the politics of identity – the influence of national ... · the politics of identity – the...
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ThePoliticsofIdentity–TheInfluenceofNationalIdentityonStates’ForeignPolicyAgenda
ACaseStudyofPost-SocialistRomania
ThesissubmittedforthedegreeofDoctorinPhilosophyattheUniversityofLeicester
By
IoanaTartacuta-LawrenceMASchoolofHistory,PoliticsandInternationalRelations
UniversityofLeicester
2017
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Abstract
ThisthesisexplorestheinfluenceofnationalidentityonRomania’spost-socialistforeignpolicyagenda,workingattheintersectionofStrategicCultureandForeignPolicyAnalysis.Itadoptsaconstructivistapproach,puttingforwardanarrativetheoryofidentity,accordingtowhichprofoundlyheldbeliefsaboutthenatureoftheSelfandOthersinfluencethebehaviourofstatesthroughtheprerogatives,anxietiesandred-linestheygenerate.Thethesisidentifiesthetellingofnationalhistoryasthemainvehicleforthesocialisationoftheidentitynarrative.ItthentracesthedevelopmentoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,fromitsformativeyearsinthenineteenthcenturytocontemporarytimes,arguingthatthesedimentationofitsmainfeaturesislinkedtotheconsistencyofitshistoricalnarrative.AparticularemphasisdevelopsintheRomanianimaginaryintermsofprioritisingtheissuesofstatesecurity,sovereignty,territorialintegrityandunity.ThethesisthenexplorestheinfluenceoftheseelementsonRomania’spost-socialistbehaviour.Itfocusesfirstlyonthetransitionperiod,whenidentity-relatedprerogativesresultedbothinadesireforEuro-Atlanticintegration,butalsoinananxietytowardschangeatdomesticlevelwhichactedasanobstacletotherealisationoftheseinternationalgoalsinthefirsthalfofthe1990s.Secondly,thethesisinvestigatesthenatureofthreerelationshipscriticaltoRomania’sforeignpolicyagenda–thosewithRussia,HungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova.OverallthethesisshowsthatthereexistsanoticeablepatternofbehaviourwhichconformswithRomania’sidentity-drivenanxietiesandprerogatives,particularlyinthecurrentvolatileenvironment.WhilstrelationswithRussiaandHungaryaremarkedbyattitudesofanxietyanddistrust,thatwithMoldovaischaracterisedbyanaffinityrootedintheirsharedidentitymarkers.ThismakesRomaniaacutelysensitivetorecentregionaldevelopmentsandhasresultedinthestate’sadaptingitsbehaviourtowardsthesethreeactorsinordertoalleviateitsidentity-relatedanxietiesconcerningsecurity,unityandindependence,notonlyofitself,butalsoofMoldova.
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TableofContents
TABLESANDFIGURES............................................................................................................5LISTOFTABLES.............................................................................................................................5LISTOFFIGURESWITHSOURCEATTRIBUTION....................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................6CASE-STUDYANDCONTEXT............................................................................................................9STRUCTUREOFTHETHESIS...........................................................................................................15CONCLUDINGREMARKS...............................................................................................................18
CHAPTER1.THEORETICALBACKGROUND............................................................................20INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................20ATTHECROSSROADSOFSTRATEGICCULTUREANDFOREIGNPOLICYANALYSIS.....................................20STRATEGICCULTURE(SC)............................................................................................................21FOREIGNPOLICYANALYSIS(FPA).................................................................................................36LIMITATIONSOFSCANDFPAANDTHECONTRIBUTIONOFTHISTHESISTOTHEFIELD.............................48
SCandtheStudyofIdentity...............................................................................................49TheAgent-StructureDebate..............................................................................................51TheUtilityofa‘SmallState’CaseStudy............................................................................55
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................57
CHAPTER2.METHODS–APPROACHANDCONSIDERATIONS...............................................59EMPLOYINGACONSTRUCTIVISTAPPROACH....................................................................................59METHODOLOGY.........................................................................................................................65
ANoteonInterviewsandRomanianSources....................................................................65TheNatureandContentoftheRomanianIdentityNarrative...........................................66TheInfluenceofIdentityonBehaviour..............................................................................72
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................75
CHAPTER3.ROMANIANHISTORYANDIDENTITY–ANATIONALOBSESSIONWITHUNIQUENESS.......................................................................................................................79
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................79THECONTINUITYOFTHEROMANIANIDENTITYNARRATIVE................................................................80ANTIQUITY–FOUNDATIONMYTHS:ORIGINS,HABITUS,RELIGION.....................................................82
Origins...............................................................................................................................82Habitus...............................................................................................................................83Religion..............................................................................................................................85
THEMEDIEVALERAANDEARLYMODERNITY–THE‘BESIEGEDFORTRESS’...........................................86TheThreeProvinces...........................................................................................................88Transylvania–HungaryastheEssentialOther.................................................................88WallachiaandMoldavia....................................................................................................92
THEMODERNERA–THETHEMEOFUNITY.....................................................................................94TheBirthofRomanianNationalIdentity–Unity...............................................................94TheEssentialOthersandNeedforIdentityNarrativeContinuity....................................100
THECOMMUNISTPERIOD..........................................................................................................103CeausescuandtheWeaponisingofRomanianNationalIdentity....................................103TheOthersinCeausescu’sRomania................................................................................107
CONCLUSION–STRUCTURE,AGENCYANDROMANIANIDENTITY......................................................110
CHAPTER4.CONTINUITYRATHERTHANCHANGE–ROMANIA’SNATIONALIDENTITYINTHETRANSITIONERA...............................................................................................................114
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................114ROMANIAIN1989...................................................................................................................115ROMANIAINEARLYTRANSITION–IONILIESCUANDTHEUSEOFIDENTITYASELECTORALTOOL.............117
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ROMANIA’SCONTEMPORARYIDENTITYNARRATIVE–CONTINUITYONCEMORE.................................123ROMANIAINTHETRANSITIONERA–FOREIGNPOLICYDIRECTIONANDDOMESTICREFORM..................128
DesiretoJointheWest–StrongercommitmenttowardsNATO.....................................128ObstaclestoAccession–ResistancetoChangeandInsistenceonStateSovereignty.....132
THERETREATOFIDENTITARYANXIETIESINTHEMID-1990S.............................................................140CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................142
CHAPTER5.ROMANIA’SRELATIONSHIPWITHRUSSIA–SURVIVINGINTHESHADOWOFTHEGREATEASTERNPOWER...................................................................................................144
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................144ANOTEONROMANIA’SCONTEMPORARYFOREIGNPOLICYANDTHECURRENTINTERNATIONALCLIMATE145ROMANIA’SIDENTITYDRIVENATTITUDETOWARDSRUSSIA–DISTRUST,FEARANDANXIETYOVERSECURITYANDINDEPENDENCE.................................................................................................................148RUSSO-ROMANIANRELATIONSDURINGTHETRANSITIONPERIOD.....................................................152CONTEMPORARYRUSSO-ROMANIANRELATIONS...........................................................................158FUTUREDIRECTIONSFORRUSSO-ROMANIANRELATIONS................................................................169CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................174
CHAPTER6.ROMANIA’SRELATIONSHIPWITHHUNGARY–MANAGINGALEGACYOFATHOUSANDYEARSOFCONFLICTANDDISCORD.................................................................176
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................176ROMANIA’SIDENTITYDRIVENATTITUDETOWARDSHUNGARY–DISTRUSTANDANXIETYOVERTERRITORIALINTEGRITYANDSOVEREIGNTY.....................................................................................................177HUNGARIAN-ROMANIANRELATIONSDURINGTHETRANSITIONPERIOD.............................................181CONTEMPORARYHUNGARIAN-ROMANIANRELATIONS...................................................................190FUTUREDIRECTIONSFORHUNGARIAN-ROMANIANRELATIONS........................................................199CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................203
CHAPTER7.ROMANIA’SRELATIONSHIPWITHTHEREPUBLICOFMOLDOVA–TWOSTATES,ONEPEOPLE?....................................................................................................................205
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................205ROMANIA’SIDENTITYDRIVENATTITUDETOWARDSTHEREPUBLICOFMOLDOVA–AFFINITYFORTHEESTRANGEDSELF......................................................................................................................206MOLDO-ROMANIANRELATIONSDURINGTHETRANSITIONPERIOD...................................................210CONTEMPORARYMOLDO-ROMANIANRELATIONS.........................................................................217FUTUREDIRECTIONSFORMOLDO-ROMANIANRELATIONS..............................................................225CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................232
CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................234FINALCONSIDERATIONS............................................................................................................240DIRECTIONSFORTHEFUTURE.....................................................................................................244
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................246
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TablesandFiguresListofTablesMajorEventsofRomanianHistoryandIdentityNarrativeThemes…………………. 67MajorEventsofRomanianContemporaryHistory……………………………………………. 102
ListofFigureswithSourceAttributionFigure1.ThemainperiodsofRomanianhistoryandtheircorrespondingthemes……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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Figure2.MapofmoderndayRomania(1945-).………………………………………………Source:RomaniaMare(JudetesiRegiuniIstorice)[GreaterRomania(CountiesandHistoricalRegions)]inHeniusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus,1926),Copyright:PublicDomain,availablefromWikimediaCommons,Category:OldMapsofRomania,uploadedbyOlahus,06.12.2007,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Romania_Mare_(judete_si_regiuni_istorice).JPG[accessed13December2016].
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Figure3.MapoftheOldKingdom(1859-1918).……………………………………………..Source:Ibid.
87
Figure4.MapofGreaterRomania(1918-1940).……………………………………………..Source:Ibid.
88
Figure5.MapofTerritorialLossesof1940.…………………………………………………….Source:Ibid.
90
Figure6.MapoftheRepublicofMoldova………………………………………………………Source:Cepleanu,S.I.,MoldovaToday,Copyright:CreativeCommonsShareAlike3.0Unported,availablefromWikimediaCommons,12.11.2011,https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MoldovaToday.png[accessed09January2017].
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Introduction
Awaken,Romanian,fromyourdeadlyslumberInwhichbarbarictyrantshavesunkyou
NoworneverfashionanewdestinyTowhichevenyourcruelenemieswillbow.
NoworneverletusprovetothisworldThatthroughthishandsRomanbloodstillflows
AndinourchestsweproudlyholdanameVictoriousinbattle,thenameofTrajan.
Watch,mightyshadows,Michael,Stephen,CorvinTheRomaniannation,yourgreat-grandchildren,Weaponsinarms,yourfirethroughtheirveins,
‘Lifeinfreedomordeath’allshout.
Priestswithcrucifixesatthehelm,asthearmyisChristianTheaimisfreedomanditssacredgoal
Wewouldratherdiefighting,infullgloryThanbecomeslavesagaininourancientland.1
TheversesabovearefromapoembyAndreiMuresanu,aTransylvanianRomanian
poetandpoliticalactivist,writteninthecontextofthe1848Pan-European
revolutions.Laterputtomusic,thehymnbecameknownasAwaken,Romanianand
wasadoptedasRomania’snationalanthemintheaftermathoftheanti-communist
insurrectionof1989.Despiteitsinherentpatriotism,orperhapsbecauseofit,these
versestellussomethingaboutwhatRomanianshaveunderstood,acrossthecenturies,
tobeessentialfeaturesoftheircharacterandhistory.TherearehintstoaRoman
origin,alinkisdrawnbetweenpresentandpastgenerations,andapictureofa
troubledhistoryawaitingvindicationispainted.TosomeonefamiliarwithRomania’s
historythefactthatthefiguresmentionedcomefromthestate’sthreeprovinces–
1A.Muresanu,‘UnRasunet[AnEcho],’originallypublishedinFoaiepentruminteXI:25,21June1848(paginationunknown),inC.Bodea(ed.),1848laRomani–oIstorieinDatesiMarturii[1848forRomanians–aHistoryinDatesandTestimonies](Bucharest:EdituraStiintificasiEnciclopedica,1982),pp.506-507.
7
Wallachia,MoldaviaandTransylvania,respectively–is,itself,symbolic.Thispoem
constitutesacalltoarms,aninvitationforRomanianseverywheretoawaken,realise
theirdestinyofunityandindependenceandavengeahistoryinwhichtheyhavebeen
separatedandoppressedbyforeignpowers.In1848,thestanzasstoodfora
desideratum.In2017,nearlyonehundredyearssinceitbecameareality,theyhave
notlosttheirsalience.Indeed,aslyricstothenationalanthem,theyserveasa
reminderofpaststruggles,aswellasofferingasnapshotofwhatitis,andwhatithas
alwaysbeen,tobeRomanian.TheanthemhasprideofplaceinRomanianpubliclife–
itisplayed,accordingtolaw,atofficialceremoniesandfestivities,atthebeginningof
eachsessionofParliament,andeven,asthisauthormayconfirm,atthestartofevery
school-dayoftheprimaryandsecondarycycles.2Additionally,eachschooltextbookof
Romanianhistoryandlanguagemustfeatureonitsfirstpagetheexactverses
reproducedabove.3
Thisstudybeganwiththeself-evidentfactthatnationalidentityisaconstitutive
featureofRomanians.TheportrayaloftheSelf,itscharacteristicsandthepriorities
whichflowfromthem,aresignificanttothispeople.Moreimportantly,these
representationsbothreflectandshapethemannerinwhichRomaniansviewthe
worldandtheirplacewithinit.ThenotionthatRomaniansareaLatin,Orthodox
people,whohavefoughtforunityandindependence,createsaparticularimageofthe
role,orevendestiny,thattheirstatehas.Putsimply,thisroleis,muchlikethatofany
nation-state,toprotecttheRomaniannation,bothphysicallyandculturally,andfoster
itsdevelopment.However,understandinghowthespecificgoalsandprioritiesofthis
stateareset,orthemannerinwhichitrelatestootheractors,requiresanin-depth
knowledgeofthepeculiaritiescreatedbyRomanians’storiesabouttheirnational
identity,theprioritiesandanxieties,theattitudesandred-linestheygenerate.These
2ParliamentofRomania,Lawnr.75/1994,Article10,publishedintheOfficialJournalofRomania237(26August1994),availablefromMonitorulJuridic[n.d.]http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/lege-nr-75-din-16-iulie-1994-privind-arborarea-drapelului-romaniei-intonarea-imnului-national-si-folosirea-sigiliilor-cu-stema-romaniei-de-catre-autoritatile-si-institutiile-publice-4303.html[accessed05January2017).3Lawnr.75/1994.Onadifferentnote,Article13ofthesamelawstipulatesthattheanthemmayonlybereproducedinRomanian.Assuch,therearenoofficialtranslationsoftheversesatthebeginningofthischapter,and,consequently,thetranslationistheauthor’sownandthesourcetowhichitisattributedisthepoem,ratherthantheanthemitself.
8
willbeuniquetoRomania,asitshistoricalexperiencesandthemannerinwhichthey
havebeenframedthroughitsnarrativeonidentitywillbeexclusivetoit.Therationale
behindcertaintypesofbehaviour,therefore,isconnectedto,andindivisiblefrom,the
preceptswhichemergefromthestoryofnationalidentity.Inotherwords,behaviour
isinextricablylinkedtoidentity,becausethelatterformsthelensthroughwhich
Romaniansappraisetheirenvironment.
Thisthesis,therefore,hasatitscoretheconceptionthatidentitymattersinthe
articulationofRomania’sinterestsandpreferencesbutalsoinperceptionsofother
actors’actions.Inotherwords,theprojecttakestheviewthatitisthroughstories
about‘whoweare’thatRomaniansareabletomakesenseoftheworldaroundthem
andthat,asaresult,thenarrativeonidentityconstitutestheinter-subjectivereality
withinwhichthestatefunctions.Asaresult,accountingforthestate’sbehaviour
requiresgraspingtheessentialtenetsoftheRomaniannationalidentitynarrativeand
assessingtheirinfluenceonitsactions.Assuch,thisprojects’mainresearchquestionis
‘WhatistheimpactofthenationalidentityonRomania’spost-socialistforeignpolicy
agenda?’Itsaimistoaddanotherlayerofunderstandingtothemotivationsbehind
statebehaviourbyadoptinganidentity-basedperspective.Whatisofinterest,firstly,
aretheanswersRomanianshavegiventothequestionsof‘whoweare,’‘whatis
importanttous,’and‘whoourOthersare.’Thesewilloffercluesastothenatureand
contentoftheidentitynarrative,aswellasthetypesofintereststhatdrawonit,and
willallowforanevaluationoftheinternationalenvironmentthroughtheRomanian
lens.Ontheotherhand,assessingitsimpactonbehaviourentailsoverlayingthis
imageovercontemporaryeventsandtracingwhen,where,andtowhatextentthe
attitudes,prioritiesandred-linesthatflowfromthisnarrativecomeintoplay.Overall,
theaimoftheprojectistoshowthatthereexistsadiscerniblepatternofbehaviour
whichfollowsaspecificrationaleconformingwithRomania’sidentity-based
prerogatives.
Thepresentendeavouris,therefore,amulti-disciplinarystudywhichengageswith
issuesofidentity,history,sociology,foreignanddomesticaffairs.Itaimstoexplain
howstoriesaboutRomanianidentityhavedevelopedandbeenperpetuatedandalso,
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moreimportantly,howtheyfeedintopresentdaybehaviour.Theaimistoshowthat
thenationalidentitynarrative,amongstotherfactors,likeexternalpressures,actsto
influencestateactioninamannerwhichhasrarelybeenaccountedforbyresearch
intoRomanianforeignpolicy.Inasense,thisprojectbringstogethertwohitherto
largelyseparateenterprises–Romanians’owninterestindefining‘whatitmeansto
beRomanian’whichhasgenerallytakentheformofsociological,anthropologicalor
psychologicalworks,andefforts,whicharefairlyrareintheWest,toexplain
Romania’sforeignpolicydirectionafter1989.Bycombiningthetwo,thethesiswill
shedlightonthemotivationsbehindRomania’sactionswhich,whilsttheymayappear
obviousfrominsideRomania,aredifficulttocomprehendfromtheoutsideorhave
beenoversimplifiedbyrationalistormaterialistexplanations.Theavenueofferedinto
thestudyofstatebehaviourbyanidentitaryperspectiveisnotanaltogethernovel
one,butitsapplicationtotheRomaniancaseis,particularlyoutsideofitsborders.
BringingRomaniaintothefold,however,isausefulundertakingnotonlybecauseit
fillsagapintheresearchbyexaminingastatewhichisseldomthesubjectofstudy,
butalsobecauseitpaintsamoreaccuratepictureoftheinter-staterelationsand
conflictswhicharecurrentlyinplayinEasternEurope,asthefollowingsectionwill
show.
Case-StudyandContext
ThescopeofthisthesisplacesitattheconfluenceofStrategicCulture(SC)andForeign
PolicyAnalysis(FPA),withinthespecificfieldofconstructiviststudiesontheinfluence
ofnationalidentity/cultureonstateinternationalbehaviour.Thepresentendeavour
seekstoaddtoagrowing,ifstillunderdeveloped,areaofresearch.SChashada
traditionalinterestinthestudyofcultureasavariableimpactingonbehaviour,andits
focushasgenerallybeenon,asthenamesuggests,thestrategicsphere,especially
concerningtheuseofforce.Researchintopoliticalculture4or,morebroadly,national
culture,arerareandeventhosetendtoemphasisethestrategyaspect.5Ontheother
side,worksonidentitywithinFPAareamorerecentdevelopment,dueatleastinpart
4SeeDuffield(1999).5SeeBerger(1996)orGray(2007).
10
totheconstructivistshiftwhichbeganinthe1990s.Bothschools,however,have
tendedtoprioritisecasestudiesconcerninggreatpowersand,consequently,the
spotlighthasrarelyfallenonsmallstates,asbothRasmussenwithinSCandBrowning
inFPAhavepointedout.6Thepresentthesis,therefore,aimstoaddtothefieldby
focusingonRomania,amedium-sizedformersocialiststatewithinEasternEurope.
Thereexistsaview,impliedintheemphasisonlargepowers,thatsmallerstates
providelessusefulcasestudies,astheyareonthereceiving,ratherthangenerating,
endoftheregionalorworldorder.Inotherwords,thatthebehaviourofsmallstatesis
toalargeextentdictatedbytheactivitiesofthegreatpowerswhichdominate
regionallyorinternationally.Thisistruetoapoint.Itisnottheintentionofthisthesis
toarguethatRomaniahasthesamefreedomofactionasRussiaortheUnitedStates,
orevenitsalliesinWesternEurope.Instead,oneacknowledgesthatexternal
pressuresaremorepowerfullyfeltbysmallstatesthantheyarebygreatpowers.
Havingsaidthat,theprojectrejectsthenotionthatthebehaviourofsmallstatesis
onlydeterminedbytheglobalbalanceofpower,or,indeed,thatallsmallstates’
prioritiesaresetexternally.Instead,itholdstheviewthat,notonlyisthestudyof
smallstatesausefulendeavourbecauseminoractorshavejustasstrongasenseof
theirownidentityasgreaterones,butthattheydo,inthecurrentcontextofa
globalisedandinter-connectedworld,havetheabilitytoimpacttheregional,ifnot
international,order.
Withthisinmind,acasestudyofRomania’smotivationsforbehaviourisboth
worthwhile,and,moreimportantly,apropitiousenterprise.Firstly,Romaniaprovides
theopportunecontextinwhichtoexploretheinfluenceofidentitynarrativeson
behaviour.Despitebeingasmallandrelativelyyoungnation,Romanianshave
developedaparticularlypowerfulsenseofidentitywhichhasbeenperpetuatedacross
severalgenerationstothepointthatitsmainfeatureshavebecomesedimented.
Indeed,oneofthehallmarksoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeisitshistoric
continuity.Assuch,thisthesisargues,inthespecificareasinwhichitfunctions,such
asensuringthephysicalintegrityofthestate,orprioritisingcertainrelationshipsover
6SeeRasmussen(2005)andBrowning(2008).
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others,theinfluenceofthenarrativeisparticularlypotent,andmoredifficulttooffset
byexternalpressures.Tracingtheinfluenceofstoriesonidentityintheseinstancesis
notonlyempiricallymorestraightforward,butalsoshowshowpowerfulthe
connectionbetweenidentitynarrativesandbehaviourcanbe,totheextenttowhich
identity-relatedprerogativesdominatemotivationsforstateactionincertainareas.
Ontheotherhand,thestateofaffairswithinEasternEuropealsowarrantsthistypeof
investigation.Theregionalclimateatthemomentis,inmanyways,oneofuncertainty
overthefutureandtherearetwofronts,inparticular,whichdeservemention.Firstly,
Russia’sannexationofCrimea(2014)andcontinuedinvolvementwithintheaffairsof
UkraineintheDonbashasunsettledtheequilibriumofEasternEuropeandputinto
questionthesecurityandstabilityoftheregion.BeyondthefactthatRussia’sactions
threatenthesovereigntyandintegrityofoneofthelargeststatesintheEuropean
Unionneighbourhood,thecrisisinUkraineisarguablyoneofthemostpressing
challengesfacedbytheEUandNATOsincetheendoftheColdWar.These
developmentshaverevealedthelackofefficiencyofEuropeanstrategicpolicytowards
theneighbourhoodandRussia,aswellasthedifficulties,inherenttoacertainextent
totheEuropeanproject,ofreachinganunanimousdecisiononaparticularcourseof
action.TheannexationofCrimeaandensuingconflicthavebeenmetwithaslowness
inreactiononthesideofEuropeanstates,butalsovaryingdegreesofthreat
perception.Adifferenceinpositionisapparentbetweenstateswithtighteconomic
linkstoMoscowandothers,particularlyontheeasternflank,wheretheproximityof
theconflictisacutelyfeltandmemoriesofanexpansionistRussiaarestillvivid.While
theEUhasputinplaceeconomicsanctionsagainstRussia,thelackofconsensuson
whatconstitutesameasuredandeffectiveresponsecontinues.Effortstoestablisha
frameworkformoreprofoundstrategiccooperationbetweenEUstatesarenascent,
andassuch,forthenumberofstates,Romaniaincluded,whoperceiveRussianactions
asanimminentthreattothemselvesandtheWesternsystemofalliances,NATO
providesthemoreeffectiveavenuetocounterbalanceMoscow’srevived
expansionism.Itisquestionable,however,whetherNATO’sincreasedpresenceinthe
regionandthestrategicsupportofferedtoitsEasternflankalliesdoesnotserve
Russia’sowninterests,ifoneweretoassumeMoscowwishestoseeareturntothe
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ColdWarspheresofinfluence.Overall,thecrisisinUkrainehascreateddissension
amongstEuropeanstatesand,particularlyinEasternEurope,aclimateofuncertainty
andsuspicion,inwhicholdtensionsandanxietieshavebeenbroughttothefore.
ThesecondfrontconcernsHungary,andinparticulartheactionsandrhetoricofits
right-winggovernment,ledbyprime-ministerViktorOrban.Overthelastfewyears,
HungaryhasbeenadisruptiveforcewithintheEUandNATO.Beginningwitha
nationalistshift,particularlythedecryingoftheTreatyofTrianon(1920)–whichsaw
thedissolutionoftheKingdomofHungaryandasignificantlossofterritorytoits
neighbours–andthepolicyofawardingofHungariancitizenshiptoitsdiasporain
contiguousstates(2010),OrbanhasunsettledhisEUandNATOeasternpartners,not
leastRomania.Budapest’sseekingofcloserrelationswithRussia,especiallyinthe
contextofthecrisisinUkrainehasalsocastdoubtonthestate’scommitmenttothe
EUandNATO.Thisdivergenceisallthemoresignificantasitcomesagainstabackdrop
ofincreasedregionaltensionswithRussiaand,morebroadly,asquestionsarebeing
raisedabouttheeffectivenessoftheEUandNATOinrespondingtocontemporary
securitychallenges.ThetheoryofTrojanHorseHungary,inotherwordsofHungaryas
adestabilisingpro-Russianelementfromwithinthetwoalliances,isoneofincreasing
concerntomembersoftheEUandNATO,particularlyinEasternEurope.Thepicture
revealedisnotonlyofariftbuildingbetweentheregionandRussia,butalsoamongst
actorswithintheEasternflankitself.Altogether,thesedevelopmentsmeanthatthe
situationinEasternEuropeisofanequilibriumteeteringontheedgeand,assuch,
understandingthemotivationsbehindthebehaviourofastateofstrategicimportance
intheregionisausefulendeavour.
Indeed,withinthismeleeRomaniaoccupiesacentralrole.Firstly,itisoneofthe
largest–secondtoPoland–statesintheEasternflank.Additionally,itisplacedatthe
edgeoftheEUandNATOandtheEuropeanneighbourhood,borderingUkrainetothe
northandtheRepublicofMoldovatotheeast.Furthermore,sincetheoutbreakofthe
Ukrainiancrisis,itsaccesstotheBlackSeahasincreasedinsignificanceduetothe
proximityofRomania’scoastlinetotheCrimeanPeninsula.Finally,italsoborders
HungarytotheWest,meaningthatthisstate’seasternandnationalistshifthavebeen
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mostacutelyfeltinBucharest.Harnessingitsstrategicposition,Romaniaplaysa
pivotalroleintheEUandNATO’sresponsetothetwoissuesmentionedabove.In
whatconcernsRussia,ithasbeenoneofthestates,alongsidePolandandtheBaltic
countriesmostprominently,todecrytheEU’ssoftapproachandrequestgreater
NATOinvolvementintheregion.Amongstthestepsundertakenonewouldhighlight
thebuildingofananti-ballisticmissileshieldwhichbecameoperationalin2016,the
establishmentofapermanentNATOofficeonitsterritory,andtheincreasingnumber
ofnavalexerciseswhicharetakingplaceintheBlackSea.ItsstanceonRussia’s
aggressionofUkrainehasbeenoneofthemostaggressive,asRomaniahassupported
thepro-WesterndirectionofformerSovietstatesandclosercooperationbetween
WesternorganisationsandtheEUneighbourhood.Onthisfront,Romaniahasalso
aimedtobuttressitsrelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldovaandsecurethisstate’s
independencefromRussia.Ontheotherhand,Bucharesthasalsobeenmostcriticalof
Hungary’snationalistrhetoricanditspursuitofclosertieswithMoscow.
However,althoughRomania’spositionisevidentfromtheempiricalevidence,
understandingthemotivationsbehinditsforeignpolicyand,consequently,itsbroader
repercussions,requiresanin-depthanalysisofthemannerinwhichthenarrativeon
identityhasfedintothestate’sbehaviour.Thatisbecause,thisthesisargues,
Romania’sactionsarenotonlyrootedincontemporaryconcernsoverregionalsecurity
andstability.Instead,thisprojectwillshowhowRomania’sforeignpolicyagendaand,
morespecifically,itsresponsetoRussiaandHungary’sactions,areinformedby
identity-basedanxietiesandprioritieswhichhavemadeitparticularlysensitiveto
thesedevelopments.Romania’sportrayaloftheSelfandRussiaandHungaryasOthers
offersanavenueintounderstandingthestate’sbehaviourtowardsthem,beyondover
simplifiedrationalistandmaterialistexplanationswhichmayfocusonalignmentwith
itsmorepowerfulalliesorself-interestmaximisation.Thebenefitofthisnovel
approachisthatitshedslightontherationaleofparticularactions,suchasRomania’s
attemptstostrengthenitsrelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldovaatthecostof
increasingtensionsbetweenitselfandRussia,whichmaybeperceivedas
counterintuitiveotherwise.Whatwillberevealedisacomplextableauoftheidentity-
basedmotivationswhichunderpinRomania’sbehaviourandmakeitnotafollowerof
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thegeneraldirectionpushedbyothers,butanautonomousactorinapositionto
harnessitsstrategicpositiontopursuespecificgoals.
However,preciselybecauseofitsstrategicimportance,Romania’sactionsmayhave
widerandprofoundrepercussionsontheinnerstabilityoftheEUandNATObutalso
consequencesintermsofthequalityofrelationsbetweentheseorganisationsand
Russia.Thethesiswillarguethatidentity-basedanxietiesoverHungary’sactionshave
ledtoagrowingriftbetweenBucharestandBudapestwhich,inthecurrentcontext,
shouldbeofutmostconcerninregardstothetwostates’capacitytocooperate
efficientlyinrespondingtothesecuritychallengesthreateningtheregion.Similarly,
thegrowingtensionsbetweenRomaniaandRussiacaused,ontheonehandbythe
hard-lineresponsefromBucharestontheissueoftheannexationofCrimea,andthe
pursuitoftighterlinksbetweenRomaniaandtheRepublicofMoldovaontheother,
revealRomania’sstanceasmoreaggressivetowardsRussiathanthatofmanyofits
allies,andoutofstepwiththegenerallinepursuebyitsWesternEuropeanpartners.
Theimplicationsmaybethatitsresponsetofuturedevelopmentsintheregionmight
deviateevenfurtherfromthedirectionprescribedbyitsalliestoapointatwhich
Romania’sbehaviouritselfwillconstituteachallengetotheregion’ssecurityand
stability.VariousscenariosincludingapotentialadhocunificationwiththeRepublicof
MoldovainthecontextofascalingupofMoscow’sinvolvementinitsaffairs,for
instance,wouldposeseriousquestionsoftheEUandNATO,aswellasRussia,interms
ofreactionandmayfurtherdestabilisethefragileequilibriumwhichexistswithin
EasternEuropecurrently.Inthiscontext,understandingthemotivationsbehind
Romania’sbehaviourbecomesanevermoreusefulandnecessaryendeavour.
