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Southern Political Science Association

The Problem of Polity: Political Participation and Aristotle's Best RegimeAuthor(s): Kevin M. CherrySource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 1406-1421Published by: Cambridge University Presson behalf of the Southern Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622366.

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The Problem of Polity: Political Participation andAristotle's Best RegimeKevin M. Cherry SaintAnselm ollege

Aristotle uses the same word?politeia?to describe both thegenus of regimes and a particular specieswithinthatgenus. I argue that this usage is a common practice inAristotle's practical works and identifiesthemostdeveloped specieswithin itsgenus. Aristotle thus sees the regime ofpolity as more appropriate for developedcommunities than the regimes often taken to represent his ideals, i.e., kingship and aristocracy. Aristotle'sunderstanding of thecapacities, and limitations,of themultitude leads him topropose themixed regime ofpolityas the best regimegenerally possible.While polity differs rom the best regimesimplydiscussed inBook VII, itstilloffersrichpossibilities for bothpolitical and theoreticalactivity.

One of the best known features of Aristotle'spolitical theory shis divisionof regimes ywhether they pursue the common good and

by the number of rulers: one, few, or many. Hefamously refers to the regime inwhich the multitudegoverns for the common advantage as politeia[iTO\LT La] or, as it is usually translated, polity(1279a37-39).1 However, as Aristotle himself notes,this word is also the name common to all regimes(1279a38, 1293a40).2 That is, he calls, and callsattention to calling, one particular species of regimeby the name of the genus towhich that species andfive others belong.Aristotle's terminology here has long raised allsorts of questions among commentators. Sidgwickcontends thatAristotle's dual use of the termpoliteiais a serious impediment in the way of forming aclear and consistent conception ofAristotle's nomenclature (1892, 144).3 More recently, Mulgan hascomplained that Aristotle's attempt to distinguishproper from improper forms of popular government

through the use of two different names isproblematicbecause the term he uses for proper popular government is also the general word for constitutions(1977, 76). Despite, or perhaps because of, this difficulty,many commentators, like Bates have emphasized the necessity of grappling with Aristotle's dualusage here as key to understanding his argument(2003, 105).4I think that with some careful attention to hislinguistic use elsewhere in the Ethics and Politics, theconfusion can be clarified and Aristotle's argumentbetter understood. Robinson notes that Aristotle'sdual usage of politeia is an example of what may becalled a 'genus-species' ambiguity, where the sameword is used tomean now a genus and now one ofthe species of that genus and laments the tendencyof translations to remove this ambiguity (1995, 24).But Robinson also notes, There are other examples ofit [such mbiguity] nAristotle'sthought 1995, 23).Aristotle's use of the same term to denote boththe general phenomenon of regime and a particular

lrrhe genus usage of politeia is generally translated as regime or constitution.translations of the oliticsare from ristotle (1984) and of the icomachean Ethics from ristotle (2002); Ihave occasionallymodifiedboth in light f theOxford Classical Texts,Aristotle (1986) and (1988), respectively.3Sidgwick, attempting to avoid the problem, concludes that politeia is more naturally used in a sense intermediate between Aristotle'sgeneral and special senses (1892, 143).4Bates (2003), highlighting everaldifficultiesnAristotle'suse of the termpoliteia, concludes that there sno specificregimecalledpoliteia, only thegeneralphenomenon ofpoliteia as regime. hope toprovide an alternativeexplanationfor thedifficulties nd justifythe consensus of scholarship that there is, in fact, a specific regime called polity.The Journal ofPolitics,Vol. 71,No. 4,October 2009, Pp. 1406-1421 doi:10.1017/S002238160999003X? 2009 SouthernPolitical ScienceAssociation ISSN 0022-38161406

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THE PROBLEM OF POLITY 1407species of regime is neither unprecedented norinsignificant. By realizing why he does so, we canachieve a better understanding of his linguisticpractice and, more specifically, a better understanding of his beliefs about the various kinds of regimes.Reading Aristotle in this light reveals a higherestimation of polity than generally conceded.5AlthoughAristotle initiallyresentspolityas therule of the multitude directed toward the commongood, it is not properly understood as the oppositeof democracy. Just as he refines his initial definitionsof democracy and oligarchy, Aristotle also expandsupon his first efinition fpolityto explainthat t isin fact amixed regime, inwhich the contributions ofthemany are combined with the contributions of thefew such that neither is in complete control. Aristotleconcedes that the multitude should have authorityover thehighestofficesby electing nd auditingtheofficeholders, but he also limits their participation tothe collective activities of serving in the assembly andon juries. It is the few excellent people, those with afuller virtue, who should serve in the highest officesof the city. By bringing together he few and themany, Aristotle's polity is a kind of mixed regime inwhich laws tend to be made and administered in away that benefits both classes. Commentators, likeJohnson, often note that polity combines distinctfeatures romotherforms f regime 1988, 191) andso has the distinction of bearing the name commonto all constitutions (192). This is true, so far as itgoes, but I believe much more can be said about whypolity has the name common to the genus.

Genus-Species Ambiguity inAristotleThomas Aquinas, the great student of Aristotle, indetermining whether equity is a part of justice,alludes to Aristotle's treatment of the issue in NEV.10 (see Summa Theologiae II-II 120.2). WhatAquinas observes is thatAristotle uses the same term,justice, to denote both a genus and a species within it.Unlike modern usage, which distinguishes between agenus and each specieswithin itby using differentterms, Aristotle tends to use his language in such away as to highlightthe relationships etween the

genus and its various members.6 More importantly,Aristotle uses the genus-term to name themost fullydeveloped species within the genus, thus indicatinghow the various species can be ordered according totheextent owhich they articipate n thefullness fthe genus.In the particular case cited by Aquinas, Aristotleargues that justice-as-genus, or comprehensive justice, serves to produce and preserve happiness or itsparts in thepoliticalcommunity NE 1129M7-19).It includes the acts of all the virtues, each ofwhich isnecessary for the happiness of the political community; it is put to use in relation to something else, andnot just yoneself (1129b32-33), therebyreservingthe community. The opposite of this virtue is thewhole of vice (1130al0), which destroys thosecommunities. In itsmore particular sense, however,justice is the species of virtue that involves takingonly one's due, i.e., the avoidance of pleonexia orover-reaching. Justice-as-species involves what isequitable, or fair, for a person, particularly in regardto honor ormoney (1130b2, 31). And because suchquestions always involve a community and may, ifresolved poorly, destroy that community, this speciesof justice shares in the name of the genus. It has thesame name because its definition is in the samegeneral class. For both have their power in relationto another person (1130a33-bl). Insofar as humanbeings are political animals, living in community withothers, justice is the general virtue concerned withpreserving communities. The particular virtue of justice, however, is the virtue concerned with honor andwealth and so most directly concerned with living incommunity with others. For this reason it bears thename of the genus.

Perhaps the most famous example of genusspecies ambiguityinAristotle is the discussion offriendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle

5Davis argues polity has its name for it exemplifies the contradiction found inall regimes, amelytheir ackof self-knowledgeabout theends they ursue (1996, 74).

