Jewish History (2014) 28: 241–244 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014DOI: 10.1007/s10835-014-9209-y

The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XIand the Rise of Fascism in Europe. By David I. Kertzer.New York: Random House, 2014. Pp. 510. $32.00.ISBN: 9780812993462.

SUSAN ZUCCOTTINew York, NY, USAE-mail: szuccotti@cs.com

In 2006, in a momentous development long awaited by historians of the HolySee, documents in the Vatican Secret Archives from the papacy of Pius XI(1922–39) were made available to the public. Well before that time, DavidKertzer had published three excellent books about papal politics and rela-tions with the Jews.1 He also had begun examining reams of material relevantto Pius XI in state and religious archives in Italy and elsewhere, as well asmemoirs and secondary studies. Kertzer was admirably prepared to deal withthe tens of thousands of newly released Vatican documents. In his resultingnew book, exhaustively researched, fascinating, and convincing, the papacyof Pius XI reads like a Shakespearean tragedy.

Pius XI and Benito Mussolini came to power in the same year. Initiallythe pope, distrustful of parliamentary democracy, saw the new Italian head ofgovernment as offering great opportunities. Here was an authoritarian rulerwith whom he could work, who would not only provide political stability andprotection from both Socialist advocates and Fascist extremists but also grantVatican requests. Mussolini seemed to offer the possibility of what Kertzercalls “a confessional state—one where the machinery of the authoritarianregime would be at the service of the Church” (355). Pius XI’s desire forsuch an arrangement and Mussolini’s interest in legitimization for his regimeresulted in the concordat of 1929 between Italy and the Holy See.

Anticlerical incidents caused primarily by fanatic Fascists continued afterthe concordat, but at the highest levels the new relationship was amicable.Pius XI helped convince the Italian public that Fascism was preferable toliberal democracy, while Mussolini granted many of the pope’s private re-quests. Kertzer describes these constant favors: books and films offensive to

1David I. Kertzer, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara (New York, 1997), and The Popesagainst the Jews: The Vatican Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism (New York, 2001),and Prisoner of the Vatican: The Popes’ Secret Plot to Capture Rome from the New ItalianState (New York, 2004).

242 BOOK REVIEW

the Church were censored; scanty clothing, mixed-gender gymnastics, andpublic dancing were banned; the rights of Protestants to convene and prose-lytize were threatened (although Kertzer indicates that Italian judges did notpermit the order for curtailment to go into effect); and much more.

When the new chancellor of Germany, Adolf Hitler, denounced commu-nism and appeared ready to cooperate with the Holy See for a few months af-ter January 1933, the pope and his secretary of state Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli,the future Pius XII, thought they perceived another regime with which theycould work to protect Church institutions. The result in July 1933 was an-other concordat. Again Pius XI gave legitimacy to an authoritarian regime,despite, among other cruelties, the growing persecutions of Jews in the ThirdReich.

Papal disillusionment with the führer was not long in coming. Despite hispromises, Hitler’s minions harassed Church institutions in Germany muchmore than Fascists were doing in Italy. Kertzer also refers to deliberatelyprovocative Nazi show trials of hundreds of priests, monks, and nuns ac-cused of corruption and pederasty (466). Nazi doctrines of the superiority ofthe “Aryan” race, the semireligious cult of the führer, “exaggerated nation-alism” (294–96; Pius XI’s term), and the increasing likelihood of Germanaggression also alienated the pope. And unlike Mussolini, Hitler offered nocooperation. Clearly the pope could not work with this regime. Contrary tothe advice of Pacelli and other papal counselors, he issued the encyclicalMit brennender Sorge in March 1937 to condemn certain Nazi doctrines andpractices, but he made few other public protests. He never denounced theongoing persecutions of Jews in the Third Reich, the Anschluss in March1938, or Kristallnacht in November of that same year. Kertzer stresses thedisastrous results of Pius XI’s reticence, suggesting that had the pope pub-licly condemned Hitler, the Italian people might have been so alienated fromNazism that Mussolini would not have been able to convince them to acceptan alliance with the Third Reich.

