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The Protective Powersof Crisis Response Strategies:Managing Reputational Assets

During a CrisisW. Timothy Coombs

ABSTRACT. This study examines how stakeholders perceive the variouscrisis response strategies identified in the Situational Crisis CommunicationTheory (SCCT). SCCT seeks to use research and theory to develop recom-mendations for the use of crisis response strategies. The crisis response strate-gies are matched to the nature of the crisis situation. The idea is to match thelevel of responsibility and aid to victims in the crisis response strategy thatwould be warranted by the crisis responsibility and reputational damage gen-erated by the crisis situation. This study reviews previous research in SCCT,establishes the need to examine stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsestrategies, and examines how respondents perceive crisis response strategiesin terms of accepting responsibility and helping victims. The results and im-plications confirm many of the ideas about crisis response strategies ad-vanced in SCCT. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth DocumentDelivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <[email protected]> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by The Haworth Press,Inc. All rights reserved.]

KEYWORDS. Crisis communication, reputation, response strategies,Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), stakeholder

W. Timothy Coombs (PhD, Purdue University) is Associate Professor, Depart-ment of Speech Communication, Coleman Hall 1814, Eastern Illinois University,Charleston, IL 61920-3099 (E-mail: [email protected]).

Journal of Promotion Management, Vol. 12(3/4) 2006Available online at http://www.haworthpress.com/web/JPM

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INTRODUCTION

A crisis happens to your organization. After providing informationstakeholders might need, you are left with an array of options whencommunicating further with stakeholders. Those options range fromdenying any responsibility to accepting full responsibility for the cri-sis. A growing body of research is focusing on the public relationsmessages delivered after a crisis has developed (i.e., Bradford andGarrett, 1995; Ihken, 2002; Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer, 1998). Situa-tional Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is one line of researchwithin this literature. SCCT was developed as a research-based guidefor selecting crisis response strategies, the communicative resourcesused to protect an organization’s reputation during a crisis. SCCT rec-ommends selecting the crisis response strategy(ies) that are appropri-ate to the characteristics of the crisis situation. The selection ispremised on the reputational threat posed by the crisis situation andthe protective properties of the crisis response strategy(ies) (Coombs,1995, 2004; Coombs and Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2005).

Research has already begun to map how stakeholders perceive the cri-sis situation (i.e., Coombs, 1998; Coombs and Holladay, 2002, 2005).The next step is to understand how stakeholders react to the various crisisresponse strategies. A clearer understanding of how stakeholders react tocrisis response strategies improves our ability to match them to the crisissituation. The study reported here explores stakeholder perceptions ofcrisis response strategies using an SCCT framework. The relevant litera-ture is reviewed and hypotheses articulated, followed by a delineation ofthe methods then the presentation of the results and discussion.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS

Over the past ten years, a rapidly growing body of crisis manage-ment research has emerged that focuses on what organizations say anddo after a crisis hits, the use of crisis response strategies. The focus ofthis research is on how communication can be used to protect theorganization’s reputation during a crisis (Benoit, 1995; Hearit, 1996,2001). A critical limitation to this research is the dependence on sim-ple lists of crisis response strategies and the use of case studies to de-velop recommended courses of action. While useful to generate ideas,case studies are not a method for building causal relationships and,therefore, not very precise when used to create recommendations for

242 JOURNAL OF PROMOTION MANAGEMENT

the utilization of crisis response strategies (Stewart, 2002). SituationalCrisis Communication theory (SCCT) is offered as a theory-based, em-pirically tested method for selecting crisis response strategies. SCCT iscomposed of three core elements: (1) the crisis situation, (2) crisis re-sponse strategies, and (3) a system for matching the crisis situation andcrisis response strategies. Exploring the three core elements providesthe context and rationale for the study reported in this manuscript.

