THE PROPOSED FULLERTON STREETCAR – CONCERNS AND

QUESTIONS

Presentation to the Fullerton City CouncilBy

Thomas A. Rubin, CPA, CMA, CMC, CIA CGMA, CFMOctober 21, 2014

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PURPOSE OF PRESENTATION• A review of the Draft Fullerton College Connector

Study (DFCCS), 2/12/14, reveals a number of important errors and raises many questions not addressed in the report or other available sources

• Peer comparisons with existing U.S. streetcar systems and other research make many of the points in the DFCCS questionable

• Throughout DFCCS, almost every single error and questionable assumption or statement favors streetcar or makes alternatives look unfavorable – this would not be expected if errors were random

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WHAT WE DON’T KNOW• After spending considerable time studying DFCCS,

there is a lot of data and information that we would like to have that is just not included or otherwise available – which has led to our concerns and issues

• It is certainly possible that there are good responses to many of our questions that may satisfy our concerns – but, until these are publicized, we will continue to express our concerns

• We have not been able to discuss this with City staff• If you decide that you might want to go forward, we

strongly suggest that these issues be studied – first3

PEER COMPARISONS• One of the best ways to test the reliability of

projections for a proposed transportation system is to compute significant metrics and compare

• There are seven streetcar systems in the U.S. comparable to what is proposed for Fullerton with data available: Kenosha, Little Rock, Memphis, Portland, Seattle, Tacoma, and Tampa

• We took actual data for from the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) National Transit Database (NTD) for these seven for 2012 and compared it to the computations we made from DFCCS for 2035

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• Kenosha, Little Rock, and Tampa are generally regarded as failed systems due to their low ridership 5

ANNUAL BOARDINGS/ROUTE MILE• So it is clear what is being evaluated, it is the 2035

ridership projections• This low level of projected ridership could be cause

for considerable pause – is it really worth it to spend this much taxpayer money, and this is all we get?

• If this is all the ridership that can be expected, there is no need to go the huge expense of Streetcar design and construction (although if higher ridership did exist, it very well could be handled excellently by modes other than Streetcar)

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• DFCCS costs appear very low compared to other agencies; we can’t reconcile stated methodology to data in report 7

COST/REVENUE VEHICLE HOUR• DCCFS, Table 5, page 45: “Streetcar cost per hour figure was

extracted from the National Transit Database and represented an average for services provided in 2011 for Seattle and Portland Streetcars.”

• Cost/Revenue Vehicle Hour per NTD 2011:–Portland: $218– Seattle: $208

• Santa Ana/Garden Grove Streetcar: $187• Anaheim Rapid Connection: $180• Cost/Revenue Vehicle Hour for Fullerton Streetcar

alternatives, per previous graph: $85-95• We cannot explain why these differ so widely

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CAPITAL COSTS• DCCFS, page 45: “Capital cost estimates were

created based on experience with other modern streetcar systems and use of a “unit rate" approach, where the major components of each alternative are quantified and multiplied by average unit costs.”

• “On a per-track mile basis, the three preferred alignment alternatives range from $25.47 million to $25.58 million.”

• We were not able to reference the “Preferred Alternatives Cost Estimates” Technical Appendix

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CAPITAL COSTS II• “Case studies” in DFCCS:– Tacoma Link (page 19): $81 million for 1.6 miles $25.3

million/route mile (two-way)– Seattle (page 20): “$19.4 million per track mile”

• Orange County streetcar projects (not in DFCCS):– Anaheim: $318.7 million for 6.4 miles $49.8

million/route mile– Santa Ana/Garden Grove: $197.4-228.1 million for

8.22/8.45 miles $24.0-27.0 million/route mile– Anaheim is deliberately done rather “fancy,” SA/GG

saves cost by utilizing former Pacific Electric right-of-way for close to half of the total alignment 10

CAPITAL COSTS III• Los Angeles – shown on page 79 as $152 million (for

3.8 miles $40 million/track mile); most recent projection is $72-100 million/track mile)

