the problem of other minds michael lacewing [email protected]
TRANSCRIPT
The threat of solipsism
• How can we know that other minds exist?
• We experience our minds directly, but it seems that we can only know of other people’s behaviour– This may be a particular problem for
substance dualism – is a mind ‘attached’ to the body?
• Solipsism: my mind is the only mind (or thing) that exists
The argument from analogy
• I have a mind.• I know from experience that my mental
states cause my behaviour.• Other people have bodies similar to mine
and behave similarly to me in similar situations.
• Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same type of cause as my behaviour, viz. mental states.
• Therefore, other people have minds.
Objection
• You cannot make an induction based on one case– Cp. This dog has three legs.
Therefore, all dogs have three legs.
Analogy II
• This behaviour has a mental cause.• That behaviour has a mental cause.• That third behaviour (etc.) has a mental
cause.• Therefore, many behaviours have a mental
cause (I know this from my own experience).
• Other people exhibit the same types of behaviour as cited above.
• Therefore, those behaviours also have mental causes.
• Therefore, other people have minds.
Clarification
• The behaviour isn’t picked out as mine, but as a type of behaviour, e.g. raising an arm– Science generalizes from cases we have
observed to ones we haven’t– This isn’t analogy, but causal inference
• It is possible that the behaviour we infer from is exceptional. But the argument isn’t meant to be a proof
• Objection: the belief that other people have minds isn’t a hypothesis at all
• What is necessary for us to be able to ascribe mental states to ourselves?
• We must be able to ascribe them to others as well– Children can only learn to name and report
their mental states through interaction with others
– Other people must therefore be able to identify the expression of mental states in our behaviour
– The child learns how to ascribe mental states to itself and others at the same time
On ascribing mental states
Implications
• The problem of other minds dissolves: there can be no knowledge of oneself as a mind without presupposing that there are other minds
• Our knowledge of other minds isn’t inferred from knowledge of what causes our own behaviour
• Substance dualism ascribes mental states to a different substance from physical states – but we have to be able to ascribe mental states to people