6What I discuss bears some resemblance to the philosophicaltheme of focal meaning, as discussed, for instance, by Barnes(1995). Barnes defines it as a word used in several ways, one ofwhich isprimary nd theothersderivative, he accounts of thederivative way containing the account of the primary way(1995, 76). The usual example is healthy, hich refersirst ndforemostto the condition of bodily healthbut is also used todescribe complexionsand foodswhich, respectively, ignifyndproduce health. There are, however, significant differencesbetween my account of hierarchical language and focal meaning.In focal meaning, all of the derivative usages bear the same nameas theprimary sage,while inhierarchicallanguage, t sonlyonespecies in a particular genus. More importantly, focal meaninggenerally applies to a variety of accidents, while the primarymeaning is a substance (77). By contrast, because hierarchicallanguage parallels the genus-species distinction, all the termsinvolved refer to substances?in this case, regimes.



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1408 KEVIN M. CHERRY

discusses three kinds of friendship: those of pleasure,those of utility, and the true friendship of virtue.Cooper suggests part of Aristotle's purpose in thisdiscussion is to clarify what itwas about them thatinclined the Greeks to group them together underthis common name (1980, 302). Though Aristotledoes not deny that associations of pleasure or utilityare in fact kinds of friendship, he is quite clear that,being based on accidental qualities, they are imperfect(1156al6). The completed, r perfect telia),form ffriendship is based on virtue and goodness; suchfriendships are fullest and best, if also themost rare(1156b7, 24-25). Thus, friendshipnthe fullsense isonly one species of friendship, albeit the one mostdeserving of the name friendship. While there aredifferent inds of friendship, hat of good men isfriendship in the first and foremost sense. The othersare friendships only insofar as they resemble truefriendship1157a30 ff).7In other words, the discussion of friendship, likethat of justice, illuminates a critical aspect of Aristotle'slinguistic practice, as Cherry and Goerner argue:

Aristotle's tendency is to see a genus as hierarchicallyarranged so that themost fully realized form within it(thehighest species) is simultaneously the form in termsof which the other, lower, forms are to be understoodby disciplined analogy rather thanmere metaphor. Thisis linguistically reflected inhis simultaneous use of theterm for thehighest species as the termfor the genus asa whole, the less complete forms pointing toward thecompleted form. (2006, 566)

Although a regular practice of Aristotle's, someexamples of genus-species ambiguity require moreunpacking than friendship or justice. For example, inBookVI of the icomacheanEthics (NE 1139a26ff.),Aristotle contrasts what we might call practicalthinkingdianoiapraktike)with speculative hinking(dianoia the?retike). Both faculties of thought areconcerned with truth and falsity, but the former isconcerned about the truth that pertains to actions,while the latter is concerned with the truth about being.Shortly thereafter,however, Aristotle distinguishes practicalthinkingntotwodifferentinds: (1) things ade(poietike) nd (2) actions done (praktike,140alff.).Doing isnot a form ofmaking, nor making a form of

doing. Being distinct activities, they are governed bydifferent intellectual capacities. The rational capacityfor art is concerned with making, not with doing.

Practical judgment, phronesis, is the capacity to deliberate well about acting, not making (1112a30 ff.).The genus of practical thought, unlike the genusof speculative thought, includes the species of bothacting and making. However, Aristotle uses the sameterm to describe the (broader) genus of practicalthought, as opposed to speculative, and a (narrower)species, that of acting, within that genus. He makesclear not only that acting is not making but also thatacting, which bears the name of the genus, ismoretruly practical activity. Making is never an end initself, only a means to something else; action, bycontrast, is an end in itself (1139M ff.).8Aristotleonce again uses the same term to name both a genusand thehighestspecieswithin it.

Appreciating this facet of Aristotle's linguisticusage helps clarify is beliefs about includingthemultitude in ruling. Though it seems problematic,Aristotle says, theremay be some truth in the ideathat the multitude should be the authoritativeelement in a city (Pol. 1281a40-42). Though noneof them is individually an excellent man [spoudaiosdrier] when takentogether heymay be capable ofjudgment at least as good as that of a single excellentman or a few excellent men (1281a42-b3).9 Thejudgment necessary for political life, that is, maynot be the province of a select few. One reason why

Aristotle is able to extend to the multitude somecapacity formaking judgments about political life ishis broad understanding of the virtue of practicaljudgment and his awareness of the connections amongthe various forms of knowledge that have to do withhuman activity. Practical judgment, phronesis, helps usdetermine both the appropriate ends of our actionsand themeans to attain those ends. While this knowledge takes various forms, according to Aristotle, suchforms are not distinct but rather related.

In his treatment of phronesis in Book VI of theNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle acknowledges thatmost of us speak of people as having practicaljudgment concerning some particular thing whentheycalculate well with a view to some particular seriousend (1140a28-30). Yet it is not immediately clearwhether Aristotle agreeswith this common way of speaking.However, by drawing a contrast between wisdom(sophia) and phronesis, Aristotle sides with commonopinion: The virtue of phronesis is one possessed by

7Irwincontends there is one definition f friendship, hich isfullysatisfiedonly by complete friendship, nd is only partlysatisfiedby friendships orpleasure and utility (1999, 277).

8Thispriorityof acting tomaking is reiterated n thePolitics,where Aristotle, in the course of discussing natural slavery,emphasizes that life is doing things, not making them(1254a7).9Aristotle later concedes the many may be excellent [spoudaioi]in soul (1286b3).



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THE PROBLEM OF POLITY 1409anyone?not only statesmen or philosophers?capableof reasoning about what is good or bad for a humanbeing (1140b4-6).While phronesis deals with what can and shouldbe done, wisdom is concerned with what is eternal andunchanging (1140a31 ff.). Philosophers?Aristotlenames Anaxagoras and Thales (1141b3?4)?seekwisdom, the most precise kind of knowledge, whichisquite differentrom theknowledgeof politicsorpractical judgment (1141al6, 20-21).10 To be sure,exercising phronesis, seeking the things that are justandbeautifulndgoodfor umanbeing (1143b21-23),depends upon a conception of the good (1141M2-14),but this does not require investigation into the Platonicor Socratic form of theGood, which Aristotle suggestsdoes not improve our actions (1096a 10 ff.). IndeedAristotle's example of someone who has phronesis isthe statesman Pericles. People like Pericles, Aristotlesays, can see what is good for themselves and for human beings, and this capacity belongs to those who

manage households as well as those who handlepolitical affairs (1140b7-ll). Phronesis is possessed bythose who manage well cities, households, and individual lives, even if they are not philosophic.However, Aristotle refines his initial suggestionthat the virtue of phronesis is common to individuals,household managers, and political leaders, and thegenus-species ambiguity again rears itshead. He saysthat phronesis is a genus within which there ismuch difference (1141b33-42a2). Phronesis, that is,encompasses the knowledge concerned with oneselfas one person, as well as that concerned with rulinga household or a city 1141b29-30).When itcomesto ruling a city,Aristotle also distinguishes betweenthe phronesis relevant to the city in the overarchingsense, in which case it is called lawgiving (nomothetike), and the more common appellation ofpolitics (politike) that deals with particular matters(1141b23?26). Aristotle laments this: he believes thatthe act of lawgiving ismore truly political action andso deserves the name, but common opinion isotherwise and he, though indicating his disagreement, defers to it.This is also an instance of genusspecies ambiguity, if one where Aristotle's usual

