­

t ic stage).

C o n s i d e r — a s a p a r t i n g s h o t — h o w the c o n t e m p o r a r y efforts

t o regulate h o m o s e x u a l i t y w i t h i n the U . S . m i l i t a r y are t h e m ­

selves the r e g u l a t o r y f o r m a t i o n of the m a s c u l i n e subject, one

w h o consecrates his i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h renunciation as an act of

speech: to say "I am a h o m o s e x u a l " is f ine as l o n g as one

also promises " a n d I d o n ' t i n t e n d to act." T h i s , the s u p p r e s s i o n

a n d s u s t a i n i n g o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n a n d t h r o u g h the c i r c u l a r

p o s t u r e b y w h i c h a b o d y utters its o w n r e n u n c i a t i o n , accedes

to its r e g u l a t i o n t h r o u g h the p r o m i s e . B u t that p e r f o r m a t i v e

utterance, h o w e v e r c o m p e l l e d , w i l l b e subject t o in fe l ic i ty , t o

s p e a k i n g o t h e r w i s e , to r e c i t i n g o n l y hal f the sentence, d e f o r m ­

i n g the p r o m i s e , r e f o r m u l a t i n g the confess ion as def iance, re­

m a i n i n g si lent . T h i s o p p o s i t i o n w i l l d r a w f r o m a n d o p p o s e

the p o w e r b y w h i c h i t i s c o m p e l l e d , a n d this short c i r c u i t i n g

of r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r const i tutes the p o s s i b i l i t y of a postmoral

gesture t o w a r d a less r e g u l a r f r e e d o m , one that f r o m the per­

spect ive of a less codi f iab le set of v a l u e s cal ls i n t o q u e s t i o n the

va lues o f m o r a l i t y .

r

Subjection, Resistance, Resignification Between Freud and Foucault

M y p r o b l e m i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e i m p l i c i t

s y s t e m s i n w h i c h w e f i n d o u r s e l v e s p r i s o n e r s ; w h a t I w o u l d

l i k e t o g r a s p i s t h e s y s t e m o f l i m i t s a n d e x c l u s i o n w h i c h

w e p r a c t i c e w i t h o u t k n o w i n g i t ; I w o u l d l i k e t o m a k e t h e

c u l t u r a l u n c o n s c i o u s a p p a r e n t .

— F o u c a u l t , " R i t u a l s o f E x c l u s i o n "

Consider , in Discipline and Punish, the p a r a d o x i c a l charac­

ter of w h a t F o u c a u l t descr ibes as the subjec t ivat ion of

the pr isoner . T h e t e r m " s u b j e c t i v a t i o n " carr ies the p a r a d o x i n

itself: assujetissement denotes b o t h the b e c o m i n g of the subject

a n d the process of s u b j e c t i o n — o n e inhabi ts the f igure of a u ­

t o n o m y o n l y by b e c o m i n g subjected to a p o w e r , a subject ion

w h i c h i m p l i e s a r a d i c a l d e p e n d e n c y . F o r F o u c a u l t , this p r o ­

cess of subjec t ivat ion takes p lace c e n t r a l l y t h r o u g h the b o d y .

In Discipline and Punish the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y not o n l y a ppea r s

as a sign of g u i l t a n d t r a n s g r e s s i o n , as the e m b o d i m e n t of p r o ­

h i b i t i o n a n d the s a n c t i o n for r i t u a l s o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n , b u t i s

84 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

f r a m e d a n d f o r m e d t h r o u g h the d i s c u r s i v e m a t r i x o f a j u r i d i ­

c a l subject. T h e c l a i m that a d i s c o u r s e " f o r m s " the b o d y is no

s i m p l e one, a n d f r o m the start w e m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h h o w s u c h

" f o r m i n g " is not the same as a " c a u s i n g " or " d e t e r m i n i n g , " s t i l l

less is i t a n o t i o n that b o d i e s are s o m e h o w m a d e of d i s c o u r s e

p u r e a n d s i m p l e . 1

F o u c a u l t suggests that the p r i s o n e r i s not r e g u l a t e d by an

exterior r e l a t i o n of p o w e r , w h e r e b y an i n s t i t u t i o n takes a p r e -

g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l a s the target o f its s u b o r d i n a t i n g a ims . O n

the contrary, the i n d i v i d u a l i s f o r m e d or, rather, f o r m u l a t e d

t h r o u g h his d i s c u r s i v e l y c o n s t i t u t e d " i d e n t i t y " as pr isoner .

Subject ion is, l i tera l ly , the making of a subject, the p r i n c i p l e

of r e g u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h a subject is f o r m u l a t e d or

p r o d u c e d . S u c h subject ion i s a k i n d of p o w e r that not o n l y

u n i l a t e r a l l y acts on a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l as a f o r m of d o m i n a ­

t i o n , b u t also activates or f o r m s the subject. H e n c e , subject ion

is ne i ther s i m p l y the d o m i n a t i o n of a subject n o r its p r o d u c ­

t i o n , b u t designates a c e r t a i n k i n d of r e s t r i c t i o n in p r o d u c t i o n ,

a r e s t r i c t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h the p r o d u c t i o n of the subject can­

not take place, a r e s t r i c t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h that p r o d u c t i o n

takes place. A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t o c c a s i o n a l l y tr ies to argue that

h i s t o r i c a l l y juridical p o w e r — p o w e r a c t i n g o n , s u b o r d i n a t i n g ,

p r e g i v e n subjects—precedes p r o d u c t i v e p o w e r , the c a p a c i t y o f

p o w e r to form subjects, w i t h the p r i s o n e r it is clear that the

subject p r o d u c e d a n d the subject r e g u l a t e d or s u b o r d i n a t e d

are one, a n d that c o m p u l s o r y p r o d u c t i o n i s its o w n f o r m o f

r e g u l a t i o n .

F o u c a u l t w a r n s against those w i t h i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n

w h o w o u l d l iberate the p r i s o n e r f r o m the p r i s o n ' s o p p r e s s i v e

confines, for the subject ion s i g n i f i e d by the exter ior i n s t i t u t i o n

of the p r i s o n does not act apart f r o m the i n v a s i o n a n d m a n a g e ­

m e n t of the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y : w h a t F o u c a u l t descr ibes as the

Between Freud and Foucault 85

f u l l siege a n d i n v a s i o n o f that b o d y b y the s i g n i f y i n g pract ices

o f the p r i s o n — n a m e l y , i n s p e c t i o n , confess ion, the r e g u l a r i z a -

t i o n a n d n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f b o d i l y m o v e m e n t a n d gesture, the

d i s c i p l i n a r y r e g i m e s o f the b o d y w h i c h have l e d feminis ts t o

c o n s u l t F o u c a u l t i n o r d e r t o elaborate the d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o d u c ­

t i o n o f gender. 2 T h e p r i s o n thus acts o n the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y ,

b u t i t does so by f o r c i n g the p r i s o n e r to a p p r o x i m a t e an i d e a l ,

a n o r m of b e h a v i o r , a m o d e l of obedience . T h i s is h o w the

p r i s o n e r ' s i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s r e n d e r e d coherent, t o t a l i z e d , m a d e

i n t o the d i s c u r s i v e a n d c o n c e p t u a l p o s s e s s i o n of the p r i s o n ; i t

is, a s F o u c a u l t insists, the w a y i n w h i c h "he b e c o m e s the p r i n ­

c i p l e o f h i s o w n s u b j e c t i o n . " 3 T h i s n o r m a t i v e i d e a l i n c u l c a t e d ,

as i t were , i n t o the p r i s o n e r is a k i n d of p s y c h i c i d e n t i t y , or

w h a t F o u c a u l t w i l l c a l l a " s o u l . " Because the s o u l i s a n i m p r i s ­

o n i n g effect, F o u c a u l t c l a i m s that the p r i s o n e r i s subjected " i n

a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l w a y " t h a n by the spat ia l c a p t i v i t y o f the

p r i s o n . Indeed, in the c i t a t i o n that f o l l o w s , the s o u l i s f igured

as itself a k i n d of s p a t i a l c a p t i v i t y , i n d e e d , as a k i n d of p r i s o n ,

w h i c h p r o v i d e s the exter ior f o r m o r r e g u l a t o r y p r i n c i p l e o f

the p r i s o n e r ' s body . T h i s b e c o m e s clear i n F o u c a u l t ' s f o r m u ­

l a t i o n that "the m a n d e s c r i b e d for us, w h o m w e are i n v i t e d t o

free, is a l r e a d y in h i m s e l f the effect of a subject ion [assujettisse­

ment] m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d t h a n h i m s e l f . . . the s o u l is the

p r i s o n of the b o d y " (30).

A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t i s s p e c i f y i n g the subjec t ivat ion of the

p r i s o n e r here, he appears also to be p r i v i l e g i n g the m e t a ­

p h o r of the p r i s o n to the or iz e the subjec t ivat ion of the b o d y .

W h a t are we to m a k e o f i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d i n v a s i o n as the

p r i v i l e g e d f i g u r e s t h r o u g h w h i c h F o u c a u l t art iculates the p r o ­

cess of subject ivat ion, the d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n of ident i t ies?

I f d i s c o u r s e p r o d u c e s i d e n t i t y b y s u p p l y i n g a n d e n f o r c i n g

a r e g u l a t o r y p r i n c i p l e w h i c h t h o r o u g h l y i n v a d e s , total izes ,

86 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

a n d r e n d e r s coherent the i n d i v i d u a l , t h e n i t seems that e v e r y

" i d e n t i t y , " insofar as i t is t o t a l i z i n g , acts as p r e c i s e l y s u c h

a " s o u l that i m p r i s o n s the b o d y . " In w h a t sense is this s o u l

" m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d " t h a n the p r i s o n e r h i m s e l f ? D o e s this

m e a n that the s o u l preexists the b o d y that animates it? H o w

are we to u n d e r s t a n d s u c h a c l a i m in the context o f F o u c a u l t ' s

t h e o r y o f p o w e r ?

R a t h e r t h a n a n s w e r that q u e s t i o n d irec t ly , one m i g h t for the

p u r p o s e s o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n c o u n t e r p o s e the " s o u l , " w h i c h F o u ­

caul t ar t iculates as an i m p r i s o n i n g f rame, to the p s y c h e in the

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c sense. 4 In the p s y c h e , the subject 's i d e a l c o r r e ­

s p o n d s to the ego- idea l , w h i c h the super-ego is s a i d to c o n ­

sult , as i t w e r e , in o r d e r to m e a s u r e the ego. L a c a n redescr ibes

this i d e a l as the " p o s i t i o n " of the subject w i t h i n the s y m b o l i c ,

the n o r m that i n s t a l l s the subject w i t h i n language a n d hence

w i t h i n a v a i l a b l e schemes o f c u l t u r a l i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . T h i s v i a b l e

a n d i n t e l l i g i b l e b e i n g , this subject, is a l w a y s p r o d u c e d at a

cost, a n d w h a t e v e r resists the n o r m a t i v e d e m a n d b y w h i c h

subjects are i n s t i t u t e d r e m a i n s u n c o n s c i o u s . T h u s the p s y c h e ,

w h i c h i n c l u d e s the u n c o n s c i o u s , i s v e r y di f ferent f r o m the

subject: the p s y c h e is p r e c i s e l y w h a t exceeds the i m p r i s o n i n g

effects of the d i s c u r s i v e d e m a n d to i n h a b i t a coherent i d e n ­

tity, to b e c o m e a coherent subject. T h e p s y c h e is w h a t resists

the r e g u l a r i z a t i o n that F o u c a u l t ascribes to n o r m a l i z i n g d i s ­

courses. T h o s e d i s c o u r s e s are s a i d to i m p r i s o n the b o d y in the

soul, to a n i m a t e a n d c o n t a i n the b o d y w i t h i n that i d e a l f rame,

a n d to that extent r e d u c e the n o t i o n of the p s y c h e to the o p e r a ­

t ions o f a n e x t e r n a l l y f r a m i n g a n d n o r m a l i z i n g i d e a l . 5 T h i s

F o u c a u l t i a n m o v e ap p e ar s to treat the p s y c h e as i f i t r e c e i v e d

u n i l a t e r a l l y the effect o f the L a c a n i a n s y m b o l i c . T h e t r a n s p o s i ­

t i o n o f the s o u l i n t o a n exter ior a n d i m p r i s o n i n g f r a m e for the

b o d y vacates, as i t w e r e , the i n f e r i o r i t y of the b o d y , l e a v i n g

Between Freud and Foucault 87

that i n f e r i o r i t y as a m a l l e a b l e surface for the u n i l a t e r a l effects

o f d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r .

I a m i n p a r t m o v i n g t o w a r d a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c r i t i c i s m o f

F o u c a u l t , for I t h i n k that one cannot a c c o u n t for subject iva­

t i o n a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , b e c o m i n g the p r i n c i p l e o f one 's o w n

subject ion w i t h o u t recourse to a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c account of the

f o r m a t i v e or generat ive effects of r e s t r i c t i o n or p r o h i b i t i o n .

M o r e o v e r , the f o r m a t i o n of the subject cannot f u l l y be t h o u g h t

— i f i t ever can b e — w i t h o u t recourse to a p a r a d o x i c a l l y en­

a b l i n g set of g r o u n d i n g constraints . Yet as I elaborate this c r i ­

t ique, s o m e r o m a n t i c i z e d n o t i o n s o f the u n c o n s c i o u s d e f i n e d

a s necessary resistance w i l l c o m e u n d e r c r i t i c a l s c r u t iny , a n d

that c r i t i c i s m w i l l e n t a i l the reemergence of a F o u c a u l t i a n p e r ­

spect ive within p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . T h e q u e s t i o n of a s u p p r e s s e d

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i n F o u c a u l t — r a i s e d b y F o u c a u l t h i m s e l f i n the

reference to a " c u l t u r a l u n c o n s c i o u s " q u o t e d in the e p i g r a p h

to this c h a p t e r — m i g h t be r a i s e d m o r e p r e c i s e l y as the p r o b ­

l e m o f l o c a t i n g o r a c c o u n t i n g for resistance. W h e r e does resis­

tance t o o r i n d i s c i p l i n a r y subject f o r m a t i o n take p lace? D o e s

the r e d u c t i o n of the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l l y r i c h n o t i o n of the p s y ­

che to that of the i m p r i s o n i n g s o u l e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y

of res istance to n o r m a l i z a t i o n a n d to subject f o r m a t i o n , a r e ­

sistance that emerges p r e c i s e l y f r o m the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y

b e t w e e n p s y c h e a n d subject? H o w w o u l d w e u n d e r s t a n d s u c h

resistance, a n d w o u l d s u c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g e n t a i l a c r i t i c a l

r e t h i n k i n g o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a l o n g the w a y ?

In w h a t f o l l o w s , I w i l l ask t w o dif ferent k i n d s o f quest ions ,

one o f F o u c a u l t , a n d another o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ( a p p l y i n g this

t e r m v a r i o u s l y t o F r e u d a n d t o L a c a n ) . 6 F i r s t , i f F o u c a u l t

u n d e r s t a n d s the p s y c h e to be an i m p r i s o n i n g effect in the ser­

v i c e o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n , t h e n h o w m i g h t h e account for p s y c h i c

resistance t o n o r m a l i z a t i o n ? S e c o n d , w h e n s o m e p r o p o n e n t s

88 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s insist that resistance to n o r m a l i z a t i o n is a

f u n c t i o n of the u n c o n s c i o u s , is this guarantee of p s y c h i c resis­

tance m e r e l y s leight o f h a n d ? M o r e precisely , i s the resistance

u p o n w h i c h p s y c h o a n a l y s i s insists s o c i a l l y a n d d i s c u r s i v e l y

p r o d u c e d , or is i t a k i n d of resistance to, an u n d e r m i n i n g of,

s o c i a l a n d d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n as such? C o n s i d e r the c l a i m

that the u n c o n s c i o u s o n l y a n d a l w a y s resists n o r m a l i z a t i o n ,

that e v e r y r i t u a l of c o n f o r m i t y to the i n j u n c t i o n s of c i v i l i z a ­

t i o n comes at a cost, a n d that a c e r t a i n u n h a r n e s s e d a n d u n -

s o c i a l i z e d r e m a i n d e r i s thereby p r o d u c e d , w h i c h contests the

a p p e a r a n c e o f the l a w - a b i d i n g subject. T h i s p s y c h i c r e m a i n d e r

s ignif ies the l i m i t s o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n . T h a t p o s i t i o n does not

i m p l y that s u c h resistance w i e l d s the p o w e r t o r e w o r k o r re-

art iculate the terms o f d i s c u r s i v e d e m a n d , the d i s c i p l i n a r y i n ­

j u n c t i o n s b y w h i c h n o r m a l i z a t i o n occurs . T o t h w a r t the i n j u n c ­

t i o n to p r o d u c e a d o c i l e b o d y is not the same as d i s m a n t l i n g

the i n j u n c t i o n or c h a n g i n g the t e r m s of subject c o n s t i t u t i o n . I f

the u n c o n s c i o u s , or the p s y c h e m o r e general ly , is d e f i n e d as re­

sistance, w h a t d o w e then m a k e o f u n c o n s c i o u s at tachments t o

subject ion, w h i c h i m p l y that the u n c o n s c i o u s i s n o m o r e free o f

n o r m a l i z i n g d i s c o u r s e t h a n the subject? I f the u n c o n s c i o u s es­

capes f r o m a g i v e n n o r m a t i v e i n j u n c t i o n , to w h a t other i n j u n c ­

t i o n does i t f o r m a n attachment? W h a t m a k e s u s t h i n k that the

u n c o n s c i o u s i s a n y less s t r u c t u r e d by the p o w e r re lat ions that

p e r v a d e c u l t u r a l s igni f iers t h a n is the language of the subject?

I f we f i n d an at tachment to subject ion at the l e v e l of the u n ­

consc ious , w h a t k i n d o f resistance i s to be w r o u g h t f r o m that?

E v e n i f we grant that u n c o n s c i o u s resistance to a n o r m a l ­

i z i n g i n j u n c t i o n guarantees the f a i l u r e o f that i n j u n c t i o n f u l l y

to const i tute its subject, does s u c h resistance do a n y t h i n g to

alter or e x p a n d the d o m i n a n t i n j u n c t i o n s or i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s of

subject f o r m a t i o n ? W h a t do we m a k e of a resistance that can

Between Freud and Foucault 89

o n l y u n d e r m i n e , b u t w h i c h appears t o have n o p o w e r t o re-

ar t icu late the terms, the s y m b o l i c terms — t o use L a c a n i a n p a r ­

l a n c e — b y w h i c h subjects are c o n s t i t u t e d , b y w h i c h subject ion

i s i n s t a l l e d in the v e r y f o r m a t i o n of the subject? T h i s resistance

establishes the i n c o m p l e t e character of a n y effort to p r o d u c e

a subject by d i s c i p l i n a r y means , b u t i t r e m a i n s u n a b l e to re-

ar t icu late the d o m i n a n t t e r m s of p r o d u c t i v e p o w e r .

Before c o n t i n u i n g this i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ,

h o w e v e r , let u s r e t u r n t o the p r o b l e m o f b o d i e s i n F o u c a u l t .

H o w a n d w h y i s resistance d e n i e d t o b o d i e s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h

d i s c i p l i n a r y r e g i m e s ? W h a t i s this n o t i o n o f d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o ­

d u c t i o n , a n d does i t w o r k as ef f icaciously as F o u c a u l t appears

to i m p l y ? In the f i n a l chapter of the first v o l u m e of The His­

tory of Sexuality, F o u c a u l t cal ls for a " h i s t o r y of b o d i e s " w h i c h

w o u l d i n q u i r e i n t o "the m a n n e r i n w h i c h w h a t i s m o s t m a ­

ter ia l a n d v i t a l i n t h e m has b e e n i n v e s t e d . " 7 I n this f o r m u l a ­

t i o n , he suggests that p o w e r acts not o n l y on the b o d y b u t also

in the b o d y , that p o w e r not o n l y p r o d u c e s the b o u n d a r i e s of a

subject b u t p e r v a d e s the i n f e r i o r i t y of that subject. In the last

f o r m u l a t i o n , i t appears that there is an " i n s i d e " to the b o d y

w h i c h exists before p o w e r ' s i n v a s i o n . B u t g i v e n the r a d i c a l ex­

t e r i o r i t y o f the s o u l , h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d " i n f e r i o r i t y "

i n F o u c a u l t ? 8 That i n f e r i o r i t y w i l l n o t b e a s o u l , a n d i t w i l l

not be a p s y c h e , b u t w h a t w i l l i t be? Is this a space of p u r e

m a l l e a b i l i t y , one w h i c h is, as i t were , r e a d y to c o n f o r m to the

d e m a n d s o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n ? Or i s this i n f e r i o r i t y to be c a l l e d ,

s i m p l y , the b o d y ? H a s i t c o m e t o the p a r a d o x i c a l p o i n t w h e r e

F o u c a u l t w a n t s to c l a i m that the s o u l i s the exter ior f o r m , a n d

the b o d y the i n t e r i o r space?

A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t w a n t s o n o c c a s i o n t o refute the p o s s i ­

b i l i t y o f a b o d y w h i c h i s not p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h p o w e r re la­

t ions, s o m e t i m e s h i s e x p l a n a t i o n s r e q u i r e a b o d y to m a i n t a i n a

90 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

m a t e r i a l i t y o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m the p o w e r re lat ions that

take it as a site of i n v e s t m e n t . 9 Indeed , the t e r m "si te" seem­

i n g l y a pp ears i n this p hr ase w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , for w h a t i s the

r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the b o d y as site a n d the i n v e s t m e n t s w h i c h

that site is s a i d to rece ive or bear? D o e s the t e r m "site" stabi­

l i z e the b o d y i n r e l a t i o n t o those investments , w h i l e def lec t ing

the q u e s t i o n o f h o w i n v e s t m e n t s establ ish, c o n t o u r , a n d d i s ­

r u p t w h a t the phrase takes for g r a n t e d as the b o d y ' s "site"

(i.e., does the t e r m "site" deflect the project of L a c a n ' s " m i r r o r

stage")? W h a t const i tutes a n " i n v e s t m e n t , " a n d w h a t i s its c o n ­

s t i t u t i n g p o w e r ? D o e s i t have a v i s u a l i z i n g f u n c t i o n , a n d c a n

w e u n d e r s t a n d the p r o d u c t i o n o f the b o d i l y ego i n F r e u d a s

the p r o j e c t e d o r s p a t i a l i z e d m o d a l i t y o f s u c h i n v e s t m e n t s ? 1 0

I n d e e d , to w h a t extent is the b o d y ' s site s t a b i l i z e d t h r o u g h a

c e r t a i n pro ject ive ins tabi l i ty , one w h i c h F o u c a u l t cannot q u i t e

d e s c r i b e a n d w h i c h w o u l d p e r h a p s engage h i m i n the p r o b ­

l e m a t i c of the ego as an i m a g i n a r y f u n c t i o n ?

Discipline and Punish offers a dif ferent c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the

r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i t y a n d investment . T h e r e the s o u l

i s t a k e n t o b e a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p o w e r t h r o u g h w h i c h the

b o d y is c u l t i v a t e d a n d f o r m e d . In a sense, it acts as a p o w e r -

l a d e n s c h e m a that p r o d u c e s a n d actual izes the b o d y . W e c a n

u n d e r s t a n d F o u c a u l t ' s references to the s o u l as an i m p l i c i t re­

w o r k i n g o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n f o r m u l a t i o n i n w h i c h the s o u l i s

u n d e r s t o o d t o b e the f o r m a n d p r i n c i p l e o f the b o d y ' s matter . 1 1

F o u c a u l t argues in Discipline and Punish that the s o u l b e c o m e s

a n o r m a t i v e a n d n o r m a l i z i n g i d e a l a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the

b o d y is t r a i n e d , s h a p e d , c u l t i v a t e d , a n d invested; i t i s a h i s ­

t o r i c a l l y speci f ic i m a g i n a r y i d e a l (idéal spéculatif) u n d e r w h i c h

the b o d y i s m a t e r i a l i z e d .

T h i s "subjec t ion" or assujetissement is not o n l y a s u b o r d i ­

n a t i o n b u t a s e c u r i n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g , a p u t t i n g i n t o p lace

Between Freud and Foucault 91

of a subject, a subject ivat ion. T h e " s o u l b r i n g s [the p r i s o n e r ]

t o existence"; not u n l i k e i n A r i s t o t l e , the s o u l , a s a n i n s t r u ­

m e n t o f p o w e r , f o r m s a n d frames the b o d y , s t a m p s i t , a n d i n

s t a m p i n g it , b r i n g s i t i n t o b e i n g . In this f o r m u l a t i o n , there i s

n o b o d y o u t s i d e o f p o w e r , for the m a t e r i a l i t y o f the b o d y —

i n d e e d , m a t e r i a l i t y i t s e l f — i s p r o d u c e d b y a n d i n d i rect r e l a ­

t i o n to the i n v e s t m e n t o f p o w e r . T h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f the p r i s o n ,

F o u c a u l t w r i t e s , is es tab l i shed to the extent that (dans la mesure

ou) i t is a vector a n d i n s t r u m e n t of p o w e r . 1 2 H e n c e , the p r i s o n

is materialized to the extent that it is invested with power. To be

g r a m m a t i c a l l y accurate, there i s no p r i s o n p r i o r to its m a t e r i ­

a l i z a t i o n ; its m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n i s coextensive w i t h its i n v e s t i t u r e

w i t h p o w e r re lat ions; a n d m a t e r i a l i t y i s the effect a n d gauge

o f this i n v e s t m e n t . T h e p r i s o n comes t o b e o n l y w i t h i n the

f i e l d o f p o w e r re lat ions, m o r e speci f ica l ly , o n l y to the extent

that i t i s saturated w i t h s u c h re lat ions a n d that s u c h a satu­

r a t i o n i s f o r m a t i v e o f its v e r y b e i n g . H e r e the b o d y — o f the

p r i s o n e r a n d o f the p r i s o n — i s not a n i n d e p e n d e n t m a t e r i a l i t y ,

a static surface or site, w h i c h a subsequent i n v e s t m e n t comes

t o m a r k , s i g n i f y u p o n , o r p e r v a d e ; the b o d y i s that for w h i c h

m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n a n d i n v e s t i t u r e are coextensive .

A l t h o u g h the s o u l i s u n d e r s t o o d to f r a m e the b o d y in Disci­

pline and Punish, F o u c a u l t suggests that the p r o d u c t i o n of the

"subject" takes p lace to s o m e degree t h r o u g h the s u b o r d i n a ­

t i o n a n d e v e n d e s t r u c t i o n o f the body. I n " N i e t z s c h e , G e n e a l ­

ogy, H i s t o r y , " F o u c a u l t r e m a r k s that o n l y t h r o u g h the de­

s t r u c t i o n of the b o d y does the subject as a "d issoc iated u n i t y "

appear : "the b o d y i s the i n s c r i b e d surface o f events ( traced by

language a n d d i s s o l v e d by ideas), the l o c u s of a d i s s o c i a t e d

self ( a d o p t i n g the i l l u s i o n of a s u b s t a n t i a l u n i t y ) , a n d a v o l ­

u m e i n p e r p e t u a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . " 1 3 T h e subject appears a t the

expense o f the b o d y , a n a p p e a r a n c e c o n d i t i o n e d i n inverse re-

9 2 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

l a t i o n to the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the body . T h e subject not o n l y

ef fect ively takes the p lace of the b o d y b u t acts as the s o u l

w h i c h f rames a n d f o r m s the b o d y i n c a p t i v i t y . H e r e the f o r m ­

i n g a n d f r a m i n g f u n c t i o n o f that exter ior s o u l w o r k s against

the b o d y ; i n d e e d , i t m i g h t be u n d e r s t o o d as the s u b l i m a t i o n

o f the b o d y i n consequence o f d i s p l a c e m e n t a n d s u b s t i t u t i o n .

In thus r e d e s c r i b i n g the b o d y in F o u c a u l t , I have c l e a r l y

w a n d e r e d i n t o a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c v o c a b u l a r y of s u b l i m a t i o n .

W h i l e there, let me pose a q u e s t i o n to r e t u r n to the issue of

subject ion a n d resistance. I f the b o d y is s u b o r d i n a t e d a n d to

s o m e extent d e s t r o y e d as the d i s s o c i a t e d self emerges, a n d i f

that emergence m i g h t be r e a d as the s u b l i m a t i o n of the b o d y

a n d the self be r e a d as the b o d y ' s g h o s t l y f o r m , t h e n is there

s o m e p a r t o f the b o d y w h i c h i s not p r e s e r v e d i n s u b l i m a t i o n ,

s o m e part o f the b o d y w h i c h r e m a i n s u n s u b l i m a t e d ?

T h i s b o d i l y r e m a i n d e r , I w o u l d suggest, s u r v i v e s for s u c h a

subject in the m o d e o f a lready, i f not a l w a y s , h a v i n g b e e n de­

s t r o y e d , in a k i n d of c o n s t i t u t i v e loss. T h e b o d y is not a site

on w h i c h a c o n s t r u c t i o n takes p lace; i t is a d e s t r u c t i o n on the

o c c a s i o n of w h i c h a subject is f o r m e d . T h e f o r m a t i o n of this

subject is at once the f r a m i n g , s u b o r d i n a t i o n , a n d r e g u l a t i o n of

the b o d y , a n d the m o d e i n w h i c h that d e s t r u c t i o n i s p r e s e r v e d

( in the sense of s u s t a i n e d a n d e m b a l m e d ) in n o r m a l i z a t i o n .

If, then, the b o d y is n o w to be u n d e r s t o o d as that w h i c h not

o n l y const i tutes the subject i n its d i s s o c i a t e d a n d s u b l i m a t e d

state, b u t also exceeds or resists a n y effort at s u b l i m a t i o n , h o w

are we to u n d e r s t a n d this b o d y that is, as i t were , negated or

r e p r e s s e d so that the subject m i g h t l ive? O n e m i g h t expect

the b o d y t o r e t u r n i n a n o n - n o r m a l i z a b l e w i l d n e s s , a n d there

are o f c o u r s e m o m e n t s i n F o u c a u l t w h e n s o m e t h i n g l i k e that

h a p p e n s . B u t m o r e often t h a n not , i n F o u c a u l t the p o s s i b i l i t y

of s u b v e r s i o n or resistance appears (a) in the course of a s u b -

Between Freud and Foucault 93

j e c t i v a t i o n that exceeds the n o r m a l i z i n g a i m s b y w h i c h i t i s

m o b i l i z e d , for e x a m p l e , i n "reverse-discourse , " o r (b) t h r o u g h

convergence w i t h other d i s c u r s i v e reg imes , w h e r e b y i n a d v e r ­

tent ly p r o d u c e d d i s c u r s i v e c o m p l e x i t y u n d e r m i n e s the teleo-

l o g i c a l a i m s of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 1 4 T h u s resistance a ppea r s as the

effect of p o w e r , as a p a r t of p o w e r , its se l f -subvers ion.

In the t h e o r i z a t i o n of resistance, a c e r t a i n p r o b l e m arises

w h i c h c o n c e r n s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d , b y i m p l i c a t i o n , the l i m i t s

o f subjec t ivat ion . F o r F o u c a u l t , the subject w h o i s p r o d u c e d

t h r o u g h subject ion i s n o t p r o d u c e d at an instant in its total i ty .

Instead, i t i s in the p r o c e s s of b e i n g p r o d u c e d , i t i s repeat­

e d l y p r o d u c e d ( w h i c h i s n o t the same a s b e i n g p r o d u c e d

a n e w a g a i n a n d again). It is p r e c i s e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e p e ­

t i t i o n w h i c h does n o t conso l idate that d i s s o c i a t e d u n i t y , the

subject, b u t w h i c h prol i ferates effects w h i c h u n d e r m i n e the

force o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n . T h e t e r m w h i c h n o t o n l y n a m e s , b u t

f o r m s a n d frames the subject—let u s use F o u c a u l t ' s e x a m p l e

of h o m o s e x u a l i t y — m o b i l i z e s a reverse d i s c o u r s e against the

v e r y r e g i m e o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n b y w h i c h i t i s s p a w n e d . T h i s is,

of course , not a p u r e o p p o s i t i o n , for the same " h o m o s e x u a l i t y "

w i l l b e d e p l o y e d first i n the serv ice o f n o r m a l i z i n g heterosexu-

a l i t y a n d s e c o n d i n the s e r v i c e o f its o w n d e p a t h o l o g i z a t i o n .

T h i s t e r m w i l l c a r r y the r i s k o f the f o r m e r m e a n i n g i n the

latter, b u t i t w o u l d be a m i s t a k e to t h i n k that s i m p l y by speak­

i n g the t e r m one ei ther t ranscends heterosexual n o r m a l i z a t i o n

or b e c o m e s its i n s t r u m e n t .

T h e r i s k o f r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s p e r s i s t e n t l y there: c o n s i d e r

the one w h o i n def iant "outness" declares h is/her h o m o s e x u ­

a l i t y o n l y t o rece ive the response, " A h yes, s o y o u are that, a n d

o n l y that." W h a t e v e r y o u say w i l l b e r e a d b a c k a s a n overt

or subt le m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f y o u r essentia l h o m o s e x u a l i t y . ( O n e

s h o u l d not u n d e r e s t i m a t e h o w e x h a u s t i n g i t i s to be e x p e c t e d

94 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

to be an " o u t " h o m o s e x u a l a l l the t i m e , w h e t h e r the expec­

t a t i o n c o m e s f r o m g a y a n d l e s b i a n al l ies o r the ir foes.) H e r e

F o u c a u l t cites a n d r e w o r k s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n , o f

m o b i l i z i n g p o l i t i c a l l y w h a t N i e t z s c h e , in On the Genealogy of

Morals, c a l l e d the "s ign c h a i n . " T h e r e N i e t z s c h e argues that the

uses to w h i c h a g i v e n s i g n i s o r i g i n a l l y p u t are " w o r l d s a p a r t "

f r o m the uses t o w h i c h i t t h e n b e c o m e s avai lable . T h i s t e m p o ­

r a l gap b e t w e e n usages p r o d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e v e r s a l

o f s i g n i f i c a t i o n , b u t also opens the w a y for an i n a u g u r a t i o n

of s i g n i f y i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s that exceed those to w h i c h the t e r m

has b e e n p r e v i o u s l y b o u n d .

T h e F o u c a u l t i a n subject i s n e v e r f u l l y c o n s t i t u t e d i n subjec­

t i o n , then; i t i s r e p e a t e d l y c o n s t i t u t e d i n subject ion, a n d i t i s

in the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e p e t i t i o n that repeats against its o r i g i n

that subject ion m i g h t be u n d e r s t o o d to d r a w its i n a d v e r t e n t l y

e n a b l i n g p o w e r . F r o m a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p e r s p e c t i v e , h o w e v e r ,

we m i g h t ask w h e t h e r this p o s s i b i l i t y of resistance to a c o n ­

s t i t u t i n g o r s u b j e c t i v a t i n g p o w e r c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m w h a t i s

" i n " o r "of" d iscourse . W h a t c a n w e m a k e o f the w a y i n w h i c h

d iscourses not o n l y const i tute the d o m a i n s of the speakable ,

b u t are themselves b o u n d e d t h r o u g h the p r o d u c t i o n of a c o n ­

s t i tut ive outs ide : the u n s p e a k a b l e , the uns igni f iab le?

F r o m a L a c a n i a n p e r s p e c t i v e , one m i g h t w e l l q u e s t i o n

w h e t h e r the effects of the p s y c h e c a n be s a i d to be e x h a u s t e d

i n w h a t c a n b e s i g n i f i e d o r w h e t h e r there i s not , over a n d

against th is s i g n i f y i n g b o d y , a d o m a i n of the p s y c h e w h i c h

contests l e g i b i l i t y . If, a c c o r d i n g to p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the subject

i s not the same as the p s y c h e f r o m w h i c h i t emerges a n d if, for

F o u c a u l t , the subject i s not the same as the b o d y f r o m w h i c h i t

emerges, t h e n p e r h a p s the b o d y has c o m e to subst i tute for the

p s y c h e i n F o u c a u l t — t h a t is , a s that w h i c h exceeds a n d c o n ­

f o u n d s the i n j u n c t i o n s of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . Is this a b o d y p u r e

Between Freud and Foucault 95

a n d s i m p l e , or does "the b o d y " c o m e to s t a n d for a c e r t a i n

o p e r a t i o n of the p s y c h e , one w h i c h i s d i s t i n c t l y different, i f not

d i r e c t l y o p p o s e d to, the s o u l f i g u r e d as an i m p r i s o n i n g effect?

Perhaps F o u c a u l t h i m s e l f has i n v e s t e d the b o d y w i t h a p s y ­

chic m e a n i n g that he c a n n o t elaborate w i t h i n the t e r m s that he

uses. H o w does the process o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n , the d i s c i p l i n a r y

p r o d u c t i o n o f the subject, b r e a k d o w n , i f i t does, i n b o t h F o u ­

c a u l t i a n a n d p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y ? W h e n c e does that fa i lure

emerge, a n d w h a t are its consequences?

C o n s i d e r the A l t h u s s e r i a n n o t i o n o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i n w h i c h

a subject i s c o n s t i t u t e d by b e i n g h a i l e d , a d d r e s s e d , n a m e d . 1 5

F o r the m o s t part , i t seems, A l t h u s s e r b e l i e v e d that this s o c i a l

d e m a n d — o n e m i g h t c a l l i t a s y m b o l i c i n j u n c t i o n — a c t u a l l y

p r o d u c e d the k i n d s o f subjects i t n a m e d . H e gives the e x a m p l e

o f the p o l i c e m a n o n the street y e l l i n g " H e y y o u there!," a n d

c o n c l u d e s that this c a l l i m p o r t a n t l y const i tutes the one i t a d ­

dresses a n d sites. T h e scene is c l e a r l y a d i s c i p l i n a r y one; the

p o l i c e m a n ' s c a l l i s a n effort t o b r i n g s o m e o n e b a c k i n l ine . Yet

w e m i g h t also u n d e r s t a n d i t i n L a c a n i a n terms a s the c a l l o f

s y m b o l i c c o n s t i t u t i o n . A s A l t h u s s e r h i m s e l f insists , th is per­

f o r m a t i v e effort of n a m i n g can o n l y attempt to b r i n g its a d ­

dressee i n t o b e i n g : there is a l w a y s the r i s k of a c e r t a i n misrecog-

nition. If one m i s r e c o g n i z e s that effort to p r o d u c e the subject,

the p r o d u c t i o n i tself falters. T h e one w h o i s h a i l e d m a y f a i l t o

hear, m i s r e a d the c a l l , t u r n the other w a y , a n s w e r to another

n a m e , insist o n not b e i n g a d d r e s s e d i n that way. I n d e e d , the

d o m a i n o f the i m a g i n a r y i s d e m a r c a t e d by A l t h u s s e r as p r e ­

c i s e l y the d o m a i n that m a k e s misrecognition poss ib le . T h e n a m e

i s c a l l e d , a n d I am sure i t i s my n a m e , b u t i t i sn ' t . T h e n a m e

is c a l l e d , a n d I am sure that a n a m e is b e i n g c a l l e d , my n a m e ,

b u t i t i s in someone 's i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e speech, or w o r s e , i t i s

s o m e o n e c o u g h i n g , or w o r s e , a r a d i a t o r w h i c h for a m o m e n t

96 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

a p p r o x i m a t e s a h u m a n voice . Or I am sure that no one has

n o t i c e d m y transgress ion, a n d that i t i s not m y n a m e that i s

b e i n g c a l l e d , b u t o n l y a c o u g h i n g passerby, the h i g h p i t c h o f

the h e a t i n g m e c h a n i s m — b u t i t i s my n a m e , a n d yet I do not

r e c o g n i z e m y s e l f in the subject that the n a m e , at this m o m e n t ,

i n s t a l l s . 1 6

C o n s i d e r the force o f this d y n a m i c o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n a n d

m i s r e c o g n i t i o n w h e n the n a m e is not a p r o p e r n a m e b u t a

s o c i a l category, 1 7 a n d hence a s igni f ier capable of b e i n g inter­

p r e t e d in a n u m b e r of d i v e r g e n t a n d c o n f l i c t u a l w a y s . To be

h a i l e d as a " w o m a n " or " J e w " or " q u e e r " or " B l a c k " or " C h i ­

c a n a " m a y b e h e a r d o r i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n a f f i r m a t i o n o r a n

i n s u l t , d e p e n d i n g o n the context i n w h i c h the h a i l i n g o c c u r s

(where context is the effective h i s t o r i c i t y a n d s p a t i a l i t y of the

s ign). I f that n a m e is c a l l e d , there is m o r e often t h a n not

s o m e hes i tat ion about w h e t h e r o r h o w t o r e s p o n d , for w h a t

is at stake is w h e t h e r the t e m p o r a r y t o t a l i z a t i o n p e r f o r m e d

by the n a m e i s p o l i t i c a l l y e n a b l i n g or p a r a l y z i n g , w h e t h e r the

foreclosure, i n d e e d the v i o l e n c e , o f the t o t a l i z i n g r e d u c t i o n

o f i d e n t i t y p e r f o r m e d b y that p a r t i c u l a r h a i l i n g i s p o l i t i c a l l y

strategic or regressive or, i f p a r a l y z i n g a n d regressive, also en­

a b l i n g i n some way.

T h e A l t h u s s e r i a n use of L a c a n centers on the f u n c t i o n of the

i m a g i n a r y as the p e r m a n e n t p o s s i b i l i t y of misrecognition, that

is, the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n s y m b o l i c d e m a n d (the

n a m e that i s interpel la ted) a n d the i n s t a b i l i t y a n d u n p r e d i c t ­

a b i l i t y of its a p p r o p r i a t i o n . I f the i n t e r p e l l a t e d n a m e seeks to

a c c o m p l i s h the i d e n t i t y to w h i c h it refers, i t b e g i n s as a per­

f o r m a t i v e process w h i c h i s nevertheless d e r a i l e d i n the i m a g i ­

nary, for the i m a g i n a r y i s s u r e l y p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the law,

s t r u c t u r e d by the law, b ut does not i m m e d i a t e l y o b e y the law.

F o r the L a c a n i a n , then, the i m a g i n a r y s ignif ies the i m p o s -

Between Freud and Foucault 97

s i b i l i t y o f the d i s c u r s i v e — t h a t is, s y m b o l i c — c o n s t i t u t i o n of

ident i ty . I d e n t i t y c a n n e v e r b e f u l l y t o t a l i z e d b y the s y m b o l i c ,

for w h a t i t fails to o r d e r w i l l emerge w i t h i n the i m a g i n a r y as

a d i s o r d e r , a site w h e r e i d e n t i t y is contested.

H e n c e , in a L a c a n i a n v e i n , Jacquel ine Rose f o r m u l a t e s the

u n c o n s c i o u s as that w h i c h t h w a r t s a n y effort of the s y m b o l i c

t o const i tute sexed i d e n t i t y c o h e r e n t l y a n d fu l ly , a n u n c o n ­

sc ious i n d i c a t e d by the s l ips a n d gaps that character ize the

w o r k i n g s of the i m a g i n a r y in language. I quote a passage

w h i c h has benef i t ted m a n y o f u s w h o have sought t o f i n d

in p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a p r i n c i p l e of res istance to g i v e n f o r m s of

s o c i a l r e a l i t y :

The unconscious constantly reveals the "failure" of identity. Because

there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is no stability of sexual

identity, no position for women (or for men) which is ever simply

achieved. N o r does psychoanalysis see such "failure" as a special-

case inability or an indiv idual deviancy from the norm. "Failure" is

not a moment to be regretted in a process of adaptation, or devel­

opment into normality, . . . "failure" is something endlessly repeated

and relived moment by moment throughout our individual histories.

