the problem of free harmony in kant's aesthetics (suny 2008) - kenneth f. rogerson

7/27/2019 The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant's Aesthetics (SUNY 2008) - Kenneth F. Rogerson

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The Problem of Free Harmony in

KANTS AESTHETICS


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The Problem of Free Harmony in

KANTS AESTHETICS

Kenneth F. Rogerson

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS


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Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

2008 State University of New York

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without

written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or

transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic

tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission

in writing of the publisher.

For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY

www.sunypress.edu

Production by Dana Foote

Marketing by Michael Campochiaro

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rogerson, Kenneth F., 1948

The problem of free harmony in Kants aesthetics / Kenneth F. Rogerson.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-7914-7625-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Kant, Immanuel, 17241804Aesthetics. 2. Aesthetics, Modern18th

century. I. Title.

B2799.A4R67 2008

111.85092dc22

2008019519

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


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Contents

Acknowledgments / vii

Note on Citations and Translations / ix

Introduction / 1

1 The Problem of Free Harmony / 7

2 The Doctrine of Aesthetic Ideas / 25

3 Natural and Artistic Beauty / 41

4 Free Harmony and Aesthetic Pleasure / 57

5 The Extensiveness of the Criterion of Beauty / 69

6 Beauty, Free Harmony, and Moral Duty / 83

Appendix The Meaning of Universal Validity in Kants Aesthetics / 101

Postscript The Argument for Universal Validity / 111

Notes / 119

Index / 133

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the two anonymous readers for State University of NewYork Press. Their suggestions have greatly improved this book. I also thank my

wife, Linda, and my son, Dylan, for their continued support.

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Note on Citations and Translations

Citations to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B page num-bers referring to the first and second editions. Citations of all other of Kants

works are to the volume and page number of the standard German editionof his collected works: Kants gesammelte Schriften (KGS). For citations to theCritique of the Power of Judgment, I have used the translation by Guyer andMatthews with one exception: For the appendix, which is a reprint of a much

earlier article of mine, I use the Meredith translation as was the case in the orig-inal article. Also, I shall refer to the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of PracticalReason, and the Critique of the Power of Judgment as the first Critique, the secondCritique, and the third Critique, respectively. Listed as follows are the originalworks and translations that I have used.

A/B Kritik der reinen Vernuf(KGS 34). Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martins Press, 1965.JL Jasche Logik (KGS 9). The Jasche Logic, Lectures on Logic, trans. Michael

Young. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cam-bridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 521640.

Gr Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 4). Groundwork of theMetaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row,1964.

KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (KGS 5). Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans.Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. The Cambridge Edition of the Works ofImmanuel Kant. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,2000.

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Introduction

This book is a study of the first half of Immanuel Kants Critique of Judgment(later translated as the Critique of the Power of Judgment) and hereafter referredto as the third Critique) entitled the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. My cen-tral concern is to give an interpretation of what is arguably the most importantissue in Kants aesthetic theory, namely, the notion of a free harmony of the

imagination and the understanding. In the Critique of Aesthetic JudgmentKant argues that an object is beautiful (is to be judged an aesthetically good ob-

ject to appreciate) if and only if it gives us pleasure the source of which is a men-tal state similar to cognition entitled the free harmony of the imagination and

the understanding. Kant believes that if and only if our aesthetic pleasure is

based on such a mental state can our judgments of taste rise above mere sub-jectivity and make a claim that holds for all who properly appreciate aestheticobjects. This is Kants way of trying to justify a kind of objectivity about aes-

thetic judgments.Kant holds that judgments of taste occupy a special position between

mere subjectivity and outright objectivity. He wants to argue, in a way perhapsunique to the history of philosophy, that aesthetic judgments are subjectively

universal. They are subjective since they are based on our feeling of pleasure.

However, according to Kant, aesthetic judgments are more than this. When wemake an aesthetic judgment we claim not only that the object pleases us but

also that the object is universally pleasing. It is this claim to universality thatmakes aesthetic judgment rather like objective, empirical judgments. But fur-

ther, Kant holds, free harmony is the basis of this pleasure. Ultimately, Kantsposition rests on the claim that aesthetic judgments are universally valid since

they are based on the universal pleasurableness of the free harmony of the imag-ination and understanding.

This description of Kants theory is not particularly controversial. Virtu-ally all scholars agree that this is Kants planto ground judgments of taste on

the purported universal pleasure of free harmony. There are, however, two in-terpretative points that are quite controversial. Scholars will disagree concern-

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ing what, exactly, a free harmony of the imagination and understanding couldmean within the Kantian philosophy. Further, it is a controversial interpretative

issue concerning why Kant believes that such a mental state is universally pleas-ing. These two interpretative issues are the central concerns for this book. I

want to give a good answer to the question of what a free harmony is on Kantsaccount and why such a mental state is pleasing.

Even a sketchy description of free harmony will be slightly complicatedsince this notion refers back to Kants position on epistemology and meta-

physics. In the Critique of Pure Reason (Kants first Critique) Kant represents cog-nition as a matter of applying concepts to a manifold of sense data. Further, it is

a hallmark of the Kantian philosophy that concepts are considered to be rulesfor the organization of these sense manifolds. To oversimplify for purposes of il-

lustration, to cognize an object as a dog is to use the dog rule to organize thesense data provided to me. All the leg perceptions, fur perceptions, tail percep-

tions, head perceptions, and so on, follow the concept/rule that we have for per-ceiving dogs. In general, Kant holds that judging objects as instantiating our

concepts is a matter of recognizing that our sense data are organized by appro-priate rules. This process of conceptualizing data from the senses is character-

ized in the Critique of Judgment as harmonizing the faculty of understanding(the faculty of concepts) with the faculty of imagination (the faculty of receiv-

ing sense data). So far so good. However, when Kant gives his account of aes-thetic appreciation he claims that we harmonize the understanding and imag-ination in a way that is free of concepts. Somehow, he wants to hold, we can

perceive a manifold of sense data and harmonize it with our faculty of con-cepts (rules) but in a way that is not actually conceptually rule governed. Sup-

posedly we can appreciate (judge) a manifold of sense as being rule-like, butwithout applying a rule. One may very well ask how this can be so. Finding an

adequate answer to this question is a theme that runs through each of the chap-ters in this book. Arguably the chief problematic of the Critique of Aesthetic

Judgment is to understand how Kant can talk about a manifold of particularsthat is somehow rule governed but without benefit of rules. Each chapter is con-

cerned in one way or another with making sense of a free harmony of the imag-ination and the understanding.

In the course of this book, I want to offer a solution to this basic problem.I argue that Kant himself has a solution to the problem of free harmony but it

is only developed around his notion of the expression of aesthetic ideas. Kantsdoctrine of the expression of aesthetic ideas is more important for his broader

aesthetic theory than is commonly thought. In the latter portions of the Cri-tique of Aesthetic Judgment Kant gives an account of how art (and even na-

ture) can be interpreted as expressing themes or ideas that would otherwise be

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difficult to communicatemuch more difficult to communicate than ordinaryempirical concepts. I shall argue that only the doctrine of beauty as the expres-

sion of ideas gives Kant a plausible explanation of how we can see objects ofbeauty as free harmonies. For example, Kant holds that an artist must create a

work that provokes us to make new associations that come together in such away to illustrate ideas that go well beyond our ordinary experience. In this way,

aesthetic appreciation gives expression to moral and religious notions that onKants account can never be known by mere empirical cognition. Expression of

ideas, I argue, makes sense of the otherwise paradoxical notion of a free har-mony of the imagination and understanding. Aesthetic appreciation involves

interpreting a manifold of sense as organized to express an idea which is not de-terminable by (free of) ordinary empirical concepts. Not only does expression

of ideas play this explanatory role, but a normative role as well. I hold that ex-pression helps to explain why aesthetic appreciation is pleasing to us and fur-

ther it explains why aesthetic experience is of moral value to us. This, then, setsup the basic thesis of my project here. Free harmony is a deeply paradoxical no-