Overall,thisprojectaimstohighlighttheinfluenceoftheRomanianidentitynarrative
onitspost-socialistbehaviour,anditsimpactontherelationshipsbuiltandpursued
withitssignificantOthers,namelyRussia,HungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova.Itwill
revealhowtheidentitynarrativehascreatedparticularprioritiesandanxietieswhich
havemadeRomaniaamodelEUandNATOpartnerbut,inthecontextofcurrent
developments,mayleadittodeviatefromcompletealignmentwithitsallies.More
importantly,itwillshowthatthereexistsapatternofbehaviourtherationalityof
15
whichislinkedtotheprerogativessetbyitsidentitynarrative.Fromthisperspective,
thethesismayaccountforRomania’scurrentactionsaswellasmakecertain
assumptionsaboutitsfutureforeignpolicydirection,contingentonthecontinuation
ofpresentcircumstances.Thebenefitofthepresententerpriseisthatitprovidesa
casestudyofastatecriticaltothestabilityoftheregion,butalso,insodoing,provides
asnapshotofsomeoftheinter-staterelationshipswhichexistinEasternEuropeatthe
moment.Theadvantageofthisapproach,however,isthatitnotonlycapturesthe
natureoftheserelationsastraditionalaccountsmay,butoffersthemaspecificdepth
byexploringtheirhistoriccontextandthemannerinwhichRomania’srepresentations
oftheSelfandOtherhavefedintopresentinteractions.Bypursuingthetaskfromthis
angle,itishoped,thecomplexityofthestateofaffairswithinEasternEurope,aswell
asRomania’srolewithinit,willberevealed.
StructureoftheThesis
Theprojectisorganisedwiththepurposeofansweringthemainresearchquestion,
‘WhatistheimpactofnationalidentityonRomania’spost-socialistforeignpolicy
agenda?’Assuch,thethesisbeginswithachapterdedicatedtothetheoretical
backgroundandaimedatsettingtheworkinitsresearchfield.Thiscontainsa
discussionofthetwomainstrandswithinwhichthethesisfits,SCandFPAandtheir
convergenceinthespecificareaofconstructiviststudieswhichinvestigate
identity/cultureandtheirlinktostatebehaviour.Thechapterexaminestheresearch
alreadyexistinginthefieldandthelimitationsofthetwoapproachesinconcernsto
thefocusandapproachoftheirstudy.Finally,thesectionoutlinestheproject’s
positiononanumberofissuesrelevanttoitsscopewhereeitheritsperspectivediffers
fromotherswithinthefieldoroverwhichthereexistsdisagreement,andthe
contributiontoknowledgeofthepresentendeavourisdemonstrated.Thischapteris
followedbyasectiononmethods,inwhichtheproject’sapproachtothestudyof
identityisexpandeduponandthethesisislocatedinexistingdebateson
constructivismtakingplaceinIR.Followingonfromthis,themethodologyofthe
projectisoutlined,withafocusonitstwo-stepapproach,namelyofinvestigatingthe
16
natureandcontentoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,succeededbyananalysisofits
influenceoverthestate’sinternationalbehaviour.
Subsequenttothesetheoreticaldiscussions,theprojectmovesintoitssubstantive
sections.Chapter3,‘RomanianHistoryandIdentity’isconcernedwithexploringthe
Romaniannarrativeonidentityanditshistoricaldevelopment.Thissectionexamines
thedominantrepresentationsoftheSelfandOthers,thesourcesoftheseportrayals,
andhowtheyhavebeenperpetuatedacrossthegenerations.Alinkisconstructed
betweenRomania’shistoricalandidentitynarratives,particularlyintermsofhow
historicalexperiencehasbeeninterpretedandusedinthecreationofidentitary
representations.ThechapterexaminesthemajorthemesoftheRomaniannarrative
onidentityastheyemergedintheformativeperiodofthenineteenthandtwentieth
centuries,highlightingtheirperpetuationinthemodernnarrative.Achronological
structure,focusedonthemainperiodsofRomania’shistory,organisesthesethemes
accordingtotheeraswithinthehistoricalnarrativeinwhichtheywereprevalent.
Overall,thischapteraimstoportraythemannerinwhichthesethemesbuildonone
anotherandcometogethertocreateaparticularrepresentationoftheSelfanOthers
inmoderntimes.Theroleofexternalcircumstances,namelytheactionsoftheOthers
HungaryandRussia,andofagency,particularlythatofNicolaeCeausecu’sregime,are
exploredinthecontextoftheunusualdegreeofcontinuityoftheRomanianidentity
narrative.
Chapter4,‘ContinuityratherthanChange,’isthepointofcrossoverbetweenthetwo
stepsinthethesis’approach.Thesectionbringstheanalysisofthenatureandcontent
ofRomanianidentitynarrativeinthecontemporaryera,namelyafterthe1989anti-
communistrevolution.ItexamineshowclaimsaboutRomanianidentitywereutilised
byreformedcommunists,ledbyIonIliescu,insecuringearlyelectoralvictoriesand
popularlegitimacy.Insodoing,thechapteralsoaddressestheissueofthe
perpetuationoftheidentitynarrative,withthenotabledeletionofthecommunist
period,intothepresentday,ascribingtheagencyofIliescu’sgovernmentsacrucial
role.Ontheotherhand,thischapteralsoanalysestheidentitynarrative’sinfluenceon
Romania’sinternationalbehaviour,withparticularemphasisonitsgoaltojointhe
17
WesterncommunitybyaccedingtotheEUandNATO.Itsinternationaleffortsare
contrastedwiththeresistancetochangenoticeableinitsdomesticpolicyagendaon
theissueofinternalreformduringthefirsthalfofthe1990s,onthesuccessofwhich
theachievementofitsforeignpolicyprerogativeswascontingent.Overall,thischapter
willshowhowtheRomanianidentitynarrativeandthecontinuityofitsmajorfeatures
werebothattherootofthestate’sinternationalagenda,butalsoconstitutedan
obstacleinitsrealisation.
Thefollowingthreechaptersarededicatedtotheexaminationofthreerelationships
crucialtoRomania’sforeignpolicy:thosewithRussia,HungaryandtheRepublicof
Moldova.Allsectionshaveasimilarstructure,focusedontracingtheinfluenceofthe
narrativeandtheanxietiesandprioritieswhichflowfromitontherelations
establishedwiththesethreeactors.Eachchapterbeginswithanexaminationofthe
particularattitudeRomaniahastowardsthesestates,asinformedbyitsidentity
narrativeandhistoricalinteractions.Subsequently,thechaptersexaminethethree
relationshipsthroughoutthetransitioneraanduptothepresentday,byaccounting
forthemajoreventswhichhaveshapedthem.Theaimistotracktheinfluenceof
theseattitudesinrelationtothechangesintheinternationalenvironmentandactors’
ownpriorities.Itwillbeshownthat,giventheopportunecircumstances,identitary
factorsmayeitherretreatorbecomeaugmented,hintingatthenotionthatthedegree
ofimpacttheidentitynarrativeonbehaviouriscontingentonbothexternaland
domesticcircumstances.Inthisexercise,currentdevelopmentsinUkraine,Hungary
andtheRepublicofMoldovaareofparticularinterest.Themainargumentwillbethat
thecontemporaryclimateissuchthatidentitaryattitudesandprerogativeshavean
especiallypowerfulinfluenceonRomania’scurrentandpotentiallyfuturebehaviour.
Finally,eachchapteroffersapredictionofthefuturerelationshipbetweenRomania
andthethreestates,aswellasRomania’sgeneralforeignpolicydirectionmore
broadly,basedonacontinuationofpresentcircumstances.Thesearebasedon
scenariosconsideredbyRomanianelitesasplausibledevelopmentswithintheregional
environment.
18
Thefinalchapterofthethesisisaconcludingsection.Heretheargumentsputforward
bytheprojectasawholearebroughttogetherinamannerwhichhighlightsthe
benefitofstudyingRomania’sbehaviourbyworkingatthejunctionbetweenSCand
FPAfromanidentitaryperspective.Thechapteroutlineswhichelementsthethesishas
borrowedfromeitherschoolofthoughtandhowstudyingidentityfromthismiddle
groundservestopaintamoreaccuratepictureofthecomplexrationalebehind
Romania’spost-socialistforeignpolicyagenda.Furthermore,thissectioncompilesthe
evidencepresentedinthethesistoshowthatthereexistsadiscerniblepattern
noticeableinRomania’sbehaviourwhichfollowsaparticularrationaleconformingto
Romania’sidentity-basedprerogatives.Theconclusionalsodiscussescertainpotential
issuesconcerningthepresentresearchapproach.
ConcludingRemarks
Thisprojectsetoutfouryearsagotopaintamoreaccuratepictureofthemotivations
behindRomania’sbehaviour,intheknowledgethatpaststudieshadseldomtaken
identityintoaccount.Theaimwasoriginallytoshowthatthemannerinwhich
Romanianegotiatesitsrolewithintheinternationalorganisationsitisamemberof,as
wellasitsrelationshipswithitsthreeOthers,isnotsimplydeterminedbythe
internationalbalanceofpower.Morespecifically,theremitwastoprovethat
Romania,asanactor,hasacertaindepthandequatestomorethanthelabelof
medium-sizedstateinEasternEurope.Romaniawouldbeportrayedasan
autonomousentity,shapedbutnotdefinedbyitsalliances;or‘defined’onlytothe
extenttowhichmembershipoftheEUandNATOistheresultofapursuitofitsown,
specificforeignpolicygoals.Thisisstilloneoftheaimsofthethesis.
However,sincethisprojectbegan,theinternationalenvironmenthasaltered
significantly,adding,inasense,tothescopeoftheproject.Itsremitwasalwaysto
showthatRomaniaviewsbothRussiaandHungaryasthreateningOthers,andthe
RepublicofMoldovaasanEstrangedSelfandthatitsforeignpolicygoalsinrelationto
theseactorswouldbeshapedaccordingly.Romaniawouldpursuethebolsteringofits
cooperationwithNATOinordertoguarditselffromRussia,maintaincordialbutnot
closerelationswithHungaryandaimtostrengthenitslinktotheRepublicofMoldova.
19
Althoughinmanywaysconfirmingtheoriginalassumptions,eventsofrecentyears,
particularlythecrisisinUkraineandBudapest’smarkedchangeinrhetoricand
behaviour,alterthecontextofthisthesis’arguments.Throughitsstrategicposition,
butalsoitsownactions,Romaniahasplaceditselfattheheartofthesedevelopments
andisnowplayinganincreasinglycriticalroleintheregion’sstability.Ithas,perhaps,
foundthenicheforitselfithadbeensearchingforsincethetimesCeausescumadea
standonbehalfofhisstateagainsttheactionsoftheSovietUnion.
Inanycase,thisendeavourisofferedadditionalutilitybythecurrentinternational
climate.Whilstitstillshowsthecapacityofasmallstatetodevelopadistinctsenseof
identityanditsabilitytopursueaparticularforeignpolicyagendapeculiartoits
internalprerogatives,italsonowshedslightonthepotentialimpactasmallstate
mighthaveontheregionalequilibrium.Romanianotonlyspeaksandactsforitself;its
behaviourhasrepercussionsonthewiderinternationalorganisationsitisamember
of.ItsrelationshipwithRussiaaffects,byextension,thenatureandqualityofthe
dialoguebetweentheseactorsandMoscow.Similarly,Romania’spursuitofcloser
relationswiththeRepublicofMoldovashouldbeseenasanaffinitybetweena
memberoftheEUandNATOandastatestillpartofRussia’ssphereofinfluence.
DiscordbetweenRomaniaandHungaryequatestoaninternalriftbetweentheEUand
NATO.Whilstthiswasalwaysthecase,inlightofrecenteventstheseconsiderations
gainfurthersignificance.IfthesituationinEasternEuropecanbequalifiedasafragile
equilibrium,thentheissueofRomania’sbehaviourbecomesevermoresalient.Inthis
vein,understandingthemotivationsbehindwhatRomaniadoes,aswellasitwhatit
mightdointhefuture,ismoreimportanttodaythanitwasfouryearsago.Thatis
becausenow,inthecontextofthevarioussecurityandpoliticalchallengesfacedby
EasternEurope,RomaniaisinapositiontoaffecttheeffectivenessoftheEUand
NATOaswellastheirrelationshipwithRussia.Theconcludingremarkofthissection,
therefore,wouldbethatendeavourssuchasthisareofparticularutilityin
contemporarytimes,whentheactionsofevenasmallstatemayimpactthe
internationalenvironmentintimesofcrisis.
20
Chapter1.TheoreticalBackground
Introduction
Thischapteroutlinesthetheoreticalbackgroundofthethesis,locatingitintheareaof
InternationalRelationsstudiesinwhichForeignPolicyAnalysisandStrategicCulture
overlap.Morespecifically,thisfieldcontainsconstructivistStrategicCulturestudies
whichgobeyondtheschool’straditionallynarrowfocusonmilitarystrategy,
examiningtheimpactofpoliticalcultureonstatebehaviourmoregenerally,and
constructivistapproacheswithinForeignPolicyAnalysiswhichdealspecificallywith
nationalidentity.Thechapterexamineseachofthedevelopmentswithinthetwo
schoolsinturn,withafocusonthemannerinwhichidentityisconceptualisedand
studied.Followingfromthis,thelimitationsofthetwoapproachesand,inthiscontext,
thethesis’ownpositiononcertainissues,suchasitsconceptionofidentityandthe
structure-agencydebate,isoutlined.Finally,thecontributiontothefieldthethesis
bringswillbeexplored,particularlyinregardstothenotionthat,byfocusingona
minorpowersuchasRomania,theprojectaddressesagapintheresearchandpaintsa
moreaccuratepictureoftheinter-staterelationshipswhichexistinEasternEurope.
AttheCrossroadsofStrategicCultureandForeignPolicyAnalysis
ThisthesisexploresthelinkbetweenidentityandRomania’spost-socialistforeign
policyagendaand,insodoing,aimstoaddanotherlayerofunderstandingtothe
motivationsbehindstatebehaviour.Theprojectthereforefindsitselfatthe
confluencebetweenthestudyofidentity/cultureandthatofforeignpolicy.Whatis
more,theprojectviewsnationalidentityasasocialconstruct,asharedsystemof
beliefsoranarrativeaboutwhotheSelfis,howitcametobethatway,whatitsvalues
andpriorities,bothdomesticandinternational,are.Asenseofidentitydevelopsasa
resultofanaccumulationofsocio-historicalexperiences–or,morespecifically,their
subjectiveinterpretation–aswellastheactor’srelationswithandpositioningin
contrasttoOthers.Whatnationalidentityprovidesisasubjectiveperceptionof
reality,alensthroughwhichastateorpeople,inthiscaseRomania,viewstheworld
anditsplacewithinit.Thisthesis,therefore,employsaconstructivistapproachto
21
statebehaviour,inwhichnarrativesonidentity,oftenunwittingly,shapethedecision-
makingprocessbyinfluencingthegoalspursuedbystates,butalsotheirappraisalof
specificcontexts,whichmaybeperceivedasespeciallythreateningorfavourable.
Thispositionlocatesthethesisinthefieldofconstructivistculturalstudiesofstates
whichidentifycultureoridentityashavingspecificimplicationsforforeignpolicy.
Therearetwospecifictraditionsengagingwiththisagendawithinwhichthisproject
maybesituated:StrategicCulture(SC)andForeignPolicyAnalysis(FPA).Inthecaseof
both,theendoftheColdWarand,morerecently,the9/11terroristattacks,7have
sparkedrenewedinterestintheconnectionbetweenidentityandbehaviour.Having
saidthat,bothintermsofscopeandapproach,thetwofieldsdiffersignificantly–
whileSCtraditionallyhasanarrowerfocusoncultureinfluencingastate’sstrategicuse
offorceandpredominantlychampionstheimportanceofstructure,FPAcastsawider
netinanalysingforeignpolicydecisionmakingingeneralandemphasisestheroleof
agency.Furthermore,whatwillalsobecomeclearisthetwotraditionsmakevery
differentclaimsaboutidentityandthemannerinwhichitshouldbeapproached.
However,asthefollowingsectionwillexplore,aswithmostschoolsofthought,SCand
FPAarenotcompletelyhomogenousanditisintheareaofoverlapthatthetypeof
studyattemptedherefitsin.
StrategicCulture(SC)
Originallydevelopedin1977byJackSnyderinanattempttoutilisethenational
culturevariableinordertoexplainthedifferentstrategiesemployedbytheSoviet
UnionincontrasttotheUnitedStatesduringtheColdWar,8SCisaneclecticclusterof
theoriesexamining,atthemostfundamentallevel,“therelevanceof‘culturalcontext’
ininfluencingstrategicpreferences.”9Inotherwords,SC’smainaimhasbeento
“integrate[withinsecuritystudies]culturalinfluencesabouthowactorswithinthe
7See,forinstance,Hudson(2013)andLantis(2009).8J.Snyder,TheSovietStrategicCulture:ImplicationsforLimitedNuclearOperations,R-2154-AF(SantaMonica:RandPublications,1977).9S.Poore,‘StrategicCulture,’inJ.Glenn,D.HowlettandS.Poore(eds),NeorealismversusStrategicCulture(Aldershot:Ashgate,2004),p.45.
22
internationalsystemmadedecisionsregardingtheuseofforce.”10Thepointof
convergenceofallstrategicculturalistsisarejectionoftherationalismand
materialismoftraditionalperspectives,suchas(Neo)realismandNeoliberalism.
Indeed,SCdefinesitselfasaschoolwhichtakes“therealistedificeastarget.”11Atthe
rootoftheirchallengeisaquestioningofthemannerinwhichidentityandcultureare
treatedandtheextenttowhichtheinfluenceofthesefactorsonpolicyarticulationis
accountedforbymainstreamperspectives.Ofparticularconcerntoculturalistsarethe
logicofanarchyanduniversalismfundamentaltotheseapproachesingeneral,andto
Neorealisminparticular.Theytakeasdeeplyproblematicthenotionthatthe
behaviourofstatesissolelyattributabletotheanarchicstructureoftheinternational
systemandthedistributionofmaterialcapabilities.Thetreatmentofstatesas‘like
units,’strippedbareofanyoftheiruniquecharacteristics,impliesthatstateidentities
areexogenouslygivenandtheirinterestsarelimitedtoadesiretosurviveunderthe
pressuresoftheinternationalstructure.Theassumption,however,thatstatesare
essentiallyutilitymaximisersisunsatisfactorytostrategicculturalistswhohave
pointedtothe“shortcomingsinahistoricalandnon-culturalstructuralmodels”12in
predictingandexplainingstatebehaviour.Insteadofthisimpoverishedconceptionof
identity,SCemphasises“theinfluenceofthedomesticculturalcontexton(…)
behaviour.”13
However,despiteitsintuitivelyattractiveapproachtoexplainingstatestrategic
behaviour,SCfailed,initsearlyphase,toenterthemainstreamofinternational
relationstheory–asGlennetalhaveputit,SCspenttheColdWar“languish[ing]in
neorealism’sshadow.”14Thishas,atleastpartly,beenputdowntoitsheterogeneityin
termsofscopeandlevelofanalysis–whetherthefocusofstudyshouldbemilitary,
politicalororganizationalculture–or,indeed,howtooperationalizetheconceptof
10C.Greathouse,‘ExaminingtheRoleandMethodologyofStrategicCulture,’Risk,Hazards&CrisisinPublicPolicy1:1(2010),p.57.11A.I.‘Johnston,‘ThinkingaboutStrategicCulture’,InternationalSecurity19:4(Spring1995),p.41.12Ibid.,pp.32-33.13J.Glenn,D.HowlettandS.Poore(a),‘Introduction,’inJ.Glenn,D.HowlettandS.Poore(eds),NeorealismversusStrategicCulture(Aldershot:Ashgate,2004),p.4.14Ibid.,p.3.
23
‘culture.’15Theresultoftheseinternaldisparitieshasbeen,asGreathouseargued,that
“the30+yearsofworkdevelopingSChasyieldedneitherastandarddefinitionnora
commonmethodologicalapproachtousing[it].”16Thelackofacoherentapproach
doesnot,however,meanthatthisbodyofworkhaslittletoofferthestudyof
internationalrelations.TheendoftheColdWarandtheeventsof9/11haveledtoa
re-evaluationoftheimportanceofnationalspecificityinregardstostatebehaviour.
Understandingandexplainingculturaldifferencesseemsmoreworthwhiletoday,one
wouldargue,thanatanytimeincontemporaryhistory.Inthiscontext,SCappears
abletoaddressthisgapinknowledge,preciselybecauseitholds‘culture’asitsmain
focusandacknowledgesthelinksbetweenitandastate’shistoryandsociety.Among
thecommonfeaturesofvariationsofSCstudiesPoorehighlightsthatthey“identify
specificnationaltendenciesthatderivefromhistoricalexperiences”andthattheterm
itselfrefers“tocollectives,whethermilitaryorganisations,policycommunitiesor
entiresocieties(…)provid[ing]certainenduringattitudes,assumptionsandbeliefs(…)
whichwillleadtoaparticularinterpretationofmaterialconditions.”17
Intheirapproachtothestudyofidentity,constructivistSCowesmuchtotheworkof
AlexanderWendt.Aimingtofindaviamediabetweenmaterialist-rationalist
perspectivesandthoseofpoststructuralism,Wendtbroughtsociallyconstructed
identitytotheforeofhissystemictheoryonthebehaviourofstatesandwithit,
broughtconstructivismitselftothetableofgreatdebateswithinIR.AsIverNeumann
suggests,“Wendt’sworkhadthegreatmeritofpropellingthestudyofcollective
identityforwardinthesensethatheplaceditbeforeawiderIRaudience.”18Inhis
influentialarticleAnarchyisWhatStatesMakeofItandlaterintheseminalSocial
TheoryofInternationalPoliticsWendtquestionsNeorealism’slogicofanarchyby
positingthatidentitiesareindeedconstructedthroughsocialinteractionandcannot
betreatedasexogenouslygiven,nordivorcedfromthenotionofinterest.Inthisview,
15TheJohnston-Graydebateinthe1990sfocusedonwhether‘culture’asavariableshouldbeevaluatedonlyinitsimpactontheoutcomealone(Johnston),oralsotheinput(Gray).Formoredetail,seeJohnston(1995)andGray(1999).16Greathouse(2010),p.58.17Poore(2004),p.50.18I.Neumann,CollectiveIdentityFormation:SelfandOtherinInternationalRelations-EUIWorkingPapers(Florence:EuropeanUniversityInstitute,1995),p.28.
24
“identityisaninherentlysocialdefinitionoftheactorgroundedinthetheorieswhich
actorscollectivelyholdaboutthemselvesandoneanotherandwhichconstitutethe
structureofthesocialworld.”19Moreover,headds,these“identitiesarethebasisof
interests.Actorstonothavea‘portfolio’ofintereststhattheycarryaround
independentofsocialcontext;instead,theydefinetheirinterestsintheprocessof
definingsituations.”20ForWendt,thesocialidentitiesofstatesdonotexistpriorto
theirinteractionoftheinternationalstageand,assuch,areaflexiblestructureopento
change.
InthisWendt’spointisthatNeorealism’s‘cultureofanarchy’isnotaninescapable
featureoftheinternationalsystem,becausethisandanyotherstateofaffairs
dependson“howidentitygetsdefined”21throughsocialinteraction.Itisperfectly
plausibletherefore,andWendtgoesontomakethisargument,22thatcooperation
betweenstatesisachievableifactorsrecasttheirownandothers’identitiesand
institutionalisethesethroughthepracticeofinteraction.23Inthisvein,thebehaviour
ofstatestowardsoneanother,aswellastheintereststheypursue,aredefinedbya
processofcontinuoussociallearning.Forthisreason,Wendtisregardedasoneofthe
mostinfluentialconstructivistswithinthediscipline.Havingsaidthat,hedoesmake
someimportantconcessionstorationalist-materialistapproaches.
Firstly,whereasidentityisatthecoreofWendt’swork,inhisdefinitionofthevarious
identitiesofstateshepurposefullyseparatestheinternationalanddomesticspheres,
andbracketsthelatterasasubjectofanalysis.AsWendthimselfnoted,“some
propertiesofthestateare‘self-organising’relativetootherstates(muchas
rationalistswouldargue,forwhomactorpropertiesareexogenoustothesystem),and
19A.Wendt,‘AnarchyIsWhatStatesMakeofIt:TheSocialConstructionofPowerPolitics,’InternationalOrganization(Spring1992)46:2,p.398.20Ibid.21M.Zehfuss,‘ConstructivismandIdentity–ADangerousLiaison,’inS.GuzziniandA.Leander(eds.),ConstructivismandInternationalRelations–AlexanderWendtandhisCritics(London:Routledge,2006),p.95.22Wendt(1992,1999)23Wendt(1992),p.417.
25
somearedependentonculturalstructuresatthesystemiclevel.”24Asaresult,hisisan
“an‘essentialist’or‘weak’constructivismthatleavestheterms,butnotthefact,of
stateindividualityopentonegotiation.”25Toputthisintocontext,Wendt
differentiatesbetween‘corporate’and‘social’identities.Theformerexistspriorto
socialinteractionandisastable,unitaryandexogenouslygiventypeofidentitywhich
“referstotheintrinsicqualitiesthatconstituteactorindividuality”and“hasitsrootsin
domesticpolitics.”26Fromthisidentityemergeseveralinterestswhichechothose
positedbymaterialist-rationalistapproaches:physicalsurvival,autonomy,economic
wellbeing,andcollectiveself-esteem.27States’‘social’identities,ontheotherhand,
“canexistonlyinrelationtoothersandthusprovideacrucialconnectionforthe
mutuallyconstitutiverelationshipbetweenagentsandstructures.Thistypeofidentity
iscontinuously(re)definedinprocessesofinteraction.”28Itisthisdimensionofidentity
whichismalleable,andwhichhasabearingonthebehaviourofstatestowardsone
anotherwithintheinternationalsystem,whereasthedomesticrealmandtheidentity
whichemergesfromitare“systematicallybracketed.”29
Inthis,ashighlightedbyWendthimself,thetheorymakesanimportantconcessionto
materialist-rationalistperspectives.Themostobviousconsequenceintermsof
Wendt’sconceptionofidentityisthenotionthatdomesticfactorshavenoimpacton
inter-staterelationsnor,indeed,thatinternationalinteractionmayalsoinfluence
‘corporate’identity.Theinterestscreatedbycorporateidentityarethesameforall
statesandexistaprioritointeraction.Thereislittleinterest,sincethisareais
bracketed,ininquiringhowthisidentityisconstructed,letalonehowitismaintained
orchallenged,whilsttheprocessof‘social’identityconstructionandadaptationare
centraltoWendt’stheoryofidentity.Theexistenceoftwoseparateidentitiesofan
actor,oneinternal,stableandexogenouslygiven,theothermalleableandexisting
24A.Wendt,‘IdentityandStructuralChangeinInternationalPolitics,’inY.LapidandF.Kratochwil(eds.),TheReturnofCultureandIdentityinIRTheory(Boulder,Colorado:LynneRiennerPublishers,1996),pp.50.25Ibid.26Wendt(1996),p.50.27A.Wendt,SocialTheoryofInternationalPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010–original1999),pp.235-236.28Zehfuss(2006),p.98.29Wendt(1992),p.423.
26
solelyintheinternationalcontext,hasledtocriticismofWendt’swork,particularly
fromcriticalconstructivistsandpoststructuralists.30Havingsaidthat,asthissection
willshow,Wendt’stheoryofidentityandhisattempttofindaviamediabetween
materialist-rationalistperspectivesandmorecriticalformsofconstructivismand
poststructuralismhashadgreattractionamongststrategicculturalists.Although
domesticfactorsarenotbracketedbytheseauthors,indeedtheyarefundamentalto
theirresearch,theirconceptionofnationalidentitiesassociallyconstructedbutatthe
sametimestableandunitaryechoesWendt’stheoryofidentity.Whereasstrategic
culturalistsarguethatidentitiesarecriticaltothearticulationofstrategicandbroader
foreignpolicy,theprocessesthroughwhichthoseidentitieswereconstructed
generallydonotfeatureintheiranalyses.Theyare,inthisrespect,thoroughgoing
structuralists,31muchlikeWendthimself,showinglittleinterestinagents’roleinthe
shapingofidentities.
Havingsaidthat,theinsightprovidedbyWendt’stheoryhascontributedtobothan
expansionanddiversificationofculturaliststudiesoverthelasttwodecades.One
particulardirectionadoptedbyanumberofstrategicculturalistsinwhatJohnstonhas
termed‘thethirdwave’32shouldbehighlighted,asitcombinesabroadeningofthe
fieldofresearchwiththisweakerconstructivistapproach.AsGlennetalpointout,the
thirdgenerationaresingledoutby“theirwillingnesstoconsiderotheraspectsofstate
policy,notjustthoserelatingtomilitaryfactors,whichmaybeinfluencedby
culture.”33Thereisanacknowledgmentinthisthatthestrategicculturewhichinforms
thedecisionsofelitesonsecurityissuesmusteithercorrespondorbesubscribedtoan
underlyingnationalpoliticalculturewhichimpactssociety,and,consequently,state
behaviour.Duffield,forinstance,arguedthattraditionalunderstandingsofSC,which
areconcernedwith“militarystrategy,especiallynuclearstrategy,andtheuseof
force”precludetheapplicabilityoftheapproach“tothefullrangeofstatebehaviours
30OnthisseeZehfuss(2002,2006),Waever(2002),Neumann(1995,2004).31R.Jepperson,A.WendtandP.J.Katzenstein,‘Norms,Identity,andCultureinNationalSecurity,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.66.32Johnston(1995),pp.32-64.33Glennetal(2004a),p.9.
27
thatmaybeofinterest.”34Anexaminationofstatepoliticalcultureinsteadoffersa
widerdimensionforculturalresearchintostatebehaviour(thepolitical,ratherthan
thesolelythestrategic)whileeffectivelysubsumingSC.35Thisbroaderapproachis
pursuedbyanumberoftheorists.Inhiscollaborativeworkof1996,Katzensteinbegins
withtheassumptionthat“stateinterestsdonotexisttobe‘discovered’byself-
interested,rationalactors.Interestsareconstructedthroughaprocessofsocial
interaction.”36Moreimportantly,heandhiscolleagueslinksecuritypolicy-makingand
theactorsresponsibleforittothewidersocialcontextinwhichtheyfunction;the
book,accordingly,“stipulatesamoresocialviewoftheenvironmentinwhichstates
andotherpoliticalactorsoperate.Anditinsiststhatpoliticalidentitiesareto
significantdegreesconstructedwithinthatenvironment.Itthusdepartsfrom
materialistnotionsandtherationalistviewofidentitiesasexogenouslygiven.”37A
moreinclusiveapproachispresentedheretothenotionsofcultureandidentity,both
ofwhicharesociallyconstructedand,therefore,contextspecific;furthermore,thereis
anacknowledgmentthatactorsthemselvesareenculturedwithinthesocial
environment.