It appears not only in the symptom, but also in dreams, in slips of

the tongue and in forms of sexual pleasure which are pushed to the

sidelines of the norm. . . . there is a resistance to identity at the very

heart of psychic l ife. 1 8

In Discipline and Punish, F o u c a u l t p r e s u m e s the efficacy of

the s y m b o l i c d e m a n d , its p e r f o r m a t i v e c a p a c i t y to const i tute

the subject w h o m it names . In The History of Sexuality, Vol­

ume l, h o w e v e r , there is b o t h a re ject ion of "a s ingle l o c u s

o f R e v o l t " — w h i c h w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y i n c l u d e the p s y c h e , the

i m a g i n a r y , o r the u n c o n s c i o u s w i t h i n its p u r v i e w — a n d a n

a f f i rmat ion o f m u l t i p l e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f resistance e n a b l e d by

p o w e r itself. F o r F o u c a u l t , res istance cannot be outside the l a w

98 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

i n another register (the i m a g i n a r y ) o r i n that w h i c h e ludes the

c o n s t i t u t i v e p o w e r of the law.

there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of

all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a p lu­

rality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are

possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage,

solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; st i l l others that are quick to

compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only

exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean

that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming w i t h respect to

the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive,

doomed to perpetual defeat. 1 9

T h i s last car icature o f p o w e r , a l t h o u g h c l e a r l y w r i t t e n w i t h

M a r c u s e i n m i n d , recal ls the effect o f the L a c a n i a n law, w h i c h

p r o d u c e s its o w n " f a i l u r e " a t the l e v e l o f the p s y c h e , b u t w h i c h

c a n never b e d i s p l a c e d o r r e f o r m u l a t e d b y that p s y c h i c re­

sistance. T h e i m a g i n a r y t h w a r t s the efficacy of the s y m b o l i c

l a w b u t cannot t u r n b a c k u p o n the law, d e m a n d i n g o r effect­

i n g its r e f o r m u l a t i o n . In this sense, p s y c h i c resistance t h w a r t s

the l a w in its effects, b u t c a n n o t r e d i r e c t the l a w or its effects.

Resistance is thus l o c a t e d in a d o m a i n that i s v i r t u a l l y p o w e r ­

less to alter the l a w that i t opposes . H e n c e , p s y c h i c resistance

p r e s u m e s the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the l a w i n its anter ior , s y m b o l i c

f o r m a n d , in that sense, co ntr ib ute s to its status q u o . In s u c h a

v i e w , resistance appears d o o m e d t o p e r p e t u a l defeat.

In contrast , F o u c a u l t f o r m u l a t e s resistance as an effect of

the v e r y p o w e r that i t i s s a i d to o p p o s e . T h i s ins istence on

the d u a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g b o t h constituted b y the l a w a n d

an effect of resistance to the l a w m a r k s a d e p a r t u r e f r o m the

L a c a n i a n f r a m e w o r k , for w h e r e L a c a n restr icts the n o t i o n o f

s o c i a l p o w e r t o the s y m b o l i c d o m a i n a n d delegates resistance

to the i m a g i n a r y , F o u c a u l t recasts the s y m b o l i c as re lat ions of

Between Freud and Foucault 99

p o w e r a n d u n d e r s t a n d s resistance as an effect o f p o w e r . F o u -

caul t ' s c o n c e p t i o n ini t iates a shift f r o m a d i s c o u r s e on law, c o n ­

c e i v e d as j u r i d i c a l (and p r e s u p p o s i n g a subject s u b o r d i n a t e d

by p o w e r ) , to a d i s c o u r s e on p o w e r , w h i c h is a f i e l d of p r o d u c ­

t ive , regulatory , a n d contestatory re lat ions. F o r F o u c a u l t , the

s y m b o l i c p r o d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f its o w n subvers ions , a n d

these s u b v e r s i o n s are u n a n t i c i p a t e d effects of s y m b o l i c inter­

pe l la t ions .

T h e n o t i o n o f "the s y m b o l i c " does n o t address the m u l t i ­

p l i c i t y o f p o w e r vectors u p o n w h i c h F o u c a u l t insists , for

p o w e r i n F o u c a u l t not o n l y consists i n the re i terated e labora­

t i o n o f n o r m s o r i n t e r p e l l a t i n g d e m a n d s , b u t i s f o r m a t i v e o r

p r o d u c t i v e , mal leable , m u l t i p l e , p r o l i f e r a t i v e , a n d c o n f l i c t u a l .

M o r e o v e r , i n its res igni f icat ions , the l a w itself i s t r a n s m u t e d

i n t o that w h i c h opposes a n d exceeds its o r i g i n a l p u r p o s e s . I n

this sense, d i s c i p l i n a r y d i s c o u r s e does n o t u n i l a t e r a l l y c o n s t i ­

tute a subject in F o u c a u l t , or rather, if it does, it simultaneously

const i tutes the c o n d i t i o n for the subject 's d e - c o n s t i t u t i o n .

W h a t i s b r o u g h t i n t o b e i n g t h r o u g h the p e r f o r m a t i v e effect o f

the i n t e r p e l l a t i n g d e m a n d is m u c h m o r e t h a n a "subject," for

the "subject" created is not for that reason f ixed in p lace : i t

b e c o m e s the o c c a s i o n for a further m a k i n g . I n d e e d , I w o u l d

a d d , a subject o n l y r e m a i n s a subject t h r o u g h a r e i t e r a t i o n or

r e a r t i c u l a t i o n of itself as a subject, a n d this d e p e n d e n c y of the

subject on r e p e t i t i o n for coherence m a y const i tute that sub­

ject's incoherence , its i n c o m p l e t e character. T h i s r e p e t i t i o n or,

better, i t e r a b i l i t y thus b e c o m e s the n o n - p l a c e of s u b v e r s i o n ,

the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e - e m b o d y i n g of the s u b j e c t i v a t i n g n o r m

that c a n redirect its n o r m a t i v i t y .

C o n s i d e r the i n v e r s i o n s o f " w o m a n " a n d " w o m a n , " de­

p e n d i n g o n the s t a g i n g a n d address o f their p e r f o r m a n c e , o f

" q u e e r " a n d "queer," d e p e n d i n g o n p a t h o l o g i z i n g o r contes-

100 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

tatory m o d e s . B o t h e x a m p l e s c o n c e r n , not a n o p p o s i t i o n be­

t w e e n r e a c t i o n a r y a n d p r o g r e s s i v e usage, b u t rather a p r o ­

gressive usage that requires a n d repeats the r e a c t i o n a r y in

o r d e r to effect a s u b v e r s i v e r e t e r r i t o r i a l i z a t i o n . F o r F o u c a u l t ,

then, the d i s c i p l i n a r y apparatus p r o d u c e s subjects, b u t as a

consequence of that p r o d u c t i o n , i t b r i n g s i n t o d i s c o u r s e the

c o n d i t i o n s for s u b v e r t i n g that apparatus itself. In other w o r d s ,

the l a w t u r n s against itself a n d s p a w n s v e r s i o n s o f itself w h i c h

o p p o s e a n d prol i ferate its a n i m a t i n g p u r p o s e s . T h e strategic

q u e s t i o n for F o u c a u l t is, then, h o w c a n w e w o r k the p o w e r

re lat ions b y w h i c h w e are w o r k e d , a n d i n w h a t d i r e c t i o n ?

In his later i n t e r v i e w s , F o u c a u l t suggests that ident i t ies are

f o r m e d w i t h i n c o n t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c a l arrangements i n r e l a ­

t i o n to c e r t a i n r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the l i b e r a l state, ones w h i c h

p r e s u m e that the assert ion of r i g h t s a n d c l a i m s to e n t i t l e m e n t

can o n l y be m a d e on the basis o f a s i n g u l a r a n d i n j u r e d i d e n ­

tity. T h e m o r e specif ic ident i t ies b e c o m e , the m o r e t o t a l i z e d

a n i d e n t i t y b e c o m e s b y that v e r y speci f ic i ty . I n d e e d , w e m i g h t

u n d e r s t a n d this c o n t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o n as the m o v e m e n t

by w h i c h a j u r i d i c a l apparatus p r o d u c e s the f ie ld o f p o s s i b l e

p o l i t i c a l subjects. Because for F o u c a u l t the d i s c i p l i n a r y a p p a ­

ratus of the state operates t h r o u g h the t o t a l i z i n g p r o d u c t i o n

o f i n d i v i d u a l s , a n d because this t o t a l i z a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l

extends the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the state (i.e., by t r a n s f o r m i n g i n d i ­

v i d u a l s i n t o subjects of the state), F o u c a u l t w i l l c a l l for a re­

m a k i n g of su bj e c t iv i ty b e y o n d the shackles o f the j u r i d i c a l law.

In this sense, w h a t we c a l l i d e n t i t y p o l i t i c s i s p r o d u c e d by a

state w h i c h c a n o n l y al locate r e c o g n i t i o n a n d r ights t o s u b ­

jects t o t a l i z e d by the p a r t i c u l a r i t y that const i tutes their p l a i n ­

tiff status. In c a l l i n g for an o v e r t h r o w , as i t w e r e , of s u c h an

arrangement , F o u c a u l t is not c a l l i n g for the release of a h i d ­

d e n or r e p r e s s e d subject iv i ty , b u t rather, for a r a d i c a l m a k i n g

T Between Freud and Foucault 101

o f subjec t iv i ty f o r m e d i n a n d against the h i s t o r i c a l h e g e m o n y

of the j u r i d i c a l subject:

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to

refuse what we are. We have to imagine and b u i l d up what we

could be to get r id of this k i n d of political "double bind," which is

the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power

structures. . . . The conclusion w o u l d be that the political, ethical,

social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate us

both from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate

us from the state and the type of individualization which is l inked to

the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the

refusal of this k i n d of individuality which has been imposed on us

for several centuries. 2 0

T w o sets o f q u e s t i o n s emerge f r o m the above analys is . F i r s t ,

w h y can F o u c a u l t f o r m u l a t e resistance i n r e l a t i o n t o the d i s c i ­

p l i n a r y p o w e r of s e x u a l i t y in The History of Sexuality, w h e r e a s

in Discipline and Punish d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r a ppea r s to deter­

m i n e d o c i l e b o d i e s incapable of resistance? Is there s o m e t h i n g

about the r e l a t i o n s h i p of sexuality to p o w e r that c o n d i t i o n s the

p o s s i b i l i t y of res istance in the f i rst text, a n d a n o t e d absence

of a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s e x u a l i t y f r o m the d i s c u s s i o n of p o w e r

a n d b o d i e s in the second? N o t e that in the History of Sexuality

the repress ive f u n c t i o n of the l a w is u n d e r m i n e d p r e c i s e l y

t h r o u g h b e c o m i n g itself the object of erot ic i n v e s t m e n t a n d ex­

c i ta t ion . D i s c i p l i n a r y apparatus fai ls to repress s e x u a l i t y p r e ­

c i s e l y because the apparatus is itself e r o t i c i z e d , b e c o m i n g the

o c c a s i o n for the incitement of sexuality a n d , therefore, u n d o i n g

its o w n repress ive a ims.

S e c o n d , w i t h this transferable p r o p e r t y o f s e x u a l invest­

m e n t s i n m i n d , w e m i g h t ask w h a t c o n d i t i o n s the p o s s i b i l i t y

F o u c a u l t invi tes , that o f r e f u s i n g the t y p e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y cor­

re lated w i t h the d i s c i p l i n a r y apparatus o f the m o d e r n state?

r 102 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

A n d h o w d o w e account for attachment t o p r e c i s e l y the k i n d

of s t a t e - l i n k e d i n d i v i d u a l i t y that reconsol idates the j u r i d i c a l

l a w ? To w h a t extent has the d i s c i p l i n a r y apparatus that at­

tempts t o p r o d u c e a n d tota l i ze i d e n t i t y b e c o m e a n a b i d i n g

object o f passionate at tachment? We cannot s i m p l y t h r o w off

the i d e n t i t i e s w e have b e c o m e , a n d F o u c a u l t ' s c a l l t o "refuse"

those i d e n t i t i e s w i l l c e r t a i n l y b e m e t w i t h resistance. I f w e re­

ject t h e o r e t i c a l l y the source of resistance in a p s y c h i c d o m a i n

that is s a i d to precede or exceed the s o c i a l , 2 1 as we m u s t , can

we r e f o r m u l a t e p s y c h i c resistance in terms of the social w i t h o u t

that r e f o r m u l a t i o n b e c o m i n g a d o m e s t i c a t i o n or n o r m a l i z a ­

t ion? ( M u s t the s o c i a l a l w a y s b e e q u a t e d w i t h the g i v e n a n d

the n o r m a l i z a b l e ? ) I n p a r t i c u l a r , h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d ,

not m e r e l y the d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o d u c t i o n of the subject, b u t the

d i s c i p l i n a r y c u l t i v a t i o n of an attachment to subjection?

S u c h a p o s t u l a t i o n m a y raise the q u e s t i o n of m a s o c h i s m —

i n d e e d , the q u e s t i o n o f m a s o c h i s m i n s u b j e c t - f o r m a t i o n — y e t

i t does not a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n of the status of "at tachment"

o r " i n v e s t m e n t . " H e r e emerges the g r a m m a t i c a l p r o b l e m b y

w h i c h a n at tachment appears t o precede the subject w h o

m i g h t be s a i d to " h a v e " it . Yet i t seems c r u c i a l to s u s p e n d the

u s u a l g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d c o n s i d e r a n i n v e r s i o n o f

t e r m s s u c h that c e r t a i n at tachments p r e c e d e a n d c o n d i t i o n the

f o r m a t i o n o f subjects (the v i s u a l i z a t i o n o f l i b i d o i n the m i r r o r

stage, the s u s t a i n i n g of that projected i m a g e t h r o u g h t i m e as

the d i s c u r s i v e f u n c t i o n of the name). Is this t h e n an o n t o l o g y

o f l i b i d o or i n v e s t m e n t that i s in s o m e sense p r i o r to a n d sepa­

rable f r o m a subject, or is e v e r y s u c h i n v e s t m e n t f r o m the start

b o u n d up w i t h a r e f l e x i v i t y that i s s t a b i l i z e d ( w i t h i n the i m a g i ­

n a r y ) as the ego? If the ego is c o m p o s e d of ident i f i cat ions , a n d

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is the r e s o l u t i o n of desire , t h e n the ego is the

Between Freud and Foucault 103

r e s i d u e of desire , the effect o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n s w h i c h , F r e u d ar­

gues in The Ego and the Id, trace a l ineage of a t tachment a n d

loss.

In F r e u d ' s v i e w , the f o r m a t i o n of consc ience enacts an at­

t a c h m e n t t o p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h f o u n d s the subject i n its reflex­

i v i t y . U n d e r the p r e s s u r e of the e thica l law, a subject emerges

w h o i s capable o f re f lex iv i ty , that is, w h o takes h i m / h e r s e l f

as an object, a n d so m i s t a k e s h im/herse l f , s ince he/she is, by

v i r t u e o f that f o u n d i n g p r o h i b i t i o n , a t a n inf in i te d is tance f r o m

his/her o r i g i n . O n l y o n the c o n d i t i o n o f a s e p a r a t i o n e n f o r c e d

t h r o u g h p r o h i b i t i o n does a subject emerge, f o r m e d t h r o u g h

the at tachment to p r o h i b i t i o n ( in o b e d i e n c e to i t , b u t also e r o t i ­

c i z i n g it). A n d this p r o h i b i t i o n i s a l l the m o r e s a v o r y p r e c i s e l y

because i t i s b o u n d u p i n the narc iss i s t i c c i r c u i t that w a r d s off

the d i s s o l u t i o n of the subject i n t o p s y c h o s i s . 2 2

F o r F o u c a u l t , a subject is f o r m e d a n d t h e n i n v e s t e d w i t h a

s e x u a l i t y by a r e g i m e of p o w e r . I f the v e r y process of subject-

f o r m a t i o n , h o w e v e r , r e q u i r e s a p r e e m p t i o n of sexual i ty , a

f o u n d i n g p r o h i b i t i o n that p r o h i b i t s a c e r t a i n desire b u t i tself

b e c o m e s a focus of desire , then a subject is f o r m e d t h r o u g h the

p r o h i b i t i o n of a sexual i ty , a p r o h i b i t i o n that at the s a m e t i m e

f o r m s this s e x u a l i t y — a n d the subject w h o is s a i d to bear it .

T h i s v i e w d i s p u t e s the F o u c a u l t i a n n o t i o n that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s

p r e s u m e s the e x t e r i o r i t y of the l a w to desire, for i t m a i n t a i n s

that there i s no desire w i t h o u t the l a w that f o r m s a n d sus­

tains the v e r y desire i t p r o h i b i t s . I n d e e d , p r o h i b i t i o n b e c o m e s

a n o d d f o r m o f p r e s e r v a t i o n , a w a y o f e r o t i c i z i n g the l a w that

w o u l d a b o l i s h e r o t i c i s m , b u t w h i c h o n l y w o r k s b y c o m p e l l i n g

e r o t i c i z a t i o n . In this sense, a "sexual i d e n t i t y " is a p r o d u c t i v e

c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms, for i d e n t i t y i s f o r m e d t h r o u g h a p r o ­

h i b i t i o n on s o m e d i m e n s i o n of the v e r y s e x u a l i t y i t i s s a i d to

104 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

bear, a n d sexual i ty , w h e n i t i s t i e d to i d e n t i t y , i s a l w a y s in

s o m e sense u n d e r c u t t i n g itself.

T h i s is not necessar i ly a static c o n t r a d i c t i o n , for the s i g n i -

fiers o f i d e n t i t y are not s t r u c t u r a l l y d e t e r m i n e d in advance . I f

F o u c a u l t c o u l d a r g u e that a s i g n c o u l d be t a k e n u p , u s e d for

p u r p o s e s counter to those for w h i c h i t w a s d e s i g n e d , then he

u n d e r s t o o d that e v e n the m o s t n o x i o u s terms c o u l d b e o w n e d ,

that the m o s t i n j u r i o u s i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s c o u l d also be the site

o f r a d i c a l r e o c c u p a t i o n a n d res igni f i ca t ion . B u t w h a t lets u s

o c c u p y the d i s c u r s i v e site o f i n j u r y ? H o w are w e a n i m a t e d

a n d m o b i l i z e d b y that d i s c u r s i v e site a n d its injury, s u c h that

o u r v e r y at tachment to i t b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n for o u r r e -

s i g n i f i c a t i o n of it? C a l l e d by an i n j u r i o u s n a m e , I c o m e i n t o

s o c i a l b e i n g , a n d because I have a c e r t a i n i n e v i t a b l e attach­

m e n t to my existence, because a c e r t a i n n a r c i s s i s m takes h o l d

of a n y t e r m that confers existence, I am l e d to e m b r a c e the

terms that in jure m e because they const i tute m e soc ia l ly . T h e

s e l f - c o l o n i z i n g trajectory o f c e r t a i n f o r m s of i d e n t i t y p o l i t i c s

are s y m p t o m a t i c of this p a r a d o x i c a l embrace of the i n j u r i o u s

t e r m . A s a further p a r a d o x , then, o n l y b y o c c u p y i n g — b e i n g

o c c u p i e d b y — t h a t i n j u r i o u s t e r m c a n I resist a n d o p p o s e i t ,

recast ing the p o w e r that const i tutes me as the p o w e r I oppose .

In this way , a c e r t a i n p l a c e for p s y c h o a n a l y s i s is s e c u r e d in

that a n y m o b i l i z a t i o n against subject ion w i l l take subject ion

as its resource, a n d that at tachment to an i n j u r i o u s i n t e r p e l l a ­

t i o n w i l l , b y w a y o f a necessar i ly a l ienated n a r c i s s i s m , b e c o m e

the c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h r e s i g n i f y i n g that i n t e r p e l l a t i o n be­

comes poss ible . T h i s w i l l n o t b e a n u n c o n s c i o u s o u t s i d e o f

p o w e r , b ut rather s o m e t h i n g l i k e the u n c o n s c i o u s o f p o w e r

itself, i n its t r a u m a t i c a n d p r o d u c t i v e i terabi l i ty .

If, then, we u n d e r s t a n d c e r t a i n k i n d s of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s to

confer ident i ty , those i n j u r i o u s i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s w i l l const i tute

Between Freud and Foucault 105

i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h injury. T h i s is not the same as s a y i n g that

s u c h a n i d e n t i t y w i l l r e m a i n a l w a y s a n d forever r o o t e d i n its

i n j u r y as l o n g as i t r e m a i n s an ident i ty , b u t i t does i m p l y that

the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n w i l l r e w o r k a n d unsett le the

passionate at tachment to subject ion w i t h o u t w h i c h subject for­

m a t i o n — a n d r e - f o r m a t i o n — c a n n o t succeed.

Althusser's Subjection 107

'Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l " Althusser's Subjection

A l thusser ' s d o c t r i n e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n c o n t i n u e s to s t r u c t u r e

c o n t e m p o r a r y debate on subject f o r m a t i o n , o f fer ing a

w a y to account for à subject w h o c o m e s i n t o b e i n g as a conse­

q u e n c e o f language, yet a l w a y s w i t h i n its terms. T h e t h e o r y o f

i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ap p e ar s to stage a s o c i a l scene in w h i c h a sub­

ject is h a i l e d , the subject t u r n s a r o u n d , a n d the subject t h e n

accepts the t e r m s by w h i c h he or she i s h a i l e d . T h i s is, no

doubt , a scene b o t h p u n i t i v e a n d r e d u c e d , for the c a l l i s m a d e

by an officer of "the L a w , " a n d this officer is cast as s i n g u l a r

a n d s p e a k i n g . C l e a r l y w e m i g h t object that the " c a l l " arr ives

s e v e r a l l y a n d i n i m p l i c i t a n d u n s p o k e n w a y s , that the scene

is never q u i t e as d y a d i c as A l t h u s s e r c l a i m s , b u t these objec­

t ions have b e e n rehearsed, a n d " i n t e r p e l l a t i o n " as a d o c t r i n e

cont inues to s u r v i v e its c r i t i q u e . I f we accept that the scene

i s e x e m p l a r y a n d a l l e g o r i c a l , then i t never needs to h a p p e n

for its e f fect iv i ty to be p r e s u m e d . Indeed, i f i t i s a l l e g o r i c a l in

B e n j a m i n ' s sense, then the process l i t e r a l i z e d by the a l l e g o r y

i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t resists n a r r a t i o n , w h a t exceeds the n a r r a -

t i v i z a b i l i t y o f events. 1 I n t e r p e l l a t i o n , on this account , i s not an

event, but a c e r t a i n w a y of staging the call, w h e r e the c a l l , as

staged, b e c o m e s d e l i t e r a l i z e d in the c o u r s e o f its e x p o s i t i o n or

darstellung. T h e c a l l i tself is a lso f i g u r e d as a d e m a n d to a l i g n

oneself w i t h the law, a t u r n i n g a r o u n d (to face the law, to f i n d

a face for the l a w ? ) , a n d an entrance i n t o the language of self-

a s c r i p t i o n — " H e r e I a m " — t h r o u g h the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of g u i l t .

W h y does subject f o r m a t i o n a p p e a r t o take p lace o n l y u p o n

the acceptance o f g u i l t , so that there i s no " I " w h o m i g h t as­

cr ibe a p lace to itself, w h o m i g h t be a n n o u n c e d in speech,

w i t h o u t first a se l f -a t t r ibut ion of g u i l t , a s u b m i s s i o n to the l a w

t h r o u g h a n acceptance o f its d e m a n d for c o n f o r m i t y ? T h e one

w h o t u r n s a r o u n d i n response t o the c a l l does not r e s p o n d t o

a d e m a n d to t u r n a r o u n d . T h e t u r n i n g a r o u n d i s an act that

is, as i t were , c o n d i t i o n e d b o t h by the " v o i c e " o f the l a w a n d

by the responsiveness o f the one h a i l e d by the law. T h e " t u r n ­

i n g a r o u n d " i s a strange sort o f m i d d l e g r o u n d ( t a k i n g p lace ,

perhaps , in a strange sort o f " m i d d l e vo ice") , 2 w h i c h is de­

t e r m i n e d b o t h b y the l a w a n d the addressee, b u t b y ne i ther

u n i l a t e r a l l y o r exhaust ive ly . A l t h o u g h there w o u l d b e n o t u r n ­

i n g a r o u n d w i t h o u t first h a v i n g b e e n h a i l e d , ne i ther w o u l d

there be a t u r n i n g a r o u n d w i t h o u t s o m e readiness to t u r n .

B u t w h e r e a n d w h e n does the c a l l i n g o f the n a m e so l ic i t the

t u r n i n g a r o u n d , the a n t i c i p a t o r y m o v e t o w a r d i d e n t i t y ? H o w

a n d w h y does the subject t u r n , a n t i c i p a t i n g the c o n f e r r a l o f

i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h the se l f -ascr ipt ion o f g u i l t ? W h a t k i n d o f r e ­

l a t i o n a l r e a d y b i n d s these t w o s u c h that the subject k n o w s to

t u r n , k n o w s that s o m e t h i n g i s to be g a i n e d f r o m s u c h a t u r n ?

H o w m i g h t w e t h i n k o f this " t u r n " a s p r i o r t o subject f o r m a ­

t i o n , a p r i o r c o m p l i c i t y w i t h the l a w w i t h o u t w h i c h n o subject

emerges? T h e t u r n t o w a r d the l a w is thus a t u r n against o n e ­

self, a t u r n i n g b a c k on oneself that const i tutes the m o v e m e n t

of conscience. B u t h o w does the reflex of consc ience p a r a l y z e

i o 8 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

the c r i t i c a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n of the l a w at the same t i m e that i t

f igures the subject's u n c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n to the l a w as a c o n d i ­

t i o n o f subject ivat ion? T h e one a d d r e s s e d i s c o m p e l l e d to t u r n

t o w a r d the l a w p r i o r to a n y p o s s i b i l i t y of a s k i n g a set of c r i t i ­

ca l quest ions: W h o i s s p e a k i n g ? W h y s h o u l d I t u r n a r o u n d ?

W h y s h o u l d I accept the terms b y w h i c h I a m h a i l e d ?

T h i s means that p r i o r to any p o s s i b i l i t y of a c r i t i c a l u n d e r ­

s t a n d i n g of the l a w is an openness or v u l n e r a b i l i t y to the law,

e x e m p l i f i e d i n the t u r n t o w a r d the law, i n the a n t i c i p a t i o n o f

c u l l i n g a n i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h the one w h o has

b r o k e n the law. Indeed, the l a w i s b r o k e n p r i o r to any p o s ­

s i b i l i t y of h a v i n g access to the law, a n d so " g u i l t " i s p r i o r to

k n o w l e d g e o f the l a w a n d is, i n this sense, a l w a y s s t rangely

i n n o c e n t . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a c r i t i c a l v i e w of the l a w is thus

l i m i t e d by w h a t m i g h t be u n d e r s t o o d as a p r i o r desire for the

law, a passionate c o m p l i c i t y w i t h law, w i t h o u t w h i c h n o s u b ­

ject c a n exist. F o r the "I" to l a u n c h its c r i t i q u e , i t m u s t first

u n d e r s t a n d that the "I" i tself is d e p e n d e n t u p o n its c o m p l i c i -

tous desire for the l a w to m a k e p o s s i b l e its o w n existence. A

c r i t i c a l r e v i e w o f the l a w w i l l not , therefore, u n d o the force o f

consc ience unless the one w h o offers that c r i t i q u e is w i l l i n g , as

i t w e r e , to be u n d o n e by the c r i t i q u e that he or she p e r f o r m s .

I t is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that the t u r n t o w a r d the l a w is

not necessitated by the h a i l i n g ; i t i s c o m p e l l i n g , in a less t h a n

l o g i c a l sense, because i t p r o m i s e s ident i ty . I f the l a w speaks in

the n a m e of a se l f - ident ica l subject ( A l t h u s s e r cites the utter­

ance of the H e b r e w G o d : "I am that I a m " ) , h o w is i t that c o n ­

science m i g h t d e l i v e r or restore a self to oneness w i t h itself, to

the p o s t u l a t i o n of se l f - ident i ty that b e c o m e s the p r e c o n d i t i o n

of the l i n g u i s t i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n " H e r e I a m " ?

Yet h o w m i g h t w e site the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f subject ivat ion

p r e c i s e l y i n that t u r n ( t o w a r d the law, against the self) , w h i c h

Althusser's Subjection 109

precedes a n d ant ic ipates the acceptance of g u i l t , a t u r n that

e ludes subject ivat ion e v e n as i t c o n d i t i o n s it? H o w does this

" t u r n " f igure a conscience that m i g h t be r e n d e r e d less c o n ­

sc ient ious t h a n A l t h u s s e r w o u l d r e n d e r it? A n d h o w does

A l t h u s s e r ' s sanct i f i cat ion of the scene of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n m a k e

the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e c o m i n g a " b a d " subject m o r e r e m o t e a n d

less i n c e n d i a r y t h a n i t m i g h t w e l l be?

T h e d o c t r i n e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n appears to p r e s u p p o s e a p r i o r

a n d u n e l a b o r a t e d d o c t r i n e o f conscience, a t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n

oneself in the sense that N i e t z s c h e d e s c r i b e d in On the Geneal­

ogy of Morals.3 T h i s readiness to accept g u i l t to g a i n a p u r c h a s e

on i d e n t i t y is l i n k e d to a h i g h l y r e l i g i o u s scenar io of a n o m i ­

n a t i n g c a l l that comes f r o m G o d a n d that const i tutes the sub­

ject by a p p e a l i n g to a n e e d for the law, an o r i g i n a l g u i l t that

the l a w p r o m i s e s to assuage t h r o u g h the c o n f e r r a l of ident i ty .

H o w does this r e l i g i o u s f i g u r a t i o n o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n r e s t r a i n i n

a d v a n c e a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f c r i t i c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w o r k ­

ings of the law, any u n d o i n g of the subject w i t h o u t w h i c h the

l a w cannot p r o c e e d ?

T h e m e n t i o n o f consc ience i n A l t h u s s e r ' s " I d e o l o g y a n d

I d e o l o g i c a l State A p p a r a t u s e s " 4 has r e c e i v e d l i t t le c r i t i c a l at­

t e n t i o n , e v e n t h o u g h the t e r m , t a k e n together w i t h the ex­

a m p l e of r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y to i l l u s t r a t e the force of i d e o l ­

ogy, suggests that the t h e o r y of i d e o l o g y is s u p p o r t e d by a

c o m p l i c a t e d set o f t h e o l o g i c a l m e t a p h o r s . A l t h o u g h A l t h u s ­

ser e x p l i c i t l y i n t r o d u c e s "the C h u r c h " m e r e l y as an example o f

i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i t appears that i d e o l o g y i n his t e r m s

cannot be t h o u g h t except t h r o u g h the m e t a p h o r i c s o f r e l i g i o u s

a u t h o r i t y . T h e f ina l sec t ion o f " I d e o l o g y " i s e n t i t l e d " A n E x ­

a m p l e : T h e C h r i s t i a n R e l i g i o u s I d e o l o g y " a n d m a k e s e x p l i c i t

the e x e m p l a r y status that r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s have o c c u p i e d

in the p r e c e d i n g sect ion of the essay. T h o s e e x a m p l e s i n c l u d e :

110 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

the p u t a t i v e " e t e r n i t y " o f i d e o l o g y ; the e x p l i c i t a n a l o g y be­

t w e e n the "obviousness o f i d e o l o g y " a n d St. P a u l ' s n o t i o n o f

the " L o g o s " i n w h i c h w e are s a i d t o " l i v e , m o v e a n d have o u r

b e i n g " ; Pascal ' s p r a y e r a s a n instance o f r i t u a l i n w h i c h as­

s u m i n g the p o s t u r e o f k n e e l i n g g ives r ise over t i m e to belief;

bel ie f i tsel f as the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e p r o d u c e d c o n d i t i o n of i d e ­

o l o g y ; a n d the d e i f y i n g c a p i t a l i z a t i o n o f " F a m i l y , " " C h u r c h , "

" S c h o o l , " a n d "State."

A l t h o u g h the last sec t ion of the essay seeks to expl icate

a n d expose the e x a m p l e o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y , this e x p o s u r e

lacks the p o w e r to defuse the force of i d e o l o g y . A l t h u s s e r ' s

o w n w r i t i n g , h e concedes, i n v a r i a b l y enacts w h a t i t t h e m a -

tizes, 5 a n d thus p r o m i s e s n o e n l i g h t e n e d escape f r o m i d e o l o g y

t h r o u g h this a r t i c u l a t i o n . T o i l l u s t r a t e the p o w e r o f i d e o l o g y

to const i tute subjects, A l t h u s s e r has recourse to the e x a m p l e

o f the d i v i n e v o i c e that names , a n d i n n a m i n g , b r i n g s its sub­

jects i n t o b e i n g . I n c l a i m i n g that s o c i a l i d e o l o g y operates i n

a n a n a l o g o u s way , A l t h u s s e r i n a d v e r t e n t l y ass imilates s o c i a l

i n t e r p e l l a t i o n t o the d i v i n e p e r f o r m a t i v e . T h e e x a m p l e o f i d e ­

o l o g y thus assumes the status of a p a r a d i g m for t h i n k i n g i d e ­

o l o g y as s u c h , w h e r e b y the i n e v i t a b l e s t ructures o f i d e o l o g y

are es tabl i shed t e x t u a l l y t h r o u g h r e l i g i o u s m e t a p h o r : the a u ­

t h o r i t y o f the " v o i c e " o f i d e o l o g y , the " v o i c e " o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ,

is f i g u r e d as a v o i c e a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e to refuse. T h e force of

i n t e r p e l l a t i o n i n A l t h u s s e r i s d e r i v e d f r o m the e x a m p l e s b y

w h i c h i t i s o s t e n s i b l y i l l u s t r a t e d , m o s t notably , G o d ' s v o i c e i n

the n a m i n g o f Peter (and M o s e s ) a n d its s e c u l a r i z a t i o n i n the

p o s t u l a t e d v o i c e of the representat ive of state a u t h o r i t y : the

p o l i c e m a n ' s vo ice i n the h a i l i n g o f the w a y w a r d p e d e s t r i a n

w i t h " H e y y o u there!"

I n other w o r d s , the d i v i n e p o w e r o f n a m i n g s t ructures

the t h e o r y of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n that accounts for the i d e o l o g i c a l

Althusser's Subjection m

c o n s t i t u t i o n of the subject. B a p t i s m exempl i f ies the l i n g u i s t i c

means b y w h i c h the subject i s c o m p e l l e d i n t o s o c i a l b e i n g .

G o d n a m e s "Peter," a n d this address establishes G o d a s the

o r i g i n o f Peter; 6 the n a m e r e m a i n s attached to Peter p e r m a ­

n e n t l y b y v i r t u e o f the i m p l i e d a n d c o n t i n u o u s presence i n the

n a m e o f the one w h o n a m e s h i m . W i t h i n the terms o f A l t h u s ­

ser 's examples , h o w e v e r , this n a m i n g cannot b e a c c o m p l i s h e d

w i t h o u t a c e r t a i n readiness or a n t i c i p a t o r y des ire on the p a r t

of the one addressed. To the extent that the n a m i n g is an a d ­

dress, there is an addressee p r i o r to the address; b ut g i v e n that

the address is a n a m e w h i c h creates w h a t i t names , there a p ­

pears to be no " P e t e r " w i t h o u t the n a m e "Peter."

I n d e e d , " P e t e r " does not exist w i t h o u t the n a m e that s u p ­

p l i e s the l i n g u i s t i c guarantee of existence. In this sense, as a

p r i o r a n d essentia l c o n d i t i o n of the f o r m a t i o n of the subject,

there is a c e r t a i n readiness to be c o m p e l l e d by the a u t h o r i t a ­

t ive i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , a readiness w h i c h suggests that one is, as

i t w e r e , a l r e a d y in r e l a t i o n to the v o i c e before the response,

a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d i n the t e r m s o f the a n i m a t i n g m i s r e c o g -

n i t i o n b y a n a u t h o r i t y t o w h i c h one s u b s e q u e n t l y y i e l d s . O r

p e r h a p s one has a l r e a d y y i e l d e d before one t u r n s a r o u n d , a n d

that t u r n i n g is m e r e l y a s i g n of an i n e v i t a b l e s u b m i s s i o n by

w h i c h one is es tabl i shed as a subject p o s i t i o n e d in language as

a p o s s i b l e addressee. In this sense, the scene w i t h the p o l i c e

i s a be lated a n d r e d o u b l e d scene, one w h i c h r e n d e r s e x p l i c i t

a f o u n d i n g s u b m i s s i o n for w h i c h n o s u c h scene w o u l d p r o v e

adequate. I f that s u b m i s s i o n b r i n g s the subject i n t o b e i n g , t h e n

the n a r r a t i v e that seeks to te l l the s t o r y of that s u b m i s s i o n c a n

p r o c e e d o n l y b y e x p l o i t i n g g r a m m a r for its f i c t i o n a l effects.

T h e n a r r a t i v e that seeks to account for h o w the subject comes

i n t o b e i n g p r e s u m e s the g r a m m a t i c a l "subject" p r i o r to the

a c c o u n t of its genesis. Yet the f o u n d i n g s u b m i s s i o n that has

112 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

not yet r e s o l v e d i n t o the subject w o u l d be p r e c i s e l y the n o n -

n a r r a t i v i z a b l e p r e h i s t o r y of the subject, a p a r a d o x w h i c h cal ls

the v e r y n a r r a t i v e of subject f o r m a t i o n i n t o q u e s t i o n . I f there

is no subject except as a consequence of this subject ion, the

n a r r a t i v e that w o u l d e x p l a i n this r e q u i r e s that the t e m p o r a l i t y

not be t rue , for the g r a m m a r of that n a r r a t i v e p r e s u p p o s e s

that there is no subject ion w i t h o u t a subject w h o u n d e r g o e s it .

Is this f o u n d i n g s u b m i s s i o n a k i n d of y i e l d i n g p r i o r to a n y

q u e s t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i o n ? H o w are w e t o u n d e r ­

s t a n d the p s y c h i c d i s p o s i t i o n a t w o r k a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h

the p e d e s t r i a n r e s p o n d s t o the l a w ? W h a t c o n d i t i o n s a n d i n ­

f o r m s that response? W h y w o u l d the p e r s o n o n the street re­

s p o n d t o " H e y y o u there!" b y t u r n i n g a r o u n d ? W h a t i s the

s igni f icance of t u r n i n g to face a v o i c e that cal ls f r o m b e h i n d ?

T h i s t u r n i n g t o w a r d the v o i c e of the l a w is a s i g n of a c e r t a i n

des ire to be b e h e l d by a n d p e r h a p s also to b e h o l d the face of

a u t h o r i t y , a v i s u a l r e n d e r i n g o f a n a u d i t o r y s c e n e — a m i r r o r

stage or, p e r h a p s m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y , a n "acoust ic m i r r o r " 7 —

that p e r m i t s the m i s r e c o g n i t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h the s o c i a l i t y

of the subject cannot be a c h i e v e d . T h i s subject ivat ion is, ac­

c o r d i n g to A l t h u s s e r , a m i s r e c o g n i t i o n , a false a n d p r o v i s i o n a l

t o t a l i z a t i o n ; w h a t prec ip i ta tes this desire for the law, this l u r e

o f m i s r e c o g n i t i o n offered in the r e p r i m a n d that establishes

s u b o r d i n a t i o n as the p r i c e of subject ivat ion? T h i s account a p ­

pears to i m p l y that s o c i a l existence, existence as a subject, c a n

be p u r c h a s e d o n l y t h r o u g h a g u i l t y e m b r a c e of the law, w h e r e

g u i l t guarantees the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the l a w a n d , hence, the

c o n t i n u a t i o n of the subject's existence. If the subject c a n o n l y

assure h is/her existence in terms of the law, a n d the l a w r e ­

q u i r e s subject ion for subject ivat ion, then, perverse ly , one m a y

(a lways a l ready) y i e l d to the l a w in o r d e r to c o n t i n u e to as­

sure one's o w n existence. T h e y i e l d i n g t o the l a w m i g h t t h e n

Althusser's Subjection 113

be r e a d as the c o m p e l l e d consequence of a narc iss is t ic attach­

m e n t to one's c o n t i n u i n g existence.

A l t h u s s e r takes u p g u i l t e x p l i c i t l y i n the narrat ive , h o w e v e r

re l iable , o f his m u r d e r o f Hélène, h i s wi fe , i n w h i c h h e n a r ­

rates, in a t e l l i n g r e v e r s a l of the p o l i c e scene in "Ideology,"

h o w h e r u s h e d i n t o the street c a l l i n g for the p o l i c e i n o r d e r

to d e l i v e r h i m s e l f up to the law. 8 T h i s c a l l i n g for the p o l i c e is

a p e c u l i a r i n v e r s i o n o f h a i l i n g w h i c h " I d e o l o g y " p r e s u p p o s e s

w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t l y t h e m a t i z i n g . W i t h o u t e x p l o i t i n g the b i o ­

g r a p h i c a l , I w a n t to p u r s u e the theoret ica l i m p o r t a n c e of this

reversa l o f the scene w i t h the p o l i c e , i n w h i c h the m a n o n the

street cal ls for the p o l i c e rather t h a n r e s p o n d i n g to the p o l i c e ' s

c a l l . I n "Ideology," g u i l t a n d conscience operate i m p l i c i t l y i n

r e l a t i o n t o a n i d e o l o g i c a l d e m a n d , a n a n i m a t i n g r e p r i m a n d , i n

the account of subject f o r m a t i o n . T h e present chapter attempts

to r e r e a d that essay to u n d e r s t a n d h o w i n t e r p e l l a t i o n is essen­

t i a l l y f i g u r e d t h r o u g h the r e l i g i o u s e x a m p l e . T h e e x e m p l a r y

status o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y u n d e r s c o r e s the p a r a d o x o f h o w

the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y of subject f o r m a t i o n d e p e n d s u p o n a pas­

sionate p u r s u i t of a r e c o g n i t i o n w h i c h , w i t h i n the t e r m s of the

r e l i g i o u s e x a m p l e , is inseparable f r o m a c o n d e m n a t i o n .

A n o t h e r w a y o f p o s i n g this q u e s t i o n w o u l d b e t o ask: H o w

is A l t h u s s e r ' s text i m p l i c a t e d in the "consc ience" that i t seeks

to e x p l a i n ? To w h a t extent is the pers is tence of the theo­

l o g i c a l m o d e l a s y m p t o m , one that c o m p e l s a s y m p t o m a t i c

r e a d i n g ? In h is i n t r o d u c t o r y essay to Reading Capital, A l t h u s ­

ser suggests that e v e r y text m u s t be r e a d for the " i n v i s i b l e "

that appears w i t h i n the w o r l d that t h e o r y renders v i s i b l e . 9 I n

a recent c o n s i d e r a t i o n of A l t h u s s e r ' s n o t i o n of " s y m p t o m a t i c

r e a d i n g , " J e a n - M a r i e V i n c e n t r e m a r k s that "a text is not inter­

es t ing o n l y because i t i s o r g a n i z e d l o g i c a l l y , because of the

a p p a r e n t l y r i g o r o u s w a y i n w h i c h i t d e v e l o p s its a r g u m e n t s ,

i i 4 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

T b u t also because of w h a t d i s o r g a n i z e s its o r d e r , because of

a l l that w e a k e n s i t . " 1 0 N e i t h e r A l t h u s s e r n o r V i n c e n t cons iders

the p o s s i b i l i t y that the e x e m p l a r y status of c e r t a i n m e t a p h o r s

m a y o c c a s i o n a s y m p t o m a t i c r e a d i n g that " w e a k e n s " r i g o r o u s

a r g u m e n t . Yet i n A l t h u s s e r ' s o w n text, r e c o n s i d e r i n g the c e n ­

t r a l r e l i g i o u s t ropes o f the v o i c e o f the l a w a n d conscience en­

ables one to q u e s t i o n w h a t has b e c o m e , w i t h i n recent l i t e r a r y

studies , an u n n e c e s s a r y t e n s i o n b e t w e e n the r e a d i n g o f m e t a ­

p h o r a n d the r e a d i n g of i d e o l o g y . To the extent that A l t h u s s e r ' s

r e l i g i o u s ana log ies are u n d e r s t o o d as m e r e l y i l l u s t r a t i v e , they

are set apart f r o m the r i g o r o u s a r g u m e n t a t i o n of the text itself,

o f fered i n p e d a g o g i c a l paraphras is . Yet the p e r f o r m a t i v e force

of the v o i c e of r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y b e c o m e s e x e m p l a r y for the

t h e o r y o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , thus e x t e n d i n g t h r o u g h e x a m p l e the

p u t a t i v e force o f d i v i n e n a m i n g t o the s o c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s b y

w h i c h the subject i s h a i l e d i n t o s o c i a l b e i n g . I do not m e a n to

suggest that the " t r u t h " of A l t h u s s e r ' s text can be d i s c o v e r e d

i n h o w the f i g u r a i d i s r u p t s " r i g o r o u s " c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . S u c h

an a p p r o a c h r o m a n t i c i z e s the f i g u r a i as essent ia l ly d i s r u p t i v e ,

w h e r e a s f igures m a y w e l l c o m p o u n d a n d intens i fy c o n c e p ­

t u a l c l a i m s . T h e c o n c e r n here has a m o r e speci f ic textual a i m ,

n a m e l y , t o s h o w h o w f i g u r e s — e x a m p l e s a n d a n a l o g i e s — i n ­

f o r m a n d e x t e n d c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s , i m p l i c a t i n g the text i n a n

i d e o l o g i c a l sanct i f i cat ion o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y w h i c h i t c a n

e x p o s e o n l y b y r e e n a c t i n g that a u t h o r i t y .