Crisis Situation: The Reputational Threat

The crisis situation is the focal point of SCCT. The amount of reputationaldamage a crisis situation can inflict drives the selection of the crisis re-sponse strategy. SCCT holds that the potential reputational damage froma crisis is a function of crisis responsibility and of intensifying factors. Areview of these factors sets the stage for a discussion of how to assess thereputational threat posed by a crisis situation. Crisis responsibility, that ishow much stakeholders attribute the cause of the crisis to the organiza-tion, is a function of the crisis type and severity of the damage. Crisis typeis simply the crisis’ category or class. Stakeholders will attribute differentamounts of crisis responsibility to the various crisis types. Collapsing ex-tant lists from Fearn-Banks (1996), Lerbinger (1997), Marcus and Good-man (1991), and Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), SCCT has identified thecrisis types presented and defined in Table 1. Culminating in a clusteranalysis conducted by Coombs and Holladay (2002), SCCT groups thecrisis types into three categories based upon the amount of crisis respon-sibility generated by each. Table 1 also provides a breakdown of the crisisclusters. Crisis expert Ian Mitroff (1988) is a proponent of grouping likecrises,creating crisis clusters. The assumption is that crises in the samecluster will have underlying similarities that allow crisis managers tohave one crisis plan that can be applied to a group of crises. A single planshould be applicable and adaptable to each crisis in the crisis cluster. As aresult, a crisis team does not have to develop a crisis management plan forevery single type of crisis to which the organization is vulnerable. The or-ganization creates a crisis portfolio, the crisis manager creates a crisisplan for each of the crisis clusters an organization may encounter (Mitroff,Harrington, and Gai, 1996; Pearson and Mitroff, 1993).

Severity of the damage represents the amount of financial, physical,environmental, or emotional harm a crisis can inflict. SCCT posits thatseverity increases perceptions of crisis responsibility. Attributions ofcrisis responsibility are important to ascertain because the stronger theattributions of crisis responsibility, the more damage a crisis will inflict

Quantitative Research 243

on an organization’s reputation (Coombs and Schmidt, 2000; Coombsand Holladay, 2001, 2002; Laufer and Gillespie, 2004).

Crisis history and relationship history act as intensifiers. Crisis history iswhether or not an organization has had a similar crisis or crises in the past.Relationship history refers to the quality of the interactions between an orga-nization and its stakeholders (Coombs and Holladay, 2001). Crisis intensifi-ers increase reputational damage directly.When intensifiers are present anorganization will suffer greater reputational damage from a crisis. Originallyintensifiers were believed to increase attributions of crisis responsibility.However, empirical studies found that the intensifiers had more of a directeffect on organizational reputation rather than an indirect effect throughcrisis responsibility (Coombs, 2004; Coombs and Holladay, 2001). Figure 1


TABLE 1. Crisis Clusters

Victim Cluster: In these crisis types the organization is also a victim of the crisis.Natural disaster: Acts of nature that damage an organization such as an earth-

quake.Rumors: False and damaging information about an organization is being circu-

lated.Workplace violence: Current or former employee attacks current employees on-

site.Product tampering/Malevolence: External agent causes damage to an organiza-

tion.

Accidental Cluster: In these crisis types the organizational actions leading to the crisis wereunintentional.

Challenges: Stakeholders claim an organization is operating in an inappropriatemanner.

Megadamage: A technical accident where the focus is on the environmental dam-age from the accident.

Technical breakdown accidents: A technology or equipment failure causes an in-dustrial accident.

Technical breakdown recalls: A technology or equipment failure causes a productto be recalled.

Preventable Cluster: In these crisis types the organization knowingly placed people at risk,took inappropriate actions, or violated a law/regulation.

Human breakdown accidents: Human error causes an industrial accident.Human breakdown recalls: Human error causes a product to be recalled.Organizational misdeed with no injuries: Stakeholders are deceived without injury.Organizational misdeed management misconduct: Laws or regulations are vio-

lated by management.Organizational misdeed with injuries: Stakeholders are placed at risk by manage-

ment and injuries occur.

illustrates the relationship between crisis responsibility, the intensifiers, andorganizational reputation.