Theupshotoftheirapproachisthatitallowstheauthorstoaccountfortheinfluence
ofcultureoverthestateasawhole.Inthesamevolume,Jeppersonetalarguethat
“culturalenvironmentsaffectnotonlytheincentivesfordifferentkindsofstate
behaviourbutalsothebasiccharacterofstates–whatwecallstate‘identity.’”38
Equally,inhisstudyofGermanandJapanesebehaviourofde-emphasisingmilitary
instrumentsasameansofsecuringnationalsecurityobjectivesaftertheSecondWorld
War,Bergerarguesthatmilitarycultureisrootedinconstantlyre-evaluatednational
identities.HisargumentisthatGermanyandJapan,“asaresultoftheirhistorical
experiencesandthewayinwhichthoseexperienceswereinterpretedbydomestic
politicalactors,havedevelopedbeliefsandvaluesthatmakethempeculiarlyreluctant
34J.Duffield,‘PoliticalCultureandStateBehavior:WhyGermanyConfoundsNeorealism’,InternationalOrganization53:4(Autumn1999),p.776.35Ibid.,p.777.36P.Katzenstein(b),‘Introduction:AlternativePerspectivesonNationalSecurity,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.2.37Ibid.,p.26.38R.Jeppersonetal(1996),p.33.
28
toresorttotheuseofmilitaryforce.”39Heimpliesthatmilitarycultureisasubsetof
politicalculture,whichisinturninformedbysocietalvaluesandpreferences;
additionally,cultureisnotstatic,butamenabletochange,asitis“underpressurefrom
externaldevelopmentsandinternalcontradictions.”40Althoughchangeismostoften
incremental,traumaticeventscantriggertheneedforsuddenrenegotiationofthese
identitiesaswasthecaseofGermanyandJapanaftertheSecondWorldWar.Overall,
Berger’saccountshowsthatmilitarystrategy,inparticularfavouringorrejectingthe
useofmilitaryinstruments,canbeaffectedbyageneralshiftinthestate’sculture,
which“comprisesbeliefsaboutthewaytheworldis–includingatthemostbasiclevel
beliefsthatdefinetheindividual’sandthegroup’sidentities–andideasabouttheway
theworldoughttobe.”41
However,moreisrevealedabouttheauthors’theoreticalcommitmentsintheir
conceptionsof‘culture’and‘identity.’Theformer“denotescollectivemodelsof
nation-stateauthorityandidentity,”42whilstthelatterismoremodestlyutilisedasa
shorthandlabel“forvaryingconstructionsofnation-andstatehood,”thatare
“enacteddomesticallyandprojectedinternationally.”43Ifidentityistreatedasa
‘label,’thequestionthatremainstobeansweredishowitshouldbeinvestigated.On
thispoint,theauthorsmakecleartheir“methodologicalconventionalism,”44andtheir
lackof“commitmentto‘subjectivism’inwhateversense.”45Theirfocusisnoton
accountingfortheprocessesthroughwhichidentitieswereconstructed,butratheron
“recount[ing]inhistoricalfashion”thedevelopmentofthe“interpretativeframes
employedbyactors.”46Therefore,itfollowsthat,whereasinterestsarenot
exogenouslygivenbutareinsteadgeneratedfromideationalfactors,understanding
howandwhytheseideationalfactorshavedevelopedisnotnecessaryto
understandingtheirinfluenceonbehaviour.ThisechoesWendt’sconceptionof
39T.Berger,‘Norms,IdentityandNationalSecurityinGermanyandJapan,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.318.40Ibid.,p.326.41Ibid.,p.325. 42Katzensteinetal(1996b),p.6.43Ibid.44Jeppersonetal(1996),p.67.45Ibid.,p.66.46Ibid.,p.67.
29
identityasstableandunitary.Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,then,thatWendtwas
himselfoneofthevolume’scontributors.
Havingsaidthat,thisintegratedviewofculturecontinuestohavetractioninthefield
ofSC.IntheirvolumeStrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction(2008),
Johnson,KartchnerandLarsendefinetheconceptas:
Thatsetofsharedbeliefs,assumptions,andmodesofbehaviour,derivedfromcommonexperiencesandacceptednarratives(bothoralandwritten),thatshapecollectiveidentityandrelationshipstoothergroups,andwhichdetermineappropriateendsandmeansforachievingsecurityobjectives.47
Thelinkbetweenidentitiesandthedecision-makingprocessishighlighted:incontrast
toneorealistassumptionsofstatesasessentiallypower-seekers,thisversionofSC
“assumesthatstatesformtheirinterests,andtheirviewsofotheractors,basedona
normativeunderstandingofwhotheyare,andwhatroletheyshouldbeplaying.”48In
otherwords,identityprovidesthelensthroughwhichstatesperceivetheirownplace
inthebroaderinternationalsetting,aswellasthemotivationsofOthers;this,inturn
affectshowstatesinteractwiththeseotheractors.
Additionally,thereisanacknowledgementthat,asidentitiesandculturesaresocially
constructed,changestothesocialcontextmayleadtotheirre-evaluation,and,
consequently,toanalterationofstatepoliciesandbehaviour:“Ifhistoricalmemory,
politicalinstitutions,andmultilateralcommitmentsshapestrategicculture,then,
recentstudiesargue,itwouldseemlogicaltoacceptthatsecuritypolicieswillevolve
overtime.”49ThisisintunewithBerger’sfindingsonGermanandJapaneseculturebut
alsowithErmarth’sstudyofthehistoricalevolutionofRussianstrategicculture.He
arguesthatRussia’spoliticalculturehasplayedasignificantroleinshapingthe
47J.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen,‘Introduction,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.9.48J.L.Johnson,‘Conclusion:TowardaStandardMethodologicalApproach,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.246.49J.S.Lantis,‘StrategicCulture:FromClausewitztoConstructivism,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.44.
30
strategicsubset,inthatit“isitselfvery‘martial’orharmoniouswithmilitaryvaluesin
thatitisgroundedontheprincipleofkto-kovo(literally‘who–whom’),thatis,who
dominatesoverwhombyvirtueofcoercivepowerorstatusimpartedbyhigher
authority.”50Unsurprisinglyhowever,hehaslesstosayabouthowthispoliticalculture
hasdevelopedtofitneatlywithapolicyofheavymilitarisation–or,indeed,explore
thelinkbetweenRussianidentityandthispoliticalculture.Instead,Ermarthfocuseson
tracingthedevelopmentoftheroleofthemilitaryasessentialtoRussianstrategic
cultureintheImperialandSovieteras,toitsdeclineattheendoftheColdWarand
intotheYeltsinperiod.Whatisinterestingabouthisapproachistheacknowledgment
thataculturewhichprioritisesmilitarymightisamenabletore-interpretationandmay
fallfromfavourintheopportuneinternationalanddomesticsetting,eveninthecase
ofastatewhichhassostrongatraditionofitasRussia.
Weakconstructivism,therefore,hasnotonlyaccommodatedabroadeningofitsfield
ofresearch,buthasalsoledtoaquestioningofSC’straditionalviewofcultureasa
largelystaticfeatureofstates.In1995,Johnstonwasarguingthat“theweightof
historicalexperiencesandhistorically-rootedstrategicpreferencestendstoconstrain
responsestochangesinthe‘objective’strategicenvironment(…).Ifstrategicculture
changes,itdoessoslowly,laggingbehindchangesin‘objective’conditions.”51Inother
words,cultureisembeddedintheconsciousnessofdecision-makersand,asaresult,is
slowtoreacttothechangingenvironment.However,constructivismnotonlyallows,
butinmanywaysdictatesthechallengingofthisnotion.Ifculturesandidentitiesare
sociallyconstructed,thentheyareopentobeingperpetuatedorreinterpretedin
equalmeasure.Thealterationofthedomesticorinternationalsettingmaytrigger
culturaldilemmaswhich“definenewdirectionsforforeignpolicyanddemandthe
reconstructionofhistoricalnarratives.”52ThisisevidentinbothBergerandErmarth’s
casestudiesonthechangeinperceptionovertheutilityofmilitaryforceinsecuring
securityobjectivesinGermany,JapanandRussia.Overall,whatthisshiftentailsisnot
50F.W.Ermarth,‘RussianStrategicCultureinFlux:BacktotheFuture?,’inJ.L.Johnson,K.M.KartchnerandJ.A.Larsen(eds.),StrategicCultureandWeaponsofMassDestruction–CulturallyBasedInsightsintoComparativeNationalSecurityPolicymaking(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2009),p.87.51Johnston(1995),p.34.ThisviewoftraditionalStrategicCulturestudiesissharedbyPoore(1996),Lantis(2009)andLibel(2016).52Lantis(2009),p.45.
31
arecognitionthatchangeisnecessary,butthatitispossible.Inasense,thisimpliesa
higherdegreeofattentionbeingawardedtotheimpactofagencyoveridentities.
Changesintheenvironment,andparticularlyshockswhichmayalterthe“evolutionary
pattern”53ofstates,areopportunitiesforidentitarytenetstobequestionedandeither
buttressedoramended.Howactorsnegotiatesuchdevelopmentsisthereforecrucial
inunderstandingstatebehaviour.Inthisview,bothcontinuityandchangeofidentity-
relatedpreceptsandthepoliciestheygeneratearevalidresponsesandrecentSCcase
studiesreflectthis.
Onthecontinuityside,andfollowingonfromBerger’saccount,Dalgaard-Nielsen
analysesGermany’snegativeresponsetotheIraqinvasionbytracingitsrootsbackto
twocompetingschoolsofthoughtwhichemergedafter1945,‘neveragainalone’and
‘neveragainwar,’which“representedcompetinginterpretationsofGermanhistory
anddivergingprescriptionsregardingsecurityanddefencepolicy.”54Boththese
interpretationsarebasedonthetraumaincurredbytheGermanpeopleasaresultof
theSecondWorldWarbut,whilsttheformeremphasisestheneedfor
democratisationandintegrationwithinthebroaderWesterncommunity,thelatter
focusesondemilitarisationandarejectionoftheuseofforcebeyondself-defenceor
humanitarianintervention.55Dalgaard-NielsenexplainsGermany’sreactiontothe
alliedinvasionofIraqasacontinuationofthedialoguebetweenthesetwotraditions.
Apre-emptivestrikeagainstIraqintheabsenceofanUNresolutionwentagainst
Germanpreceptsonmilitaryintervention,andasaresult,Germanydeclinedentering
thecoalitionofthewilling.AtthesametimeGermanywantedtoavoidinternational
isolationinthematterbyseekingtobuildananti-warcounter-coalitionalongside
FranceandRussia.56BoththemotivationsbehindGermany’snegativeresponsetothe
Iraqinvasionanditssubsequentpositiontowardsitaretellingofitsingrainedanxiety
towardswarandisolation.Dalgaard-Nielsenthereforechallengestheneorealist
assessmentoftheevent,whichwouldviewthe‘no’toIraqasevidenceofthe
53Greathouse(2010),p.78.54A.Dalgaard-Nielsen,‘TheTestofStrategicCulture:Germany,PacifismandPre-emptiveStrikes,’SecurityDialogue36:3(2005),pp.339-359.55Ibid.,p.344.56Ibid.,pp.351-352.
32
emergenceof“amoreassertiveandindependentGermany,”57andtracesittoa
continuationofitspost-warpoliticalandstrategicculture.
Ontheotherhand,inacomparativestudybetweenAustraliaandNew-Zealand,David
McCrawexplorestheissueofchange/continuitybyanalysingthedevelopmentofthe
twostates’strategiccultures.Theauthorarguesthatastate’sstrategicculturehasits
“rootsinfundamentalinfluencessuchasgeopoliticalsetting,historyandpolitical
culture.”58Assuch,hesuggeststhatthedifferenthistoricalexperiencesanddomestic
environmentsoftwosimilaractorscanleadtodistinctstrategicpositions.In
Australia’scase,McCrawnoticesacontinuityofitsrealiststrategicculture,“whichis
permeatedwithaconcernaboutthedevelopmentofmilitarythreatstothecountry
andtheneedfordeterrentforceandallies.”59Incontrast,NewZealand’sgeographical
isolationandlackofhistoricalexperienceofexternalattacks–whichhadcausedthe
developmentofsecurity-relatedanxietiesinAustralia–ledtothedevelopmentofan
alternativeidealiststrategicculture,which“isanti-militaristandlooksforwaysto
resolvedisputesbynegotiationanddiplomacy.”60Asaresult,theneo-liberal
alternativereplacedthetraditionalAustralian-inspiredrealistvariantandisnowNew
Zealand’sdominantstrategicculture.61Again,McCrawdoesnotanalysetheprocesses
throughwhichthesepoliticalculturesdevelopedor,indeedthebroaderlinkto
Australian/NewZealanderidentities.However,hisstudyofgeo-politicallysimilar
actorsdoesshowthatcontinuityorchangeofculturesiscontextcontingentandthat
historicalnarratives,thoughenduring,areopentore-interpretation.
Finally,thebroadeningofthefieldofresearchofSC,aswellasitsventureinto
constructivism,mightultimatelyaddressasignificantissuewiththisschool–thelack
ofcasestudiesofminorpowersorsmallstates.Strategicculturalistshavetraditionally
showngreatinterestinanalysingtheuniqueculturesofgreatpowers,suchasthe
57Ibid.,p.340.58D.McCraw,‘ChangeandContinuityinStrategicCulture:theCasesofAustraliaandNewZealand,’AustralianJournalofInternationalAffairs65:2(2011),p.167.59Ibid.,p.174.60Ibid.,p.176.61Ibid.,p.182.
33
USA,62SovietUnion/Russia,63Germany,64orChina.65Lessattentionhasbeenpaidto
smallerstateswhosecapacitytoinfluencetheinternationalworldorderislimitedand
moredifficulttogauge.Arguably,arecognitionhasgenerallybeenlackingthatminor
powersmay,attheveryleast,bereactingtochangeswithintheinternationalsystem
inuniqueways,ifnotactivelyshapingit,andthatthereisutilityinstudyingtheir
behaviour.TherearethosewithinSC,however,whohavesettorectifythisgapinthe
research.Rasmussen,forinstance,arguesthat,byexaminingaminorstate,inhiscase
Denmark,onemayuncovercertaintruthsaboutthechangingworldorderthatwould
otherwisebehiddenfromus:“perhapstheaffairsofminorpowersbetterreflectthe
effectsofchangesinworldorderthanthoseofmajorpowersbecausewhileitisthe
majorpowersthatbringaboutchangesinworldorder,itistheminorpowersthatare
affectedbythechanges.”66
HisstudyrevealsthatDenmark’sperceptionsovertheuseofmilitaryforceafterthe
ColdWarhasbeenshapedbyculturalfactors,namelyadialoguebetweentwo
discourses–‘cosmopolitans’and‘defencists.’Hethereforerejectsthestructuralist
explanationforDenmark’sincreasedmilitaryactivismduringthe1990sthat“anystate
(…)hassomeinherenturgetoprojectmilitarypower,i.e.anurgethatmightbe
quelledbyoutsidepressure(…)butwhichwouldsurelyberevivedwhenthatpressure
disappeared.”67Insteadheoffersanagent-orientedanalysisofhowcosmopolitans–
whorejecttheuseofarmedforcesbutfordefensivepurposes–anddefencists–who
argueforastrongmilitarycapacity–foundcommongroundovertheutilityofusing
militaryforceinthepost-ColdWarenvironment.RasmussenarguesthattheDanish
strategicculturedebateshifted“fromwhetherforcewasusefulatalltothepurposes
thatforceshouldbeusedfor”andemphasised“‘activism,’whichsignifiesawillingness
tousemilitaryforceagainstwhatisperceivedasthenewthreattotheglobalised
world.”68Moreimportantly,hehighlightstheroleofagents,byarguingthattheir
62Mahnken(2009).63Herman(1996),Ermarth(2009).64Berger(1996),Daalgard-Nielsen(2005).65Johnston(1996).66M.V.Rasmussen,‘What’stheUseofIt?DanishStrategicCultureandtheUtilityofArmedForce,’CooperationandConflict:JournaloftheNordicInternationalStudiesAssociation40:1(2005),pp.68.67Ibid.,p.69.68Ibid.,p.82.
34
discoursewasbothshapingandbeingshapedbyanewpolicyorpracticeofactivism.
ForRasmussen,bothdiscourseandpracticeconstituteaculture;theendoftheCold
War‘unsettled’thebalancebetweenDanishdiscourseandpractice,and,Rasmussen
argues,theconsequencewouldeitherhavebeentheemergenceofanewculture,or
therefashioningoftheexistingoneinamannerinwhich“therelationshipsbetween
discoursesareredefinedtofitanewpractice.”69
BytracingtheevolutionofDanishstrategiccultureinthisway,theauthoruncoversa
continuityrootedinflexibilityandaculturewhich,whilstdeveloping,maintainsits
originalvalues.Therefore,Rasmussenshows,ontheonehand,thatthebehaviourof
smallstatescannotbeaccuratelyunderstoodsimplybycorrelationtomajorpowers,
asminoractorsaredrivenbydomesticandculturalfactorsasmuchastheyare
impactedbyexternalconditions.Secondly,heemphasisestheroleofagencyin
(re)shapingculture.Insodoing,however,Rasmussenalsopresentsadeeper
conceptionofculture/identity,questioningtraditionalconstructivistSCaccounts’focus
ondescribinghowagentsact,whilstignoringwhyandforwhatpurposecertain
coursesofactionwerepursued.Instead,thepracticetheoryheputsforwarddrawson
morecriticalstrandsofconstructivismandpoststructuralism,byincludingdiscourseas
wellaspracticeinthestudy.70Hisanalysisthereforeprovidesananalysisofagents’
interactionwiththediscursivestructureofstrategicculturebyexamininghownew
possibilitiesforaction“influenceandareinfluencedbyexistingdiscoursesonthe
country’splaceintheworld.”71Overall,Rasmussen’semphasisondiscourseand
agents’abilitytoemployitinadjustingthestrategicculturesoastofitandlegitimate
newpracticesshowsaconceptionofidentitywhichsetstheauthorapartfromthe
mainstreamWendt-inspiredculturalists.Indeed,thisapproachbringsRasmussen’s
studyclosertothoseincreasinglyadoptedinidentity-orientedFPA,suchasBrowning
andDoty.
Overall,theschoolofSChasdevelopedsignificantlyinbothnatureandscopeof
researchoverrecentyearsandthisthesisincorporatesmanyoftheseelements.It
69Ibid.,p.72.70Rasmussen(2005),p.71.71Ibid.
35
sharestheviewthatculture/identityissociallyconstructed,andexploresitsinfluence
inguidingthebehaviourofstates,intermsofeffectivelysettingprioritiesandred-
lines.Thebroadeningofthefieldfrommilitarystrategytoforeignpolicyisnecessary,
because,asDuffieldargued,thisallowstheresearchertostudytheimpactof
culture/identityoveravarietyofactionswhichgobeyondsolelytheuseofforce.
Secondly,thethesisacknowledgesthatre-evaluationsofcultures/identitiesarenot
onlypossible,butaconditionfortheirsurvival.Thirdly,itaddstotheincidenceof
studiesofminorpowersbyfocusingonRomania,astatewhichintraditionalaccounts
haslimitedfreedominsettingitsownforeignpolicyagenda.Whatisalsoclear,onthe
otherhand,isthatSCislargelydominatedbyWendt-inspiredweakconstructivismand
adoptsaconceptionofidentityinwhichthelatterisrendered,asDavidCampbellhas
noted,assomethingessentialised,72ineffectavariablethatcanbestudiedby
recoursetoaconventionalmethodology.73Inconsequence,thefocusismostoften
exclusivelyonhowacultureinfluencesbehaviour–i.e.ontheeffects–ratherthan
alsoonthesocialprocesseswhichhaveledtoitsdevelopment.Althoughthereexists
anacknowledgmentoftheroleofagentsinshapingculturesandidentities,rather
thansolelybeinginfluencedbythem,thislinkisrarelyexplored.Assuch,theinroads
madebyauthorssuchasRasmussen,whointerrogatetheroleofagentsinthe
developmentofidentitiesthroughbothdiscourseandpracticeareespecially
significant.Thethesiswillthereforeaimtoaddressthelimitationsofthisweak
constructivistperspectivebyarguingthatthestructuresofmeaningwhicharticulate
intoasenseofidentitymayindeedbecomesedimented,offeringthemparticular
stabilityandresiliencetochange.However,bytheirverynature,thesestructuresare
constitutedandsocialisedbyagentsthroughdiscourse.Assuch,treatingidentities
simplyasvariableseschewstheprocessesthroughwhichtheanswerstothequestions
‘whoweare,’‘whoourothersare,’etc.weredevelopedandcametobeacceptedas
trueatonepoint,and/orrejectedatanother.Incontrasttothisconstrictingapproach,
thethesis’adoptsadeeperconceptionofidentity,onewhichexamineshowagents
areshapedby,butalsothemselvesshape,identitiesthroughsocialprocesses.Inthis
view,thesedimentednatureandstabilityofparticularstructuresofmeaningcannot
72Campbell(1998),p.218.73Jeppersonetal(1996),p.67.
36
betakenasagiven;insteaditcanonlybeaccountedforbyexploringagents’
interactionwiththesestructures.
ForeignPolicyAnalysis(FPA)
Initsapproach,thethesisdrawsonadeeperconceptionofidentitywhichis
increasinglynoticeablewithintheschoolofFPA.ContrastingSC’straditionallynarrow
fieldofresearchandpreferredstructuralism,FPA,asthe“studyofconductand
practiceofrelationsbetweendifferentactors,primarilystates,intheinternational
system,”74isnaturallybroaderinscopeandprimarilyagent-oriented.Duetoits
interestinthedecision-makingprocessanditsvarioussourcesofinfluence,thisschool
fitstheagendaofthisthesis,inparticularitsmorecriticalconstructivist/postructuralist
strands.IthasbeenarguedthatconstructivismandatleastsomeFPAaccountsare
naturalbedfellows75and,accordingtoHoughton,therehasexisted“afocuson
subjectivity,theconstructionofmeaningandideationalfactors–asopposedto
supposedly‘objective’structures–[which]wasevidentinthestudyofforeignpolicy
decisionmakingfromthestart.”76OneoftheearlyseminalworksonFPA,Richard
Snyder(nottobeconfusedwithSC’sJackSnyder),BruckandSapin’sForeignPolicy
Decision-Making(1963)highlightstheinterplaybetweenactorsandtheenvironment
inwhichtheyfunction:
Itisdifficulttoseehowwecanaccountforspecificactionsandforcontinuitiesofpolicieswithouttryingtodiscoverhowtheiroperatingenvironmentisperceivedbythoseresponsibleofchoices,(…)whatmattersareselectedforattention,andhowtheirpastexperienceconditionspresentresponses.77
Moreimportantly,theyarguethatcultureisafeaturesharedbyallmembersofa
community,includingdecision-makersand,assuch,hasabearingonstateaction:"the
decision-makerentersthegovernmentfromthelargersocialsysteminwhichhealso
74C.AldenandA.Aran,ForeignPolicyAnalysis(London:Routledge,2013),p.1.75D.P.Houghton,‘ReinvigoratingtheStudyofForeignPolicyDecisionMaking:TowardaConstructivistApproach,’ForeignPolicyAnalysis3(2007),p.27.76Ibid.,p.31.77R.C.Snyder,H.W.BruckandB.Sapin,ForeignPolicyDecision-Making–AnApproachtotheStudyofInternationalPolitics2ndEdition(NewYork:TheFreePressofGlencoe,1963),p.5.
37
retainsmembership.Hecomestodecision-makingasa‘culturebearer.’Any
conceptualschemeforanalysingstatebehaviourmustattempttoaccountforthe
impactofculturalpatternsondecisions.”78Fromitsveryinception,therefore,FPAwas
concernedwithbothactors’subjectivityandthemannerinwhichtheiridentities
influencethedecision-makingprocess.However,asHoughtonpointsout,“this
dimensiontoFPAlaylargelydormantuntilthe1990s.”79Constructivistperspectives,
indeed,weresomewhatside-lined,as“thedominantapproachestoFPAshare[d]an
acceptanceofrationalismandamaterialistontology,”whichwere“particularlyclear
in(Neo)Realistaccountsoftheinternationalsystem.”80
Havingsaidthat,muchlikeinthecaseofSC,theendoftheColdWarsawaresurgence
ininterestforthestudyoftheinter-subjectivenatureofrealityand,consequentlythe
influenceofideationalfactorsonbehaviour.Hillarguesthatincreasinglyrelevantto
FPAistheconstructivistinspirednotionthat“identityiscentraltoourunderstanding
offoreignpolicy,and(often)viceversa”andthat“itsuseextend[s]FPA’sstandard
concernwiththedomesticsourcesofforeignpolicytotheareasofculture,including
nationalism,tradition,memoryandself-understanding.81Forhim,theincreasedfocus
onidentityislinkedtoaturntowardsconstructivismthat“representsan
epistemologicalchallengeinthesenseoftherenewedcriticismofpositivismthatit
implies(…).Itsuggeststhatforeignpolicycanbotharisefromaconstructednational
identityandbeconstitutiveofthatidentity.”82Thereisanacknowledgmentinthis
that,farfrombeingexogenouslygiven,identitybothshapesandisshapedbythe
discourseandpracticeofagents.Assuch,changesinidentitiesandvalues,aswellas
theforeignpolicytheyinfluencebecomesnotonlyapossibility,butoften,anecessity.
AldenandAran,forinstance,observethat“normsarecontingentandreinterpretedby
stateandnon-stateactorsovertime.Foreignpolicydecisionmakingisaprocessthat
evolvesandrespondstochangingconditionswithinthehallsofpolicyandthewider
78Ibid.,p.156.79Houghton(2007),p.32.80C.Browning,Constructivism,NarrativeandForeignPolicyAnalysis–aCaseStudyofFinland(Bern:PeterLang,2008),pp.19-20.81C.Hill,‘ForeignPolicyAnalysis,’inB.Badie,D.Berg-SchlosserandL.Morlino(eds.),InternationalEncyclopediaofPoliticalScience(London:Sage,2011),p.921.82Ibid.,p.922.
38
society.FPAshouldrecognizeasformativetheseconditionsofchange(…).”83They
arguethatconstructivism“providesacoherentsetofinsightsandanalysesofpractice
whichcoherewellwithcoreinterestsofFPAscholarship.”84Constructivismoffers,
therefore,awayofrevealingtheinterplaybetweenactorsandtheiridentities,how
theyareutilised,refashionedorreinforcedtolegitimateresponsesinthedomesticor
internationalenvironment.
ThisturninFPAmatchesthesimilardevelopmentwithinSC.Incontrasttotheweak
constructivismwhichdominatesculturalists,however,inFPAonenoticesamove
towardsamoreholistic,deeperconceptionofidentity.Firstly,thereexistsincreased
interestintotheprocessofdevelopmentofidentitiesandansweringquestionsrelated
towhycertainidentitieshaveevolvedinparticularways.Inthis,theroleofhistoryor
rather,thetellingofhistory,becomeskey.AsBreuningpointsout,historical
experienceisparamountintheshapingofculturesandidentities:“culturedenotesthe
setofvaluesthatistransmittedthroughtheteachingofnationalhistory.Attheheart
ofaculturearegeneralizedbeliefsandattitudesaboutone’sownstate,aboutother
states,andabouttheactualanddesirablerelationshipsbetweenthese.”85Asaresult,
studyingacultureoridentityentailsunderstandinghowmemoriesofthepast
influencepresentconcernsandhowthey“shapethesensibilitiesofleaders,interms
ofboththeirownreflexivereactionsandtheirperceptionsofwhattheirdomestic
publicwillaccept.”86History,orbetteryet,howhistoryisinterpreted,mattersinthe
constructionofidentities,which,inturn,matterintheconstructionofforeignpolicyas
wellasthemannerinwhichforeignpolicychoicesarerelayedorlegitimatedtothe
widerpublic.
BanerjeepicksuponthisandSnyderetal’snotionofdecision-makersasculture
bearersinhisstudyofthebehaviourofthetwosuperpowersduringtheColdWar.His
argumentisthat“culturemakesstatesnotonlyunitarydecision-makersbutintegrated
psychoculturalsubjectswithstate-levelidentities,emotions,causalbeliefs,and
83AldenandAran(2013),p.115.84Ibid.,p.116.85M.Breuning,ForeignPolicyAnalysis–aComparativeIntroduction(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2007),p.128.86Ibid.,pp.128-129
39
motives.”87Actorsareseennotas“individualpsychologicalsubjectsbutascarriersand
coauthors(sic)ofculturesanddiscoursesthatgainacoherentexistenceoutsideany
oneperson.”88Specifically,Banerjeearguesthatcultureguidestheactionsofactorsby
providingthemwithbehaviouralscriptsorhistoricalstructures.Agentslearnfromthe
past,constructingpatternsofresponsetospecificcircumstanceswhicharerepeatedin
futuresimilarsituations:“historicalstructuresareviewed(…)asself-perpetuating
systemsofbeliefs,motives,andactionsofinteractinggroups.Theyarerepetitive
patternsofcollectiveactionthatreinforceandareanimatedbyenduringpatternsof
culturalbelief.”89TheseculturalbeliefsarerootedindescriptionsoftheSelfand
Othersincertainhistoricalcontexts,implyingthattheSelf-Othercontrastsbecome
entrenchedandcertaincircumstancestriggerparticulartypesofbehaviour:“agroup
ofstateleaderswhoshareaculturewillrespondtoeventsdeemedbythatcultureto
implicatetheirstatewithcommonperceptions,causalattributions,emotions,and
motives.”90Overall,Banerjeeseesagencyandstructureasmutuallyconstituted,with
culturesprovidingactorsablueprintforaction,whichactorsthenreinforcethrough
theirbehaviour.Continuityofculturalpatternsofbehaviouristhereforeahallmarkof
Banerjee’smodelanditimplies,toadegree,thatculturelimitstheavenuesforaction
totheprescribedscript.
However,perhapsthemostradicalmoveintheconceptualisationofidentitywithin
FPAandIRmorebroadlyisofferedbycriticalconstructivistsandpoststructuralists.In
contrasttoweakconstructivistswho,aswehaveseen,makecertainconcessionsto
rationalist-materialistapproaches,theseauthorstaketheissueoftheconstructionof
socialrealitymostseriously,questioningthenotionoftheexistenceofamaterial
world,atleastinsofarasobjective,unmediatedknowledgeofthisrealityispossible.
Whereassomeofthetheoristsreferredtointhissectionmayidentifythemselvesas
poststructuralistsorconstructivists,whatbringstheirtheoriestogetherareanumber
87S.Banerjee,‘ReproductionofSubjectsinHistoricalStudies:Attribution,IdentityandEmotionontheEarlyColdWar,’InternationalStudiesQuarterly35:1(1991),pp.19-20.88Ibid.,p.20.89Ibid.,p.23.90Ibid.,p.20.
40
offundamentalassumptionsonhowtoapproachthestudyofidentityandafocuson
themannerinwhichtheyareconstitutedandalteredbyagents.