F o r A l t h u s s e r , the efficacy o f i d e o l o g y consists i n p a r t i n

the f o r m a t i o n of conscience, w h e r e the n o t i o n "consc ience" is

u n d e r s t o o d t o p lace r e s t r i c t i o n s o n w h a t i s speakable or, m o r e

general ly , representable . C o n s c i e n c e cannot b e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d

as a se l f - res tr ic t ion, if that r e l a t i o n is c o n s t r u e d as a p r e g i v e n

ref lex iv i ty , a t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself p e r f o r m e d by a r e a d y -

m a d e subject. Instead, i t designates a k i n d of t u r n i n g b a c k —

Althusser's Subjection " 5

a r e f l e x i v i t y — w h i c h const i tutes the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y

for the subject to f o r m . R e f l e x i v i t y is c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h this

m o m e n t o f conscience, this t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n oneself, w h i c h

is s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h a t u r n i n g t o w a r d the law. T h i s self-

r e s t r i c t i o n does not i n t e r n a l i z e a n e x t e r n a l l a w : the m o d e l o f

i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n takes for g r a n t e d that an " i n t e r n a l " a n d "exter­

n a l " have a l r e a d y b e e n f o r m e d . Instead, this se l f -restr ic t ion i s

p r i o r to the subject. It const i tutes the i n a u g u r a t i n g ref lexive

t u r n o f the subject, e n a c t e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the l a w a n d

hence d e t e r m i n e d by, h a v i n g p r e j u d i c a t i v e f o r e k n o w l e d g e of,

the law. C o n s c i e n c e is f u n d a m e n t a l to the p r o d u c t i o n a n d

r e g u l a t i o n of the c i t izen-subject , for conscience t u r n s the i n d i ­

v i d u a l a r o u n d , m a k e s h i m / h e r avai lable t o the s u b j e c t i v a t i n g

r e p r i m a n d . T h e l a w r e d o u b l e s that r e p r i m a n d , h o w e v e r : the

t u r n i n g b a c k i s a t u r n i n g t o w a r d . H o w are these t u r n s to be

t h o u g h t together, w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g one to the other?

Before the p o l i c e or the c h u r c h a u t h o r i t i e s a r r i v e on the

A l t h u s s e r i a n scene, there is a reference to p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h ,

i n a L a c a n i a n v e i n , i s l i n k e d w i t h the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f

speech. A l t h u s s e r l i n k s the emergence of a c o n s c i o u s n e s s —

a n d a conscience ("la conscience c i v i q u e et p r o f e s s i o n e l l e " ) —

w i t h the p r o b l e m of s p e a k i n g p r o p e r l y (bien parler)}1 "Speak­

i n g p r o p e r l y " appears to be an instance o f the i d e o l o g i c a l

w o r k of a c q u i r i n g s k i l l s , a process c e n t r a l to the f o r m a t i o n of

the subject. T h e "diverse s k i l l s " o f labor p o w e r m u s t be r e p r o ­

d u c e d , a n d i n c r e a s i n g l y this r e p r o d u c t i o n h a p p e n s "outs ide

the f i r m " a n d in school, that is , o u t s i d e p r o d u c t i o n a n d in e d u ­

c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e s k i l l s to be l e a r n e d are, above a l l , the

skills of speech. T h e first m e n t i o n of "conscience," w h i c h w i l l

t u r n out to be c e n t r a l to the success or efficacy of i n t e r p e l l a ­

t i o n , i s l i n k e d to the a c q u i s i t i o n of mastery, to l e a r n i n g h o w to

"speak p r o p e r l y . " T h e r e p r o d u c t i o n of the subject takes p l a c e

n 6 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects o f U s A l l "

t h r o u g h the r e p r o d u c t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s , c o n s t i t u t i n g , as i t

were , the r u l e s a n d att i tudes o b s e r v e d " b y e v e r y agent i n the

d i v i s i o n of labour ." In this sense the ru les of p r o p e r speech

are also the ru les by w h i c h respect i s p r o f e r r e d or w i t h h e l d .

W o r k e r s are taught to speak p r o p e r l y a n d m a n a g e r s l e a r n to

speak to w o r k e r s " i n the r i g h t w a y [bien commander]" (131-

32/72).

L a n g u a g e s k i l l s are s a i d to be m a s t e r e d a n d masterable , yet

th is m a s t e r y i s f i g u r e d by A l t h u s s e r qui te c l e a r l y as a k i n d

o f s u b m i s s i o n : "the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f labor p o w e r r e q u i r e s not

o n l y a r e p r o d u c t i o n of (the laborer 's) s k i l l s , b u t also, at the

same t i m e , a r e p r o d u c t i o n of its s u b m i s s i o n to the ru les of the

establ ished o r d e r [soumission à l'idéologie dominante]" (132/72).

T h i s s u b m i s s i o n to the ru les of the d o m i n a n t i d e o l o g y leads

in the next p a r a g r a p h to the p r o b l e m a t i c of subjection, w h i c h

carr ies the d o u b l e m e a n i n g of h a v i n g s u b m i t t e d to these ru les

a n d b e c o m i n g c o n s t i t u t e d w i t h i n s o c i a l i t y b y v i r t u e o f this

s u b m i s s i o n .

A l t h u s s e r w r i t e s that "the s c h o o l . . . teaches ' k n o w - h o w '

[ski l ls ; des 'savoir-faire'] . . . in f o r m s w h i c h ensure subjection to

the ruling ideology [ l 'assujetissement à l ' idéologie d o m i n a n t e ]

or [ou] the m a s t e r y of its ' p r a c t i c e ' " (133/73). C o n s i d e r the

l o g i c a l effect o f the d i s j u n c t i v e " o r " in the m i d d l e o f th is for­

m u l a t i o n : "subject ion t o the r u l i n g i d e o l o g y o r " — p u t i n differ­

ent, yet e q u i v a l e n t terms — " t h e m a s t e r y of its ' p r a c t i c e ' " ( m y

emphasis) . T h e m o r e a p r a c t i c e is m a s t e r e d , the m o r e f u l l y

subject ion i s a c h i e v e d . S u b m i s s i o n a n d m a s t e r y take p l a c e

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , a n d this p a r a d o x i c a l s i m u l t a n e i t y const i tutes

the a m b i v a l e n c e o f subject ion. T h o u g h one m i g h t expect sub­

m i s s i o n t o consist i n y i e l d i n g t o a n e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d d o m i ­

nant o r d e r a n d to be m a r k e d by a loss o f c o n t r o l a n d mastery,

p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i t i s i tself m a r k e d b y mastery. T h e b i n a r y f rame

Althusser's Subjection 117

of m a s t e r y / s u b m i s s i o n is forfe i ted by A l t h u s s e r as he recasts

s u b m i s s i o n p r e c i s e l y a n d p a r a d o x i c a l l y as a k i n d of mastery.

In this v i e w , ne i ther s u b m i s s i o n n o r m a s t e r y is performed by a

subject; the l i v e d s i m u l t a n e i t y of s u b m i s s i o n as mastery , a n d

m a s t e r y as s u b m i s s i o n , is the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y for the

emergence of the subject.

T h e c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m here i s u n d e r s c o r e d by a g r a m ­

m a t i c a l one in w h i c h there c a n be no subject p r i o r to a s u b m i s ­

s ion , a n d yet there i s a g r a m m a t i c a l l y i n d u c e d "need to k n o w "

who u n d e r g o e s this s u b m i s s i o n in o r d e r to b e c o m e a subject.

A l t h u s s e r i n t r o d u c e s the t e r m " i n d i v i d u a l " as a p l a c e - h o l d e r

t o satisfy p r o v i s i o n a l l y this g r a m m a t i c a l n e e d , b ut w h a t m i g h t

u l t i m a t e l y fit the g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t w i l l not be a static

g r a m m a t i c a l subject. T h e g r a m m a r of the subject emerges o n l y

as a consequence of the process we are t r y i n g to descr ibe .

Because we are, as i t w e r e , t r a p p e d w i t h i n the g r a m m a t i c a l

t i m e of the subject (e.g., " w e are t r y i n g to describe," " w e are

t r a p p e d " ) , i t is a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e to ask after the genea logy

o f its c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g that c o n s t r u c t i o n i n

a s k i n g the q u e s t i o n .

W h a t , p r i o r t o the subject, accounts for its f o r m a t i o n ? A l ­

thusser b e g i n s " I d e o l o g y a n d I d e o l o g i c a l State A p p a r a t u s e s "

by r e f e r r i n g to the r e p r o d u c t i o n of s o c i a l re lat ions, spec i f ied

as the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l s k i l l s . He t h e n d i s t i n g u i s h e s be­

t w e e n s k i l l s r e p r o d u c e d i n the f i r m a n d those r e p r o d u c e d i n

e d u c a t i o n . T h e subject is f o r m e d w i t h respect to the latter. In a

sense, this r e p r o d u c t i o n of re lat ions is p r i o r to the subject w h o

i s f o r m e d in its course. Yet the t w o cannot , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g ,

be t h o u g h t w i t h o u t each other.

T h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l re lat ions , the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f

s k i l l s , i s the r e p r o d u c t i o n of subject ion. B u t the r e p r o d u c t i o n

of labor i s not c e n t r a l h e r e — t h e c e n t r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n is one

i i 8 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

p r o p e r to the subject a n d takes p l a c e in r e l a t i o n to language

a n d t o the f o r m a t i o n o f conscience. F o r A l t h u s s e r , t o p e r f o r m

tasks " c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y " is to p e r f o r m t h e m , as i t were , a g a i n

a n d a g a i n , t o r e p r o d u c e those s k i l l s a n d , i n r e p r o d u c i n g t h e m ,

t o a c q u i r e mastery. A l t h u s s e r places " c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y " i n q u o ­

t a t i o n m a r k s ("pour s 'acquit ter ' consc ienc ieusement ' d e l e u r

tâche," 73), thus b r i n g i n g i n t o re l ie f the w a y i n w h i c h labor

is m o r a l i z e d . T h e m o r a l sense of s'acquitter i s lost in its t rans­

l a t i o n as "to p e r f o r m " : if the m a s t e r y of a set of s k i l l s is to

be c o n s t r u e d as an acquitting of oneself, then this m a s t e r y of

savoir-faire defends one against an a c c u s a t i o n ; qu i te l i tera l ly ,

i t is the accused 's d e c l a r a t i o n of i n n o c e n c e . To a c q u i t oneself

" c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y " is, then, to c o n s t r u e l a b o r as a confess ion of

i n n o c e n c e , a d i s p l a y or p r o o f of gui l t lessness in the face of the

d e m a n d for confess ion i m p l i e d b y a n insistent accusat ion .

" S u b m i s s i o n " to the r u l e s o f the d o m i n a n t i d e o l o g y m i g h t

then be u n d e r s t o o d as a s u b m i s s i o n to the necessi ty to p r o v e

i n n o c e n c e in the face of a c c u s a t i o n , a s u b m i s s i o n to the de­

m a n d for proof , a n e x e c u t i o n o f that proof , a n d a c q u i s i t i o n o f

the status o f the subject in a n d t h r o u g h c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the

t e r m s of the i n t e r r o g a t i v e law. To b e c o m e a "subject" is thus

t o have b e e n p r e s u m e d g u i l t y , t h e n t r i e d a n d d e c l a r e d i n n o ­

cent. Because this d e c l a r a t i o n is n o t a s ing le act b u t a status

incessant ly reproduced, to b e c o m e a "subject" is to be c o n t i n u ­

o u s l y in the process of a c q u i t t i n g oneself o f the a c c u s a t i o n of

gui l t . It is to have b e c o m e an e m b l e m of lawfulness , a c i t i z e n

i n g o o d s t a n d i n g , b u t one for w h o m that status i s tenuous ,

i n d e e d , one w h o has k n o w n — s o m e h o w , s o m e w h e r e — w h a t i t

is not to have that s t a n d i n g a n d hence to have b e e n cast o u t

as g u i l t y Yet because this g u i l t c o n d i t i o n s the subject, i t c o n ­

stitutes the p r e h i s t o r y o f the subject ion to the l a w by w h i c h

the subject i s p r o d u c e d . H e r e one m i g h t u s e f u l l y conjecture

Althusser s Subjection 119

that the reason there are so f e w references to " b a d subjects"

in A l t h u s s e r i s that the t e r m tends t o w a r d the o x y m o r o n i c . To

be " b a d " is not yet to be a subject, not yet to have a c q u i t t e d

oneself of the a l l e g a t i o n of g u i l t . 1 2

T h i s p e r f o r m a n c e is n o t s i m p l y in accord w i t h these s k i l l s ,

for there i s no subject p r i o r to their p e r f o r m i n g ; p e r f o r m i n g

s k i l l s l a b o r i o u s l y w o r k s the subject i n t o its status as a s o c i a l

b e i n g . There i s g u i l t , a n d then a r e p e t i t i v e p r a c t i c e by w h i c h

s k i l l s are a c q u i r e d , a n d t h e n a n d o n l y then a n a s s u m p t i o n o f

the g r a m m a t i c a l p l a c e w i t h i n the s o c i a l as a subject.

To say that the subject p e r f o r m s a c c o r d i n g to a set of s k i l l s

is, as it were , to take g r a m m a r at its w o r d : there is a subject

w h o encounters a set of s k i l l s to be l e a r n e d , learns t h e m or

fai ls t o l e a r n t h e m , a n d t h e n a n d o n l y then c a n i t b e s a i d ei ther

to have m a s t e r e d those s k i l l s or not . To master a set of s k i l l s is

not s i m p l y to accept a set of s k i l l s , b u t to r e p r o d u c e t h e m in

a n d as one's o w n act iv i ty . T h i s i s not s i m p l y to act a c c o r d i n g

to a set of rules , b u t to e m b o d y ru les in the c o u r s e of a c t i o n

a n d t o r e p r o d u c e those r u l e s i n e m b o d i e d r i t u a l s o f a c t i o n . 1 3

W h a t leads to this r e p r o d u c t i o n ? C l e a r l y , i t i s not m e r e l y

a m e c h a n i s t i c a p p r o p r i a t i o n of n o r m s , n o r is it a v o l u n t a r i s t i c

a p p r o p r i a t i o n . I t is ne i ther s i m p l e b e h a v i o r i s m n o r a d e l i b ­

erate project. To the extent that it precedes the f o r m a t i o n of

the subject, i t is not yet of the o r d e r of consciousness , a n d

yet this i n v o l u n t a r y c o m p u l s i o n is not a m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y i n ­

d u c e d effect. T h e n o t i o n of r i t u a l suggests that i t i s p e r f o r m e d ,

a n d that in the r e p e t i t i o n of p e r f o r m a n c e a be l ie f i s s p a w n e d ,

w h i c h i s then i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the p e r f o r m a n c e i n its subse­

quent operat ions . B u t i n h e r e n t to a n y p e r f o r m a n c e is a c o m ­

p u l s i o n to "acquit oneself," a n d so p r i o r to a n y p e r f o r m a n c e i s

a n a n x i e t y a n d a k n o w i n g n e s s w h i c h b e c o m e s ar t icu late a n d

a n i m a t i n g o n l y o n the o c c a s i o n o f the r e p r i m a n d .

120 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A H "

Is i t poss ib le to separate the p s y c h i c d i m e n s i o n of this r i t u ­

a l is t ic r e p e t i t i o n f r o m the "acts" b y w h i c h i t i s a n i m a t e d a n d

reanimated? T h e v e r y n o t i o n o f r i t u a l i s m e a n t to r e n d e r be­

l ief a n d p r a c t i c e inseparable . Yet the S l o v e n i a n c r i t i c M l a d e n

D o l a r argues that A l t h u s s e r fai ls to account for the p s y c h e as

a separate d i m e n s i o n . D o l a r counse ls a r e t u r n to L a c a n , m u c h

in the same w a y that Slavoj Z i z e k suggests a necessary c o m ­

p l e m e n t a r i t y b e t w e e n A l t h u s s e r a n d L a c a n . 1 4 T o insist o n the

s e p a r a b i l i t y o f the p s y c h e f r o m s o c i a l p r a c t i c e i s to intens i fy

the r e l i g i o u s m e t a p h o r i c s in A l t h u s s e r , that is, to f igure the

p s y c h e as p u r e idea l i ty , not u n l i k e the i d e a l i t y of the s o u l . I

t u r n , then, t o D o l a r ' s r e a d i n g o f A l t h u s s e r i n o r d e r t o c o n s i d e r

the tens ion b e t w e e n the p u t a t i v e i d e a l i t y o f subjec t iv i ty a n d

the c l a i m that i d e o l o g y , i n c l u d i n g p s y c h i c real i ty , i s part of the

e x p a n d e d d o m a i n o f m a t e r i a l i t y i n the A l t h u s s e r i a n sense.

M l a d e n D o l a r ' s essay " B e y o n d I n t e r p e l l a t i o n " 1 5 suggests

that A l t h u s s e r , despi te his o c c a s i o n a l use of L a c a n ' s t h e o r y of

the i m a g i n a r y , fails to apprec iate the d i s r u p t i v e p o t e n t i a l of

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , in p a r t i c u l a r , the n o t i o n of the R e a l as des ig­

n a t i n g that w h i c h never b e c o m e s ava i lab le to subject ivat ion.

D o l a r wr i tes , "To p u t i t the s i m p l e s t way , there is a part of the

i n d i v i d u a l that cannot success fu l ly pass i n t o the subject, an

e lement of ' p r e - i d e o l o g i c a l ' a n d 'presubject ive ' materia prima

that comes to haunt subjec t iv i ty once i t is c o n s t i t u t e d as s u c h "

(75). T h e use of "materia prima" here is s igni f icant , for w i t h

this p h rase D o l a r e x p l i c i t l y contests the s o c i a l account o f m a ­

t e r i a l i t y that A l t h u s s e r p r o v i d e s . In fact, this "materia prima"

never materializes in the A l t h u s s e r i a n sense, never emerges as

a pract ice , a r i t u a l , or a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n ; f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w

of the s o c i a l , the "mater ia p r i m a " is r a d i c a l l y immaterial. D o l a r

thus c r i t i c i z e s A l t h u s s e r for e l i d i n g the d i m e n s i o n of subjec­

t i v i t y that r e m a i n s r a d i c a l l y i m m a t e r i a l , b a r r e d f r o m appear-

Althusser's Subjection 121

ance w i t h i n mater ia l i ty . A c c o r d i n g t o D o l a r , i n t e r p e l l a t i o n can

o n l y e x p l a i n the f o r m a t i o n of the subject in a p a r t i a l w a y :

"for A l t h u s s e r , the subject i s w h a t m a k e s i d e o l o g y w o r k ; for

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the subject emerges w h e r e i d e o l o g y fails. . . .

T h e r e m a i n d e r p r o d u c e d b y subjec t ivat ion i s a lso i n v i s i b l e

f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n . " " I n t e r p e l l a t i o n " h e

wr i tes , " is a w a y of a v o i d i n g [that r e m a i n d e r ] " (76). At stake

for D o l a r is the n e e d to s t re ngthe n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the

d o m a i n o f the s y m b o l i c , u n d e r s t o o d a s c o m m u n i c a b l e speech

a n d s o c i a l b o n d s , a n d that o f the p s y c h i c , w h i c h i s o n t o l o g i -

c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m the s o c i a l a n d i s d e n n e d as the r e m a i n d e r

that the n o t i o n of the s o c i a l cannot take i n t o account .

D o l a r d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i t y a n d i n f e r i o r i t y ,

then l o o s e l y a l igns that d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h the A l t h u s s e r i a n d i v i ­

s i o n b e t w e e n the m a t e r i a l i t y of the state a p p a r a t u s a n d the

p u t a t i v e i d e a l i t y o f subject ivi ty . In a f o r m u l a t i o n w i t h s t r o n g

C a r t e s i a n resonance, D o l a r defines s u b j e c t i v i t y t h r o u g h the

n o t i o n o f i n f e r i o r i t y a n d ident i f ies as m a t e r i a l the d o m a i n o f

e x t e r i o r i t y (i.e., exter ior to the subject). He p r e s u p p o s e s that

subjec t iv i ty consists i n b o t h i n f e r i o r i t y a n d idea l i ty , w h e r e a s

m a t e r i a l i t y be longs to its o p p o s i t e , the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g exter ior

w o r l d .

T h i s m a n n e r o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i n t e r i o r f r o m exter ior m a y

w e l l s e e m strange as a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of or e x t r a p o l a t i o n

f r o m A l t h u s s e r ' s p o s i t i o n . A l t h u s s e r ' s d i s t i n c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n

is, after a l l , t o u n d e r m i n e the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m p r e s u p p o s e d

by the c o n v e n t i o n a l M a r x i s t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a m a t e r i a l

base a n d a n i d e a l o r i d e o l o g i c a l s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . H e does s o

by asser t ing the m a t e r i a l i t y of the i d e o l o g i c a l : "an i d e o l o g y

a l w a y s exists i n a n apparatus , a n d its pract ice , o r pract ices .

T h i s existence i s m a t e r i a l . " 1 6

T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of the subject is material to the extent that

122 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l " Althusser's Subjection 123

this c o n s t i t u t i o n takes p lace t h r o u g h rituals, a n d these r i t u a l s

m a t e r i a l i z e "the ideas of the subject" (169). W h a t is c a l l e d "sub­

ject iv i ty ," u n d e r s t o o d a s the l i v e d a n d i m a g i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e o f

the subject, i s i tself d e r i v e d f r o m the m a t e r i a l r i t u a l s b y w h i c h

subjects are c o n s t i t u t e d . Pascal ' s b e l i e v e r knee ls m o r e t h a n

once, necessar i ly r e p e a t i n g the gesture b y w h i c h be l ie f i s c o n ­

j u r e d . T o u n d e r s t a n d , m o r e b r o a d l y , "the r i t u a l s o f i d e o l o g i c a l

r e c o g n i t i o n " ' (173) by w h i c h the subject i s c o n s t i t u t e d is cen­

t r a l t o the v e r y n o t i o n o f i d e o l o g y . B u t i f be l ie f f o l l o w s f r o m

the p o s t u r e of prayer , i f that p o s t u r e c o n d i t i o n s a n d reiterates

bel ief , t h e n h o w are w e t o separate the i d e a t i o n a l sphere f r o m

the r i t u a l pract ices b y w h i c h i t i s incessant ly r e i n s t i t u t e d ?

A l t h o u g h the q u e s t i o n of the subject is not the same as

the q u e s t i o n of subject iv i ty , in D o l a r ' s essay i t nevertheless

r e m a i n s u n c l e a r h o w those t w o n o t i o n s are t o b e t h o u g h t

together. T h e n o t i o n o f " s u b j e c t i v i t y " does not have m u c h p l a y

i n A l t h u s s e r , except p e r h a p s i n the c r i t i q u e o f s u b j e c t i v i s m ,

a n d i t i s u n c l e a r h o w that t e r m m i g h t b e t r a n s p o s e d onto

the t e r m s h e uses. T h i s m a y b e D o l a r ' s c r i t i c a l p o i n t , n a m e l y ,

that there is not e n o u g h of a p lace for subjec t iv i ty in A l t h u s ­

ser 's text. D o l a r ' s p r i m a r y c r i t i c a l c o n c e r n i s that A l t h u s s e r

cannot f u l l y take i n t o account the " r e m a i n d e r " p r o d u c e d b y

subject ivat ion, the n o n - p h e n o m e n a l " k e r n e l o f i n f e r i o r i t y . " 1 7

I n fact, D o l a r w i l l argue that the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the i n ­

ter ior a n d the exter ior i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h "the i n t r o j e c t i o n

of the object" (79). H e n c e , a p r i m a r y object is intro jected, a n d

that i n t r o j e c t i o n b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y for the

subject. T h e i r r e c o v e r a b i l i t y of that object is , thus, not o n l y the

s u p p o r t i n g c o n d i t i o n of the subject b u t the pers istent threat

to its coherence. T h e L a c a n i a n n o t i o n of the R e a l is cast as the

first act of i n t r o j e c t i o n as w e l l as the subject's r a d i c a l l i m i t .

In D o l a r , the i d e a l i t y of this k e r n e l of i n f e r i o r i t y sets the

l i m i t t o b o t h m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n a n d subject ivat ion; i t const i tutes

the c o n s t i t u t i v e l a c k o r the n o n - s y m b o l i z a b l e Rea l . A s fore­

c l o s e d or intro jected, the p r i m a r y object is lost a n d i d e a l i z e d at

once; the i d e a l i t y a c q u i r e d b y this object t h r o u g h i n t r o j e c t i o n

const i tutes the f o u n d i n g i d e a l i t y o f subject ivi ty . T h i s i n s i g h t

i s the one that A l t h u s s e r ap p e ars to m i s s , a n d yet D o l a r a p ­

pears t o attr ibute t o h i m the v e r y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i ­

a l i t y a n d i d e a l i t y that i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a l i z e d i n A l t h u s s e r ' s

theory:

there is a step in the emergence of both the subject and the Other

that Althusser leaves out and that can perhaps be best illustrated by

Althusser's o w n example. To elucidate the transition between the ex­

ternal materiality of state apparatuses (institutions, practices, rituals,

etc.) and the inferiority of ideological subjectivity, Althusser borrows

a famous suggestion from Pascal, namely his scandalous piece of ad­

vice that the best way to become a believer is to follow the religious

rituals. (88)

D o l a r refers to this as a "senseless r i t u a l , " a n d then reverses

the A l t h u s s e r i a n account in o r d e r to establ ish that the c r e e d

a n d the r i t u a l are the effects of "a s u p p o s i t i o n , " that r i t u a l

f o l l o w s belief , b u t i s not its c o n d i t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n . D o l a r

u n d e r s c o r e s the i n a b i l i t y o f A l t h u s s e r ' s t h e o r y o f r i t u a l p r a c ­

tice t o a c c o u n t for the m o t i v a t i o n t o p r a y : " W h a t m a d e h i m

f o l l o w the r i t u a l ? W h y d i d he/she consent to repeat a series of

senseless gestures?" (89).

D o l a r ' s quest ions are i m p o s s i b l e t o satisfy i n A l t h u s s e r ' s

terms, b u t the v e r y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f D o l a r ' s quest ions c a n

b e c o u n t e r e d w i t h a n A l t h u s s e r i a n e x p l a n a t i o n . T h a t D o l a r

p r e s u m e s a c o n s e n t i n g subject p r i o r to the p e r f o r m a n c e of

a r i t u a l suggests that he p r e s u m e s a v o l i t i o n a l subject m u s t

a l r e a d y b e i n p lace t o g i v e a n account o f m o t i v a t i o n . B u t h o w

does this c o n s e n t i n g subject c o m e to be? T h i s s u p p o s i n g a n d

124 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

c o n s e n t i n g subject appears to precede a n d c o n d i t i o n the "en­

t r a n c e " into the s y m b o l i c a n d , hence, the b e c o m i n g of a sub­

ject. T h e c i r c u l a r i t y is clear, b u t h o w is i t to be u n d e r s t o o d ? Is

i t a f a i l i n g of A l t h u s s e r not to p r o v i d e the subject p r i o r to the

f o r m a t i o n of the subject, or does his " f a i l u r e " i n d i c a t e o n l y that

the g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the n a r r a t i v e w o r k against

the account of subject f o r m a t i o n that the n a r r a t i v e attempts to

p r o v i d e ? To l i t e r a l i z e or to ascribe an o n t o l o g i c a l status to the

g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t of "the subject" is to p r e s u m e a m i ­

m e t i c r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n g r a m m a r a n d o n t o l o g y w h i c h misses

the p o i n t , b o t h A l t h u s s e r i a n a n d L a c a n i a n , that the a n t i c i p a ­

t ions o f g r a m m a r are a l w a y s a n d o n l y r e t r o a c t i v e l y i n s t a l l e d .

T h e g r a m m a r that g o v e r n s the n a r r a t i o n of subject f o r m a ­

t i o n p r e s u m e s that the g r a m m a t i c a l p lace for the subject has

a l r e a d y b e e n establ ished. In an i m p o r t a n t sense, then, the

g r a m m a r that the n a r r a t i v e requires results f r o m the n a r r a t i v e

itself. T h e account of subject f o r m a t i o n is thus a d o u b l e f ic­

t i o n a t c r o s s - p u r p o s e s w i t h itself, r e p e a t e d l y s y m p t o m a t i z i n g

w h a t resists n a r r a t i o n .

W i t t g e n s t e i n r e m a r k s , " W e speak, w e utter w o r d s , a n d o n l y

later get a sense of their l i fe ." A n t i c i p a t i o n of s u c h sense gov­

erns the " e m p t y " r i t u a l that is speech, a n d ensures its i ter-

abi l i ty . In this sense, then, we m u s t ne i ther first be l ieve before

w e k n e e l n o r k n o w the sense o f w o r d s before w e speak. O n the

contrary , b o t h are p e r f o r m e d "on f a i t h " that sense w i l l a r r i v e

i n a n d t h r o u g h a r t i c u l a t i o n i t s e l f — a n a n t i c i p a t i o n that i s n o t

thereby g o v e r n e d by a guarantee of n o e m a t i c sat isfact ion. If

s u p p o s i n g a n d c o n s e n t i n g are u n t h i n k a b l e o u t s i d e o f the l a n ­

guage of s u p p o s i n g a n d c o n s e n t i n g , a n d this language i s i tself

a s e d i m e n t a t i o n of r i t u a l f o r m s — t h e r i t u a l s of C a r t e s i a n i s m —

then the act b y w h i c h w e m i g h t "consent" t o k n e e l i s n o m o r e

a n d no less r i t u a l i s t i c t h a n the k n e e l i n g itself.

Althusser's Subjection 125

D o l a r m a k e s his ob ject ion e x p l i c i t l y t h e o l o g i c a l b y suggest­

i n g that A l t h u s s e r ' s r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i t y

to i n c l u d e the d o m a i n of i d e o l o g y is too i n c l u s i v e , that i t leaves

no r o o m for a n o n - m a t e r i a l i z a b l e idea l i ty , the lost a n d i n t r o -

jected object that i n a u g u r a t e s the f o r m a t i o n of the subject. It

r e m a i n s unclear , h o w e v e r , p r e c i s e l y h o w D o l a r reads " m a t e r i ­

a l i t y " i n A l t h u s s e r , a n d w h e t h e r the r i t u a l a n d hence temporal

d i m e n s i o n o f m a t e r i a l i t y in A l t h u s s e r i s effaced in favor o f a

r e d u c t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i t y t o the e m p i r i c a l l y o r s o c i a l l y g i v e n :

This is also why Althusser's ardent insistence on materiality is in­

sufficient: the Other that emerges here, the Other of the symbolic

order, is not material, and Althusser covers up this non-materiality

by talking about the materiality of institutions and practices. If sub­

jectivity can spring up from materially fol lowing certain rituals, it is

only insofar as those rituals function as a symbolic automatism, that

is, insofar as they are governed by an "immaterial" logic supported

by the Other. That Other cannot be discovered by scrutinizing ma­

teriality . . . what counts is ultimately not that they are material, but

that they are ruled by a code and by a repetition. (89)

T h i s last r e m a r k f o r m u l a t e s a n o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i ­

a l i t y a n d r e p e t i t i o n that appears t o b e i n d i rect t e n s i o n w i t h

A l t h u s s e r ' s o w n a r g u m e n t a t i o n . I f i d e o l o g y i s m a t e r i a l to the

extent that it consists in a set of pract ices , a n d pract ices are

g o v e r n e d b y r i tua ls , t h e n m a t e r i a l i t y i s d e f i n e d a s m u c h b y

r i t u a l a n d r e p e t i t i o n a s i t i s b y m o r e n a r r o w l y e m p i r i c i s t c o n ­

cept ions . M o r e o v e r , the r i t u a l s of i d e o l o g y are m a t e r i a l to the

extent that they a c q u i r e a productive c a p a c i t y a n d , in A l t h u s ­

ser's text, w h a t r i t u a l s p r o d u c e are subjects.

D o l a r e x p l a i n s that r i t u a l s p r o d u c e not subjects, b u t subjec­

t iv i ty , a n d can do so o n l y to the extent that they are themselves

g o v e r n e d by a s y m b o l i c or re i terat ive l o g i c , a l o g i c w h i c h is

i m m a t e r i a l . S u b j e c t i v i t y for D o l a r i s s a i d t o " s p r i n g u p f r o m

126 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "

m a t e r i a l l y f o l l o w i n g c e r t a i n r i tua ls , " w h e r e the " s p r i n g i n g u p "

is n o t itself m a t e r i a l , b u t w h e r e the n o t i o n of " f o l l o w i n g " a

r i t u a l does have a m a t e r i a l d i m e n s i o n . S u b j e c t i v i t y arises i m ­

m a t e r i a l l y f r o m a m a t e r i a l r i t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e , but this c a n

h a p p e n o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n that a l o g i c precedes a n d s u p ­

p o r t s this r i t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e , a n i m m a t e r i a l l o g i c , one w h i c h

encodes a n d reenacts the i d e a l i z i n g effects o f intro ject ion. B u t

h o w are w e t o d i s t i n g u i s h the r e p e t i t i o n p r o p e r t o r i t u a l a n d

the r e p e t i t i o n p r o p e r to the " s y m b o l i c a u t o m a t i s m " ?

C o n s i d e r the i n s e p a r a b i l i t y o f those t w o r e p e t i t i o n s i n A l ­

thusser 's d e s c r i p t i o n of the m a t e r i a l i t y of ideas a n d the i d e a l

i n i d e o l o g y :

Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an

ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged

that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed

by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus. It

therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the

following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideol­

ogy existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material

practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the

material actions of a subject acting in al l consciousness according to

his belief. 1 8

Ideas exist " i n s c r i b e d " in acts that are pract ices r e g u l a t e d

b y r i tua ls . C a n they a p p e a r a n y other w a y , a n d c a n they have

a n "existence" o u t s i d e o f r i t u a l ? W h a t m i g h t i t m e a n t o r e ­

t h i n k the m a t e r i a l n o t o n l y as r e g u l a t e d r e p e t i t i o n , b u t as a

r e p e t i t i o n that p r o d u c e s a subject a c t i n g in f u l l consc iousness

a c c o r d i n g to h is be l ie f? T h e subject's bel ie f i s no dif ferent f r o m

Pascal 's ; they are b o t h the resul t of the r e p e t i t i o u s c o n j u r i n g

that A l t h u s s e r cal ls "mater ia l i ty . "

D o l a r argues that A l t h u s s e r fai ls to take i n t o a c c o u n t the

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i t y a n d the s y m b o l i c , b u t w h e r e

Althusser's Subjection 127

w o u l d w e p lace " i n t e r p e l l a t i o n " o n this m a p p i n g o f the d i v i d e ?

Is i t the v o i c e of the s y m b o l i c , is i t the r i t u a l i z e d v o i c e of the

state, or have the t w o b e c o m e i n d i s s o l u b l e ? If, to use D o l a r ' s

t e r m , the s y m b o l i c acquires its "existence" o n l y i n r i t u a l , t h e n

w h a t establishes the i d e a l i t y o f that s y m b o l i c d o m a i n apart

f r o m the v a r i o u s m o d e s o f its a p p e a r a n c e a n d i t e r a b i l i t y ?

R i t u a l takes p lace t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n , a n d r e p e t i t i o n i m p l i e s

the d i s c o n t i n u i t y o f the m a t e r i a l , the i r r e d u c i b i l i t y or m a t e r i ­

a l i t y t o p h e n o m e n a l i t y . T h e i n t e r v a l b y w h i c h a n y r e p e t i t i o n

takes p lace does not, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , appear; i t is , as it w e r e ,

the absence by w h i c h the p h e n o m e n a l i s a r t i c u l a t e d . B u t this

n o n - a p p e a r a n c e or absence is n o t for that reason an " i d e a l i t y , "

for i t is b o u n d to the a r t i c u l a t i o n as its c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d absent

necessity.

T h e o l o g i c a l res istance t o m a t e r i a l i s m i s e x e m p l i f i e d i n D o ­

l a r ' s e x p l i c i t defense o f L a c a n ' s C a r t e s i a n i n h e r i t a n c e , 1 9 h is i n ­

sistance u p o n the p u r e i d e a l i t y o f the s o u l , yet the t h e o l o g i c a l

i m p u l s e also s t ructures A l t h u s s e r ' s w o r k i n the f igure o f the

p u n i t i v e law. D o l a r suggests that, t h o u g h the l a w s u c c e s s f u l l y

regulates its subjects, i t cannot t o u c h a c e r t a i n i n t e r i o r reg is ­

ter of l o v e : "there is a r e m a i n d e r i n v o l v e d in the m e c h a n i s m

of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , the left-over of the c lean cut , a n d . . . this r e ­

m a i n d e r can be p i n p o i n t e d in the e x p e r i e n c e of l o v e " (85). A

bit fur ther o n , he asks, " C o u l d one say that l o v e i s w h a t we

f i n d b e y o n d i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ? "

H e r e l o v e is, i n D o l a r ' s w o r d s , a " f o r c e d choice ," s u g g e s t i n g

that w h a t he e x p e c t e d f r o m the n o t i o n of a subject w h o "con­

sents" to k n e e l a n d p r a y is an a c c o u n t of a " f o r c e d c o n s e n t " of

some k i n d . L o v e i s b e y o n d i n t e r p e l l a t i o n p r e c i s e l y because i t

i s u n d e r s t o o d t o b e c o m p e l l e d b y a n i m m a t e r i a l l a w — t h e s y m ­

b o l i c — o v e r a n d above the r i t u a l i s t i c l a w s that g o v e r n the v a r i ­

ous pract ices o f love: " T h e O t h e r that emerges here, the O t h e r

128 "Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us A l l "

o f the s y m b o l i c order , i s not m a t e r i a l , a n d A l t h u s s e r covers u p

this n o n - m a t e r i a l i t y b y t a l k i n g about the m a t e r i a l i t y o f i n s t i ­

tut ions a n d p r a c t i c e s " (89). T h e O t h e r w h o i s lost, intro jected,

w h o is s a i d to b e c o m e the i m m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n of the subject,

inaugurates the r e p e t i t i o n specif ic to the s y m b o l i c , the p u n c ­

tuated fantasy of a r e t u r n that never is or c o u l d be c o m p l e t e d .

L e t u s p r o v i s i o n a l l y accept this p s y c h o a n a l y t i c account o f

subject f o r m a t i o n , concede that the subject cannot f o r m except

t h r o u g h a b a r r e d r e l a t i o n to the O t h e r , a n d e v e n c o n s i d e r this

b a r r e d O t h e r to r e a p p e a r as the introjected c o n d i t i o n of sub­

ject f o r m a t i o n , s p l i t t i n g the subject at its i n c e p t i o n . E v e n so,

are there other f o r m s of " l o s i n g " the O t h e r that are n o t i n t r o ­

ject ion, a n d are there v a r i o u s w a y s o f i n t r o j e c t i n g that O t h e r ?

A r e these terms not c u l t u r a l l y e laborated, i n d e e d , r i t u a l i z e d ,

to s u c h a degree that no meta-scheme of s y m b o l i c l o g i c es­

capes the h e r m e n e u t i c s of s o c i a l d e s c r i p t i o n ?

S igni f i cant ly , t h o u g h s o c i a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s are d e s c r i b e d b y

D o l a r a s a l w a y s " f a i l i n g " f u l l y t o const i tute subjects, n o s u c h

" f a i l u r e " seems at w o r k in the c o m p u l s o r y character o f love.

To the extent that p r i m a r y i n t r o j e c t i o n is an act of love , i t is ,

I w o u l d suggest, not an act p e r f o r m e d o n l y once, b u t a r e ­

i terated a n d i n d e e d r i t u a l affair. B u t w h a t i s t o k e e p u s f r o m

m a k i n g the a n a l o g y that w e f a l l i n l o v e i n m u c h the same w a y

w e k n e e l a n d pray, o r that w e m a y w e l l b e d o i n g one w h e n w e

t h i n k w e are d o i n g the other?

Yet D o l a r ' s suggest ion that l o v e m i g h t b e " b e y o n d " inter­

p e l l a t i o n i s a n i m p o r t a n t one. A l t h u s s e r w o u l d have benef i ted

f r o m a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w the l a w b e c o m e s the o b ­

ject of pass ionate at tachment , a strange scene of love. F o r the

conscience w h i c h c o m p e l s the w a y w a r d p e d e s t r i a n t o t u r n

a r o u n d u p o n h e a r i n g the p o l i c e m a n ' s address o r urges the

m u r d e r e r i n t o the streets in search of the p o l i c e appears to be

Althusser's Subjection 129

d r i v e n b y a l o v e o f the l a w w h i c h c a n b e satisf ied o n l y b y r i t u a l

p u n i s h m e n t . To the extent that A l t h u s s e r gestures t o w a r d this

analys is , he beg ins to e x p l a i n h o w a subject is f o r m e d t h r o u g h

the passionate p u r s u i t of the r e p r i m a n d i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of the

state. That the subject t u r n s r o u n d or rushes t o w a r d the l a w

suggests that the subject l ives in passionate e x p e c t a t i o n of the

law. S u c h l o v e is not b e y o n d i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ; rather, i t f o r m s the

passionate c i rc le i n w h i c h the subject b e c o m e s e n s n a r e d b y its

o w n state.

T h e f a i l u r e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n is c l e a r l y to be v a l u e d , b u t

to f igure that fa i lure in t e r m s that rehabi l i tate a s t r u c t u r e of

l o v e o u t s i d e the d o m a i n o f the s o c i a l r i s k s r e i f y i n g p a r t i c u ­

lar s o c i a l f o r m s of l o v e as e ternal p s y c h i c facts. It a lso leaves

u n e x p l a i n e d the p a s s i o n that precedes a n d f o r m s conscience,

that precedes a n d f o r m s the p o s s i b i l i t y of love, one that ac­

counts for the f a i l u r e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n f u l l y to const i tute the

subject i t names. I n t e r p e l l a t i o n is " b a r r e d " f r o m success not

by a s t r u c t u r a l l y p e r m a n e n t f o r m of p r o h i b i t i o n (or f o r e c l o ­

sure), b u t by its i n a b i l i t y to d e t e r m i n e the c o n s t i t u t i v e h e l d o f

the h u m a n . If consc ience is one f o r m that the passionate at­

t a c h m e n t to existence takes, then the fa i lure of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n

is to be f o u n d p r e c i s e l y in the passionate at tachment that also

a l l o w s i t to w o r k . A c c o r d i n g to the l o g i c o f conscience, w h i c h

f u l l y constra ins A l t h u s s e r , the subject's existence cannot be

l i n g u i s t i c a l l y g u a r a n t e e d w i t h o u t passionate at tachment to the

law. T h i s c o m p l i c i t y a t once c o n d i t i o n s a n d l i m i t s the v i a b i l i t y

of a c r i t i c a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n of the law. O n e cannot c r i t i c i z e too

far the terms by w h i c h one's existence i s secured.

B u t i f the d i s c u r s i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s for existence exceed the

r e p r i m a n d v o i c e d b y the law, w o u l d that not lessen the n e e d

to c o n f i r m one's g u i l t a n d e m b a r k on a p a t h o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s ­

ness as a w a y to g a i n a p u r c h a s e on i d e n t i t y ? W h a t are the

T

130 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "

c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o u r v e r y sense o f l i n g u i s t i c s u r v i v a l

d e p e n d s u p o n o u r w i l l i n g n e s s t o t u r n b a c k u p o n ourse lves ,

that is, i n w h i c h a t ta in ing r e c o g n i z a b l e b e i n g requires self-

n e g a t i o n , r e q u i r e s e x i s t i n g as a se l f -negat ing b e i n g in o r d e r to

at ta in a n d preserve a status as " b e i n g " at a l l?