In many ways, Pius XI’s policies toward Fascist Italy resembled thoseinvolving Germany. Kertzer demonstrates that the pope was uncomfortablewith Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia and subsequent intervention on the sideof Franco in Spain, but he uttered no public objections. He desperately dis-liked Mussolini’s growing alliance with Hitler, but apart from leaving Romefor Castel Gandolfo during the führer’s visit to the Holy City in May 1938, hedid not publicly express his dismay. Then as the duce’s racist and anti-Jewishpolicies emerged in the summer and autumn of 1938, Pius XI took almost nopublic position in opposition, although he lobbied hard behind the scenes forthe concordat-assigned right of the Church to sanction and conduct marriages

BOOK REVIEW 243

between Catholics and Jews.2 Indeed, in one of the more valuable insights toemerge from the newly released papal documents, Kertzer demonstrates thatPius XI actually agreed to a deal with Mussolini in August 1938: he wouldnot publicly condemn the incipient anti-Jewish policies if Mussolini wouldprevent Fascist fanatics from persecuting Catholic Action.

Addressing the Shakespearean dimension of the papacy of Pius XI,though without using that term, Kertzer makes it clear that in his final yearsthe pontiff came to realize that he had been tragically mistaken in one of themajor commitments of his life—his belief that he could work with authori-tarian rulers. But the pope was rather authoritarian himself—confrontational,outspoken, stubborn, independent. That being the case, why did he not protestwhat he came to dislike so much? Kertzer gives several reasons. RegardingGermany, Pius XI feared a break with Hitler, destruction of the concordat,and consequent intensification of the persecution of Catholics—an explana-tion not unlike that given for the reticence of Pius XII concerning the Holo-caust. Regarding Italy, the pope feared that weakening Mussolini and con-tributing to his fall would lead to a new regime with which he could not workat all. Kertzer also shows from the documents that the pope’s counselors werefar less confrontational than he and that they not only advised against protestsbut also sabotaged his efforts in that direction.

Questions of interpretation remain, as Kertzer would undoubtedly agree.Indeed, one of the strengths and pleasures of this fine book, in addition to itswealth of new material and its vivid descriptive prose, is that the author doesnot hammer the reader with his own conclusions. He presents what he hasdiscovered. The reader must ponder and reflect. Among the questions: WasPius XI really a strong leader? Should he have been better able to impose hiswill, despite his old age, his illness, and his dissenting advisors? For that mat-ter, what was his will? Did he truly overcome his hostility to parliamentarydemocracy? Or was he, in the last analysis, too afraid of the consequencesof protest? Are there grounds here for a comparison with Pius XII, who isusually portrayed as so different?

And finally, though far from incidentally, what were Pius XI’s views onthe Jews? Kertzer uses apt quotations to demonstrate the antisemitism ofmany priests who were papal associates, such as Pietro Tacchi-Venturi, En-rico Rosa, Włodzimierz Ledóchowski, Francesco Borgongini-Duca, AgostinoGemelli, Giuseppe Pizzardo, and others. He shows too that stridently anti-semitic articles in periodicals such as La Civiltà Cattolica and L’Osservatore

2Pius XI’s only articulated condemnation of antisemitism, as opposed to racism, occurred at aprivate audience with the staff of the Belgian Catholic radio in September 1938. Pacelli and anundersecretary of state, Monsignor Domenico Tardini, kept the statement out of L’OsservatoreRomano (317).

244 BOOK REVIEW

Romano and similar conversations between papal spokesmen and Mus-solini’s agents before 1938 helped pave the way for the Fascist anti-Jewishlaws. Pius XI was less outspoken than his advisors on this subject, but he didlittle to discourage them. What were his private views—not about racism,which he clearly abhorred, but about antisemitism, anti-Judaism, and the po-sition of Jews in contemporary society? Kertzer analyzes the pope’s effortsat the end of his life to produce an encyclical condemning racism, and hefinds riveting new material regarding a speech the pontiff hoped to make at-tacking Fascism. The speech was preempted by his death the evening beforeits scheduled delivery, and copies of both the encyclical and the speech dis-appeared from his night table, confiscated in all probability by Pacelli. Butgiven the horrendous gravity of the times, both statements were mild. MightPius XI have done more, and sooner, to avert the tragedy that ultimatelyoverwhelmed him?