• Milwaukee, Wisconsin – $84.6 million for 3.8 miles $22.3 million/track mile

• Portland Case Study (page 22), shows:– “System-wide average of $11.5 million per track mile”– Good Samaritan to Portland State, $56.9 million for 2.4

mile double track, which is $11.9 million/track mile – but Portland Streetcar web site has $148.3 million for 3.35 miles double track $22.1 million/track mile

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CAPITAL COSTS IV• Tempe, Arizona – $129.34 million for 2.7 miles

$48 million/mile• Tucson, Arizona -- $196.53 million for 3.9 route

miles $50 million/mileCONCLUSION 1: “$25.47 million to $25.58 million” in

DFCCS may be more properly considered to be the lower end of the reasonable range, with a high end of approximately $50 million – and it is certainly possible to exceed that figure

CONCLUSION 2: Both capital and operating costs in DFCCS may be significantly understated

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WATCH OUT FOR COST CHANGES• There is a very long history of cost changes in rail

projects• These changes are almost all increases, many of

them major• Cost reductions are generally only due to changes in

scope:– Reduction in route length– Change from double-track to single-track– Eliminate/reduce bicycle/pedestrian track or other

promised amenities

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WITH ALL THIS, WHY STREETCAR?• DFCCS, page 12: “This study focused on topics that

recent studies on circulator systems in operations have shown to be the best predictors for whether investment in new transit will enhance mobility and generate substantial new investment in the area (emphasis added).”

• Page 12: “Also, (bus) shuttle systems have not been found to enhance economic development along the corridors they service.”

• So, this is not really a transportation study, it is an economic development study

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BUT – IS THERE REALLY ANYTHING THERE?• DFCCS, page 22, shows Portland “Streetcar Results:” “Over $3.5

billion in economic development”• This is nothing but a list of construction projects that has

occurred within a few blocks of the streetcar line through downtown Portland – cause/effect not shown

• Even if one believes that rail transit is a development generator, do you think that the light rail system, with 224 million passenger miles a year, should be given some of the credit, rather than all going to the streetcar system, with four million a year?

• The taxpayer subsidies are over $1,000,000,000 – which the taxpayers will never fully recover, particularly since there have been so much tax abatements on that $3.5 billion of economic development 18

WHAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT VALUE OF A STREETCAR PASSENGER?

• According to the literature, very high• Let’s use data from Streetcars’ Economic Impact in

the United States, equilibrium capital, May 26, 2010• Ridership: National Transit Database 2012

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City Kenosha Little Rock Memphis Portland Tampa

Development Investment

$150 million $400 million $2,000 million $3,500 million >$1,000 million

Daily Passengers

62 168 1,889 5,006 418

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WHAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT VALUE OF A STREETCAR PASSENGER?

• The only output of Streetcar is moving people – so, unless someone is prepared to claim that it is the construction of streetcar track et al that is the driver of development, not that the streetcar has a transportation purpose, then the only thing to compare is claimed development impact and riders

• I submit that one streetcar passenger making a daily round trip is simply not worth anything remotely close – meaning orders of magnitude – to $2.4 million in development impact

• By the way, a lot of the Streetcar passengers were making the same trip before the Streetcar existed 21

LOS ANGELES DASH• Since the 1980’s the City of Los Angeles now

operates 32 DASH circulator bus systems all over the City, particularly in the major commercial/ business/government/retail/entertainment areas

• If all that is required to show that a transit mode creates development that would not otherwise exist is to total construction costs within a few blocks of a route, DASH would be shown to be the most incredible development engine ever discovered!!!

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SPEED OF TRAVEL• Note that the average operating speed for the six

original alternatives is almost two-thirds higher than the average for the seven comparable streetcar systems that reported to NTD – and the slowest of the six alternatives is almost 20% faster than the fastest of the existing systems

• Although there is not sufficient data in DFCCS to allow the calculation of the speeds of the three modified alternatives, they were shortened slightly, so the speeds are now lower – but, as near as we can tell, they are still shown as operating faster than all the existing streetcar lines 24

WHY IS OPERATING SPEED IMPORTANT?