Firstly,thereexistsarecognitionthatwhotheSelfisisnotsomethingthatcanbe
takenforgrantedoressentialised.BecausetheimageoftheSelfisproducedinternally
throughsocialprocessesanytheorytreatingidentityasaunitary,stableandeasily
intelligiblefromtheoutsideeschewsthecomplexityinvolvedintheconstructionof
theSelf.AsZehfusspointsoutinhercriticismofWendt,thenotionofapre-given
corporateidentitydoesnottakeintoaccountthevariousdebatesaboutwhotheSelf
shouldbe,91whichtakeplacedomestically,adimensionbracketedinhisinquiry.
Zehfussdrawsattentiontothefactthat,inhercasestudyofGermanidentity,“a
numberofdifferentrepresentations(…)werearticulatedwithintheFRG.Hencethe
questionofwhatidentityistobeattachedtothenotionof‘German’or‘Germany’was
acontestedissuenotonlybetweentheFRGanditssignificantothers.”92Therefore,
theprocessesthroughwhichanswerstothequestion‘whoweare?’areproduced,
reproducedorcontestedarekeyinunderstandingstateidentities.Thesedonotsimply
exist,butareinstead“emergentaspartofanongoingperformancereaffirming
subjectivityandidentity.”93Actorsconstructstoriesaboutwhotheyare,intheprocess
ofwhichtheynecessarilycreateaparticularrepresentationoftherealmwithinwhich
theyfunction,andtheotherstheycomeincontactwith.Atthesametime,these
stories,ornarratives,createinterestsandhavethepowertolegitimatecertaincourses
ofaction,whilstmakingothersimpossible.94Identityandforeignpolicy,therefore,are
inextricablylinked,asforeignpolicyreflectsaparticularrepresentationoftheSelfand
itsinterests.Ontheotherhand,withidentityunderstoodasperformance,foreign
policybecomesameansof(re)constitutingtheSelfasasubject.95
Inthisconceptionofidentity,moreover,discourseorlanguageiscentraltothe
constitutionoftheSelf.AsBrowningnotes,“ifweaccepttheconstructivistviewof
91Zehfuss(2006),p.107.92Ibid.93Browning(2008),p.45.94R.L.Doty,‘ForeignPolicyasSocialConstruction:APost-PositivistAnalysisofUsCounterinsurgencyPolicyinthePhilippines,’InternationalStudiesQuarterly37(1993).95Browning(2008),p.45.Author’sownemphasis.
41
language,thenitfollowsthatadescriptioncanneversimplyclaimtobediscovering
theessenceofsocialreality,butisalsoengagedincreatingandconstitutingit.”96A
specifictellingofidentity,then,hassignificantconstitutivepower,becauseby
presentingastoryasfacts–‘thisiswhoweare,’‘theseareourothers’–iteffectively
makesthemreal.Campbell,forinstance,arguesthat“identityfunctionswithin
discourse,butinsodoing,ittransgressesanderasesthediscursive/extradiscursive
distinction.”97Inotherwords,itisonlythroughdiscoursethatwemaycomprehend
andbringnon-linguisticphenomenaintobeing.98BydrawingonDerrida,Zehfuss
makesasimilarpointontheconstitutivepowerofidentitynarrativesthat,contraryto
mainstreamaccounts,thedistinctionbetweenrealityanditsrepresentationsisnot
clearcut,99becauseweallalreadyfunctionwithinthisrealityandcannotmakesense
ofitexceptthroughourinterpretations.100Asaresult,shecontinues,“ifthe‘real’is
notnatural,ifwecannotevergobacktoadefinitiveorigin,thenanyclaimtoanorigin
willneedtobequestioned.Narrativesofidentitystartsomewhere.Theyclaim
possessionofanorigin.”101Anidentitynarrative,therefore,buildscontext.Itprovides,
importantly,anorderingandinterpretationofthepastwhichlegitimatesaparticular
representationoftheSelf.AsCampbellnotes,thenarrativisingofhistorymediates
betweenpastandpresentbyconferringontohistoricaleventsandrelationshipswith
othersmeaningswhichmakethepresentworldintelligibletous.102AsBrowning
furtherargues,throughthesestoriesaboutthepastitbecomespossibleto
“understandthesituationswefacetodayandtotellourselveswhatkindofpersonwe
were,areandwillbe.”103Thetellingofhistory,therefore,becomescriticalasthemain
vehiclethroughwhichaparticularrepresentationoftheSelfisconstructedand
socialised.Consequently,anidentitynarrativecreatesnotonlythecurrentsocial
reality,butentailsalsoa(re)constitutionofthepastand,inthisconception,identity
96Ibid.,p.42.97D.Campbell(a),NationalDeconstruction–Violence,Identity,andJusticeinBosnia(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinneapolisPress,1998),p.25.98Ibid.99M.Zehfuss,ConstructivisminInternationalRelations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),p.246.100Ibid.,p.256.101Ibid.,p.246.102Campbell(a)(1998),p.34.103Browning(2008),p.47.
42
constructionisrevealedasamuchmorecomplexprocessthanmainstreamorweak
constructivistaccountswouldallow.Itisthislinktothetellingofhistory,that‘whowe
were’hassignificantbearingon‘whoweare,’whichgivestheidentitynarrativeits
depth.Withoutit,asaresult,identityremainsepiphenomenaland,toacertainextent,
hollow.
Afinalpointonthisconceptionofidentityreferstothesignificanceoftheprocessof
differentiationentailedintheconstructionofSelf.AsBrowningargues,“fundamental
tonarrativeisanexplicitconcernwithachievingaself-constitutionthrough
differentiatingtheselffromothers.”104Inotherwords,thecreationoftheSelfis
achievedinrelationtoOthers,whichprovidesboththeboundariesoftheSelf–whois
inandwhoisout–and,importantly,itscharacteristics–‘howweare’aswellas‘how
wearenot.’Becauseofthis,asCampbellnotes,theconceptsofidentityanddifference
aremutuallyconstituted.105TheOther,therefore,becomesanessentialelementofthe
Self,asanyeffortatestablishingindividualityandidentityentailsframingtheactorvis-
à-visOthers.Inthisview,delineationfromOthersisan“activeandongoingpartof
identityformation.”106Havingsaidthat,asWaeverandHansenpointout,the
Self/Othernexusisnotalwaysnecessarilyantagonistic.Theyarguethat“difference
onlycollapsesintooppositioninspecialsituations”andthat,“inadditiontoOthers
(castasradicallydifferentandpotentiallythreateningenemies)thereare,forinstance,
friendsandrelatives.”107Thefocusofidentitystudies,asNeumannargued,should
thereforebeon“howtheseboundaries,”orlackthereof,“comeintoexistenceandare
maintained.”108
WithinFPA,aseminalworkemphasizingtheconstitutivepowerofdiscourseinthe
processofotheringisthatofRoxanneDotyandherstudyoftheUS’counterinsurgency
policytowardsthePhilippines.ShecriticisestraditionalFPAaccountsofstate
104Ibid.,p.49.105D.Campbell(b),WritingSecurity–UnitedStatesForeignPolicyandthePoliticsofIdentityRevisedEdition(Manchester:EireandEurope,1998revisededition,original1992),p.9.106Neumann(1995),p.28.107Waever,O.,‘Identities,CommunitiesandForeignPolicy:DiscourseAnalysisasForeignPolicyTheory,’inL.HansenandO.Waever(eds.),EuropeanIntegrationandNationalIdentity–TheChallengeoftheNordicStates(London:Routledge,2002),p.24.108Neumann(1995),p.28.
43
behaviour,notingthattheyarepredominantly“concernedwithexplainingwhy
particulardecisionsresultinginspecificcoursesofactionweremade;”109inother
words,theyfocusonansweringwhyquestions,ortoprovethataspecificactionwas
predictableinagivensituation.110However,inherview,thistypeofanalysespreclude
adiscussionofwhyandwhichcertaintypesofbehaviourcouldbeundertaken.Doty’s
studyexploreshow-possiblequestions,byexamining“howmeaningsareproduced
andattachedtovarioussocialsubjects/objects,thusconstitutingparticular
interpretivedispositionswhichcreatecertainpossibilitiesandprecludeothers.”111
Consequently,“whatisexplainedisnotwhyaparticularoutcomeobtained,butrather
howthesubjects,objects,andinterpretivedispositionsweresociallyconstructedsuch
thatcertainpracticesweremadepossible.”112Onenoticesheresignificantsimilarities
betweenthisstudyandRasmussen’swork,asittoofocusesontheconstructivepower
ofdiscourse,whichmaybeusedtolegitimatecertainpractices–inthiscase,Doty
showshowtheUSconstructedanimageofthePhilippinesthatjustifiedan
interventionwhichwouldotherwisehavebeenimpossibleifthestatewereviewedas
asovereignequal.ForDoty,theemphasisisonthe“linguisticconstructionof
reality,”113whichmeansthattheportrayaloftheSelfandOthersinparticular
situationsisfluidandopentoreinterpretation.Thisstudythereforeemphasisesthe
constructednatureofsubjectiverealitiesandagents’roleinshapingthem.As,
ChristopherBrowninghasargued,“‘how’questionsproblematizetheverybasesof
‘why’questionsbyanalysingthesociallyconstructedbeliefs,symbolsandmythswhich
underliedominantclaimstorationality.”114Furthermore,becauseitisinthepowerof
agentstoaltertheserealities,constructivistFPAstudiesmustacknowledgethatthe
systemsofmeaningattachedtotheSelfandOtherswhichundergirdpoliciescan
alwaysbechanged,consequentlyleadingtoanalterationofthepoliciesthemselves.
Drawingonthisinsight,CosandBilginexamineTurkey’sconstructionoftheSoviet
Other,namelythefactthattheportrayaloftheSovietUnionshiftedfromfriendtofoe
109Doty(1993),p.298.110Ibid.111Ibid.112Ibid.113Ibid.,p.302.114Browning(2008),p.22.
44
aftertheSecondWorldWar.115TheybuildonDoty’show-possibleapproachtoshow
how,throughvariousportrayalsoftheSelfandOther,identitiesandinterestslinkedto
themareconstructed.116Theimportanceofdiscourseinthisprocessisalso
highlighted:“dominantdiscourses,throughrepresentationsofthe‘self’andthe
‘other,’constructa‘commonsense’thatpredefineswhatis‘intelligible’and‘rational’
courseofactionandwhatisnot.”117Asaresult,discourseactsasan
“enabler/limiter”118offoreignpolicychoice.CosandBilginusethisframeworkto
exploreTurkey’sotheringofTsarist/SovietRussia,theimageofwhichdeveloped,ina
fewdecades,from‘TsaristRussia,therival,’to‘SovietRussia,thesincerefriend,’and,
finally,to‘SovietRussia,theexpansionistthreat’after1945.119ByportrayingSoviet
Russiaasanexistentialthreat,Turkey’spro-Western,andparticularly,pro-American
foreignpolicydirectionwastherebylegitimated.Theauthorsshowhowtheidentityof
anOthermayberecastinthecontextofchangingcircumstancesand,insodoing,they
revealtheconnectionbetweenrepresentationsoftheSelf/Otherandnational
identitiesandinterests:analterationoftheimageofanOtheris,atthesametime,a
consequenceofachangeinnationalidentityandinterests,andareinforcementof
them.
Finally,whilstCosandBilginareconcernedprimarilywiththeconstructionofOthers’
identities,Browningprovidesacomprehensivestudyofhowcriticalconstructivismand
Doty’show-possibleapproachmaybeemployedintheexaminationofportrayalsof
theSelfandtheirimpactonforeignpolicy.Placingthesocialprocessesthroughwhich
subjectivityisconstitutedattheheartofhisanalysis,Browningputsforwarda
narrativetheoryofidentity,“whichseekstoshowhowactionbecomesmeaningfulin
theprocessofnarratingconstitutivestoriesoftheself.”120Hearguesthat“identities
(andtheintereststhatflowfromthem)arenotahistoricalandfixed,butareunstable
andinconstantneedofre-affirmationandre-constructioninviewofunfoldingevents
115K.CosandP.Bilgin,‘Stalin’sDemands:Constructionofthe‘SovietOther’inTurkey’sForeignPolicy,1919-1945,’ForeignPolicyAnalysis6(2010),pp.43-60.116Ibid.,p.46.117Ibid.118Ibid.119Ibid.,pp.57-58.120Browning(2008),p.45.
45
anddevelopingrelationships.”121Browninghighlightsthecontinuousdialogue
betweenagentsandthestructureofidentitynarratives,emphasisingthatisthrough
storiesaboutwhowearethatweareabletoattachmeaningtothesocialworldand
makesenseofourplaceontheinternationalstage.Inthisview,theSelf/Othernexus
becomeskeytotheconstitutionoftheSelf:“in[the]processofstorytelling,the
storytellingsubjectpositionsvariousevents,incidentsandactors(includingitself)ina
frameworkofnegativeandpositiverelationships.”122Drawingoncriticalconstructivist
andpoststructuralistapproachtoidentityconstruction,theauthorexploresthe
processesofconstitutingtheSelfinrelationtoOthersthroughnarratives,andhow,in
hiscasestudyofFinland,“particularconceptsandidentitymarkershaveemerged”but
also“howtheirinterpretationandmeaninghaschangedanddevelopedasFinnshave
soughttopositionthemselvesintheworldthroughtime.”123Inhisapproach,identity
isfluid,malleable,andmultiplenarrativescanexistatanyonetime,eachwithitsown
degreeofsalienceandtraction.
Similarlytothisproject,BrowningidentifiesrecurringthemesofFinnishidentitywhich
have,eitherontheirownorinvariouscombinations,shapedthedominantidentity
narrativeatdifferentpointsintime,suchas“Nordicity,Europeanness,theBaltic,
Russia,neutrality,sovereignty,unity,sizeandpragmatism,aswellashowFinlandhas
beenvariouslypositionedalongtheEast-Westcontinuum.”124Ontheotherhand,
whilstemphasisingthenecessitythatidentitynarrativesarechallengedand
reinterpretedovertime,withmultiplethemesbeinginplayatanygivenmoment,“itis
alsothecasethatacrossdifferentperiodsacertainamountofsedimentationof
particularnarrativestructuresbecomesevident.”125Inthis,Browningacknowledges
thatcertainidentitythemesmaybecomeentrenchedmakingthemincreasingly
resilienttoagents’attemptsattheirmarginalization.Therefore,continuity,aswellas
change,ispossible.
121Browning(2008),p.11.122Ibid.,p.46.123Ibid.,p.14.124Ibid.125Ibid.,pp.14-15.
46
Ontheotherhand,Browningalsoarguesthat,foracertainnarrativeofidentityto
fulfilitsfunction,itmustbesocialisedsoasto“createacrossagroupofpeoplea
feelingofasharednationalexperienceandcommonidentity.”126Inthisthe
constructionofahistoricalnarrativeiscrucial.Inasense,thispositionpicksupon
Breuning’sconnectionbetweenidentityandhistory,butreversesthecausal
relationship:“presentconcernsandconflictstendtoreceiveanhistoricalprojection,
aspresentrepresentationsoftheselfandofothersandtherelationshipsentailed,are
givenhistoricalvaliditythroughselectivenarrativesthatimplythatithasalwaysbeen
so.”127Theroleofhistoricalnarrativesisthereforeeithertobuttressacertain
conceptionofidentityortoreconstituteittofitcontemporaneousinterestsand
alteringSelf-Otherrelations.ThisperspectivecontrastsBreuningandBanerjee’s
positionthathistoricalstructuresareenduringandlimitorshapeagents’identities
andactions;inhisnarrativetheoryofidentitytheagent-structurerelationshipis
decidedlytiltedintheagency’sfavour.
Finally,Browning’sstudyhasanadditionalsignificanceinthecontextofthisthesis,
namelythathisaccountsimilarlyfocusesontheidentitypoliticsofaminorstate.Ina
separatearticletheauthorchallengesmainstreamFPA’sfocusonmajorpowersand
therealitythat“smallstatesarefrequentlyignored,theviewbeingthatultimately
theyhavetogoalongwiththeframesdictatedbylarger,morepowerfulstates.”128
SimilarlytoRasmussen,Browningrejectsneorealistassumptionsthatsmallstateshave
littlefreedominpursuinganidentity-drivenforeignpolicyagendabecausethe
pressuresoftheinternationalsystemaretoostrongfordomesticfactorstobearany
meaningfulinfluence.129Instead,Browningarguesthatwhatoffersorlimitssmall
states’opportunitiesformanoeuvreisthemannerinwhich‘smallness’isfedintothe
identitynarrative:ifitisportrayedasaweaknessorasrestrictingthestate’scapacity
foraction,“thenthiswillaffecthowstateinterestsandpossibilitiesforactionare
conceived.Incontrast,morepositiverenderingsofsmallnessinconstructingstate
126Ibid.,p.52.127Ibid.,p.54.128C.Browning,‘Small,SmartandSalient?RethinkingIdentityinSmallStatesLiterature,’CambridgeReviewofInternationalAffairs19:4(2006),p.669.129Ibid.,p.671.
47
identitieswillentailbroaderpossibilitiesforforeignpolicies.”130Asaresult,studying
smallstatesisaworthwhileexercisebecausetheseactorspossessthecapacitytocast
their‘smallness’inwayswhicharerelevanttotheirforeignpolicybehaviour.
Browning’scasestudy,therefore,hasasimilarscopetothepresentthesisand,
althoughtherearesomedifferencesintheirapproaches,hisworkremainsan
importantreferencepointforit.
Overall,FPA,muchlikeSC,hasdevelopedinadirectionwhichsuitsthepurposesof
thisproject.Theacknowledgmentofidentityasadomesticfactorwhichinfluencesthe
foreignpolicydecision-makingprocesshasbeenfacilitatedbytheadoptionof
constructivistapproaches.Moreover,initscriticalconstructivist/postructuralist
strands,wehaveseenamovetowardssomeradicalclaimsaboutthenatureof
identitiesandtheroleofsocialprocessesintheirconstitutionanddevelopment.This
projectpicksupmanyoftheassumptionsandtypesofargumentmadebythese
theories.Firstly,themutuallyconstitutivenatureofagentsas‘culturebearers’and
identitiesiscriticaltothisthesis.Onthispoint,FPA,withitsagent-orientedagenda,
offersacontrastingperspectivetothatofthestructure-focusedSC.However,even
withinFPA,ashasbeenshown,therearedifferentpositionsonwherethebalancelies
withinthisrelationship,fromBreuningandBanerjee’sargumentsthathistorical
structureshaveanenduringqualitywhichlimitsorshapesagents’coursesofaction,to
identity-as-performancetheoriesinwhich“theselfisalwaysfreetonarrate
differently,tochangethestory.”131Ontheagent-structuredebate,aswillbediscussed
presently,thethesiswillpositionitselfinthemiddlegroundbyarguingthat,whilstas
socialconstructsstructuresofmeaningmayalwaysbealtered,themoresedimented
andentrenchedtheyarethemoredifficultthesestructuresbecometodisplace.
Havingsaidthat,thepremisesofthisprojectowemuchtocriticalconstructivistand
postructuralistworkonidentity.Oneoftheseisacknowledgingtheimportanceof
discourseintheprocessofconstitutingtheSelf.Itisthroughstories,ornarrativeson
‘whoweare’thatagentsareabletogenerateasenseofcollectiveidentity,
understandtheenvironmentinwhichtheyfunctionandattachmeaningtocertain
130Ibid.,p.674.131Browning(2008),p.58.
48
coursesofaction.Moreover,theprojectarguesthatnarrativesnotonlycreatea
currentsubjectiverealitybutalsoconstitutethepastinamannerwhichlegitimisesa
particularrepresentationoftheSelf.Historicalnarrativesthereforebecomeavehicle
forthesocialisationandsedimentationofspecificidentitynarrativesandtheinterests
whicharederivedfromthem.Furthermore,thethesisdrawsonthenotionthatinthe
processofestablishing‘whoweare,’agentsarealsoinherentlyoutlining‘whoweare
not.’Assuch,theprocessofdifferentiationfromOthersisvitaltotheconstitutionof
theSelf–identitynarrativescreate,bytheirverynature,threateningorfriendly
Others,butalso,aswillbeshowninthecaseofRomania,EstrangedSelves.Finally,
addingtotheincidenceofstudiesontheforeignpolicyofsmallstates,thisproject
takesasimilarviewtoBrowningontheutilityofexpandingtheagendainthisdirection
andtakingadvantageoftheexplanatorycapacityofconstructivistapproaches,in
contrasttothelimitedabilityofrationalist-materialistavenuestoaccountforthe
foreignpolicydifferencesbetweenminorpowers.
LimitationsofSCandFPAandtheContributionofthisThesistotheField
Thereis,therefore,anoverlapbetweenSCandFPAanditiswithinthisfieldthatthe
presentprojectfits.BothSCandFPAfeatureconstructivistapproachestothestudyof
stateaction.Furthermore,constructivismhasallowedtwoschoolswhichtraditionally
adoptdifferentstancesontheagency-structuredebatetomeetinthemiddle,atleast
toacertainextent;forSC,thishasmeantmoreattentionbeingpaidtoactors’capacity
toaltertheirstrategiccultureinthechangingenvironment,whilstforFPAithas
involvedaccountingforthepossibilitythatitisnotonlythatagentsshapethe
structure,butthathistoricalnarrativesandidentitiesalsoshapeactors.Thisoverlap
hasoccurredbecauseSC,whichhasculture/identityatitsheartthroughout,has
expandeditsresearchfromtherathernarrowinterestinthecultureoftheuseof
force,intothebroaderfieldofpoliticalandnationalculture.ForFPA,ontheother
hand,thecrucialshiftwasinincludingidentityintherangeofdomesticfactorswhich
haveanimpactonforeignpolicy.Finally,bothfieldshaveexpandedtheirresearchinto
thestudyofsmallstates,goingagainstthetraditionalfocusonthebehaviourofmajor
powers.However,thereexistalsosomeimportantdifferencesbetweenthesetwo
49
traditions,especiallyintermsoftheirapproachtothestudyofidentityand,generally,
therelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure.Theaimofthisthesisistofinda
middlepathwhichbringstheseapproachestogetherand,insodoing,providea
frameworkforresearchingtheinfluenceofidentityonthebehaviourofstateswhichis
sensitivetoallthecomplexitiesinvolvedinthedevelopmentofidentities.
SCandtheStudyofIdentity
Forthepurposesofthisproject,themostimportantlimitationofSCistobefoundin
themannerinwhichidentityisconceptualizedandstudied.Ashasalreadybeen
outlined,bydrawingonweakconstructivistclaimsaboutthenatureofsocialreality,
SCtendstotreatidentitiesinanessentialistmanner,asvariableswhichserveto
explainparticularpatternsofbehaviour.Thereexists,onewouldargue,alargely
exclusivefocusondescribingthecontentofcultures,whilstthesocialprocesses
throughwhichtheyareconstitutedinthefirstplacearenotinvestigated.Inhisstudy
ofGermanyandJapan,forinstance,Bergerdoesnotengagewiththeprocessofhow
thepost-waridentitiesdevelopedbutlimitshimselftoexploringhowtheyimpacted
onthetwostates’strategicculture.132ThisfactispickedupbyKatzensteininthe
conclusiontothevolume:“theempiricalessayshavelittletosayaboutthemannerby
whichcollectiveidentitiesandnormsareconstructedthroughdifferentgenerative
processes:ecological,socialandinternal.”133ThesamecouldbesaidofErmarth’s
studyofRussianstrategiccultureorDalgaard-Nielsen’saccountofGermany–neither
examinethedeeperculturalmeaningsattachedtothepositionsoutlined,orthe
processeswhichhaveledtotheirdevelopment.134Overall,mostSCstudiestendtobe
concernedsolelywiththeimpactofidentityonbehaviour,whilstitssourcesand
evolutionarepredominantlybracketed;incidentally,thismirrorsDoty’scriticismof
mainstreamFPA.Thefocustendstobeonwhyratherthanhowquestions,whichis
132Berger(1996),pp.317-356.133J.Katzenstein(a),‘Conclusion,’inP.Katzenstein(ed.),TheCultureofNationalSecurity–NormsandIdentityinWorldPolitics(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.513.134Ermarth(2009),Dalgaard-Nielsen(2005).
50
moreproblematicforSCthanitisforFPA,preciselybecauseculture/identityisitscore
concern.
PickinguponacriticismleviedbyZehfussagainstWendtwhichcanbeappliedto
strategicculturalistsalso,“theexclusionof(…)domesticprocessesofarticulationof
stateidentityarepartoftheproblem.”135Theissuewiththisapproachtothestudyof
identityisthat,bynotexamininghoworwhyaspecificactorhascometodevelopa
specificidentity,thesubjectiverationaleforactiontheidentitygeneratesremains
underdetermined.Whatweareleftwithisaschematicrepresentationofstate
identitiesandinterestswhichmayexplaincertainbehaviours,butnotall.AsWaever
andHansenpointout,thetheory“isunabletoexplaininasystematicway–beyond
historicalnarrative–whythesameculturalandhistoricalbackgroundcansustain
highlycontradictoryforeignpolicies,ortoexplainchange,especiallydiscontinuous
change.”136Whilstacknowledgingthatchangesinbothidentityand,consequently,
policyarepossible,SC’sweakconstructivismdoesnotprovideanadequateframework
foritsinvestigation.Inotherwords,tounderstandthefullspectrumofbehaviours
whichmayberenderedaslegitimateorillegitimate,necessaryorimpossibleata
specificmomentintime,adifferentapproachtothestudyofidentityisneeded.Most
importantly,thisapproachmustinterrogateseriouslytheroleofagencyinidentity
construction,anissueonwhichSCrarelytouchesupon.
Anavenueforaddressingthislimitationisofferedbycriticalconstructivistsand
poststructuralistswhoplacesocialprocessesattheverycoreoftheiranalysis.
Understandingidentitiesasbeingarticulatedthroughdiscoursehighlightsthe
importanceofnarrativestoidentityconstitution.Whatiskeyisthatdescribing
identitiesisinsufficienttograspingtheirinfluenceonbehaviourbecauseidentitiesare
notgeneratedoutofthinair.Theyaresubjectiveconstructswhichprovideanswersto
criticalquestionsregardingthenatureoftheSelfandthemannerinwhichitrelatesto
theoutsideworld,whichisitselfcreatedintheprocessofconstitutingtheSelf.
Therefore,examininghowevents,bothpastandpresentareperceivedbyagentsand
135Zehfuss(2006),p.111.136Waever(2002),p.22.
51
howstoriesabouttheSelfarereinforcedorchallengedataparticularmomentintime
isvitaltoexplainingachangeorcontinuityinbehaviour.Moreover,becausemultiple
answerstothesamequestionsof‘whoweare’or‘whatthiseventmeans’are
possible,thestabilityandunitarycharacterofidentitiesneedstobeprovenandnot
takenforgranted,asisthecasewiththevastmajorityofSCstudies.Consequently,the
projectwilldrawontheinsightsprovidedbycriticalconstructivistsandpostructuralists
toshownotonlyhowstoriesaboutRomanianidentityinfluencethestate’sbehaviour,
butalsohowthefeaturesoftheidentitynarrativewhichshapeforeignpolicypriorities
haveemergedandacquiredgreatstayingpower.Theprojectwillidentifytherecurring
themesofRomanianidentity–similarlytoBrowning’sexercise–andplacethemin
historicalcontext,tracinghowthenarrativesurroundingthemhasbeenadaptedor
reinforcedatkeymomentsinthestate’sevolution.Thebenefitofthishistorical
perspectiveisthatitcapturesthemutuallyconstitutivenatureofstoriesofnational
identityandhistory;ontheonehand,theportrayaloftheSelfandOthersisreflected
inthenarrativeofRomania’shistory;meanwhile,thehistoricalnarrativeactsasan
instrumentforthesocialisationoftheseportrayals.Thisapproachoffersanavenue
intounderstandingthecontinuityorchangeofnationalidentitynarrativesand,
consequently,behaviour,bylinkingittothedialoguebetweentheagents–Romanians
–andthestructure–theidentitynarrative–throughthetellingofnationalhistory.
TheAgent-StructureDebate
Drawingonthepointabove,thenextnecessarystepisoutliningthethesis’positionon
thequestionoftherelationshipbetweenagencyandstructure.Ashasbeenpreviously
examined,SCandFPAtraditionallytakecontrastingviewsonthematter,withthe
formerpredominantlystructuralistandthelatteragent-oriented.Although
constructivismhas,toacertainextent,bridgedthisgap,differencesinapproach
remain.Aswehaveseen,SCtendstofavourstructureoveragency.Thisisevident,for
instance,intheworkofKatzensteinetal,who“areinterestedinhowstructuresof
constructedmeaning,embodiedinnormsoridentities,affectwhatstatesdo.”137
ThereisanobviousconnectioninthispositiontoSC’sweakconstructivismandtheir
137Jeppersonetal(1996),p.66.
52
lackofconcernwiththeprocessesinvolvedin(re)constitutingidentitiesrootedina
predilectiontowardsposingwhyratherthanhowquestions.Animportantexception
tothistrendisrepresentedbyRasmussen’sstudyofDanishdiscourseonmilitary
strategybut,ashasbeennoted,heisheavilyinfluencedbycritical
constructivist/postructuralistworkonidentity.HisapproachmatchesthatofFPA
authorssuchasDoty,CosandBilginandBrowningwhosimilarlyfocusonagents’
discursiveconstructionoftheSelfandOthers.However,outsideofcritical
constructivist/postructuraliststudies,withinFPAtherealsoexistsmovementonthis
debate,withauthorssuchasBanerjeeorSnyderetal,forinstance,allowingfora
greaterdegreeofimpactofculturalstructuresovertheagent.
Asforthisproject,takingintoaccountthecriticalassumptionsregardingthe
importanceofsocialprocessesinthegenerationofidentitynarratives,itfollowsthat
SC’sthoroughgoingstructuralismmustberejected.Thethesisunderstandsaparticular
representationoftheSelfasbeingarticulatedthroughnarrativeand,insodoing,
acknowledgesthatagentscananddointeractwiththestructureinmeaningfulways.
Inaneverchanginginternationalanddomesticenvironments,thenatureandprecepts
ofstoriesofnationalidentityareunderconstantscrutinyandpressure.Whenthe
contextchanges,whenaperceptionemergesthatathreathasemergedor
disappeared,there-evaluationofcertainidentitarytenetsmaybenecessary.Inthis
sense,theprojectagreeswithBrowning’sassertionthatcertainnarrativesofidentity
maygainsalienceandbecomeentrenchedorbemarginalisedovertime,138andinthis
theroleofagentsisparamount.Thetwoparticularsuchinstancesthisthesiswillfocus
onaretheinteractionofNicolaeCeausescuandIonIliescuwiththeRomanianidentity
narrativeduringthecommunistperiodanditsaftermath.However,thefreedom
awardedtoagentsinalteringidentitynarrativesorcomingupwithnewones
noticeableinmuchofcriticalconstructivist/postructuralistworkisslightlyproblematic.
Forinstance,inDoty’sexaminationoftheUScounterinsurgencyofthePhilippines,she
examineshow“thesubjects,objects,andinterpretivedispositionsweresocially
constructed”139insuchawaythataninterventionwhichwouldhavebeenillegitimate
138Browning(2008),p.16.139Doty(1993),p.298.