In a N i e t z s c h e a n v e i n , s u c h a slave m o r a l i t y m a y be p r e d i ­

cated u p o n the sober c a l c u l a t i o n that i t i s better to " b e " en­

s l a v e d in s u c h a w a y t h a n not to " b e " at a l l . B u t the t e r m s

that c o n s t r a i n the o p t i o n to b e i n g versus not b e i n g " c a l l f o r "

another k i n d o f response. U n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s does a l a w

m o n o p o l i z e the t e r m s o f existence in so t h o r o u g h a w a y ? Or

is this a t h e o l o g i c a l fantasy of the l a w ? Is there a p o s s i b i l i t y of

b e i n g e lsewhere o r o t h e r w i s e , w i t h o u t d e n y i n g o u r c o m p l i c i t y

i n the l a w that w e o p p o s e ? S u c h p o s s i b i l i t y w o u l d r e q u i r e

a dif ferent k i n d of t u r n , one that, enabled by the law, t u r n s

a w a y f r o m the law, r e s i s t i n g its l u r e o f i d e n t i t y , an agency that

o u t r u n s a n d counters the c o n d i t i o n s o f its emergence. S u c h

a t u r n d e m a n d s a w i l l i n g n e s s not to b e — a c r i t i c a l desubjec-

t i v a t i o n — i n o r d e r to e x p o s e the l a w as less p o w e r f u l t h a n i t

seems. W h a t f o r m s m i g h t l i n g u i s t i c s u r v i v a l take i n this de-

s u b j e c t i v i z e d d o m a i n ? H o w w o u l d one k n o w one's existence?

T h r o u g h w h a t terms w o u l d i t b e r e c o g n i z e d a n d r e c o g n i z a b l e ?

S u c h quest ions cannot b e a n s w e r e d here, but they i n d i c a t e

a d i r e c t i o n for t h i n k i n g that is p e r h a p s p r i o r to the q u e s t i o n

of conscience, n a m e l y , the q u e s t i o n that p r e o c c u p i e d S p i n o z a ,

N i e t z s c h e , a n d m o s t recently , G i o r g i o A g a m b e n : H o w are w e

to u n d e r s t a n d the des ire to be as a c o n s t i t u t i v e desire? R e s i t u -

a t i n g conscience a n d i n t e r p e l l a t i o n w i t h i n s u c h a n account ,

w e m i g h t then a d d t o this q u e s t i o n another : H o w i s s u c h a

desire e x p l o i t e d n o t o n l y b y a l a w i n the s i n g u l a r , but b y l a w s

o f v a r i o u s k i n d s s u c h that w e y i e l d t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n i n o r d e r

to m a i n t a i n s o m e sense o f s o c i a l " b e i n g " ?

Althusser's Subjection 131

I n c o n c l u s i o n , A g a m b e n offers u s one d i r e c t i o n for r e t h i n k ­

i n g ethics a l o n g the l ines of the desire to be, hence, at a d i s ­

tance f r o m a n y p a r t i c u l a r f o r m a t i o n o f conscience:

if human beings were or had to be this or that substance, this or that

destiny, no ethical experience w o u l d be possible . . . .

This does not mean, however, that humans are not, and do not

have to be, something, that they are simply consigned to nothingness

and therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to be, to adopt or

not to adopt this or that destiny (nihilism and decisionism coincide

at this point). There is in effect something that humans are and have

to be, but this is not an essence nor properly a thing: It is the simple

fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality.20

A g a m b e n m i g h t b e r e a d a s c l a i m i n g that this p o s s i b i l i t y

m u s t resolve itself i n t o s o m e t h i n g , b u t cannot u n d o its o w n

status as p o s s i b i l i t y t h r o u g h s u c h a r e s o l u t i o n . O r , rather, we

m i g h t r e r e a d " b e i n g " as p r e c i s e l y the p o t e n t i a l i t y that r e m a i n s

u n e x h a u s t e d by a n y p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p e l l a t i o n . S u c h a f a i l u r e o f

i n t e r p e l l a t i o n m a y w e l l u n d e r m i n e the c a p a c i t y o f the subject

to " b e " in a se l f - ident ica l sense, b u t i t m a y also m a r k the p a t h

t o w a r d a m o r e o p e n , e v e n m o r e e th ica l , k i n d o f b e i n g , one o f

or for the future.

Refused Identification 133

Melancholy Gender / Refused Identification

I n g r i e f t h e w o r l d b e c o m e s p o o r a n d e m p t y ; i n m e l a n c h o l i a

i t i s t h e e g o i tsel f . — F r e u d , " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a "

H o w i s i t t h e n that i n m e l a n c h o l i a t h e s u p e r - e g o c a n

b e c o m e a g a t h e r i n g - p l a c e f o r t h e d e a t h i n s t i n c t s ?

— F r e u d , The Ego and the Id

It m a y at first seem strange to t h i n k of gender as a k i n d

of m e l a n c h o l y , or as one of m e l a n c h o l y ' s effects. B u t let us

r e m e m b e r that in The Ego and the Id F r e u d h i m s e l f a c k n o w l ­

e d g e d that m e l a n c h o l y , the u n f i n i s h e d process of g r i e v i n g , i s

c e n t r a l to the f o r m a t i o n of the ident i f i cat ions that f o r m the

ego. Indeed, ident i f i cat ions f o r m e d f r o m u n f i n i s h e d gr ief are

the m o d e s i n w h i c h the lost object i s i n c o r p o r a t e d a n d p h a n -

t a s m a t i c a l l y p r e s e r v e d i n a n d a s the ego. C o n s i d e r i n conjunc­

t i o n w i t h this i n s i g h t F r e u d ' s further r e m a r k that "the ego i s

first a n d foremost a b o d i l y ego," 1 not m e r e l y a surface, b u t

"the p r o j e c t i o n of a surface." F u r t h e r , this b o d i l y ego assumes

a g e n d e r e d m o r p h o l o g y , so that the b o d i l y ego is a lso a gen­

d e r e d ego. I h o p e first to e x p l a i n the sense in w h i c h a m e l a n ­

c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is c e n t r a l to the process w h e r e b y the ego

assumes a g e n d e r e d character. S e c o n d , I w a n t to e x p l o r e h o w

this ana lys i s of the m e l a n c h o l i c f o r m a t i o n of gender sheds

l i g h t o n the p r e d i c a m e n t o f l i v i n g w i t h i n a c u l t u r e w h i c h can

m o u r n the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l at tachment o n l y w i t h great dif­

f iculty .

R e f l e c t i n g o n h is s p e c u l a t i o n s i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o ­

l i a , " F r e u d w r i t e s in The Ego and the Id that in the ear l ier essay

he h a d s u p p o s e d that "an object w h i c h w a s lost has b e e n set

up a g a i n i n s i d e the e g o — t h a t is, that an object-cathexis h a d

b e e n r e p l a c e d b y a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . A t that t i m e , h o w e v e r , " h e

c o n t i n u e d , "we d i d not apprec iate the f u l l s igni f icance o f this

process a n d d i d not k n o w h o w c o m m o n a n d h o w t y p i c a l i t is.

S ince t h e n we have c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d that this k i n d o f sub­

s t i t u t i o n has a great share in d e t e r m i n i n g the f o r m t a k e n by the

ego a n d that i t m a k e s a n essentia l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o w a r d b u i l d ­

i n g up w h a t is c a l l e d its ' character ' " (p. 28). S l i g h t l y later in the

same text, F r e u d e x p a n d s this v i e w : " w h e n i t h a p p e n s that a

p e r s o n has to g ive up a s e x u a l object, there q ui te often ensues

an a l terat ion of his ego w h i c h c a n o n l y be d e s c r i b e d as a set­

t i n g up of the object i n s i d e the ego, as i t o c c u r s in m e l a n c h o l i a "

(29). H e c o n c l u d e s this d i s c u s s i o n b y s p e c u l a t i n g that " i t m a y

be that this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is the sole c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h

the i d c a n g i v e u p its objects . . . i t m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o s u p ­

pose that the character of the ego is a p r e c i p i t a t e of a b a n d o n e d

object-cathexes a n d that i t conta ins the h i s t o r y of those object-

c h o i c e s " (29). W h a t F r e u d here cal ls the "character of the ego"

appears to be the s e d i m e n t a t i o n of objects l o v e d a n d lost, the

a r c h a e l o g i c a l r e m a i n d e r , as i t were , of u n r e s o l v e d grief.

W h a t i s p e r h a p s m o s t s t r i k i n g about h is f o r m u l a t i o n here i s

h o w i t reverses h is p o s i t i o n i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a "

on w h a t i t m e a n s to resolve grief. In the ear l ier essay, F r e u d

134 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification 135

assumes that gr ie f c a n be r e s o l v e d t h r o u g h a de-cathexis , a

b r e a k i n g of at tachment , as w e l l as the subsequent m a k i n g of

n e w attachments. In The Ego and the Id, he m a k e s r o o m for

the n o t i o n that m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n m a y be a prerequisite

for l e t t i n g the object go. By c l a i m i n g this , he changes w h a t i t

m e a n s to "let an object go," for there is no f ina l b r e a k i n g of the

at tachment . T h e r e is, rather, the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the attach­

m e n t as i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , w h e r e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n b e c o m e s a m a g i c a l ,

a p s y c h i c f o r m of p r e s e r v i n g the object. Insofar as i d e n t i f i c a ­

t i o n is the p s y c h i c preserve of the object a n d s u c h i d e n t i f i c a ­

t ions c o m e to f o r m the ego, the lost object cont inues to h a u n t

a n d i n h a b i t the ego as one of its c o n s t i t u t i v e ident i f i cat ions .

T h e lost object is, in that sense, m a d e coextensive w i t h the ego

itself. I n d e e d , one m i g h t c o n c l u d e that m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a ­

t i o n p e r m i t s the loss o f the object in the externa l w o r l d p r e ­

c i s e l y because it p r o v i d e s a w a y to preserve the object as p a r t

of the ego a n d , hence, to avert the loss as a c o m p l e t e loss. H e r e

we see that l e t t i n g the object go means , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , not f u l l

a b a n d o n m e n t of the object b ut t r a n s f e r r i n g the status of the

object f r o m e x t e r n a l t o i n t e r n a l . G i v i n g u p the object b e c o m e s

p o s s i b l e o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n of a m e l a n c h o l i c i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n

or, w h a t m i g h t for o u r p u r p o s e s t u r n o u t t o b e e v e n m o r e i m ­

p o r t a n t , a m e l a n c h o l i c incorporation.

If in m e l a n c h o l i a a loss is re fused , it is not for that r e a s o n

a b o l i s h e d . I n t e r n a l i z a t i o n preserves loss i n the p s y c h e ; m o r e

prec ise ly , the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of loss is p a r t of the m e c h a n i s m

of its re fusa l . I f the object c a n no longer exist in the e x t e r n a l

w o r l d , i t w i l l t h e n exist i n t e r n a l l y , a n d that i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n w i l l

be a w a y to d i s a v o w the loss, to k e e p it at bay, to stay or post­

p o n e the r e c o g n i t i o n a n d suf fer ing o f loss.

Is there a w a y in w h i c h gender ident i f i ca t ions or, rather,

the ident i f i ca t ions that b e c o m e c e n t r a l to the f o r m a t i o n of

gender, are p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h m e l a n c h o l i c ident i f i ca t ion? I t

seems clear that the p o s i t i o n s of " m a s c u l i n e " a n d " f e m i n i n e , "

w h i c h F r e u d , in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905),

u n d e r s t o o d as the effects of l a b o r i o u s a n d u n c e r t a i n a c c o m ­

p l i s h m e n t , are establ ished i n part t h r o u g h p r o h i b i t i o n s w h i c h

demand the loss of c e r t a i n s e x u a l at tachments , a n d d e m a n d as

w e l l that those losses not be a v o w e d , a n d not be g r i e v e d . If the

a s s u m p t i o n o f f e m i n i n i t y a n d the a s s u m p t i o n o f m a s c u l i n i t y

p r o c e e d t h r o u g h the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f a n a l w a y s t e n u o u s

heterosexual i ty , we m i g h t u n d e r s t a n d the force o f this ac­

c o m p l i s h m e n t as m a n d a t i n g the a b a n d o n m e n t o f h o m o s e x u a l

at tachments or, p e r h a p s m o r e t renchant ly , preempting the p o s ­

s i b i l i t y of h o m o s e x u a l at tachment, a forec losure of p o s s i b i l i t y

w h i c h p r o d u c e s a d o m a i n of h o m o s e x u a l i t y u n d e r s t o o d as

u n l i v a b l e p a s s i o n a n d u n g r i e v a b l e loss. T h i s h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y

i s p r o d u c e d not o n l y t h r o u g h i m p l e m e n t i n g the p r o h i b i t i o n

o n incest but , p r i o r t o that, b y e n f o r c i n g the p r o h i b i t i o n o n

h o m o s e x u a l i t y . T h e o e d i p a l conf l ict p r e s u m e s that hetero­

s e x u a l des ire has a l r e a d y b e e n accomplished, that the d i s t i n c t i o n

b e t w e e n heterosexual a n d h o m o s e x u a l has b e e n e n f o r c e d (a

d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h , after a l l , has no necessi ty) ; in this sense, the

p r o h i b i t i o n o n incest p r e s u p p o s e s the p r o h i b i t i o n o n h o m o ­

sexual i ty , for i t p r e s u m e s the h e t e r o s e x u a l i z a t i o n of desire.

T o accept this v i e w w e m u s t b e g i n b y p r e s u p p o s i n g that

m a s c u l i n e a n d f e m i n i n e are not d i s p o s i t i o n s , a s F r e u d s o m e ­

t i m e s argues, b u t i n d e e d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , ones w h i c h e m e r g e

i n t a n d e m w i t h the a c h i e v e m e n t o f heterosexual i ty . H e r e

F r e u d art iculates a c u l t u r a l l o g i c w h e r e b y g e n d e r i s a c h i e v e d

a n d s t a b i l i z e d t h r o u g h heterosexual p o s i t i o n i n g , a n d w h e r e

threats to h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y thus b e c o m e threats to g e n d e r itself.

T h e p r e v a l e n c e o f this heterosexual m a t r i x i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n

o f gender emerges not o n l y i n F r e u d ' s text, b u t i n the c u l t u r a l

i 3 6 Melancholy Gender

f o r m s of l i fe that have a b s o r b e d this m a t r i x a n d are i n h a b ­

i t e d by e v e r y d a y f o r m s of gender a n x i e t y H e n c e , the fear o f

h o m o s e x u a l desire in a w o m a n m a y i n d u c e a p a n i c that she is

l o s i n g her f e m i n i n i t y , that she is not a w o m a n , that she is no

longer a p r o p e r w o m a n , that i f she is not q u i t e a m a n , she is

l i k e one, a n d hence m o n s t r o u s i n s o m e way. O r i n a m a n , the

terror of h o m o s e x u a l des ire m a y l e a d to a terror of b e i n g c o n ­

s t r u e d as f e m i n i n e , f e m i n i z e d , of no longer b e i n g p r o p e r l y a

m a n , of b e i n g a " f a i l e d " m a n , or b e i n g in s o m e sense a f igure

of m o n s t r o s i t y or abjection.

I w o u l d a r g u e that p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y there are m a n y

w a y s o f e x p e r i e n c i n g gender a n d s e x u a l i t y that do not r e d u c e

to this e q u a t i o n , that do not p r e s u m e that g e n d e r is s t a b i l i z e d

t h r o u g h the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a f i r m heterosexual i ty , but for the

m o m e n t I w a n t to i n v o k e this stark a n d h y p e r b o l i c c o n s t r u c ­

t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n gender a n d s e x u a l i t y i n o r d e r t o

t h i n k t h r o u g h the q u e s t i o n o f u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r e i v a b l e loss

i n the f o r m a t i o n o f w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l the g e n d e r e d character

of the ego.

C o n s i d e r that gender i s a c q u i r e d at least in part t h r o u g h

the r e p u d i a t i o n of h o m o s e x u a l at tachments; the g i r l b e c o m e s

a g i r l t h r o u g h b e i n g subject to a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h bars the

m o t h e r as an object of desire a n d insta l l s that b a r r e d object as

a part of the ego, i n d e e d , as a m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . T h u s

the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n conta ins w i t h i n i t b o t h the p r o h i b i t i o n a n d

the desire , a n d so e m b o d i e s the u n g r i e v e d loss of the h o m o ­

s e x u a l cathexis. If one is a g i r l to the extent that one does n o t

w a n t a g i r l , t h e n w a n t i n g a g i r l w i l l b r i n g b e i n g a g i r l i n t o

q u e s t i o n ; w i t h i n this m a t r i x , h o m o s e x u a l desire thus p a n i c s

gender.

H e t e r o s e x u a l i t y i s c u l t i v a t e d t h r o u g h p r o h i b i t i o n s , a n d

these p r o h i b i t i o n s take as one of their objects h o m o s e x u a l at-

Refused Identification 137

tachments , thereby f o r c i n g the loss of those attachments . 2 I f

the g i r l is to transfer l o v e f r o m her father to a subst i tute ob­

ject, she m u s t , a c c o r d i n g to F r e u d i a n l o g i c , first r e n o u n c e l o v e

for her mother , a n d r e n o u n c e i t in s u c h a w a y that b o t h the

a i m a n d the object are forec losed. She m u s t not transfer that

h o m o s e x u a l l o v e onto a subst i tute f e m i n i n e f igure, b u t r e ­

n o u n c e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l at tachment itself. O n l y

on this c o n d i t i o n does a heterosexual a i m b e c o m e establ i shed

as w h a t s o m e c a l l a s e x u a l o r i e n t a t i o n . O n l y on the c o n d i t i o n

of this forec losure of h o m o s e x u a l i t y c a n the father a n d s u b s t i ­

tutes for h i m b e c o m e objects o f desire , a n d the m o t h e r b e c o m e

the u n e a s y site of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .

B e c o m i n g a " m a n " w i t h i n this l o g i c requires r e p u d i a t i n g

f e m i n i n i t y as a p r e c o n d i t i o n for the h e t e r o s e x u a l i z a t i o n of

s e x u a l des ire a n d its f u n d a m e n t a l a m b i v a l e n c e . I f a m a n be­

c o m e s h e t e r o s e x u a l b y r e p u d i a t i n g the f e m i n i n e , w h e r e c o u l d

that r e p u d i a t i o n l i v e except i n a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h his

heterosexual career seeks to d e n y ? Indeed, the desire for the

f e m i n i n e i s m a r k e d b y that r e p u d i a t i o n : h e w a n t s the w o m a n

h e w o u l d never be. H e w o u l d n ' t b e caught d e a d b e i n g her:

therefore he w a n t s her. She is his r e p u d i a t e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (a

r e p u d i a t i o n he susta ins as at once i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d the object

o f h i s desire). O n e o f the m o s t a n x i o u s a i m s o f h i s des ire w i l l

be to elaborate the di f ference b e t w e e n h i m a n d her, a n d he

w i l l seek t o d i s c o v e r a n d i n s t a l l p r o o f o f that difference. H i s

w a n t i n g w i l l b e h a u n t e d b y a d r e a d o f b e i n g w h a t h e wan t s ,

so that his w a n t i n g w i l l a lso a l w a y s be a k i n d of d r e a d . P r e ­

c ise ly because w h a t i s r e p u d i a t e d a n d hence lost i s p r e s e r v e d

as a r e p u d i a t e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , this desire w i l l at tempt to over­

c o m e a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h c a n never b e complete .

I n d e e d , h e w i l l not i d e n t i f y w i t h her, a n d h e w i l l not desire

another m a n . That re fusa l to desire , that sacrif ice of desire

i 3 8 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification 139

u n d e r the force o f p r o h i b i t i o n , w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e h o m o s e x u a l i t y

a s a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h m a s c u l i n i t y B u t this m a s c u l i n i t y w i l l

be h a u n t e d by the l o v e i t c a n n o t gr ieve , a n d before I suggest

h o w this m i g h t b e true, I ' d l i k e t o situate the k i n d o f w r i t i n g

that I have b e e n of fer ing as a c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l engagement w i t h

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y that be longs nei ther to the fields of p s y ­

c h o l o g y n o r t o p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , b u t w h i c h nevertheless seeks

to es tabl i sh an i n t e l l e c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to those enterprises .

T h u s far, I have b e e n o f fer ing s o m e t h i n g l i k e an exegesis

of a c e r t a i n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c l o g i c , one that appears in s o m e

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c texts b u t w h i c h these texts a n d others also

s o m e t i m e s contest. I m a k e no e m p i r i c a l c l a i m s , n o r attempt a

s u r v e y o f c u r r e n t p s y c h o a n a l y t i c s c h o l a r s h i p o n gender, s e x u ­

al i ty , or m e l a n c h o l y . I w a n t m e r e l y to suggest w h a t I take to be

s o m e p r o d u c t i v e convergences b e t w e e n F r e u d ' s t h i n k i n g o n

u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r i e v a b l e loss a n d the p r e d i c a m e n t o f l i v i n g

i n a c u l t u r e w h i c h c a n m o u r n the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l attach­

m e n t o n l y w i t h great d i f f i c u l t y

T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c i s m a d e a l l the m o r e acute w h e n w e c o n ­

s i d e r the ravages of A I D S , a n d the task of f i n d i n g a p u b l i c

o c c a s i o n a n d language i n w h i c h t o gr ieve this s e e m i n g l y e n d ­

less n u m b e r o f deaths. M o r e general ly , this p r o b l e m m a k e s

i tself felt i n the u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h w h i c h h o m o s e x u a l l o v e a n d

loss is r e g a r d e d : is it r e g a r d e d as a " t r u e " love, a " t r u e " loss,

a l o v e a n d loss w o r t h y a n d capable o f b e i n g g r i e v e d , a n d thus

w o r t h y a n d capable o f h a v i n g b e e n l i v e d ? O r i s i t a l o v e a n d

a loss h a u n t e d by the specter of a c e r t a i n u n r e a l i t y , a c e r t a i n

u n t h i n k a b i l i t y , the d o u b l e d i s a v o w a l o f the "I n e v e r l o v e d her,

a n d I never lost her," u t t e r e d by a w o m a n , the "I never l o v e d

h i m , I never lost h i m , " u t t e r e d by a m a n ? Is this the "never-

n e v e r " that s u p p o r t s the n a t u r a l i z e d surface of heterosexual

l i fe as w e l l as its p e r v a s i v e m e l a n c h o l i a ? Is i t the d i s a v o w a l of

loss b y w h i c h s e x u a l f o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g g a y s e x u a l f o r m a ­

t i o n , p r o c e e d s ?

I f we accept the n o t i o n that the p r o h i b i t i o n on h o m o s e x u ­

a l i t y operates t h r o u g h o u t a l a r g e l y heterosexual c u l t u r e as

one of its d e f i n i n g operat ions , then the loss of h o m o s e x u a l o b ­

jects a n d a i m s (not s i m p l y this p e r s o n of the same gender,

b u t any p e r s o n of the same gender) w o u l d a p p e a r to be fore­

c l o s e d f r o m the start. I say " f o r e c l o s e d " to suggest that this is

a p r e e m p t i v e loss, a m o u r n i n g for u n l i v e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s . If this

l o v e is f r o m the start o u t of the q u e s t i o n , then i t cannot h a p ­

p e n , a n d i f i t does, i t c e r t a i n l y d i d not . I f i t does, i t h a p p e n s

o n l y u n d e r the of f ic ia l s i g n o f its p r o h i b i t i o n a n d d i s a v o w a l . 3

W h e n c e r t a i n k i n d s of losses are c o m p e l l e d by a set o f c u l ­

t u r a l l y p r e v a l e n t p r o h i b i t i o n s , we m i g h t expect a c u l t u r a l l y

p r e v a l e n t f o r m o f m e l a n c h o l i a , one w h i c h s ignals the inter­

n a l i z a t i o n o f the u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r i e v a b l e h o m o s e x u a l ca-

thexis. A n d w h e r e there i s n o p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n o r d i s c o u r s e

t h r o u g h w h i c h s u c h a loss m i g h t b e n a m e d a n d m o u r n e d ,

then m e l a n c h o l i a takes o n c u l t u r a l d i m e n s i o n s o f c o n t e m p o ­

r a r y consequence. Of course, i t comes as no s u r p r i s e that the

m o r e h y p e r b o l i c a n d defensive a m a s c u l i n e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the

m o r e fierce the u n g r i e v e d h o m o s e x u a l cathexis. In this sense,

w e m i g h t u n d e r s t a n d b o t h " m a s c u l i n i t y " a n d " f e m i n i n i t y " a s

f o r m e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h ident i f i ca t ions w h i c h are i n

p a r t c o m p o s e d o f d i s a v o w e d grief.

I f we accept the n o t i o n that h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y n a t u r a l i z e s

itself by i n s i s t i n g on the r a d i c a l otherness o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y ,

then heterosexual i d e n t i t y is p u r c h a s e d t h r o u g h a m e l a n c h o l i c

i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the l o v e that i t d i s a v o w s : the m a n w h o insists

u p o n the coherence o f h i s h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y w i l l c l a i m that h e

never l o v e d another m a n , a n d hence never lost another m a n .

That love, that a t tachment b e c o m e s subject to a d o u b l e d i s -

140 Melancholy Gender

a v o w a l , a never h a v i n g l o v e d , a n d a never h a v i n g lost. T h i s

" n e v e r - n e v e r " thus f o u n d s the heterosexual subject, as i t w e r e ;

i t i s a n i d e n t i t y b a s e d u p o n the re fusa l t o a v o w a n at tachment

a n d , hence, the re fusa l to gr ieve.

T h e r e i s p e r h a p s a m o r e c u l t u r a l l y i n s t r u c t i v e w a y of de­

s c r i b i n g this scenar io , for i t is not s i m p l y a matter of an

i n d i v i d u a l ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o a v o w a n d hence t o gr ieve h o m o ­

s e x u a l attachments. W h e n the p r o h i b i t i o n against h o m o s e x u ­

a l i t y i s c u l t u r a l l y p e r v a s i v e , then the " l o s s " o f h o m o s e x u a l

l o v e i s p r e c i p i t a t e d t h r o u g h a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h i s repeated

a n d r i t u a l i z e d t h r o u g h o u t the c u l t u r e . W h a t ensues is a c u l t u r e

o f g e n d e r m e l a n c h o l y i n w h i c h m a s c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y

emerge as the traces of an u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r i e v a b l e love;

i n d e e d , w h e r e m a s c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y w i t h i n the hetero­

s e x u a l m a t r i x are s t r e ngthe ne d t h r o u g h the r e p u d i a t i o n s that

they p e r f o r m . In o p p o s i t i o n to a c o n c e p t i o n of s e x u a l i t y w h i c h

is s a i d to "express" a gender, g e n d e r i tself is here u n d e r s t o o d

t o b e c o m p o s e d o f p r e c i s e l y w h a t r e m a i n s i n a r t i c u l a t e i n sexu­

ality.

I f w e u n d e r s t a n d g e n d e r m e l a n c h o l y i n this way , t h e n per­

haps w e c a n m a k e sense o f the p e c u l i a r p h e n o m e n o n w h e r e b y

h o m o s e x u a l desire b e c o m e s a source of g u i l t . In " M o u r n i n g

a n d M e l a n c h o l i a " F r e u d argues that m e l a n c h o l y i s m a r k e d

b y the e x p e r i e n c e o f self-beratement. H e wr i tes , "If one l i s ­

tens c a r e f u l l y to the m a n y a n d v a r i o u s self-accusations of the

m e l a n c h o l i c , one cannot i n the e n d a v o i d the i m p r e s s i o n that

often the m o s t v i o l e n t of t h e m are h a r d l y at a l l a p p l i c a b l e to

the pat ient h imsel f , b u t that w i t h ins igni f i cant m o d i f i c a t i o n s

they do fit s o m e o n e else, s o m e p e r s o n w h o m the pat ient loves,

has l o v e d or o u g h t to l o v e . . . the sel f-reproaches are re­

proaches against a l o v e d object w h i c h have b e e n shi f ted on to

the pat ient ' s o w n ego ." 4

Refused Identification 141

F r e u d goes on to conjecture that the conf l ict w i t h the other

w h i c h r e m a i n s u n r e s o l v e d at the t i m e the other i s lost r e -

emerges in the p s y c h e as a w a y of c o n t i n u i n g the q u a r r e l . I n ­

d e e d , anger at the other is doubt less exacerbated by the d e a t h

or d e p a r t u r e w h i c h occas ions the loss. B u t this anger i s t u r n e d

i n w a r d a n d b e c o m e s the substance o f self-beratement.

I n " O n N a r c i s s i s m , " F r e u d l i n k s the e x p e r i e n c e o f g u i l t w i t h

the t u r n i n g b a c k i n t o the ego o f h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o . 5 P u t t i n g

aside the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r l i b i d o c a n be h o m o s e x u a l or

heterosexual , w e m i g h t rephrase F r e u d a n d c o n s i d e r g u i l t a s

the t u r n i n g b a c k into the ego of h o m o s e x u a l attachment. I f the

loss b e c o m e s a r e n e w e d scene of conf l ict , a n d i f the aggress ion

that f o l l o w s f r o m that loss cannot be a r t i c u l a t e d or external ­

i z e d , t h e n i t r e b o u n d s u p o n the ego itself, in the f o r m of a

super-ego. T h i s w i l l e v e n t u a l l y l e a d F r e u d t o l i n k m e l a n c h o l i c

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the agency of the super-ego in The Ego and

the Id, b u t a l r e a d y in " O n N a r c i s s i s m " we have s o m e sense o f

h o w g u i l t i s w r o u g h t f r o m u n g r i e v a b l e h o m o s e x u a l i t y .

T h e ego i s s a i d t o b e c o m e i m p o v e r i s h e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a ,

b u t i t appears as p o o r p r e c i s e l y t h r o u g h the w o r k i n g s of self-

beratement . T h e ego- idea l , w h a t F r e u d cal ls the " m e a s u r e "

against w h i c h the ego is j u d g e d by the super-ego, i s p r e c i s e l y

the i d e a l o f s o c i a l r e c t i t u d e d e n n e d over a n d against h o m o ­

sexual i ty . " T h i s i d e a l , " F r e u d wr i tes , "has a s o c i a l s ide: i t is

a lso the c o m m o n i d e a l of a fami ly , a class or a n a t i o n . It

not o n l y b i n d s the narc iss is t ic l i b i d o , b u t also a considerable

a m o u n t o f the person ' s h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o , w h i c h i n this w a y

b e c o m e s t u r n e d b a c k i n t o the ego. T h e d issat is fact ion d u e to

the n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t o f this i d e a l l iberates h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o ,

w h i c h is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a sense of g u i l t (dread of the c o m ­

m u n i t y ) " (81).

B u t the m o v e m e n t of this " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " is not altogether

142 Melancholy Gender

clear. A f t e r a l l , F r e u d w i l l argue in Civilization and Its Dis­

contents that these s o c i a l ideals are t r a n s f o r m e d into a sense

o f g u i l t t h r o u g h a k i n d o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n w h i c h i s not , u l t i ­

mately , m i m e t i c . In " O n N a r c i s s i s m , " i t i s not that one treats

oneself as h a r s h l y as one w a s treated b u t rather that the ag­

gress ion t o w a r d the i d e a l a n d its u n f u l f i l l a b i l i t y i s t u r n e d i n ­

w a r d , a n d this sel f-aggression b e c o m e s the p r i m a r y s t r u c t u r e

of conscience: " b y m e a n s of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [the c h i l d ] takes the

unat tackable a u t h o r i t y i n t o h i m s e l f " (86).

In this sense, in m e l a n c h o l i a the super-ego c a n b e c o m e a

g a t h e r i n g p lace for the death inst incts . As s u c h , i t i s not nec­

essar i ly the same as those i n s t i n c t s or their effect. In this

w a y , m e l a n c h o l i a attracts the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s to the super-ego,

the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d as a regressive s t r i v i n g

t o w a r d o r g a n i c e q u i l i b r i u m , a n d the self-beratement o f the

super-ego b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d to m a k e use of that regressive

s t r i v i n g for its o w n p u r p o s e s . M e l a n c h o l y i s b o t h the re fusal

of gr ief a n d the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of loss, a m i m i n g of the death i t

cannot m o u r n . Yet the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f d e a t h d r a w s u p o n the

d e a t h inst incts to s u c h a degree that we m i g h t w e l l w o n d e r

w h e t h e r the t w o c a n b e separated f r o m one another, w h e t h e r

a n a l y t i c a l l y o r p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y .

T h e p r o h i b i t i o n o n h o m o s e x u a l i t y p r e e m p t s the process o f

gr ief a n d p r o m p t s a m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h effec­

t i v e l y t u r n s h o m o s e x u a l desire b a c k u p o n itself. T h i s t u r n ­

i n g b a c k u p o n itself i s p r e c i s e l y the a c t i o n o f self-beratement

a n d g u i l t . S igni f i cant ly , h o m o s e x u a l i t y is not a b o l i s h e d b u t

p r e s e r v e d , t h o u g h p r e s e r v e d p r e c i s e l y i n the p r o h i b i t i o n o n

h o m o s e x u a l i t y . In Civilization and Its Discontents, F r e u d m a k e s

c lear that consc ience r e q u i r e s the c o n t i n u o u s sacrif ice or re­

n u n c i a t i o n of i n s t i n c t to p r o d u c e the p e c u l i a r sat is fact ion that

conscience requires ; consc ience i s never assuaged by r e n u n c i a -

Refused Identification 143

t i o n , but i s p a r a d o x i c a l l y s t r eng t h ened ( " r e n u n c i a t i o n breeds

into lerance") . 6 R e n u n c i a t i o n does not a b o l i s h the ins t inct ; i t

d e p l o y s the ins t inct for its o w n p u r p o s e s , so that p r o h i b i t i o n ,

a n d the l i v e d exper ience of p r o h i b i t i o n as repeated r e n u n c i a ­

t i o n , i s n o u r i s h e d p r e c i s e l y by the i n s t i n c t that i t renounces .

In this scenario, r e n u n c i a t i o n r e q u i r e s the v e r y h o m o s e x u a l i t y

that i t c o n d e m n s , not as its e x t e r n a l object, b u t as its o w n m o s t

t r e a s u r e d source of sustenance. T h e act o f r e n o u n c i n g h o m o ­

s e x u a l i t y thus p a r a d o x i c a l l y s trengthens h o m o s e x u a l i t y , b u t i t

s trengthens h o m o s e x u a l i t y p r e c i s e l y as the p o w e r of r e n u n ­

c ia t ion . R e n u n c i a t i o n b e c o m e s the a i m a n d v e h i c l e o f satisfac­

t i o n . A n d i t is, we m i g h t conjecture, p r e c i s e l y the fear o f set­

t i n g h o m o s e x u a l i t y loose f r o m this c i r c u i t o f r e n u n c i a t i o n that

so terrif ies the g u a r d i a n s o f m a s c u l i n i t y in the U . S . m i l i t a r y .

W h a t w o u l d m a s c u l i n i t y " b e " w i t h o u t this aggressive c i r c u i t

o f r e n u n c i a t i o n f r o m w h i c h i t i s w r o u g h t ? G a y s i n the m i l i t a r y

threaten to u n d o m a s c u l i n i t y o n l y because this m a s c u l i n i t y i s

m a d e o f r e p u d i a t e d h o m o s e x u a l i t y . 7

S o m e suggest ions I m a d e in Bodies That Matter6 can f a c i l i ­

tate the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of m e l a n c h o l i a as

a s p e c i f i c a l l y p s y c h i c e c o n o m y to the p r o d u c t i o n of the c i r ­

c u i t r y of m e l a n c h o l i a as p a r t of the o p e r a t i o n of r e g u l a t o r y

p o w e r . If m e l a n c h o l i a designates a sphere of a t tachment that

is not e x p l i c i t l y p r o d u c e d as an object of d i s c o u r s e , t h e n i t

erodes the o p e r a t i o n of la ng u a g e that not o n l y pos i t s objects,

but regulates a n d n o r m a l i z e s objects t h r o u g h that p o s i t i n g .

If m e l a n c h o l i a appea rs at first to be a f o r m of c o n t a i n m e n t ,

a w a y of i n t e r n a l i z i n g an at tachment that i s b a r r e d f r o m the

w o r l d , i t a lso establishes the p s y c h i c c o n d i t i o n s for r e g a r d i n g

"the w o r l d " i tself a s c o n t i n g e n t l y o r g a n i z e d t h r o u g h c e r t a i n

k i n d s o f forec losures . 9

H a v i n g d e s c r i b e d a m e l a n c h o l y p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the c o m -

144 Melancholy Gender

p u l s o r y p r o d u c t i o n of heterosexual i ty , thus, a heterosexual

m e l a n c h o l y that one m i g h t r e a d in the w o r k i n g s o f gender

itself, I w a n t n o w to suggest that r i g i d f o r m s of gender a n d

sexua l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , w h e t h e r h o m o s e x u a l o r heterosexual ,

appear to s p a w n f o r m s of m e l a n c h o l y . I w o u l d l i k e first to re­

cons ider the t h e o r y of gender as p e r f o r m a t i v e that I e laborated

in Gender Trouble, a n d t h e n to t u r n to the q u e s t i o n of gay m e l ­

a n c h o l i a a n d the p o l i t i c a l consequences of u n g r i e v a b l e loss.

T h e r e I a r g u e d that g e n d e r is p e r f o r m a t i v e , by w h i c h I

m e a n t that no gender i s "expressed" by act ions, gestures, or

speech, b ut that the p e r f o r m a n c e of g e n d e r p r o d u c e s re tro­

a c t i v e l y the i l l u s i o n that there is an i n n e r gender core. That is,

the p e r f o r m a n c e of gender r e t r o a c t i v e l y p r o d u c e s the effect of

s o m e t rue or a b i d i n g f e m i n i n e essence or d i s p o s i t i o n , so that

one cannot use a n express ive m o d e l for t h i n k i n g about gen­

der. M o r e o v e r , I a r g u e d that g e n d e r is p r o d u c e d as a r i t u a l i z e d

r e p e t i t i o n o f convent ions , a n d that this r i t u a l i s s o c i a l l y c o m ­

p e l l e d in part by the force of a c o m p u l s o r y heterosexual i ty . In

this context , I w o u l d l i k e to r e t u r n to the q u e s t i o n of d r a g to

e x p l a i n i n clearer terms h o w I u n d e r s t a n d p s y c h o a n a l y s i s t o

b e l i n k e d w i t h gender p e r f o r m a t i v i t y , a n d h o w I take per for-

m a t i v i t y t o b e l i n k e d w i t h m e l a n c h o l i a .

It is n o t e n o u g h to say that g e n d e r is p e r f o r m e d , or that

the m e a n i n g o f gender can be d e r i v e d f r o m its p e r f o r m a n c e ,

w h e t h e r or not one w a n t s to r e t h i n k p e r f o r m a n c e as a c o m ­

p u l s o r y s o c i a l r i t u a l . C l e a r l y there are w o r k i n g s o f gender that

do not " s h o w " in w h a t i s p e r f o r m e d as gender, a n d to r e d u c e

the p s y c h i c w o r k i n g s of gender to the l i t e r a l p e r f o r m a n c e of

gender w o u l d be a mis take . P s y c h o a n a l y s i s insists that the

o p a c i t y of the u n c o n s c i o u s sets l i m i t s to the e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n of

the psyche. It also a r g u e s — r i g h t l y , I t h i n k — t h a t w h a t is ex­

t e r i o r i z e d o r p e r f o r m e d can o n l y b e u n d e r s t o o d b y reference

Refused Identification 145

t o w h a t i s b a r r e d f r o m p e r f o r m a n c e , w h a t cannot o r w i l l not

b e p e r f o r m e d .

T h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n d r a g p e r f o r m a n c e s a n d g e n d e r per­

f o r m a t i v i t y in Gender Trouble goes s o m e t h i n g l i k e this : w h e n a

m a n is p e r f o r m i n g d r a g as a w o m a n , the " i m i t a t i o n " that d r a g

is s a i d to be is t a k e n as an " i m i t a t i o n " of f e m i n i n i t y , b u t the

" f e m i n i n i t y " that he imitates is not u n d e r s t o o d as b e i n g itself

an i m i t a t i o n . Yet i f one cons iders that g e n d e r is a c q u i r e d , that

i t i s a s s u m e d i n r e l a t i o n t o ideals w h i c h are never q u i t e i n ­

habi ted b y anyone, then f e m i n i n i t y i s a n i d e a l w h i c h e v e r y o n e

a l w a y s a n d o n l y " imitates ." T h u s , d r a g imitates the i m i t a t i v e

s t r u c t u r e of gender, r e v e a l i n g g e n d e r itself to be an i m i t a ­

t i o n . H o w e v e r attract ive this f o r m u l a t i o n m a y have s e e m e d , i t

d i d n ' t address the q u e s t i o n o f h o w c e r t a i n f o r m s o f d i s a v o w a l

a n d r e p u d i a t i o n c o m e to o r g a n i z e the p e r f o r m a n c e o f gender.

H o w i s the p h e n o m e n o n o f gender m e l a n c h o l i a t o b e re la ted

to the p r a c t i c e of gender p e r f o r m a t i v i t y ?

M o r e o v e r , g i v e n the i c o n o g r a p h i e f igure of the m e l a n c h o l i c

d r a g q u e e n , one m i g h t ask w h e t h e r there is not a d issat is f ied

l o n g i n g in the m i m e t i c i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f g e n d e r that i s d r a g .

H e r e one m i g h t ask also after the d i s a v o w a l w h i c h occas ions

the p e r f o r m a n c e a n d w h i c h p e r f o r m a n c e m i g h t b e s a i d t o

enact, w h e r e p e r f o r m a n c e engages "act ing o u t " i n the p s y c h o ­

a n a l y t i c sense. If m e l a n c h o l i a in F r e u d ' s sense is the effect of

an u n g r i e v e d loss , 1 0 p e r f o r m a n c e , u n d e r s t o o d as "act ing out , "

m a y be re lated to the p r o b l e m of u n a c k n o w l e d g e d loss. I f there

is an u n g r i e v e d loss in d r a g p e r f o r m a n c e , p e r h a p s i t i s a loss

that i s re fused a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the p e r f o r m e d i d e n t i f i c a ­

t i o n , one w h i c h reiterates a g e n d e r e d i d e a l i z a t i o n a n d its r a d i ­

ca l u n i n h a b i t a b i l i t y . T h i s is, then, ne i ther a t e r r i t o r i a l i z a t i o n of

the f e m i n i n e by the m a s c u l i n e n o r a s i g n of the essentia l p l a s ­

t i c i t y of gender. It suggests that the p e r f o r m a n c e a l legor izes a

146 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification 147

loss i t cannot gr ieve, a l legor izes the i n c o r p o r a t i v e fantasy of

m e l a n c h o l i a w h e r e b y a n object i s p h a n t a s m a t i c a l l y t a k e n i n

or on as a w a y of r e f u s i n g to let i t go. G e n d e r itself m i g h t be

u n d e r s t o o d in part as the "act ing o u t " of u n r e s o l v e d grief.

T h e above ana lys i s is a r i s k y one because it suggests that

for a " m a n " p e r f o r m i n g f e m i n i n i t y , or for a " w o m a n " p e r f o r m ­

i n g m a s c u l i n i t y (the latter is a l w a y s , in effect, to p e r f o r m a

l i t t le less, g i v e n that f e m i n i n i t y is cast as the spectacular gen­

der) , there i s an at tachment t o — a n d a loss a n d refusal o f — t h e

f igure o f f e m i n i n i t y b y the m a n , o r the f igure o f m a s c u l i n i t y b y

the w o m a n . I t i s i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s c o r e that, a l t h o u g h d r a g

is an effort to negotiate c r o s s - g e n d e r e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , cross-

g e n d e r e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s not the o n l y p a r a d i g m for t h i n k i n g

about h o m o s e x u a l i t y , m e r e l y one a m o n g others. D r a g a l lego­

r izes s o m e set of m e l a n c h o l i c i n c o r p o r a t i v e fantasies that sta­

b i l i z e gender. N o t o n l y are a vast n u m b e r of d r a g p e r f o r m e r s

straight , b u t i t w o u l d be a m i s t a k e to t h i n k that h o m o s e x u ­

a l i t y i s best e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h the p e r f o r m a t i v i t y that i s d r a g .