hierarchical organization of terms is frustrated byrespect for common opinion.11

Genus-species ambiguity, however, is also presentwithin the termphronesis: if the practical judgment ofwhat is good for oneself, one's household, and one'scityall fallwithin thebroad genus,which kind ofknowledge is most appropriately called phronesis7.12Aristotle notices thatmost people believe phronesis tobe particularly concerned with one's individual welfare, for someone who knows and devotes his time tothings that concern himself seems to be possessed ofpractical udgment phronimos),hile politicalpeopleseem to be busybodies (1142al-2). Yet Aristotle notonly refrainsrom endorsingthisopinion (he onlyquotesEuripides' lostplayPhiloctetes),ut also givesreason to doubt it: presumably it is impossible to seekone's own wellbeing without household managementor the political art (1142a9-10).13As Irwin points out, Aristotle is emphasizing herethatphronesis should not be concerned with one's owninterestso the exclusion f thegood of others 1999,245^16). Properly understood, prudence is concernednot only with one's own good but also with the goodof one's household and community. It is difficult topursue one's own good through the exercise ofindividual phronesis in the absence of related capacitiesfor phronesis with respect to the family and city(1142a9-10). The connection between the good ofthe individual nd thegood of thecommunity,fterall, explains the transition from the NicomacheanEthics to the Politics.14

10Thales's possession of theoretical wisdom, as adduced in BookVI, did not preclude his possession of phronesis,as Aristotlerecounts nBook I of the olitics (1259a5 ft).However,Aristotle,in this passage, does call attention to Thales' knowledge not onlyof universals but also of particulars, which ismore characteristicof practical judgment than wisdom.

nIn his work on political things, olitik?n,Aristotle treatsnotparticular deliberations but rather lawgiving in its overarchingsense, as Strauss (1964) emphasizes.12Bodeiis also accepts a hierarchical reading of Aristotle's discussion of phronesis, but unlike me, he asserts that legislative

prudence is far more important than household managementand prudence in the specific sense of the term because everyindividual,despite his autonomy, is amember of a householdand a city and ... every household, despite its autonomy, is partof a city (1993, 65). See also Vander Waerdt, who argues thatdespite the apparent elevation of political prudence, it cannottruly be architectonic because of the tension between the goodman and thegood citizen (1985b, 82-87).13Rudermanails o noteAristotlequestionstheproprietyfusing

phronesis primarily to describe actions concerned with one's ownwell-being (1997, 413); he omits Aristotle's use of dokei, seems,and ascribes theopinion ofEuripides toAristotle (1141b29).14Might he relationship etween the various forms fphronesishelpus tounderstandAristotle's remark hat he endof thecity sthe same as that of individuals?Phronesis has as its end theidentification of what is good and advantageous [agatha kaisumpheronta]for the sake of livingwell (NE 1140a26-28);therefore,hecapacityfordetermining ell theactivities f a cityas well as a person or household must have something to do withthat end.



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At the same time, however, Aristotle does notobject to using phronesis to refer to the species ofpractical judgment concerned primarily with oneselfprovided that concern iswide enough to encompassthe good of the community to which one belongs.While he indicates his disagreement with the common use of politike, he shows no such reservationsabout the common use of phronesis to referprimarilyto deliberating about one's own ends.While the endof political phronesis?namely, the good of thecity?may be themost authoritative and comprehensive, as is suggested at the beginning of the Ethics(1094a26-bll), the character of laws that directcitizens toward that end will depend upon thecharacter and practical knowledge of those who makethem; bad people will not make good laws. Becauseregimeswill reflect hat citizensbelieve is good forhuman beings, understanding the good for humanbeings is prior to understanding either what is goodfor the cityorwhether the city'sgood should takeprecedence over that of individuals. This is whyphronesis associated with individual lives is thespecies which is deserving of, and so bears, the nameof the genus.

Practical Judgment andPolitical JudgmentHaving discussed the relation of phronesis towisdom,letus now considerwhy itmightbe possible for themultitude to have phronesis at a level that warrantsallowing them to share in certain offices in the city'sruling odyyetdoes not justifyivingthem bsoluteauthority. Though theybelong to the same genus, thedistinction between individual phronesis and politikewill be critical in understanding Aristotle's argumenthere.

Phronesis takes into account both the universaland, insofar as it concerns action, the particular.Hence, people who have experience often are moreadept at action than others who do have knowledge[eidot?n] (1141bl4?18). Indeed, Aristotle says, practical judgment relies more so on particulars thanuniversals, which may be why it can existwithout thetheoretical knowledge or wisdom characteristic of

philosophers (1141b21?22). Later, he will go so far asto say that practical judgment is not science[phronesis ouk episteme], for it is directed at anultimate particular (1142a23-24). For this reason,Aristotle warns that young people are unlikely to

possess phronesis, as they have not yet acquired

adequate experience. It is not a lack of study but alack of experience that hinders their pursuit of thegood (1142all ft).In contrast to the knowledge of universals andthe theoretical wisdom required to achieve it, experience with particulars is something which the (adult)multitude in the citymight have?particularly experience with matters that affect them and their lives.For that reason, phronesis is a virtue theymay acquire, particularly to the extent necessary to take partin judgingnot as individualsbut collectivelyinassemblies or juries. At the same time, however, mostpeople are unlikely to have the amount or breadth ofexperience and reflection necessary to acquire political phronesis (i.e., politike), let alone that phronesisnecessary for lawgiving (nomothetike). It is only thosefewwho do develop thosekinds of phronesiswhoought tohold offices n thecity s individuals atherthan as part of a group.While laws are a necessary part of any goodregime, they are never adequate for judging everysituation, and so it is necessary that they are supplementedby good judgmenton thepart of citizens. Following many commentators, I believe thatAristotle ultimately, though not without hesitation,concludes that it is better for themany, rather thanonly the one or the few, to participate in suchjudgments.15 Aristotle understands the virtue ofpractical judgment to be one susceptible of relatively

widespread distribution. However, not every multitude is capable of judging well and so warrants thisresponsibility; only a certain kind ofmultitude thatjudges better than the one or the few (1281M5-17).The multitude must have developed the virtue ofpractical judgment through their experiences andbring those experiences to bear on the decisions theymake. One of the explicit conditions is that themultitude not be overly slavish, but we might alsosuspect that the multitude in question must havesome level of ethical virtue lest theydisregard the lawsand undermine the regime itself (1282al5-16).Aristotle first intimates that themultitude, whencombined with the few,may be no worse at judgingthan the few alone (1281a34-38, 1282al6-17), but helater suggests that having themultitude participate in

making certain judgments is in fact better thanhaving only the few make such judgments. Thereare some [arts] concerning which the maker mightnot be theonly or the best judge,but where thosewho do not possess the art also have some knowledge15See,e.g., Bluhm (1962), Nichols (1992), Kraut (2002), andBates (2003).