tion that cannot be adequately explained under ususal interpretations of Kantstheory. The doctrine of expression of aesthetic ideas will solve this paradox and

as a result expression of ideas becomes crucial for Kants aesthetic theory. While

the main thesis of this book is quite straightforward, there is quite a lot to do in

order to show that the position is plausible. In the first chapter I lay out the ba-sic problem that a free harmony of the imagination and the understanding ap-pears to be paradoxical by requiring us to contemplate orderliness yet with-

out any defined order. I also survey and criticize interpretations that attempt toresolve this paradox. I argue that each such attempt comes up wanting. I fur-

ther begin to develop my thesis that Kants doctrine of expression of aestheticideas will help us out of the paradox. Specifically, an artwork (or natural object)

that can be interpreted as expressing an aesthetic idea will accomplish this ex-pression via a mental state that is free of concepts and yet orderly due to the

fact that it expresses an idea.The topic of chapter 2 is Kants account of the expression of aesthetic

ideas. Since I believe that expression of ideas is important to Kants broadertheory of beauty, the point of this chapter is to look more closely at the doctrine

of the expression of ideas and specifically the doctrines connection to the re-quirement that beauty be the appreciation of a free harmony. I argue that ex-

pression of aesthetic ideas is not only consistent with the free harmony re-quirement but an extension and elaboration of that position.

In the third chapter I consider a potential problem for my thesis that ex-pression of aesthetic ideas plays an important role in Kants theory. It would be

natural to think that expression of aesthetic ideas could play a significant role

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in an account of artistic beauty while it would be quite out of place concerningnatural beauty. But since Kant considers natural beauty at least as important as

artistic beauty, the emphasis on expression of ideas might seem misguided. Iwant to argue that the art/nature distinction in Kant has been overdrawn by

scholars and that there is not an important criterial difference between the two.Even further, as Kant himself indicates, I want to argue that natural beauty can

be seen as expressive in a way similar to artistic beauty and, in this way, defusethe objection raised.

Chapter 4 addresses the issues of free harmony and expression of ideasfrom a slightly different direction than the previous chapters. In this chapter I

consider a question fundamental to Kants account of aesthetic value, namelythe claim that free harmony is the source of a universal pleasure. Specifically, I

want to consider why Kant would regard free harmony pleasing at all, let alone,universally pleasing. This seemingly central question has not received sufficient

attention in the literature. I argue that answering this evaluative question againleads to Kants account of expression of ideas.

Chapter 5 concerns a problem that arises in chapter 1 and is connectedto the proper interpretation of the free harmony of the imagination and the un-

derstanding. This chapter is largely critical of current interpretations of free har-

mony. I argue that if we were to accept current interpretations of free harmony,

then Kant would be wedded to the thesis that every object we could appreciatewould, in some sense, count as beautiful. This is a position that Kant clearly re-jects and as such the current interpretations are flawed. I also offer a solution

to the problem that on many readings everything is beautiful for Kant. Again,I argue that appealing to the doctrine of aesthetic ideas will free Kant of this

problem.Chapter 6 addresses what has become a controversial issue in the inter-

pretation of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Beyond claiming that ap-preciation of objects as free harmonies is universally pleasing, Kant claims that

such appreciation is also of moral value. My task in this chapter is to analyze therelationship between pleasure in free harmony, following on the discussion of

the previous chapter, and draw out the implications this has for our moral life.I have appended to the above chapters my essay The Meaning of Uni-

versal Validity in Kants Aesthetics, as originally published with minor correc-tions, and have added a postscript to take into consideration current develop-

ments. In this appendix I argue for an interpretation of Kants groundingof judgments of taste that involves all of the elements discussed previously. I lay

out a case an interpretation of Kants argumentative strategy for establishingthe universal validity of aesthetic judgments of taste that centrally uses his doc-

trine of aesthetic ideas. In the postscript I go farther to consider and criticize

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current interpretations of Kants argument to the universal validity of judg-ments of taste.

As described above, there is a central thesis that runs through each of thechapters in this book; namely, that the doctrine of expression of aesthetic ideas

is needed to explain the possibility and the value of a free harmony of the imag-ination and the understanding. However, the chapters that follow are also in-

tended to be more or less self-standing essays addressing different aspects andproblems in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. For example, chapter 3 can

be read is an independent essay on Kants distinction between artistic and nat-ural beauty or chapter 6 can be read as an independent essay on the relation of

beauty and morality in Kant. In order that these chapters work as relatively in-dependent essays, certain discussions will show up more than once in the book.

I intended to give enough of the relevant discussion in each chapter to movethe point of the argument forward and refer the reader to a fuller treatment in

other chapters. Such redundancy is, hopefully, excusable given the nature of theproject.

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1

The Problem of Free Harmony

I want to consider a particularly troublesome problem internal to Kants theoryof beauty. In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment Kant argues that an object

is beautiful if and only if it is able to give us pleasure, the source of which is amental state similar to cognition called the free harmony of the imagination

and the understanding. And, an object that is able to occasion such a mental

state of free harmony is said to exhibit purposiveness without purpose.1 Theproblem for Kant scholars is how to make sense of either a free harmony of

the cognitive faculties or of a purposiveness not directed by a purpose. WhatI shall attempt here is first to lay out the problem in its most troublesome form

and argue, minimally, that there is a solution to Kants problems, at least for the

case of artistic beautyperhaps for natural beauty as well.

1

What we learn from the Critique of Pure Reason (Kants first Critique) is that theprocess of judgment is one of organizing a manifold of the imagination (a col-

lection of sense particulars) by a concept of some sort. Further, it is character-istic of the Kantian philosophy that concepts are regarded as rules for how a

manifold is governed. According to Kant, to judge that a manifold of sense par-ticulars falls under a concept (the job of the understanding) is to recognize

that the manifold conforms to a particular rulethat the manifold is rule gov-erned.2 The rule, as it were, is presumed to provide a schema of what our per-

ception of a specific empirical objects is to be. To have the concept of a dog isto know what sort of order a perceptual manifold will possess. Now, while this

is the most general description of judging, it is important to note that for Kant

there are two different species of judging: determinate judgment and reflectivejudgment. Determinant judgments are ones where our predication of a con-

cept to a manifold can be warranted on the grounds of experience (either di-rectly in the case of empirical concepts or on the basis of the possibility of ex-

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perience in the case of the pure concepts). A reflective judgment, however,predicates ideas of a manifold, and in Kants technical sense the predication

of ideas cannot be grounded in experience. Ideas like God, freedom, and im-mortality are notions the application of which always outstrips our evidential

base.3 For example, in the Critique of Judgment, (Kants third Critique) Kant ismost interested to show that teleological judgments are reflectivethey assert

that nature is governed by purposes. And although, Kant argues, such assertionsexceed our empirical evidence, it may be useful for doing science to act as if

such judgments were true. This continues a theme from the first Critique whereKant gave ideas of reason a regulative function.4

Having taken this brief excursion into Kants doctrine of judgment, wecan now state the problem with the notions of free harmony and purposive-

ness without purpose. Kant wants to say that the pleasure of taste has its sourcein a mental operation similar to cognitive judgments. To make a cognitive judg-

ment is to claim that an object (manifold of perception) instantiates a certainconcept (the manifold is governed by a certain rule). However, unlike ordinary

cases of judgment Kant insists quite strongly that the kind of judging that givesaesthetic pleasure is not governed by any type of rules. The interpretative ques-

tion that arises here is, How can there be a species of judging that employs no

rules? One would think that the very notion of judging requires the application

of some kind of rule (either determinant or reflective). More precisely, if Kantsgeneral characterization of judging is as a harmony between the imagination(responsible for gathering particulars) and the understanding (the faculty of giv-

ing rules), then free harmony would seem a contradiction. How can one havea harmony with the faculty of rules when one has no rule? Similarly, if we take

the formulation of purposiveness without purpose, the question can be asked:How can we judge an object to be purposive if we do not attribute (even in

an as if sense) some purpose to it?5

It will be useful here to consider what sorts of rules Kant thinks are in-

appropriate to the mental state of free harmony and roughly why aesthetic ap-preciation cannot be of these kinds. There are at least three sorts of rules that

Kant thinks are inappropriate to aesthetic judging. Kant argues, in the first mo-ment of the Analytic of the Beautiful (the Analytic), that judgments of beauty

cannot be ordinary, determinant (empirical) judgments roughly becausebeauty cannot be considered a class concepta concept naming an organi-

zation of perceivable properties.6 Kants argument against such a position is di-rect, if somewhat question-begging. Beauty cannot simply described a configu-

ration of empirical properties since judging something as beautiful must, in part,be a matter of taking pleasure in the object. And for Kant pleasure is not an ob-

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jective property that an object can possess. Pleasure is the subjective (aesthetic,Kant would say) response to an object.