53
ifthePhilippineswererepresentedasasovereignequalwasmadepossible.Inthis
case,theagent,theUS,hadcompletefreedomtoconstitutethesubjectofPhilippines,
anOther,intoanentityagainstwhomactionwasjustified.ForBrowning,too,identity
asperformancemeansthat“theconstitutionoftheselfisalwaysinprocess,and
alwaysopentochangeanddevelopment.”140Inthisview,“multiplenarrativesof
identityarealwaysinplay,eachwithvaryingconstitutiveeffectsandpower.”141Again,
agentsplayacriticalroleindeterminingwhichrepresentationoftheSelfbecomes
dominantandhowandwhenitischallengedbydevelopingandbringingintoplay
alternativenarratives.
Onequestions,however,whetherthesepositionsaccuratelyreflectthebalance
betweenagencyandstructure.Moreover,ifagentshaveanunhinderedabilitytoalter
thestructuresofidentitynarratives,thenthereisnopossiblewayinwhichthelatter
mayinfluencetheformerintermsofbehaviour,whichwouldrenderthisproject
purposeless.Instead,thisthesisproposesthatstructuresofidentitynarrativesmay
acquireacertaindegreeofresilienceand,insodoing,limitagents’abilitytomodify
them,especiallyindrasticways.Atthesametimeasbeingresilienttochange,these
structureswillhaveanimpactonthebehaviourofactors,bymakingcertaincoursesof
actionpossibleandothersimpossible.Onarrivingatthisposition,thethesisdrawson
WaeverandHansen’sworkonNordicstatesandEuropeanintegration.Whereasthey
describethemselvesaspostructuralistintheirfocusontheconstructionofstructures
ofmeaningthroughdiscourse,theyacknowledgethattheyare“morestructuralist”142
intheirargumentthatparticularconceptionsofstate,nationandpeoplemayhave
specialstaying-power.Theysuggestthat,whilstmultipleandcompetingdiscourseson
identitymayexistatthesametime,somegodeeperthanothersintermsoftheir
sedimentation,makingtheseparticularnarrativesespeciallydifficulttodisplace.They
proposealayereddiscursivestructureinwhich“deeperstructures,”suchas
conceptionsofstateandnation,“aremoresolidlysedimentedandmoredifficultto
140Browningbook,p.48.141Ibid.,p.14.142L.Hansen,‘Introduction,’inL.HansenandO.Waever(eds.),EuropeanIntegrationandNationalIdentity–TheChallengeoftheNordicStates(London:Routledge,2002),p.5.
54
politiciseandchange,”143thansurfacelayersconcerningEurope.Inthisapproach,
agents’abilitytoconstituteEuropeasasubject,andinso-doingarticulateaparticular
‘nationalinterest’inregardstointegration,isrestrictedbyaconceptualconstellation
whichfusesstatewithnationandthePeopleandseesanymovestowardssupra-
statehoodasinherentlythreatening.144Inthisview,theabilityofagentstoalterthis
deeperdiscursivestructureonstateandnationisseverelylimited,becauseofits
sedimentation.This,inturn,affectstheircapacitytoaltertheconstellationofmeaning
concerningEurope,becausedeepstructuresprovidethefoundationforlayerscloser
tothesurface.145
WhatWaeverandHansen’sperspectiveoffers,therefore,isawayoflinkingthecritical
constructivist/postrstructuralistconceptionofidentitywithamorestructuralist
approachaccordingtowhich,whilsteventhedeepeststructuresofidentitynarratives
mayberearticulated–astheyare,afterall,discursiveconstructs,-theyare
nonethelesshighlyresilienttoalterationbyagents.Forthisproject,keyinthe
developmentofsuchidentitynarrativesaretheprocessesofsedimentationand
socialisation.Whenaparticularnarrativehasbeenreproduced,alongitsbroadlines,
overthecourseofseveralgenerations,asitwillbearguedwasthecaseinRomania,it
becomesincreasinglydifficulttodisplaceasthedominantrepresentationoftheSelf
andrestrictiveintermsofagents’abilitytoalteritsmaintenets.Thatisthecase,one
wouldsuggest,fortworeasons.Firstly,pickinguponapointmadebySnyderetal,
agents’ownrationalityisshapedbytheidentitynarrativeinwhichtheywere
socialised146and,assuch,allinteractionsbetweenagentsandthestructureare
achievedfromapositionwithinratherthanwithoutthesubjectiverealitygenerated
bytheoriginalidentitynarrative.Consequently,certaincoursesofactionwillbe
perceivedaspossible,whilstotherswillbeimpossible;theselimitsultimatelyalso
includethemannerinwhichtheSelfanditsinterestsmaybe(re)presented.Secondly,
foranewnarrativetotakerootsitneedstobeacceptedand,subsequently,socialised.
Assuch,discourseswhichseemtogoagainstthefundamentalvaluesofthedominant
143Waever(2002),p.32.144Ibid.,p.80.145Browning,p.61.146Snyderetal(1963),p.156.
55
representationinplay,asHansenshowsinhercasestudyofDenmark,147are
particularlydifficulttolegitimateatsocietallevelandthereforeunlikelytogain
traction.Whilstchangestothesesedimentedstructuresispossible,theymustbe
incrementalandoccurintheopportunecircumstancesofastableenvironmentwhich
wouldallowfortheirsocialisation,inotherwords,fortheshapingofanewgeneration
ofagents.
Thebenefitofthismiddlegroundapproach,asopposedtothosewhichfavoureither
agencyorstructure,isthatitallowsonetotracetheinfluenceofagentsonstructures
ofidentitynarrativesandvice-versa.Fromthisposition,narrativealterationisa
possibility,butnotanecessity,ascertainconditionsmustbefulfilledforittooccur.
Thisallowstheresearchertoexaminebothcontinuity–theremitofmostSCstudies–
andchange–thefocusofdiscursiveapproaches–inidentitynarrativesandbehaviour.
Moreover,thisperspectivedoesnotoutrightdismissSC’sassumptionthatidentities
arestableandunitary.Thethesisarguesthatnarrativesofidentitymayindeedhavea
certaindegreeofstability,relativetotheleveloftheirsedimentation.Equally,in
situationsinwhichthedominantrepresentationoftheSelfhasbecomeentrenchedit
willbedifficultforalternativeportrayalsabouttheSelftoemergeandevenmore
difficultforthemtobecomeacceptedatthesocietallevel.However,whatiskeyisthat
thisisnotagiven.Suchstructuresonlycomeaboutinspecificcircumstances,asisthe
caseofRomaniaand,asaresult,thestabilityandunitarycharacterofthesestructures
mustbeinterrogated,ratherthantakenforgranted.
TheUtilityofa‘SmallState’CaseStudy
Finally,thisprojectsaddstothefieldbyfocusingonasmallstatewhichhasrarely
beenthesubjectofacademicinvestigation.Ashasbeenoutlined,mosttraditional
analysestendtoconcernmajorpowers.Althoughthereisincreasinginterestinthe
identitypoliticsofminorpowers,148thissectionofthefieldisstillunder-researched,
particularlyinEasternEurope.Acase-studyofRomaniathereforecontributestothe
147L.Hansen,‘SustainingSovereignty:TheDanishApproachtoEurope,’inL.HansenandO.Waever(eds.),EuropeanIntegrationandNationalIdentity–TheChallengeoftheNordicStates(London:Routledge,2002).148Rasmussen(2005),Browning(2006,2007,2008,2010).
56
understandingofidentity-basedmotivationsofastatewhichhasanimportantroleto
playinthesecurityandstabilityoftheEasternhalfofthecontinent.Thisisallthe
morethecaseastensionsbetweentheEuropeanUnionandNATOontheonehand,
andRussiaontheother,areatapost-ColdWarhigh.Thisthesisagreeswithboth
Rasmussen’spointthattheeffectsontheinternationalenvironmentcausedbythe
actionsofmajorpowersaremostaccuratelygaugedinthebehaviourofsmall
states,149andBrowning’sargumentthatminorpowersretainacertainfreedomof
actiondictatedbytheirperceptionofhow‘smallness’affectsthem.150Romania’sown
narrativeonidentityhasoftenhighlightedtheanxietiescausedbyitssmall-state
condition,particularlyintermsoftheinfluenceexertedbygreaterpowersinits
domesticaffairs.ItisequallytruethatRomania’shistory,andprobablyfuture,has
beenandwilllargelybedeterminedbythebalanceofpowerandnatureofinteraction
betweenRussiaandtheWest.
That,however,doesnotmeanthatRomania’sforeignpolicyshouldbeseensimplyas
apredictablereactiontotheinterplaybetweengreatpowers,northatitsagendaisset
solelybyitsstrongerallies.Thisthesisarguesthatthistypeofassessmentiserroneous
becauseitfocusesonexternalpressuresanddiscountstheinternalmotivationsbehind
thestate’sbehaviour.Byadoptinganidentity-basedperspective,Romaniaappearsnot
asapowerlessentity,guidedinitsbehaviourbythegreatpowers,butasan
autonomousactor,whichfunctionswithinauniqueinter-subjectivereality.Theutility
instudyingit,then,liesintheacknowledgmentthatRomaniaalsofeaturesunique
patternsofbehaviourwhichcorrespondtohistoricallyenduringclaimsaboutits
identity.InRomania’scase,theseentrenchedbeliefshaveinfluencedbothitsgeneral
foreignpolicydirection–namelyanemphasisonitsWesternalliances–andits
contemporaryrelationstoitssignificantOthers–thecasestudiesfocusonRussia,
HungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova.Inthesethreerelationshipsparticularlyitwill
bearguedthatidentity-basedanxietiesandprerogativesinfluenceRomania’s
behaviourtowardsthem.Bystudyingthenatureoftheseelementsandtheirimpact
onforeignpolicy,thisthesisaimstohighlighttheroleRomaniaplays–orseesitselfto
149Rasmussen(2005),p.68.150Browning(2006),p.674.
57
beplaying–inEasternEuropeandhowitsactionsmightshapethefuturestabilityand
securityoftheregion.
Overall,thebenefitofthisstudyisfirstlythatitfillsagapintheresearch,asanalyses
ofthisstate’sforeignpolicyspecificallyarerare,andgenerallyadoptaneo-realistof
neo-liberalperspective.151Fromanidentity-basedapproach,however,themotivations
behindRomania’sinternationalbehaviourappearmorecomplexthantheseaccounts
wouldassume.Ontheotherhand,focusingonRomaniaandthenatureandqualityof
itsrelationshipwithitsneighboursoffersaclearerpictureoftheinteractionbetween
EasternEuropeanstates,bothwithintheEUandNATOaswellastheirrelationswith
Russia.Thisprojectcapturestheintricacyoftheserelationsandshowshow,inan
interconnectedworld,theactionsofevenasmallstatemayhaveprofoundregionalor
internationalrepercussions.Inthisview,identity-basedtensionsbetweenRomania
andHungaryaresignificantbecausetheymayaffectthestabilityandeffectivenessof
theEUandNATO,organisationsbothstatesaremembersof.Similarly,Romania’s
perceptionsofthethreatposedbyRussia’sannexationofCrimeadiffersignificantlyto
thoseofmanyintheWest,duetothisstate’sportrayalofitshistoricalexperienceof
interactionwithanexpansionistRussia.Understandingthemotivationsbehind
Romania’sbehaviour,therefore,isnotonlyausefulendeavourinitself,butisvaluable
inrevealingthestateofaffairsintheregionasawhole.
Conclusion
Thischapterhasplacedthethesisinthefieldofconstructiviststudiesintothelink
betweennationalidentityandforeignpolicy,intheareaofintersectionofSCandFPA.
Findingamiddlegroundbetweentheweakconstructivistandpredominantly
structuralistapproachofculture-focusedSCandFPA’straditionalagent-oriented
perspective,aswellasthedeeperconceptionofidentityemployedbyitscritical
constructiviststrand,isnotaneasyfeat.However,bydevelopinganarrativetheoryof
identityandcouplingthiswithabalancedapproachtotheagent-structuredebate,one
mayarguethisis,indeed,possible.Whatisultimatelyrequiredinstudyingthe
influenceofidentityonbehaviour–SC’smainaim–isanexpansionoffocus,which
151See,forinstanceAndreev(2009),Gallagher(1998),Ivanov(2010),Nicolescu(2010),Turnock(2001).
58
incorporatesbothhowandwhyquestions.Understandingidentitiesassubjective
storiesabouttheSelfallowsonetoeffectivelyinterrogatetheroleofagentsin
constructingidentitiesthroughsocialprocessessuchasthetellingofnationalhistory.
However,contrarytothepositionofmostcriticalconstructivist/postructuralist
authorsreviewedinthischapter,thethesisarguesthatthedeepest,mostentrenched
structuresofmeaningwhicharticulateintoidentitynarrativesareparticularlydifficult
todisplaceand,asaresult,acertaindoseofstructuralismisrequiredtotrulygraspthe
relationshipbetweenagentsandtheiridentity.Finally,thethesisalsoaddstoa
broadeningofthefieldofresearch,byfocusingonasmallpowerwhichhasrarely
beenthesubjectofanidentity-basedanalysis.Byrevealingtheinternalmotivations
behindRomania’sactions,thisthesisarguesthatnotonlyaresmallstatesinfluenced
byidentitaryfactors,butthattheiractionshaverepercussionsataregionalandeven
internationallevel.Ultimately,thepointisthatmakingsenseand/orpredictingthe
behaviourofsmallstatesrequires,muchasisthecasewithgreatpowers,an
understandingoftheuniqueidentitieswhichshapetheforeignpolicydecisionsofsuch
actors.
59
Chapter2.Methods–ApproachandConsiderations
Thischapterhighlightsthemethodologyemployedforthepurposesofthisprojectas
wellascertainconsiderationsrelatedtoitandissplitintotwosection.Thefirst
discussesthebenefitsofemployingaconstructivistapproachinthestudyofRomanian
identityanditsbearingonforeignpolicyandlocatesthepresentthesiswithinexisting
debatesaboutconstructivismwithreferencetoSCandFPA.Secondly,afteranoteon
interviewsandtranslations,themethodologyoftheprojectisexpandedupon:atwo-
stepapproachisoutlined,thefirstofwhichisconcernedwiththenatureand
developmentoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeandthesecondwiththemannerin
whichitinfluencesbehaviour.Thesectiondiscussesthethesis’processoftacklingthe
twostepsinthecorechaptersandthesourcesitwillutilisetothisend.
EmployingaConstructivistApproach
Asmentionedpreviously,thereexistsarathersmallselectionofaccountsofRomania’s
foreignpolicyagenda,coveringeithertheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheColdWar
(knowndomesticallyas‘thetransition’)orthetimesincethestate’saccessiontoNATO
andtheEUwasachieved(2007andonwards).ThestudieswhichdoaddressRomania’s
foreignpolicyunsurprisinglyoutlinethedifficultyoftransitionandtheslowpaceof
domesticreformmeanttoalignthestatetothestandardrequiredformembershipof
thesetwoorganisations.Traditionalexplanationsofferedofboththeparticulargoalof
accessionandthechallengesRomaniafacedinachievingittendtofocusonthe
generaltrendofformersocialiststatesseekingmembershipofEuro-Atlantic
organisations152andonthecontinuationofcommunisteraautomatismsbyRomania’s
politicalleadership,respectively.153Inotherwordsandtoputitsimply,thegeneral
perceptionisthatRomaniaappliedtojointheEUandNATObecause,aswasthecase
withalltheEasternblocstates,thiswasthesensiblethingtodo,andhaddifficultiesin
accomplishingthisaimbecauseoftheill-judgeddecisionsofitspoliticalelites.Since
accession,thebulkofstudiesonRomaniatendtofocusonitspolicyofalignmentwith
152Nicolescu(2010),p.65.153SeeGallagher(1995,1998),Cinopoes,(2010)etc.
60
thegeneraldirectionpursuedbytheinternationalorganisationsitisamemberof154
and,again,thechallengesposedbyintegrationtoasystemstillplaguedbya
communistlegacy.155
Onewouldarguethatwhattheseaccountshaveincommonisamainstream
materialistandrationalistapproachtoRomania’sbehaviour.Whetheradoptinga
NeorealistorNeoliberalperspective,suchstudieshavelargelyfocusedonwhatcould
bedirectlyobservedandempiricallyproven,withapreoccupation,asBrowningnotes,
“withpositinguniversallawsofrationalbehaviour.”156Explanationshighlightingthe
‘returntoEurope’trendfitsneatlyinthiscategory.Ontheotherhand,perspectives
whichfocusonRomania’slittleexperienceofbeingademocracyandstrong
communistlegacybetraythetypeoftreatmentofideationalfactorspresentinthe
workofNeoliberalssuchasGoldsteinandKeohane.157Inthisview,whereasideasare
broughtintothefold,withafocusonthosedrawnfromcommunistexperience,all
theseideasdoisobscurewhatwouldotherwisehavebeentherationalandlogical
courseofactiontobeundertakenduringtransition.Inotherwords,explanations
revolvearoundthenotionthatRomanianelitesinfluencedbytheircommunistera
trainingwereunabletodiscerntheirandtheirstate’sobjectiveinterestincarryingout
reformand,asaresult,theprocessofaccessionwasprolongedandmadeneedlessly
morechallenging.
However,thenotionthatRomaniabehavesasarationalactordrivenbyobjective
interestsreadilycomprehensibletooutsideobserversisproblematicbecause,as
Browningcontinues,“itentailsahollowconceptionofsubjectivityandofidentity.”158
InsofarasRomaniahasanidentity,thisisdictatedbyitscapabilitiesandposition
withintheinternationalsystem,i.e.asmallstateoftheformerEasternbloc.Inwhatits
politicalleadershipisconcerned,theiridentityandinterestsarecapturedunderthe
labelof‘unreformedcommunists.’However,thisthesisarguesthatthisapproach
154Nicolescu(2010).155SeeGallagher(2009),Andreev(2009),forinstance.156Browning(2008),p.18.157J.GoldsteinandR.Keohane,‘IdeasandForeignPolicy:AnAnalyticalFramework,’inJ.GoldsteinandR.Keohane,IdeasandForeignPolicy–Beliefs,Institutions,andPoliticalChange(Ithaca,NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1993),158Browning(2008),p.18.
61
betraysanimpoverishedappreciationoftheinternalmotivationsbehindRomania’s
behaviour,bothbeforeandafteraccession,andthereforeseekstoaddanotherlayer
ofunderstandingtothishithertorarelyexploreddimension.Constructivism,onthe
otherhand,offersanavenueintoexploringidentitiesassocialconstructsgenerated
withinthedomesticenvironmentinwhichtheactorfunctions.Inthisview,farfrom
beingepiphenomenal,identitiesareattheverycoreofestablishingwhatarational
courseofactionentailsinaparticularsituation.Aconstructivistapproachreveals
Romanianotasanactorwhoseinterestsaredeterminedbymaterialcapabilitiesora
schematicrepresentationofitselite’scharacteristics,butasonewithitsown
viewpointoftheinternationalrealmandaperceptionofitspositionwithinit,and
whicharticulatesinterestsinresponsetobothexternalandinternalpressuresasthey
areinterpreteddomestically.
InlightofthecriticismbroughttomainstreamperspectivesonRomania’spost-socialist
foreignpolicyagenda,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatthisthesisemploysa
constructivistapproach.Havingsaidthat,asthepreviouschaptermadeclear,there
existsavarietyofconstructivistpositionsbeingadoptedwithinbothSCandFPA.There
iscertainlyaprofounddifference,bothintermsofclaimsaboutthenatureofidentity
andthemannerinwhichitshouldbestudied,betweentheweakconstructivism
predominantinSCandthecriticalconstructivist/postructuraliststrandofFPA.The
issueswithweakconstructivism’sconceptionofidentityhavelargelybeenoutlined
earlier,andthischapterwillnotgothroughthemagainindetail.However,thelackof
interestintheprocessesthroughwhichidentitiesarearticulatedisdeeplyproblematic
becauseiteschewsfromthecomplexitiesofidentityconstructionanditslinksto
foreignpolicymaking.Onesuchissueisitscommitmenttoobjectivism,andthenotion
thatidentityisavariabletheinfluenceoverbehaviourofwhichcanbeexaminedsolely
byrecoursetohistoricalrecounting.Bytreatingidentityinthiswaythese
constructivistseludethefactthatidentitiesdonotsimplyexist,butaresubjective
interpretationsofwhotheactorwasorisatanyonepointintime.Moreover,the
processesofsocialisationthroughwhichtheseinterpretationsbecomeacceptedas
truearebracketedintheirinquiry.Assuch,internaldebatesabouttheSelfandthe
roleofagentsinalteringorreinforcingparticularstructuresofmeaningare
62
inaccessibletotheiranalysis.InthecaseofRomania,thisperspectivecouldnotexplain
thewayinwhichthestoryofRomanianidentitywasadaptedtofitthechallengesof
transitionoraccession.Anothersignificantdrawbackinthisapproachisthatthe
theorycannotaccountforaspecific,yetcriticalissues–thataparticular
representationoftheSelfismutuallyconstitutedinrelationtoportrayalsofOthers.In
otherwords,thatitisthroughprocessesofdifferentiationandassociationthatagents
renderintelligibletheenvironmentandactorsaroundthem,butalsopindownthe
Self.159Sincetheseportrayalsgenerateintereststobepursuedthroughforeignpolicy,
changesinbehaviourtowardsOthersnotonlyreflectapotentialreassessmentof
theseactorsasfriendsorfoes,butalsosignalare-evaluationofcriticalprecepts
regardingtheSelf.Again,goingbacktothecasestudy,weakconstructivismcannot
explainhowchangesinforeignpolicytowardsRomania’sOthersbecamepossiblein
contextsinwhichparticularidentity-relatedprioritiesconcerningtheSelfwere
reorderedinthefaceofanever-changingdomesticandinternationalenvironments.
Overall,weakconstructivismdoesnotofferacomprehensiveframeworkforstudying
Romanianidentityoritslinktothestate’sbehaviour.Instead,thisthesisdrawson
criticalconstructivist/postructuralistthoughtinordertoexplorehowidentitiesare
developedandfunction.Itputsforwardanarrativetheoryofidentity,inwhichthe
storieswetellourselvesaboutwhoweareandtheenvironmentinwhichwefunction
notonlyhaveabearingonforeignpolicyandbehaviour,butalsomakeaction
meaningful.160Inthissense,storiesaboutidentityareseenasbotharesult,because
theyaresocialised,andacreatoroftheuniquesubjectiverealityinwhichtheSelfand
Othersarepositioned.161Acknowledgingtheimportanceofdiscourseinthe
constitutionoftheSelf,acrucialroleinthegenerationofnarrativesonidentityis
attributedtothetellingofnationalhistory.Thethesisarguesthat,byconstructing
storiesabouthistoricaleventsandrelationships,itbecomespossibletorenderthe
presentinamannerwhichisintelligibletous.Theinextricablelinkbetweenhistorical
andidentitynarrativesliesinthenotionthat‘whowewere’legitimatesaparticular
159Neumann(1995),p.27.160Browning(2008),p.45.161Ibid.,p.46.
63
representationof‘whoweare,’butalso‘whoweshouldbe.’Storiesaboutthepast
Selfthereforebecomevehiclesforthedisseminationofspecificidentitynarrativesand
theinterestswhichflowfromthem.Asaresult,oneofthemainaimsofthisthesisis
toshowhowtheRomaniannarrativeonhistoryhasbeendevelopedandexplorethe
mainidentity-relatedthemeswhichemergefromit.Moreover,becausetheSelfand
Othersaremutuallyconstituted,theprojectwillalsoshowhow,throughoutthe
historicalnarrative,particularrepresentationsofthreesignificantOthersare
generatedinthecourseofconstitutingtheRomanianSelf,throughprocessesof
differentiationandassociation.
Havingsaidthat,wherethethesisdivergesfromthevastmajorityofcritical
constructivist/postructuraliststudiesanddrawsonthestructuralismofSCand,
importantly,theworkofWaeverandHansen,isontheissueoftheenduranceof
identitynarratives.Theprojectarguesthatparticularstructuresofmeaning,once
socialised,acquireasedimentedquality.ThemoreastoryabouttheSelfis
reproduced,therefore,themoreitbecomesentrenchedanddifficulttodisplace.This
isexactlythecase,itwillbeargued,inthecaseofRomania,wherethehistoricaland
identitynarrativeshavebeendisseminatedalongthesamelinesoverseveral
generations.Asaresult,specificconceptionsaboutthenatureoftheRomanianSelf
anditsOthershavebecomerootedintheRomanianimaginaryandarehighly
influentialandresilienttochange.Forinstance,thisappliestonotionsaboutwhatthe
roleoftheRomanianstateisandthethreateningnatureofHungaryandRussia,as
Romania’shistoricalfoes.Fromthesedeepeststructuresofmeaningemergeparticular
anxieties–‘thiscannotbedone’–andprerogatives–‘thismustbedone’–which
generateparticularattitudesandintereststhatarepursuedthroughbothdomestic
andforeignpolicy.Maintainingterritorialintegrityorensuringthesecurityand
sovereigntyofthestatefallintothiscategory.Inacknowledgingtheroleofagency,
however,thisisnottosaythatthesestructuresarecompletelyrigidandtheirbearing
overagentsisuniform.
Therewillbesituationsinwhichcertainprerogativesgenerateconflictinggoals
requiringagentstogiveoneantecedenceovertheother.Equally,therelativestrength
64
ofanxietiesisnotconstantovertimeandthisiswhentheinfluenceoftherespective
structuresofmeaningoveragentsisdiminished.Indeed,anxietiesmayrecedeor
becomeaugmented,becausetheyrespondtochangesinboththedomesticand
externalenvironments,orratheragents’interpretationofthem.Forinstance,
apprehensionoverrelationswithathreateningOthermaydiminishifthatOther
ceasestobeconsideredathreat.Itwillbearguedthatinperiodssuchasthese,when
anxietiessurroundingparticularissuesarelowwithmultiplegoalsinplay,agentsenjoy
morefreedominreorderingpriorities,adoptingdifferentattitudesandarticulating
newinterestsinconnectiontothem.Forexample,thegoalofmaintainingdistance
fromapreviouslythreateningOthermaybesupersededbythatofaccessiontoan
internationalorganisationwhichpresupposescooperationwiththisOtherand
thereforeaninterestinestablishingamiablerelationsmaybearticulated.This,itwill
beargued,arepreciselythecircumstanceswhichsawasignificantdétenteinthe
relationshipbetweenRomaniaandHungaryinthe1990s.Becausethesegoals–
distancefromHungaryandaccessiontotheEUandNATO,–bothofwhicharerooted
intheidentitynarrativeandtheprerogativesofensuringstatesecurity,sovereignty
andunity-cannotbesecuredatthesametime,agentsmustprioritiesoneoverthe
other.ThisorderingofprioritiesdependsbothonwhetherHungaryisperceivedasa
threatandtherelativeextenttowhichitisconsideredthatthestatewillbenefitfrom
achangeinattitude.Agents’owninterpretationofthedomesticandinternational
environmentsisthereforekeyintheprocessofestablishingpriorities,whilethe
structureoftheidentitynarrativeismalleableenoughtoallowforthistypeof
changes.This,ineffect,explainswhyandhowthesameidentitynarrativemay
legitimateabroadspectrumofbehaviours162andrevealsagencyandstructureas
mutuallyconstituted,witheachexertingacertainlevelofinfluence,withoutholding
dominion,overtheother.
Throughthisapproach,thethesisseekstobridgethevariousconstructivistpositions
employedwithinSCandFPA.SimilarlytoWaeverandHansen,onewoulddescribeitas
criticalconstructivistinitsapproachtothestudyofidentityandtheconstructionof
structuresofmeaning.However,itremainsmorestructuralistthanotherstudiesdue
162Waever(2002),p.22.
65
toitsassumptionthatsedimentedidentitynarrativeshaveacertainresilienceto
changeand,therefore,abearingonagents,byshapingnotionsofnationalinterestand
generatingprerogativesandred-lines.Nonetheless,inacknowledgingagents’rolein
constructingidentitynarrativesinthefirstplaceandtheirabilitytointeractwitheven
thedeepeststructuresofmeaning,thethesisdepartsfromthe‘thoroughgoing’
structuralismofSC,treadingthemiddlegroundinwhatconcernstheagent-structure
debate.Thisapproach,however,posesanumberofmethodologicalchallenges,in
termsofhowexactlyonemaygoaboutanalysingboththenatureandcontentaswell
astheinfluenceofsedimentedclaimsaboutidentityonstatebehaviour.
Consequently,thefollowingsectiondealswiththeproject’smethodology.
Methodology
ANoteonInterviewsandRomanianSources
ForthepurposesofthisresearchseveralinterviewswithRomanianpoliticiansand
academicswereconductedinBucharest,inJune2014.Theoriginalideawasthatthey
wouldprovidetheprimaryaccountsandinterpretationsofRomania’sforeignpolicy
agenda.However,itsoonbecameobviousthattherewassignificantoverlapinthe
informationgatheredfromtherespondents,suchasuniversitylecturers,aliberal
politicianandaformerMinisterofCulture.OnRomania’sforeignpolicydirectionand
challengesposedbycommunismduringtransition,forinstance,therewasalmost
completealignment.Thereasonbehindthis,onewouldsuggest,isthatthegeneral
assessmentoftheissuesinvolvedinthesubjectmatteraddressedbythisproject,such
astheonesmentionedabove,arenotareasofcontroversywithinRomaniansocietyat
themoment.Therefore,itwasconsideredthatadditionalinterviewswereunlikelyto
contributeanysignificantadditionalinformation.Asaresult,thethesisshiftedfocusto
couplingthedatacollectedfromtheseinterviewswiththatofotherprimarysources,
suchasstatementsfromofficials,pollsandstatistics,andanalysesofeventsalready
availableinthemedia.Theinformationfromtheinterviewsisusedpredominantlyin
Chapter5,inthesectiononRomania’scontemporaryforeignpolicyagenda.However,
therespondents’inputisalsothreadedthroughouttheothercorechapters,offering
66
primaryinformationonthenatureoftransitionandtherelationshipwithRussia,the
HungarianminorityandtheRepublicofMoldova.163
AsecondmatterwhichshouldbeexpandeduponconcernsthematerialinRomanian
utilisedbythisproject.Severalsuchsourceshavebeenemployed,suchasbooks,
journalandnewspaperarticles,onlinematerial,officialstatements,statistics,the
interviewsconductedandevenfragmentsofpoemsorsongs,suchasthenational
anthem.AlltranslationsfromRomaniantoEnglisharetheauthor’sownandthe
sourcesinRomanianarereferencedbytheoriginaltitlefollowedbyitstranslationinto
Englishinsquarebrackets.
Thissectionwillnowmoveontoexpandonthemethodsusedinansweringthethesis’
mainresearchquestion‘WhatistheimpactofnationalidentityonRomania’sforeign
policyagenda?’Assessingtheinfluenceoftheidentity,understoodasanarrative
structure,onbehaviourfromaconstructivistperspectiveentailstwoseparatesteps.