Ultimately the crisis situation is composed of four elements used toassess its potential reputational threat: (1) the crisis type, (2) severity ofdamage, (3) crisis history, and (4) relationship history. Assessing poten-tial reputational threat from a crisis situation is a two-step process. First,the crisis type is identified, attributions of crisis responsibility deter-mined, and initial reputational damage assessed. By identifying the cri-sis type, a crisis manager can place the crisis into one of the three crisisclusters that estimate the initial level of crisis responsibility the crisisshould generate. Second, the modifying effects of severity, crisis his-tory, and performance history are considered. A crisis that is severeshould generate stronger attributions of crisis responsibility so the crisismanager treats the crisis as if it were a member of the next stronger cri-sis cluster. For instance, a crisis in the victim cluster is treated as if it isin the accidental cluster and a crisis in the accidental cluster is treated asif it is in the preventable cluster. If either or both of crisis history or per-formance history are negative, reputational damage is intensified andthe crisis manager again treats his or her crisis as if it were in the nextstronger, more damaging crisis cluster. SCCT assesses the reputationalthreat of a crisis situation in order to select the appropriate crisis re-sponse strategy(ies). An appropriate crisis response strategy matchesthe level of reputational damage generated by the crisis situation withthe “protective powers” of the crisis response strategies.

Crisis Response Strategies

What an organization says and does after a crisis hits, the crisisresponse strategies, has significant ramifications for its reputation(Barton, 2001; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1999). SCCT takes a systematic


OrganizationalResponsibility

Severity

Reputation

Intensifiers• Crisis History• Relationship History

FIGURE 1. SCCT Concepts and Relationships Between Those Concepts

approach to identifying the crisis response strategies that can be used tomaximize reputational protection. Obviously an organizational re-sponse to a crisis is more than an effort to protect the organization’s rep-utation. However, the organization’s reputation is now recognized as avaluable asset (Alsop, 2004; Dowling, 2002; Fombrun and van Riel,2004). Roughly, reputation is how an organization is perceived by itspublics. Research consistently links a favorable reputation to favorableorganizational results, including financial performance, sales, recruit-ment success, and government influence (Fombrun, 1996; Klein, 1999;Nakra, 2000). Thus, reputation is a resource worthy of protection and alegitimate concern during a crisis. The initial crisis response from an or-ganization needs to provide what is called instructing information. Adiscussion of instructing information helps to establish what crisis re-sponse strategies are and when they are to be used.

Instructing Information. SCCT separates crisis response strategiesfrom instructing information, another aspect of what an organizationsays or does after a crisis. Instructing information represents whatstakeholders need and want to know after a crisis hits. There are threetypes of instructing information: (1) crisis basics; the basic informationabout what happened in the crisis event, (2) protection; what stake-holders need to do to protect themselves from harm, and (3) correction;what the organization is doing to correct the problem/prevent a repeat ofthe crisis (Bergman, 1994; Coombs, 1999; Sturges, 1994). Consistentwith recommendations made by crisis experts, SCCT argues that in-structing information must be provided; it is not an option. The crisismanagers must tell stakeholders immdiately what to do to protect them-selves. Providing batch numbers on recalled meat or locations for whereto return defective products are examples of initial protection instruct-ing information. A crisis manager will not always know all of the neces-sary instructing information early in the crisis management process. Forinstance, the cause of a crisis, part of the crisis basics, may not be knownat first. Without a cause, no corrective action can be planned. Airline ac-cidents, for example, typically take months to determine a cause (Ray,1999). Crisis basic and correction instructing information are providedas that information becomes available to an organization (Bergman,1994). Instructing information is an essential part of crisis managementand must be given to stakeholders.