But dismissing such aesthetic objectivism does not end Kants complaintsagainst rules used to make aesthetic judgments. In 9 of the Critique of Aesthetic

Judgment Kant argues that while the pleasure of taste must be founded on a men-tal state of judging an object and such judging cannot be of the conceptual, de-

terminant kind, neither can the judging be of the reflective, teleological type.Generally, Kant argues that aesthetic judging is not a matter of claiming that an

object suits any sort of end or purpose (even if our judgment is only an as ifjudgment). Specifically, Kant considers two versions of this teleological position.

We could take pleasure in recognizing that an object is good for some ordinarypractical purpose we might have (a judgment of utility) or we could take pleasure

in recognizing that an object is good as an x; that is, an object is judged to be anear perfect example of some class concept.7For example, a picture may represent

a paradigm case of a horsethis is the thesis of Leibnizean perfectionism Kantcriticizes in 15. Similar to his complaint against aesthetic objectivism, Kant ob-

jects to perfectionism, in part, because it has no direct connection to pleasure.Kants criticism of grounding beauty on either judgments of utility or per-

fection is that in order for useful or perfect objects to give pleasure at all we

must assume some merely contingent interests on the part of those who appreci-

ate the objects. We will not take pleasure in something having use value unlesswe are interested in the end that the object serves. Nor, presumably, do we takepleasure in perfectionism unless we are interested in seeing near paradigm exam-

ples of class concepts. Further, Kant holds, we can never hope to get any sort ofconsensus about aesthetic value if we appeal to the whim of individual interests.

Although the above is Kants official criticism of reducing aesthetic judg-ing to teleological judging, there is a larger point in the background. If judg-

ments of taste could be reduced to judgments of utility or perfection, then wecould formulate precise standards for either evaluating or constructing art-

works. All we would need to know in order to evaluate a work as good (or cre-ate a good one) is the purpose the work should achieve. We could then set about

to find the meanswhich presumably can be pinned down with some accuracy.But this conflicts with the notion (which Kant endorses) that aesthetic judging

and aesthetic creation cannot be formulaic.8 If they were formulaic, thencreativity would be of little concern in art, and aesthetic evaluation could be a

precise scienceboth of which Kant disavows.Kant seems to have worked himself into a corner. He starts with the prem-

ise that aesthetic pleasure must come from an activity of judging. Judging isunderstood as organizing a manifold of particulars by a rule. But Kant seems to

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have taken away any candidate for a rule to organize the manifold. Aestheticjudging cannot be rule governed by a determinant concept or a teleological Idea.

And these seem to be the only alternatives he has to offer. It appears that noth-ing is left and it seems that Kant is perfectly happy with this result. As Kant de-

scribes aesthetic judging it must be a recognition that objects are merely sub-jectively purposive where this seems to mean that the object occasions a

harmony of the faculty of sense with the faculty of concepts (rules) but some-how without using any rules:

If pleasure is connected with the mere apprehension (apprehensio) of the form of an

object of intuition, without a relation of this to a concept for determinate cogni-tion, then the representation is thereby related not to the object, but solely to the

subject, and the pleasure can express nothing but its suitability to the cognitive fac-

ulties that are in play in the reflecting power of judgment, insofar as they are in play,

and thus merely a subjective formal purposiveness of the object. (KU 5: 18990,

7576)

The problem is that it is very difficult to understand what sense there is

in claiming that aesthetic contemplation is a kind of judging without rules

when the very definition of judging in the Kant lexicon is that of a rule-gov-

erned activity.

2

There have been attempts to save Kant from the problem cited above. One res-cue attempt turns upon a reading of mere subjective purposiveness and the

strictness of the no rule requirement. There are some portions of Kants textthat suggest that while a free harmony is rule governed without a rule, the cru-

cial notion of without a rule should be understood in what might be called anabstractive sense. Specifically, when Kant claims a free harmony is a har-

mony without rules, perhaps he should really say that the manifold is rule gov-erned but when we engage in aesthetic appreciation we do not care which rule

it is. And in this sense, we are only interested in the formal quality of mererule governedness. We are only concerned subjectively that the manifold is

rule governed. We are not interested in what rule prescribes the order of themanifold. The following passage would seem to support such a reading:

Now, if the determining ground of the judgment on this universal communicabil-

ity of the representation is to be conceived of merely subjectively, namely without

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a concept of the object, it can be nothing other than the state of mind that is en-countered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as

they relate a given representation to cognition in general. (KU 5: 217, 102)

On the basis of such passages, it could be argued that the problem of in-

terpreting free harmony or purposiveness without purpose can be gottenaround. We can talk about a manifold being rule governed (which seems to be

a requirement of any version of judging) and yet insist that the harmony ofthe faculties is free in the sense that aesthetic judging abstracts from the spe-

cific rule employed to unify the manifold. Perhaps, we are only concerned with

the closeness of fit between manifold and rule. Such is suggested by Kants claimin 21 that a free harmony is also one that is opitimal for the animation of bothpowers of the mind (KU 5: 238, 123).

Although the above would be a way of solving the puzzle of a free har-

mony, it is a route that Kant should not take. This solution cannot avoid Kantsdeeper arguments against utility and perfectionism. To say that an object occa-

sions a free harmony in the abstractive sense entails that we can specify arather precise formula for beauty: An object is beautiful if and only if there is a

closeness of fit between a manifold of imagination and a rule specifying a re-flective idea of utility or a rule specifying an empirical concept. At the very least

this position is seriously inconsistent with Kants rejection of perfectionism. Thetheory of perfectionism would also seem to subscribe to a closeness of fit cri-

teria since there is no hint in the theory that an object is beautiful only if itmeasures up to some particular paradigmrather, any paradigm will do. One

must assume, then, that the measure of perfection would be how well an art-work fits the paradigm concept it is intended to represent. Nor, do I think Kant

would want to subscribe to a closeness of fit criteria in the case of ideas of util-ity. If such a criteria were adopted, again we would seem to be able to formulate

some precise standards for the creation and evaluation of beautya possibilityantithetical to Kants enterprise.

But beyond the charge of inconsistency, the abstractive interpretationwould promote some very odd paradigms of beauty and ones that Kant explic-

itly rejects. If free harmony is taken to mean closeness of fit to a rule (regard-less of which rule), then well-drawn geometrical figures would be first-rate art-

works, for example, a well-drawn square. A well-drawn square is an object witha high degree of conformity to a concept (the square rule) and as such would

be an excellent artwork. Yet, it is just such cases that Kant explicitly rejects be-

cause they are lacking in freedom.9 Similarly, if we assumed that free har-mony should be understood in the abstractive sense and specifically abstract-

ing from teleological ideas (instead of determinant concepts) we would fare no



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better. On a teleological reading we would now have to admit that a well-de-signed wrench (the perfect water-pump pliers) is an excellent work of beauty.