W h a t does s e e m u s e f u l i n this ana lys is , h o w e v e r , i s that d r a g

exposes o r a l l e g o r i z e s the m u n d a n e p s y c h i c a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e

pract ices b y w h i c h h e t e r o s e x u a l i z e d genders f o r m themselves

t h r o u g h r e n o u n c i n g the possibility of h o m o s e x u a l i t y , a fore­

c l o s u r e w h i c h p r o d u c e s b o t h a f i e l d of heterosexual objects

a n d a d o m a i n o f those w h o m i t w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e to love.

D r a g thus a l l e g o r i z e s heterosexual melancholy, the m e l a n c h o l y

by w h i c h a m a s c u l i n e gender i s f o r m e d f r o m the re fusal to

gr ieve the m a s c u l i n e as a p o s s i b i l i t y of love ; a f e m i n i n e gen­

d e r i s f o r m e d ( taken o n , assumed) t h r o u g h the i n c o r p o r a t i v e

fantasy by w h i c h the f e m i n i n e is e x c l u d e d as a poss ib le object

o f love , a n e x c l u s i o n never g r i e v e d , b u t " p r e s e r v e d " t h r o u g h

h e i g h t e n e d f e m i n i n e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . In this sense, the " t ruest"

l esb ian m e l a n c h o l i c i s the s t r i c t l y s tra ight w o m a n , a n d the

" t ruest" g a y m a l e m e l a n c h o l i c i s the s t r i c t l y s tra ight m a n .

W h a t d r a g does expose , h o w e v e r , i s that i n the " n o r m a l "

c o n s t i t u t i o n of g e n d e r p r e s e n t a t i o n , the gender that is p e r ­

f o r m e d is c o n s t i t u t e d by a set of d i s a v o w e d attachments ,

ident i f i ca t ions w h i c h const i tute a dif ferent d o m a i n of the

" u n p e r f o r m a b l e . " I n d e e d , w h a t const i tutes the sexually u n p e r -

f o r m a b l e m a y — b u t n e e d n o t — b e p e r f o r m e d as gender identifi­

cation.11 To the extent that h o m o s e x u a l at tachments r e m a i n u n ­

a c k n o w l e d g e d w i t h i n n o r m a t i v e heterosexual i ty , they are not

m e r e l y c o n s t i t u t e d a s desires w h i c h e m e r g e a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y

b e c o m e p r o h i b i t e d ; rather, these desires are p r o s c r i b e d f r o m

the start. A n d w h e n t h e y d o e m e r g e o n the far s ide o f the

censor, they m a y w e l l c a r r y the m a r k o f i m p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h

t h e m , p e r f o r m i n g , as i t w e r e , as the i m p o s s i b l e w i t h i n the p o s ­

sible. A s s u c h , t h e y w i l l not b e at tachments that c a n b e o p e n l y

g r i e v e d . T h i s is , then, less a refusal to gr ieve (the M i t s c h e r l i c h

f o r m u l a t i o n that accents the c h o i c e i n v o l v e d ) t h a n a p r e e m p ­

t i o n o f gr ie f p e r f o r m e d b y the absence o f c u l t u r a l c o n v e n t i o n s

for a v o w i n g the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l love. A n d this absence

p r o d u c e s a c u l t u r e of h e t e r o s e x u a l m e l a n c h o l y , one w h i c h c a n

b e r e a d i n the h y p e r b o l i c ident i f i ca t ions b y w h i c h m u n d a n e

heterosexual m a s c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y c o n f i r m themselves .

T h e s t ra ight m a n becomes ( m i m e s , cites, a p p r o p r i a t e s , assumes

the status of) the m a n he " n e v e r " l o v e d a n d " n e v e r " g r i e v e d ;

the s tra ight w o m a n becomes the w o m a n she " n e v e r " l o v e d a n d

" n e v e r " g r i e v e d . I t i s in this sense, then, that w h a t is m o s t a p ­

p a r e n t l y p e r f o r m e d as g e n d e r is the s i g n a n d s y m p t o m of a

p e r v a s i v e d i s a v o w a l .

G a y m e l a n c h o l i a , h o w e v e r , also conta ins anger that c a n b e

t rans lated i n t o p o l i t i c a l express ion. It is p r e c i s e l y to c o u n t e r

148 Melancholy Gender

this p e r v a s i v e c u l t u r a l r i s k o f gay m e l a n c h o l i a (what the n e w s ­

papers genera l i ze as "depression") that there has b e e n an i n ­

sistent p u b l i c i z a t i o n a n d p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f gr ief over those w h o

have d i e d f r o m A I D S . T h e N a m e s Project Q u i l t is e x e m p l a r y ,

r i t u a l i z i n g a n d r e p e a t i n g the n a m e itself as a w a y of p u b l i c a l l y

a v o w i n g l i m i t l e s s loss . 1 2

Insofar as the gr ief r e m a i n s unspeakable , the rage over

the loss can r e d o u b l e b y v i r t u e o f r e m a i n i n g u n a v o w e d . A n d

i f that rage is p u b l i c a l l y p r o s c r i b e d , the m e l a n c h o l i c effects

o f s u c h a p r o s c r i p t i o n can achieve s u i c i d a l p r o p o r t i o n s . T h e

e m e r g e n c e o f c o l l e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s for g r i e v i n g are thus c r u ­

c i a l to s u r v i v a l , to r e a s s e m b l i n g c o m m u n i t y , to reart iculat-

i n g k i n s h i p , to r e w e a v i n g s u s t a i n i n g relat ions. Insofar as they

i n v o l v e the p u b l i c i z a t i o n a n d d r a m a t i z a t i o n o f d e a t h — a s i n

the case o f " d i e - i n s " b y Q u e e r N a t i o n — t h e y c a l l for b e i n g

r e a d as l i f e - a f f i r m i n g re jo inders to the d i r e p s y c h i c conse­

quences o f a g r i e v i n g process c u l t u r a l l y t h w a r t e d a n d p r o ­

s c r i b e d .

M e l a n c h o l y c a n w o r k , h o w e v e r , w i t h i n h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n

specif ic w a y s that c a l l for r e t h i n k i n g . W i t h i n the f o r m a t i o n o f

g a y a n d l e s b i a n i d e n t i t y , there m a y be an effort to d i s a v o w

a c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p to heterosexual i ty . W h e n this d i s ­

a v o w a l is u n d e r s t o o d as a p o l i t i c a l necess i ty in o r d e r to specify

gay a n d lesb ian i d e n t i t y over a n d against its ostensible o p p o ­

site, heterosexual i ty , that c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e p a r a d o x i c a l l y c u l ­

minates in a w e a k e n i n g of the v e r y c o n s t i t u e n c y i t is m e a n t

to unite . N o t o n l y does s u c h a strategy attr ibute a false a n d

m o n o l i t h i c status to heterosexual i ty , b u t i t misses the p o l i t i ­

ca l o p p o r t u n i t y t o w o r k o n the w e a k n e s s i n heterosexual

subject ivat ion a n d t o refute the l o g i c o f m u t u a l e x c l u s i o n b y

w h i c h h e t e r o s e x i s m proceeds . M o r e o v e r , a ful l -scale d e n i a l o f

the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p c a n const i tute a reject ion of heterosexu-

Refused Identification 149

a l i t y that is to s o m e degree an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a rejected

heterosexual i ty . I m p o r t a n t to this economy, h o w e v e r , is the re­

fusa l to r e c o g n i z e this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n that is, as i t were , a l r e a d y

m a d e , a re fusal w h i c h absent ly designates the d o m a i n of a

s p e c i f i c a l l y gay m e l a n c h o l i a , a loss w h i c h cannot be r e c o g ­

n i z e d a n d , hence, cannot be m o u r n e d . F o r a gay or l e s b i a n

i d e n t i t y p o s i t i o n to s u s t a i n its a p p e a r a n c e as coherent, hetero­

s e x u a l i t y m u s t r e m a i n i n that rejected a n d r e p u d i a t e d place.

P a r a d o x i c a l l y , its heterosexual remains m u s t be sustained p r e ­

c i s e l y t h r o u g h i n s i s t i n g on the seamless coherence of a spec i f i ­

c a l l y g a y ident i ty . H e r e i t s h o u l d b e c o m e clear that a r a d i c a l

refusal to i d e n t i f y suggests that on s o m e l e v e l an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n

has a l r e a d y t a k e n place, a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n has b e e n m a d e a n d

d i s a v o w e d , w h o s e s y m p t o m a t i c a p p e a r a n c e i s the ins is tence,

the o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n that is, as it w e r e ,

w o r n o n the b o d y that s h o w s .

T h i s raises the p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n of the cost of ar t i cu la t ­

i n g a coherent i d e n t i t y p o s i t i o n b y p r o d u c i n g , e x c l u d i n g , a n d

r e p u d i a t i n g a d o m a i n of abjected specters that threaten the

a r b i t r a r i l y c l o s e d d o m a i n o f subject p o s i t i o n s . P e r h a p s o n l y

by r i s k i n g the incoherence of i d e n t i t y is c o n n e c t i o n poss ib le , a

p o l i t i c a l p o i n t that correlates w i t h L e o Bersani ' s i n s i g h t that

o n l y the d e c e n t e r e d subject i s avai lable to d e s i r e . 1 3 W h a t can­

not be a v o w e d as a c o n s t i t u t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n for a n y g i v e n

subject p o s i t i o n r u n s the r i s k n o t o n l y o f b e c o m i n g external ­

i z e d i n a d e g r a d e d f o r m , b u t r e p e a t e d l y r e p u d i a t e d a n d sub­

ject to a p o l i c y of d i s a v o w a l .

T h e l o g i c o f r e p u d i a t i o n that I've c h a r t e d here i s in s o m e

w a y s a h y p e r b o l i c theory, a l o g i c in d r a g , as i t w e r e , w h i c h

overstates the case, b u t overstates it for a reason. T h e r e is

no necessary reason for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to o p p o s e desire , or

for desire to be fue led by r e p u d i a t i o n . T h i s r e m a i n s t r u e for

150 Melancholy Gender

h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y a n d h o m o s e x u a l i t y a l ike , a n d for f o r m s o f b i -

s e x u a l i t y that take themselves to be c o m p o s i t e f o r m s of each.

I n d e e d , w e are m a d e a l l the m o r e fragi le u n d e r the p r e s s u r e o f

s u c h rules , a n d a l l the m o r e m o b i l e w h e n a m b i v a l e n c e a n d loss

are g i v e n a d r a m a t i c language i n w h i c h to d o their a c t i n g out . | Keeping It Moving

Commentary on Judith Butler's

"Melancholy Gender / Refused

Identification"

A D A M P H I L L I P S

E n d s o f s e n t e n c e s a n d o t h e r p a u s e s o n l y c o m e w h e n w e r u n

o u t o f t i m e o r h o p e .

— C a r o l y n C r e e d o n , The Best American Poetry

If , as F r e u d suggests, character is c o n s t i t u t e d by i d e n t i f i c a ­

t i o n — t h e ego l i k e n i n g i tself t o w h a t i t once l o v e d — t h e n

character is c lose to car icature , an i m i t a t i o n of an i m i t a t i o n . 1

L i k e the artists P l a t o w a n t e d t o b a n , w e are m a k i n g copies o f

copies , b u t u n l i k e P la to ' s artists w e have n o o r i g i n a l , o n l y a n

inf in i te success ion of l ikenesses to s o m e o n e w h o , to a l l intents

a n d p u r p o s e s , does not exist. F r e u d ' s n o t i o n of character is a

p a r o d y of a P l a t o n i c w o r k of art; h i s t h e o r y of character for­

m a t i o n t h r o u g h i d e n t i f i c a t i o n m a k e s a m o c k e r y of character

a s i n a n y w a y substant ive . T h e ego i s a l w a y s d r e s s i n g u p for

s o m e w h e r e to go. Insofar as b e i n g is b e i n g l i k e , there c a n be

152 Melancholy Gender

no p l a c e for T r u e selves or core g e n d e r ident i t ies . A f t e r a l l ,

m y sense o f a u t h e n t i c i t y c a n c o m e o n l y f r o m the senses o f a u ­

t h e n t i c i t y i n m y c u l t u r e . I n this context, m y T r u e Self i s m o r e

a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e d as my P r e f e r r e d Self (or Selves). I am the

p e r f o r m e r o f m y c o n s c i o u s a n d u n c o n s c i o u s preferences.

L a c a n ' s m i r r o r - s t a g e is a testament to the h a v o c w r e a k e d

b y m i m e t i c f o r m s o f d e v e l o p m e n t ; a n d M i k k e l Borch-Jacobsen

a n d L e o B e r s a n i i n p a r t i c u l a r have e x p o s e d the v i o l e n c e a n d

t a u t o l o g y o f F r e u d ' s t h e o r y o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the m u t u a l i m ­

p l i c a t i o n a n d c o m p l i c i t y i n v o l v e d i n b e i n g l i k e . 2 A s J u d i t h

B u t l e r ' s s o b e r i n g essay s h o w s , this c r i t i c a l concept o f i d e n t i f i ­

c a t i o n is the n e x u s for a n u m b e r of content ious issues in c o n ­

t e m p o r a r y theory; i t inv i tes us to w o n d e r w h a t we use other

p e o p l e for a n d h o w other t h e y are. In fact, i t forces us to c o n ­

front the q u e s t i o n that exerc ised F r e u d a n d that object re la­

t ions a n d r e l a t i o n a l p s y c h o a n a l y s i s take for granted; i n w h a t

sense d o w e have w h a t w e prefer t o c a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h

each other?

W h e n F r e u d p r o p o s e d that the object w a s m e r e l y "sol­

d e r e d " o n t o the i n s t i n c t , that o u r p r i m a r y c o m m i t m e n t w a s

to o u r des ire a n d n o t to its target, he i m p l i e d that we are

n o t attached t o each other i n the w a y s w e l i k e t o t h i n k . 3

F r e u d g l i m p s e d in the Interpretation of Dreams the ego's p o t e n ­

t i a l for p r o m i s c u o u s m o b i l i t y ; d r e a m s i n p a r t i c u l a r r e v e a l e d

that p s y c h i c l ife w a s a s t o n i s h i n g l y m o b i l e a n d a d v e n t u r o u s

e v e n i f l i v e d life w a s not . (Very f e w p e o p l e are a c t i v e l y b i ­

sexua l yet e v e r y o n e i s p s y c h i c a l l y b isexual . ) F r e u d h a d b o t h

t o e x p l a i n this d i s p a r i t y — t h a t w e d o n o t have the courage,

as i t were , of o u r p r i m a r y p r o c e s s — a n d also to f i n d a way ,

in theory, o f g r o u n d i n g the F a u s t i a n ego, d e f i n i n g its loya l t ies

w h e n they s o m e t i m e s s e e m e d u n r e l i a b l e . T h e ego c e r t a i n l y

s e e m e d shi f ty i n its a l legiances , a n d s o i t w a s w i t h s o m e re-

Refused Identification 153

l ief that F r e u d t u r n e d t o m o u r n i n g , w h i c h s e e m e d t o revea l

that the ego i s g r o u n d e d i n its r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h l o v e d a n d

h a t e d others. 4 M o u r n i n g i s i m m e n s e l y r e a s s u r i n g because i t

c o n v i n c e s u s o f s o m e t h i n g w e m i g h t o t h e r w i s e doubt ; o u r at­

t a c h m e n t t o others. T h e p r o t r a c t e d p a i n f u l n e s s o f m o u r n i n g

c o n f i r m s s o m e t h i n g that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s h a d p u t i n t o q u e s t i o n :

h o w i n t r a n s i g e n t l y d e v o t e d w e are t o the p e o p l e w e l o v e a n d

hate. D e s p i t e the e v i d e n c e o f o u r d r e a m s , o u r c a p a c i t y for i n ­

finite s u b s t i t u t i o n is meager. In this sense, m o u r n i n g has b e e n

a bal last for the m o r e r a d i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . It

i s the r o c k , so to speak, on w h i c h P r o m e t h e u s founders .

It m i g h t at first seem m o r e accurate to say that, for F r e u d , i t

w a s the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x that b o t h c o n s t i t u t e d a n d set l i m i t s

to the e x o r b i t a n c e of the ego. B u t i t is , as K l e i n has s h o w n ,

the m o u r n i n g e n t a i l e d i n the s o - c a l l e d r e s o l u t i o n o f the O e d i ­

p u s c o m p l e x that consol idates the ego. W i t h o u t m o u r n i n g for

p r i m a r y objects there i s no w a y o u t of the m a g i c c i rc le of the

f a m i l y . I n d e e d , p a r t l y t h r o u g h the w o r k o f K l e i n , m o u r n i n g

has p r o v i d e d the f o u n d a t i o n for d e v e l o p m e n t i n m o s t v e r s i o n s

o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ; so m u c h so, in fact, that m o u r n i n g has ac­

q u i r e d the status of a q u a s i - r e l i g i o u s concept in p s y c h o a n a l y ­

sis. A n a l y s t s be l ieve in m o u r n i n g ; i f a pat ient w e r e to c l a i m ,

a s E m e r s o n once d i d , that m o u r n i n g w a s " s h a l l o w " h e o r she

w o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e "out o f t o u c h " w i t h s o m e t h i n g o r

other. It is as t h o u g h a c a p a c i t y for m o u r n i n g , w i t h a l l that i t

i m p l i e s , const i tutes the h u m a n c o m m u n i t y . W e c a n n o m o r e

i m a g i n e a w o r l d w i t h o u t b e r e a v e m e n t t h a n we c a n i m a g i n e a

w o r l d w i t h o u t p u n i s h m e n t .

I t h i n k that, s o m e w h a t a l o n g these l ines , J u d i t h B u t l e r is

t r y i n g t o use m o u r n i n g t o g i v e s o m e grav i ty , i n b o t h senses,

to her e x h i l a r a t i n g n o t i o n of gender as p e r f o r m a t i v e . W h a t

is r e m a r k a b l e about her essay is that she manages to do this

154 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification *55

w i t h o u t the a r g u m e n t ' s d e g e n e r a t i n g i n t o the m o r e c o e r c i v e

piet ies that t a l k about gr ie f u s u a l l y b r i n g s i n its w a k e . M o u r n ­

i n g m a k e s m o r a l i s t s o f u s a l l . T h e r e w i l l never b e m o r e gender

ident i t ies t h a n w e c a n i n v e n t a n d p e r f o r m . W e s h o u l d not b e

c e l e b r a t i n g those p e o p l e , m a n y o f w h o m are p s y c h o a n a l y s t s ,

w h o , i n the n a m e o f T r u t h , o r P s y c h i c H e a l t h , o r M a t u r i t y ,

seek to l i m i t the r e p e r t o i r e .

I t i s n o w a cl iché, in t h e o r y i f not in pract ice , that a l l ver­

sions o f g e n d e r i d e n t i t y are c o n f l i c t u a l a n d therefore p r o b l e m ­

atic. W h a t B u t l e r i s p r o p o s i n g w i t h her n o t i o n o f a m e l a n c h o l i c

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a " c u l t u r e o f g e n d e r m e l a n c h o l y i n w h i c h m a s ­

c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y e m e r g e a s the traces o f a n u n g r i e v e d

a n d u n g r i e v a b l e love," i s a n e w v e r s i o n o f an o l d q u e s t i o n

about g e n d e r i d e n t i t y . W h y are h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s —

the i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y n a m e d " n e g a t i v e " O e d i p u s c o m p l e x — d e ­

s c r i b e d , e v e n i f not o r i g i n a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d , a v e r s i v e l y ? W h y

are these m a n i f e s t l y pass ionate loves d i s a v o w e d , m a d e u n -

m o u r n a b l e , r e p u d i a t e d , a n d t h e n p u n i s h e d w h e n w i t n e s s e d

i n others? A t the least, i t seems clear f r o m B u t l e r ' s c o n v i n c ­

i n g a c c o u n t that the c u l t u r a l l y p e r v a s i v e h o s t i l i t y — b o t h inter-

a n d i n t r a p s y c h i c a l l y — t o h o m o s e x u a l i t y i s b a s e d o n envy. I f

s o m e heterosexuals i n p r e - A i D S t i m e s w e r e e x p l i c i t l y e n v i o u s

o f the p r o m i s c u i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l s — w h y can' t W E c r u i s e ? —

heterosexuals n o w m a y b e m o r e l i k e l y t o e n v y s i m p l y the i n t i ­

m a c y that s o m e p e o p l e are free t o i n d u l g e a n d elaborate w i t h

p e o p l e of the same sex. B u t if, as B u t l e r suggests, " m a s c u ­

l i n i t y " a n d " f e m i n i n i t y " are f o r m e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h

ident i f i ca t ions that are c o m p o s e d i n p a r t o f d i s a v o w e d grief,

w h a t w o u l d i t b e l i k e t o l i v e i n a w o r l d that a c k n o w l e d g e d

a n d s a n c t i o n e d s u c h grief, that a l l o w e d us, as i t w e r e , the f u l l

c o u r s e o f o u r b e r e a v e m e n t o f d i s o w n e d o r r e n o u n c e d gen­

d e r ident i t ies? W h a t w o u l d have t o h a p p e n i n the s o - c a l l e d

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o m m u n i t y for a n ethos t o b e created i n w h i c h

pat ients w e r e e n c o u r a g e d t o m o u r n the loss o f a l l their r e ­

p r e s s e d g e n d e r ident i t ies?

These s e e m to me to be q u e s t i o n s of c o n s i d e r a b l e interest,

p r o v i d e d they d o not e n t a i l the i d e a l i z a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g — i t s

use as a s p u r i o u s r e d e m p t i v e pract ice , as a k i n d of ersatz c u r e

for r e p r e s s i o n or the anguishes of u n c e r t a i n t y . I f the c o n v i n c e d

heterosexual m a n , in B u t l e r ' s w o r d s , " b e c o m e s subject to a

d o u b l e d i s a v o w a l , a n e v e r - h a v i n g - l o v e d a n d a n e v e r - h a v i n g -

lost," the h o m o s e x u a l a t tachment , is i t therefore to b e c o m e

i n t e g r a l to the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c project to a n a l y z e , or engineer

the u n d o i n g o f this d i s a v o w a l i f the heterosexual m a n c l a i m s

to be r e l a t i v e l y u n t r o u b l e d by it? To m e , the absolute p l a u s i ­

b i l i t y o f B u t l e r ' s a r g u m e n t poses s o m e t e l l i n g c l i n i c a l q u a n ­

daries . W h o , for e x a m p l e , dec ides w h a t const i tutes a p r o b l e m

for the pat ient? A n d b y w h a t cr i ter ia? A s s u m e d heterosexu-

a l i t y is e v e r y b i t as m u c h of a " p r o b l e m " as a n y other a s s u m e d

p o s i t i o n (all s y m p t o m s , after a l l , are states of c o n v i c t i o n ) . C e r ­

t a i n l y B u t l e r ' s p a p e r r e m i n d s u s o f the cost, the d e p r i v a t i o n , i n

a l l gender ident i t ies , not to m e n t i o n the t e r r o r i n f o r m i n g these

desperate measures . " T h e r e is ," B u t l e r w r i t e s , "no necessary

reason for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to o p p o s e desire , or for desire to be

f u e l e d by r e p u d i a t i o n . " B u t there is , of course, a necessary rea­

son b y a c e r t a i n k i n d o f p s y c h o a n a l y t i c l o g i c . I n F r e u d ' s v i e w ,

w e b e c o m e w h a t w e c a n n o t have, a n d w e des ire (and p u n i s h )

w h a t w e are c o m p e l l e d t o d i s o w n . B u t w h y these c h o i c e s —

w h y can't w e d o b o t h a n d s o m e t h i n g else a s w e l l ? — a n d w h y

are they the choices?

These are the issues o p e n e d up in B u t l e r ' s Gender Trouble.

T h e essent ia l ly p e r f o r m a t i v e , c o n s t r u c t e d nature o f g e n d e r

i d e n t i t y m a k e s a l l constra ints o f the r e p e r t o i r e seem fact i t ious

a n d u n n e c e s s a r i l y oppress ive . B u t just as e v e r y p e r f o r m a n c e is

154 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification *55

w i t h o u t the a r g u m e n t ' s d e g e n e r a t i n g i n t o the m o r e coerc ive

p ie t ies that t a l k about gr ief u s u a l l y b r i n g s i n its w a k e . M o u r n ­

i n g m a k e s m o r a l i s t s o f u s a l l . T h e r e w i l l never b e m o r e g e n d e r

i d e n t i t i e s t h a n w e c a n i n v e n t a n d p e r f o r m . W e s h o u l d not b e

c e l e b r a t i n g those p e o p l e , m a n y o f w h o m are p s y c h o a n a l y s t s ,

w h o , i n the n a m e o f T r u t h , o r P s y c h i c H e a l t h , o r M a t u r i t y ,

seek to l i m i t the r e p e r t o i r e .

I t i s n o w a cl iché, in t h e o r y i f not in pract ice , that a l l ver­

sions o f g e n d e r i d e n t i t y are c o n f l i c t u a l a n d therefore p r o b l e m ­

atic. W h a t B u t l e r i s p r o p o s i n g w i t h her n o t i o n o f a m e l a n c h o l i c

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a " c u l t u r e o f g e n d e r m e l a n c h o l y i n w h i c h m a s ­

c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y e m e r g e as the traces o f an u n g r i e v e d

a n d u n g r i e v a b l e love ," i s a n e w v e r s i o n o f a n o l d q u e s t i o n

about g e n d e r i d e n t i t y . W h y are h o m o s e x u a l at tachments —

the i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y n a m e d "negat ive" O e d i p u s c o m p l e x — d e ­

s c r i b e d , e v e n i f not o r i g i n a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d , avers ive ly? W h y

are these m a n i f e s t l y pass ionate loves d i s a v o w e d , m a d e u n -

m o u r n a b l e , r e p u d i a t e d , a n d t h e n p u n i s h e d w h e n w i t n e s s e d

i n others? A t the least, i t seems clear f r o m B u t l e r ' s c o n v i n c ­

i n g a c c o u n t that the c u l t u r a l l y p e r v a s i v e h o s t i l i t y — b o t h inter-

a n d i n t r a p s y c h i c a l l y — t o h o m o s e x u a l i t y i s b a s e d o n envy. I f

s o m e heterosexuals i n p r e - A i D S t i m e s w e r e e x p l i c i t l y e n v i o u s

o f the p r o m i s c u i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l s — w h y can' t W E cruise? —

heterosexuals n o w m a y b e m o r e l i k e l y t o e n v y s i m p l y the i n t i ­

m a c y that s o m e p e o p l e are free t o i n d u l g e a n d elaborate w i t h

p e o p l e of the same sex. B u t if, as B u t l e r suggests, " m a s c u ­

l i n i t y " a n d " f e m i n i n i t y " are f o r m e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h

ident i f i ca t ions that are c o m p o s e d i n p a r t o f d i s a v o w e d grief,

w h a t w o u l d i t b e l i k e t o l i v e i n a w o r l d that a c k n o w l e d g e d

a n d s a n c t i o n e d s u c h grief, that a l l o w e d us, as i t were , the f u l l

c o u r s e o f o u r b e r e a v e m e n t o f d i s o w n e d o r r e n o u n c e d gen­

der ident i t ies? W h a t w o u l d h a v e t o h a p p e n i n the s o - c a l l e d

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o m m u n i t y for a n ethos t o b e created i n w h i c h

pat ients w e r e e n c o u r a g e d t o m o u r n the loss o f a l l their r e ­

p r e s s e d gender i d e n t i t i e s ?

These s e e m to me to be q u e s t i o n s of cons iderable interest,

p r o v i d e d they d o not e n t a i l the i d e a l i z a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g — i t s

use as a s p u r i o u s r e d e m p t i v e pract ice , as a k i n d of ersatz cure

for r e p r e s s i o n or the a n g u i s h e s of u n c e r t a i n t y . I f the c o n v i n c e d

heterosexual m a n , in B u t l e r ' s w o r d s , " b e c o m e s subject to a

d o u b l e d i s a v o w a l , a n e v e r - h a v i n g - l o v e d a n d a n e v e r - h a v i n g -

lost," the h o m o s e x u a l a t tachment , is i t therefore to b e c o m e

i n t e g r a l to the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c project to a n a l y z e , or engineer

the u n d o i n g o f th is d i s a v o w a l i f the h e t e r o s e x u a l m a n c l a i m s

to be r e l a t i v e l y u n t r o u b l e d by it? To m e , the absolute p l a u s i ­

b i l i t y o f B u t l e r ' s a r g u m e n t poses s o m e t e l l i n g c l i n i c a l q u a n ­

daries . W h o , for e x a m p l e , dec ides w h a t const i tutes a p r o b l e m

for the pat ient? A n d b y w h a t cr i ter ia? A s s u m e d heterosexu­

a l i t y is e v e r y b i t as m u c h of a " p r o b l e m " as a n y other a s s u m e d

p o s i t i o n (all s y m p t o m s , after a l l , are states o f c o n v i c t i o n ) . C e r ­

t a i n l y B u t l e r ' s p a p e r r e m i n d s u s o f the cost, the d e p r i v a t i o n , i n

a l l gender ident i t ies , not to m e n t i o n the terror i n f o r m i n g these

desperate measures . " T h e r e is ," B u t l e r w r i t e s , "no necessary

reason for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to o p p o s e desire , or for desire to be

f u e l e d by r e p u d i a t i o n . " B u t there is, of course, a necessary rea­

son b y a c e r t a i n k i n d o f p s y c h o a n a l y t i c l o g i c . I n F r e u d ' s v i e w ,

w e b e c o m e w h a t w e cannot have, a n d w e des ire (and p u n i s h )

w h a t w e are c o m p e l l e d t o d i s o w n . B u t w h y these c h o i c e s —

w h y can' t w e d o b o t h a n d s o m e t h i n g else a s w e l l ? — a n d w h y

are they the choices?

These are the issues o p e n e d up in B u t l e r ' s Gender Trouble.

T h e essent ia l ly p e r f o r m a t i v e , c o n s t r u c t e d nature o f g e n d e r

i d e n t i t y m a k e s a l l constra ints o f the r e p e r t o i r e s e e m fact i t ious

a n d u n n e c e s s a r i l y o p p r e s s i v e . B u t just as e v e r y p e r f o r m a n c e i s

i 5 6 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification *57

s u b s i d i z e d b y a n i n h i b i t i o n e lsewhere, s o there i s n o i d e n t i t y ,

h o w e v e r c o m p e l l i n g the p e r f o r m a n c e , w i t h o u t suffer ing. I f the

i d e a of p e r f o r m a n c e frees i d e n t i t y i n t o states of (somet imes

w i l l e d ) p o s s i b i l i t y , m o u r n i n g refers those same ident i t ies b a c k

t o the ir u n c o n s c i o u s histor ies , w i t h their r e p e t i t i o n s a n d their

waste; those p a r a m e t e r s that s e e m i n g l y t h w a r t o u r o p t i o n s .

M o u r n i n g a n d p e r f o r m a n c e — a n d the p e r f o r m a n c e s that c o n ­

st i tute o u r sense o f m o u r n i n g — s e e m u s e f u l l y t w i n n e d . W i t h ­

o u t the i d e a o f p e r f o r m a n c e , m o u r n i n g b e c o m e s l i t e r a l i z e d as

T r u t h — o u r deepest act; w i t h o u t the i d e a o f m o u r n i n g , p e r ­

f o r m a n c e b e c o m e s a n excessive d e m a n d — p r e t e n d there's n o

u n c o n s c i o u s , t h e n p r e t e n d w h a t y o u l ike . " I be l ieve i n a l l s i n ­

cerity," Va léry w r o t e , "that i f each m a n w e r e not able to l i v e a

n u m b e r o f l ives bes ide h is o w n , he w o u l d not be able to l i v e h is

o w n l i f e . " 5 Va léry ' s i r o n i c s i n c e r i t y — f r o m w h i c h o f h i s l ives i s

h e s p e a k i n g ? — i n v i t e s us, l i k e But ler , t o m u l t i p l y o u r vers ions

o f self as s o m e k i n d o f p s y c h i c necessi ty; as t h o u g h we m i g h t

not be able to bear the loss of not d o i n g so. B u t h o w m a n y

l ives c a n the analys t r e c o g n i z e i n , or d e m a n d of, h is pat ient ,

a n d w h a t are the constraints on this r e c o g n i t i o n that so easi ly

b e c o m e s a d e m a n d ?

In analys is , of course, i t is not o n l y the pat ient ' s gender

i d e n t i t i e s that are at stake. B o t h the analyst a n d her pat ient are

w o r k i n g t o s u s t a i n their desire, a n d d e s i r e — b o t h i n t r a - a n d

i n t e r p s y c h i c a l l y — d e p e n d s o n difference. T h e r e a l w a y s has

to be s o m e t h i n g else, s o m e t h i n g suf f ic ient ly (or a p p a r e n t l y )

other. T h e specter of A p h a n i s i s , Jones's r e p r e s s e d concept of

the d e a t h of desire , haunts the process . B u t t h o u g h des ire de­

p e n d s o n dif ference, w e o n l y l i k e the dif ferences w e l i k e ; the

set of des irable or tolerable differences, d e s i r e - s u s t a i n i n g dif­

ference, is never in f in i te for anyone. P s y c h o a n a l y s i s is about

w h e r e w e d r a w these c o n s t i t u t i v e l ines. A n y c l i n i c i a n i s o n l y

too c o n s c i o u s of the constra ints , the u n c o n s c i o u s constraints ,

on p o s s i b i l i t y that are c a l l e d s y m p t o m s (and f r o m a dif ferent

p e r s p e c t i v e are c a l l e d the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x ) . B u t , o f course ,

w h a t i s p o s s i b l e in analys is , or a n y w h e r e else, i s d i c t a t e d

b y o u r theoret ica l p a r a d i g m s , b y the languages w e choose

to speak about o u r pract ice . D e s p i t e boasts to the c o n t r a r y

— p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the I m p o s s i b l e P r o f e s s i o n a n d the l i k e —

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s is o n l y as d i f f i cu l t as we m a k e it .

F r o m a c l i n i c a l p o i n t o f v i e w , B u t l e r ' s i n i t i a l p o l i t i c a l v o l ­

u n t a r i s m in Gender Trouble w o u l d h a v e m a d e analysts w a r y .

B u t there i s n o o b v i o u s reason w h y analysts i n the ir p r a c t i c e

have to be less i m a g i n a t i v e t h a n B u t l e r i s a s k i n g t h e m to be

i n " M e l a n c h o l y G e n d e r . " T h e analys t w h o bel ieves i n the u n ­

c o n s c i o u s can h a r d l y set h i m s e l f up as a representat ive of the

authent ic l i fe even t h o u g h the language he uses to ta lk about

his job is f u l l of the j a r g o n of a u t h e n t i c i t y ( integrity , honesty,

t r u t h , self, inst inct) . T h e la ng u a g e o f p e r f o r m a n c e m a y be too

easy to d i s m i s s c l i n i c a l l y as evas ive , in a w a y that i s b l i n d to

the theatr ica l i ty of the a n a l y t i c s i t u a t i o n . B u t l e r ' s use of i d e n t i ­

f i ca t ion p u t s the n o t i o n of the p e r f o r m a t i v e b a c k i n t o the a n a ­

l y t i c f rame; w h a t is m o r e s u r p r i s i n g is that she has b e e n able

to use m o u r n i n g as a w a y of n u a n c i n g the t h e a t r i c a l i t y that

i s i n t e g r a l t o o u r m a k i n g o f ident i t ies , o u r m a k i n g ourse lves

up t h r o u g h loss. I t i s fortunate that w r i t e r s are interested in

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s because, u n l i k e analysts , they are free to t h i n k

u p t h o u g h t s u n c o n s t r a i n e d b y the h y p n o t i c effect o f c l i n i c a l

pract ice . G o o d p e r f o r m e r s , l i k e m u s i c i a n s o r s p o r t s p e o p l e o r

analysts , are often not that g o o d at t a l k i n g about w h a t they do,

p a r t l y because they are the ones w h o do it .

A n d the d o i n g i t , o f course , l i k e the l i v i n g o f a n y l i fe, i n ­

v o l v e s a c k n o w l e d g i n g , i n one w a y o r another , that there are

o n l y t w o sexes. T h o u g h this, i n a n d o f itself, says n o t h i n g about

158 Melancholy Gender

the p o s s i b l e r e p e r t o i r e o f g e n d e r ident i t ies . T h e l o g i c o f B u t ­

ler ' s a r g u m e n t , the k i n d o f i n s t r u c t i v e i n c o h e r e n c e she f inds

in F r e u d , recuperates a sense o f p o s s i b i l i t y for a n a l y t i c p r a c ­

tice. A n d yet the v e r y l u c i d i t y o f B u t l e r ' s essay also p r o m p t s

another k i n d of ref lect ion. I t c a n s o m e t i m e s s e e m a s h a m e that

there are o n l y t w o sexes, not least because we use this differ­

ence as a p a r a d i g m to do so m u c h w o r k for us (the differences

b e t w e e n the sexes are, o f course , m o r e e x c i t i n g , or m o r e ar­

t i cu lab le , t h a n the differences b e t w e e n a l i v e b o d y a n d a d e a d

b o d y ) . T h e r e is a k i n d of i n t e l l e c t u a l m e l a n c h o l y in the loss of a

t h i r d sex that n e v e r existed a n d s o c a n n e v e r b e m o u r n e d ; this

t h i r d , i r r a t i o n a l sex that w o u l d b r e a k the s p e l l (or the logic) of

the t w o , a n d that i s one o f the c h i l d ' s f o r m a t i v e a n d r e p r e s s e d

fantasies about h i m s e l f or herself. (There is a l i n k b e t w e e n this

m a g i c a l s o l u t i o n to the p r i m a l scene a n d fantasies o f synthes is

a n d r e d e m p t i o n . ) W h a t F r e u d c a l l e d p r i m a r y process is, after

a l l , the e r a s i n g of m u t u a l e x c l u s i o n , a l o g i c d e f y i n g l o g i c . T h i s

f o r m of g e n e r o s i t y (and r a d i c a l i s m ) i s not a l w a y s ava i lab le , i t

seems, to o u r s e c o n d a r y - p r o c e s s selves.

S t a r t i n g w i t h t w o sexes, a s w e m u s t — d e s c r i b e d a s o p p o -

sites or a l ternat ives or c o m p l e m e n t s — l o c k s us i n t o a l o g i c , a

b i n a r y s y s t e m that often seems r e m o t e f r o m l i v e d a n d s p o ­

k e n e x p e r i e n c e a n d i s c o m p l i c i t w i t h the other b i n a r y p a i r s —

i n s i d e / o u t s i d e , p r i m a r y p r o c e s s / s e c o n d a r y process , s a d i s m /

m a s o c h i s m , a n d so o n — t h a t are s u c h a m i s l e a d i n g p a r t o f

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c language. W e s h o u l d b e s p e a k i n g o f p a r a ­

doxes a n d s p e c t r u m s , not c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d m u t u a l e x c l u ­

s i o n . E v e r y c h i l d r i g h t l y w a n t s to k n o w w h e t h e r there i s a

p o s i t i o n b e y o n d e x c l u s i o n o r di f ference o r s e p a r a t e n e s s — a

w o r l d i n w h i c h l e a v i n g a n d b e i n g left o u t d i s a p p e a r s , a n i d e a

t a k e n up a t a di f ferent l e v e l in U t o p i a n s o c i a l i s m , w h i c h a i m s a t

a soc ie ty w i t h o u t m a r g i n s a n d therefore w i t h o u t h u m i l i a t i o n .

Refused Identification 159

In t h i n k i n g about gender, or a n y of the s o - c a l l e d ident i t ies ,

it seems to be e x t r e m e l y d i f f icul t to f i n d a p i c t u r e or a s t o r y

that n o longer needs the i d e a o f e x c l u s i o n . A n d B u t l e r ' s theo­

re t i ca l d e s c r i p t i o n s reflect this. T h e r e seems to be s o m e t h i n g

b e w i t c h i n g , c e r t a i n l y i n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c theory, about the i d e a

— a n d the e x p e r i e n c e — o f e v a c u a t i o n a n d o f the k i n d s o f def i ­

n i t i o n that the i d e a o f i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e c a n g i v e u s ( i n r e l a ­

t i v e l y recent p s y c h o a n a l y t i c h i s t o r y B a l i n t w a s a s k i n g w h e t h e r

the f ish w a s in the w a t e r or the w a t e r in the fish). O b v i o u s l y ,

the v o c a b u l a r y of d i f f e r e n c e — t h e m e a n s of e s t a b l i s h i n g those

i n t r a - a n d i n t e r p s y c h i c b o u n d a r i e s a n d l i m i t s w h i c h p s y c h o ­

analys i s p r o m o t e s — i s , b y d e f i n i t i o n , far m o r e extensive t h a n

the language of sameness (the same, of course , is not o n l y

the ident ica l ) . We c a n ta lk a b o u t d i f f e r e n c e — i n a sense, that 's

w h a t t a l k i s a b o u t — b u t sameness m a k e s u s m u t e , d u l l , o r r e ­

p e t i t i v e . A n d t o ta lk about h o m o s e x u a l i t y e x c l u s i v e l y i n t e r m s

of sameness i s to c o m p o u n d the m u d d l e . Sameness , l i k e dif fer­

ence, is a (mot ivated) fantasy, not a n a t u r a l fact. T h e la ng u a g e

of b o u n d a r i e s that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i s so intent o n , a n d that

m a k e s p o s s i b l e n o t i o n s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d m o u r n i n g , p r o ­

motes a specif ic set of a s s u m p t i o n s about w h a t a p e r s o n is a n d

c a n be. It is a p i c t u r e of a p e r s o n i n f o r m e d by the languages of

p u r i t y a n d p r o p e r t y , w h a t M a r y D o u g l a s m o r e exact ly c a l l e d

p u r i t y a n d danger. I t m a y b e m o r e u s e f u l t o ta lk about gra­

dat ions a n d b l u r r i n g rather t h a n c o n t o u r s a n d o u t l i n e s w h e n

w e p l o t o u r stories about gender. 6 B u t l e r ' s language o f p e r ­

f o r m a n c e k e e p s d e f i n i t i o n o n the m o v e , w h i c h i s w h e r e i t i s

a n y w a y . M o u r n i n g s l o w s things d o w n .

Refused Identification 161

Reply to A d a m Phillips's

Commentary on

"Melancholy Gender /

Refused Identification"

A d a m P h i l l i p s ' s w e l c o m e c o m m e n t a r y c o n f i r m s that there

i l m i g h t be a d i a l o g u e , even p e r h a p s a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c one,

b e t w e e n a c l i n i c a l a n d a s p e c u l a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e on q u e s t i o n s

o f gender, m e l a n c h o l i a , a n d p e r f o r m a t i v i t y . C l e a r l y the p o s i ­

t ions here are not as "staked o u t " as is often the case, for

P h i l l i p s is h i m s e l f b o t h a c l i n i c i a n a n d a s p e c u l a t i v e t h i n k e r ,

a n d thus furthers the d o u b l y d i m e n s i o n e d w r i t i n g i n a u g u r a t e d

by F r e u d . Indeed, w h a t m i g h t at first s e e m a str ict o p p o s i ­

t i o n — t h e c l i n i c i a n , o n the one h a n d , a n d the c u l t u r a l theorist

o f gender, o n the o t h e r — i s b r o k e n d o w n a n d r e c o n f i g u r e d i n

the course of this exchange, a n d i t is as m u c h the content of

h i s c l a i m s a s the m o v e m e n t o f his o w n t h i n k i n g w h i c h m a k e s

m e w a n t t o r e c o n s i d e r the o p p o s i t i o n a l f r a m i n g a n d t h i n k i n g

w h i c h seems, l u c k i l y , not t o b e able t o s u s t a i n itself here. M y

r e p l y w i l l focus first o n the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r m e l a n c h o l y

is r i g h t l y u n d e r s t o o d to o p p o s e or to t e m p e r n o t i o n s of gen­

d e r p e r f o r m a t i v i t y , a n d second, o n w h e t h e r s e x u a l di f ference

is an o p p o s i t i o n that is as stable as i t m i g h t appear.