• Speed is very important to potential passengers – if the speed is slower than is modeled, passenger demand may be overestimated

• Slower speeds could easily require the procurement – and operations and maintenance – of more vehicles to operate the assumed 15 min. headways

• Slower operating speeds could require redesign of the alignment for additional passing tracks or double-tracking – but, most likely, there will not be much single-track in Fullerton, except at route terminals

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BUS SHUTTLE SYSTEM• DFCCS, page 12: “This Connector Study did not

analyze the creation of a bus shuttle system. While shuttle systems exist throughout the United States, providing point-to-point connections between transit stations, educational institutions, and major employers, and they can be implemented more quickly and at lower cost than a streetcar or fixed guideway system, shuttles cannot access the full range of funds available for public transportation systems, and therefore rely upon funding from local governments and/or private funders.”

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BUS SHUTTLE SYSTEM II• This is madness• It totally fails to recognize that the capital cost of

Streetcar would be far more twenty times that of shuttle bus – the City share of the capital cost of a Streetcar project would be far more than the total cost of a bus shuttle system

• It is false as to funding availability – Shuttle Bus can actually access funds that Streetcar projects can’t:– Federal 49 USC 5309 “Bus” capital program – OCTA Measure M2 “Community Based Transit/

Circulators” (Project V)27

BUS SHUTTLE SYSTEM III• DFCCS, page 12: “The analysis focused on the

evaluation of a fixed guideway (emphasis added) transit service, using either rail or rubber tired vehicles.”

• Fixed guideway bus requires dedicated or semi-dedicated (HOV/HOT) lanes – and is impossible here because dedicated bus lanes in the study area would do great disservice to the cars, trucks, buses, and bicycles using roadway general-purpose lanes

• This makes no sense, other than as excuse for not studying Shuttle Bus – which beats the @#$%?! out of Streetcar in a head-to-head comparison 28

YOU HAVE NO ROOM FOR DEDICATED TRANSIT LANES, RAIL OR BUS

• Fullerton streets simply do not have roadway width to spare for dedicated transit lanes, neither steel tracks nor exclusive bus lanes for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) – everything you have now is being used

• There is nothing to give and no feasible way to get more road width

• To understand what would be required, let’s take a look at how this works in other cities – where the ridership and time savings justifies the space utilized.

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CLEVELAND HEATHLINE BRT

• Healthline is a “center” BRT system – bus lanes/stations in road center• Note right-side loading bus operating in “wrong” direction• Requires two dedicated lanes, plus space for center stations

Dedicated Lanes

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CURITIBA, BRAZIL “SURFACE METRO”

• “Conventional” right-side boarding – with dedicated lanes• 80-foot, double-articulated buses• May be world’s best transit system – 70% transit modal split, all

funding from fares, no taxpayer cost 31

FULLERTON BRT MADES NO SENSE• If, like Curitiba, you would be running 80-foot buses

with 270 passengers every 45 seconds at peak, with average trip lengths of five miles, it is not only worthwhile to dedicate traffic lanes, you should dedicate entire streets

• But, for one 25-foot bus every fifteen minutes, with fewer than ten passengers on average, taking average trips of a bit over one mile, dedicated BRT lanes are totally inappropriate

• We cannot understand why this was considered for one second in DFCCS – not only shouldn’t be done, but can’t be done 32

THE “REAL” ALTERNATIVE TO STREETCAR IS SMALL BUSES

• On the left is a 25-foot, sixteen-seat, two-wheelchair bus operated by City of Lawrence Transit near the University of Kansas campus

• If you want to get fancier, you can go for a replica trolley, designed to look like an old-fashioned streetcar – this one is from San Antonio.

• New streetcars run about $2.5-4.0 million each – these buses are about 10% of that. Yes, the buses are smaller, and will generally last only about half as long, but the cost per unit of capacity per year for a bus, vs. a streetcar, is well under half – and, since it runs on the same roads that have been and will always be there, there is no cost for tracks, stations, propulsion power supply, etc. 33

STREETCAR vs. SHUTTLE BUS• An important question to ask is, what does it cost to

provide a trip on the Streetcar vs. the obvious transit alternative, a “Shuttle Bus?”