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THE PROBLEM OF POLITY 1411

of itswork (1282al7-19). For this reason, Aristotlesays, themultitude, though unable to serve as individuals, should collectively have authority over electingand auditing officials and should serve asmembers ofthe assembly and juries.Aristotle believes the multitude may, in fact, becapable of acquiring a species of phronesis which isadequate for them to take part in the mixed regimethat governs the city.He is quite clear that phronesisisnot a kind of theoretical isdom,which he oftendenies the multitude can possess. Rather, he emphasizes the relationship of phronesis to experience,which the multitude can have. Again, this is not tosaythat hemultitude iscapableofacquiring olitike,which would enable them to serve in the city's highestoffices as individuals, much less that they could acquire nomothetike, the species of phronesis necessaryto legislate well in a manner akin to Solon. It is,rather, tomake a more limited claim that the multitudemay acquire the species of phronesis that enablesit to judge well involving the particular matters overwhich Aristotle suggests giving them authority, i.e.,the assessment of specific policies in the assembly, theevaluation of cases in the law courts, and the selectionand auditing of office holders.16

Polity as Genus and SpeciesWith this as background, let us return to the questions surrounding the usage of politeia in the Politics.To understand how the regime generally translated aspolity is the highest specieswithin the genus ofregimes, it is essential to understand what a regimeis, i.e., a political community, and how polity exemplifies these traits more than any other species.Aristotle's account of the development of politicalcommunities illuminates how regimes ought to beself-sufficient communities of free and (relatively)equal citizens of a sufficient level of virtue to share inruling in turnwith a view toward the common end ofliving well.

In Book III of the Politics, Aristotle discusses thevarious forms of kingship, one of which he callsheroic and was characteristic of the earliest cities(1285b3-19). Kings of thiskind gained theirofficebecause they had been benefactors of the multitudein connection with the arts orwith war or by bringingthem together [in a city], or providing them land.Their duties included leadership inwar and thosesacrifices that did not require priests (1285b9-10), aswell as being judges in legal cases (1285bl0-ll).Because the people were grateful for these benefits,they accepted such kings and even allowed theirdescendents to succeed them.17

The rule of heroic kings was justified becausetheir virtues helped them procure a greater level ofself-sufficiency through providing better for defenseagainst enemies, necessary sacrifices, and a means ofresolving disagreements among inhabitants of different villages (1285b4 ff.). The attempt to secure thesegoods, particularly those of mere life, is what ledcitizens of the earliest poleis to accept the rule ofheroic kings. Once in the polis, citizens continue thesearch formore efficientmeans of securing the goodsnecessary for mere life as well as the good life(1252b29-30). These kings procuredmany goodsand achieved a level of self-sufficiency in their cities. Aristotle indicates that a greater level of selfsufficiency was still possible, but it required thedevelopment of different parts in the regime. A cityis more self-sufficient when the responsibilities ofsecuring what is necessary for political life are sharedamong many people, so each person is responsible forone task (1273b9?11). But, on Aristotle's account, amultitude capable of contributing to what is necessaryfor thecity isnot only likely o demand someshare in ruling in exchange for their contributionsbut also justifiedndoing sobecause they elpmakethe polis self-sufficient so its citizens can pursue thegood life 1281a4-10).Aristotle argues that the origin of the polis is thedrive for self-sufficiency (autarkeia). The desire tosecure the goods of daily life leadsmen and women tounite in the household. The desire to secure thegoods of nondaily life?for instance, better security

16Taylor places Aristotle in the mainstream of modern republican theory 2002, 253) and identifies im as a progenitorofthe liberal-cum-republicanradition npolitical thought (242),discovering a marked kinship between the principles andprescriptions of Aristotle and those of the American Founders(256). (See also Waldron 1995.) Collins (2002) critiques thisview, focusing n theway inwhichAristotle is concernedaboutthe limits of law in general. I, however, would focus on Aristotle'swarning that only certain multitudes deserve to share in rule,which is different from the natural rightsdoctrine of theAmerican founding.

17Aristotledistinguishes such kings not only fromkingshipslimited by law?that of Sparta, for instance?but also from theabsolute rule of one person similar to household management,which he calls pambasileia. While we may infer that thepambasileus benefitsthosehe rules in a way similar to that oftheheroicking,which iswhyAristotle saysthatpeople ought toobey such a person gladly (1284b32-34), such a rulerwill notbe bound by laws. It is the possibility of absolute kingshipwithout law that leads to Aristotle's dialectical treatment f

whether the rule of law is better than the rule of one man.



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against foreign invasion?leads to the union ofseveral households in a village. Although the poliscomes about as a result of the desire to secure thegoods ofmere life in amore effectivemanner, it alsoexists for?and indeed is defined by its pursuitof?the good life. In the time of heroic kingship,one man was responsible for a variety of tasks,including war, sacrifice, and legal judgments becauseit was rare to discover men who were very outstanding in virtue (1286b8-10).However, as more people attained a sufficientlevel of virtue to benefit their communities, theyceased to be satisfied with kingly rule and soughtsomething common and established a polity(1286M3-14). Inotherwords,what justified heruleof heroic kings?their ability to procure what wasnecessary for self-sufficiency?also justifies the transitionfromkingshiptopolitical rule (1285M4-19).The development of a citizen body able to contributetoward what is necessary for self-sufficiency seems togo hand-in-hand with the development of a citizenbody capable, on the basis of their experience andvirtue, fparticipating npolitical life. he desire ofsuch citizens to exercise their political capacitiesled them to seek a regime inwhich they couldparticipate more fully inwhat characterizes a politicalcommunity: speech about the good, just, and advantageous (1253al4-18). Aristotle is clear that when apolitical community contains amultitude capable ofsuch participation, a regime ought to provide fortheir participation: it is evident that among similarand equal persons it is neither advantageous nor justfor one person to have authority over all [matters](1287b41-88a2).Aristotle often treats the nature of things as whatthey are in their developed form (1252a31 ff.),and hesuggests that a polis in which virtue and politicalauthority are more equally dispersed among thecommunity is the natural development of politicallife: It does not accord with nature for the part to bepreeminent over the whole (1288a26-27).18 Giventhe connections of nature with growth in theGreek word physis [


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suspect most cities in the future will be democratic(1286b20-22).20Aristotle praises the polis not because it is the laststage of historical human development but becauseof what it is: the community that makes possiblethepursuitof thegood life for the largest ossiblenumber or proportion of its citizens. In the same

way, he praises polity not because of when it arises inthe course of the development of political life?itwould, on my interpretation, be similarly praisedeven if it predated heroic kingship?but because oftheway inwhich it represents the fullest developmentofwhat it stobe a political community, egardlessfthe actual historical circumstances of its existence.21As a mixed regime combining various contributionsand claims to rule, rather than a simple regime thatrecognizes only one contribution or claim, polity isunlikely to have arisen in the earliest cities. Inadditionto thenecessity nd difficultyfdevelopingvirtue among the multitude, the arrangement of amixed regime requires some experience with differentforms of rule before being able to combine them intoone, mixed form. Aristotle believes the multitude iscapable of possessing this experience, which bothexplains and justifies their efforts to secure participation in a mixed regime.