We appreciate that it fits well the orderliness required of a pair of water-pumppliers even though, of course, we not interested that the orderliness appreciated

is water-pump plier orderliness. But here again, apart from the fact that suchparadigms are unacceptable to us, it is very difficult to reconcile this position

with Kants claim that objects must be purposive but without purpose. It wouldseem that under this reading, it turns out after all that beauty really has to do

with what Kant calls objective purposiveness. Objects suit our subjectivepurpose of harmony of the faculties only by living up to some version of objec-

tive purposiveness. Again, if this is what Kant has in mind, his position is dif-ficult to distinguish from the claim that aesthetic goodness can be reduced to

either the goodness of utility or perfection.There is, however, another alternative sometimes pursued.10 From the re-

marks in 9 and 21 of the Analytic it could be claimed that Kant has a quitedifferent way to recognize a harmony between the two faculties. That is to say,

the problem we have had is one of understanding what a harmony between theimagination and understanding could be where there is no rule to account for

the harmony. One answer to this question, suggested at 9 and 21, is that un-

like usual cognition where recognition is achieved by the application of a rule,

we recognize free harmony by means of a feeling. We simply feel the fit ofthe two faculties:

The powers of cognition that are set into play by this representation are hereby in

a free play, since no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cog-

nition. Thus the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling of

the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cog-

nition in general. (KU 5: 217, 102)

There are difficulties with taking this interpretation. First, were we to at-tribute to Kant the view that we can simply feel rule governedness without

applying a rule, it would be a position quite unique to the critical philosophyand may well contradict some of the more important arguments in the Critiqueof Pure Reason. Specifically, it seems to be important to the Transcendental De-duction of the Categories that every manifold of representations be united by a

rule.11 But even if we could admit such an unusual activity as feeling a con-ceptual fit without using concepts, there are problems with this position intrin-

sic to the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. As most commentators agree, toget any version of the arguments of paragraphs 9 and 21 off the ground, Kant

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must argue that free harmony is a mental state very much like mental state ofordinary cognition. Discussing free harmony Kant says:

. . . for we are conscious that this subjective relation suited to cognition in gen-

eral must be valid for everyone and consequently universally communicable, just

as any determinate cognition is, which still always rests on that relation as its sub-

jective condition. (KU 5: 218, 103)

Roughly, Kant wants to argue that if ordinary cognitive states are univer-sally communicable, then so is free harmony. Kant seemingly wants to argue

here that, short of skepticism, we must assume that ordinary cognitive states areuniversally communicable and since a free harmony of the faculties is suffi-

ciently similar to a cognitive state, then it must be the case that free harmonyis also universally communicable. This line of reasoning is thought to be crucial

to Kants larger argument to show the universal validity of judgments of taste.But if free harmony and ordinary cognition are as radically different as the pres-

ent account supposes, then Kants inference about universal communicabilityis clearly weakened. As Ralf Meerbote has convincingly argued, Kant is saddled

with a nasty dilemma.12 Either he holds that free harmony is literally a harmony

devoid of concepts, in which case he cannot draw a close parallel with cogni-

tion, or he admits that aesthetic judging uses concepts, in which case he losesthe sense of freedom.Perhaps, as yet another possible interpretation one should understand free

harmony not as abstracted from concepts or, somehow, simply devoid of con-cepts, but go in quite a different direction and claim that a free harmony is one

whereby we can apply several different concepts to a manifold. This is what PaulGuyer has recently called a multicognitive interpretation of free harmony.13

Presumably, the sense in which a relationship of the imagination and under-standing is suitably free of concepts is if it is free on any one determinate con-cept to pin down the order of the manifold. Instead we are free, as Guyer putsit, to flit between a multiplicity of possible concepts. In addition to the prob-

lems that Guyer finds with this interpretation, let me add a couple more. Thisinterpretation, like others we have seen in the aforementioned, will likely gen-

erate some odd paradigms. It would seem that a good candidate for an aestheticobject on this accounting would be one so constructed to make it easy and nat-

ural to conceptualize it under different concepts. One cannot help thinking thatWittgensteins duck-rabbit would come across as a prime candidate of an aes-

thetic object. However, as entertaining as duck-rabbit games are, few wouldput them forward as excellent aesthetic objects.



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There is, however, a deeper problem with the multicognitive interpre-tation that is internal to the argument of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.

As mentioned above, many commentators interpret Kant as offering an argu-ment for the universal validity of aesthetic judgments on grounds similar to

the universal validity of ordinary cognitive states. Roughly, in order to accountfor shared cognition we assume that everyone conceptualizes manifolds in the

same waythat is, everyone who is confronted with a Fido-like manifold seesthat it is a dog-ordered manifold. Everyone, Kant seems to argue, must recog-

nize orderliness in the same way. But, a free harmony denotes a kind of orderli-ness. Thus, presumably, if I recognize free harmony with a feeling of pleasure

and I have a right to assume everyone must recognize orderliness in the sameway, then I can assume that others will feel pleasure in free harmony as well.

Again, we will have much to say about such an argument. But for now,notice how the multicognitive interpretation will make a mess of an argument

like the one above. If by a free harmony of the imagination and understandingKant means that for an appropriate aesthetic object we are free to see the ob-

ject as displaying any number of orderings. But if this is the case, I have noreason to believe that anyone will share my recognition of order in an aesthetic

object. And, thus, a key feature of the analogy between free harmony and cog-

nition is brokena feature that was intended as a cornerstone of Kants argu-

ment to the universal validity of aesthetic judgments.There is one further interpretation that deserves close attention. HenryAllison in his recent book offers an interesting interpretation of free harmony

that, if successful, will avoid the dilemma previously cited by Meerbote. To con-struct an argument for the universal validity of free harmony from paragraphs

9, 21, and 38, we must assume that appreciating a free harmony and applying aconcept to a manifold are quite similar activities. Both are a matter of finding

order in a manifold. Although both involve a kind of harmony between ourcognitive faculties, there is an important difference. When we recognize the rule

orderedness of manifold by the application of a concept, we do not simply ap-preciate an objects rule orderedness; we also assert that the manifold shows a

rule orderedness similar to that of other objects. It is on the basis of this simi-larity that we classify an object as a certain kind. Appreciation of beauty, how-

ever, is not a matter of classifying objects by finding a common rule. We are onlyconcerned, as Kant says time and again, with in the subjective purposiveness

of objects. Subjective purposiveness can now be understood as an interest in or-derliness for its own sake, not as a concern with the order an object may share

in common with others.Henry Allison, following Carl Posy, interprets Kant as claiming that when

we engage in aesthetic contemplation the normal concerns of cognition are

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suspended.14

That is to say, free harmony judging is indeed looking for rule or-deredness of a manifold but since our normal concerns of cognition are sus-pended we do not follow through by applying concepts. We are not concerned

with comparing an objects rule orderedness to other, similar objects. This posi-tion seems to avoid the dilemma above. Aesthetic contemplation and ordinary

empirical judgments are similar in that both are concerned with finding rule or-deredness in a manifold. The difference between the two is that aesthetic con-

templation is concerned with orderedness per se while an empirical judgment

is further interested in determining a similarity with other objects. Having madethis distinction, presumably, we can claim that free harmony is not conceptual

and yet it describes a rule-ordered manifold. Paul Guyer has dubbed this typeof interpretation a precognitive interpretation of free harmony since it con-

siders a free harmony a recognition of an orderly manifold that is logically priorto conceptualization.15