• We used Alternative 4 for comparison (not much difference between alternatives for this purpose)

• DFCCS did not have full data for Bus alternatives, so we made reasonable assumptions

• Annualized capital costs are computed using the Federal Transit Administration’s “New Starts” methodology – allocates capital costs over the useful lives of the assets procured for the project

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STREETCAR vs. SHUTTLE BUS II• Shuttle Bus assumptions:– Ridership: Two-thirds of Streetcar’s (16 boardings/hour;

OCTA bus average for 2012 was 34)– Capital costs: Five buses @ $350,000 each, plus 25%

more for all else $2,187,500 total– Shuttle Bus would likely cost less and carry more

• Useful lives (from FTA):– Streetcar: 25 years– Shuttle bus: 12 years

• All other data from DFCCS (even though we find much of it questionable)

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OPERATING RESULTS• Streetcar ridership is 50% higher• Streetcar operating cost is 27% higher• Streetcar operating cost per rider is 16% lower

Advantage, Streetcar

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CAPITAL AND OVERALL RESULTS• Streetcar capital costs over 80 times that of Shuttle

Bus• Streetcar annualized capital costs are over 37 times

that of Shuttle Bus• Streetcar total annualized costs are over six-and-

one-half times that of Shuttle Bus• Streetcar annualized costs per rider are over four-

and-one-third times that of Shuttle Bus

Advantage, Shuttle Bus39

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IF THE OBJECTIVE IS RIDERSHIP, …• Even using streetcar capital and operating cost data

that may be significantly understated, the cost of carrying passengers on Streetcar is far, far higher than carrying passengers on Shuttle Bus

• If what the City is after is to add mobility options, and doing so in a cost-effective manner, then Shuttle Bus is far superior to Streetcar for the taxpayers

• Even using assumptions unfavorable to Shuttle Bus, ridership could be increased substantially by adding more bus service at a fraction of Streetcar’s cost – and done much faster, with far lower risks 41

HOW TO FIT IN THE TRACKS?• Since streetcar – by definition – runs on general

purpose lanes on streets with rubber-tire vehicles, there are always major issues with placing Streetcar tracks, particularly on existing streets

• Streetcars operate at lower speeds than most other motorized vehicles, and make frequent start/stops

• Given the low carrying capacity of Streetcars, it is common for total road capacity to decline when they are implemented, which may result in traffic transferred to other roadways

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HOW TO FIT IN THE TRACKS? II• Turns are a particular problem• For this reason, the preferred practice is to

eliminate, or at least minimize, the number of turns• Of course, it is rarely possible to completely

eliminate all turns, so the emphasis becomes one of avoiding left turns if at all possible

• Left turning Streetcars have to start in, or get to, the middle of the (two-way) street, then cross against on-coming traffic

• Left turns for Streetcars are also difficult to coordinate with left turning cars/trucks 43

HOW TO FIT IN THE TRACKS? III• We were surprised to find that, in all three

Preferred Alternatives, there were almost as many left turns as right

• Streetcar operations can also conflict with:– Street parking– Entrances to parking lots and garages– Bike paths and cyclists– Buses– Rubber-tire vehicles making right turns

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STATE COLLEGE AT CHAPMANLOOKING NORTH

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STATE COLLEGE AT CHAPMANLOOKING NORTH

• You are using the entire street – two thru traffic lanes in each direction plus dual left turn lanes

• There is nothing to take for any other use – you need all that there is there and there are no options for adding anything new, such as curb parking – or a dedicated Bus Rapid Transit Lane

• Even providing three-foot clearance for cyclists under new statute is marginal

• Putting Streetcar tracks in center of road will be very difficult – and stations close to impossible

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CHAPMAN AVENUELooking West Towards State College

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CHAPMAN AVENUELooking West Towards State College