Basic Crisis Response Options. Crisis response strategies are op-tional; crisis managers can choose which, if any, to use in a crisis situa-tion. The key to protecting the organizational reputation is to select theappropriate crisis response strategy(ies). Sturges (1994) refers to efforts


to repair the organization’s reputation as internalizing information. At-tribution theory and neoinstitutional theory serve as the basis in SCCTfor determining which crisis response strategies are appropriate for agiven crisis situation. SCCT provides a crisis manager with three basicoptions for using crisis response strategies: (1) establish that no crisisexists, (2) alter the attributions about the crisis event to make it appearless negative to stakeholders, or (3) alter how stakeholders perceive theorganization–work to protect/repair the reputation (Coombs and Holladay,1996). If a crisis manager can establish no crisis exists, there is noreputational threat; no crisis equals no threat. A crisis manager can re-duce the reputational damage if she or he can make the crisis appear lessnegative–affect the attributions generated by the crisis. Finally, a crisismanager may have to deal with the aftermath of a crisis by addressingthe stakeholders directly in order to rebuild the reputation. These threebasic response options are called deny, diminish, and deal. Table 2 or-ganizes the various crisis response strategies according to these threeoptions.

The deny response option seeks to prove no crisis exists or that theorganization has no responsibility for the crisis. Disproving a crisis ex-ists or the organization’s responsibility for the event serves to eliminatethe reputational threat presented by a crisis. For instance, an organiza-tion may deny there was a chemical release (accident) by proving thegas cloud was simply steam vented by some turbines. Scapegoating,blaming someone else for the crisis, denies any responsibility for thecrisis. There is a crisis but it does not involve/belong to the organizationin question.

The diminish response option reflects the attribution theory aspectof SCCT. A crisis manager accepts a crisis occurred and that his orher organization is involved but tries to change the attributions stake-holders make about a crisis in order to reduce the reputational dam-age from the crisis situation. Two tactics can be used to shapeattributions. First, crisis managers can argue the organization hasminimal responsibility for the crisis; the crisis event was primarily aresult of circumstances beyond their control. Second, crisis manag-ers can claim the crisis was not as serious (severe) as stakeholdersmight think it to be. The crisis managers must establish the true,lower level of seriousness for the crisis thereby reducing the amountof crisis responsibility attributed to the organization. The focus ofthe diminish response option is to lessen attributions of crisis respon-sibility. If stakeholders attribute less crisis responsibility to the orga-nization, the crisis will do less reputational damage. Moreover, a


crisis manager can match the level of crisis acceptance in a crisis re-sponse strategy to the level of crisis responsibility generated by a crisis.The more responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization themore the crisis response strategy must seem to accept responsibility forthe crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002).

There is more to the reputational damage inflicted by a crisis than crisis re-sponsibility; there are the direct effects of the intensifiers. The deal response


TABLE 2. Crisis Response Strategies by Response Option

Deny Response OptionAttack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming some-

thing is wrong with the organization.• The organization threatened to sue the people who claim a crisis oc-

curred.Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis.

• The organization said that no crisis event occurred.Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organiza-

tion for the crisis.• The organization blamed the supplier for the crisis.

Diminish Response OptionExcuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to

do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.• The organization said it did not intend for the crisis to occur and that ac-

cidents happen as part of the operation of any organization.Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.

• The organization said the damage and injuries from the crisis were veryminor.

Deal Response OptionIngratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past

good works by the organization.• The organization thanked stakeholders for their help and reminded

stakeholders of the organization's past effort to help the community andto improve the environment.

Concern: Crisis manager expresses concern for the victims.• The organization expressed concern for the victims.

Compassion: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims.• The organization offered money and products as compensation.

Regret: Crisis manager indicates the organization feels bad about the crisis.• The organization said it felt bad that the crisis incident occurred.

Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for thecrisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.

• The organization publicly accepted full responsibility for the crisis andasked stakeholders to forgive the mistake.

option addresses the intensifiers and reflects the neoinstitutional theory as-pects of SCCT. According to neoinstitutional theory, organizations are ex-pected to behavior in certain ways; act in ways that are consistent withsocietal norms/expectations (Allen and Caillouet, 1994). Organizations areconsidered legitimate when they conform to norms/meet expectations. A le-gitimate organization avoids criticism/problems with stakeholders and isjudged worthy of operating in society (Finet, 1994; Massey, 2001). A crisisis frequently a violation of societal norms/expectations. We expect sulfuricacid to be delivered safely or for trains not to derail. When a crisis hits, an or-ganization must work to rebuild its legitimacy and it does so through corpo-rate discourse (Allen and Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995; Sellnow, Ulmer,and Snider, 1998).