P h i l l i p s suggests that the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i c i n ­

c o r p o r a t i o n t e m p e r s the v o l u n t a r i s m of the p o s i t i o n associated

w i t h g e n d e r p e r f o r m a t i v i t y that has e m e r g e d i n the r e c e p t i o n

of Gender Trouble. On the one h a n d , there a ppea r s to be a r e ­

p u d i a t e d a n d u n r e s o l v e d k n o t of grief, a n d on the other, a self-

c o n s c i o u s subject w h o , in a S a r t r i a n v e i n , creates itself a n e w

a g a i n a n d again. B u t w h a t i f the terms of this o p p o s i t i o n are

not qui te as stable as they seem? C o n s i d e r that the i r r e s o l u ­

t i o n of m e l a n c h o l i a i s t i e d to the check p l a c e d u p o n a g g r es s io n

against the lost other, that the i d e a l i z a t i o n of the other that

a c c o m p a n i e s sel f-beratement in m e l a n c h o l i a i s p r e c i s e l y the

r o u t i n g against the ego o f aggress ion t o w a r d the other w h i c h

i s p r o h i b i t e d f r o m b e i n g expressed d irect ly . T h e p r o h i b i t i o n

w o r k s i n the service o f a n i d e a l i z a t i o n , b u t i t a lso w o r k s i n the

service of an i d e a l i z a t i o n of grief as a p u r e or sacred pract ice .

T h e m e l a n c h o l i c , b a r r e d f r o m aggressive e x p r e s s i o n , b e g i n s t o

m i m e a n d i n c o r p o r a t e the lost one, r e f u s i n g the loss t h r o u g h

that i n c o r p o r a t i v e strategy, " c o n t i n u i n g the q u a r r e l " w i t h the

other, b u t n o w i n the f o r m o f a n i n t r a p s y c h i c self-beratement.

B u t this process i s not o n l y i n t r a p s y c h i c , for s y m p t o m a t i c ex­

p r e s s i o n i s p r e c i s e l y the r e t u r n o f w h a t i s e x c l u d e d in the

process o f i d e a l i z a t i o n . W h a t i s the p lace o f "act ing o u t " i n

r e l a t i o n t o s y m p t o m a t i c e x p r e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n berate-

m e n t escapes the i n t r a p s y c h i c c i r c u i t t o e m e r g e i n d i s p l a c e d

a n d e x t e r n a l i z e d f o r m s ? I s this k i n d o f "act ing out ," w h i c h

often takes the f o r m of a p a n t o m i m e , not the v e r y v e n u e for

a n aggress ion that refuses t o r e m a i n l o c k e d u p i n the c i r c u i t o f

sel f-beratement, an aggress ion that breaks o u t of that c i r c u i t

o n l y t o heap itself, t h r o u g h d i s p l a c e m e n t , o n objects w h i c h

1Ô2 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification 163

s i g n i f y the resonance, the r e m a i n s , of the lost other? In this

sense, w h a t is p e r f o r m e d as a consequence of m e l a n c h o l i a is

not a v o l u n t a r y act, b u t a n a c t i n g out m o t i v a t e d — i n p a r t — b y

a n u n o w n e d aggress ion.

H o w does this account w o r k i n the context o f gender m e l ­

a n c h o l i a ? I f I a c q u i r e m y g e n d e r b y r e p u d i a t i n g m y l o v e for

one o f m y o w n gender, t h e n that r e p u d i a t i o n l ives o n i n the

a c t i n g o u t o f my g e n d e r a n d asks to be r e a d as r i v a l r y , ag­

gress ion, i d e a l i z a t i o n , a n d m e l a n c h o l i a . I f I am a w o m a n to

the extent that I have n e v e r l o v e d one, b o t h aggress ion a n d

s h a m e are l o c k e d i n t o that "never," that "no way," w h i c h sug­

gests that w h a t e v e r g e n d e r I am is threatened f u n d a m e n t a l l y

by the r e t u r n o f the l o v e r e n d e r e d u n t h i n k a b l e by that defen­

sive "never." Therefore w h a t I act, i n d e e d , w h a t I "choose,"

has s o m e t h i n g p r o f o u n d l y u n c h o s e n i n i t that r u n s t h r o u g h

the c o u r s e of that " p e r f o r m a n c e . " H e r e the n o t i o n of g e n d e r

p e r f o r m a t i v i t y cal ls for p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r e t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h the

n o t i o n of "act ing out , " as i t emerges in the a r t i c u l a t i o n of m e l ­

a n c h o l i a a n d i n the p a n t o m i m i c response t o loss w h e r e b y the

lost other i s i n c o r p o r a t e d in the f o r m a t i v e ident i f i ca t ions of

the ego.

P h i l l i p s i s r i g h t t o w a r n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s against a n i d e a l i z a ­

t i o n of m o u r n i n g itself, the s a c r a l i z a t i o n of m o u r n i n g as the

c o n s u m m a t e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r i t u a l . I t is as i f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s

as a p r a c t i c e r i s k s b e c o m i n g aff l icted w i t h the v e r y suf fer ing

i t seeks to k n o w . T h e r e s o l u t i o n of gr ief b e c o m e s u n t h i n k a b l e

i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h o u r v a r i o u s losses b e c o m e the c o n d i ­

t i o n for p s y c h o a n a l y s i s as a p r a c t i c e of i n t e r m i n a b l e m o u r n ­

i n g . B u t w h a t breaks the h o l d o f gr ief except the c u l t i v a t i o n of

the aggress ion gr ief h o l d s a t b a y against the m e a n s by w h i c h

i t i s h e l d at bay? Part of w h a t susta ins a n d extends the p e r i o d

o f m o u r n i n g i s p r e c i s e l y the p r o h i b i t i o n against e x p r e s s i n g

aggress ion t o w a r d w h a t is l o s t — i n part because that lost one

has a b a n d o n e d us, a n d in the s a c r a l i z a t i o n o f the object, we

e x c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r a g i n g against that a b a n d o n m e n t .

W h a t are the a f f i rmat ive consequences o f m i m e t i c a c t i n g o u t

as i t w o r k s , w i t h i n a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c f rame, to theatr ica l i ze that

aggress ion w i t h o u t e t h i c a l consequence, a n d t o art iculate , for

the p u r p o s e s of sel f-ref lect ion, t h r o u g h a set of "acts" the l o g i c

o f r e p u d i a t i o n by w h i c h they are m o t i v a t e d ? Isn't i t then the

case that s u c h theatr ica l i ty m i g h t w o r k as a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c

n o t i o n a n d not o n l y a s that w h i c h m u s t b e c o r r e c t e d o r t e m ­

p e r e d b y p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ? W o u l d n ' t that b e one w a y t o c o u n t e r

the i d e a l i z a t i o n of m o u r n i n g (itself a s y m p t o m of m o u r n i n g )

w h i c h c o m m i t s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s t o the sober w o r k o f p e r m a ­

nent m o u r n i n g ? To w h a t extent is that effect of " p e r m a n e n c e "

the resul t of the force of r e p u d i a t i o n itself, aggress ion in the

service of a se l f -berat ing b i n d t y p i c a l of m e l a n c h o l i a ?

P h i l l i p s asks another set o f quest ions , w h i c h s e e m also to

w o r k w i t h i n a c e r t a i n o p p o s i t i o n a l f rame w h i c h m a y b e less

o p p o s i t i o n a l t h a n a t first appears . H e rephrases m y q u e s t i o n

a p p r o p r i a t e l y w h e n he quer ies w h e t h e r there is a necessary

reason for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to o p p o s e desire or for des ire to be

f u e l e d b y r e p u d i a t i o n . H e c l a i m s that w i t h i n the p s y c h o a n a ­

l y t i c f r a m e w o r k there are g o o d reasons, a n d that e v e r y p o s i ­

t i o n t a k e n up a n d e v e r y des ire d e t e r m i n e d engages a p s y c h i c

confl ict . T h i s f o l l o w s f r o m the fact that there are a l w a y s losses,

refusals, a n d sacrifices to be m a d e a l o n g the w a y to h a v i n g the

ego o r character f o r m e d o r h a v i n g desire d i s p o s e d i n a n y de­

terminate d i r e c t i o n . T h i s seems r ight . B u t p e r h a p s there is a

w a y of d e v e l o p i n g a t y p o l o g y of " r e f u s a l " a n d " e x c l u s i o n " that

m i g h t h e l p u s d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n w h a t i s r i g o r o u s l y r e p u d i ­

ated a n d forec losed, a n d w h a t h a p p e n s t o b e less r i g i d l y o r

p e r m a n e n t l y d e c l i n e d . S u r e l y there is, say, a w a y of account-

164 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification 165

i n g for h o m o s e x u a l i t y w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e s that i t i s r o o t e d i n

a n u n c o n s c i o u s r e p u d i a t i o n o f h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y a n d w h i c h , i n

m a k i n g that p r e s u m p t i o n , d e t e r m i n e s r e p u d i a t e d heterosexu­

a l i t y t o b e the u n c o n s c i o u s " t r u t h " o f l i v e d h o m o s e x u a l i t y .

B u t is s u c h a p r e s u m p t i o n about r e p u d i a t i o n necessary to ac­

c o u n t for the trajectory o f l i v e d h o m o s e x u a l i t y ? C o u l d there

b e e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g accounts o f u n c o n s c i o u s m o t i v a t i o n s

that account for h o m o s e x u a l i t y w h i c h do not a s s u m e the re­

p u d i a t e d status o f h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y i n its f o r m a t i o n ? A n d w h a t

o f those h o m o s e x u a l s w h o d o not r i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e hetero­

s e x u a l i t y either i n t r a p s y c h i c a l l y o r i n t e r p s y c h i c a l l y , b u t w h o

are nevertheless r e l a t i v e l y d e t e r m i n e d in the d i r e c t i o n a l i t y o f

their desire? Perhaps the e c o n o m y of desire a l w a y s w o r k s

t h r o u g h refusal a n d loss of s o m e k i n d , b u t i t is not as a conse­

quence an e c o n o m y s t r u c t u r e d by a l o g i c o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n .

Isn't th is k i n d o f p o s t c o n t r a d i c t o r y p s y c h i c m o b i l i t y w h a t i s

d e s i r e d p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l l y , a n d w h a t F r e u d sought t o c i r c u m ­

scribe t h r o u g h reference to the b isexedness of the p s y c h e ? Is

this m o b i l i t y not a s i g n that a r i g o r o u s l y i n s t i t u t e d l o g i c of r e ­

p u d i a t i o n i s not , after a l l , necessary for p s y c h i c s u r v i v a l ?

I t seems to me that we m u s t accept, as P h i l l i p s r i g h t l y c o u n ­

sels us to d o , that there i s no " p o s i t i o n b e y o n d e x c l u s i o n — o r

difference, o r separateness" a n d n o " w o r l d i n w h i c h l e a v i n g

a n d b e i n g left out d isappears . " B u t does this acceptance c o m ­

m i t us to the p o s i t i o n that "sex" is a stable category or that

objects o f h o m o s e x u a l l o v e m u s t d i s a p p e a r t h r o u g h the force

o f r e p u d i a t i o n a n d p r o h i b i t i o n ? T o w h a t extent m u s t w e a l i g n

this m o r e g e n e r a l a n d i n e v i t a b l e s e p a r a t i o n a n d loss w i t h a

r e p u d i a t i o n o f h o m o s e x u a l l o v e w h i c h m a k e s g e n d e r m e l a n ­

chol ies of us al l? T h e "g ivenness" of s e x u a l dif ference is c l e a r l y

not to be d e n i e d , a n d I agree that there is no " t h i r d sex" to be

f o u n d o r p u r s u e d . B u t w h y i s sexua l dif ference the p r i m a r y

guarantor o f loss i n o u r p s y c h i c l ives? A n d can a l l s e p a r a t i o n

a n d loss be t r a c e d b a c k to that s t r u c t u r i n g loss of the other sex

b y w h i c h w e emerge a s this sexed b e i n g i n the w o r l d ?

Perhaps this a s s u m p t i o n i s t r o u b l e d i f we take s e r i o u s l y the

n o t i o n that sex is at once g i v e n a n d a c c o m p l i s h e d — g i v e n as

that w h i c h is (always) yet to be a c c o m p l i s h e d — a n d that i t is

a c c o m p l i s h e d i n part t h r o u g h a h e t e r o s e x u a l i z a t i o n o f l i b i d i ­

n a l a ims . T h i s a p p e a r e d t o b e F r e u d ' s a r g u m e n t i n the o p e n i n g

chapters of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. To w h a t ex­

tent does the heterosexual f rame for des ire a n d loss cast the

p r o b l e m of separat ion a n d loss first a n d foremost as a p r o b ­

l e m of sexua l dif ference?

C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g p r o b l e m a t i c , w h i c h i s not q u i t e i n

P h i l l i p s ' s language, but touches on the f r a m e w o r k that he es­

pouses. D o e s i t f o l l o w that i f one desires a w o m a n , one is

d e s i r i n g f r o m a m a s c u l i n e d i s p o s i t i o n , or i s that d i s p o s i t i o n

r e t r o a c t i v e l y a t t r i b u t e d to the d e s i r i n g p o s i t i o n as a w a y of re­

t a i n i n g heterosexual i ty as the w a y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the sepa­

rateness or a l t e r i t y that c o n d i t i o n s desire? F o r i f that c l a i m

w e r e true, e v e r y w o m a n w h o desires another w o m a n desires

her f r o m a m a s c u l i n e d i s p o s i t i o n a n d is " h e t e r o s e x u a l " to

that degree; o d d l y , t h o u g h , i f the other w o m a n desires her i n

r e t u r n , the e c o n o m y b e c o m e s one o f m a l e h o m o s e x u a l i t y ^ ) .

D o e s this theoret ica l f r a m e not m i s u n d e r s t a n d the m o d e s o f

a l ter i ty that pers is t w i t h i n h o m o s e x u a l i t y , r e d u c i n g the h o m o ­

sexual to a p u r s u i t of sameness w h i c h is, in fact, v e r y r a r e l y

the case (or is as often the case in h e t e r o s e x u a l p u r s u i t ) ?

Is th is e x p l a n a t i o n t h r o u g h recourse to m a s c u l i n e d i s p o s i ­

t i o n not an instance o f the theoret ica l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f " m a s c u ­

l i n i t y " o r o f the m a s c u l i n e "sex" w h i c h covers o v e r — o r fore­

c l o s e s — t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f another t e r m i n o l o g y w h i c h w o u l d

a v o w a r i c h p s y c h i c w o r l d o f a t tachment a n d loss w h i c h i s

i 6 6 Melancholy Gender

not f i n a l l y r e d u c i b l e to a g i v e n n o t i o n of s e x u a l dif ference? In­

d e e d , to w h a t extent are o u r n o t i o n s o f the m a s c u l i n e a n d the

f e m i n i n e f o r m e d t h r o u g h the lost at tachments w h i c h they are

s a i d t o occas ion? C a n w e f i n a l l y ever resolve the q u e s t i o n o f

w h e t h e r s e x u a l dif ference is the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of a m e l a n ­

c h o l i c heterosexual i ty , s a c r a l i z e d as theory, or w h e t h e r i t is the

g i v e n c o n d i t i o n o f loss a n d at tachment i n a n y set o f h u m a n

re lat ions? It seems clear that in s o m e cases i t is b o t h , but that

w e w o u l d lose a v i t a l t e r m i n o l o g y for u n d e r s t a n d i n g loss a n d

its f o r m a t i v e effects i f we w e r e to a s s u m e f r o m the outset that

we o n l y a n d a l w a y s lose the other sex, for i t is as often the

case that we are often in the m e l a n c h o l i c b i n d o f h a v i n g lost

o u r o w n sex i n o r d e r , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t o b e c o m e it .

Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage

C o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n the e g o a n d t h e i d e a l . . . u l t i m a t e l y ref lect

t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n w h a t i s r e a l a n d w h a t i s p s y c h i c a l ,

b e t w e e n t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d a n d t h e i n t e r n a l w o r l d .

— F r e u d , The Ego and the Id

In " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " m e l a n c h o l y at first appears

t o b e a n aberrant f o r m o f m o u r n i n g , i n w h i c h one denies

the loss of an object (an other or an ideal) a n d refuses the task

of grief, u n d e r s t o o d as b r e a k i n g at tachment to the one w h o is

lost. T h i s lost object is m a g i c a l l y r e t a i n e d as part of one 's p s y ­

c h i c life. T h e s o c i a l w o r l d appears t o b e e c l i p s e d i n m e l a n c h o l y ,

a n d a n i n t e r n a l w o r l d s t r u c t u r e d i n a m b i v a l e n c e emerges a s

the consequence. I t i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y clear h o w m e l a n c h o l y

m i g h t b e r e a d , then, i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l l ife, 1 i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n

t e r m s of the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n of p s y c h i c l ife. Yet the a c c o u n t of

m e l a n c h o l y i s a n a c c o u n t o f h o w p s y c h i c a n d s o c i a l d o m a i n s

are p r o d u c e d i n r e l a t i o n t o one another. A s s u c h , m e l a n c h o l y

offers p o t e n t i a l i n s i g h t i n t o h o w the b o u n d a r i e s o f the s o c i a l

are i n s t i t u t e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d , not o n l y at the expense of p s y -

i 6 8 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 169

c h i c l i fe, b u t t h r o u g h b i n d i n g p s y c h i c l i fe i n t o f o r m s o f m e l a n ­

c h o l i c a m b i v a l e n c e .

M e l a n c h o l i a thus r e t u r n s us to the f igure of the " t u r n " as a

f o u n d i n g t r o p e i n the d i s c o u r s e o f the psyche . I n H e g e l , t u r n ­

i n g b a c k u p o n oneself comes t o s i g n i f y the ascetic a n d s k e p t i ­

c a l m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v i t y that m a r k the u n h a p p y consciousness;

in N i e t z s c h e , t u r n i n g b a c k on oneself suggests a r e t r a c t i n g of

w h a t one has s a i d or done, or a r e c o i l i n g in s h a m e in the face

of w h a t one has done. In A l t h u s s e r , the t u r n that the p e d e s ­

t r i a n m a k e s t o w a r d the v o i c e of the l a w is at once ref lexive

(the m o m e n t of b e c o m i n g a subject w h o s e se l f -consciousness

i s m e d i a t e d b y the l a w ) a n d sel f-subjugating.

A c c o r d i n g t o the n a r r a t i v e o f m e l a n c h o l i a that F r e u d p r o ­

v i d e s , the ego i s s a i d to " t u r n b a c k u p o n i tsel f" once l o v e fails

to f i n d its object a n d i n s t e a d takes itself as not o n l y an object of

love , b u t of aggress ion a n d hate as w e l l . B u t w h a t i s th is "self"

that takes itself as its o w n object? Is the one w h o " takes" itself

a n d the one w h o i s " t a k e n " the same? T h i s s e d u c t i o n o f reflex­

i v i t y seems to f o u n d e r l o g i c a l l y , s ince i t i s u n c l e a r that this ego

c a n exist p r i o r t o its m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e " t u r n " that m a r k s the

m e l a n c h o l i c response to loss appears to in i t ia te the r e d o u b l i n g

of the ego as an object; o n l y by t u r n i n g b a c k on itself does the

ego a c q u i r e the status of a p e r c e p t u a l object. M o r e o v e r , the at­

t a c h m e n t to the object that is u n d e r s t o o d in m e l a n c h o l i a to be

r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the ego u n d e r g o e s a f u n d a m e n t a l transfor­

m a t i o n i n the course o f that r e d i r e c t i o n . N o t o n l y i s the attach­

m e n t s a i d to go f r o m l o v e to hate as i t m o v e s f r o m the object

to the ego, b u t the ego itself is p r o d u c e d as a psychic object; in

fact, the v e r y a r t i c u l a t i o n of this p s y c h i c space, s o m e t i m e s f ig­

u r e d a s " i n t e r n a l , " d e p e n d s o n this m e l a n c h o l i c t u r n .

T h e t u r n f r o m the object to the ego p r o d u c e s the ego, w h i c h

subst i tutes for the object lost. T h i s p r o d u c t i o n is a t r o p o l o g i c a l

g e n e r a t i o n a n d f o l l o w s f r o m the p s y c h i c c o m p u l s i o n t o s u b ­

st i tute for objects lost. T h u s , in m e l a n c h o l i a not o n l y does the

ego subst i tute for the object, b u t this act of s u b s t i t u t i o n insti­

tutes the ego as a necessary response to or "defense" against

loss. To the extent that the ego is "the p r e c i p i t a t e of its aban­

d o n e d object-cathexes," it is the c o n g e a l m e n t of a h i s t o r y of

loss, the s e d i m e n t a t i o n of re lat ions of s u b s t i t u t i o n o v e r t i m e ,

the r e s o l u t i o n of a t r o p o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n t o the o n t o l o g i c a l

effect of the self.

M o r e o v e r , this s u b s t i t u t i o n of ego for object does not q u i t e

w o r k . T h e ego is a p o o r subst i tute for the lost object, a n d its

fa i lure to subst i tute in a w a y that satisfies (that is , to o v e r c o m e

its status as a s u b s t i t u t i o n ) , leads to the a m b i v a l e n c e that d i s ­

t i n g u i s h e s m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e t u r n f r o m the object to the ego c a n

never q u i t e be a c c o m p l i s h e d ; i t i n v o l v e s f i g u r i n g the ego on

the m o d e l of the object (as suggested in the i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r a ­

graphs o f " O n N a r c i s s i s m " ) ; i t a lso i n v o l v e s the u n c o n s c i o u s

be l ie f that the ego m i g h t compensate for the loss that is suf­

fered. To the extent that the ego fails to p r o v i d e s u c h c o m p e n ­

sat ion, i t exposes the fau l t l ines i n its o w n t e n u o u s f o u n d a t i o n s .

A r e we to accept that the ego t u r n s f r o m the object to the

ego, or that the ego t u r n s its p a s s i o n , as one m i g h t r e d i r e c t a

w h e e l , f r o m the object to itself 1 D o e s the same ego t u r n its i n ­

v e s t m e n t f r o m the object to itself, or is the ego f u n d a m e n t a l l y

a l t e r e d by v i r t u e of b e c o m i n g the object o f s u c h a t u r n ? W h a t

i s the status o f " i n v e s t m e n t " a n d "at tachment"? D o they i n d i ­

cate a free-f loat ing des ire that r e m a i n s the same regardless of

the k i n d of object to w h i c h i t i s d i rec ted? D o e s the t u r n not

o n l y p r o d u c e the ego b y w h i c h i t i s os tens ib ly i n i t i a t e d b u t

also s t r u c t u r e the at tachment i t is s a i d to redirect?

Is s u c h a t u r n or r e d i r e c t i o n even poss ib le? T h e loss for

w h i c h the t u r n seeks to compensate i s not o v e r c o m e , a n d the

Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 171

object is not res tored; rather, the loss b e c o m e s the o p a q u e c o n ­

d i t i o n for the emergence of the ego, a loss that haunts it f r o m

the start a s c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d avowable . F r e u d r e m a r k s that i n

m o u r n i n g the object i s " d e c l a r e d " lost o r d e a d , b u t i n m e l a n ­

c h o l i a , i t f o l l o w s , n o s u c h d e c l a r a t i o n i s poss ib le . 2 M e l a n c h o ­

l i a is p r e c i s e l y the effect of u n a v o w a b l e loss. A loss p r i o r to

s p e e c h a n d d e c l a r a t i o n , i t i s the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n o f its p o s ­

s i b i l i t y : a w i t h d r a w a l or r e t r a c t i o n f r o m speech that m a k e s

speech poss ib le . I n this sense, m e l a n c h o l i a m a k e s m o u r n i n g

poss ib le , a v i e w that F r e u d c a m e to accept in The Ego and the Id.

T h e i n a b i l i t y to declare s u c h a loss s ignif ies the " r e t r a c t i o n "

or " a b s o r p t i o n " of the loss by the ego. C l e a r l y , the ego does not

l i t e r a l l y take an object i n s i d e itself, as i f the ego w e r e a k i n d of

shelter p r i o r to its m e l a n c h o l y . T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e s

that p r e s u m e the t o p o g r a p h i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f a n " i n t e r n a l w o r l d "

a n d its v a r i o u s "parts" m i s s the c r u c i a l p o i n t that m e l a n c h o l y

is p r e c i s e l y w h a t i n t e r i o r i z e s the p s y c h e , that is, m a k e s i t p o s ­

s ible to refer to the p s y c h e t h r o u g h s u c h t o p o g r a p h i c a l tropes.

T h e t u r n f r o m object to ego is the m o v e m e n t that m a k e s the

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m poss ib le , that m a r k s the d i v i s i o n ,

the s e p a r a t i o n or loss, that f o r m s the ego to b e g i n w i t h . In this

sense, the t u r n f r o m the object to the ego fails success fu l ly to

subst i tute the latter for the former , b u t does succeed in m a r k ­

i n g a n d p e r p e t u a t i n g the p a r t i t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o . T h e t u r n

thus p r o d u c e s the d i v i d e b e t w e e n ego a n d object, the i n t e r n a l

a n d e x t e r n a l w o r l d s that i t appears to p r e s u m e .

If a p r e c o n s t i t u t e d ego w e r e able to m a k e s u c h a t u r n f r o m

an object to itself, i t appears that i t w o u l d have to t u r n f r o m a

p r e c o n s t i t u t e d external r e a l i t y t o a n i n t e r n a l one. B u t s u c h a n

e x p l a n a t i o n c o u l d not account for the v e r y d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n

i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l o n w h i c h i t d e p e n d s . Indeed, i t i s u n c l e a r

that s u c h a d i v i s i o n c a n be u n d e r s t o o d apart f r o m its context

i n m e l a n c h o l i a . I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I h o p e t o c lar i fy h o w m e l ­

a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s the p r o d u c t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a l w o r l d a s w e l l

as a t o p o g r a p h i c a l set of f ict ions that s t ructures the psyche . If

the m e l a n c h o l i c t u r n i s the m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h the d i s t i n c ­

t i o n b e t w e e n i n t e r n a l a n d external w o r l d s i s i n s t i t u t e d , then

m e l a n c h o l i a ini t iates a v a r i a b l e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c

a n d the s o c i a l , a b o u n d a r y , I h o p e to s h o w , that d i s t r i b u t e s a n d

regulates the p s y c h i c sphere i n r e l a t i o n t o p r e v a i l i n g n o r m s o f

s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n .

T h a t a l o v e or des ire or l i b i d i n a l a t tachment is u n d e r ­

s t o o d to take itself as its object, a n d to do this t h r o u g h the

f igure o f the t u r n , suggests once a g a i n the t r o p o l o g i c a l b e g i n ­

n i n g s of subject f o r m a t i o n . F r e u d ' s essay p r e s u m e s that l o v e

of the object comes first, a n d o n l y u p o n the loss of the o b ­

ject does m e l a n c h o l y emerge. C o n s i d e r e d closely, h o w e v e r ,

F r e u d ' s essay m a k e s c lear that there c a n be no ego w i t h o u t

m e l a n c h o l i a , that the ego's loss is c o n s t i t u t i v e . T h e n a r r a t i v e

g r a m m a r that m i g h t account for this r e l a t i o n s h i p i s necessar i ly

c o n f o u n d e d f r o m the start.

M e l a n c h o l i a does not n a m e a p s y c h i c process that m i g h t be

r e c o u n t e d t h r o u g h an adequate e x p l a n a t o r y scheme. I t tends

t o c o n f o u n d a n y e x p l a n a t i o n o f p s y c h i c process that w e m i g h t

b e i n c l i n e d t o offer. A n d the reason i t c o n f o u n d s a n y s u c h

effort is that it m a k e s c lear that o u r a b i l i t y to refer to the

p s y c h e t h r o u g h t ropes of i n t e r n a l i t y are themselves effects of

a m e l a n c h o l i c c o n d i t i o n . M e l a n c h o l i a p r o d u c e s a set of spa-

t i a l i z i n g t ropes for p s y c h i c l ife, d o m i c i l e s o f p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d

shelter as w e l l as arenas for s truggle a n d p e r s e c u t i o n . S u c h

t ropes d o not " e x p l a i n " m e l a n c h o l i a : they const i tute s o m e o f

its tabular d i s c u r s i v e effects. 3 In a m a n n e r that recal ls N i e t z -

172 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 173

sche's account of the f a b r i c a t i o n of conscience, F r e u d offers a

v i e w o f consc ience a s a n agency a n d " i n s t i t u t i o n " p r o d u c e d

a n d m a i n t a i n e d b y m e l a n c h o l y .

A l t h o u g h F r e u d seeks t o d i s t i n g u i s h m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n ­

c h o l i a in this essay, he offers a p o r t r a i t of m e l a n c h o l i a that

c o n t i n u a l l y b l u r s i n t o h is v i e w o f m o u r n i n g . H e b e g i n s his de­

s c r i p t i o n , for instance, b y r e m a r k i n g that m o u r n i n g m a y be a

" r e a c t i o n to the loss of a l o v e d p e r s o n , or to the loss of s o m e

abstrac t ion that has t a k e n the p lace of one, s u c h as one's c o u n ­

try, l iber ty , a n i d e a l , a n d s o o n " (243). A t first, m o u r n i n g seems

t o h a v e t w o f o r m s , one i n w h i c h s o m e o n e i s lost, s o m e o n e r e a l

i s lost, a n d another, i n w h i c h w h a t i s lost i n the someone r e a l

is i d e a l , the loss of an i d e a l . As the essay progresses , i t appears

that the loss of the i d e a l , "the loss of a m o r e i d e a l k i n d " is

c o r r e l a t e d w i t h m e l a n c h o l i a . A l r e a d y w i t h i n m o u r n i n g , h o w ­

ever, the loss m a y be of an abstract ion or an i d e a l , one that

has t a k e n the p l a c e of the one w h o is lost. A f e w p a r a g r a p h s

later, he notes that " m e l a n c h o l i a too m a y be the r e a c t i o n to

the loss of a l o v e d object" a n d that " w h e r e the e x c i t i n g causes

are di f ferent [ from m o u r n i n g ] one c a n r e c o g n i z e that there is

a loss of a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " If one m o u r n s for the loss of

a n i d e a l , a n d that i d e a l m a y subst i tute for a p e r s o n w h o has

b e e n lost, or w h o s e l o v e is b e l i e v e d to be lost, then i t m a k e s

no sense to c l a i m that m e l a n c h o l i a is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a loss

o f " a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " A n d yet, a dif ferent k i n d o f d i s t i n c t i o n

b e t w e e n the t w o emerges w h e n F r e u d c l a i m s , w i t h reference

to m o u r n i n g , that the i d e a l m a y have s u b s t i t u t e d for the per­

son a n d , w i t h reference t o m e l a n c h o l i a , that the m e l a n c h o l i c

" k n o w s w h o m h e has lost b u t not what h e has lost i n h i m . " I n

m e l a n c h o l i a , the i d e a l that the p e r s o n represents appears to be

u n k n o w a b l e ; i n m o u r n i n g , the p e r s o n , o r the i d e a l that s u b s t i ­

tutes for the p e r s o n a n d that, p r e s u m a b l y , renders the p e r s o n

lost, is u n k n o w a b l e .

F r e u d says m e l a n c h o l i a i s re lated to "an object-loss w i t h ­

d r a w n f r o m consciousness ," b u t t o the extent that m o u r n i n g

is re lated to subst i tute ideals a n d abstract ions s u c h as " c o u n ­

t r y a n d l iber ty , " i t too is c l e a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h the loss of

the object, a d o u b l e loss that i n v o l v e s b o t h the subst i tute i d e a l

a n d the p e r s o n . W h e r e a s i n m e l a n c h o l i a the i d e a l i s o c c l u d e d

a n d one does not k n o w w h a t one has lost " i n " the p e r s o n lost,

i n m o u r n i n g one r i s k s not k n o w i n g w h o m one has lost " i n "

l o s i n g the i d e a l .

L a t e r i n the essay F r e u d specifies the p s y c h i c systems i n

w h i c h m e l a n c h o l y takes p l a c e a n d w h a t i t m e a n s for m e l a n ­

c h o l y to be re lated to "an object-loss w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n ­

sciousness." H e w r i t e s that "the u n c o n s c i o u s [ thing-]presen-

t a t i o n [Dingvorstellung] of the object has b e e n a b a n d o n e d by

the l i b i d o " (256)." T h e " t h i n g - p r e s e n t a t i o n " of the object is

not the object itself, but a cathected trace, one that is , in re­

l a t i o n to the object, a l r e a d y a subst i tute a n d a d e r i v a t i v e . In

m o u r n i n g , the traces of the object, its i n n u m e r a b l e " l i n k s , " are

o v e r c o m e p i e c e m e a l o v e r t i m e . I n m e l a n c h o l i a , the presence

o f a m b i v a l e n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o the object m a k e s a n y s u c h p r o ­

gressive d e - l i n k i n g o f l i b i d i n a l a t tachment i m p o s s i b l e . Rather,

"countless separate struggles are c a r r i e d on over the object, in

w h i c h l o v e a n d hate c o n t e n d w i t h each other; the one seeks

to d e t a c h the l i b i d o f r o m the object, the other to m a i n t a i n this

p o s i t i o n of the l i b i d o against the assault ." T h i s strange battle­

f i e l d i s t o b e f o u n d , F r e u d m a i n t a i n s , i n "the r e g i o n o f the

m e m o r y - t r a c e s of things."

A m b i v a l e n c e m a y be a character is t ic feature of e v e r y l o v e

at tachment that a p a r t i c u l a r ego m a k e s , or i t m a y " p r o c e e d

174 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 175

p r e c i s e l y f r o m those exper iences that i n v o l v e d the threat of

l o s i n g the object" (256). T h i s last r e m a r k suggests, h o w e v e r ,

that ambivalence may well be a result of loss, that the loss of an

object p r e c i p i t a t e s an a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d i t as p a r t of the

process of l e t t i n g it go. 5 I f so, then m e l a n c h o l i a , d e n n e d as the

a m b i v a l e n t r e a c t i o n to loss, m a y be coextensive w i t h loss, so

that m o u r n i n g i s s u b s u m e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a . F r e u d ' s statement

that m e l a n c h o l i a arises f r o m "an object-loss w i t h d r a w n f r o m

c o n s c i o u s n e s s " i s thus s p e c i f i e d in r e l a t i o n to a m b i v a l e n c e :

" e v e r y t h i n g to do w i t h these struggles d u e to a m b i v a l e n c e r e ­

m a i n s w i t h d r a w n f r o m consciousness , u n t i l the o u t c o m e char­

acterist ic o f m e l a n c h o l i a has set i n . " T h e a m b i v a l e n c e r e m a i n s

entzogen—withdrawn—only to take on a speci f ic f o r m in m e l ­

a n c h o l i a , one in w h i c h dif ferent aspects o f the p s y c h e are ac­

c o r d e d o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the r e l a t i o n o f a m b i v a l e n c e .

F r e u d offers this p s y c h i c a r t i c u l a t i o n of a m b i v a l e n c e as "a c o n ­

flict b e t w e e n one part of the ego a n d the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " as an

account of the f o r m a t i o n of the super-ego in its c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n

to the ego. A m b i v a l e n c e thus precedes the p s y c h i c t o p o g r a ­

p h y of super-ego/ego; its m e l a n c h o l i c a r t i c u l a t i o n is offered

as the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y of that v e r y topography. T h u s ,

i t w o u l d m a k e no sense to seek recourse to s u c h a t o p o g r a p h y

to explain m e l a n c h o l i a , if the a m b i v a l e n c e that is s a i d to d i s ­

t i n g u i s h m e l a n c h o l i a i s w h a t t h e n b e c o m e s a r t i c u l a t e d — a f t e r

a p e r i o d o f b e i n g w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s — a s ego a n d

super-ego. T h e i n t e r n a l t o p o g r a p h y b y w h i c h m e l a n c h o l i a i s

p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n e d is i tself the effect of that m e l a n c h o l i a . W a l ­

ter B e n j a m i n r e m a r k s that m e l a n c h o l i a spat ia l izes , a n d that

its effort to reverse or s u s p e n d t i m e p r o d u c e s " l a n d s c a p e s " as

its s ignature effect. 6 O n e m i g h t p r o f i t a b l y r e a d the F r e u d i a n

t o p o g r a p h y that m e l a n c h o l y occas ions as p r e c i s e l y s u c h a spa-

t i a l i z e d l a n d s c a p e o f the m i n d .

T h e a m b i v a l e n c e that i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m consc iousness re­

m a i n s w i t h d r a w n " n o t u n t i l the o u t c o m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f

m e l a n c h o l y has set i n " (257; " b i s n i c h t d e r fur d i e M e l a n c h o l i e

charakter is t i sche A u s g a n g e ingetreten i s t " [211]). W h a t is this

character is t ic "exi t" or " p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e " that m e l a n c h o l y

takes? F r e u d w r i t e s , " this , a s w e k n o w , consists i n the threat­

e n e d l i b i d i n a l cathexis at l e n g t h a b a n d o n i n g the object, only ,

h o w e v e r , t o d r a w b a c k t o the p l a c e i n the ego f r o m w h i c h i t

has p r o c e e d e d . " A m o r e prec ise t r a n s l a t i o n w o u l d c lar i fy that

m e l a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s an at tempt to subst i tute the ego for that

cathexis, one that i n v o l v e s a r e t u r n of the cathexis to its p o i n t

of o r i g i n : the threatened cathexis is a b a n d o n e d , b u t o n l y to

pull itself back onto the place of the ego ("aber n u r , um s i c h auf

d i e Stel le des Ichs . . . z u r ù c k z u z i e h e n " ) , a p lace f r o m w h i c h

the threatened at tachment has d e p a r t e d ("von der sie ausge-

g a n g e n w a r " ) .

In m e l a n c h o l i a , cathexis is u n d e r s t o o d to engage reflex-

i v e l y w i t h i tself ( " u m s i c h auf d i e Stel le des Ichs . . . z u r ù c k ­

z u z i e h e n " ) a n d , spec i f ica l ly , t o d r a w o r p u l l i tself i n a n d b a c k

to the p l a c e o f its o w n d e p a r t u r e or g o i n g - o u t . T h i s " p l a c e "

of the ego is not q u i t e the same as the ego itself, b u t seems

to represent a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , an Ausgangspunkt, for the

l i b i d o , as w e l l as the m e l a n c h o l i c site of its r e t u r n . In this re­

t u r n of l i b i d o to its p l a c e of d e p a r t u r e , a p lace of the ego, a

m e l a n c h o l i c c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n o f l i b i d o takes place.

T h i s r e t u r n is d e s c r i b e d as a w i t h d r a w a l , a d r a w i n g or p u l l ­

i n g b a c k (zuriickziehung), b u t also, in the next l ine , as a f l ight:

" D i e L i e b e hat s i c h s o d u r c h i h r e F l u c h t ins Ich der A u f h e b u n g

e n t z o g e n " (210). 7 A l t h o u g h this l i n e i s t rans lated i n f a m o u s l y

as "So by t a k i n g f l ight i n t o the ego l o v e escapes e x t i n c t i o n "

(257), the sense of e s c a p i n g e x t i n c t i o n is not p r e c i s e l y r ight .

T h e w o r d entzogen, for instance, w a s p r e v i o u s l y t rans la ted as

176 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 177

" w i t h d r a w n " a n d Aufhebung carr ies a n o t o r i o u s l y a m b i g u o u s

set o f m e a n i n g s f r o m its c i r c u l a t i o n w i t h i n H e g e l i a n d iscourse :

c a n c e l l a t i o n b u t not qui te e x t i n c t i o n ; s u s p e n s i o n , p r e s e r v a ­

t i o n , a n d o v e r c o m i n g . T h r o u g h its f l ight i n t o the ego, o r i n the

ego, l o v e has w i t h d r a w n o r t a k e n a w a y its o w n o v e r c o m i n g ,

w i t h d r a w n a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , r e n d e r e d i t p s y c h i c . H e r e i t i s

not a q u e s t i o n o f l o v e "escaping an e x t i n c t i o n " m a n d a t e d f r o m

elsewhere; rather, l o v e i tself w i t h d r a w s or takes a w a y the de­

s t r u c t i o n of the object, takes i t on as its o w n destruct iveness .

Instead of b r e a k i n g w i t h the object, or t r a n s f o r m i n g the object

t h r o u g h m o u r n i n g , th is Aufhebung—this act ive , n e g a t i n g , a n d

t r a n s f o r m a t i v e m o v e m e n t — i s t a k e n i n t o the ego. T h e " f l i g h t "

of l o v e i n t o the ego is this effort to s q u i r r e l the Aufhebung a w a y

i n s i d e , t o w i t h d r a w i t f r o m external real i ty , a n d t o inst i tute a n

i n t e r n a l t o p o g r a p h y i n w h i c h the a m b i v a l e n c e m i g h t f i n d a n

a l t e r e d a r t i c u l a t i o n . T h e w i t h d r a w a l o f a m b i v a l e n c e thus p r o ­

duces the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p s y c h i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , i n d e e d , a

f a b u l a t i o n of p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h y .

T h i s f l ight a n d w i t h d r a w a l i s n a m e d , in the next l ine , as a

regress ion, one that m a k e s p o s s i b l e the c o n s c i o u s representa­

t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a : "After this r e g r e s s i o n o f the l i b i d o the p r o ­

cess c a n b e c o m e consc ious , and it is represented to consciousness

as a conflict between one part of the ego and the critical agency [ u n d

reprasent ier t s i c h d e m B e w u s s t s e i n als e i n K o n f l i k t z w i s c h e n

e i n e m T e i l des Ichs a n d der k r i t i s c h e n Instanz; m y e m p h a s i s ] . "

W h e r e a s one m i g h t expect that the r e g r e s s i o n of the l i b i d o ,

its b e i n g w i t h d r a w n i n t o consc iousness (as w e l l as the w i t h ­

d r a w a l of a m b i v a l e n c e i n t o consciousness) is the fa i lure of its

a r t i c u l a t i o n , the o p p o s i t e a ppe a rs t o b e the case. O n l y u p o n

the c o n d i t i o n of s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l does m e l a n c h o l i a take

a c o n s c i o u s f o r m . T h e w i t h d r a w a l or r e g r e s s i o n of l i b i d o is

r e p r e s e n t e d to consc iousness as a conf l ict b e t w e e n parts of the

ego; i n d e e d , the ego c o m e s to be r e p r e s e n t e d in parts o n l y on

the c o n d i t i o n that s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l or r e g r e s s i o n has t a k e n

place. I f m e l a n c h o l i a const i tutes the w i t h d r a w a l or regress ion

o f a m b i v a l e n c e , a n d i f that a m b i v a l e n c e b e c o m e s c o n s c i o u s

t h r o u g h b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d as o p p o s i t i o n a l parts of the ego,

a n d that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s m a d e p o s s i b l e o n the c o n d i t i o n o f

that w i t h d r a w a l , t h e n i t f o l l o w s that this préf igurat ion of the

t o p o g r a p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ego a n d super-ego i s i tsel f

d e p e n d e n t u p o n m e l a n c h o l i a . M e l a n c h o l i a p r o d u c e s the p o s ­

s i b i l i t y for the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p s y c h i c life. T h e Aufhebung

that i s w i t h d r a w n — o n e that m i g h t have m e a n t the o v e r c o m i n g

of loss t h r o u g h at tachment to a subst i tute o b j e c t — i s an Auf­

hebung that reemerges w i t h i n a n d as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a cance l ­

l a t i o n a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n of the object, a set of " w o r d - t r a c e s " (to

use F r e u d ' s term) that b e c o m e s the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r e p r e s e n ­

t a t i o n of p s y c h i c life.

T o w h a t extent does m e l a n c h o l i a represent a n o t h e r w i s e

unrepresentable a m b i v a l e n c e b y f a b u l a t i n g p s y c h i c t o p o g r a ­

phies? R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i tself i m p l i c a t e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a , that

is, the effort to re-present that is at an i n f i n i t e d is tance f r o m its

object. M o r e speci f ica l ly , m e l a n c h o l i a p r o v i d e s the c o n d i t i o n

of p o s s i b i l i t y for the a r t i c u l a t i o n of p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h i e s , of

the ego in its c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l a t i o n to the super-ego a n d thus of

the ego itself. A l t h o u g h the ego is s a i d to be the p o i n t of d e p a r ­

ture for a l i b i d o that is s u b s e q u e n t l y w i t h d r a w n into the ego,

i t n o w appears that o n l y u p o n s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l c a n the ego

emerge as an object for consciousness , s o m e t h i n g that m i g h t

be represented at a l l , w h e t h e r as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e or a site

of r e t u r n . I n d e e d , the phrase " w i t h d r a w n i n t o the ego" is the

re t roact ive p r o d u c t o f the m e l a n c h o l i c process i t p u r p o r t s to

178 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 179

descr ibe. T h u s i t does not , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , descr ibe a p r e -

c o n s t i t u t e d p s y c h i c process b ut emerges in a be lated f a s h i o n

as a representat ion c o n d i t i o n e d by m e l a n c h o l i c w i t h d r a w a l .