I believe that there are yet problems with this attempt to free Kant of thedifficulties of free harmony.16 I suspect that this interpretation puts too little dis-

tance between a free harmony of the imagination and understanding and anordinary, rule-governed conceptual judgment. Consider the judgment Fido is

a dog. When I make such a judgment I notice that the manifold of imagina-tion I am presented with possesses a certain order. It is the order defined by my

concept (rule) dog. When I make the judgment I recognize that my manifoldhas a certain order and that this order is common to manifolds presented onother occasionsthis is the sense in which dog functions as a class concept forme. My judgments define a class of objects in terms of common rule orderliness

of their manifolds of perception. Aesthetic appreciation is presumably differentfrom this. When appreciating an aesthetic object I judge the manifold to be

orderly but do not compare this manifolds orderliness to that of other similarlyorderly objects, if there are any. This seems to imply that we could very well

say that an aesthetic object displays a rule orderedness; its just that we are not

concerned as to whether or not that rule is instantiated anywhere else. For allwe know or care, the rule could be uniquely instantiated in the case we are

presently observing.This interpretation is fine as far as it goes, but there are problems. Con-

sider again my experience of Fido. In an ordinary, empirical experience of Fido,I recognize that the present manifold of sense exhibits an orderliness shared

with a certain class of objects (dogs). This is also to say that I recognize thatFido exhibits the dog rule shared by all dogs. Experience of Fido is rule or-

dered and it is rule ordered by the determinate dog rule. On the present in-terpretation, aesthetic appreciation of an object is very much like our Fido ex-

perience. Presumably, empirical experience and aesthetic appreciation are



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alike insofar as both involve the recognition of the rule orderness of the man-ifold of sense. Both the experience of Fido and the aesthetic appreciation of

the Mona Lisa (for example) involve the recognition that the manifold ofsense under consideration is ordered by a specific rule. The difference is that

in the Fido case we also focus on the fact that the Fido rule has multiple in-stantiations whereas in the Mona Lisa case we do not concern ourselves with

instantiations.If my understanding of the above interpretation is correct, then the dis-

tinction between free harmony and determinate judging is not a difference be-tween a rule-ordered manifold (determinate judging) and a manifold that is not

rule ordered (free harmony). Rather the distinction is between our recognizinga rule-ordered manifold that has multiple instantiations (determinate judging)

and our recognizing a rule-ordered manifold but without reference to instanti-ation (free harmony). But if this is the difference, it is hard to see that it is much

of a difference. Or, perhaps, it is difficult to see that this difference cannot beovercome. It seems entirely possible that we could consider any object aes-

thetically and that any object could suit Kants free harmony requirement.17 Isee no reason, in principle, why we could not consider Fido for the rule order-

ness of its manifold in abstraction from our knowledge of whether this rule is

multiply instantiated or not. To consider an object in such a way would, I take

it, suit Kants injunction that we consider an object merely for its mere sub-jective purposiveness. That is to say, we are concerned only the extent to whichan object is rule ordered, we are unconcerned whether this rule shows up else-

where in our experience. But if it is possible to consider dogs and all manner ofobjects as aesthetic objects, Kant loses the distinction between ordinary objects

and special aesthetic objects that the free harmony criteria seems to establish.Additionally, if any object could be considered aesthetically, in the fashion sug-

gested, it is not obvious how one would distinguish between good aesthetic ob-jects and those not so good. If we could make a distinction in kind between ob-

jects that were free harmonies and those that were not, then the distinctionbetween aesthetic and nonaesthetic objects would be clear. But this is not the

case.There is another attempt to resolve the dilemma that free harmony pres-

ents that is rather similar to the Alison/Posy solution. Hannah Ginsborg sees thefree harmony issue bound up with an even larger problem in the Kantian phi-

losophy.18 Kant has an account of empirical concept acquisition that is, unfor-tunately, rather sketchy.19 As we have seen, Kant regards all concepts as rules

describing a certain order of perceptual elements in an experience. Further, hisofficial position as to how we come to form a new empirical concept is by way

of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Kant gives an example:

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I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects withone another I note they are different from one another in regard to the trunk,

branches, and leaves, etc.: but next I reflect what they have in common, trunk,

branches, and leaves themselves, and I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc.,

of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree. (Logik, para. 6, Ak IX, 9495; 592)

The problem with this account is that it seems one already needs a con-

cept (rule) of tree in order to single out spruce, willow, and linden as appropri-ate candidates to engage in a process of comparison, reflection, and abstraction.

If we did not already have something like a tree rule in mind, it seems unlikely

that of all the objects in the world we would pick these individuals to work ourconcept-forming labor upon. To put the matter differently, if we did not alreadyhave some rough concept of tree we wouldnt have picked out a spruce, willow,

and linden as appropriate objects to hone our formal concept of tree.

To solve the problem of empirical concept acquisition Ginsborg admit-tedly goes beyond Kants text to suggest an account that he could have (should

have) given. In order to make coherent Kants account of empirical concept ac-quisition he needs to make a distinction between two ways in which one could

have and use rules for the ordering of an empirical manifold. Ginsborgs sug-gestion is that initially when we consider objects like the spruce, willow, and lin-

den we pick them out because we are using a process that is exemplary of rules,but only subsequently (by the process of comparison, reflection, and abstrac-

tion) do we come up an explicit rule that is the concept tree.20 Ginsborg givesa useful analogy. Using the English language is a rule-governed activity in two

senses. Simply speaking English is rule governed insofar as this activity is gov-erned by lexical rules and rules of grammar.21 All of this is rather unstudied

and even unconscious. However, this exemplary use of rules becomes the ba-sis for subsequent, explicit rules of English usage. How we use English unreflec-

tively allows us the ability to extract explicit rules of usage.Ginsborg applies this analogy to empirical concept acquisition. Consider

the first time a person runs across what we would now call a tree. On that firstencounter our observer would not apply the conceptual tree rule to the per-

ceptual manifoldno such rule is available. Nonetheless, claims Ginsborg, sucha first encounter may yet be rule governed in a primitive sense. Presumably, we

can find order in our first tree experience that will set the standard for any fu-ture tree encounters. Our first encounters with a tree are rule governed in a

primitive way as opposed to subsequent experiences where we approach tree

with the explicit concept well in hand.The model of primitive, rule-governed experiences as a key to the account

of empirical concept acquisition sets the stage for an interpretation of the no-



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tion of a free harmony of the imagination and understanding in the Critiqueof Aesthetic Judgment. Recall that the central interpretative problem with a

free harmony of the imagination and understanding is trying to figure out howthe imagination could harmonize with the rule function of the understanding

and yet do so without rules (concepts). Ginsborgs primitive and exemplary rule-governed experiences seem to fit the bill. Kant claims that when we consider an

object aesthetically we consider a manifold of imagination for its conformity tothe rule-governed function of the understanding but yet without applying a

rule. This may seem mysterious. But if Ginsborg is correct we do this sort of thingall the time in the process of empirical concept acquisition. When we approach

a tree for the first time we must be able to appreciate the rule governedness ofthe manifold in order to be able subsequently to find other instances of a tree.

But this is an ability to discern rule governedness without using a rule. And,Ginsborg holds, this is just the ability required in aesthetic cases of free harmony.

An additional bonus of Ginsborgs account is that it adds coherence towhat seems to be Kants central arguments justifying the universal validity of

judgments of taste. As we have seen, it is commonly thought that Kants proofof the universal validity of judgments of taste crucially depends on the premise

that the mental state of free harmony is sufficiently similar to a conceptually de-

termined cognitive state that we can regard aesthetic judgments to be as uni-

versally valid as an ordinary empirical judgment.

22

Under most interpretationsof free harmony this similarity between free harmony and empirical judgmentsis difficult to explain. How can a nonconceptually determined manifold be suf-

ficiently similar to a conceptual manifold such that we could draw inferencesfrom one to the other? Ginsborgs interpretation seems to help this inference. If

Ginsborg is correct, then part of the story of empirical cognition (the part in-volving concept acquisition) requires our ability to recognize the rule gov-

ernedness of a manifold prior to our application of an actual rule. Thus, Kant isjustified in thinking that aesthetic appreciation depends on an ability we can as-

sume to be shared by all.Ginsborgs account may in fact go a long way in helping to understand

Kants account of empirical concept acquisition; however, as an interpretation offree harmony it suffers from difficulties similar to those found with the

Allison/Posy interpretation. The danger with trying to argue a close similaritybetween free harmony and ordinary, conceptual cognition is that one may fail

to distinguish adequately aesthetic appreciation from cognition. If, as Ginsborgseems to suggest, empirical concept acquisition requires us to experience the

rule governedness of a manifold without applying a rule and that this activityis very much like (if not identical to) the experience of free harmony, then it would

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seem that tree experiences are also aesthetic experiences. It would seem that wecould approach a tree now and appreciate it as if we were experiencing it for the

first time and did not already possess a concept of tree. And, if we could do sucha thing, then experiencing a tree would be an instance of free harmony of the imag-

ination and understanding. And, as such, it would be an aesthetic experience.Ginsborg is aware of this difficulty and tries to meet it.23 To distinguish

the mental activity of free harmony from the act of empirical concept acquisi-tion, Ginsborg claims that while each act of acquisition requires the recognition

of a rule governedness with a rule (like free harmony) such acquisition cannottake place without also, at the same time, applying our newly acquired concept

in the process. As Ginsborg puts it, (t)he act through which I acquire the con-cept tree is at the same time my first act of judging something to be a tree.24

This seems to distinguish free harmony from empirical concept acquisition. Itcannot be the case that every act of empirical concept acquisition is also an aes-

thetic experience of free harmony since, Ginsborg holds, each act of acquiringa concept is also an act of applying that conceptunlike a pure free harmony

experience. Also, apparently, once we have applied a concept to a tree experi-ence we cannot approach a tree as if it were not a conceptually determined man-

ifold. Presumably we cannot abstract the primitive act of recognizing orderliness

from the final act of applying a concept.