Organizational management utilizes crisis response strategies torebuild legitimacy and to protect the organizational reputation dur-ing a crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 1996). As a crisis threatens orga-nizational legitimacy, it simultaneously threatens to damage theorganization’s reputation, how stakeholders perceive the organiza-tion. Legitimacy and organizational reputation have been conceptu-alized similarly with both utilizing the core elements of credibilityand trust (Coombs, 1998; Coombs and Holladay, 2001; Fombrun,1996; Massey, 2001). The deal response options can be treated as ef-forts to restore legitimacy by directly addressing how stakeholdersperceive the organization-efforts to reshape its reputation.

Fundamental Matching Process

The basic matching process of SCCT can be outlined using the crisisclusters and response options. For a more detailed treatment of the sub-ject refer to Coombs (1995) or Coombs and Holladay (1996). If there isno crisis, and the organization can prove that, the crisis manager usesthe deny response option. Combating rumors is an example of a crisistype that favors denial. Any other crisis in the victim cluster requiresonly instructing information from the organization. Crisis responsibilityis very low and there is little violation of societal norms. Crisis types inthe accidental cluster produce stronger attributions of crisis responsibil-ity and there is a greater violation of societal norms and so the diminishresponse option is used. The stakeholders are open to influence on attri-butions of the crisis because the threat is minimal. Crisis types in thepreventable cluster produce very strong attributions of crisis responsi-bility and represent seriously violations of societal norms and so thecrisis manager needs to use the deal response options. The potential


damage to the organizational reputation is great and so the responsemust work to rebuild the reputation.

Crisis Response Strategies and Hypotheses

SCCT utilizes the set of crisis response strategies located in Table 2.This list is a fusion of other crisis response typologies. The stimulus sec-tion goes into the development of the crisis response strategy list ingreater detail. SCCT starts with the assumptions that instructing infor-mation must be delivered and that part of crisis management is dedi-cated to protecting the organization’s reputation. Moreover, SCCTrecognizes the need to understand how stakeholders actually perceivethe crisis response strategies. Past discussions of crisis response strate-gies reflect a sender-orientation. Researchers list various crisis responsestrategies and assume stakeholders will respond to them in a particularfashion and that the crisis response strategies will be perceived as in-tended by the sender (crisis manager) (Allen and Caillouet, 1994;Benoit, 1995; Hobbs, 1995). While this may be a starting point for organizing crisis response strategies, there is a need to move to a re-ceiver-orientation. Before using a crisis response strategy, crisis man-agers should have some idea of how stakeholders will interpret thosemessage strategies. SCCT recommends understanding how stake-holders perceive crisis response strategies (Coombs and Holladay,2002). The study reported here is an attempt to uncover and to mapstakeholder perceptions of the crisis response strategies.

The many crisis response strategy typologies that exist assume thatthe stakeholders will perceive the crisis response strategies in particularways. Hence, it is possible to estimate how people will perceive the cri-sis response strategies from extant research. It is believed that the tencrisis response strategies will cluster according to the three response op-tions of deny, diminish, and deal. Four hypotheses were derived fromthis belief:

H1: The ten crisis response strategies will cluster into groups thatcorrespond to the deny, diminish, and deal response options.

H2: The deny, scapegoat, and attack the accuser crisis response strat-egies will cluster together.

H3: The excuse and justification crisis response strategy options willcluster together.


H4: The ingratiation/bolster, apology, concern, compassion, and re-gret crisis response strategies will cluster together.

METHODOLOGY

Participants

The respondents in the study were 78 undergraduate students en-rolled in communication courses at an urban, Midwestern university.Of the respondents, 71.8% were women (n = 56) and 28.2% were men(n = 22). The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 48 years (M = 23,SD = 5.05).