T h i s last p o i n t raises the q u e s t i o n of the status of the p s y ­

c h i c t o p o g r a p h i e s that p r e d o m i n a t e i n this a n d other essays

b y F r e u d . A l t h o u g h one m i g h t expect that s u c h t o p o g r a p h i e s

are to be r e a d as the e x p l a n a t o r y a p p a r a t u s of p s y c h o a n a l y ­

sis a n d not, as i t were , one of its t e x t u a l i z e d s y m p t o m s , F r e u d

suggests that the v e r y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ego a n d super-ego

c a n be t raced to an a m b i v a l e n c e that i s first w i t h d r a w n f r o m

consc iousness a n d then reemerges as a p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h y

in w h i c h " c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " i s sp l i t off f r o m the ego. S i m i l a r l y ,

in his d i s c u s s i o n of the self-beratements of the super-ego, he

refers t e l l i n g l y to conscience as "one of the major i n s t i t u t i o n s

of the ego."

C l e a r l y p l a y i n g on a m e t a p h o r of a s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d d o ­

m a i n of p o w e r , F r e u d ' s reference to consc ience as " a m o n g the

major i n s t i t u t i o n s of the ego [Ichinstitutionen]" (247) suggests

not o n l y that conscience i s i n s t i t u t e d , p r o d u c e d , a n d m a i n ­

t a i n e d w i t h i n a larger p o l i t y a n d its o r g a n i z a t i o n , b u t that the

ego a n d its v a r i o u s parts are accessible t h r o u g h a m e t a p h o r i c a l

language that attr ibutes a s o c i a l content a n d s t r u c t u r e to these

p r e s u m a b l y p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a . A l t h o u g h F r e u d beg ins his

essay b y i n s i s t i n g o n the i n d i s p u t a b l y " p s y c h o g e n i c n a t u r e "

(243) o f the m e l a n c h o l i a a n d m o u r n i n g u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n

in the essay, he also p r o v i d e s s o c i a l m e t a p h o r s that not o n l y

g o v e r n the t o p o g r a p h i c d e s c r i p t i o n s o f m e l a n c h o l y ' s o p e r a ­

t i o n , b u t i m p l i c i t l y u n d o h is o w n c l a i m t o p r o v i d e a speci f i ­

c a l l y p s y c h o g e n i c e x p l a n a t i o n o f these p s y c h i c states. F r e u d

descr ibes "one p a r t of the ego [that] sets itself over against the

other, judges it c r i t i ca l ly , a n d , as it were , takes it as its object."

A c r i t i c a l agency is s a i d to be "spl i t off" (abgespalten) f r o m the

ego, suggest ing that in s o m e p r i o r state, this c r i t i c a l f a c u l t y

w a s not yet separate. H o w , precise ly , this s p l i t t i n g of the ego

into parts o c c u r s is , i t seems, p a r t of the strange, f a b u l a t i n g

scene i n i t i a t e d by m e l a n c h o l y , the w i t h d r a w a l o f cathexis f r o m

the object to the ego, a n d the subsequent emergence of a r e p ­

resentat ion of the p s y c h e in terms of sp l i ts a n d parts, ar t icu lat ­

i n g a m b i v a l e n c e a n d i n t e r n a l a n t a g o n i s m . I s this t o p o g r a p h y

not s y m p t o m a t i c o f w h a t i t seeks t o e x p l a i n ? H o w else d o w e

e x p l a i n this i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n of the p s y c h e a n d its e x p r e s s i o n

here as a scene of p a r t i t i o n a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n ? Is there an i m ­

p l i c i t s o c i a l text in this t o p o g r a p h i c a l r e n d i t i o n o f p s y c h i c life,

one that instal ls a n t a g o n i s m (the threat of j u d g m e n t ) as the

s t r u c t u r a l necessi ty o f the t o p o g r a p h i c a l m o d e l , one that fo l ­

l o w s f r o m m e l a n c h o l i a a n d f r o m a w i t h d r a w a l o f at tachment?

M e l a n c h o l i a descr ibes a process b y w h i c h a n o r i g i n a l l y ex­

terna l object is lost, or an i d e a l is lost, a n d the re fusa l to break

the at tachment to s u c h an object or i d e a l leads to the w i t h ­

d r a w a l of the object i n t o the ego, the r e p l a c e m e n t of the object

b y the ego, a n d the set t ing u p o f a n i n n e r w o r l d i n w h i c h a

c r i t i c a l agency is sp l i t off f r o m the ego a n d p r o c e e d s to take

the ego as its object. In a w e l l - k n o w n passage, F r e u d m a k e s

c lear that the accusat ions that the c r i t i c a l agency is s a i d to l eve l

against the ego t u r n o u t to be v e r y m u c h l i k e the accusat ions

that the ego w o u l d have l e v e l e d against the object or the i d e a l .

T h u s , the ego absorbs b o t h l o v e a n d rage against the object.

M e l a n c h o l i a appears to be a process of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , a n d one

m i g h t w e l l r e a d its effects as a p s y c h i c state that has ef fect ively

s u b s t i t u t e d itself for the w o r l d i n w h i c h i t d w e l l s . T h e effect o f

m e l a n c h o l i a , then, appears to be the loss of the s o c i a l w o r l d ,

the s u b s t i t u t i o n o f p s y c h i c parts a n d a n t a g o n i s m s for e x t e r n a l

re lat ions a m o n g s o c i a l actors: "an object-loss w a s t r a n s f o r m e d

i n t o an ego-loss a n d the conf l ict b e t w e e n the ego a n d the l o v e d

180 Psychic Inceptions

p e r s o n i n t o a c leavage b e t w e e n the c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of the ego

a n d the ego as a l tered by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " (249).

T h e object is lost, a n d the ego is s a i d to w i t h d r a w the o b ­

ject i n t o itself. T h e "object" thus w i t h d r a w n is a l r e a d y m a g i c a l ,

a trace of s o m e k i n d , a representat ive of the object, b u t not

the object itself, w h i c h is, after a l l , gone. T h e ego i n t o w h i c h

this r e m n a n t is " b r o u g h t " is not exact ly a shelter for lost par t -

objects, a l t h o u g h i t is s o m e t i m e s d e s c r i b e d that way. T h e ego

is "a l tered by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , " that is, a l t e r e d by v i r t u e of ab­

s o r b i n g the object or p u l l i n g b a c k its o w n cathexis onto itself.

T h e " p r i c e " of s u c h an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s that the ego

spl i ts i n t o the c r i t i c a l agency a n d the ego as object of c r i t i c i s m

a n d j u d g m e n t . T h u s the r e l a t i o n t o the object reappears " i n "

the ego, not m e r e l y as a m e n t a l event or s i n g u l a r r e p r e s e n ­

tat ion, b u t as a scene of sel f-beratement that reconf igures the

t o p o g r a p h y of the ego, a fantasy of i n t e r n a l p a r t i t i o n a n d j u d g ­

m e n t that c o m e s to s t r u c t u r e the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p s y c h i c l i fe

tout court. T h e ego n o w stands for the object, a n d the c r i t i c a l

agency c o m e s to represent the ego's d i s o w n e d rage, re i f i ed as

a p s y c h i c agency separate f r o m the ego itself. That rage, a n d

the at tachment i t i m p l i e s , are " t u r n e d b a c k u p o n " the ego, b u t

f r o m w h e r e ?

Yet c e r t a i n s o c i a l l y ident i f iab le features of the m e l a n c h o l i c ,

i n c l u d i n g " c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e s s , " suggest that m e l a n c h o l i a i s

not an a s o c i a l p s y c h i c state. In fact, m e l a n c h o l i a i s p r o d u c e d

to the extent that the s o c i a l w o r l d is e c l i p s e d by the p s y c h i c ,

that a c e r t a i n transfer of a t tachment f r o m objects to ego takes

place, n o t w i t h o u t a c o n t a m i n a t i o n of the p s y c h i c sphere by

the s o c i a l sphere that i s a b a n d o n e d . F r e u d suggests as m u c h

w h e n h e e x p l a i n s that the lost other i s not s i m p l y b r o u g h t i n ­

s ide the ego, as one m i g h t shelter a w a y w a r d d o g . T h e act of

i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n (to be c o n s t r u e d as a fantasy rather t h a n as a

Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 181

p r o c e s s 8 ) t r a n s f o r m s the object (one m i g h t even use the t e r m

Aufhebung for s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ) ; the other is t a k e n in

a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an ego, b u t an ego to be r e v i l e d , t h e r e b y

b o t h p r o d u c i n g a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g the c r i t i c a l "agency . . .

c o m m o n l y c a l l e d conscience." A f o r m of m o r a l r e f l e x i v i t y i s

p r o d u c e d i n w h i c h the ego spl i ts i tsel f t o f u r n i s h a n inter­

n a l p e r s p e c t i v e b y w h i c h t o j u d g e itself. T h i s ref lexive r e l a ­

t i o n b y w h i c h the ego b e c o m e s a n object for itself t u r n s o u t

to be a w i t h d r a w n a n d t r a n s f o r m e d (entzogen a n d aufgehoben)

r e l a t i o n to the lost other; in this sense, r e f l e x i v i t y appears to

d e p e n d u p o n the p r i o r o p e r a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e ego i s

a lso f i g u r e d as h a v i n g a voice t h r o u g h this process , a n d it a p ­

pears i m p e r a t i v e w i t h i n m e l a n c h o l i a that sel f-beratement b e

v o i c e d , not m e r e l y to oneself, b u t in the presence of others.

T h e sel f-reproaches of the ego are not s i m p l y the i m i t a t i o n

of reproaches once l e v e l e d against the ego f r o m the one lost ,

as i s c o m m o n l y a s s u m e d ; rather, they are reproaches l e v e l e d

against the other that n o w t u r n b a c k u p o n the ego.

Before w e c o n s i d e r m o r e c lose ly w h a t i t m e a n s for s o m e ­

t h i n g t o " t u r n b a c k u p o n itsel f" i n this way , i t seems i m p o r ­

tant to note that the p s y c h i c f o r m of r e f l e x i v i t y m e l a n c h o l i a

elaborates carr ies the trace of the other w i t h i n it as a d i s s i m u ­

lated soc ia l i ty , a n d that the p e r f o r m a n c e of m e l a n c h o l i a as the

shameless v o i c i n g of sel f-beratement in front of others effects

a d e t o u r that rejoins m e l a n c h o l i a to its lost or w i t h d r a w n s o c i ­

ality. In m e l a n c h o l i a , not o n l y i s the loss o f an other or an i d e a l

lost to consciousness , but the s o c i a l w o r l d in w h i c h s u c h a loss

b e c a m e p o s s i b l e i s a lso lost. T h e m e l a n c h o l i c does not m e r e l y

w i t h d r a w the lost object f r o m consciousness , b u t w i t h d r a w s

i n t o the p s y c h e a c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the s o c i a l w o r l d as w e l l . T h e

ego thus becomes a " p o l i t y " a n d consc ience one of its "major

i n s t i t u t i o n s , " p r e c i s e l y because p s y c h i c l i fe w i t h d r a w s a s o c i a l

182 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 183

w o r l d i n t o itself i n a n effort t o a n n u l the losses that w o r l d de­

m a n d s . W i t h i n m e l a n c h o l i a , the p s y c h e b e c o m e s the topos i n

w h i c h there i s n o loss a n d , i n d e e d , n o negat ion . M e l a n c h o l i a

refuses to a c k n o w l e d g e loss, a n d in this sense "preserves" its

lost objects as p s y c h i c effects.

F r e u d r e m a r k s the s o c i a l c o n d u c t o f the m e l a n c h o l i c , e m ­

p h a s i z i n g h i s or her shameless se l f -exposure: "the m e l a n c h o l i c

does not b eh a ve in q ui te the same w a y as a p e r s o n w h o is

c r u s h e d b y r e m o r s e a n d se l f -reproach i n a n o r m a l fashion.

Fee l ings o f s h a m e are l a c k i n g . . . o r . . . are not p r o m i n e n t . . . .

O n e m i g h t e m p h a s i z e the presence i n h i m o f a n a l m o s t o p p o ­

site trait o f insistent c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e s s w h i c h f inds satisfac­

t i o n i n s e l f - e x p o s u r e " (247). T h e m e l a n c h o l i c sustains a n i n ­

d irect a n d def lected r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the s o c i a l i t y f r o m w h i c h

he or she has w i t h d r a w n . O n e would have d e n o u n c e d the lost

other i f one c o u l d — f o r d e p a r t i n g , i f for n o other reason. F u l ­

f i l l i n g a w i s h w h o s e f o r m , the past subjunct ive , p r e c l u d e s

a n y s u c h f u l f i l l m e n t , the m e l a n c h o l i c seeks not o n l y to r e ­

verse t i m e , r e i n s t a t i n g the i m a g i n a r y past as the present, b u t

to o c c u p y e v e r y p o s i t i o n a n d thereby to p r e c l u d e the loss o f

the addressee. T h e m e l a n c h o l i c w o u l d h a v e said something, i f

h e o r she c o u l d , b u t d i d not, a n d n o w bel ieves i n the sus­

t a i n i n g p o w e r o f the voice . V a i n l y , the m e l a n c h o l i c n o w says

w h a t he or she w o u l d have s a i d , a d d r e s s e d o n l y to h imsel f , as

one w h o i s a l r e a d y spl i t off f r o m h i m s e l f , b u t w h o s e p o w e r

o f self-address d e p e n d s u p o n this self-forfeiture. T h e m e l a n ­

c h o l i c thus b u r r o w s i n a d i r e c t i o n o p p o s i t e t o that i n w h i c h h e

m i g h t f i n d a fresher trace of the lost other, a t t e m p t i n g to re­

solve the loss t h r o u g h p s y c h i c subst i tut ions a n d c o m p o u n d i n g

the loss as he goes. A fa i lure of address, a fa i lure to s u s t a i n the

other t h r o u g h the v o i c e that addresses, m e l a n c h o l i a emerges

as a c o m p e n s a t o r y f o r m of negat ive n a r c i s s i s m : I r e v i l e m y ­

self a n d rehabi l i tate the other i n the f o r m o f m y o w n i n t e r n a l

a m b i v a l e n c e . I refuse to speak to or of the other, b u t I speak

v o l u m i n o u s l y about mysel f , l e a v i n g a re fracted t r a i l of w h a t I

d i d not say to or about the other. T h e stronger the i n h i b i t i o n

against e x p r e s s i o n , the s tronger the e x p r e s s i o n of conscience.

H o w does this p r o b l e m o f the u n c o n s c i o u s loss, the re fused

loss, that m a r k s m e l a n c h o l i a r e t u r n us to the p r o b l e m of the re­

l a t i o n b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c a n d the socia l? I n m o u r n i n g , F r e u d

tel ls us, there is n o t h i n g about the loss that is u n c o n s c i o u s . In

m e l a n c h o l i a , h e m a i n t a i n s , "the object-loss i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m

consc iousness" : the object is not o n l y lost , b u t that loss itself is

lost, w i t h d r a w n a n d p r e s e r v e d i n the s u s p e n d e d t i m e o f p s y ­

c h i c life. In other w o r d s , a c c o r d i n g to the m e l a n c h o l i c , " I have

lost n o t h i n g . "

T h e u n s p e a k a b i l i t y a n d u n r e p r e s e n t a b i l i t y o f this loss t r a n s ­

lates d i r e c t l y i n t o a h e i g h t e n i n g of conscience. W h e r e one

m i g h t expect that consc ience w o u l d w a x a n d w a n e a c c o r d i n g

to the s t rength of e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d p r o h i b i t i o n s , i t appears

that its s t r e n g t h has m o r e to do w i t h m a r s h a l l i n g aggres­

s i o n in the serv ice of r e f u s i n g to a c k n o w l e d g e a loss that has

a l r e a d y t a k e n place, a re fusal to lose a t i m e that is a l r e a d y

gone. O d d l y , the p s y c h e ' s m o r a l i s m a ppea r s to be an i n d e x o f

its o w n t h w a r t e d grief a n d i l l e g i b l e rage. T h u s , i f the r e l a t i o n

b e t w e e n m e l a n c h o l i a a n d s o c i a l l ife is to be reestabl ished, i t i s

not to be m e a s u r e d by r e g a r d i n g the self-beratements of c o n ­

science as m i m e t i c i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n s of the beratements l e v e l e d

by s o c i a l agencies o f j u d g m e n t or p r o h i b i t i o n . Rather, f o r m s

o f s o c i a l p o w e r emerge that regulate w h a t losses w i l l a n d w i l l

not b e g r i e v e d ; i n the s o c i a l forec losure o f gr ief w e m i g h t f i n d

w h a t fuels the i n t e r n a l v i o l e n c e of conscience.

A l t h o u g h s o c i a l p o w e r regulates w h a t losses can b e g r i e v e d ,

it is not a l w a y s as effective as it a i m s to be. T h e loss can-

184 Psychic Inceptions

not f u l l y be d e n i e d , b u t nei ther does i t appear in a w a y that

can d i r e c t l y be af f i rmed. T h e " p l a i n t s " o f the m e l a n c h o l i c are

i n v a r i a b l y m i s d i r e c t e d , yet in this m i s d i r e c t i o n resides a n a ­

scent p o l i t i c a l text. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n on grief registers as a loss

of speech for its addressee. T h e p a i n of loss is " c r e d i t e d " to

the one w h o suffers it , a t w h i c h p o i n t the loss is u n d e r s t o o d

as a fault or i n j u r y d e s e r v i n g of redress; one seeks redress for

h a r m s d o n e to oneself, b u t f r o m no one except oneself.

T h e v i o l e n c e o f s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n i s not to be f o u n d in its

u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n , b u t i n the c i r c u i t o u s route b y w h i c h the p s y ­

che accuses itself of its o w n worthlessness . No doubt , this is a

strange a n d o p a q u e s y m p t o m o f u n r e s o l v e d grief. W h y does

the r e t r a c t i o n of the lost other i n t o the ego, the re fusal to ac­

k n o w l e d g e loss, c u l m i n a t e in a d e p r i v a t i o n of the ego? Is the

loss res i tuated in a w a y that n u l l i f i e s the ego in order , p s y ­

chica l ly , to save the object? T h e decrease in self-esteem that is

s a i d t o d i s t i n g u i s h m e l a n c h o l i a f r o m m o u r n i n g appears t o r e ­

sult f r o m p r o d i g i o u s efforts b y the c r i t i c a l agency t o d e p r i v e

the ego of its esteem. B u t one c o u l d e q u a l l y say that there is no

q u e s t i o n of h i g h or l o w self-esteem p r i o r to the o p e r a t i o n of

this c r i t i c a l agency, no "esteem" that be longs to the ego p r i o r to

its p a r t i t i o n i n t o ego a n d super-ego. P r i o r to the o p e r a t i o n of

a c r i t i c a l agency, i t w o u l d be d i f f icul t to gauge the ego against

an i d e a l , a j u d g m e n t that p r e s u p p o s e s a c r i t i c a l agency that

m i g h t a p p r o v e or d i s a p p r o v e of the ego's m o r a l state. In this

sense, self-esteem appears to be p r o d u c e d by the v e r y c r i t i c a l

agency b y w h i c h i t i s p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t r o y e d .

F r e u d does refer to this r e s i t u a t i n g of loss in the ego w h e n

he refers to the ego as i m p o v e r i s h e d , as h a v i n g b e c o m e p o o r ,

a n d "an object-loss . . . t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an ego- loss" (249).

T h i s loss in the ego is a p p a r e n t l y a loss of an i d e a l of itself, a n d

in F r e u d ' s later w o r k , he specifies that the j u d g m e n t s o f c o n -

Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 185

science w o r k in s u c h a w a y that the super-ego gauges the ego

against the "ego-ideal ." T h e ego is f o u n d to be i m p o v e r i s h e d

bes ide this i d e a l , a n d the " l o s s " that the ego suffers is a loss

o f c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n itself a n d the i d e a l b y w h i c h i t

i s j u d g e d . W h e r e does this i d e a l emerge f r o m ? Is i t a r b i t r a r i l y

m a n u f a c t u r e d by the ego, or do s u c h ideals r e t a i n the trace of

s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n a n d n o r m a t i v i t y ? F r e u d r e m a r k s that m e l a n ­

c h o l i a is a response not just to death , b u t to other o r d e r s of

loss, i n c l u d i n g "sl ights a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s " (250). A n d w h e n

h e i n t r o d u c e s the n o t i o n that b o t h m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n c h o l i a

c a n be responses to the loss of an i d e a l , s u c h as " c o u n t r y " or

" l iber ty , " he m a k e s c lear by h is e x a m p l e s that s u c h idea ls are

s o c i a l i n character.

T h e ideals by w h i c h the ego judges itself c l e a r l y are ones by

w h i c h the ego w i l l b e f o u n d w a n t i n g . T h e m e l a n c h o l i c c o m ­

pares h i m - o r herself i n v i d i o u s l y w i t h s u c h s o c i a l ideals . I f

they are the p s y c h i c sanct i f i cat ion of once-externa l objects or

ideals , then they are s e e m i n g l y also the target of aggress ion.

Indeed, w e m i g h t w e l l ask w h e t h e r the s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the

ego is, as i t were , berated by the i d e a l is not the i n v e r s i o n of

a p r i o r s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the ego w o u l d , i f i t c o u l d , have be­

rated the idea l . Is the p s y c h i c v i o l e n c e of conscience not a r e ­

fracted i n d i c t m e n t of the s o c i a l f o r m s that have m a d e c e r t a i n

k i n d s of losses u n g r i e v a b l e ?

T h u s , a loss in the w o r l d that cannot be d e c l a r e d enrages,

generates a m b i v a l e n c e , a n d becomes the loss " i n " the ego that

i s nameless a n d dif fuse a n d that p r o m p t s p u b l i c r i t u a l s of self-

beratement. O f m o u r n i n g , F r e u d w r i t e s that i t " i m p e l s the

ego to g i v e up the object by declaring the object to be d e a d "

(257, m y emphasis) . M e l a n c h o l i a , i t w o u l d f o l l o w , refuses t o

m a k e a n y s u c h d e c l a r a t i o n , dec l ines speech, s u s p e n d i n g the

" v e r d i c t of r e a l i t y that the object no longer exists" (255). We

•

i 8 6 Psychic Inceptions

k n o w , h o w e v e r , that the m e l a n c h o l i c is also " c o m m u n i c a t i v e , "

w h i c h suggests that h is or her speech is neither v e r d i c t i v e

n o r dec larat ive (assertoric), but i n e v i t a b l y i n d i r e c t a n d c i r c u ­

i tous. W h a t cannot be d e c l a r e d by the m e l a n c h o l i c i s never­

theless w h a t governs m e l a n c h o l i c speech — a n u n s p e a k a b i l i t y

that o r g a n i z e s the f ie ld of the speakable.

" T h e loss of the m e l a n c h o l i c seems p u z z l i n g to us because

we cannot see what it is that is a b s o r b i n g h i m so e n t i r e l y " (247).

W h a t cannot be d i r e c t l y s p o k e n i s also w h a t i s o c c l u d e d f r o m

sight, absent f r o m the v i s u a l f ie ld that o r g a n i z e d m e l a n c h o ­

l i a . M e l a n c h o l i a i s k e p t f r o m v i e w ; i t i s a n a b s o r p t i o n b y

s o m e t h i n g that cannot be a c c o m m o d a t e d by v i s i o n , that re­

sists b e i n g b r o u g h t i n t o the o p e n , nei ther seen n o r d e c l a r e d .

As p r i v a t e a n d i rrecoverable as this loss seems, the m e l a n ­

c h o l i c i s s trangely o u t g o i n g , p u r s u i n g a n " insistent c o m m u n i ­

cativeness w h i c h f inds sat isfact ion in se l f -exposure" (247). T h e

worthlessness o f the ego i s ins i s tent ly c o m m u n i c a t e d . M e l ­

a n c h o l i c speech, nei ther v e r d i c t i v e n o r dec larat ive , r e m a i n s

unable to speak its loss. W h a t the m e l a n c h o l i c does declare ,

namely , his o w n worthlessness , ident i f ies the loss at the s ight

of the ego a n d , hence, cont inues to f a i l to i d e n t i f y the loss.

Self-beratement takes the p lace of a b a n d o n m e n t , a n d becomes

the t o k e n of its refusal .

T h e h e i g h t e n i n g o f conscience u n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s

attests to the u n a v o w e d status of the loss. T h e ego b e c o m e s

m o r a l i z e d o n the c o n d i t i o n o f u n g r i e v e d loss. B u t w h a t c o n d i ­

t ions m a k e i t poss ib le to gr ieve, or not to gr ieve, loss?

T h e ego not o n l y b r i n g s the object i n s i d e but b r i n g s ag­

gress ion against the object a l o n g w i t h it. T h e m o r e this object

is b r o u g h t i n s i d e , as i t were , the h i g h e r the sel f-debasement,

the p o o r e r the ego becomes: d e l u s i o n a l self-abasement "over­

comes the i n s t i n c t w h i c h c o m p e l s e v e r y l i v i n g t h i n g t o l i f e "

Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 187

(246). T h e aggress ion t u r n e d against the ego has the p o w e r

t o contest a n d o v e r c o m e the desire t o l ive . A t this p o i n t i n

F r e u d ' s theory, aggress ion against oneself i s d e r i v e d f r o m an

o u t w a r d l y d i r e c t e d aggress ion against an other. B u t one c a n

d i s c e r n in this f o r m u l a t i o n the b e g i n n i n g s of ref lect ion on a

d r i v e that m i g h t be s a i d to c o u n t e r the p leasure p r i n c i p l e ,

w h a t is later referred to as the death d r i v e .

In m e l a n c h o l i a , the ego contracts s o m e t h i n g of the loss or

a b a n d o n m e n t b y w h i c h the object i s n o w m a r k e d , a n aban­

d o n m e n t that is re fused a n d , as re fused, is i n c o r p o r a t e d . In

this sense, to refuse a loss is to b e c o m e it. If the ego cannot

accept the loss of the other, then the loss that the other comes

to represent b e c o m e s the loss that n o w character izes the ego:

the ego becomes p o o r a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d . A loss suffered in

the w o r l d becomes n o w the character is t ic lack in the ego (a

sp l i t that is , as i t were , i m p o r t e d t h r o u g h the necessary w o r k

of in terna l i za t ion) .

In this way, m e l a n c h o l i a operates in a d i r e c t i o n d i r e c t l y

counter to n a r c i s s i s m . E c h o i n g the b i b l i c a l cadence of "the

s h a d o w of death," a w a y in w h i c h d e a t h i m p o s e s its presence

o n life, F r e u d r e m a r k s that i n m e l a n c h o l i a "the s h a d o w o f the

object fel l u p o n the ego" (249). In L a c a n ' s essays on n a r c i s ­

s i s m , the f o r m u l a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t l y reversed: the s h a d o w of

the ego falls u p o n the object. 9 N a r c i s s i s m cont inues to c o n t r o l

love, e v e n w h e n that n a r c i s s i s m appears to g i v e w a y to object-

love: it is s t i l l m y s e l f that I f i n d there at the site of the object,

my absence. In m e l a n c h o l i a this f o r m u l a t i o n i s reversed: in the

p lace of the loss that the other comes to represent, I f i n d m y ­

self to be that loss, i m p o v e r i s h e d , w a n t i n g . In narc iss is t ic love ,

the other contracts my abundance . In m e l a n c h o l i a , I contract

the other 's absence.

T h i s o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n m e l a n c h o l i a a n d n a r c i s s i s m ges-

i 8 8 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 189

tures t o w a r d the d u a l - d r i v e theory. F r e u d is c lear that m e l a n ­

c h o l i a m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d in part as a narc iss is t ic d is turbance .

S o m e of its features c o m e f r o m n a r c i s s i s m , b u t some c o m e

f r o m m o u r n i n g . I n m a k i n g this c l a i m , F r e u d appears t o set

m o u r n i n g as a l i m i t to n a r c i s s i s m , or p e r h a p s , as its counter-

d i r e c t i o n . W h a t erodes the ego i n m e l a n c h o l i a i s u n d e r s t o o d

to be a loss that w a s o r i g i n a l l y external , b u t by The Ego and

the Id F r e u d comes to r e c o g n i z e that the w o r k of m e l a n c h o ­

l i a m a y w e l l b e i n the serv ice o f the death d r i v e . H e asks,

" H o w i s i t then that i n m e l a n c h o l i a the super-ego can be­

c o m e a gather ing-place for the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s ? " 1 0 H o w is i t

that the e g o - e r o d i n g effects of m e l a n c h o l i a , the ones that over­

c o m e "the ins t inct w h i c h c o m p e l s every l i v i n g t h i n g t o l ife,"

c o m e to w o r k in the service of a d r i v e that seeks to o v e r c o m e

life? F r e u d goes further a n d r e m a r k s that the "merci less v i o ­

lence" o f conscience s h o w s that " w h a t i s n o w h o l d i n g s w a y

in the super-ego is, as it were , a p u r e c u l t u r e of the death

ins t inct [Todestrieb]" (53). In m e l a n c h o l i a , t h e n , a c c o r d i n g to

this r e v i s e d theory p u b l i s h e d in The Ego and the Id, it w o u l d

be i m p o s s i b l e to separate the death d r i v e f r o m the conscience

h e i g h t e n e d t h r o u g h m e l a n c h o l i a . In ei ther case, the ego r i s k s

its l ife in the face of its fa i lure to l i v e up to the s tandards en­

c o d e d i n the ego- ideal . A n d the aggress ion i t takes u p o n itself

is in part p r o p o r t i o n a l to the aggress ion against the other that

i t has m a n a g e d to b r i n g u n d e r c o n t r o l .

In this account of m e l a n c h o l i a , r e f l e x i v i t y emerges, as i t

does for N i e t z s c h e , as a t r a n s p o s e d aggress iv i ty . As we have

seen, for F r e u d i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " aggress ion

is p r i m a r i l y a r e l a t i o n to others a n d o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y a re la­

t i o n to oneself. He r e m a r k s that the s u i c i d a l p e r s o n m u s t first

have u n d e r g o n e m u r d e r o u s i m p u l s e s , a n d suggests that self-

t o r m e n t satisfies s a d i s m a n d hate. B o t h of these i m p u l s e s have

been e x p e r i e n c e d a s " t u r n e d a r o u n d u p o n the subject's o w n

self" (251) — " e i n e W e n d u n g gegen d i e eigene Person er fahren

haben." T h e a m b i v a l e n c e that contains this aggress ion spl i ts

the cathexis, w h i c h is then d i s t r i b u t e d i n t o "parts": p a r t o f

the erot ic cathexis regresses to i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; the other p a r t to

s a d i s m . Set up as i n t e r n a l parts of the ego, the sadist ic part

takes a i m at the part that identi f ies , a n d the p s y c h i c a l l y v i o l e n t

d r a m a of the super-ego proceeds . F r e u d appears to a s s u m e

a m b i v a l e n c e at the scene of loss: a w i s h for the other to d i e or

to go (a w i s h that is s o m e t i m e s inst igated by the des ire of the

ego to l i v e a n d , hence, break its at tachment to w h a t has gone

or d ied) . F r e u d interprets this a m b i v a l e n c e as at once an i n ­

stance of s a d i s m a n d a w i s h to preserve the other as oneself.

Se l f - torment i s this s a d i s m t u r n e d b a c k on the ego, e n c o d i n g

a n d d i s s i m u l a t i n g the d u a l des ire to v a n q u i s h a n d to save the

object. S e l f - p u n i s h m e n t , he notes, is "the c i r c u i t o u s p a t h " of

s a d i s m ; we m i g h t a d d , i t i s the c i r c u i t o u s p a t h o f i d e n t i f i c a ­

t i o n as w e l l .

F r e u d appears clear here that s a d i s m precedes m a s o c h i s m .

( H i s later emphas is o n the d e a t h d r i v e w i l l invert this p r i o r i t y . )

Ref lexive ar t i cu la t ions o f aggress ion are a l w a y s d e r i v e d f r o m

o u t w a r d l y d i r e c t e d ones. W e have k n o w n for s o m e t i m e , h e

wr i tes , that "no n e u r o t i c h a r b o r s thoughts o f s u i c i d e w h i c h he

has not t u r n e d back u p o n h i m s e l f [auf sich zuruckwendet] f r o m

m u r d e r o u s i m p u l s e s t o w a r d o t h e r s " (252). T h e ego takes itself

as an object in the place of t a k i n g the other as an object. I n d e e d ,

the ego first takes itself as an object on the c o n d i t i o n that it has

already t a k e n the other as an object, a n d that the other b e c o m e s

the m o d e l by w h i c h the ego assumes its b o u n d a r y as an o b ­

ject for i t s e l f — a k i n d o f m i m e s i s , not u n l i k e that d e s c r i b e d b y

M i k k e l Borch-Jacobsen, 1 1 i n w h i c h m i m e t i c a c t i v i t y p r o d u c e s

the ego as an object on the m o d e l of the other. M i m e s i s w i t h i n

190 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 191

m e l a n c h o l i a p e r f o r m s this a c t i v i t y as the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the

other " i n t o the ego." T h i s is an effort to preserve the other a n d

at the same t i m e to d i s s i m u l a t e aggress ion t o w a r d the other.

C l e a r l y no F r e u d i a n t h e o r y that takes the ego as p r i m a r y

o r p r e g i v e n can account for the w a y i n w h i c h the ego first

b e c o m e s an object on the c o n d i t i o n of the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of

aggress ion a n d the re fusal of loss. M e l a n c h o l i a establishes the

t e n u o u s basis of the ego, a n d indicates s o m e t h i n g of its status

as an i n s t r u m e n t of containment. T h e s igni f icance of the ego

as c o n t a i n i n g aggress ion b e c o m e s clear w h e n we c o n s i d e r

F r e u d ' s e x p l i c i t l y s o c i a l m e t a p h o r i c s i n these d e s c r i p t i o n s .

O n e passage, n o t e d b y H o m i B h a b h a , 1 2 suggests s o m e t h i n g o f

the p o l i t i c a l a n a l o g y at issue. " M e l a n c h o l i c . . . r e a c t i o n . . .

p r o c e e d s f r o m a m e n t a l conste l la t ion of r e v o l t [seelischen Kon-

stellation der Auflehnung], w h i c h has then, by a c e r t a i n process ,

p a s s e d over into the c r u s h e d state of m e l a n c h o l i a [die melan-

cholische Zerknirschung]" (248).

B h a b h a argues that m e l a n c h o l i a is not a f o r m of pass iv i ty ,

b u t a f o r m of revol t that takes place t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n a n d

m e t o n y m y . T h e m e l a n c h o l i c inverts against itself the i n d i c t ­

m e n t i t w o u l d l e v e l against the other; this " i n c o r p o r a t i o n " o f

the other is also, B h a b h a notes, a " d i s i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the M a s ­

ter." U n d e r s c o r i n g that "the L a w is e n t o m b e d as loss at the

p o i n t of its i d e a l author i ty , " he argues that m e l a n c h o l i a c o n ­

tests the i d e a l i t y o f that a u t h o r i t y p r e c i s e l y by i n c o r p o r a t i n g

i t . 1 3 A u t h o r i t y ' s i d e a l i t y i s i n c o r p o r a b l e e lsewhere, n o longer

t i e d in a n y absolute sense to one f igure of the law.

M e l a n c h o l i a is a r e b e l l i o n that has been p u t d o w n , c r u s h e d .

Yet it is not a static affair; it cont inues as a k i n d of " w o r k " that

takes p l a c e b y def lect ion. F i g u r e d w i t h i n the w o r k i n g s o f the

p s y c h e is the p o w e r of the state to p r e e m p t an i n s u r r e c t i o n ­

a r y rage. T h e " c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " of the m e l a n c h o l i c is at once a

s o c i a l a n d p s y c h i c i n s t r u m e n t . T h i s super-egoic conscience i s

not s i m p l y analogous to the state's m i l i t a r y p o w e r over its c i t i ­

z e n r y ; the state cu l t ivates m e l a n c h o l i a a m o n g its c i t i z e n r y p r e ­

c ise ly a s a w a y o f d i s s i m u l a t i n g a n d d i s p l a c i n g its o w n i d e a l

a u t h o r i t y . T h i s is not to suggest that consc ience is a s i m p l e

i n s t a n t i a t i o n of the state; on the contrary , i t is the v a n i s h i n g

p o i n t o f the state's a u t h o r i t y , its p s y c h i c i d e a l i z a t i o n , a n d , i n

that sense, its d i s a p p e a r a n c e as an external object. T h e p r o c e s s

of f o r m i n g the subject is a process of r e n d e r i n g the t e r r o r i z ­

i n g p o w e r o f the state i n v i s i b l e — a n d ef fect ive—as the i d e a l i t y

of conscience. F u r t h e r m o r e , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the i d e a l of

" L a w " u n d e r s c o r e s the cont ingent r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a g i v e n

state a n d the i d e a l i t y o f its p o w e r . T h i s i d e a l i t y c a n a l w a y s be

i n c o r p o r a t e d e lsewhere a n d r e m a i n s i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h

a n y o f its g i v e n i n c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h a t this i d e a l i t y c a n n o t be

r e d u c e d to a n y of its i n c o r p o r a t i o n s does not m e a n , h o w e v e r ,

that i t subsists in a n o u m e n a l sphere b e y o n d a l l e m b o d i m e n t s .

Rather, the i n c o r p o r a t i o n s are sites of r e a r t i c u l a t i o n , c o n d i ­

t ions for a " w o r k i n g t h r o u g h " a n d , p o t e n t i a l l y , a " t h r o w i n g

off" (Auflehnung).

T h e revol t i n m e l a n c h o l i a c a n b e d i s t i l l e d b y m a r s h a l l i n g

aggress ion in the service o f m o u r n i n g , b ut also, necessari ly , o f

l ife. A s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p s y c h i c terror, consc ience w i e l d s the

p o w e r of c o n d e m n a t i o n that, q u i te l i tera l ly , poses a threat to

one's life. F r e u d notes that i t "often e n o u g h succeeds in d r i v ­

i n g the ego i n t o death, if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in

t i m e b y the change r o u n d i n t o m a n i a . " 1 4 M a n i a ap p e ars t o b e

the energet ic t h r o w i n g off of the at tachment to the lost object,

e n s h r i n e d i n the w o r k i n g s o f conscience. Yet i n m a n i a , " w h a t

the ego has s u r m o u n t e d a n d w h a t i t i s t r i u m p h i n g o v e r re­

m a i n h i d d e n f r o m i t . " 1 5 I n m a n i a , the t y r a n t i s f e n d e d off, b u t

not t h r o w n off or o v e r c o m e . M a n i a m a r k s a t e m p o r a r y sus-

192 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 193

p e n s i o n or m a s t e r i n g of the t y r a n t by the ego, b u t the t y r a n t

r e m a i n s s t r u c t u r a l l y e n s c o n c e d for that p s y c h e — a n d u n k n o w ­

able. F o r a r e s o l u t i o n of m e l a n c h o l i a that is m o r e t h o r o u g h

t h a n a n y m a n i a c a n p r o v i d e , F r e u d suggests that " a v e r d i c t o f

r e a l i t y " m u s t b e accepted for m e l a n c h o l i a t o b e c o m e m o u r n ­

i n g , a n d for the at tachment to the lost object to be severed.

Indeed, the aggre ss io n i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e d by conscience against

the ego is p r e c i s e l y w h a t m u s t be r e a p p r o p r i a t e d in the ser­

v i c e of the desire to l i v e : "the l i b i d o ' s at tachment to the lost

object is m e t by the v e r d i c t of r e a l i t y that the object no longer

exists; a n d the ego, c o n f r o n t e d as i t w e r e w i t h the q u e s t i o n

w h e t h e r i t s h a l l share this fate, i s p e r s u a d e d by the s u m of the

narc iss i s t i c satisfactions i t d e r i v e s f r o m b e i n g a l i v e to sever its

a t tachment to the object that has b e e n a b o l i s h e d " (255).

F o r the m e l a n c h o l i c , b r e a k i n g the at tachment const i tutes

a s e c o n d loss of the object. If the object lost its e x t e r n a l i t y

w h e n i t b e c a m e a p s y c h i c i d e a l , i t n o w loses its i d e a l i t y as the

ego t u r n s against conscience, thus d e c e n t e r i n g itself. T h e j u d g ­

ments of consc ience are e x c h a n g e d for the v e r d i c t of real i ty ,

a n d this v e r d i c t poses a d i l e m m a for the m e l a n c h o l i c , n a m e l y ,

w h e t h e r to f o l l o w the lost object i n t o d e a t h or to seize the

o p p o r t u n i t y to l ive . Later, F r e u d r e m a r k s that there c a n be

no s e v e r i n g of this at tachment to the object w i t h o u t a d i rec t

" d e c l a r a t i o n " of loss a n d the d e s a n c t i f i c a t i o n of the object by

e x t e r n a l i z i n g aggress ion against i t : "Just as m o u r n i n g i m p e l s

the ego to g i v e up the object by d e c l a r i n g the object to be

d e a d a n d of fer ing the ego the i n d u c e m e n t to l ive , so does each

s ingle s t ruggle of a m b i v a l e n c e l o o s e n the f i x a t i o n of the l i b i d o

to the object by d i s p a r a g i n g i t , d e n i g r a t i n g i t a n d even as i t

w e r e k i l l i n g it off [entwertet, herabsetzt, gleichsam audi erschlagt]"

(257). " K i l l i n g off" the c r i t i c a l agency reverses a n d d isp laces

the i n t e r i o r i z e d scene o f consc ience a n d clears the w a y for

p s y c h i c s u r v i v a l . W h e r e a s m e l a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s a " d e l u s i o n a l

se l f -abasement . . . that o v e r c o m e s the i n s t i n c t w h i c h c o m p e l s

e v e r y l i v i n g t h i n g t o l i fe ," the break w i t h m e l a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s

t u r n i n g against the a l r e a d y " t u r n e d b a c k " aggress ion that c o n ­

stitutes conscience. S u r v i v a l , not p r e c i s e l y the o p p o s i t e o f m e l ­

a n c h o l i a , b u t w h a t m e l a n c h o l i a p u t s i n s u s p e n s i o n — r e q u i r e s

r e d i r e c t i n g rage against the lost other, d e f i l i n g the s a n c t i t y of

the d e a d for the p u r p o s e s of life, r a g i n g against the d e a d in

o r d e r not to j o i n t h e m .

A l t h o u g h s u c h rage m a y b e r e q u i r e d t o b r e a k the m e l ­

a n c h o l i c b i n d , there i s n o f ina l r e p r i e v e f r o m the a m b i v a ­

lence a n d n o f ina l s e p a r a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g f r o m m e l a n c h o l i a .