ThefirstisexaminingthenatureandcontentofRomania’sidentitynarrative,whilst
thesecondrequiresoverlayingthisrepresentationontopofthestate’scontemporary
behaviourinordertoexaminehowthenarrativefeedsintobehaviour.Forpurposeof
clarity,bothwillbeexplainedinturn.
TheNatureandContentoftheRomanianIdentityNarrative
IntermsofthenatureandcontentoftheRomaniannarrativeonidentity,the
challengeisinestablishingitsessentialfeatures,howtheyhavedeveloped,aswellas
thereasonswhycertainconceptsholdaparticularsignificance.Inasense,thisisan
exerciseinposingatleastsomeofDoty’show-possiblequestions.164Inanswering
them,thisthesisholdsthathistory,orthetellingofhistory,iscentral.Ifidentityisnot
takenasagiven,thenshowinghowandwhichcertaintenetsbecameentrenchedin
theRomanianimaginaryrequiresahistoricalapproach.Indeed,forthepurposesof
thisproject,historyiscentraltotheconstructionofidentitynarratives,fortwo
reasons.Firstly,historicalexperiencesshapeactors’perceptionsofthemselvesandthe
163Asanadditionalnote,thetranscriptsoftheseinterviewsareintheauthor’spossession.164Doty(1993).
67
worldaroundthem,muchlikeBreuninghasargued.165Secondly,itislargelythrough
historicalnarrativesthataparticularstoryaboutidentityisperpetuated.166Coupled
withelitediscourse,aparticulartellingofhistoryoffershintsastotherepresentation
oftheSelfandOthersinplayatthattime.Thenarrativeofhistoryandthatofidentity
areinherentlyinterlinked–historytellingperpetuatesacertainportrayaloftheSelf
andOther,therebysocialisingindividualsinaspecificidentitynarrative,whilst
alterationstoiteithersignaltheemergenceoforactivelycreateanewone.
Asaresult,therequirementsofthissteparetwofold–firstly,onemustengagewith
Romanianhistory,withparticularfocusonthemannerinwhichitsexperienceshave
beenportrayed;and,secondly,fromthisreadingofthehistoricalnarrative,onemust
establishwhatthemainfeaturesoftheidentitynarrative–termedthemes–areand
howortowhatextentthestoryhasbeenalteredovertime.
Itisimportanttonotethat,whilstthenarrativeonRomaniannationalidentitybegins
inearnestinthenineteenthcentury,itnonethelessemploystheentiretyof
Romanians’historicalexperiences,fromtheirethno-genesistomoderntimes,in
buildingtherepresentationoftheSelfandOthers.Therefore,whilstwhatisofinterest
herearetellingsofRomania’shistoryofthemodernera,theprocessofexaminingthe
identitynarrativerequiresengagingwithRomania’shistoryasawhole.Whatthe
projectaimstoachieve,therefore,isatableauofdomesticinterpretationsof
Romanianhistorywithafocusontheidentitarythemeswhichtheyseektoemphasise.
Thisreproducingofthehistoricalnarrativedrawsonanumberofsources,fromthe
nineteenthcenturyandtothepresentday–someareconcernedspecificallywith
Romania’shistory,suchastheworksofNicolaeIorga(1830),HenrisStahl(1922),
Fischer-Galati(1970),NeaguDjuvara(2010)andFlorinConstantiniu(2011).Others,
suchasLucianBoia(2011,2012)orMihaiMilca(2010),offerahistoricalperspective
onthedevelopmentofRomanianidentity.Theformerisareputedcontemporary
RomanianhistorianbuthisworkalsodelvesintothemythsprevalentinRomanian
society(IstorieŞiMitȊnConştiinţaRomânească[HistoryandMythinRomanian
165Breuning(2007).166Browning(2008).
68
Consciousness],2011)andalsothemannerinwhichRomaniahasadapted,orrather
hasfailedtoadapt,toEuro-Atlanticintegration(Romania,TaradefrontieraaEuropei
[Romania,FrontierStateofEurope],2012).SociologistMihaiMilca,ontheotherhand,
offersachronologyofthedevelopmentoftheRomanianstateswhilstalsojuxtaposing
RomanianidentitytothatoftheEuropeanversion(IdentitateRomâneascăşi
Europeană[RomanianandEuropeanIdentity],2010).Finally,contemporaneous
accountsofeventshavealsobeenutilisedtoshowperceptionsofcertaineventsatthe
timewhentheyoccurred–themagazinearticlesofKirileanu(1909)orRebreanu
(1940),ortherevolutionaryaddressofBalcescu(1847),areexamplesofthese.The
interestinthesesourcesisnotonlyininformationgathering,butalso,more
importantly,themannerinwhichhistoryisbeingnarrated.Theexpositionitselfoffers
cluesintowhataspectsoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeareinplayandhowthey
arecontextuallyframed.
Ontheotherhand,inestablishingthethemesoftheidentitynarrativetheproject
drewonsomeofthemajordomesticworksontheRomaniancharacter,psychology,
andmythology.Fromtheearlierperiodofthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,the
seminalworksofDraghicescu(1907)andRadulescu-Motru(1937)wereofparticular
interest.ThesewerecoupledwithmodernanalysessuchasBoia(2011,2012)orMilca
(2010)inwhichtheconcernwithboththehistoricalandidentitynarrativesisevident.
Finally,theworkofDutceac-Segesten(2010),whichoffersinsightintoRomanians’Self
andOtherimagemyth-buildingthroughanexaminationofhistorytext-books,further
strengthenstheconnectionbetweenthetellingofhistoryandidentityconstruction.As
such,itisaninvaluablesourceforthisproject,notleastbecauseitshowshowthe
socialisationofaparticularnarrativeonidentityisachieved.Fromthesesources,the
projectidentifiedthemainrecurringthemesandclassifiedthemastheFoundation
Myths,consistingofOrigins,HabitusandReligion;theBesiegedFortress,with
victimisationandresistanceastwosidesofthesamecoin;andthethemeofUnity,
withitsemphasisonthenation-state.
Asacaveat,thisprojectdoesnotmakethepretencethatthesethemesorthemanner
inwhichtheyaretreatedareorisexhaustive.Indeed,thereareaspectsrelevantto
69
representationsoftheRomanianSelfwhicharenotaddressedhere–oneofthemore
obviousonesistheconundrumofwhetherRomaniabelongsintheEastortheWest.
Ontheotherhand,therearecomplexitieswithineachthemewhichhavenotbeen
analysed–intheOriginstheme,forinstance,overtimetherehasbeenintense
discussiononwhethertheRomanorDacianrootsaremostvaluabletotheRomanian
character.Whysomethemesandaspectspertainingtothemhavebeenpreferred
overothersis,toalargeextent,asubjectivematter.Whatonewouldargueisthat,
overall,theaimofthethesisistoshowhowenduringclaimsaboutRomanianidentity
influencebehaviourand,assuch,thechoiceofthemesmustberelevanttothis
endeavour–theEast-Westdebatehaspredominantlybeensettledintheaftermathof
theendoftheColdWar;Romaniacancertainlynotbearguedtobewaveringbetween
pro-Westernandpro-Easterndirections.Ontheotherhand,thatwhichdividesthose
whofavoured,atonepointoranother,theRomanorDacianrootsoftheRomanian
peopleislesssignificant,onewouldargue,thanthatwhichunitesthem–thatthe
originsofRomaniansmarkthemoutasspecial,orpeculiarwithintheirregional
setting.Assuch,althoughthereisadangerofover-simplifyingthecontentandhistory
ofdebateonRomanianidentity,thethesisaddresseswhatareconsideredtobe,
subjectivelyofcourse,boththedominantandmostrelevantfeaturesofthenarrative.
Asimilardiscussionshouldfollowonthechoiceofsources.Thereare,ofcourse,many
accountsofRomanianhistoryandpsychology,someofwhichhavenotbeenincluded
inthisproject.Workingoutwhichsourcestoutiliseandwhichtoomitis,again,a
subjectivebutnecessaryprocess.Spacedoesnotallowforanexhaustive
representationofeitherRomania’shistoryoridentitynarrative.Assuch,theaccounts
usedwerethosedeemedofmostinterest,eitherbecausetheirauthorsortheirwork
areparticularlyreputable–NicolaeIorgaandNicolaeBalcescu,forinstance,aresome
ofthemostcelebratedpersonalitiesofRomania’sunificationperiod,duetotheir
politicalactivismbutalsotheirhistoricalwork;DraghicescuandRadulescu-Motru’s
accountsaremostinfluentialinthefieldofRomanianidentity,or‘psychology’asit
wasthenreferredto,whilstBoiaandConstantiniuareamongstthemajor
contemporaryRomanianhistorians.Other,moreobscuresources,havebeen
employedbecausetheyconfirmoraddtothemoreprominentaccounts–
70
stenographerandhistorianHenricStahl’slectureonthehistoryoftheRomanian
people(1922),lawyerSofronie’sarticleonthehistoricandjuridicalsignificanceofthe
unificationof1918(1942)orFischer-Galati’sHistoryofTwentiethCenturyRumania
(sic)(1970)fallintothiscategory.Whatthethesisisattemptingtoachieveisa
renderingofRomania’sidentitynarrative,butitalsoaimstohighlighttheconsistency
acrosstheliteraturewithwhichitsmaintenetsaredepicted.Asaresult,allthese
sourcesarevaluableintheirinput,andwhilst,manyothersarenotaddressed,the
onespresentedarerelevanttothisinquiry.
Returningtotheissueathand,theprojecttracesthethemesoftheRomanianidentity
narrativeandthemannerinwhichtheyemergefromthetellingofhistory.The
historicalapproachisevidentinthestructureofChapter3,whichcoversthisissue.
Thechapterisdividedintofourhistoricalperiods,Antiquity,Middle-Ages,Modernity
andCommunism.Toeachofthefirstthreeareassignedthemajorthemeswhich
predominatetheirinterpretation.Asaresult,thehistoricalnarrativeofAntiquityis
concernedwiththeFoundationMyths,theMiddlesAgeswiththeBesiegedFortress
andModernitywithUnity.Thethesisshowshowtheseaspectsemergefromthe
particularnarrationofeachindividualperiod,butalsohowtheyfeedintoone-
another.Forinstance,theFoundationMythsareseenasmotivationforRomanians’
resistanceagainstforeigninfluenceduringtheMiddleAgesandboththeFoundation
MythsandtheBesiegedFortressarefundamentalinjustifyingUnitybetweenthe
threeprovincesintheModernera.Theaimistoshownotonlywhichthemeis
dominantwithinacertainperiod,butalsohowtheycometogetherinaparticular
articulationoftheimageofSelfandOther.
Bymatchingupmodernandcontemporaryaccounts,apictureofthecontinuityofthe
identitynarrativeisrevealedthroughtheperpetuationofaparticulartellingofhistory.
Continuityinallthemajoraspectsoftheidentitynarrativeisconsideredtobeoneof
itsmajorhallmarksand,importantly,attherootoftoday’sattitudestowardsits
significantOthers–RussiaandHungary.Thethesisaccountsforthisenduranceby
examiningthefactorsinplaybetweenthecreationoftheRomaniannation-stateand
theendofSecondWorldWar,inparticulartheactionsofRussiaandHungarywhich
71
sedimentedtheperceptionofthetwoactorsasexistentialthreatsandensuredthe
continuedsalienceofthethemesofUnityandBesiegedFortress.Finally,thechapter
turnstotheimpactoftheCommunistera,andespeciallyNicolaeCeausescu’sregime,
inbuttressingandaugmentingthemainfeaturesoftheidentitynarrativebyexamining
bothprimarysources,workspublishedorrepublishedintheperiodconcernedwith
theRomanian‘nationalcharacter,’manyofwhichhavebeenmentionedabove,aswell
assecondaryaccountsassessingtherepercussionsofCeausescu’sactionson
Romanians’perceptionsoftheSelfandRussianandHungarianOthers.Theaimofthis
sectionistoshowhowCeausescu’shyperversion,preoccupiedpredominantlywith
theuniquenessofRomanians,builtonalreadyexistingrepresentationstoensurethe
reproducingofanarrativeofidentityinwhichthecontrastbetweenSelfandOtheris
sharpened.Asaresult,bothexternalfactors,ortheirdomesticinterpretation,and
agencyplayasignificantroleintheperpetuationofRomaniannarrativeofidentityup
totheanti-communistrevolutionof1989.
Thefinalstageistobringtheanalysisintothecontemporaryera,namelyafterthe
1989uprising.Thetransitionperiodofthe1990sisarguedtohavebeendecisiveinthe
versionofthenationalidentitynarrativeinplaytoday,notleastbecausethefallofthe
communistregimequalifiesasthetypeofhistoricshockwhichnormallyleadstoare-
evaluationofidentities.Asaresult,thethesispaysparticularattentiontotherole
playedbytransitiongovernments,andparticularlythoseofIonIliescu,inorderto
determineboththeextenttowhichclaimsaboutidentitywerequestionedandhow
thecommunistlegacywasnegotiated.Chapter4analyseshowtheidentitynarrative
fedintoearlyelectoralcontestsandwasutilisedbyIliescu’sreformedcommuniststo
justifytheirelection.Furthermore,thethesisshowshow,throughitsactionsand
rhetoric,thegovernmentensuredtheperpetuationofaversionofthenarrativewhich,
whilstiteliminatedthecommunistcomponent,wasotherwiseindistinguishablefrom
earlierdominantrepresentationsoftheSelfandOther.Asaresult,itwillbeargued,
thecontemporaryself-imageofRomanians,aswellastheirperceptionoftheir
significantOthers,remainedlargelyunaltered.Forthispurpose,thethesisemploysa
varietyofsources,includingprimaryones,suchasparliamentarydebatesand
interviews,andsecondarydomesticandWesternaccounts,includingnewspaper
72
articles,assessingthenatureofthetransitionperiod.Theinputofforeignobservers,
suchasCipkowski(1991),Gilberg(1990),Gallagher(1995,1998,2009)andTurnock
(2001)isvaluableinachievingabalancedandobjectiveoverviewoftheevents,whilst
domesticsourcesofferinsightintohowthesewereperceivedontheground.Overall,
thissectioncompletesthetableauofthedevelopmentandmaincharacteristicofthe
Romanianidentitynarrativeandemphasisestheroleofagency,thistimeofIliescu’s
regime,inensuringitscontinuity.
TheInfluenceofIdentityonBehaviour
ThesecondstepentailsoverlayingthemainpreceptsoftheRomanianidentity
narrativeontothestate’sinternationalbehavioursincethe1989revolution.Thethesis
aimstoachievethisbyaddressingbothdimensionsofidentity,concerningtheSelfand
theOther.Ontheonehand,throughunderstandingRomanians’perceptionoftheSelf
and,particularly,whattheyviewedtobeRomania’splaceinthepost-ColdWar
internationalenvironment,onemightshedlightonthestate’sgeneralforeignpolicy
directionaswellashowBucharestwentaboutachievingitsgoals.Representationsof
Others,meanwhile,setthesegoalsintoabroadercontextandservetoexplainthe
typesofrelationsestablishedbetweenRomaniaandtheseactors.Themannerin
whichtheidentitynarrativeinfluencesbehaviour,thisthesisargues,isbygenerating
certainprioritiesorred-linesinwhatconcernstheactionsofthestate.Inotherwords,
itactstocreateparticularprerogatives,anxieties,andattitudestowardsotheractors
ontheinternationalstageanditisthroughunderstandingtheseby-productsofthe
identitynarrativethatonemayaccuratelyaccountforastate’sbehaviour.
Assuch,Chapter4isconcernedwiththetransitionperiodfromcommunismto
attainingmembershipofEUandNATO(1989-2007).Thisspanofnearlytwentyyearsis
considereddecisiveinestablishingandconsolidatingRomania’scontemporaryforeign
policyagenda.Thethesisidentifiestwopredominantandultimatelyconflicting
attitudesrootedinitsnationalidentitynarrativewhichhadasignificantimpacton
Romania’sbehaviourinthisperiod.Thefirstisitsforeignpolicypriority,basedonthe
unanimousdesiretojointheWest,whichdominatedtheentiretransitionperiod.
Integrationwouldsatisfytheprerogativeofensuringthesecurityofthestaterootedin
73
theUnitythemeand,tonolesserextent,itseconomicdevelopment.Thesecondwas
ananxietymanifestingintheresistancetochangeofbothelitesandthegeneral
populationinplayinthefirsthalfofthe1990s,alegacyofthecommunistperiodin
equalmeasuretothatofthehistoricalcontinuityofitsidentitynarrative.Thechapter
examineshowthesetwoattitudescreatedbothopportunitiesandchallengesfor
Romaniantransitiongovernments,untilthelatterattituderecededafter1996.Forthis
purpose,thedomesticreformswhichwereessentialinachievingmembershipofEU
andNATOareanalysed,withparticularemphasisonthedifficultiesofeconomic
reformandtheminorityquestion,namelytheissueofawardinggrouprightsto
Romania’ssignificantHungarianminority.Thesourcesemployedinthissectionare
accountsofRomania’sexperienceoftransition,bothdomesticandinternational,
mentionedabove.Additionally,primarysourcessuchastheinterviewsconductedfor
thisprojectandparliamentarydebatesarealsoutilised.Whatthissectionultimately
aimstoachieveisahighlightingofthecrucialdiscrepancybetweenRomania’s
behaviourontheinternationalanddomesticstages,inthatitwishedtoalteritsglobal
statuswithoutitstraditionalmodusvivendibeingaffected.Boththeseaspectsare
arguedtoberootedinitssedimentedportrayaloftheSelf.
Followingonfromthis,thethesisexaminesthenatureofRomania’sforeignpolicy
directionafteraccession,atthebeginningofChapter5,anditsrelationshipswithits
significantOthers,fromthetransitionperioduptothisday.Forthispurpose,three
casestudieshavebeenchosen,namelyRomania’srelationswithRussia,Hungaryand
theRepublicofMoldova,eachofthemhavingbeendesignatedaspecificchapter.The
reasonwhythethesisfocusesonthese,ratherthanotherrelationships,isprimarily
becauseoftheirsignificanceintheRomanianview.RussiaandHungaryemergefrom
thehistoricalandidentitynarrativeasthemainthreateningOthers,whilstthe
RepublicofMoldovais,conversely,viewedasanEstrangedSelf.Thecontinuityofthe
mainaspectsoftheidentitynarrative,ontheotherhand,isconsequentialtothe
perpetuationofaparticularrepresentationoftheseactors,whichinfluences
Romanianattitudestowardsthem.
74
Thethreecasestudychaptershavesimilarstructures.Firstthethesisidentifiesthe
mainattitudesRomaniaexhibitstowardsthesethreeactors,aswellastheareasof
sensitivityrelevanttotheirrelationship.InthecaseofRussiaandHungary,themain
identity-basedattitudeisoneofdistrust,anxietyandfearovertheiractions,rootedin
thethemeoftheBesiegedFortress.TherelationshipbetweenRomaniaandRussiais
markedbyaviewoftheOtherasexpansionistandadangertoRomania’s
independence,securityandcloserelationswiththeRepublicofMoldova.Ontheother
hand,thethreatperceptionwhereHungaryisconcernedmainlyrevolvesaroundthe
preservationoftheterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyoftheRomanianstateandthe
issueofTransylvaniaasadisputedregionbetweenthetwoactors.InwhatMoldovais
concerned,thethesisarguesthatRomanians’attitudeisinformedbyboththe
FoundationMythsandthethemeofUnity.MoldovaisviewedasanEstranged
RomanianSelf,withthesameoriginsandidentitymarkers,leadingtoaperception
thattheyarelikeus.Ontheotherhand,theforcedseparationofMoldovafrom
Romaniaisseenasaninherenthistoricalinjustice,strengtheningboththecaseof
Russiaasanexistentialthreat,andtheRomanianinterestintheaffairsofChisinau.
Oncetheseattitudesareoutlined,thethesisexaminesRomania’sbehaviourinrelation
toeachoftheseactors,accountingforboththeretreatandaugmentationofidentitary
factorsinspecificcontexts.Itdoessoinchronologicalmanner,examiningthemajor
eventswhichhavedefinedtheirpost-1989relationship.Inordertoachievethis,the
thesisdrawsonprimaryaccounts–theinterviewsconductedbytheauthor,
parliamentarydebatesandofficialstatements–andsecondarysourcesassessing
eithertheeventsthemselvesortheirconsequences.Manyofthesourcesutilisedin
thesechaptershavealreadybeenmentioned:Boia(2011,2012)orDutceac-Segesten
(2010),forinstance,arepointsofreferencethroughoutthethesis.Additionally,each
chapterutilisesspecificsourcesconcernedwiththerespectiverelationshiporthe
activitiesofthatactor.Theseincludebooks,journalandnewspaperarticles,and
declarationsbyvariousorganisations,suchasNATOortheUnionistPlatformAction
2012.InthecaseofRussia,theworkofEurasianisttheoristDughin(2011)isemployed,
asistheworkongeopoliticsbyRomanianpoliticalcommentatorGusa(2011),thaton
Russian-RomanianrelationsofdiplomatsStefureac(2015)andMaior(2015),aswellas
75
variousarticlesbysociologistDanDungaciu(2011,2015,2016).InthecaseofHungary
sourcesconsultedincludeSalat’schapteronthefailedreconciliationbetweenthetwo
statesafter1996(2013),andKulcsarandBradatan’sarticleonHungariandomestic
politics(2007).InthecasestudyofRomania’srelationshipwiththeRepublicof
Moldova,someofthemainsourcesincludeAngelescu’sassessmentofthe
developmentofRomania’spost-socialistrelationswithactorsinEasternEuropeand
theBlackSearegion(2011),Cash’sarticleonMoldovanidentity(2007),orthatof
PanicionRomaniannationalismintheRepublicofMoldova(2003).Additionally,all
threechaptersfeaturearticlesfromRomania’smainnewsagencies,Agerpres,
Mediafax,andHotnews,aswellasstatisticsandopinionpollsconductedbyINSCOP
andIRES,astwoofthemostcitedsuchsourcesbytheRomanianmedia.
Onthisnote,thethesisfinallyoffersapredictionofRomania’sfuturerelationshipwith
theseactors,aswellasitsforeignpolicydirectionmorebroadly.Itdoesthisby
drawingonscenariosconsideredbyRomanianelitesinlightofpresentinternational
developments–theconflictinEasternUkraineorHungary’snationalistandeastern
shiftareexamplesofthis.Whatisofinteresthereisnotwhetherthesescenariosare
probable,orevenplausible,butthefactthatRomaniansperceivethemassuch.Thatis
becausethisthesisarguesthat,withinitsintersubjectivereality,themotivations
behindRomania’sactionsarerootedinperceptionsofcurrent,aswellasfuture,
threatsandopportunities.Thefactthatthesescenariosarebeingcontemplated,
therefore,offershintsatRomania’spresentbehaviourbutalsothetypesofactionsit
islikelytoconsiderinthefuture.Withthecaveatthatsuchdevelopmentsare
contingentonacontinuationofcurrentcircumstances,onewouldarguethatidentity
offersanavenuefornotonlyaccountingfor,butalsopredictingstatebehaviour.With
this,itisaimed,acomprehensiveinsightintotheinfluenceofentrenchedbeliefsabout
Romanianidentityoverthestate’srelationshipwiththeseactors,andthebehaviour
whichflowsfromthem,willbeachieved.
Conclusion
Thischapterhasoutlinedthethesis’approachandmethodologytostudyingthelink
betweentheRomanianidentitynarrativeandthestate’sforeignpolicyagenda.As
76
such,storiesaboutidentity,andtheinter-subjectiverealitytheycreate,arethemain
focusofthisproject.Thatisbecausethesenarrativesconfermeaningoncultural
factors,suchaslanguage,religion,geography,historyandethnicityandconsequently
shapethemannerinwhichRomaniansperceivethemselvesinrelationtothose
aroundthem.ThefollowingchapterswillexaminehowthisparticularimageoftheSelf
andOtherwasconstructedandperpetuatedinordertocreatetheidentitynarrativein
playtoday.Itwillbeshownhowtheculturalelementsmentionedabovewereutilised
tojustifyaspecificdestinyforRomanians,thatofbeingunited,andanequally
importantroleforthestate,toprotectthisunityandtheRomaniancharacter.Finally,
thethesiswillexaminehowtheattitudeswhichflowfromthisnarrativefeedinto
Romania’scurrentinternationalbehaviour,bothintermsofsatisfyingtheidentity-
prerogativessetbytheportrayaloftheSelf,butalsothroughtheanxietiesand
affinitieswhichemergefromtherepresentationoftheOthers.
77
Table1.MajorEventsofRomanianHistoryandtheIdentityNarrativeThemesTheyAreSubscribedTo
FoundationMyths
106A.D. DaciaiscolonisedbyRome271A.D. RomansretreatfromtheregionCirca3rdcentury ChristianisationofDacia
BesiegedFortress
11thcentury
HungariansbegintheircolonisationofTransylvania,achievedbytheendofthecentury
1330 Wallachiaisestablished,followingavictoryagainsttheHungariantroops
1365 Moldaviaisalsocreated,insimilarcircumstances
1366 HungariankingdecreesthatnobilityinTransylvaniashouldbeconditionedbyaffiliationtotheCatholicfate
1437UnioTriumNationumcertifiesRomanianTransylvaniansastoleratednationandeliminatespoliticalrights.
1476 WallachiabecomesapermanentvassaltotheOttomanEmpire
1512 Moldavia,similarly,recognisestheOttomanEmpireassuzerain
Unity
1791
SupplexLibellusValachorumispublished,callingforequalityofrightsforTransylvanianRomanians.Thefirstdocumentwhichintroducesnationhoodasabasisforemancipation
1812 Moldaviaispartitioned.EasternMoldaviaisplacedunderTsaristruleandbecomesknownasBessarabia
1848 Failedrevolution,hadasexpressgoalunification1859(24January)
WallachiauniteswithWesternMoldovatoformthefirststateofRomania
1878 TheOldKingdomachievesindependencefromtheOttomanEmpire
1916 RomaniaentersthefirstWorldWaronthesideoftheEntente,withtheexpressgoalofgainingTransylvania
1918TheFirstWorldWarendsandtheDualMonarchyandTsaristEmpirecollapse.TransylvaniaandBessarabiaareawardedtoRomania
1918(1December)
GreaterRomaniaisproclaimed.ThenewstateapproximatestheterritoryinhabitedbyRomanianethnics.
BesiegedFortress&Unity
1940
Ayearofterritoriallosses.ASovietultimatumresultsinthecedingofBessarabiaandNorthernBukovina(June).HungaryisawardedNorthernTransylvania(August)andBulgariagainstheCadrilater(September).
78
1941RomaniajoinstheSecondWorldWaronthesideoftheAxiswiththegoalofwinningbackBessarabia,whichisquicklyoccupiedbyGermanandRomaniatroops
1944 Thetideofthewarischanging.RomaniaturnsthegunsonGermanyandbeginsfightingonthesideoftheAllies
1945
TheSecondWorldWarends.Romaniaisconsideredadefeatedstate.NorthernTransylvaniaisreturned,butBessarabiaisonceagaincededtoRussia.BessarabiaisincludedintheMoldavianASSR(hithertoTransnistria)andbecomesafullyfledgedSovietRepublic
Communism
1948 TheMoscowbackedCommunistPartycomestopowerinRomania
1965 NicolaeCeausescubecomesSecretaryGeneraloftheCommunistParty.RomaniabeginsitsbreakfromRussia.
1968 CeausescucondemnstheSovietinvasionofCzechoslovakia.
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Chapter3.RomanianHistoryandIdentity–aNationalObsession
withUniqueness
Figure1.ThemainperiodsofRomanianhistoryandtheircorrespondingthemes.
Introduction
Thischapter’smainaimistooutlinethemajorthemesoftheRomanianidentity
narrativeastheycrystallisedintheformativeperiodofthenineteenthandearly
twentiethcentury,highlightingtheirperpetuationintothemodernhistoricalnarrative.
Thechapterbeginswithadiscussionofcontinuityoftheidentitynarrativeinthe
Romaniancontext.Thefollowingthreesectionsexaminethenarrativeofthethree
mainperiodsofRomanianhistoryandtheidentitythemeswhichemergemost
prominentlyfromthem.Assuch,theeraofAntiquitycorrespondstotheFoundation
Myths–Origins,theHabitusandReligion,–thebedrockofthenarrativeonthe
Romaniancharacter’suniqueness.TotheMiddleAgesisconscribedthethemeof
BesiegedFortress,theidentitarymanifestationofahistoryofoppression,whilst
ModernityismarkedbytheemergenceofthethemeofUnity,whichbringstogether
thefirsttwothemes.BoththeidentitaryuniquenessoftheRomanianpeopleandtheir
unjusthistoricalexperiencevindicatethecreationofanationalstatewithinwhichthe
specialdestinyofRomaniansmaybefulfilled.Thecontinuityofthishistoricalnarrative
intothecontemporaryera,asahallmarkoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,is
80
exploredwithreferencetoexternalcircumstances,namelyperceptionsoverthe
actionsoftheOthers,butalsoinrelationtotheroleplayedbyNicolaeCeasescu’s
regimeduringthefinalperiod,Communism.Whilstaddingnothingnewtothe
narrative,Ceausescu’sregimeaugmentsitsmainfeatures,particularlyinregardsto
RomanianuniquenessandthethemeofUnity,therebyentrenchingtheSelf-Other
contrastwithHungaryandRussia.Thechapterendswithanassessmentofthe
RomanianidentitynarrativeinplayattheendoftheCommunistperiod,andthe
impactofagencyonthisstructure.
TheContinuityoftheRomanianIdentityNarrative
Dutceac-Segestenwrote,“thenationalprojectisanodetoparticularism,to
uniquenesseven.Everynationattemptstodescribeitselfasanexceptional
combinationofcharacteristics,hand-pickedtodefinethetruesoulofthe
community.”167ThisquoteneatlyappliestoRomanians,apeopleconcernedwiththeir
nationalcharacterbothbeforeandafterthecreationoftheirstate.AsLucianBoia
argues,tothisday“theendeavourtouncover‘whatitmeanstobeRomanian’seems
farfromhavingexhausteditsresourcesandarguments.Onemightevenarguethatthe
firsttraitofRomaniansistheobsessionwiththeirownidentity.”168Indeed,in
researchingthesubjectofRomanianidentityonehasdiscoveredacontinuedeffortby
localhistorians,sociologistsandphilosophersto‘makesense’ofRomaniannes,whatis
‘special’aboutRomanians,andestablishtheirdestiny,inotherwordstheirrightful
placewithinEuropeandthewiderinternationalcommunity.Whilstthismay,initself,
notbepeculiartoRomanians,whatisperhapssurprisingisthereproductionofthe
originalidentitynarrativewhichemergedinthenineteenthandearlytwentieth
century,andwasaimedspecificallyatthejustificationofthecreationofaRomanian
nationalstate,tothisday.Thisisapparentintheremarkablecontinuityofthe
historicalnarrativethroughwhichclaimsaboutidentityaresocialised.Aparticular
viewofhistoryisperpetuated,ensuringthatportrayalsoftheSelfandOthersfollow
167A.Dutceac-Segesten,Myth,Identity,andConflict–AComparativeAnalysisofRomanianandSerbianHistoryTextbooks(Plymouth:LexingtonBooks,2011)p.122.168L.,Boia,IstorieŞiMitȊnConştiinţaRomânească[HistoryandMythinRomanianConsciousness]2ndEdition(Bucharest:Humanitas,2011),pp.245-246.