Measures

Respondents were asked to rate each of the ten crisis response strate-gies for its (1) emphasis on protecting the victim of the crisis and (2) or-ganization’s acceptance of responsibility for the crisis. A 7-point Likertscale was used with response options ranging from “1 = Strongly dis-agree” to “7 = Strongly agree.” The two evaluative criteria were selected to reflect SCCT’s roots in neoinstitutional theory and attribution the-ory. Helping the victim reflects neoinstitutional theory’s need to meetexpectations–stakeholders do expect organizations to help the victims.Seeking to assist the victims indicates the organization acting appropri-ately by trying to reestablish the norms it violated when the crisis cre-ated victims. Aiding the victim should help to protect reputational assetsas well (Coombs and Holladay, 1996; Sellnow et al., 1998). Acceptingresponsibility reflects the attribution theory’s concern for responsibilityfor an act/crisis. If stakeholders perceive the organization is responsiblefor the crisis, accepting responsibility in the crisis response should serveto lessen the reputational damage from the crisis (Coombs, 1995;Coombs and Holladay, 2002).

Stimulus

The respondents were given examples of ten different crisis responsestrategies to evaluate. Each crisis response strategy was presented as aone-sentence description of how an organization responded to a crisis.No specific crisis type was used because that could have affected theresults; thus, the generic term “crisis” was used. Table 2 includes the


one-sentence description of the crisis response strategies. The ten crisisresponse strategies were based on previous SCCT-related research thatdistilled a list of crisis response strategies from a wide array of crisiscommunication writings (Coombs, 1999). Three changes were made tothe original list of crisis response strategies developed by Coombs(1999). First, corrective action was removed from the list because it wasconsidered to be a form of instructing information rather than an op-tional crisis response strategy. Second, scapegoat was added because ofprevious research finding it to be such a problematic crisis responsestrategy (Benoit, 1995; Hobbs, 1995). Third, the compassion, concern,and regret crisis response strategies were added because of consistentcalls in the crisis management literature to express some form of sympa-thy (compassion, concern, or regret) for victims (Augustine, 1995;Coombs, 1998; Tyler, 1997; Sen and Egelhoff, 1991).

Procedures

Respondents were given a packet containing a cover page with direc-tions and five pages containing the ten crisis response strategies to eval-uate. The procedure took 20 to 25 minutes.

RESULTS

H1-H4 were based on the grouping of the crisis response strategies soa hierarchical cluster analysis was used. A hierarchical cluster analysisis used to discover relatively homogeneous clusters of cases based onsome measured characteristic or characteristics. Cases, in this study ofcrisis response strategies, are sorted into groups or clusters such that thedegree of association is stronger between members of the same clusterand weaker between members of different clusters. An effective clusteranalysis requires two important decisions: (1) identify the variables tobe used to create the clusters and (2) select a method for assessing theoptimum number of clusters. Crisis responsibility and protecting thevictim were selected to create the clusters because they reflect the twotheoretical foundations of SCCT-attribution theory and neoinstitutionaltheory. Repeated measures ANOVAs and t-tests were used to assess theoptimum number of clusters. Both statistical tests help to establish ifthere are significant differences between the clusters. The best fit wasfound when the clusters were shown to be distinct from one another


when compared using the crisis responsibility and protect the victimscores.

The cluster analysis found a 5-cluster solution after one stage, a4-cluster solution after three stages, and a 3-cluster solution after sixstages. The crisis response strategies in each cluster were combined tocreate cluster scores, then a series of repeated measure ANOVAs andpaired-sample t-tests were used to determine which of the cluster solu-tions was the best fit. The 3-cluster solution seemed to best represent thedata in that the clusters were all significantly different from one anotheron their scores for both crisis responsibility and protect the victim; thiswas not the case for either the 5-cluster or 4-cluster solutions. In the5-cluster solution, there was no clean separation among all clusters forboth responsibility and help the victim scores. In the 4-cluster solution,there was not a clean separation among all clusters for help victimscores. The 3-cluster solution provided a clean and clear distinction be-tween the crisis response strategy clusters. The repeated measuresANOVA was significant for both responsibility (Wilks’ l = .11, F(2,66) = 286.18, p < .001) and help the victim (Wilks’ l = .14, F(2, 73) =227.99, p < .001). This indicated that there were significant differencesbetween clusters; so pairwise comparisons were used to determinewhich clusters were significantly different from one another. Pairwisecomparisons between the clusters were conducted using paired-samplet-tests. Table 3 provides the results of the t-tests. The ten crisis responsestrategies formed three clusters: denial, diminish, and deal. Table 4presents the clusters.