Having examined the origins and development ofpolitical communities, I believe it is clear that themixed regimecalled polity fulfills, fnot perfectlythen to a higher degree than other regimes, what it isto be a regime and so deserves the name of the genus.A regime, Aristotle tells us, is some arrangement ofoffices na polis (1278b8-10).As a polis, theregimeshould be self-sufficient1252b28-30) and directedtoward the good life,rather than simply seekingprofit r defense (1280a30 ff). Moreover, it shouldallow citizens to participate in deliberations about thejust, advantageous, and good (1253a9-18), exemplifying political rule rather than mastery, which isinappropriate for the community of free persons

and equal persons that is a polis (1279al7-21,1328a35, 1332M6-29, cf. 1284a3-15). In such a community, rule should be shared among citizens in turn,not held by one person or group (1279a8-10).To be sure,Aristotle does not believe rule shouldbe shared among all citizens in every regime. However, he does suggest that a city that not only is selfsufficient and promotes the good life but also has amultitude capable of participating in politics andsharing in that good life ismore developed, more inaccord with nature, than other cities. Polity, morethan other regimes, is comprised of free and equalcitizens who seek, and deserve, to rule and be ruled inturn.Moreover, it allows a greater number of peoplewith awidervariety fviewstoparticipate npoliticallife. Johnson emphasizes how Aristotle's use ofpoliteia illuminates the idea that politics is an activityf equals sharing y turns n theartsof rulingand being ruled. There is a certain requirement thatsuch activity be both 'virtuous' and carried on by 'themany' (1988, 204).A regime, however, is not just any arrangementof offices in a city. The arrangement should be witha view to livingfinely [kal?s] (1278b20-24), andpolity?perhaps alone of regimes?supplies both ofthe conditions Aristotle says are necessary for a city tobe finelydministered oikeisthaial?s].While everycity requires thewell-born, the free, and thewealthy,justice and military virtue are necessary for a citytobe beautiful (1283al4-22).22Not only ispoliticaljustice characteristic of a community of relatively freeand equal persons ruled by laws (NE 1134a24-30),which describesa politymore thana kingship,but

military virtue is also the characteristic first identifiedbyAristotle sbelongingtopolity.Why doesmilitaryvirtue help a city to be finely governed, and how doesit justifyncluding hemultitude in ruling?

MilitaryVirtue and Political LifeThough Aristotle suggests the natural course ofdevelopment would lead to amixed regime inwhicha virtuous multitude, capable of phronesis, shares inrule,he explainswhykingships ftendegenerate ntotyrannies or oligarchies rather than develop intoaristocracies or polities. Certain peoples lack either

20Simpson, although he questions whether Aristotle believes thisargument, also reads the passages to suggest that kingship nowis no longer good or correct because now the number of thevirtuous, or those capable of exercising rule, are much greater, andthus there will be no one man who stands out above the rest(1998, 185).While not all cities are sufficientlyeveloped tosupport olitical rule, disagreewith Simpson,forreasons statedbelow, that pambasileia represents Aristotle's preferred regime.2Aristotle recognizes hatpolity isnot the lasthistoricalstageofdevelopment; it, too, degenerates when people come to value wealth,leading to oligarchies, tyrannies, and democracies (1286M1-20).However, because Aristotle criticizes Socrates's overly rigid anddeterministic account of regime change (V.12), I hesitate toemphasize this point.

22While heOCT suggests olitikes, ord adoptspolemikes, hichis better supported in the manuscripts. Newman refers to1291a24-27, where justice and military excellence are said to begoods of soul that transcend what ismerely necessary for the city(1902, III.232).



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the necessary spirit or deliberative faculty to engagein self-rule (VII.7); other peoples, by virtue of a city'slocation, develop vices that preclude them fromacquiring the necessary virtue (VII.5, 6). Bad lawsdevelop bad habits, such as the excessive valuation ofwealth, which leads to tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy rather than polity.

Despite these obstacles, some cities did developpopulations capable of ruling and being ruled in turn.One reason for this seems to be the expansion ofthe city's military, particularly the hoplites, and thedevelopment among citizens of military virtue.23Military virtue is saidbyAristotleto formthebasisfor the regimecalled politeia (1279M-2), and thecapacity of the many to acquire military virtueindicates a capacity on their part to acquire othervirtues as well. This is what Aristotle recommendsinhis cityaccording to prayer inBook VII of thePolitics: The young of the citywill serve as soldiers,acquiring the necessary experience and practicaljudgment that enables them to rule once they reachmiddle age. In other words, serving in the militaryprovides young citizens with the time and opportunity to acquire the necessary experience in order thatthey might develop the virtue of phronesis.Aristotle emphasizes this connection in discussingruling and being ruled in turn. In a community ofthose who are similar in stock and free, the abilitynot only to rule but also to be ruled is required ofa citizen aswell as the good man (1277b7-17). Butthe ability to rule is such that it can be learned onlyby being ruled, for it isnot possible to rulewell without having been ruled (1277b7-13). In other words,themultitude can acquire thephronesis necessary forsharing in rule only through firsthaving been ruled.And it is likely hey xperience eing ruled s soldiersas well as citizens. The experience soldiers receive inbeing ruled contributes to one character trait thatAristotle emphasizes is necessary for a multitude towarrant inclusion in a regime: lawfulness. In a polity,the multitude must be free persons acting in no wayagainst the law (1286a36-37).

The lawful multitude must have some ethicalvirtue, and the laws of a polity foster the developmentof habits that give rise to these virtues. Serving in themilitary would do perhaps even more to guaranteethat citizens become courageous, ifnot moderate aswell. Military discipline, after all, gives rise tomilitaryvirtue. As Simpson acknowledges, the military lifecontains many parts of virtue (1998, 155). Butmilitary virtue, like the other kinds of ethical virtue,is connected tophronesis in twoways. While there isno virtuewithoutphronesis (NE 1144M9-21), it isalso impossible to have phronesis without ethicalvirtue (1144b30-32). By helping citizens acquireethical virtue, military life also helps them acquirephronesis.Book VI of the Ethics provides another way inwhich serving n themilitary can help develop thekind of knowledge necessary for ruling. Aristotledistinguishes phronesis from a variety of other intellectual capacities that have to do with action?e.g.,art and cleverness. One of these is sunesis, the abilityto perceive the excellence of the deliberations of otherpeople (1142b35ff.).By observingthe deliberationsof others about their own actions, we may, Aristotlesuggests, learn from them and improve our futuredeliberations.

Military virtue thus contributes in threeways tothe development of phronesis necessary for the multitude to participate in ruling. First, it provides thenecessary experience with particulars essential forphronesis. Second, itdevelops the habits of obedienceto the laws as well as those of ethical virtue, withoutwhich there can be no phronesis. Finally, it offers thepossibilityof improvingthe capacity for judgingwell through the observation of the judgments ofothers.Thiswould bemore likely fthosegivingtheorders?those who already have phronesis?explainedtheir decisions, but even in the absence of that, it islikely that some soldiers will perceive the reasoningbehind what they are told to do. The experienceassociated with the development of military virtuethus makes possible the development of phronesisamong themultitude, and this iswhat makes possibleand justifies llowingthemultitude to share nrulingin a polity.