Ginsborgs position does seem to get her out of the problems noted above.However, there are further difficulties here. Ginsborgs interpretation of freeharmony depends on her admittedly speculative account of empirical concept

acquisitionparticularly the claim that such concept acquisition requires aprimitive recognition of a rule governedness without rules. But even if we were

to grant this, the further claim that each act of acquisition is inseparable froman act of application seems, at best, ad hoc. I see no reason, other than a mere

assertion, why in a Kantian account of original acquisition we could not recog-nize a something (a tree) as rule governed at one moment and only later af-

ter acquaintance with other somethings (trees) we start applying the concepttree. Nor do I see any reason in a Kantian position why we could not act as if

we were seeing a tree for the first time and recreate, as it were, that original mo-ment of appreciating rule governedness per se. But maybe Ginsborg is right.

Maybe empirical concept acquisition is very different from aesthetic apprecia-tion. Specifically, perhaps approaching a tree is so very different from ap-

proaching an artwork that the cognitive processes are very different. But if thisis so, we fall on the other horn of the dilemma discussed earlier. If the processes

are so very different, there is no reason to believe that any argument based ontheir similarity is going to succeed.



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3

There is, however, one portion of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment whereKant has a solution to how a manifold can be both rule governed and free. The

relevant discussion is contained in Kants description of how artistic geniuscan create works of art that express aesthetic ideas.25 I want to argue: (1) the

expression of aesthetic ideas gives a definite sense to the notion of a rule-governed manifoldit is governed by an aesthetic idea; (2) this sort of rule

governedness is compatible with the requirement for a free use of the imagi-nation; and (3) more tentatively, that the expression of ideas is a general solu-

tion to the problem of free harmony (for both art and nature).26

While Kant understandably stresses the role of originality in artistic cre-

ation, at least as important is his claim that the artist must also combine his orher creativity with some sort of organization (as usual without constraint of pre-

conceived rules). The problem Kant considers in his discussion of artistic cre-ation looks very like the one that has been bothering us: How can an artist

create a work that is free and yet organized? Kants explicit solution in these sec-tions is that the artist can achieve the proper organization for his work only if

he or she creates a work that expresses an aesthetic idea. Thus, expression ofideas seems to play the crucial role of explaining, in the admittedly narrow case

of artistic creation, how an aesthetic object can be rule governed. In fact, Kantgoes so far as to argue that expression of ideas is not just a way of organizing a

manifold to meet the rule-governed requirement, but the only appropriate wayfor artistic creation:

To be rich and original in ideas is not as necessary for the sake of beauty as is the

suitability of the imagination in its freedom to the lawfulness of the understand-

ing. For all the richness of the former produces, in its lawless freedom, nothing but

nonsense; the power of judgment, however, is the faculty for bringing it in line

with the understanding. (KU 5: 319, 197)

The point Kant repeats often in these sections is that genius (which Kantdefines in part as the faculty to produce aesthetic ideas) is able to create fine art

only insofar as it can provide a rule to the free fancy of the imagination (KU5: 307, 186). This is required since without genius organizing an artwork in or-

der to express an idea, we would be unable to account for the works rule gov-ernedness. Kant argues in these sections that the genius who lacks the skill of

organizing to express at best creates original nonsense (KU 5: 308, 186).Without such organization an artist cannot produce an artwork that remains

purposive by introducing clarity and order (KU 5: 319, 197). Or more posi-

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tively, the ability to present aesthetic ideas is that which purposively sets themental powers into motion (KU 5: 313, 192).27

The evidence of these sections seems quite conclusive. Kant holds thatexpression of aesthetic ideas is a requirement for artistic creation and it is re-

quired because it explains rule governedness. And while Kant offers this thesisas part of an explanation of artistic creation it takes only a slight extension of

his doctrine to see how it would apply to artistic appreciation as well. The artistis saddled with the task of creating a work such that when properly appreciated

it stimulates the imagination in such a way as to express an idea. This, Kantclaims, requires genius. But, we can suppose something similar goes on dur-

ing aesthetic appreciation. The person who properly appreciates a work of art(or, I would maintain, natural beauty as well) must be able to interpret the ele-

ments of the work in such a way as to see that they come together to expressan idea. As such, both the artist and the art appreciator must be able to expe-

rience an object as stimulating a free harmony of the imagination and under-standing in such a manner that we interpret the object as expressing an idea.

On the basis of these passages it might be granted that Kant can accountfor how aesthetic appreciation involves a rule-like harmony of the imagination

and the understanding. Aesthetic appreciation involves our interpreting a man-

ifold as organized in a way to best express an aesthetic idea. But perhaps it is

more difficult to argue that expression of ideas is consistent with the restrictionthat the mental state of appreciation is free. Here I enlist the support of someimportant work on Kant by Paul Guyer. It has been argued, successfully I be-

lieve, that the mental state of appreciating an artwork that expresses ideas isone free from conceptual determination.28 It is crucial for this interpretation to

notice that Kants description of the process of either producing or recognizingan aesthetic idea is a description of a free harmony. That is to say, recogniz-

ing an artwork as expressing an aesthetic idea is a case of freely harmonizing amanifold of sense with the rule faculty of the understanding:

In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, annexed to a

given concept, with which, in the free employment of imagination, such a multi-

plicity of partial representations are bound up, that no expression indicating a def-

inite concept can be found for it. (KU 5: 316, 194)

The sense in which the expression of aesthetic ideas involves a free har-mony seems to be that, as Kant understands aesthetic ideas, they refer to some-

thing that cannot be literally describedthey are notions of things too big forordinary empirical description. Kants favorite examples are moral and religious

notions (invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, heaven, eternity,



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creation, etc.) (KU 5: 314, 192). As a result, to express such an idea requires,Kant supposes, that we create works that stimulate the imagination to make all

sorts of associations that substitute for a literal description of these elusive en-tities. And importantly, the process of expression is one that must be indepen-

dent of all conceptssince no concepts can literally describe the notions in-volved. As Kant puts the matter, expression of ideas can be communicated

without constraint of rules (KU 5: 317, 195).I shall save for the next chapter a more technical description of the ex-

pression of aesthetic ideas; here I only want to suggest how expression is a men-tal state compatible with the restriction that aesthetic appreciation is one of free

harmony. Expression of aesthetic ideas is a free harmony since expressionmust be unlike ordinary cases of conceptual determination. In ordinary cases

(either empirical concepts or teleological ideas) Kant supposes that we come toobjects with a well-formed notion of what the thing is either presumed to be or

what function it is presumed to serve. Judging an object to be the expression ofan aesthetic idea is quite another matter. Since there can be no well-formed

concept of things like heaven, hell, and so on, we give free reign to our imagi-nation in order to interpret an object as expressing an idea of such things. This

is not a matter of judging that an object falls under a given concept or serves

some purpose. Neither a well-formed idea of an end nor a determinant concept

is possible for the objects that art can supposedly express. As such, art cannotbe governed by rules or standards in the ordinary sense. Rather, Kant claims,the artist can be said to create a new rule as a result of his free use of his cog-

nitive faculties (KU 5: 318, 195). Regardless of how the process of expressionis achieved (and Kant thinks here that genius is a mysterious gift of nature

one which cannot be taught or learned), it cannot employ any concepts orteleological ideas (KU 5: 317, 194).