The three clusters match perfectly with those anticipated in H1-H4.Deny, attack accuser, and scapegoat formed the denial cluster. Allthree claim no crisis exists for the organization in question. Excuseand justification formed the diminish cluster; each tries to limit the or-ganization’s responsibility for the crisis. Compassion, concern, regret,ingratiation (operationalized to include thanking stakeholders), andapology formed the deal cluster; all five make direct efforts to addressthe stakeholders. The crisis response strategies clustered as antici-pated indicating that how researchers view the crisis response strate-gies is consistent with how respondents evaluate the crisis responsestrategies. It is critical to check for such consistency between concep-tualization and perception because the perceptions of the researchercan be wrong.



TABLE 3. Cluster t-Test Results

M SD t p n2

Responsibility

Deny 1.58 .78 13.27 p < .001 .71

Diminish 3.60 1.24

Deny 1.60 .79 23.30 p < .001 .89

Deal 4.99 .95

Diminish 3.64 1.23 9.14 p < .001 .55

Deal 4.99 .95

Help the Victim

Deny 1.67 .83 10.59 p < .001 .59

Diminish 2.84 1.17

Deny 1.68 .85 21.49 p < .001 .86

Deal 4.41 1.06

Diminish 2.86 1.17 13.16 p < .001 .70

Deal 4.41 1.06

TABLE 4. Crisis Response Strategy Clusters

Deny Cluster

Deny

Attack Accuser

Scapegoat

Diminish Cluster

Excuse

Justification

Deal Cluster

Concern

Regret

Compassion

Ingratiation

Apology

DISCUSSION

An organization’s reputation is one of the resources crisis managementattempts to protect and communication plays a vital role in those protec-tive efforts (Barton, 2001; Benoit, 1995). Crisis managers should selectcrisis response strategies that best serve to protect the organization. It isvital that crisis managers make informed choices about crisis responsestrategies based upon theoretically derived and empirically tested evi-dence rather than rely on hunches or recommendations for simple casestudies (Coombs and Schmidt, 2000). Situational Crisis CommunicationTheory (SCCT) is an effort to build a theory-based and empirically testedset of guidelines for selecting crisis response strategies.

SCCT is premised on matching the crisis response strategy to the de-mands of the crisis situation. The demands are a function of the crisis re-sponsibility and reputational damage a crisis situation is likely togenerate. Previous research has begun to detail the way stakeholdersmake attributions about crisis situations (Coombs, 1998, 2004; Coombsand Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2005). This study sought to shed lighton the other half of SCCT–the way stakeholders perceive the crisis re-sponse strategies. SCCT posits that as perceptions of crisis responsibil-ity and reputational damage increase, the crisis managers should usecrisis response strategies that accept greater responsibility and seek torepair legitimacy by aiding the crisis victims (Coombs and Holladay,2002). The protective properties of crisis response strategies are foundin their ability to create perceptions of the organization taking responsi-bility for the crisis and aiding victims. These two dimensions reflectSCCT’s attribution theory and neoinstitutional theory roots. To havemore faith in these recommendations, we should have some idea of howstakeholders will react to the crisis response strategies–how they per-ceive the protective properties of the crisis response strategies. Do thecrisis response strategies create the desired perceptions of taking re-sponsibility and helping victims?