• In this area, City has good sidewalk system with appropriate width for pedestrian load

• With some possible exceptions, sidewalks should be adequate for “curb lane” Streetcar stops for expected passenger loads

• Note minimal setback of buildings, common to most of proposed streets along alignment – there is just not anything that can be done to add to street or sidewalk width, so you must work with what you have – and minimize disruptions to current users

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FULLERTON TRANSPORTATION CENTERLooking North up Pomona Avenue

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FULLERTON TRANSPORTATION CENTER• DFCCS has line terminating on the far side of

Commonwealth, where Streetcars would remain for several minutes while awaiting return trip

• This would block access in and out of parking on both sides

• Probably better to extend line to approximately where the photograph was taken, where layover will not be a problem, probably on East (right) side of the access

• Will require some redesign of parking lot access and loss of some parking slots – but is doable

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PAMONA AVENUE, LOOKING NORTH

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PAMONA AVENUE, LOOKING NORTH• This is the approach to the Fullerton Transportation

Center• Obviously, very tight for two Streetcar tracks (single-

tracking not advisable)• Recommend you consider “back-in” diagonal

parking:– Backing up is far more dangerous than driving forward,

so it is best to do the more dangerous maneuver when there are far fewer things to hit, and they are less likely to be living entities, or have living entities in them

– (Backing into a Streetcar is tough to explain to your auto insurance agent) 52

COMMONWEALTH, LOOKING EAST

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COMMONWEALTH, LOOKING EAST• Note bike lane, bus stop, and parking• Again, no possibility of running Streetcar in center

of road; no place for station• Cyclists and Streetcar tracks do not mix well – and

putting tracks in curb lane causes very large potential for conflicts with cyclists traveling in the same direction – wheels hit embedded track slot for wheel flanges at narrow angle and there is great potential for spills – and life-altering injuries

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PROPULSION POWER SUPPLY• One of the endearing features in Fullerton’s built

environment is the absence of overhead utility lines• While there are ways to avoid overhead catenary

systems for power supply, virtually all streetcar systems do have bare copper wires, ~750v, suspended over the running track – and supported by a variety of clever poles and other devices

• Properly designed, installed, and maintained, these present only very minor safety concerns, but make sure your fire department is fully engaged in all aspects of planning, design, and implementation

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STREETCARS REQUIRE CATENARY

Seattle South Lake Union Streetcar 56

HISTORIC AND REPLICA STREETCARS

Tampa – Original Birney Safety car from 1920-1940

era that operated in Tampa – note trolley pole

Tampa – Replica trolley, constructed new by Gomaca

Trolley – note trolley pole 57

• DFCCS, page 32: “When asked what type of Connector the community would prefer, the majority would prefer an Historical Trolley.”

• Recommend that historic trolleys not be utilized; if the older look is considered important, than replica vehicles should be given strong consideration

HISTORIC AND REPLICA STREETCARS II

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WHY NOT HISTORIC VEHICLES?• The Memphis Trolley is operated with historic

vehicles – and suffered vehicle fires in November 2013 and April 2014

• In both cases, passengers were originally trapped in the burning vehicles, one vehicle totally destroyed

• All Trolley service has been suspended while the vehicles are being completely inspected and necessary work performed to ensure safety – the substitute service is being operated with buses

• Air conditioning difficult with historic vehicles

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WHY NOT HISTORIC VEHICLES? II• Historic vehicles can be far cheaper to acquire than

modern streetcars or replicas, even considering rebuilding cost, but:– They don’t come with warranties– It is impossible to find trained maintenance people, you

must train your own from scratch– Getting parts is difficult to impossible – you may have to

custom manufacture some parts– Maintenance costs, and out-of-service times, may be far

higher than purchased-new vehicles– Ride quality may suffer– Safety concerns 60

WHAT IS A “TROLLEY?”• The original meaning of “trolley” was – and still is –

the U-shaped curved piece of metal that is forced against the overhead propulsion power line by spring or hydraulic action, the “U” allowing it to maintain contact with the power line as the motion of the car moves it along the line