Moreover, expression of ideas, as others have pointed out, may even becompatible with what some regard as Kants unfortunate doctrine of perceptual

formalism. That is to say, it could be argued that my interpretation comes dan-gerously close to claiming that all beauty must express ideas, and this interpre-

tation seems to conflict with Kants supposed perceptual formalism. But, thereneed be no conflict here since Kant holds the plausible enough position that the

artists job is to manipulate perceptual elements in such a way as to achieve anexpression of ideas.29 What Kant suggests is that formal unity of a manifold

(even if this manifold is restricted to perceptible elements) can be achieved onlyif the artist works up his matter with some aesthetic idea in mind.30

As mentioned above, the claim that recognizing aesthetic ideas as a men-tal state compatible with free harmony is a fairly well-accepted interpretation

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of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. However, I want to claim somethingstronger than mere compatibility. Expression of aesthetic ideas solves the prob-

lem of interpreting free harmony. And further, if expression is the only way tomake sense of a free harmony, then we may be forced to conclude that expression

is a necessary condition for beauty. Indeed, there are passages where Kant claimsthat expression is criterial for beauty (KU 5: 320, 197). However, it could be ar-

gued that we should discount such passages on the interpretation that althoughexpression of ideas may be compatible with the free harmony requirement, ex-

pression is only one species of beautywhether an object expresses or not is quitecontingent. However, if it is the case that expression is needed to explain the pos-

sibility of free harmony, then expression is far from contingent. And Kants pro-nouncement that all beauty is expressive can be taken more seriously.

To be sure, there are several problems left if we try to argue that expres-sion plays the central role I attribute to it. In spite of passages like the one just

quoted, sometimes it seems that Kant holds that expression of aesthetic ideas isa feature only of artistic, not natural beauty. Thus, expression could not be cri-

terial for all judgments of beauty. Strictly speaking, trying to argue that expres-sion is criterial for all species of beauty goes beyond the argument of this chap-

ter. If I have been convincing that expression solves the riddle of free harmony

(even if this riddle can only be solved for artistic beauty), I have completed my

task. But a little can be said in favor of assuming that Kant intends expressionto be a general criteria. First, there are passages where Kant refers to beautiesof nature as expressive.31 Second, some think that calling nature expressive is

an odd thing to do since with nature, unlike art, we cannot strictly attribute thesort of intentionality seemingly required for expressiveness. Of art, we may say

quite truly that the artist expresses something in his work, but even if we mayinterpret a sunset as expressing grandeur, literally it does not. Yet, trying to force

such a distinction on Kant will not work for the simple reason that even in thecase of artistic beauty, the recognition of expression does not depend on actu-

ally attributing intentions to a creator.32 As we shall see in more detail in thenext chapter, Kant holds that art is created by genius that acts unselfcon-

sciously. Thus, Kant seems able to say that with both art and nature we inter-pret objects as if created with the intention of expressing an idea.

This leads to a more general point about Kants distinction between artand nature. For some time it was supposed that such a distinction was philo-

sophically important to Kants aesthetics; however, this has been disputed re-cently in a number of ways.33 I shall not rehearse the arguments here but only

point to one passage where Kant makes the distinction in order to show its rel-ative unimportance for the issue of beauty:



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Beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) can in general be called the expressionof aesthetic ideas: only in beautiful art this idea must be occasioned by a concept

of the object, but in beautiful nature the mere reflection on a given intuition, with-

out a concept of what the object ought to be, is sufficient for arousing and com-

municating the idea of which that object is considered as the expression. (KU 5:

320, 197)

Kant argues that for a work to be art it must be intended to conform to aconcept of an Objectwhere this seems to mean that the artist must first rep-

resent something by his art. And subsequently, after representing some object

the artist can express an idea (say, painting a picture of a woman that expressessadness). Yet, appreciation of nature obviously short circuits this process (thereis no sense in which nature represents). Of course, Kant can be accused of be-

ing just wrong in thinking that all art must represent, but on Kants own grounds

the fact that an object does or does not represent is irrelevant to its beauty. Thisis part of the lesson supposedly learned in the Analytic. And if this is the im-

portant difference between art and nature, it is difficult to see the relevance ofthe distinction for aesthetic judgment. We shall look into these matters more

closely in the chapter 3.

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2

The Doctrine of Aesthetic Ideas

In the first chapter I suggested that Kants doctrine of the expression of aestheticideas may help to explain the problematic notion of a free harmony of the imag-

ination and the understanding. In this chapter I want to take a longer look atthe notion of aesthetic ideas. After providing a description of what it is, for Kant,

to express an aesthetic idea, I want to consider in more detail how this doctrine

fits with and helps to explain his doctrine of free harmony. Also, I want to con-sider how expression of ideas may be of aesthetic value and, thus, how expres-

sion might play a role in support of the universal validity of aesthetic judgments.Much of the discussion of Kants aesthetic theory centers around his at-

tempt to justify what he takes to be aesthetic judgments special status. Aes-

thetic judgments are, for Kant, judgments that claim a subjective, universalvalidity. Further, as we saw in the first chapter, Kant argues that aesthetic judg-ments universal status can be justified only if certain objects give us pleasure

the source of which is the mental state of free harmony. And since the mentalstate of free harmony is some kind of recognition of the order of a manifold of

sense, then it is thought to follow (on traditional interpretations of Kant) thatan objects aesthetic worth (its beauty) consists in its formthe way in which

a manifold is ordered.1 Simply put, Kants substantive position on aestheticvalue seems to be a formalism.2 None of this short description will come as any

surprise to anyone familiar with the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. How-ever, rather more confounding is Kants subsequent discussions, from 42 to the

end, where he appears to adopt a position typically thought to be antitheticalto formalism; namely, the position that art (and perhaps nature as well) ought

to be in the business of expressing certain kinds of ideas. Kant goes so far asto claim, seemingly, that expression of aesthetic ideas is a criterion (perhaps

even the only criterion) for beauty. At 51 Kant claims that (b)eauty (whether

it be of nature or art) can in general be termed the expression of aesthetic ideas(KU 5: 320, 197). This apparently puts Kant in a bind. If Kant is indeed a for-

malist, it would appear to be inconsistent to also claim that beauty must bejudged in terms of the content that an object has to communicate to its audi-

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ence. The goal of this chapter is to take a look at Kants discussion of expres-sion of aesthetic ideas and see what role he may intend for the doctrine.

1

In this section I want simply to sketch out what Kants doctrine of expression ofaesthetic ideas amounts to and follow up in the next two sections by consider-

ing how this doctrine squares with other parts of his account (notably his com-mitment to formalism) and, further, what role expression might play in Kants

account of aesthetic value. Perhaps the most explicit description of an aestheticidea comes in 49:

By an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination oc-

casions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate

thought, i.e. concept, being adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully

attains or can make intelligible.One readily sees that it is the counterpart (pen-

dant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition

(representation of the imagination) can be adequate. (KU 5: 314, 192)

A little bit of background is appropriate here. In the description of aes-thetic ideas Kant relies on a distinction developed in the Critique of Pure Rea-son (Kants first Critique) between concepts (Begriffe) and ideas (Ideen)which,in turn, gives rise to determinant or reflective judgments as discussed in chap-ter 1. Concepts, as Kant defines them, falls into two groups: ordinary empirical

concepts and pure or a priori concepts. Empirical concepts like dog or tree arenotions that can be tied directly to sense intuition (sense data). To simplify, an

empirical concept specifies what we are to find in our sense perception. Theconcept dog or a tree is defined by specifying the kinds of sense manifolds we

would expect to experience and that could be appropriately called dog or tree.For short, dog or tree refers to types of manifolds of sense intuition. All of this

is quite compatible with a fairly typical empiricists view of concepts. In fact,Kant would also agree with the empiricist that we come to form these concepts

by first looking at different configuration of sense manifolds, grouping them bysimilarities and, finally, naming the groups (by use of a concept).3 In this respect

ordinary, empirical concepts are a posteriori; they are based on experience.There is, however, one important difference between Kants account of empir-

ical concepts and those of the empiricists. Locke, for example, tends to look atconcepts as paradigm cases of individualsDog would refer to a paradigm in-

dividual of the class of dogs. For Kant, as we saw in chapter 1, concepts are rules

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for organizing manifolds of sense. For something to be a dog, the manifold ofsense of that object must measure up to the dog rule. That is to say, the mani-

fold must possess certain elementstail, head, etc.and all of those elementsmust be of the proper form or in the proper configuration.