81
similarpatternsofrepresentation.AssociologistConstantinSchifirnethasargued,“in
whatconcernstheexpressionofRomaniannationalcharactertraits,aXXIcentury
RomanianisnotentirelydifferentfromtheXIXcenturyRomanian.Therefore,
RomanianidentitybecomesaconstantoftheRomaniannationalcharacter.”169
Thisensuresacertainlevelofsolidarityanduniformityofcharacternotonlybetween
Romaniansofacertainperiod,butacrossgenerations.Thelinkwiththepastbecomes
ahallmarkoftheidentitynarrativeasmemoriesofeventhedistanteventsare
retainedinthecontemporaryimaginaryandtranslatedintomodernversionsofthe
narrative.AsSchifirnetcontinues,“it[Romanianidentity]hasitsorigininapast,andis
thereforesubscribedtoahistoricandgenerationalcontinuity.Romanianstodayare
identical,incertainethnicandspiritualtraits,toRomaniansfromacrosstheages.”170
Thisnarrative,however,isadoubleedgedsword.Ontheonehand,theactualisation
ofthepasthastheeffectofcreatingadurablesenseofnationalidentity,thefeatures
ofwhichshowremarkablecontinuity,preciselybecauseitdrawsontimespast:“we
liveinthepresent,butwerelateourselvestoourorigins,wehaveanincontestable
identity,butweharnessitthroughtheidentityofourancestors.”171Ontheother
hand,acertainportrayaloftheSelfbringswithitacorrespondingrepresentationof
theOthers,whichissimilarlyperpetuated.Assuch,theantagonismswithHungaryand
RussiafromtheformativeeraoftheRomanianstatearereproduced,ensuringthatthe
characteroftheseOthersasessentiallythreateningisreinforced.Inwhatis,
essentially,aviciouscycle,theseimagesoftheOthersensurethecontinuedsalienceof
themainfeaturesoftheSelf–thedesiretoaffirmitsuniquenessandprotectitfrom
foreigninfluences.Inthefollowingsections,thecontinuityofthehistoricalnarrative
willbeoutlined,coupled,finally,withanassessmentoftheCeausecuregime’s
particularimpactontheidentitynarrative.
169C.Schifirnet,‘IdentitateRomaneascainContextulModernitatiiTendentiale[TheRomanianIdentityintheContextofTrend-SettingModernity],’RevistaRomanadeSociologie[TheRomanianJournalofSociology](newseries)XX:5-6(2009),p.474.170Ibid.,p.473.171Boia(2011),p.188.
82
Antiquity–FoundationMyths:Origins,Habitus,Religion
Origins
ForRomanians,bothhistoryandidentitybeginatthebeginning.TheSelfandthe
Otheraretwosidesofthesamecoin,inotherwords,themoreeffortispouredin
accentuatingone,thestrongerthecontrastisbuiltbetweenthetwo.IntheRomanian
imaginary,differentiationfromitsneighbourshasitsrootsintheirpeople’sunique
commonancestry–asMihaiMilcaargues,“Romanianidentityisbuiltsuigenerisonan
inheritanceresultedfromthesymbiosisoftheDaco-Romanstrands.”172Thisnotionis
notnew;itpicksuponearlierworksonwhatwasthentermed‘Romanianpsychology:’
in1907DumitruDraghicescuarguedthat“thesoulandcharacterofapeopleare
decidedby(…)[firstamongthreeaspects]thebasicethnicelement.”173In1937,
anotherimportantsociologicalworkbyConstantinRadulescu-Motrualsoemphasised
originsasthehallmarkofapeople’spsychology:“thespiritualtraitsofanationare
conditionedby(…)thehereditarybiologicalfundamentofthepeople.”174
InRomania,this‘fundament’isconsidereduniqueintheregion.Romaniansarethe
resultoftheRomancolonisationoftheancientregionofDacia,followingashortwar
in105-106AD.Thispeople,astheirnamesuggest,are,therefore,ofLatinorigin,
delineatingthemfromtheOthersofEasternEuropeortheBalkans;thesegroupsare
generallyofSlav,TurkicorMagyar(Hungarian)descent.AlthoughtheRomans
retreatedfromDaciain271AD,theirlegacywassignificant,bothatthetimeand
subsequently,particularlyinwhatconcernslanguage.TheRomanianlanguageisbased
onaformoflateLatin,which,althoughexposedtoSlavicinfluenceslateron,remains
closelyrelatedtoWesternLatinlanguagesand,therefore,essentiallyunlikeanyother
Easterndialects.Assuch,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout,“languageactedfromthe
verybeginningasanobviousdissimilaritywithrespecttothegroupslivinginthe
172M.Milca,IdentitateRomâneascăşiEuropeană[RomanianandEuropeanIdentity](Bucharest:Virtual,2010),p.27.173D.Draghicescu,DinPshihologiaPoporuluiRomân[FromthePsychologyoftheRomanianPeople](Bucharest:Albatros,reprintedin1995original1907),p.7.174C.Radulescu-Motru,PsihologiaPoporuluiRomân[ThePsychologyoftheRomanianPeople](Bucharest:Paideia,reprintedin1999original1937),p.11.
83
vicinityandbecametheprimarymarkerforgroupidentity.”175Intheabsenceof
statehood,languageisthemainunifyingfeaturesharedbyallRomaniansandoccupies
animportantpositioninthearticulationofthenarrativeconcerningRomanians’
spiritualunity.Thisisevidentina1922lecturebygraphologistandhistorianHenric
StahlcalledtheancientRomanianterritory“thelandofallofasingletongue.”176
Habitus
Figure2.ModerndayRomania(1945-),withthethreeregionsoutlined.Transylvaniatothewest,MoldovatotheeastandWallachiatothesouth.ThecurvatureoftheCarpathiansformsthebackboneofthecountry,andtheDanubeRomania’sborderwithBulgaria.TheBlackSeainthesouth-eastisthefinalgeographicreferencepoint.AdaptedbytheauthorfromMapofGreaterRomania,HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus,1926).Seelistoffiguresforcompletereference.
ItisalsosignificantthatRomanDaciaoccupiedapproximatelythesameterritoryasthe
proto-Romanianstateswhichsucceededit.Therefore,fromtheirveryincipience,
175Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.122.176H.Stahl,TarileRomanestipanainpreajmatimpurilormoderne–douaprelegeritinuteofiterilorscoaleispecialedegeniu[TheRomanianStatesUntilAroundModernTimes–TwoLecturesHeldfortheOfficersoftheSpecialSchoolofEngineerCorps](Bucharest:CulturaNeamuluiRomanesc,1922),p.12.
84
Romaniansestablishalinguisticandethno-geneticuniqueness,aswellasanatural
habitus,inotherwordsageographicalspacewhichbecomesthecradleofthispeople.
Radulescu-Motru,forinstance,believedthat,alongsideethnicity,“geographical
surroundings”177alsoinfluencedthecharacteristicsofanation.Likewise,philosopher
LucianBlaga,oneofthemostcelebratedRomanianphilosophers,arguedthatthe
physicalfeaturesoftheterritoryreflectedinthepeople’sspiritandeveninfluenced
theirfate:“ourunconscioussoulisorganicallyandinseparablysolidarywiththis
spatialhorizon(…)whichconstitutestheframeworkforaparticulardestiny.”178Inthe
Romanianimaginary,notuniquelyofcourse,thereisapowerfullinkagebetweenthe
geographicalspaceandthepeople.Naturallandmarksformthebordersofthe
territory–ashistorianDjuvaraargues,“ourcountryisalargecirclearoundthe
Transylvanianplateau,”179withtheCarpathianMountainsasitsbackboneandthe
RiverDanubeandBlackSeaasitssouthernandeasternlimits.Forreference,see
[Figure2],themapofmoderndayRomania.Manyhavearguedthatthisnatural
enclosurehasnotonlymarkedtheRomaniancharacter,butalsophysicallyprotected
it,initsearlydays,fromforeigninterference,thusensuringtheunitaryethno-genesis
ofthispeople.AshistorianFlorinConstantiniupointsout,“thereisatendency(…)to
considertheharmoniouscompositionoftheCarpathian-Danubianspaceasagift
offeredbyProvidenceorNaturetoitslater‘worthy’inhabitants–theRomanians–
helpingthemconfirmandaffirmtheirunity.”180ThisisevidentinStahl’searlierwork,
wherehearguesthat“becauseofourgeographicalpositioningwewerenotethnically
influencedbybarbarians”andtoitRomaniansowe“theircontinuityasapeople.”181
Additionally,tracingtheiroriginsbacktoAncientDaciaandRomeoffersRomanians
historicalantecedencewithintheregionandevenacertainpedigreeofancestryto
whichSlavicorMagyargroupsmaynotlayclaim.Ontopofdemarcatingthemfrom
peoplesofSlavicorHungariandescentwhoarrivedonthecontinentduringthe
177Radulescu-Motru(1999),p.11.178L.Blaga,TrilogiaCulturii[TheTrilogyofCulture](Bucharest:Humanitas,2011),p.164.179N.Djuvara,OScurtăIstorieaRomânilorPovestităCelorTineri[AShortHistoryofRomaniaNarratedtoOurYoung]12thEdition(Bucharest:Humanitas,2010),p.11.180F.Constantiniu,OIstorieSincerăAPoporuluiRomân[AnHonestHistoryoftheRomanianPeople]4thEdition(Bucharest:UniversEnciclopedicGold,2011),p.27.181Stahl(1922),p.11,p.9.
85
migrationwavesofthesixthcenturyandonwards,thisDaco-Romanlinkprovides
Romanianswithanteriorityintheirterritoryand,consequently,alegitimacyin
occupyingit.AsMilcacontinueshissummaryofthefundamentalfeaturesof
Romanianidentity:“itcertifiesitselfbyinvokingtheprincipleofhistoricalcontinuityin
theCarpathian-Danubian-Pontic182space.”183ThisformsthebasisofRomania’s
argumentofhistoricownershipoverTransylvania,theareaofcontentionwith
Hungary.
Religion
ThethirdfoundationmythoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeisreligion.For
Romanians,belongingtotheEasternChristianfaithisapivotalaspectbecauseitacts
asamechanismofbothself-definitionanddemarcationfromOthers.Religion
becomespartoftheoriginsnarrative,asproto-RomaniansChristianisewhilststill
underorimmediatelyaftertheRomanoccupationofDacia.AsDjuvaraargues,proof
canbefoundintheRomanianlanguageitself:“thetestimonyoflanguageisthemost
powerfulinestablishingtheancientnessofChristianityinRomania;allfundamental
termsrelatingtoreligionareofLatinorigin(…).”184Moreimportantly,however,the
narrativeemphasisesthefactthatOrthodoxywasnotimposedonRomanians,but
developednaturallyspreadingacrossthepopulation,evenbeforetheChurchbecame
anorganisedinstitution,exemplifiedhereinMihaiMilca’sassertion:“beforebeing
embodiedintheChurch(…),ChristianOrthodoxywasapopular,diffuse
phenomenon.”185Thenotionofagrass-rootsChristianityanditsearlybeginnings
implies,ineffect,thatreligionformspartofthefabricofRomanianness–Romanians
werebornChristianand,assuch,theirculturalandidentitarydevelopmentistightly
linkedtotheadherencetoandprotectionofChristianvalues.Thislinkhasbeen
emphasisedbyRomanianhistoriansacrosstheages,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout:
“thethesisofapopularChristianityoroftheorganiclinkbetweenthedefinitionofthe
ethnicgroupsanditsreligionwasverypopularamonghistoriansof19thcentury,and
182ThistheRomanianhabitus,orthenaturalgeographicspaceassociatedwiththeRomanianpeople.See[Figure2].AllRomanianinhabitedterritoriesarecontainedwithinthisimaginedregion.183Milca(2010),p.27.184Djuvara(2010),p.38.185Milca(2010),p.66.
86
evenbeforethem,amongthefirstauthorsofmedievalchronicles.”186Thisis
noticeableinStahl,whoarguesthat“thecementofthesamereligioninallRomanian
speakers”187preservedtheunityoftheRomanianpeople.Religion,coupledwith
language,becomesasecondidentitarymarkerandfeedsintotheSelf-Othernarrative.
ThiscombinationofLatinityandOrthodoxyisindeedunique,revealingRomaniansasa
‘special’ethnicgroup,delineatingthemnotonlyfromnon-Christiangroups,suchas
theOttomanEmpire,butalsosettingthemapartfromotherChristianpeoples–
Dutceac-Segesten,forinstance,suggeststhat“thethesisofpopularChristianityisused
asasignofprideandprimacyoverotherinhabitantsoftheregion.”188TheHungarians,
whoconvertedtoChristianityonlyin1001,areacaseinpoint–theirlateconversion
placestheminaninferiorpositionvis-à-vistheRomanians,inanotherdimensionof
thenarrativeonlegitimacywithinthehabitus.OrthodoxyplacesRomaniansfirmly
withintheEasternEuropeanhistoryandspaceandoffersthemacertainpedigree;
journalistPamfilSeicarusummarisesthisbyarguingthat“throughOrthodoxywehold
thetruthoftheEasternworld.”189
TheMedievalEraandEarlyModernity–The‘BesiegedFortress’
InRomania,boththeidentityandhistoricalnarrativesmustreconciletwoseemingly
incongruousfacts:whilsttheyseektoportrayRomaniansasuniqueandevensuperior
fromtheperspectiveoftheiroriginsandculturaltraits,itisnonethelessthecasethat
theiractualhistoricalexperienceislessthanillustrious.NotonlywereRomanians,for
muchoftheirhistory,separatedinthreeprovinces,buttheywere,byallaccounts,
developmentallaggards,only“effectivelyenteringtheMiddleAgesinthe14thcentury,
whenintheOccidenttheywerecomingtoanendandtheRenaissancewasnear.”190
Evenmoresignificantly,thislateenteringintohistorymeantthatRomanianscouldnot
competewiththeestablishedregionalpowers,whetherPoland,Hungaryorthe
186Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.167.187Stahl(1922),p.46.188Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.121.189P.Seicaru,SensultraditieiinDreptullamemorie[TheMeaningofTraditionintheRighttoMemory]VolumeIV(Bucharest:Dacia,1993),p.172,reproducedinM.Milca,IdentitateRomâneascăşiEuropeană[RomanianandEuropeanIdentity](Bucharest:Virtual,2010,p.71).190L.Boia,Romania,TaradefrontieraaEuropei[Romania,FrontierStateofEurope],4thEdition(Bucharest:Humanitas,2012),pp-61-62.
87
OttomanEmpire:“theycouldnot–accordingtomedievalhierarchy–beonequal
footingwiththeirneighbours.”191TheconsequenceisaMedievalperiodwhichfor
Romaniansessentiallyconsistsofsuccessivevassalagetoandoccupationbythe
foreignpowersmentionedabove.Thenarrativemustmitigatethissmall-state
conditionand,essentially,justifyRomanianexceptionalisminsuchmodestconditions.
ItachievesthisbyreinforcingtheSelf-Othercontrastalreadyarticulatedinthe
FoundationMythsandconstructingcertainrecurringthemes,mostprominentlyofthe
RomanianprovincesasBesiegedFortresses,victimsoftheexpansionisttendenciesof
theOthers,butwhichshowaremarkablecapacityofresistanceundermanyguises,
frommilitary,toreligiousandcultural.Asaresult,thenarrativereconcilesthe
provinces’historicfailuresbyattributingthemnottoRomanians,buttotheirharassing
Others,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout:“thepositionofvictimoffersmoralhigh
groundfromwhencetopassjudgementontheworld,one’sneighbours,orone’s
critics;sowhileitappearstobeapositionofweakness,itconfers,infact,acertain
merit.”192Thistendencytowardsself-victimisationisevidentfromanearlystage.The
threadcanbetracedbacktomedievaltimes,whenaMoldovanchroniclernotedthat
hisstatewas“inthepathofmalice.”193Thistheme,however,hasbeenprevalent
amongstmodernwritersalso.Draghicescunoted:“ourhistoricandsociallife(…)was
estranged,dependentandlimitedbythatofothers.Ourhistorywasmadebyour
neighbours,notaswewouldhavewantedit,butastheywishedit.Wedidnotliveour
ownlife,butthatofmanyothers(…).”194Evenasrecentlyas2011,historianFlorin
Constantiniucommentedthat“weweresuccessivelyattacked,plundered,dominated,
occupied,exploited.”195Romania’shistory,particularlyintheMedievalperiod,is
essentiallyconflictual,andthedestinyofitspeopleisnotintheirownhands,butoften
atthemercyoftheOther.Inthesub-sectionswhichfollow,examiningtheexperience
ofthethreemedievalprovincesduringtheMiddleAges,itwillbeshownhowthe
narrativereinforcestheSelf-Othercontrast.
191Boia(2012),p.62.192Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.107.193GrigoreUreche,citedinConstantiniu(2011),p.28.194Drăghicescu(1995),p.355.195Constantiniu(2011),p.29.
88
TheThreeProvinces
ThethreeRomanianprincipalitiescameintobeingatdifferenttimesinthecontextof
theHungariandominationovertheregionattheturnofthefirstmillennium.
TransylvaniawasdirectlyoccupiedandintegratedintheKingdomofHungarybythe
endoftheeleventhcentury,whilstWallachiaandMoldaviawerecreatedasaresultof
theaggregationoflocalfeudallordswhobuiltalliancesinordertopushback
HungarianarmiescrossingtheCarpathianMountains.Thetwoprovinceswere
officiallyestablishedin1330and1365,respectively,intheaftermathofmilitary
victoriesagainsttheMagyarforces,becoming,asConstantiniuargues“irreversible
political-territorialrealitiesonthemapofmedievalEurope.”196Thereare,therefore,
threeregionswhichbringtogetherthevastmajorityofRomanianspeakers.Theyare
not,however,equalinstatus.Fromtheverybeginning,Transylvaniawaspartofthe
HungarianKingdomanditspathanddevelopmentwaslargelydisassociatedfromthat
ofWallachiaandMoldaviauntilthetwentiethcentury.Theothertwoaresemi-
independentsmallmedievalstateswhowillhavetonegotiatetheirgeo-strategic
positionattheconfluenceofanumberofregionalpowers–Poland,Hungaryand,
later,theOttomanandTsaristEmpires.Thehistoricalnarrative,althoughittreats
WallachiaandMoldaviaseparatelyfromTransylvania,197nonethelessfollowsthesame
patternofinterpretation,addressingthesamethemesinbothcases,inorderto
create,perhaps,thesenseofasharedexperience,ofcommunalitybetweenthethree
provinces,underdifferentcircumstances.
Transylvania–HungaryastheEssentialOther
InTransylvania,thefocusisonthecontrastbetweentheconqueredRomanians,who
formthemajorityofthepopulation,andtherulingHungarianswho,althoughinthe
minority,suppressandpersecutetheautochthonouspopulationthroughoutthe
thousandyearstheymaintaincontroloftheregion.Oppressionfirsttakesona
religiousdimension,withHungary’sconcertedattemptsattheconversionofthe
196Ibid.p.77.197Iorga,Constantiniu,Djuvara,Boia,etc.assignseparatesubchapterstothedevelopmentofTransylvania.
89
OrthodoxRomanianstotheCatholicfaith,totheextentthat,thenarrative
emphasises,itconditionsaccesstothenobilityclasstoaffiliationtotheWestern
Church.198Thesecondfacetofsuppressionistheinstitutionalisedpoliticalexclusionof
Romaniansfromtheregion’sleadershipstructure,throughapactnamedUnioTrium
Nationum(1437),regardingthedistributionofpoweramongsttheprivilegednations
oftheHungariansandtheirallies,theSaxonsandtheSzeklers.Romanians,mostof
whomhadbeenrelegatedtotheranksofthepeasantrybytheCatholiccondition,
wereconsideredatoleratednation,and“weredeprivedofpoliticalrightsandsubject
todiscriminationbytheprivilegednations.”199Thisstatusquowouldlargelyholduntil
theunificationwithRomaniain1918,meaningthat,forfourhundredyears
TransylvanianRomanianswerediscriminatedagainstandwere,asDjuvaraargued“a
negligiblequantityfromapoliticalperspective.”200
ThisportrayaloftheRomaniansasthe“mainvictimsofasystemofsocial
oppression”201makesTransylvaniathequintessentialBesiegedFortressinthe
Romanianimaginary,asthepopulationhereiscompletelysubjugatedtoitsHungarian
conquerors,lackingbothpoliticalrightsandsocialstanding.Draghicescu,forinstance,
arguesthat“theHungarianshavecommandedus,astheydostillinTransylvaniaand
Banat,andhaveimposedonustheirwillandlanguage.”202Tothisheaddsashort
commentonaforeignobserver’sdescriptionofTransylvanianRomanians,tellingof
theSelf-imagewhichhasdevelopedasaresultofthisnarrative:“theyhaveslyness,
theslave’sweapon.”203ThisimageoftheenslavementofTransylvanianRomaniansisa
powerfulandenduringone;Dutceac-Segestenpointsoutthat“themillenniumlong
slavery”204undertheHungariansisevenreferredtoinmodernhistorytextbooks.
Resentmentoverthisstateofaffairsisnoticeableinthenarrativetothisday:“inusing
theterm‘Romanianstate’forTransylvaniaoneshouldnotlosesightofthisreality[of
Romanians’exclusionfrompubliclife]:Romanianswereautochthonousandinthe
198Djuvara(2010),p.98;Constantiniu(2011),p.81.199S.Fischer-Galati,TwentiethCenturyRumania(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1970),p.14.200Djuvara(2010),p.102.201Iorga(1930),p.112.202Draghicescu(1995),p.460.203deGerando,citedinDraghicescu(1995),p.510.204Mihailescuetal,citedinDutceac-Segesten(2011),p.225.
90
majority,butthepoliticalclasswasinitsoverwhelmingmajorityHungarian.”205This
interpretationofthesituationofTransylvanianRomaniansduringtheMiddleAges
definesRomanians’collectivememoryofandcontemporaryattitudestowards
Hungary.LucianBoiacapturesthisaccuratelywhenhesuggeststhat“extreme
opinionsreachmythicalproportionsandreachtheintensityofapsychosis.Evidently,
historybearsitsresponsibility:thediscriminationofRomaniansandthecontemptuous
attitudetowardstheminHungarybefore1918(…)cannotbuthavemarkedRomanian
consciousness.”206
ThisisallthemorethecaseaspersecutionwasrootedinRomanians’initialrejection
ofHungary’sattemptstoconvertthemtotheCatholicfaith.Theresistanceaspect,
presenthereinaculturalform,completesthethemeofBesiegedFortress.Romanians’
attachmenttotheirreligionhasadoublesignificance,astheoriginalbasisfor
discriminationbutalsoasproofoftheessentialdelineationbetweenthemselvesand
Hungarians.Milcaemphasisesthiswhenhesuggeststhat“Orthodoxy(…)wasaform
ofidentitaryresistanceagainstHungarianattemptstocatholiciseRomanians.”207
ConversionisseenasconducivetoassimilationintotheHungariancommunity208and
resistancetoit,inasense,entailsthesurvivaloftheRomanianethnicelementin
Transylvania.Draghicescu,forinstance,arguesthat:“itmusthavebeenan
extraordinaryvitalitywhich,withalltheindignationofourhistory,keptusalive.Since
theChristianlawseemstohavecontributedtopreservingusinCatholicHungary(…),it
wasabsorbingitsconservationpowerfromtheenergyofourpeople.”209In1930,the
statesmanandhistorianNicolaeIorga,oneoftheartisansoftheunification,implied
thattherejectionoftheCatholicfaithwasparamountinTransylvanianRomanians’
preservationoftheiruniquecharacter:“theRomanianlifeofthevillagesfrom
Ardeal210wasnotonlymaintainedbutwasflourishingintermsofawarenessofits
nationhood”asthepopulationtherewas“profoundlyboundtoitslanguage,religion
205Constantiniu(2011),p.82.206Boia(2011),p.278.207Milca(2010),pp.68-70.208Djuvara(2010)andConstantiniu(2011)bothpointthatseverallaterTransylvanianvoevodsdescendfromCatholicisedandMagyarisedRomaniannoblelines.209Draghicescu(1995),p.358.210ThecentralregionofTransylvania.
91
andtraditions.”211Conversely,forRomanianswhohadcatholicised,thislinkhadbeen
lost:“therehadexistedaRomaniannobility[inTransylvania].(…)Butanotherreligion,
anothersociallife,anotherpoliticalgoalhadwonovertheirsouls,whichwere,
becauseofit,slowlytransformed.”212
Inidentitaryterms,thisisimportantbecauseitcementsthenotionofanequalitysign
betweenOrthodoxyandRomanians.Ontheotherhand,theessentialsocialand
politicalrepercussionsofthisequationcompletethetableauofRomaniansasvictims
oftheHungarians.Ultimately,thisinterpretationofTransylvania’shistoryemphasises
thepricepaidbyRomaniansforretainingtheirtraditionalvaluesandgivesthis
struggleanalmostheroicdimension–survivalbearsthecostofdominationbya
foreignpower.AsDutceac-Segestenpointsout,thisnarrativeispervasive:inacertain
Romanianhistorytext-book,Hungariansareportrayedas“responsibleforthelackof
officialrecognitionofOrthodoxy,andthereforeforthemaltreatmentofthosewho
continuetoembraceitdespitedifficulties.ThesufferingoftheOrthodoxfaithfulis
placedintheheritagelineoftheearlyChristianmissionaries.”213Thisportrayalofthe
SelfiscomplementedbyarepresentationofHungaryasanessentialOtherand
responsibleforthehistoricsubjugationofTransylvanianRomanians.More
importantly,presentedinthecontextofthehistoricalexperienceoftheRomanian
people,thedramaofTransylvaniaisexportedsuchthatHungary’spersecutionof
TransylvanianRomaniansbecomesaninjusticeleviedagainstallRomanians;inother
words,anationalratherthanregionalissue.Asaresult,Boiaargues,Romanianshave
constructedamytharoundHungary’sinfluenceontheexistenceandaffairsoftheir
state,ascribingtoittheroleof“dominantpiecetowhicharesubordinatedallmajor
Romanianevolutions.”214Dutceac-Segestenpicksuponthismythbuildingexercise.In
herreviewofRomanianhistorytextbooks,shefindsthat,mostoften,“Hungariansare
portrayedonlyasenemies,ascounterweightstotheRomanianaction.Theydonot
appeartopossessspecificfeatures,otherthananincessantdesiretoopposethe
211Iorga(1930),pp.110-111.212Ibid.,p.112.213Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.167.214Boia(2011),p.279.
92
Romaniancause(…).”215Consequently,Hungariansoccupyaspecificandcriticalplace
intheRomanianimaginary,attheheartofalleffortstocreate,uniteandprotectthe
Romanianterritories.
WallachiaandMoldavia
InWallachiaandMoldavia,thehistoricalnarrativefollowssimilarpatternsof
interpretation,despitethedifferenceinstatusbetweenthemandTransylvania.The
twoprincipalitieswere,ineffect,establishedpoliticalandadministrativeentities,but
theirsmall-stateconditionmeantthattheycouldnotachieveindependence.Inthe
twocenturiesthatfollowedtheircreation,Wallachiawas“attimes(…)avassalof
Hungary,oravassaltotheOttomans(forthefirsttimein1390),orasemi-
independentstate(…)”216whilstMoldaviaswitchedfrombeingavassalofHungaryto
swearingallegiancetothePolishcrowninwhathasbeendescribedasa“strugglefor
politicalemancipation(…)bythevoevodsofWallachiaandMoldova.”217Withtherise
oftheOttomanEmpireinthefifteenthcenturythebalanceofpowerinSouthernand
EasternEuropechangedandthetwostatesbecamepermanentvassalstothePorte,
Wallachiain1476andMoldaviain1512,suzeraintywhichlasteduntilthenineteenth
century.Themedievalexperienceofthetwostates,therefore,isoneprimarilyof
subserviencetoforeignpowerswhichisobviouslyatoddswiththeprerogativeofself-
preservationandofrejectionofexternalinfluencesthatappearssoprominently
throughoutthenarrative.Again,thethemeoftheBesiegedFortressaimstovindicate
thisstateofaffairsand,similarlytothecaseofTransylvania,thefocusisonboththe
victimisationoftheRomanianpeoplesandresistance,whichheretakestheguiseof
ensuringthesurvivalandautonomyofthestates.
Draghicescuhighlights“theintriguesandinterventionoftheTurks,Hungariansand
Polesintheinternalaffairsofthesistercountries”aswellasthe“humiliationsand
defeatssuffered”218bytheRomanianpeople.Radulescu-Motrualsotalksabout“the
215Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.224.216P.R.Magocsi,HistoricalAtlasofCentralEurope(Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,2002),p.30.217Fischer-Galati(1970),p.10.218Draghicescu(1995),p.297.
93
wickedcircumstancesourpeoplehaveendured.”219Contemporaryhistorian
ConstantiniubelievesthattheRomanianstateswereexploitedbecauseoftheir
inherentgeo-politicalsignificance,onthepathofallcontinental“expansionsand
invasions.”220ThepicturecreatedisoneofRomaniansashelplesstargetsof
expansionistlargerpowers.Undersuchcircumstances,independenceisnotanoption
andthedestinyofthesestatescanonlybeoneofsubmission.Thistypeofnarrativeis
evidenceofwhatDutceac-SegestenarguesisRomania’s“traditionofplacing[itself]in
aninferiorpositionvis-à-vistheirmorepowerfulneighboursandthusjustify[ing]the
lackofpowerordominancebyplacingtheblameelsewhere.”221
Showing,however,Romanians’relativeweaknessisnotenough.Inordertocomplete
theBesiegedFortresstableauanarrativeofresistanceisrequired.Forthis,thefocus
shiftsonportrayingRomanians’benevolentacceptanceofsuzeraintyasaguaranteeof
thesurvivalofthestateswhichprotectstheRomanianethnicelement.AsBoiaargues,
theRomaniannarrativeemphasisesthe“remarkablevitalityoftheRomanianregions,
whichsucceeded,indifficultconditions(…),toprotecttheirexistence,whilstonce
powerfulstates,suchasHungaryorPoland(…),collapsed,swallowedbyevengreater
powers.”222MihaiMilcagoesasfarastosuggestthatthis,infact,wastheraisond’être
oftheprincipalities:“aminimumstrategyofsurvivaloftheRomanianelement
requiredaccommodatingtocircumstancesandthetemporarycompromisewith
superiorforces,crushingfromamilitary,demographic,etc.perspective.”223
Romanianscannothopetoachieveindependence,butself-preservationisattainable;
therefore,acceptingvassalageisnotcowardlybutadefendable,perhapseven
ingenious,measureofensuringthesurvivaloftheRomanianelement.Inidentitary
terms,thisnarrativeissignificant,becauseitreinforcestheportrayalofRomaniansas
resoluteinretainingtheirstatehoodinahistoricalcontextwhichisagainstthem,as
wellasrevealingthemasspecialinhowtheynegotiatethedifficultcircumstancesthey
arefacing.