Polity and the Best RegimeYet if justice and military virtue are necessary for acitytobe finely dministered, hus legitimatingheclaim of the multitude to participate in a mixed

23Salkever suggests the connection between military virtue andphronesis is problematic: There is no explanation ofwhy thepossession of andreia (manliness) guarantees the later floweringof dikaiosune (justice) and epiekeia (equity or decency ... )(2007, 35). AlthoughAristotle does not offer n explicit explanation, I believe, and hope to show, the connection is defensible.Salkever argues that Aristotle is concerned about the consequences of the common understanding of manliness for politicallife; I do not disagreewith this interpretationut believe thatmilitary virtue, if properly understood, is not necessarily dominated by andreia. It can be not only necessary for but alsobeneficial to thecity (cf.Frank 2005, 167-68).



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THE PROBLEM OF POLITY 1415regime, what of Aristotle's statement that it is education and virtue above all that have a just claimto rulewith a view to the highest end of the city, i.e.,the good life (1283a24-26)? In other words, what isthe relationship etweenpolityand the best regimediscussed inBook VII of thePolitics7. n Book IV,Aristotle distinguishes the best regime simply, the regime forwhich one would pray above all, with externalthingsroviding o impediment 1288b23-24),from the best regime generally possible, the regimemost fitting for all cities and more attainable forall (1288b34, 38). While almost all commentatorstake polity to be Aristotle's best regime in some way,there ismuch disagreement about what way. Someread Aristotle to prefer kingship and aristocracy topolity and insist he recommends polity only becauseof thedifficultyf institutinghese. thers treat t sthe best regime possible formost cities given theprevalence of oligarchy and democracy. And stillothers maintain Aristotle's polity is in fact his bestregime simply.Bluhm (1962) argues that thebest regime is apolity populated by a large number of virtuous andwell-to-do men who lead the life of moral virtuepresented in the Ethics as the best social lifeattainable and therefore the way of life of the idealpolis (747-48).24AlthoughNichols disagreeswithBluhm's optimistic assessment of the virtues of themiddle class (202 n9), she,too,depictspolityas thebest regimesimply (1992, 88).25As themixed regime, polity combines the various contributions?andvarious claims to rule?of the different parts ofthe city. The multitude's participation in rule is

required by the higher end of the city because oftheir collective virtue and prudence as well as itslower end because of the threat to the city stemmingfrom their exclusion (68).26 By bringing togetherthe few and many, Nichols continues, polity allowshuman beings to fulfill theirnatures as political beings,sharing in rule and participating in the continuousdebate over benefits and justice (88).27While I agree with some parts of Nichols's argument, particularly regarding the various contributionsand claims within the city, I disagree that Aristotledescribes polity as the best regime simply.28 His descriptionof the best regime simply in Book IV?what quality it should have to be what one wouldpray for above all, with external things providing noimpediment (1288b23-24)?mirrors far too closelythe languageused inBook VII, describingthebestregime simply as the city that is to be constituted onthe basis of what one would pray for (1325b36).

Moreover, while Aristotle is emphatic that while thisregime must not be impossible, he also acknowledgesthat the conditions required for its realization areunlikely. Nichols, by contrast, argues that polity servesnot only as a paradigm but also a potential regime forall other cities. This isnot the case for the best regimesimply, whose material requirements prevent most, ifnot all, existing regimes from achieving it.29 These

material conditions, in fact, are outside the control ofstatesmen, which iswhy it is necessary to investigatehow statesmen should legislate for other kinds ofregimes and not only the best simply.For instance, the regime according to prayerwould lack the economic classes found in a polity,

24Bluhm argues the regime of Book VII is a polity under optimalconditions (1962, 744); thuspolity,as itgenerally ccurs, isnotthe best regimesimply 749). Bluhm is right hat the regimeofBook VII cannot be understood as an aristocracy in any traditionalsenseof the ruleby thefew,much less kingship (751),butthe differences etween polity and the city of Book VII aresufficiently significant that they warrant different names, as Idiscuss below.25Nichols contends, based largely on the presence of slavery, thattheregime ccordingtoprayerof BookVII of the olitics isnot,in fact, Aristotle's best regime simply but rather an illustrationof the limits fpolitics. See also Salkever (2007, 34-35). Simplyacceptingtheir laim thatthe regime fBookVII isnot, infact,Aristotle's best would make my argument easier; however, Ibelieve Aristotledoes portray tas best. The problem of slavery

may not be as great as it first appears; a population of naturalslaves is no more unlikely than some of the other conditions heenumerates.And perhaps it is only in the best regime thatAristotle could recommend, as he does, that masters free theirslaves if they are capable of independent reasoning and choice:The citizens of the best regimeswould be able tomake thisdetermination, which Aristotle acknowledges is difficult, and todo what is right, which may be even more so.

26Her emphasis on statesmanship, which distinguishes her argument from Bluhm's (202 n9), parallelsmy account of thephronesis of the multitude and the politike of statesmen.27Nichols rguesthatpolitiesbeginbymixing poor and richwithamodicum ofmilitaryvirtue,such thatthe lawswill in factbeobeyed.However, ifproperly rdered,they ill over timedevelopamiddle classwith a higher levelofvirtue that llows thepolityto become an aristocracy, a regime in which those with somedegree of virtue rule and are ruled in turn (1992, 99). In otherwords, the political institutions of polity remain a mixture,while the citizens move toward a middle status in theireconomic and ethical character.28Both luhm (1962, 748) and Nichols (1992, 88) emphasize theway inwhich polity is theregimemost reflectivefpolitical rule,allowing citizens to rule and be ruled in turn.29Hence also disagreewith Frank,who believes thattheregimeof Book VII existsas an actualizable future (2005, 140) forAthens if it can firstbe transformed nto a combination ofaristocracy and democracy that she calls a democracy of distinction (142). Samaras, acknowledging the extensive materialpreconditions for this regime, argues that it is a blueprint for theprospective colonist of Asia Minor and not Athens (2007, 89).



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even a well-arranged polity that promotes a largemiddle class. Moreover, itwould provide the basis fora more leisurely life thatwould allow the citizens todevelop more fully the ethical and intellectual virtues.Aristotleargues inBook IV thatthe regimethat isbest [ariste] nd theway of life that isbest [aristos]for most cities and most human beings is one thatemphasizes the middling sort of life. The bestregime generally possible, that is, requires only thevirtue appropriate to private persons and does notrequire a high level of education or circumstancesthatwould be dependent on chance (1295a25-34,emphasisadded). In thebest regime imply, y contrast, anyone might act in the best [arista] mannerand live blessedly (1324a23-25). In other words, allcitizens would have a high level of education andamplebenefits f fortune; hebest regime simply fBookVII isnot thebest regimegenerally ossible.

Following most commentators, I believe Aristotleconsiders polity to be the best regime generallypossible and not the best regime simply. However,I arguethat ristotlehas a higherestimation fpolitythan is often acknowledged because he sees a closerconnection between it and the city of prayer inBook VII than is commonly recognized. Most ofthose commentators who believe that polity is thebest regimegenerallypossible do so because theybelieve that kingship and aristocracy are no longerpolitical possibilities.30 For them, the purporteddifference etweenthepolityand theregime fBookVII is, in the words of one critic, a strength because,unlike the city of prayer, the constitutional polity isactualizable (Frank 2005, 164). Polity, as the onlyactualizable correct regime, is the best regime generallypossible by default, leadingDavis to lamentthatpraisingpolityrequires praise ofmediocrity; itis a hard and uninspiring case to argue (1996, 82).I argue, by contrast, that the regime called polity is

quite similar to the city of prayer and so its designation as the best regime generally possible ismorethandamningwith faintpraise.Why mightAristotlepraise polity as more than mediocre?