Pure or a priori concepts most certainly represent a great departure fromtraditional empiricists. It does not overstate the case to say that the central proj-

ect of the first Critique is to argue that there are concepts properly describingour sense-experienced world that are, nonetheless, logically prior to that sense

experience. Such pure or a priori concepts are very limited in number. Kant ar-gues primarily for the concepts of substance and causality as well as the two pure

intuitions of space and time.4

Although there are obviously significant differ-ences between ordinary, a posteriori concepts and pure, a priori concepts it is

nonetheless the case that a priori concepts are in a proper sense empirically de-terminant. That is to say, while a priori concepts are not derived from sense ex-

perience, they apply to sense experiencein fact Kant argues that they neces-sarily apply to sense experience. As such, like ordinary empirical concepts, a

priori concepts are also rules specifying an order for an empirical manifold. Forexample, the a priori concept of causality requires that there be a necessary rule

of temporal succession from one happening to another.5 Both a priori and a pos-

teriori concepts are determinant as regards sense intuition insofar as we can

specify, in both cases, what sort of sense manifolds fall under the concepts.However, both a posteriori and a priori concepts are to be distinguishedfrom ideas according to Kant. In the first Critique Kant is concerned to postu-late a kind of representation distinct from concepts that applies to objects andstates of affairs beyond the bounds of sense intuition and, hence, beyond the

bounds of sense verification. Notably, in the first Critique, Kant is primarily con-cerned with just three such ideas of reason: God, freedom, and immortality.6

None of these ideas is determinant according to Kant since we cannot spec-ify the nature of the sense manifold that would count as instances of these ideas.

We cannot do this since the objects or states of affairs are not objects of expe-rienceare not the sort of things about which we can have sense knowledge.

In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment Kant retains the basic distinctionbetween ideas and concepts. It is still the case that concepts are concrete, de-

terminant representations by which we can come to describe what an objectwould be like for sensible experience. Ideas, on the other hand, are representa-

tions (and no doubt problematic ones) that refer to objects and states of affairsbeyond sensible experience. However, Kant wants further to distinguish be-

tween different kinds of ideasrational ideas and aesthetic ideas. Near the endof the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant claims that aesthetic ideas are

inexponible while rational ideas are indemonstrable. (Remark I, KU 5: 342,

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218.) Unusual language to one side, these labels are intended to reflect theanalysis indicated in the passage from above (KU 5: 314). Kant wants to claim

that both aesthetic and rational ideas attempt to go beyond experience, but indifferent ways. Aesthetic ideas induce so much thought that concepts cannot

be adequate to the job of representation. (They are inexponible.) Rationalideas, however, attempt to represent that which has too little intuition for a con-

cept to get a grip on. (They are indemonstrable.)As is often the case when Kant attempts to make a technical distinction,

he overdraws the difference between aesthetic and rational ideas. It seems to beKants position that ideas attempt to represent objects and states of affairs that

cannot be met with in ordinary sense experience. Ideas of reason, Kant now sug-gests, do this by way of abstraction. We might portray the idea of God, for ex-

ample, by abstracting from mortal limitationsa beingnot limited by space andtime, a beingnot finite in power, knowledge, or goodness. In an artwork, how-ever, we may attempt to portray the very same idea of God, but this time we doso by giving some sense of God by suggesting, metaphorically or symbolically,

that which cannot be directly experienced.7 Jupiters eagle, with the lightningin its claws brings to mind the mighty king of heaven because of certain

analogies between the majesty of the bird and the majesty of God. Or, again us-

ing analogies, the idea of a monarchical state could represented by a body

with a soul if it is ruled in accordance with laws internal to the people, but by amere machine (like a handmill) if it is ruled by a single absolute will ( KU 5:352, 226).

Kant holds the position that artworks (and, as we shall see, natural ob-jects as well) are able to express ideas of objects or states of affairs beyond our

sensible experience by suggesting such things symbolically by way of an anal-ogy.8 However, this account of expression is not without its problems. Even if

we were to grant that objects and states of affairs beyond our sense experiencecan be suggested symbolically, it is an open question whether symbolism must

always operate analogically. It seems quite likely that symbolism can function ina variety of ways to express ideasby making associations, by relying on certain

conventions, and perhaps by other techniques. Further, unless symbolism is verybroadly defined, it is quite likely that artworks express ideas by using techniques

other than symbolism. For example an artwork might express a range of humanemotions (often examples that Kant uses) by representing persons with outward

demeanor characteristic of persons having those emotions. I would be hardpressed to call such a technique one of symbolism.

In spite of these misgivings, Kants broad characterization of expression ofaesthetic ideas seems plausible enough. An aesthetic idea is a representation

of the imagination that occasions much thinking (KU 5: 314, 192). Or ex-

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pression of an aesthetic idea is something else, which gives the imaginationcause to spread itself over a multitude of related representations, which let one

think more than one can express in a concept determined by words (KU 5:315, 193). Kants general position here is that an artwork expresses an idea by

stimulating the imagination to make associations that congeal into a notion ofsomething that we cannot meet with directly in experience. This is an interest-

ing account of expression even if Kant is mistaken about the specific details ofhow these associations are madenamely, whether they must all by analogical

and symbolic.

2

At the very least Kant holds that artistic beauty can be a matter of expressing

aesthetic ideas. We even have a rough description of how Kant believes that wecome to appreciate that ideas are expressed. However, many questions about

the doctrine remain. For example, most of Kants discussion of aesthetic ideasoccurs, understandably enough, in the context of art and artistic creation. In

fact, Kants primary explanation of how expression works is embedded in his ac-

count of how artistic genius creates an object that we come to appreciate as

expressing an idea:

Genius really consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach and no

diligence learn, of finding ideas for a given concept on the one hand and on the

other hitting upon the expression for these . . . for to express what is unnameable

. . . requires a faculty for apprehending the rapidly passing play of the imagination

and unifying it into a concept (which for that reason is original and at the same

time discloses a new rule, which could not have been deduced from any an-

tecedent principles or examples), which can be communicated without the con-

straint of rules. (KU 5: 317, 19495)

Kants position seems to be the following. An artist through an exerciseof genius is able to construct an object that stimulates a host of thoughts and

associations (rapidly passing play of the imagination) and yet is able to shapethese thoughts into a coherent whole suggesting a particular idea. More specif-

ically, an artists genius is able to bring a new rule to organize his or her ma-terial in order to express an idea of an object or state of affairs that goes beyond

our sense experience. Genius, in short, is intended as an account of how art-works are created such that they can be properly appreciated as expressing an

idea. Given this account one may very well assume that expression of aesthetic

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ideas is something exclusive to art and artistic creation.9

Although this topicwill be considered at length in the next chapter on art and nature, a little canbe said here. At the very least, Kant does not hold the position that only art ex-

presses aesthetic ideas. As we have seen above in 51, Kant quite explicitlyholds that beauty of either art or nature can express aesthetic ideas (KU 5: 320,

197). One might complain that although Kant clearly says this, nonetheless, onhis own grounds this makes no sense. Specifically, it makes no sense to say that

natural

the problem of free harmony in kant's aesthetics (suny 2008) - kenneth f. rogerson

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