A set of ten crisis response strategies was identified and operationalized.Respondents were asked to read each crisis response strategy and to rate(1) how much responsibility the organization seemed to take for the crisisand (2) the organization’s emphasis on helping the victims of the crisis.Based on previous research, the crisis response strategies were anticipatedto form three clusters: deny, diminish, and deal. The cluster analysis foundthree clusters: deny, diminish, and deal. The results indicated that respon-dents did perceive the crisis response strategies as intended in terms of cri-sis responsibility and helping the victim.


Understanding how stakeholders may perceive the various crisis re-sponse strategies is valuable to crisis managers. The deny strategiesclaim no organizational responsibility for a crisis. This is a risky re-sponse if stakeholders feel an organization does hold some crisis re-sponsibility. The organization must “prove” it has no responsibility nobe effective. Deny strategies should be reserved for crisis situations thatrequire a fight such as rumors or unfair challenges. The diminish strate-gies reinforce the low levels of crisis responsibility attributed to acci-dental crises. The crisis manager seeks to highlight the unintentionalnature and/or minimal damage associated with the crisis.

The deal strategies offer a wide range of options that seem to accept re-sponsibility and attend to victim concerns. Expressions of concern, com-passion, or regret were rated equal to a full apology. This equivalence issignificant because full apologies create definite legal liabilities (Tyler,1997). Expressions of concern, compassion, or regret may be usedagainst an organization in court but juries may reject the statements as ad-missions of guilt. Moreover, some states, including California and Mas-sachusetts, have laws protecting organizations from liability when usingexpressions of concern, compassion, or regret (Fuchs-Burnett, 2002;Patel and Reinsch, 2003).

The results of this study are useful to crisis managers and to crisis re-searchers. SCCT started with a system for matching the crisis responsestrategy(ies) to the crisis situation (Coombs, 1995). A number of studieshave helped to establish how SCCT can be used to estimate the amount ofcrisis responsibility and reputational damage a crisis situation will generate(Coombs, 1998; Coombs and Holladay, 2002). The crisis situations can bedivided into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable. These threeclusters are in a sequence that reflect an increasing amount of crisis respon-sibility and reputational damage. This current study examined respondentperceptions of the protective power of crisis response strategies andgrouped the crisis response strategies into three clusters using accepting re-sponsibility and helping the victims: deny, diminish, and deal. A crisismanager can now have more confidence in how well a particular crisis re-sponse strategy will protect the organizational reputation. This study pro-vides some insight into how stakeholders might perceive the levels of crisisresponsibility acceptance and concern for victims associated with variouscrisis response strategies. Additional research with a more diverse respon-dent pool would serve to strength these insights.

SCCT recommends crisis managers use instructing information aloneor a deny crisis response strategy be used in the victim cluster; the dimin-ish crisis response strategies should be used in the accident cluster, and


deal, including apology, crisis response strategies should be used in theintentional cluster. The choice between apology and the other deal crisisresponse options is primarily a legal one. Apologies leave an organizationopen to legal liabilities and so an organization may seek the sympathystrategies and less liability (Fitzpatrick, 1995; French, 2002; Tyler,1997). However, for grievous organizational misdeeds an apology wouldbe recommended because the organization will suffer legal losses with orwithout the apology and an apology might actually lessen the financialdamages (French, 2002). This study provides additional empirical evi-dence to support the recommendations for SCCT by verifying the per-ceived protective powers of crisis response strategies.

Crisis research can use the results of this study to conduct future re-search. Now that the two basic aspects of SCCT have been studied (cri-sis situation and crisis response strategies), researchers can examine thematching recommendation of SCCT in greater detail. So far only a lim-ited testing of SCCT matching recommendations has been performed(Coombs and Holladay, 1996; Coombs and Schmidt, 2000). If we are tohave greater confidence in SCCT matching, further research is required.This study has provided crisis managers with information to make moreinformed choices when selecting what to say and do in order to maxi-mize the protection of reputational assets of an organization during acrisis.

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Received: March 31, 2004Revised: August 16, 2005

Accepted: September 12, 2005


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