Aristotle's claim that, with a view toward thegood life that should be the end of all politicalcommunities, education and virtue have the justclaim to rule is qualified: they have above all thejust claim to rule. This hesitation, I think, impliesthatthey o nothave theonly ustclaim to rule; thecontributions of wealthy and free-born are notinsignificant. Moreover, the use of the term virtuehere is presumably broad enough to include thejustice and military excellence associated with amultitude suited for political rule thatAristotlepreviously said was necessary for a noble, or beautiful, administration. All of these have some claim torule,which is reflected in themixed regime of polity.Indeed, Aristotle suggests that in a communitywhere there exists a variety of just claims to rule, thatof themultitude?taken collectively and provided itis of a certain sort?is more persuasive than that ofthewealthy few or even the virtuous few (1283b27 ff.).It isnot, in the case of polity, a question ofwhether thejudgment of a certain multitude taken collectively issuperior to that of a few excellent individuals; rather,polity mixes both parts: a multitude possessing military virtue and justice and the few outstanding individuals (1281b34-36).While Aristotledoes indicatethat ostracism may sometimes be necessary for certain cities, he does not seem to expect it in cities inwhich themultitude has developed some level of virtue and political capacity (1284a3 ff.). Polity, therefore, not only incorporates but also benefits from thepresence of individuals whose virtue exceeds, thoughnot excessively, that of themultitude. Aristotle callsthe rule of either part?the few or the many?incomplete and imperfect, ateles (1281b38). The

mixed regimeof polity is perfected nd completedby including oth the few and themany.To be sure,many have argued thatAristotle's preferred regimes are kingship and aristocracy. A closereading, however, questions whether kingship is apoliticalkind of rule and sowhether it isa regime tall (see 1310a40 ff., 1311a24).31 Cooper observes thatalthough Aristotle recognizes kingship as one just

30Mulgan argues that while so-called aristocracy might have aclaim to be superior to polity, Aristotle does not accept it as acandidate for the best constitution for most cities and men. Iteither iesbeyond thereach ofmost states r else isveryclose innature topolity (1977, 102-03). He thereforesuggests olity isthebest regimegenerally ossible onlybecause the realizationofkingship or aristocracyis unlikely ifnot impossible. Simpsonsimilarly rgues thatwhile Aristotle believes the simplybestregime sa kind ofkingshipor aristocracy 1998, 290), polity istheregimehe recommends formost citiesbecause it is thekindof regime most people and most cities can share in, emphasizing that aristocracies aiming at virtue are not within the reachofmost people and cities (327).And althoughKraut arguesthatAristotle'sbest regime, s depicted in Book VII, isone inwhichthere sawide degreeofpoliticalparticipation, e stillmaintainsthat Aristotle believes that when there are no kingly persons ...we shouldwish we had such extraordinary ndividuals in ourmidst (2002, 416).

31Yack acknowledges Aristotle's clear and explicit statementthatkingship is a regime (1993, 85); however,he concludes thatkingship, like tyranny, involves the monopolization of politicalrule by a single individual (85), which cannot be part ofAristotle's understanding of political community withoutundermining its coherence and consistency (87).



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THE PROBLEM OF POLITY 1417and valid form of rule in a 7roAis ... and undercertain circumstances the best and most just form ofrule, he still refuses to call it a 7toAitlk?s kind ofrule (1999, 75 n5, emphasis added).32 Likewise,Davis argues the rule of the pambasileius reduces thecity to a household, replacing political rule witheconomic (1996, 121).33 Aristotle himself asserts itdoes not in accord with nature?or, perhaps, development?for one man to be so superior to hiscommunity that he deserves unlimited personal rule(1288a26-8).34What of aristocracy? Aristotle indicates thataristocracy is much like kingship: each of themwishes tobe established n thebasis ofvirtue that sfurnished ith equipment (1289a30-33). But likekingship, an aristocracy established solely on thebasis of virtue?assuming that it has the necessaryequipment?excludes most citizens from participation and so, again like kingship, moves away frombeing a political regime. To the extent, however, thataristocracies approximate a polity by incorporatingother elements?which Aristotle explicitly says thosearistocracies which are possible for cities to sustainwill do (1295a31-34)?they aremore fully oliticalcommunities, ifat the expense of losing their aristocratic character.

Aristotle does not deny that, in certain places andtimes, a community may have a nature suitable forkingship r aristocracy1287b38 ff.). hat I suggestis that the development of political communities overtimewill?if not frustratedbymany of thepotentialdangers Aristotle discusses?be in a direction tomake rule increasingly political, as was historicallythe case in some, though far from all, cities. In otherwords, the conventional view has it backward: Thedifficulty of developing a multitude capable of participating in political life often makes itnecessary forcities, if theywish to be governed well, to accept therule of kings and aristocrats.

What, then, are we tomake of the regime according to prayer?the best regime simply?discussed inBook VII? It is important to note at the outset thatAristotle never refers explicitly to this regime as anaristocracy.35 It has little in common with existingaristocracies, either those so-called aristocraciesthat include claims to rule other than virtue or thosetrue aristocracies that exclude the vast majority ofcitizens from participating in political life. Rather,I suggest, ithas more in common with polity in thatboth regimes ustify idespread political participationon thepossessionofa kind ofvirtue ifdifferentkinds in the different regimes). While a true aristocracy includes the best simply on the basis of virtue(1293b3-5), Aristotle refrains romcalling the cityaccording to prayer an aristocracy to highlight theway it differs from the aristocracies with which wehave experience 1293b7 ff). ather,by referringo itfrequentlys the bestpoliteia,he repeatedly alls tomind its connection with polity.In particular, Aristotle emphasizes the way thatthe regime according to prayer will be run not by oneor few but rather a multitude. It is a city that has amultitudewith thecapacityfordoing thatforwhichthe city exists?i.e., living well?that is a great city(1326a21-22). Even in the best regime simply, it isnecessary to have a multitude that is capable ofjudging what is advantageous and just in order tobe self-sufficient (1328M3-19, 29a2-6). In otherwords, ruleinthebest regime imply ill be political;amultitude of citizens will rule and be ruled in turn.In both kinds of regimes,themultitudewill selectand audit the highest offices of the city.36Thedifference is that, in the best regime simply, morecitizens will possess the levels of virtue necessary tofill those offices,thusbetter exemplifying oliticalrule by turn.For this reason, some scholars have emphasizedthe connection between the city of prayer and theregime called polity. Nichols, for instance, cites thissimilaritynfavor f her argument hatpolity is thesimply best regime (1992, 89-90, 99). Frank agrees

32It selsewhere ikenedtohouseholdmanagement,which differsfrompolitical rule (1285b29-33). Thus Davis: There seemstobeno form of kingship as political rule_For a king to rulewithout consent may be good household management, but it isnotpolitical justice.Forhim torulewith consentmay be politicalrule,but it isnot kingship (1996, 58).33Davisconcludespambasileia isAristotle'spreferred ption butacknowledgesthat such a regime acks justice (1996, 58) and sothe best city snot a city (66).34Aristotle says the excessive virtue required for kingly rule isgreater than what accords with human nature (1286b26-7).Reading into nature the connotations of development inherentin theGreek,Aristotlehints that tdoes not accordwith humandevelopment for one person to have the kind of monopoly ofvirtue thatjustifies inglyrule.