F r e u d ' s v i e w that m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n c h o l i a m i g h t b e d i s t i n ­

g u i s h e d i s c h a l l e n g e d n o t o n l y i n his o w n essay b y that n a m e ,

but e x p l i c i t l y in The Ego and the Id. A m b i v a l e n c e , w h i c h is first

i d e n t i f i e d a s a p o s s i b l e response t o loss i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l ­

a n c h o l i a , " becomes, t o w a r d the e n d of the essay, the s t ruggle

that loss occasions b e t w e e n the desire to l i v e a n d the desire

t o die. A s s u c h , b o t h a m b i v a l e n c e a n d the s t r u g g l e o f l i fe a n d

death, t o b o r r o w H e g e l i a n par lance , are o c c a s i o n e d b y loss,

i n d e e d , i n s t i g a t e d b y loss. I f a m b i v a l e n c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s m e l ­

a n c h o l i a f r o m m o u r n i n g , a n d i f m o u r n i n g entai ls a m b i v a l e n c e

as part of the process of " w o r k i n g t h r o u g h , " then there is no

w o r k o f m o u r n i n g that does not engage m e l a n c h o l i a . A s w a s

r e m a r k e d in the p r e v i o u s chapter, F r e u d argues in The Ego

and the Id that the ego is c o m p o s e d of its lost at tachments a n d

that there w o u l d be no ego w e r e there no i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f

loss a l o n g m e l a n c h o l i c l ines. T h e inverse o f th is p o s i t i o n , h o w ­

ever, i s not p u r s u e d b y F r e u d , a l t h o u g h his t h e o r y p o i n t s the

w a y : i f the ego conta ins aggress ion against the other w h o is

gone, t h e n i t f o l l o w s that r e e x t e r n a l i z i n g that aggress ion " u n -

c o n t a i n s " the ego. T h e des ire to l i v e is not the desire of the

194 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 195

ego, b u t a desire that u n d o e s the ego in the course of its emer­

gence. T h e " m a s t e r y " o f the ego w o u l d t h e n be i d e n t i f i e d as

the effect of the d e a t h d r i v e , a n d life, in a N i e t z s c h e a n sense,

w o u l d break apart that mastery, i n i t i a t i n g a l i v e d m o d e of be­

c o m i n g that contests the stasis a n d defensive status of the ego.

B u t the s tory o f m o u r n i n g cannot b e r e d u c e d t o one i n

w h i c h life t r i u m p h s over death. T h e d y n a m i c i s m o r e c o m ­

p l i c a t e d . A l t h o u g h i n 1917 F r e u d does not yet d i s t i n g u i s h be­

t w e e n the p l e a s u r e p r i n c i p l e a n d the d e a t h d r i v e , he does note

that m e l a n c h o l y has the p o w e r to force the ego i n t o death.

By 1923, he e x p l i c i t l y c l a i m s that conscience, as i t f u n c t i o n s

in m e l a n c h o l i a , i s "a g a t h e r i n g p l a c e " for the death dr ives . In

m o u r n i n g , the c l a i m of l ife does not t r i u m p h over the l u r e o f

death; on the contrary , the "death d r i v e s " are m a r s h a l l e d in the

serv ice o f b r e a k i n g w i t h the object, " k i l l i n g " the object i n o r d e r

to l ive . F u r t h e r , insofar as the object resides as the i d e a l i t y of

conscience, a n d the ego i s s i tuated w i t h i n that t o p o g r a p h i c a l

scene, b o t h conscience a n d the ego are necessar i ly u n d o n e by

that m u r d e r o u s c l a i m o n life. T h e "death d r i v e " i s thus p a r a ­

d o x i c a l l y necessary for s u r v i v a l ; i n m o u r n i n g , the b r e a k i n g o f

a t tachment inaugurates life. B u t this " b r e a k " i s never f ina l or

f u l l . O n e does not retract a q u a n t i t y of l i b i d o f r o m one object

in o r d e r to invest i t in another. To the extent that m e l a n c h o l y

establishes the p o s i t i o n a l i t y of the ego, the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

the p s y c h i c a n d the s o c i a l , i t also funct ions to m a k e p o s s i b l e

a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e n c o u n t e r w i t h alterity. T h e c o n c l u s i o n o f

gr ie f m a y u n d o the ego ( i n the sense of " u n b i n d i n g " i t f r o m its

cathexis in conscience), b u t i t does not d e s t r o y it . T h e r e i s no

b r e a k w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i v e h i s t o r i c i t y o f loss t o w h i c h m e l a n ­

c h o l y attests (except p e r h a p s i n the m a n i c response, w h i c h i s

a l w a y s t e m p o r a r y ) . T h e h i s t o r i c i t y o f loss i s to be f o u n d in

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d , hence, i n the v e r y f o r m s that at tachment

i s b o u n d t o take. " L i b i d o " a n d "at tachment" i n s u c h a v i e w

c o u l d not be c o n c e i v e d as free-f loating energies, b u t as h a v i n g

a h i s t o r i c i t y that c o u l d n e v e r f u l l y be r e c o v e r e d .

I f i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " F r e u d t h o u g h t that one

m u s t sever one at tachment to m a k e another, in The Ego and the

Id, he is clear that o n l y u p o n the c o n d i t i o n that the lost other

b e c o m e s i n t e r n a l i z e d can m o u r n i n g ever b e a c c o m p l i s h e d a n d

n e w at tachments b e g u n . H e r e , o f course, a n u n e x p l o r e d p o i n t

deserves r e m a r k : i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n does not have to take the

f o r m of a m e r c i l e s s l y v i o l e n t conscience, a n d c e r t a i n k i n d s of

i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , w h i c h are not a l w a y s i n c o r p o r a t i o n s , are nec­

essary for s u r v i v a l . 1 6 I n d e e d , D e r r i d a insists, w i t h the later

F r e u d , that " m o u r n i n g is the af f i rmat ive i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the

O t h e r " a n d that, i n p r i n c i p l e , there can b e n o e n d t o m o u r n ­

i n g . 1 7

I n d e e d , one m a y rage against one's at tachment to s o m e

others ( w h i c h is s i m p l y to alter the terms of the at tachment) ,

but no rage c a n sever the at tachment to alterity, except per­

h a p s a s u i c i d a l rage that u s u a l l y s t i l l leaves b e h i n d a note, a

f i n a l address , thus c o n f i r m i n g that a l l o c u t o r y b o n d . S u r v i v a l

does not take p l a c e because an a u t o n o m o u s ego exercises a u ­

t o n o m y i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g w o r l d ; o n the

contrary , no ego can e m e r g e except t h r o u g h a n i m a t i n g ref­

erence to s u c h a w o r l d . S u r v i v a l is a matter of a v o w i n g the

trace of loss that inaugurates one's o w n emergence. To m a k e

of m e l a n c h o l i a a s i m p l e " r e f u s a l " to gr ieve its losses conjures

a subject w h o m i g h t a l r e a d y be s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t its losses,

that is, one w h o v o l u n t a r i l y extends a n d retracts h is or her

w i l l . Yet the subject w h o m i g h t gr ieve i s i m p l i c a t e d in a loss

o f a u t o n o m y that i s m a n d a t e d by l i n g u i s t i c a n d s o c i a l l i fe; i t

can never p r o d u c e itself a u t o n o m o u s l y . F r o m the start, this

ego is other t h a n itself; w h a t m e l a n c h o l i a s h o w s is that o n l y

196 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 197

by a b s o r b i n g the other as oneself does one b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g

a t a l l . T h e s o c i a l t e r m s w h i c h m a k e s u r v i v a l poss ib le , w h i c h

interpe l la te s o c i a l existence, never reflect the a u t o n o m y of the

one w h o c o m e s t o r e c o g n i z e h i m - o r hersel f i n t h e m ar id , thus,

s tands a chance "to b e " w i t h i n language. I n d e e d , by f o r f e i t i n g

that n o t i o n o f a u t o n o m y s u r v i v a l b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e ; the "ego"

i s re leased f r o m its m e l a n c h o l i c forec losure of the soc ia l . T h e

ego comes i n t o b e i n g on the c o n d i t i o n of the " trace" of the

other, w h o is, at that m o m e n t of emergence, a l r e a d y at a d i s ­

tance. To accept the a u t o n o m y of the ego is to forget that trace;

a n d to accept that trace is to e m b a r k u p o n a process of m o u r n ­

i n g that c a n never b e complete , for n o f ina l severance c o u l d

take p l a c e w i t h o u t d i s s o l v i n g the ego.

T h i s i n s i g h t that m e l a n c h o l i a offers i n t o the p o w e r of the

trace of a l t e r i t y to p r o d u c e the ego "a long a f i c t i o n a l l i n e , " as

L a c a n has p u t i t , i s n o t res t r i c ted to the trace of some speci f ic

set of others, that is, to the c h i l d a n d its m o t h e r or to other

d y a d i c pairs . I n d e e d , the " o t h e r " m a y be an i d e a l , a c o u n t r y , a

concept o f l iberty , in w h i c h the loss o f s u c h ideals i s c o m p e n ­

sated b y the i n t e r i o r i z e d i d e a l i t y o f conscience. A n other o r a n

i d e a l m a y b e " l o s t " b y b e i n g r e n d e r e d u n s p e a k a b l e , that is , lost

t h r o u g h p r o h i b i t i o n o r forec losure: u n s p e a k a b l e , i m p o s s i b l e

t o declare , b u t e m e r g i n g i n the i n d i r e c t i o n o f c o m p l a i n t a n d

the h e i g h t e n e d j u d g m e n t s o f conscience. C o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the

p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h y of a m b i v a l e n c e , the f a d e d s o c i a l text re­

q u i r e s a di f ferent sort of g e n e a l o g y in the f o r m a t i o n of the

subject, one w h i c h takes i n t o account h o w w h a t r e m a i n s u n ­

s p e a k a b l y absent i n h a b i t s the p s y c h i c v o i c e o f the one w h o re­

m a i n s . T h e v i o l e n c e of the loss i s r e d o u b l e d a n d refracted in a

v i o l e n c e of the p s y c h i c agency that threatens death; the s o c i a l

i s " t u r n e d b a c k " i n t o the p s y c h i c , o n l y to leave its trace in the

v o i c e of conscience. C o n s c i e n c e thus fai ls to instant iate s o c i a l

r e g u l a t i o n ; rather, i t is the i n s t r u m e n t of its d i s s i m u l a t i o n . To

c l a i m life in s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s to contest the r i g h t e o u s p s y ­

che, not b y a n act o f w i l l , b u t b y s u b m i s s i o n t o a s o c i a l i t y a n d

l i n g u i s t i c l i fe that m a k e s s u c h acts p o s s i b l e , one that exceeds

the b o u n d s of the ego a n d its "autonomy." To pers is t in one's

b e i n g m e a n s to be g i v e n o v e r f r o m the start to s o c i a l t e r m s

that are never f u l l y one's o w n . T h o s e t e r m s inst i tute a l i n g u i s ­

t ic l i fe for the "one" w h o speaks p r i o r to a n y act of agency,

a n d t h e y r e m a i n b o t h i r r e d u c i b l e t o the one w h o speaks a n d

the necessary c o n d i t i o n s of s u c h speech. In this sense, inter­

p e l l a t i o n w o r k s by f a i l i n g , that is, i t inst i tutes its subject as an

agent p r e c i s e l y to the extent that it fai ls to d e t e r m i n e s u c h a

subject e x h a u s t i v e l y i n t i m e .

T h e i n a u g u r a t i v e scene o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n i s one in w h i c h a

c e r t a i n f a i l u r e to be c o n s t i t u t e d b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n of p o s ­

s i b i l i t y for c o n s t i t u t i n g oneself. S o c i a l d i s c o u r s e w i e l d s the

p o w e r to f o r m a n d regulate a subject t h r o u g h the i m p o s i t i o n

o f its o w n terms. T h o s e terms, h o w e v e r , are not s i m p l y ac­

cepted o r i n t e r n a l i z e d ; they b e c o m e p s y c h i c o n l y t h r o u g h the

m o v e m e n t b y w h i c h t h e y are d i s s i m u l a t e d a n d " t u r n e d . " I n

the absence of e x p l i c i t r e g u l a t i o n , the subject emerges as one

for w h o m p o w e r has b e c o m e voice , a n d voice , the r e g u l a t o r y

i n s t r u m e n t of the psyche . T h e s p e e c h acts o f p o w e r — t h e dec­

l a r a t i o n of g u i l t , the j u d g m e n t of worthlessness , the v e r d i c t s of

r e a l i t y — a r e t o p o g r a p h i c a l l y r e n d e r e d a s p s y c h i c i n s t r u m e n t s

a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n a p s y c h i c l a n d s c a p e that d e p e n d s o n

its m e t a p h o r i c i t y for its p l a u s i b i l i t y . R e g u l a t o r y p o w e r be­

comes " i n t e r n a l " o n l y t h r o u g h the m e l a n c h o l i c p r o d u c t i o n o f

the f igure of i n t e r n a l space, one that f o l l o w s f r o m the w i t h ­

d r a w i n g o f resources — a w i t h d r a w a l a n d t u r n i n g o f language,

a s w e l l . B y w i t h d r a w i n g its o w n presence, p o w e r b e c o m e s a n

object l o s t — " a loss o f a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " E l i g i b l e for m e l a n -

198 Psychic Inceptions

c h o l i c i n c o r p o r a t i o n , p o w e r n o l o n g e r acts u n i l a t e r a l l y o n its

subject. Rather, the subject is p r o d u c e d , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h r o u g h

this w i t h d r a w a l o f p o w e r , its d i s s i m u l a t i o n a n d f a b u l a t i o n o f

the p s y c h e as a s p e a k i n g topos. S o c i a l p o w e r vanishes , be­

c o m i n g the object lost, or s o c i a l p o w e r m a k e s v a n i s h , effecting

a m a n d a t o r y set of losses. T h u s , it effects a m e l a n c h o l i a that re­

p r o d u c e s p o w e r as the p s y c h i c v o i c e of j u d g m e n t a d d r e s s e d to

( t u r n e d u p o n ) oneself, thus m o d e l i n g r e f l e x i v i t y o n subject ion.

S o m e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c theorists o f the s o c i a l have a r g u e d

that s o c i a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n a l w a y s p r o d u c e s a p s y c h i c excess i t

cannot c o n t r o l . Yet the p r o d u c t i o n of the p s y c h i c as a d i s t i n c t

d o m a i n cannot obl i terate the s o c i a l o c c a s i o n o f this p r o d u c ­

t i o n . T h e " i n s t i t u t i o n " o f the ego cannot f u l l y o v e r c o m e its

s o c i a l res idue , g i v e n that its " v o i c e " i s f r o m the start b o r r o w e d

f r o m elsewhere, a r e c a s t i n g of a s o c i a l " p l a i n t " as p s y c h i c self-

j u d g m e n t .

T h e p o w e r i m p o s e d u p o n one i s the p o w e r that animates

one's emergence, a n d there appears to be no escaping this

a m b i v a l e n c e . Indeed, there appears to be no "one" w i t h o u t

a m b i v a l e n c e , w h i c h is to say that the f ic t ive r e d o u b l i n g neces­

sary to b e c o m e a self ru les out the p o s s i b i l i t y of strict ident i ty .

F i n a l l y , t h e n , there is no a m b i v a l e n c e w i t h o u t loss as the ver­

d i c t of soc ia l i ty , one that leaves the trace of its t u r n at the scene

of one's emergence.

Notes

I N T R O D U C T I O N

I. Hayden White remarks i n Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978) that "the w o r d tropic derives from tropikos, tropos, which in classical Greek meant ' turn' and i n Koine 'way' or 'manner.' It comes into modern Indo-European languages by way of tropus, which i n Classical Latin meant 'metaphor' or 'figure of speech' and in Late Latin, especially as applied to music theory, 'mood' or 'measure' " (p. 2). White goes on to associate the notion of trope w i t h style, a term that he understands to distinguish the study of discourse from both the study of fiction and logic. Tropes are "de­viations" from customary language, but they also generate figures of speech or thought (a distinction crucial to Quinti l l ian's account as well). In this sense, a trope can produce a connection between terms that is not considered either customary or logical. For our purposes, this means that a trope operates in a way that is not restricted to ac­cepted versions of reality. At the same time, a trope cannot operate, that is, generate new meanings or connections, if its departure from custom and logic is not recognized as such a departure. In this sense, a trope presupposes an accepted version of reality for its operation.

For Nietzsche, however, the recirculation and sedimentation of tropes is the condition of possibility for the customary use of lan­guage. Indeed, he argues that tropes are the stuff out of which literal and conceptual language emerges. O n l y through a k i n d of forgetful-ness of the tropological status of language does something like cus­tomary language take hold. Customary language is the sedimentation

202 Notes to Pages 7-14 Notes to Pages 16-28 203

or "deadening" effect of tropes. This suggestion is made clear, both

argumentatively and rhetorically, in his essay " O n Truth and Lie in an

Extra-Moral Sense," in Friedrich Nietzsche, On Rhetoric and Language,

ed. Sander Gilman et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

" T u r n " was an English term for "trope" in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, used in referring to several syntactical figures

of speech. Richard Lanham writes that a trope is a specific kind of

figure, one which changes the meaning of a w o r d (A Handlist of Rhe­

torical Terms, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Some ar­

gue for retaining the term "figure" for terms that change the meaning

of more than one word. Quintillian objects to this distinction, insist­

ing that this change of meaning happens in ways that are not redu­

cible to single or plural words, and then defines a trope as a change

of meaning, whereas "figure" is used for a change in form (i.e., the

form of a pattern of speech or even a genre of writing). That this turn

is considered generative or productive seems especially relevant to

our consideration of the production or generation of the subject. Not

only is generation what a trope does, but the explanation of gen­

eration seems to require the use of tropes, an operation of language

that both reflects and enacts the generativity it seeks to explain, irre-

ducibly mimetic and performative.

2. My discussion of "attachment" is indebted to Wendy Brown's

essay "Wounded Attachments," in her States of Injury: Freedom and

Power in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

3. In " O n Narcissism," Freud distinguishes between narcissistic

and anaclitic forms of love, arguing that the former enhance or in­

flate the ego, and the latter lead to its diminution or impoverishment.

4. On the notion that repetition, signifying the death drive, marks

the limit of the ego's mastery, see Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental

Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. A l a n Sheridan (New

York: Norton, 1978), pp. 40-49. Freud makes the argument in Beyond

the Pleasure Principle (The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological

Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. [Lon­

don: Hogarth, 1953-74], Ï8: 20-23).

5. This discussion continues arguments that I made in Bodies That

Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993): "There is no power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power

in its persistence and instability" (p. 9). This statement was not meant

to suggest that power acts without the subject. On the contrary, for

power to act, there must be a subject, but that necessity does not

make the subject into the origin of power.

6. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison

(New York: Pantheon, 1977), Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison

(Paris: Gallimard, 1975); The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Intro­

duction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), Histoire de

la sexualité 1: Volonté de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1978); The Use of

Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon,

1985), L'usage des plaisirs, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); "Two Lectures,"

Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 19J2-J7, ed.

C o l i n Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 78-108.

7. Lacan refers to the subject as excrescence.

8. Nietzsche develops the notion of the sign-chain (Zeichenkette) in

On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Ran­

d o m House, 1967), pp. 77-78; Zur Généalogie der Moral, in Nietzsche,

Samtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzelbànden, ed. Giorgio

C o l l i and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 5 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp.

314-15. H e remarks that the origin of a w o r d or an instrument may

come to assume purposes and produce effects for which it was never

originally intended or fashioned.

9. I distinguish between internal and interior, according to conven­

tions within phenomenology: "internal" designates a contingent rela­

tion; "interior," a constitutive relation. This terminology also under­

scores the phenomenological register of the latter.

10. Both authors use the w o r d Trieb for drive. In addition, both

figure this drive as what can and does turn back u p o n itself.

11. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed examination of this notion.

12. For a discussion of the lack of originary violence in F o u -

cauldian notions of discursive productivity, see Gayatri Chakravorty

Spivak's provocative essay "More on Power/Knowledge," in her Out­

side in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 33.

13. Freud's reflections on " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia" in The Ego

and the Id become important for Melanie Klein's observations on in­

corporation.

14. Spinoza argues that "everything insofar as it is in itself, en-

204 Notes to Pages 31-54

deavors to persist in its own being" (p. 135), even as he insists that

"a thing, which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has nec­

essarily been conditioned by G o d " (p. 61). Autonomy is thus always

conditioned and, to that extent, subverted by the conditions of its

own possibility. ("The Ethics," Philosophy of Spinoza, trans. R. H. M.

Elwes [New York: Tudor Publishing House], 1934.)

C H A P T E R 1

N O T E : This chapter originally appeared in David Clarke and Tilot-

tama Rajan, eds., Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy and Con­

temporary Theory (Buffalo: S U N Y Press, 1995). I would like to thank

Wil l iam Connolly and Peter Fenves for comments on earlier versions

of this essay.

1. In the following text I refer to this chapter in abbreviated form

as "The Unhappy Consciousness." English citations are from The Phe­

nomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1977); German citations are from G . W. F Hegel, Werke in zwan-

zig Bdnden, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am M a i n : Suhrkamp, 1980). Page n u m ­

bers for later citations will appear in the text.

2. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison

(New York: Pantheon, 1977), p. 30; Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la

prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), p. 30.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter

Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 87; Zur Généalogie

der Moral, in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15

Einzelbànden, ed. Giorgio C o l l i and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 5 (Berlin:

de Gruyter, 1988), p. 325.

4. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 30/34.

5. The relevance of the psychoanalytic understanding of the "phan-

tasmatic" and, in particular, the view of Laplanche and Pontalis that

the subject is dissimulated in the scene of phantasy. We might con­

sider the various stages of progress in the Phenomenology as succes­

sive forms of the phantasmatic, that is, successive ways in which the

subject becomes dissimulated in and as the scene of its action.

6. See Sigmund Freud, " O n Narcissism: An Introduction," The

Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,

Notes to Pages 55-81 205

ed. and trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953-74),

14: 73-104, for a discussion of the origins of conscience in the repres­

sion of homosexuality.

7. Here one can see that Foucault's critique of Freud in The His­

tory of Sexuality, Volume 1 is partially wrong. Foucault's view that

psychoanalysis fails to understand how law produces desire is itself

a failure to understand the way in which prohibition is productive.

Foucault reserves the term "power" for a productive operation that is

understood not to apply to "law." Yet we see that an insurmountable

equivocation between the two terms is produced once law is under­

stood as productive.

8. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James

Strachey (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 84.

9. Nietzsche, Zur Généalogie der Moral, 411-12; my translation.

Kaufman's equivalent is on pp. 162-63.

C H A P T E R 2

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter

Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 58; Zur Généalogie

der Moral, in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15

Einzelbànden, ed. Giorgio C o l l i and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 5 (Berlin:

de Gruyter, 1988), p. 292.

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kauf­

mann (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 25; fenseits von Gut und

Base, in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzel­

bànden, ed. Giorgio Coll i and Mazzino Montinari, 5: 32.

3. Ibid., p. 29/36.

4. Sigmund Freud, " O n the Mechanism of Paranoia," third sec­

tion of "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a

Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)," The Standard Edition of the

Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James

Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953-74) 12: 31.

5. Sigmund Freud, " O n Narcissism: An Introduction," Standard

Edition, 14: 73-104.

6. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James

Strachey (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 84.

2o6 Notes to Pages 84-89 Notes to Pages 90-101 207

C H A P T E R 3

N O T E : This essay was previously published in John Rajchman, ed.,

The Question of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1995).

1. The following discussion borrows from and expands u p o n

Chapter 1 of my Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"

(New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 33-36.

2. See Sandra Bartky, Femininity and Domination (New York: Rout­

ledge, 1990).

3. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,

trans. A l a n Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 203; Sur­

veiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), p. 202.

4. It is important to distinguish between the notion of the psyche,

which includes the notion of the unconscious, and that of the subject,

whose formation is conditioned by the exclusion of the unconscious.

5. For an extended and rich discussion of how norms work to

subjectivate and, in particular, how norms are to be understood

as transitive actions, see Pierre Macherey, "Towards a Natural H i s ­

tory of N o r m s " in Timothy J. Armstrong, trans, and ed., Michel Fou­

cault/Philosopher (Routledge: N e w York, 1992), pp. 176-91. In the

same volume, for a discussion of Foucault as writing indirectly about

Lacan, see Jacques-Alain Miller, "Michel Foucault and Psychoanaly­

sis," pp. 58-63. On the problem of the dynamic relation between

ethical demands and the subjectivity to which they are addressed,

see the very useful comparative discussion of Foucault and Lacan

in John Rajchman, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan, and the Question of

Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1991).

6. This is not to suggest that psychoanalysis is only to be repre­

sented by these two figures, although in this analysis it will be.

7. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduc­

tion, tr. Robert H u r l e y (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 152; F o u ­

cault, La volonté de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), p. 200.

8. This question is raised in a different way by Charles Taylor when

he asks whether there is a place for Augustinian "inwardness" in F o u ­

cault; see his "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in David Couzens

Hoy, éd., Foucault: A Critical Reader (New York: Blackwell, 1986), p. 99.

It is also taken up in an interesting way by Wil l iam Connolly in his

The Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Press, 1993).

9. See my "Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions," Jour­

nal of Philosophy 86, no. 11 (November 1989): 257-79.

10. See discussions of the bodily ego in Freud, "The Ego and the

Id," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund

Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953-

74), 19: 26, and in Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the

Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 53~74-

11. For a fuller explanation of Foucault's reworking of Aristotle,

see "Bodies that Matter" in m y Bodies that Matter, pp. 32-36.

12. "What was at issue was not whether the prison environment

was too harsh or too aseptic, too primitive or too efficient, but its

very materiality as an instrument and vector of power," Discipline and

Punish, p. 30; Surveiller et punir, p. 35.

13. See Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault

Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

14. See Zakia Pathak and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, "Shahbano," in

Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political (New

York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 257-79.

15. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

(Notes Towards an Investigation)," Lenin and Philosophy and Other

Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 170-77.

16. For an excellent book that appropriates this Althusserian prob­

lematic for feminism, see Denise Riley, "Am I That Name? ": Feminism

and the Category of 'Women in History (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1988).

17. See Slavoj Zizek on the social interpellation of the proper name

in The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 87-102.

18. Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso,

1987), pp. 90-91.

19. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, pp. 95-96.

20. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Michel Foucault: Beyond

Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabi­

now (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 212.

208 Notes to Pages 102-9 Notes to Pages 109-12 209

21. See the preface to Victor Burgin, James Donald, and C o r a

Kaplan, eds., Formations of Fantasy (London: Methuen, 1986), for a

psychoanalytic warning against "collapsing" the psychic and the

social.

22. In the above, the terms "attachment" and "investment" might

be understood as intentional in the phenomenological sense, that is,

as libidinal movements or trajectories which always take an object.

There is no free-floating attachment which subsequently takes an

object; rather, an attachment is always an attachment to an object,

where that to which it is attached alters the attachment itself. The

transferability of attachment presupposes that the object to which an

attachment is made may change, but that the attachment will per­

sist and will always take some object, and that this action of binding

to (tied always to a certain warding off) is the constitutive action of

attachment. This notion of attachment seems close to certain efforts

to account for drives in non-biologistic terms (to be distinguished

from efforts that take the biological seriously). Here one might seek

recourse to Gilles Deleuze's reading of drives in Masochism: An In­

terpretation of Coldness and Cruelty (New York: Braziller, 1971; Presen­

tation de Sacher-Masoch [Paris: Minuit, 1967]), in which he suggests

that drives may be understood as the pulsionality of positing or

valuation. See also Jean Laplanche's recent discussions in which "the

drive" becomes indissociable from its cultural articulation: "we think

it necessary to conceive of a dual expository stage: on the one hand,

the preliminary stage of an organism that is bound to homeostasis

and self-preservation, and, on the other hand, the stage of the adult

cultural world in which the infant is immediately and completely i m ­

mersed," }ean Laplanche: Seduction, Translation, Drives, ed. John Fletcher

and Martin Stanton (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1992),

p. 187.

C H A P T E R 4

1. See Walter Benjamin, On the Origins of German Tragic Drama,

trans. Peter Osborne (Cambridge: M I T Press, 1987).

2. I thank Hayden White for this suggestion.

3. Nietzsche distinguishes between conscience and bad conscience

in On the Genealogy of Morals, linking the first with the capacity to

promise and the second to the problem of internalization and of debt.

The distinction appears not to be sustained, as it becomes apparent

that the being who promises can only stand for his/her future by first

becoming regular, that is, by internalizing the law or, to be precise,

"burning it into the will." Internalization, introduced in the second

essay, section 16, involves the turning of the will (or instincts) against

itself. In section fifteen, Nietzsche introduces freedom as that which

turns against itself in the making of bad conscience: "This instinct for

freedom forcibly made l a t e n t . . . this instinct for freedom pushed back

and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and

vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience

is in its beginnings" (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals,

trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale [New York: Random

House, 1967], p. 87).

4. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

(Notes Towards an Investigation)," Lenin and Philosophy and Other

Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127-88; "Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d'etat," Positions

(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), pp. 67-126.

5. Althusser implicates his own writing in the version of ideologi­

cal interpellation that he explains: "it is essential to realize that both

he who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are

themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (a tautologi­

cal proposition, i.e. that the author and the reader of these lines both

live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology" (ibid., p. 171; p. 110).

In this remark, Althusser presumes the authoritative capacities of the

voice and insists that his writing, to the extent that it is ideological,

addresses its reader as would a voice.

6. Ibid., p. 177.

7. See Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in

Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

1988). Silverman notes the "theological" dimension of the "voice-

over" in film, which always escapes the viewer's gaze (p. 49). Silver­

man also makes clear that the voice recognized in the cinematic pre­

sentation of voice is not only the maternal voice, but a repudiated

dimension of the masculine subject's own voice (pp. 80-81). Silver-

210 Notes to Pages 113-19 Notes to Pages 120-39 211

man's analysis sheds light on the "voice" of ideology insofar as the

subject who turns around already knows the voice to which he re­

sponds, suggesting an irreducible ambiguity between the "voice" of

conscience and the "voice" of the law.

8. See section I in Louis Althusser, L'avenir dure longtemps, suivi les

faits (Paris: Éditions S T O C K / I M E C , 1992).

9. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben

Brewster (London: Verso, 1970), p. 26; Lire le Capital (Paris: François

Maspero, 1968).

10. Jean-Marie Vincent, " L a lecture symptomale chez Althusser,"

in Futur Antérieur, éd., Sur Althusser: Passages (Paris: Éditions L ' H a r ­

mattan, 1993), p. 97 (my translation).

11. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," p. 132;

"Idéologie," p. 72.

12. One might usefully compare Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic

with Althusser on this point. In both, labor is effectively guaranteed

through a Christian ethic, although in Althusser the religious inflec­

tion appears to be more Catholic than Protestant.

13. Pierre Bourdieu elaborates the concept of the habitus in The

Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 66-79, where he analyzes the embodied rituals of everydayness by which a

given culture produces and sustains belief in its own "obviousness."

Bourdieu underscores the place of the body, its gestures, its stylistics,

its unconscious "knowingness" as the site for the reconstitution of a

practical sense without which social reality could not be constituted.

Bourdieu's notion of the habitus might well be read as a reformula­

tion of Althusser's notion of ideology. Whereas Althusser writes that

ideology constitutes the "obviousness" of the subject, but that this

obviousness is the effect of a dispositif, the same term reemerges in

Bourdieu to describe the way in which a habitus generates certain

beliefs. For Bourdieu, dispositions are generative and transposable.

Note in Althusser's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"

the inception of this latter reappropriation: "An individual believes in

G o d , or Duty, or Justice, etc. This belief derives (for everyone, i.e. for

all those who live in an ideological representation of ideology, which

reduces ideology to ideas endowed by definition with a spiritual exis­

tence) from the ideas of the individual concerned, i.e. from h i m as a

subject with a consciousness which contains the ideas of his belief.

In this way, i.e. by means of the absolutely ideological 'conceptual'

device (dispositif) thus set up (a subject endowed with a conscious­

ness in which he freely forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he

believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally

follows" (p. 167).

14. See Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso,

1989), pp. 1-2.

15. Mladen Dolar, "Beyond Interpellation," Qui Parle 6, no. 2

(Spring-Summer 1993): 73-96. The English version is a revision of the

original, "Jenseits der Anrufung," in Slavoj Zizek, ed., Gestalten der

Autoritt (Vienna: H o r a Verlag, 1991).

16. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," p. 166.

17. Dolar, "Beyond Interpellation," p. 76.

18. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," pp.

169-70; "Idéologie," p. 109.

19. Dolar, "Beyond Interpellation," p. 78.

20. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael

Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 43.

C H A P T E R 5

N O T E : This paper was first presented at the Division 39 Meetings of

the American Psychological Association in N e w York City in A p r i l

1993. It was subsequently published with the replies from and to

A d a m Phillips in Psychoanalytic Dialogues: A journal of Relational Per­

spectives 5 no. 2 (1995): 165-94.

1. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, in The Standard Edition of the

Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James

Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953-74), x 9 :

2. Presumably, sexuality must be trained away from things, ani­

mals, parts of all of the above, and narcissistic attachments of vari­

ous kinds.

3. The notion of foreclosure has become Lacanian terminology for

Freud's notion of Verwerfung. Distinguished from repression under-

212 Notes to Pages 140-53 Notes to Pages 156-74. 213

stood as an action by an already-formed subject, foreclosure is an act

of negation that founds and forms the subject. See the entry "Forclu­

sion" in J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse

(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 163-67.

4. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," Standard Edition,

14: 169.

5. Sigmund Freud, " O n Narcissism: An Introduction," Standard

Edition, 14: 81-82.

6. See Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey,

(New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 81-92.

7. See "Contagious Word: 'Homosexuality' and the Military," in

my Excitable Speech (New York: Routledge, 1996).

8. See my Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 169-

77-

9. The following argument is taken from my Bodies That Matter, pp.

233-36. 10. See "Freud and the Melancholia of Gender" in my Gender

Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge,

1990). 11. This is not to suggest that an exclusionary matrix rigorously

distinguishes between how one identifies and how one desires; it is

quite possible to have overlapping identification and desire in hetero­

sexual or homosexual exchange, or in a bisexual history of sexual

practice. Furthermore, "masculinity" and "femininity" do not ex­

haust the terms for either eroticized identification or desire.

12. See Douglas C r i m p , " M o u r n i n g and Militancy," October 51

(Winter 1989): 97-107.

13. Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 64-66,112-13.

Notes to Phillips Reply

1. Freud, The Ego and the Id, 19: 12-59.

2. M i k k e l Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1993); Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body.

3. Freud, Three Essays on the History of Sexuality, Standard Edition, 7:

125-243.

4. Freud, " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia."

5. Quoted in S. D u n n , Walking Light (New York: Norton, 1993).

6. M a r y Douglas, Purity and Danger (London, Routledge, 1966).

C H A P T E R 6

1. See Eric Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in

Postwar Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), and Alex­

ander and Margarate Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles

of Collective Behavior, trans. Beverley R. Placzek (New York: Grove

Press, 1975). See also, for a feminist account that situates melancho­

lia within the production of sexual difference, Juliana Schiesari, The

Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Symbolics of

Loss in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

2. Sigmund Freud, " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia," The Standard Edi­

tion of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans.

James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953-74), 14: 256.

3. Here Melanie Klein's trenchant intervention on the relation of

melancholia to paranoia and manic-depressive states does not carry

the analysis far enough. Her theory tends to rely on tropes of inter-

nality without asking whether such tropes are the effects of a melan­

cholia that they seek to explain. See "A Contribution to the Psycho-

genesis of Manic-Depressive States" (1935) and " M o u r n i n g and Its

Relation to Manic-Depressive States" (1935) in The Selected Melanie

Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell (London: Penguin, 1986). For an excellent

essay on Klein and the primary status of aggression, see Jacqueline

Rose's "Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein," in Why War? —

Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1993), pp. 137-90.

4. Here F r e u d replaces the term Sachvorstellung, used in his essay

"The Unconscious" (Standard Edition, 14: 201), by Dingvorstellung.

In the Standard Edition, James Strachey notes that Dingvorstellung

appears in The Interpretation of Dreams in the discussion of jokes.

The distinction is that between a word-presentation and a thing-

presentation. Strachey explains that the latter consists in "the ca-

thexis, if not of the direct memory-images of the thing, at least of

remoter memory-traces derived from these" (ibid.).

5. F r e u d concedes as m u c h earlier in the essay when he remarks

214 Notes to Pages 174-95 Notes to Page 195 215

that "the loss of a love object is an excellent opportunity for the am­

bivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and come into

the open" (250-51). Toward the end of the essay, Freud remarks upon

"an essential analogy between mourning and melancholia": mourn­

ing impels the ego to detach from its lost object in order to continue to

live, and melancholia, through "the struggle of ambivalence loosen(s)

the fixation of the libido to the object by disparaging it" (257).

6. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, trans.

John Osborne (London: N L B , 1977), pp. 92-97.

7. Sigmund Freud, "Trauer u n d Melancholie," Psychologie des Un-

bewussten, Studienausgabe (Frankfurt a. M . : S. Fischer, 1982), 193-212.

8. See Roy Schaefer, A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 177. For a view of fantasy

that operates within melancholia, see chapter one of Nicolas A b r a ­

ham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psycho­

analysis, tr. and ed. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1994).

9. "The image of man's body is the principle of every unity he

perceives in objects . . . all the objects of his world are always struc­

tured around the wandering shadow of his own ego [l'ombre errante de

son propre moi]" (Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II,

trans. Sylvana Tomaselli [New York: W. W. Norton, 1991], p. 166; Le

Séminaire, livre II [Paris: Seuil, 1978], p. 198).

10. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, The Standard Edition, 19: 54.

("Wie kommt es nun, dass bei der Melancholie das der Ich zu einer

A r t Sammelstàtte der Todestriebe werden kann?")

11. On primary mimesis, see M i k k e l Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional

Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect (Stanford: Stanford University

Press, 1993).

12. H o m i K. Bhabha, "Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern

Guilt," in Lawrence Grossberg et al., eds., Cultural Studies: A Reader

(New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 65-66.

13. Ibid., p. 66.

14. Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 253.

15. Freud, " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia," p. 254.

16. Jessica Benjamin has argued something similar in Bonds of Love

(New York: Pantheon, 1988), and Kaja Silverman has made the case

for "heteropathic identification" in The Threshold of the Visible World

(New York: Routledge, 1996). Based in quite different psychoanalytic

views, each has contested the centrality of incorporation and super-

egoic functions in the account of internalization.

17. Jacques Derrida, remarks, Humanities Research Institute, U n i ­

versity of California, Irvine, A p r i l 5,1995.

Index

Abraham, Nicolas, 214118 Agamben, Giorgio, 130-31, 2111120 agency, 10,13-16 AIDS, 27, 138,148, 154 Althusser, Louis, 2, 5-6, 30, 95-

96, 106-31, 207ni5, 20904-6, 21008-9, 2 i o n n

Aristotle, 90-91, 207ml

Bartky, Sandra, 2o6n2 Bhabha, Homi, 190, 214012 Benjamin, Jessica, 2i4ni6 Benjamin, Walter, 174, 208m,

21406 Bersani, Leo, 2i2n3 body, 35-36, 42-43, 47-48, 51,

54-55- 57, 59- 68, 83-87, 89-91 Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel, 152, 189,

212n2 Bourdieu, Pierre, 2ion3

Brown, Wendy, 202n2

Connolly, William, 20708 conscience, 18, 22-24, 63-64, 67-

69, 71, 107, 109, 114, 115, 118, 129, 132-33, 172, 181, 183, 185, 188,191-97

Crimp, Douglas, 212012

death, 27, 41-43,142 Deleuze, Gilles, 2o8n22 Derrida, Jacques, 195, 215017 desire, 22-23, 39~4°< 61-62,103,

108, 193-94 Dolar, Mladen, 120-26, 2 i m i 5 Douglas, Mary, 159

foreclosure, 8-9, 23 Foucault, Michel, 2-3, 5-7, 16, 18,

25» 31-33* 53/ 58-60, 83-105, 203n6, 204n2, 20404, 20507, 20603, 20607, 207019-20

Freud, Sigmuod, 22, 34, 53, 55-58, 60-61, 63, 69, 78-82,132-52, 167-95, 20406, 20504-8

grief, 24, 138-40, 145-47 guilt, 25, 73-74,107-9, 118-19,141

Hegel, G. W. F., 3, 23, 24, 31-61, 176,193

homosexuality, 23, 80, 82, 93-94, 133-50, 163-66

ioterpellatioo, 106-11,128-29, 1-97 Jones, Eroest, 156

218 Index

Kierkegaard, Soren, 48 Klein, Melanie, 25, 153, 170,

203ni3, 21303

Lacan, Jacques, 87, 94-98, 115, 122, 124,127, 152, 187, 202n2, 203n7, 2 i in3 , 21409

Laplanche, Jean, 2 0 4 ^ , 2o8n22 love, 7-8, 25-27, 127-28,168, 171

Macherey, Pierre, 2o6n5 Marcuse, Herbert, 58 masochism, 102 melancholia, 19, 23,133-97 Miller, Jacques-Alain, 2o6n5 Mitscherlich, Alexander and

Margarete, 213m

norms, 19, 21, 25, 28, 32, 99

paranoia, 27, 80 Pathak, Zakia, 207ni4 performatives, 110,114 Phillips, Adam, 151-65 Pontalis, J.-B., 2 0 4 ^ psychoanalysis, 6-7, 11, 25, 55,

86-87, !38/144-46,156-65,198

Quintillian, Marcus, 201m

rage, 180-81,183,190,193,195 Rajan, Rajeswari Sunder, 207ni4 Rajchman, John, 2o6n5 Riley, Denise, 207ni6

Rose, Jacqueline, 97, 207ni8

sadism, 46 Santner, Eric, 213m Schaefer, Roy, 2i4n8 Silverman, Kaja, 20907, 2i4ni6 sociality, 21, 29, 165, 178-79,

181-82, 185, 196, 198 soul, 76, 85-86, 89-91 Spinoza, Benedict de, 27, 62,

203~4ni4 Spivak, Gayatry Chakravorty,

203ni2 sublimation, 92 survival, 7, 28, 193,195-96

Taylor, Charles, 2o6n8 Torok, Maria, 2i4n8 turn, trope of the, 3-4, 68, 76,

81,106-7, H4_ 15> !30/140-42, 168-69, 189, 193,197-98

Valéry, Paul, 156 Vincent, Jean-Marie, 113-14,

2ionio

Weber, Max, 2ioni2 White, Hayden, 201m, 2o8n2 Whitford, Margaret, 207nio will, 63-66, 69-70, 72-73, 76-77 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 124

Zizek, Slavoj, 207ni7, 2 i m i 4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Butler, Judith P.

The psychic life of power : theories in subjection / Judith

Butler.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8047-2811-9 (cl.) : ISBN 0-8047-2812-7 (pbk.)

1. Self (Philosophy) 2. Power (Philosophy) 3. Self—Social

aspects. 4. Power (Social sciences) I. Title.

BD438 .5.B88 1997

126—dc21 96-40851

CIP

® This book is printed on acid-free, recycled paper.

Original printing 1997

Last figure below indicates year of this printing:

07 06 05 04 03 02 01

C R I T I C A L T H E O R Y ; P H I L O S O P H Y

T H E P S Y C H I C L I F E O F P O W E R

Theories in Subjection

J U D I T H B U T L E R

As a form of power, subjection is paradoxical. To be dominated by a power

external to oneself is a familiar and agonizing form power takes. To find, how­

ever, that what "one" is, one's very formation as a subject, is dependent upon

that very power is quite another. If, following Foucault, we understand power

as forming the subject as well, it provides the very condition of its existence

and the trajectory of its desire. Power is not simply what we depend on for

our existence but that which forms reflexivity as well. Drawing upon Hegel,

Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, and Althusser, this challenging and lucid work

offers a theory of subject formation that illuminates as ambivalent the psychic

effects of social power.

If we take Hegel and Nietzsche seriously, then the "inner life" of conscious­

ness and, indeed, of conscience, not only is fabricated by power, but becomes

one of the ways in which power is anchored in subjectivity. The author con­

siders the way in which psychic life is generated by the social operation of

power, and how that social operation of power is concealed and fortified by

the psyche that it produces. Power is no longer understood to be "internal­

ized" by an existing subject, but the subject is spawned as an ambivalent effect

of power, one that is staged through the operation of conscience.

To claim that power fabricates the psyche is also to claim that there is a fic­

tional and fabricated quality to the psyche. The figure of a psyche that "turns

against itself" is crucial to this study, and offers an alternative to describing

power as "internalized." Although most readers of Foucault eschew psycho­

analytic theory, and most thinkers of the psyche eschew Foucault, the author

seeks to theorize this ambivalent relation between the social and the psychic

as one of the most dynamic and difficult effects of power.

This work combines social theory, philosophy, and psychoanalysis in novel

ways, offering a more sustained analysis of the theory of subject formation

implicit in such other works of the author as Bodies That Matter: On the

Discursive Limits of "Sex" and Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of

Identity.

Judith Butler is Chancellor's Professor of Rheti

University of California, Berkeley. The New York Public Library

The Branch Libraries JEFFERSON MARKET REGIONAL BRANCH 425 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10011

J MR

S T A N F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y F

www.sup.org ISBN O-8047-2812-7

Jacket art courtesy of John H. Muse