• The trolley is placed at the end of a “trolley pole”• The term “trolley’ became extended, in the

vernacular, to mean the streetcar vehicle that is operated by the power that flows through the trolley to the electric motors

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WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?• To a large extent, trolleys and trolley poles on rail

vehicles (but not trolley buses) have been replaced by pantographs because:– Trolley poles will become detached from the overhead

wire, causing the vehicle to come to a stop– This frequently happens at the worst possible times in

the worst possible places– Mostly, this occurs because of various types of problems

with the mechanisms, but it can also be due to deliberate actions of bystanders – in fact, in many old-time communities served by streetcars, pulling the trolley pole off the wire was a rite of passage for youths

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WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT II• When the trolley comes off the overhead wire, the

operator must get out of the vehicle, grab the rope provided for that purpose, and maneuver the trolley pole so that the trolley reengages the wire

• With some exceptions, pantographs are the preferred method of contact with the overhead line

• Historic trolleys are almost all equipped with trolley poles

• For this reason alone, historic trolleys are contra-indicated; if a historical look is considered important, replica trolleys are probably better

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UTILITY RELOCATION• There is an incredible amount of work required to

put in a rail line on top of utilities under the street:– New and used water– Electricity– Natural Gas– Telephone, cable, other communications

• Go down a street and count the manhole covers – there is something under each one and it very well could mean major costs to relocate

• In California, it is the responsibility of the project to pay for utility relocation costs

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UTILITY RELOCATION II• A city like Fullerton, which has gone to great lengths

to get rid of “telephone poles” and above-ground wires, can wind up with higher costs for utility relocation because so much of the utilities are now under the streets – where the Streetcar would run

• Unanticipated utility relocation costs more than doubled the cost of the proposed Los Angeles Streetcar – and may kill the project

• Milwaukee assumed that Streetcar utility relocation would be paid by utility ratepayers, but the Utilities Commission ruled otherwise – this may stop project

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YOU WILL NEED AN O&M YARD• An operating and maintenance facility is an absolute

necessity• Preferably, as close as possible to the Streetcar

revenue tracks, where the Streetcar is carrying riders (it costs about as much to construct a mile of non-revenue track as it does for revenue track)

• This is an industrial activity, which includes what can be high levels of noise, including during evening hours

• Where will it go?

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TACOMA LINK O&M YARD •Tacoma Link has a three-car fleet, very close to the three-four car fleet proposed for Fullerton•This yard is approximately the length of a football field, goal line to goal line, and approximately one acre in size

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OTHER CONSIDERATIONS• If you take a Federal grant, you are obligated to keep the

assets that you buy with the money in transit service for their specified useful lives. For rail cars, that’s 25 years, for most other major capital items, it is twenty to thirty years.

• If you use Federal funds to buy an asset with a 25-year life, and you stop transit service after ten years, you own the Federal government 60% of the grant amount used to buy it. With rail cars, you might be able to find another transit operator to take them on and use them, which would satisfy the Fed’s – but, what exactly are you supposed to do with rails in the street that cost a whole lot more money than the rail cars? 68

FACTUAL ERRORS• South Lake Union in Seattle shown with operating

cost of $1.6 million; actual for 2012 was $2.8 million• Tacoma Link shown with a fare of $2.00-2.75; this is

the fare for Seattle Link, a true light rail line, not a streetcar – Tacoma Link is more of a parking lot shuttle and does not currently charge a fare

• These data were important in capital and operating costs and ridership projections in DFCCS

• 24.5% farebox recovery ratio, based on OCTA ratio, unrealistic – many riders will be riding on passes, including lower cost student passes

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THIS IS JUST THE BEGINNING• This is not, by any means, the totality of our

concerns and questions• You owe it to the taxpayers to determine the true

story before you decide to spend any more taxpayer dollars on what may very well be a terrible idea

• We would be most pleased to meet with your technical people and consultants to see if we can get to the bottom of what is really going on

• If not, we will continue our research, and we will bring these matters of concern to you, the press and media, and the general public

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