35Somepassages inBook III are read to refer o thecity f BookVII as an aristocracy 1289a30-33, 1290al, 1293M-3). Such aninterpretation equiresrearranging he textof thePolitics as wehave it,which has some, but not unanimous, support. Moresuggestive, I think, is that Aristotle refrains from calling it anaristocracy while discussing it.36Because it involves ruleby themultitude, the cityaccordingtoprayer scloser toAristotle'sdefinition fpolityas theregimewhere the multitude governs for the common advantage thanthe definition of aristocracy s the rule of the few [olig?n]looking toward the common advantage (1279a31-38).



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persons is all but impossible 147).38Even thebestregime of Book VII, Bartlett argues, is flawed, as it isdevoted not to contemplation but to leisure, whichhe presents as no more than the closest imitation ofthephilosophic lifethat ispossiblewithin theconfinesof thepoliticalcommunity 148). Because thecontemplative life is fundamentally different from thepolitical life, t is achieved outside of politics, andthus even the best law or the best regime ?forBartlett, ingship (153-54 nl2)?is only imperfectlyjust (149).However, others, like Zuckert, deny Bartlett'sclaim of a subordination of politics to philosophyinAristotle 1983, 185).The highest uman life snotnecessarily devoted exclusively to contemplation, andregimes that allow citizens to engage in true politicalactivity ay contribute oboth thegood life nd thedevelopment of our rational capacities (1333a6-ll).As Rorty argues, nothing about the practical life ...prevents its also being contemplative and even enhanced by being contemplative (1980,377). Phronesisand contemplation can be mutually reinforcing; thebest human lifewould include both.

While a complete treatment of this issue isoutside our scope at this time, there is at least onesignificantirtueofpolityworthmentioning in thiscontext. Political communities are constituted on thebasis of shared reasoning about the just and unjust,as well as the good and bad and advantageous anddisadvantageous (1253al4-18).39 Resolving the dispute about what is just,Aristotle says, is a task suitedforpolitical philosophy (1282b23). By including hevariety of different claims to rule?wealth, free birth,excellence?polity actually opens the door for politicalphilosophytoplaya greater ole inthecity s thevarious claimants argue about justice. The attempt toresolve questions about justice goes beyond introducing oliticalphilosophy;there sprecedent nclassicalpolitical philosophy?Plato's Republic being themostnotable example?for leading people to philosophy

itselfthrough investigationnto justice (cf. olitics1279b 3).Even ifthepolitical life swholly subordinate to thephilosophical, olityprovidesnotonlyfora robust and inclusive political community but alsoone open to philosophy.An Aristotle who emphasizes how participationin political life contributes to the fulfillmentfhuman life clearly supports the enterprise of politicaltheory. Moreover, an Aristotle who justifies theparticipationof themultitude in political lifecancontribute to contemporary debates within politicaltheory. Indeed, Aristotle's very justification for therule of certain multitudes?their having certainvirtues, particularly phronesis?highlights the importance he places on political, or civic, education. Liberalism has recognized the necessity?perhaps theunavoidability?of such education, but Aristotleseems to insist thatmore should be done in regimeswhere themultitude is to share in ruling.40A full treatment of this issue is beyond my scope,but Iwant to raise one issue directly related tomyargument. Aristotle believes that to participate inruling, the multitude must have certain virtues.Assuming thathe is right bout thenecessity f suchtraits, is he also right that one way in which thisvirtuemightbe acquired is through ilitaryservice?A civic education that emphasizes military servicecertainly has its dangers; Aristotle, given his discussion of Sparta, is aware of this (1271M-6). However,Aristotle's complaint about Sparta is neither theextent of her civic education nor itsmilitary component, but rather its exclusive focus on courage and,moreover, the inappropriate ends to which Spartalooks in preparing its citizens for military service(1324b8-25a5, 1333b38 ff.).A contemporary Aristotelian approach to this issue might ask whethermodern military service can help citizens acquire

phronesis while avoiding the possible hazards. Perhaps a case can be made for national service of amore peaceful kind playing the role military serviceonce did. In any case, Aristotle's emphasis on theimportance of civic education for a regime inwhichthe multitude shares in ruling both poses a challenge38Bartlett presents the pambasileus as Aristotle's adoption, albeitdistorted forpolitical purposes, of the philosopher-king inPlato's Republic (1994, 148) and intimates hatkingship is thusAristotle'spreferred egime (153-54 nl2). In light f Aristotle'scarefully eveloped distinctionbetweenpractical and theoreticalknowledge, I findunconvincingBartlett'ssuggestionthat thereis less to this distinction thanmeets the eye, thatAristotle'sinvention of phronesis is designed to make morally virtuousactions appear simply rational (154 nl3).

39Aristotle's emphasis on this shared reasoning and speech allowshim to be a resource for discourse theories of politics; indeed,Putnam has argued that Aristotle is a better resource for suchtheories because he has a richer notion of the human good(1987, 56, 58).

40Collins focuses on the advantages of an Aristotelian conceptionof citizenship over contemporary understandings; see, in particular, chapter 1 and her conclusion. However, Collins's ultimateconcern istheconflict etween thepolitical and philosophicwaysof life, nd she claimsAristotleultimately refers he latter: thecontemplative r theoretical ife, nd not thepolitical ormorallife, s thebest one for human being (2006, 93). Like Bartlett,Collins arguesthat ristotle reject[s] thepolitical life ecause itisan obstacle to the fullest uman life 146) and so even thebestcivic education is incomplete and must point beyond itself.



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to liberal theory and provides resources for thinkingabout that challenge.Polity, I have argued, is the best regime generally

possible because it is the regime that represents thefullest development of political life that statesmen canbring into being without thematerial conditions forwhichwe would pray.Although itwould differ rompolity in itsmaterial conditions and so in the character of its citizens, the city according to prayerresembles polity in itspolitical institutions, most importantly thewidespread participation in ruling andbeing ruled in turn. Though itwould not necessarilysecure the highest excellences of human life, politywould promote the kind of discussion and deliberation thatmake political liferewarding ndmightlead to philosophy. And because partnership in deliberation about the just and advantageous and inruling and being ruled iswhat constitutes a polis, itmakes sense thatpolity?the particular regime inwhichrule and deliberation are most held in common?bears the name of the genus politeia, the characteristics of which it represents inmost developed form.

AcknowledgmentsVersions of this paper were presented at the 2007meetingsof theSocietyfor ncientGreekPhilosophyand the Northeast Political Science Association,where I benefited from comments by ThanassisSamaras and Kathryn Sensen. JeffreyChurch, E.A.Goerner, and Catherine Zuckert provided helpfulcomments on this and earlier drafts.Manuscript submitted 6 February 2008Manuscript accepted orpublication16November2008

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Kevin M. Cherry is assistant professor of politics,Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH 03102.

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