219Radulescu-Motru(1999),p.45.220Constantiniu(2011),pp.28-29.221Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.107.222Boia(2012),p.62.223Milca(2010),p.70.
94
Withthis,thethemeofBesiegedFortressiscomplete.InbothTransylvaniaontheone
hand,andWallachiaandMoldaviaontheother,thepicturecreatedbythehistorical
narrativeisoneofconflictandoppressionbygreaterpowers.Romaniansarevictimsof
historybutmanagetoretaintheirfledglingidentitybyvariousmeans,andoftenat
greatcost.ThedifferentiationbetweenSelfandOtherisathreadthatrunsthroughout
andleadstoaperceptionthat,althoughphysicallyseparated,Romaniansnonetheless
shareadesiretoprotectthevaluesthatwouldlaterdefinetheuniquenessoftheir
character,whetherreligiousattachmentorautonomywithinthehabitus.Inthe
modernera,theseideaswouldallbeharnessedwhenanewthemeemerges–thatof
unityandindependence.
TheModernEra–theThemeofUnityTheBirthofRomanianNationalIdentity–Unity
UnityisthelinchpinoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,towhichallSelfandOther
regardingfeaturesexploredsofararesubordinated–Dutceac-Segesten,forinstance,
considersittobe“oneofthemajorpillarsofintheconstructionofnationalRomanian
identityandadominantmyth.224TheemergenceofthisthemeintheRomanian
regionsisunsurprisinglytightlylinkedtothenationalisttrendwhichsweptEuropein
theeighteenthandnineteenthcentury,asLucianBoiaargues:“thethemecouldnot
buttemptRomanians.Anationwhichwaslateinachievingunity,(…)Romaniansfelt
theneedtodefinetheelementsofthisunity,thetraitswhichmadethemsimilarto
oneanotheranddifferentfromothers.”225Tothisend,theFoundationMythsaswell
astheBesiegedFortressthemewereutilisedtoprovethespiritualunityofthe
Romaniansand,ultimately,legitimisethecreationofasinglestatebringingtogether
allRomanianspeakers.ThesenowsedimentedclaimsaboutRomanianidentitywere,
therefore,fromtheverybeginningapoliticaltool.Theconnectionbetweenthisunity-
drivensenseofidentityandthetroubledhistoryoftheRomanianregionswasalso
paramount.Intellectualsbasedtheirargumentsforunificationonthecultural
communalitiesofallRomaniansandtheexistenceofadefactoRomaniannation,but
224Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.171.225Ibid.,p.238.
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alsousedthevictimhoodnarrativetoportraythecreationofanation-stateas
vindicationforRomanians’historyofoppressionandinterferencebyforeignpowers.
Themodernhistoricalnarrativehighlightsboththepoliticaleffortstoachievethe
unificationoftheregions,andalsotheprocessofdevelopmentoftheseideas.For
instance,thefactthatthefirstattestationofRomaniannationhoodinanofficial
contextcamefromTransylvaniaintheformofapetitionforpoliticalrightsfor
RomanianTransylvanians(SupplexLibellusValacharomTranssilvaniae,1791)isof
particularsignificancefortworeasons.Firstly,theappealwasbasedonthe
preponderanceoftheRomanianethnicelementintheregion,butalsoonits
anterioritycomparedtotherulingHungarians226anargumentintunewiththeOrigins
andHabitatmyths.RomanianscouldtracetheirexistencewithinTransylvaniato
Antiquityandthisdefinedtheirhistoricalrightinoccupyingit,whilst,atthesametime,
entitlingthemtopoliticalrecognition.Assuch,Constantiniuargues,theSupplex“was
theexpressionoftheremarkableprogressinthecrystallisationofRomanian
nationalistideology.”227Secondly,itprovesthattheemancipationmovementbeginsin
Transylvaniaandfromhereitis“funnelledintoWalachiaandMoldavia”228throughout
thenineteenthcentury.Thisiscrucialtotheidentitynarrativeasitmeansthatthe
awarenessofnationalbelongingofTransylvanianRomaniansisnotstymiedbytheir
suppressionunderHungarianrule,but,tothecontrary,triggeredbyit.Theattestation
ofnationhoodbecomes,inthisvein,amodernmanifestationofresistancetoforeign
ruleintheBesiegedFortressofTransylvania.Asthisthemeiscarriedacrossthe
CarpathiansintoWallachiaandMoldavia,theidentitarydiscourseplacesTransylvania
attheheartoftheendeavourtobringtogethertheRomaniannation.
Itwasnotlongbeforethesenotionsbegantogathertractionintheothertwo
Romanianregionsanditisherethattheybecomeargumentsfortheestablishmentof
anation-state.Aparticularlyinterestingbook,publishedinthecommunistperiod
(1982),acompendiumofworksandcorrespondencebyRomanianleadersand
intellectuals,effectivelytrackstheevolutionofthediscourseonunityinthefirsthalf
226SeeMilca(2010),Constantiniu(2011),Djuvara(2010).227Constantiniu(2011),p.190.228Ibid.,p.15.
96
ofthenineteenthcentury.Bythe1830sRomanianadministratorswerepointingout
that“thedifferencebetweentheworld’speoplesarefirstaccordingtoreligion,
languageandproximity–andsecondly,accordingtotraditionsandthenatureofthe
administration–neitheroneofthesecanbefoundbetweenWallachiansand
Moldavians.”229Thereisarecognition,therefore,thatthesimilaritiesbetweenthe
peoplesinthetwoprincipalitiesarebasedonboththeircommonorigins,butalso
theirsimilarhistoricalexperiences.BythePan-Europeanrevolutionof1848,the
discoursehadcrystallisedaroundtheidentificationofthesefactorsastheconstitutive
elementsofaRomaniannationencompassingnotonlyWallachiaandMoldavia,but
theotherRomanianinhabitedregionsaswell.RevolutionarieslikeNicolaeBalcescu
werearguingthat“ouraim,gentlemen,IbelievecannotbeotherthantheNational
UnityofRomanians.Aunityfirstoffeeling,tobringwithitpoliticalUnity,tomake
Wallachians,Moldavians,Bessarabians,230Transylvanians(…),onebodypolitic,one
nation,onestate.”231Theframingofhisargument,however,highlightsthemannerin
whichthemedievalvictimhoodnarrativehasfedintotheunitydiscourse:“these
Romanianstatesthathaveexistedforeighteencenturies,thisnation(…)whichhas
escapedunscathedfromtheterroroftheMiddleAgeswhensomanyenemiesmore
powerfulthanitthreatenedtoconquerit(…)howcoulditbedestinedtodisappear
now(…)inthecenturyofliberty.”232Unityandindependenceweredeserved,
therefore,preciselybecausethehistoryoftheRomanianregionshadhithertobeen
oneofhardshipandendurance.
229Conachi,citedinG.Kirileanu,‘IdeeaUniriilamarelelogofatC.Conachi[TheIdeaofUnificationinLogotheteC.Conachi],’ConvorbitiLiterare,XLIII:1(1909),pp.55-59,inC.Bodea,1848laRomani–oIstorieinDatesiMarturii[1848forRomanians–aHistoryinDatesandTestimonies](Bucharest:EdituraStiintificasiEnciclopedica,1982),p.80.230BythispointMoldaviahasalreadybeenpartitionedintheWesternMoldavia,thesemi-independentstateandBessarabia,controlledbytheTsaristEmpire(1812).231N.Balcescu,’Privireasuprastariidefata,asupratrecutuluisiviitoruluipatrieinoastre[AnOverviewoftheCurrentSituation,overthePastandFutureofOurNation],’Operevol.I,G.ZaneandE.Zane(eds)(Bucharest:EdituraAcademieiRomane,1974),pp.171-178,inC.Bodea,1848laRomani–oIstorieinDatesiMarturii[1848forRomanians–aHistoryinDatesandTestimonies](Bucharest:EdituraStiintificasiEnciclopedica,1982),pp.319-320.232Ibid.,p.318.
97
Figure3.TheOldKingdom(1859-1918).ResultedfromtheunificationofWesternMoldavia,inblue,andWallachia,inpink.Adaptedbytheauthorfrom‘MapofGreaterRomania,’HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus1926).Seelistoffigureforcompletereference.
Boththesegoalswereeventuallyachieved,althoughinstages.In1859camethe
unificationofWallachiaandMoldaviainthefirststateofRomania,alsoknownasthe
OldKingdom–see[Figure3].IndependencefromtheOttomanEmpirewasattainedin
1878andTransylvaniaandBessarabiajoinedtheothertworegionsaftertheFirst
WorldWar,in1918–see[Figure4].ThisfinalstageistheculminationoftheRomanian
nationalprojectand,assuch,oneofthemostcelebratedeventsofitshistory–itisno
coincidencethatthedateofthedefactounification,1December,isRomania’s
nationalday.Thecompletionofthehabitusandtheestablishmentofanindependent
statebringingtogetherallRomanianspeakersisthebenchmarkoftheRomanian
identitynarrativeandavindicationofahistoricalexperiencemarkedbyforeign
domination.ContemporaneousstatesmanandhistorianIorgaframesthisbestwhen
heassertsthat“inthisCarpathian-DanubianOrient[exists]apeopleofabout
14.000.000souls,withanancientoriginalcivilisationwhichdoesnotask,inexchange
foritsmillenarysuffering(…),foranythingmorethanrespectofitsincontestable
98
destiny”233tobebroughttogetherinasinglestate.Revealingpoliticalunityasthe
specialdestinyofallRomaniansplacesthenation-stateatthecentreoftheidentity
narrative;thestatewasseenasthephysicalmanifestationoftheexistenceof
Romaniansasapeopleand,assuch,itscreationsignifiedtherightful‘cominginto
being’oftheRomaniannation,againstthevicissitudesofhistory.Thisperceptionof
theestablishmentofanation-stateasjustdesertsispervasive.NotedjuristGeorge
Sofronie,activeinthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,arguedin1942that“forthe
nationalconsciousness(…)ofRomanianseverywhere,thedecisiontakenon1
December1918(…)has,aboveallelse,thesignificanceofajustsentenceinalong
historicalprocess.”234
Figure4.GreaterRomania(1918-1940).ResultedfromtheunificationoftheOldKingdom,inpink;Bessarabia,inyellow;andTransylvania,inblue.Adaptedbytheauthorfrom‘MapofGreaterRomania,’
233N.Iorga,IstoriaRomanilorsiaCivilisatieiLor[TheHistoryofRomaniansandTheirCivilisation](Bucharest:EdituraFundatieiFerdinandI,1930),p.281.234G.Sofronie,‘Semnificatiajuridico-istoricaaActuluidelaAlba-Iulia[TheJuridicalandHistoricalSignificanceoftheAlba-IuliaAct],’inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.329.
99
HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus1926).Seelistoffiguresforcompletereference.
Eveninthecontemporarynarrative,boththeFoundationMythsandBesiegedFortress
themeareusedinframingthisachievement.Djuvara,forinstance,callstheGreat
Unification“miraculous(…)[and]thefulfilmentofRomanians’centuriesolddreamto
cometogetherfromBanat[A/NregionintheWestofthecountry]totheDniester
River.”235Onenoticeshereanemphasisontheorganichabituslimitedbynatural
landmarksandalinkingbetweenpoliticalandgeographicalcompleteness.Milca,on
theotherhand,arguesthat“Romanianidentitymetamorphosed,afterperiodsof
humiliationandoppressionbythegreatpowers,knew,after1918(…)aneraof
patrioticexaltationandnationaljubilation.(…)Romaniansenjoyedafeelingof
realisationofacollectiveaspirationrefusedforcenturiesonend(…).”236Thereisa
certainsenseherethatRomaniaineffectdefeatshistory,achievingunificationdespite
itseternalill-wishersandthusitssuccessisanindividualendeavour,outliningonce
againtheresilienceanddeterminationofitspeople.Itisthereforethecasethat,whilst
thethemeofUnityisdominant,thediscourseonitslegitimacyincorporatesthemajor
aspectsofthefoundationandmedievalthemes,tothepointatwhichtheybecome
constitutiveelementsofit.
235N.Djuvara(2010),p.236.236Milca(2010),p.86.
100
TheEssentialOthersandNeedforIdentityNarrativeContinuity
Figure5.TerritorialLossesof1940.Inyellow,Bessarabia,cededtotheSovietUnion;inblue,North-WesternTransylvania,cededtoHungary;inorange,theCadrilaterregion,cededtoBulgaria.Adaptedbytheauthorfrom‘MapofGreaterRomania,’HeinusAtlas(Leipzig:KartographischeAnstaltvonF.A.Brockhaus1926).Seelistoffigureforcompletereference.
AlthoughtheunificationofthethreeRomanianprincipalitiesisnowalmostahundred
yearsold,thethemeofUnitystillrepresents‘amajorpillar’oftheRomanianidentity
narrative.AsLucianBoiahasargued,“inRomanianculture,themythofunity,orof
uniformity,issoentrenched”thatitaffectsevenspecialists,“historiansor
sociologists.”237Thereare,ofcourse,complexreasonswhythatisthecase,notleast
theinfluenceofcommunismontheidentitynarrativewhichwillbediscussedinthe
followingsection.Thisthesisargues,however,thatanimportantaspectwhichone
shouldtakeintoaccountisthat,intheRomanianperception,thisunitytodayis
neithercompleteoruncontested,givingthethemecontemporarysalience.Asaresult,
nationalunitycontinuestoplayacrucialpartintheRomanianimaginary,withthe
237Boia(2010),p.235.
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focusnowshiftingfromthecreationtotheprotectionoftheRomanianstate.Inthis,
twoparticularactorsplayacriticalrolebecauseoftheirperceivedinterestsand
interferenceintheaffairsofthenewstate–HungaryandRussia,–becoming
effectivelysubscribedinthethemeofUnityasessentiallythreateningOthers.
IthasalreadybeenshownhowHungary’sconqueringofTransylvaniaandits
treatmentoftheindigenousRomanianpopulationhasbeenportrayedinthehistorical
andidentitynarrative,buildingHungaryintoanessentialenemyofRomanians’efforts
foremancipation.TransylvaniawaseventuallyannexedbytheOldKingdomafterthe
FirstWorldWarresolvingasituationwhichDjuvaraargued,“weighedheavilyonthe
Romanianheart.”238Thatisbecause,withoutTransylvaniathenationalproject
remainedincomplete,asDraghicescu’sassertionexemplifies:“ourhistory,ourmap,is
unfinishedandstillawaitsthefulfilmentofitsrealandnaturalcontours.”239These
identitaryscarswouldperhapshavehealed,hadtheissueofownershipof
Transylvaniabeensettledatthetime.However,Hungarydidnotrenounceitsclaim
overTransylvaniaand,giventheopportunityin1940,itannexedpartofitunder
sanctionfromGermany–see[Figure5].Althoughtheterritorywaseventually
returnedtoRomaniaattheendoftheSecondWorldWar,thefactthatHungary
challengedRomania’srightofpossessingTransylvaniadefinitivelyconfirmedthe
interpretationofthisactorasanexistentialthreattoitspeopleand,fromnowon,its
territorialintegrity.AcontemporaneousaccountrevealstheimpactofHungarian
aggressionontheRomanianimaginary:“wedidnotbelieve,no-onecouldeverhave
imaginedthattherighteousnessofRomania,whilstsoevident,wouldeverbe
questionedagain.”240BuildingonthealreadyexistingtensionsbetweenRomaniaand
Hungary,thedenialofthe‘righteousness’ofthecontoursoftheRomanianstate,
basedonhistoricalrights,istheeventwhichconclusivelysituatesHungaryasan
antagonisticforceintheRomanianidentitydiscourse,ascribingtoit,asBoiaand
Dutceac-Segestenhaveargued,adominantmalignantroleinthenation’sevolution.241
238Djuvara(2010),p.230.239Draghicescu(1995),p.447.240L.Rebreanu,‘Transilvania1940[Transylvania1940],’Familia[TheFamily]76,seriesIV:1(January1941),pp.8-10,inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.207.241Boia(2011),p.279,Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.224.
102
TheperceptionthattheirterritorycontinuestobecontestedandisstillaBesieged
FortresscausesinRomaniansaninherentsuspicionanddistrustofHungary’sactions,
whilst,ontheotherhand,inidentitarytermsreinforcestheimportanceofaffirming
andprotectingtheirunity.Thisisultimatelyattherootofcontemporaryattitudes
towardsHungary,notleastduetoBudapest’scontinuedinterestintheaffairsofits
minorityinTransylvania.
Inthisview,theraisond’êtreoftheRomanianstatebecomestheprotectionoftheir
habitusandpeoplefromexternalinterference.TheactionsofthesecondOtherdo
nothingifnotexacerbatethistendency.Russiaentersthescenemuchlaterthan
Hungary,butitsinfluenceonRomanianhistoryandidentityisportrayedtobejustasif
notevenmorepowerfulthanHungary’s.PartofthereasonisthatTsaristRussia’s
expansionintoEasternEurope,primarilythroughthecenturies-longRusso-Turkish
Wars,coincideswiththearticulationoftheRomaniannationalproject–atatime
whennationalunitybecomestheirmainpoliticalgoal,Russia’sinterferenceinthe
affairsofMoldaviaandWallachiaintensifies.AsLucianBoiaargues,theconsequence
isthatRussiansareseen“withsuspicions,evenhostility,asapotentialthreattothe
Romaniannation.”242Thethreatmaterialisesmostprominentlyinthecaseof
Bessarabia,originallytheeasternpartofMoldavia.TheregionisannexedbyRussiain
1812243beginningwhatDjuvaratermed“thetragedyofBessarabia.”244Despite
unifyingwithRomaniain1918afterthedisintegrationoftheTsaristEmpire,
BessarabiaisreclaimedbyRussiain1940andlostforgoodaftertheendoftheSecond
WorldWar,whenitbecomesaSovietrepublic–see[Figure5].Thepartitionof
MoldaviaanditsforcedseparationfromtheRomanianstateasadirectresultof
RussianinterferencehashadaprofoundimpactontheRomanianidentitynarrativein
boththearticulationoftheSelf,andRussiaasanOther.
InwhatconcernstheSelf,thesheerexistenceofBessarabia–nowtheRepublicof
Moldova–anotherterritoryinhabitedbyRomanians,meansthatthenationalproject
242Boia(2012),p.80.243In[Figure3]onenoticesthat,bythetimeofthe1859unification,BessarabiawasseparatefromMoldavia,p.79.244Djuvara(2010),p.172.
103
remainsincomplete–thegoalofnationalunityand,asacorollary,theprotectionof
thestate’sintegrityhavebeenfailed.Whatmakestheeventevenmoresignificantis
thefactthat,forRomanians,Bessarabiaisnotacontestedterritory:asBoiaargues,
“over[it]Romanianshadanincontestablehistoricalright–ithadbeenstolenfrom
Moldaviain1812.”245Agreatinjustice,therefore,hasbeeninflictedontheRomanian
peoplewhich,coupledwiththerealitythatGreaterRomaniawasanephemeral
project(allinall,BessarabiawaspartofRomaniaforonly25years)makesitslossthe
greattragedyofRomanianmodernhistory.Ontheotherhand,theauthorofthis
wrongdoingisRussia,yetanothergreatpowerenforcingitswillontheRomanian
people,confirmingitssmallstateconditionandputtinganendtothedreamofa
“GreaterRomaniafromtheDniester[i.e.theeasternborderofMoldova]totheTisza
[thewesternborderofTransylvania].”246ThethemeofBesiegedFortressreprised,
RussiareplacestheOthersofthepast–Poland,Austro-Hungary,theOttomans–as
theessentialthreateningsuperpower,withtheRomaniansvictimsoftheir
expansionism.AsMarinargues,Russiansbecomeforeversubscribedinthevictimhood
narrative:“(…)itisthemwhoareresponsibleofthe‘unfortunatedestiny’ofthe
Romanians.”247Thisnotionmayseemsurprising,takingintoaccountthefiftyyears
thatfollowedthelossofBessarabia,whichsawRomania’smoveintotheSoviet
Union’ssphereofinfluenceduringtheColdWar.However,aswillbeshowninthe
nextsection,althoughtheresponsetotheeventwasmutedatthetime,Ceausescu’s
nationalsocialismsoonbroughtthissimmeringresentmenttotheforeanddefined,to
alargeextent,Romania’scontemporaryattitudetowardsRussia.Theconsequenceof
theeventoverallisthatthereisanindeliblelink,intheRomanianimaginary,between
RussiaandtheunravellingofRomanianunity.
TheCommunistPeriodCeausescuandtheWeaponisingofRomanianNationalIdentity
SofarithasbeenshownhowtheRomanianidentitynarrative,whichemergesin
earnestduringthenineteenthcentury,hasnationalunityandthenation-stateatits
245Boia(2012),p.94.246Boia(2011),p.216.247MarincitedinDutceac-Segesten(2011),p.218.
104
heart,andisdeeplyrootedinthetellingofitspeople’shistory,particularlyitsorigins
andmedievalexperiences.TheSelf-Othercontrastisoneoftheprimarymarkersof
thisnarrative,afactwhichisnotinitselfunique.However,themannerinwhichitwas
utilisedinthecommunistperiod,especiallyduringCeausescu’sregime,makesit
crucialinunderstandingRomanians’contemporaryanxietiesandsensitivitiesin
regardstotheroleofthestateanditsrelationswithbothRussiaandHungaryas
Others,andtheRepublicofMoldova,asanEstrangedSelf.
Romaniancommunismis,initself,anoddentity.BeforetheSecondWorldWarit
wouldhavebeenunthinkablethattheCommunistPartycouldeverrisetopowerin
thisstate.AsBoiahasargued,itwasperceivedasa“foreigner’sparty,betrayerof
nationalinterests(…).TherealityisitplayedtoMoscow’stune,proclaimingthe
multinationalcharacteroftheRomanianstateandnations’righttoself-determination
(inotherwords,thebreakingupofRomaniaand,mostimportantly,therecoveryof
BessarabiabytheRussians).”248Asaresult,itwentagainsttheprimaryprerogativesof
theRomanianstate,theprotectionofitsunityandevenitsnationalcharacter.Addto
thisthedramaofthelossofBessarabia,Romania’sadoptionofcommunismasstate
ideologycould,therefore,nothavebeenthepeople’schoice;asRomanianhistorians
haveendeavouredtopointout,itwas,instead,imposedbyMoscow.249Sinceboth
communistideologyandtheclosenesstoRussiaitsadoptionentailedwere
incompatiblewiththepreceptsoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,theirenforcement
would,overtime,cementtheimageofRussiaasamalignantinterferingforceinthe
affairsoftheRomanianstate.Intheshortterm,therewasnonethelessanattemptby
thepro-MoscowCommunistPartytopursueare-alignmentoftheRomanianidentity
andhistoricalnarrativestothisnewcourse.Boiaarguesthat,duringthe1950sthe
Sovietmodelhadto“impregnateRomanians’minds.Theonlyhistoricandcultural
referencepointremainedRussia.(…)Historywasrewritten.”Ifbeforetheemphasis
hadbeenonthenationalidea,“nowtheaccentshiftedto(…)integrationintheSlav
space,inparticular‘brotherly’relationswithRussiaandtheSovietUnion.”250The
248Boia(2012),p.105.249SeeBoia(2011),Constantiniu(2011),Djuvara(2010).250Boia(2012),pp.117-118.
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population’sand,soonafter,elites’reactiontothis,however,wasoneintunewith
Romanianattitudetowardsforeigninfluenceingeneral,namelyresistance;not
political,butcultural.AttemptsatRussification,forinstance,failedcomprehensively,
asBoiapointsout:“even(…)whenRussianwasintenselystudied,toofewactually
learntit.Manyonly‘pretended’:itwasasignofnon-adherence,apassiveformof
resistance.(…)EvenlessdidtheRomanianslearntolovetheRussians.Noteven
Romaniancommunistslovedthem.”251
Additionally,whatfollowedwasanendeavourtobreakawayfromRussian
communismand,whilstnotrenouncingtheideologyaltogether,fashioningitinto
somethingcompatiblewiththedominantportrayaloftheRomanianSelf.AsDutceac-
Segestenstates,thiswasachievedbycreating“theRomanian‘socialistnation,’a
combinationofnationalismandMarxism.”252Althoughthetrendbeganinthelate
1950sundertheleadershipofGheorgheGheorghiu-Dej,itisNicolaeCeausecu’s
administrationwhichexemplifiestheseeffortsmostprominently.Hisregime
combined,andthuslegitimised,personalrulewiththemainpreceptsoftheRomanian
identitynarrative,cloakedinadestructiveformofnationalism.AsCinopoeshas
pointedout“thecultofpersonalitywenthandinhandwiththenationalistdirection
Ceausescuadoptedsoonaftercomingtopower.”253Ceausescueffectivelytookthe
constitutivethemesofthenarrativeandalteredtheminsuchaswayastoportraythe
uniquenessoftheRomaniancharacterandthedifferentiationfromOthersasaproud
nationaldestinyandtheirprotectionasthemainresponsibilityofthestate.Asaresult,
constructinganunquestionablelinkbetweenhisregimeandRomania’sgloriouspast
ofresistingforeigninterferencewascrucial,withcertainattempts,suchasthebuilding
ofa“totem-likesculpturewithCeausescu’sheadatthetopofacolumnofRomanian
princes,”254whichmaytodayseembizarre,ifnotentirelyfarcical.Despiteits
questionablemethods,theaimsofRomaniancommunismweretosubscribe
Ceausescutothelonglistof‘historicaldefendersofthenation’and,throughthis,
251Ibid.p.225.252Dutcean-Segesten(2011),p.21.253R.Cinopoes,NationalismandIdentityinRomania:AHistoryofExtremePoliticsfromtheBirthoftheStatetoEUAccession(London:Tauris,2010),p.74.254Dutceac-Segesten(2011)p.22.
106
createhimintoapowerfulfigurecommittedtoensuringthecontinuityand
strengtheningoftheRomaniannation.
Thepursuitofthisnewdirectionentailedaliftonthestrictcensorshiponnationalist
literatureofthe1950sandthere-publishingandcreationofnewworksonRomanian
identity.TheFoundationMyths(withthenotableexceptionofreligion)andUnity
themetakecentrestage,inapolicythatmythologisesRomanianhistoryandidentity.
Ceausescuhimselfrathercrudelyseekstocapturethepsychologicalprofileof
Romaniansbydrawingonthecharacteristicsoftheirancestors,theDaciansand
Romans:“fromtheDacians[theRomaniantakes]histhirstforfreedom,thewillto
neverbowhisheadtoforeignoppressors,thedeterminationtobetruetohimself,the
onlymasterofhisfate,”whilstfromtheRomanshederiveshis“rationalspirit,
judgmentandpassionforcreation.”255Are-iteration,therefore,ofthenotionof
Romaniansassynthesisoftwoequallynobleandancientlines,theinfluenceofwhich
isstillvisibleintheircharacter.Thehabitusanditssignificanceindefiningand
protectingtheRomanianpeopleisofequalimportanceasdescriptionssuchasthis
exemplify:
OurDacia,themostpreciselycontoured,themostsolidlyandorganicallyconstructedgeographicspace[oftheBalkans](…),hasslowlykneadedandrevealed,whiledetachingitwithitsownphysiognomyfromtherest,aparticularpeople–theRomanianpeople.Thereis,indeed,nootherhistoryorpeopletorepresentsuchclearexpressionsoftheirland,asaretheRomanianpeopleandtheirhistory.256
Geographyandhistoryareinterconnected,thecombinationofthetwoprovidingthe
auspiciouscircumstancesfortheuniquedevelopmentoftheRomaniannation.Interms
ofimplicationsfortheRomanianidentitynarrative,thisemphasisongeographyismeant
toinstilinthemindofthepeopleasenseofprideintheindividualityoftheirnationand
255Ceausescu,citedinBoia(2011),p.245.256I.Conea,‘Spatiulgeograficromanesc[TheRomanianGeographicalSpace],’RevistaFundatiilorRegale[TheRoyalFoundationsMagazine]IX:7(1July1942),pp.38-47,inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.301.
107
theoverallconvictionthattheRomanianterritoryformsanorganicandindivisiblepart
oftheirnation.
Fromthisthemetonationalunityandthenation-statethereisbutonestepandfor
theRomaniancommunistregime,itisparticularlyimportant.AsDutceac-Segesten
pointsout,theemphasison“culturalunitybasedonashareddescentjustifiesthe
formationofa‘nationalunitarystate’includingallRomanianspeakers.Thisis
presentedasthemostardentdesireofthepeopleandaconstantpreoccupationof
theirleaders.”257Ineffect,Ceausescu’sregimere-imaginedRomanianhistoryasa
constantendeavourtoachievepoliticalunity,therealitybeing,ashasbeenshown,
thatthisprocessbeginsonlyinthenineteenthcentury.LucianBoiaarguesthat“unity,
alongsidecontinuity,becamethedirectingaxisofthehistoricaldiscourse.”258Through
this,hecontinues,theregimeportrayedunityasa“specifictraitoftheRomanian
being.”259Itistellingofthisrhetoricthattheperiodsawthepublishingofworkssuch
asthecompendiumontheunitydiscourseofthenineteenthcentury(Bodea,1982)or
anotheranthologyofessaysandarticlesfromtheSecondWorldWar(Ivascuand
Tanasescu,1977)whichfeaturesreactionstotheoccupationofTransylvania
prominentlyalongsidepressreleasesbytheCommunistParty.
TheOthersinCeausescu’sRomania
Endeavourssuchasthesearemeantnotonlytoensurethatthepast,distortedasitis,
remainsvividinthecollectivememoryofthepeople,butalso,inadvertently,thatthe
imageofthethreateningOthersisperpetuated.Inthis,thecommunistagencyhas
beenparticularlysuccessful,notinchangingthemaintenetsoftheRomanianidentity
narrative,butinbuttressingthemandaugmentingtheSelf-Othercontrast.By
emphasisingboththeuniquenessofRomaniansandtheirdesireforunity,aswellas
thedisruptiveinterferenceoftheOthers,thisversionofthenarrativeensuresthatthe
pastisneverforgottenandoldtrespassesneverforgiven.Assuch,inwhatconcerns
bothRussiaandHungary,theirimageasexistentialthreatstotheRomanianstateis
257Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.171.258Boia(2011),p.229.259Ibid.
108
exacerbated.Inthefirstinstance,thebreakfromMoscowisowedasmuchto
Romania’sresentmenttowardsRussiaastoCeausescu’sdesiretoholdsoledominion
overthestate.Thetwoareeffectivelyrelated–Ceausescuconnectedhisowndesire
forindependence260fromtheSovietUniontotheexistingpopularanimositytowards
Moscow.ThebreakupofGreaterRomaniaandthemannerinwhichtheremainderof
thestatehadbeentreatedbytheSovietsaftertheSecondWorldWarhadcemented
intheRomanianimaginarythenotionthatRussiawasaninherentthreat,andnota
friend,totheirpeople.AsBoiaargues,“theassaultofcommunismonRomanian
cultureandsocietywasofextraordinarybrutality.”261Althoughundercommunistrule,
Romaniahadbeenconsideredalosingpartyofthewarandorderedtopayheavy
reparationstotheSovietUnion.262Addedtothis,itremainedunderSovietoccupation
fromtheendofthewaruntil1958.Altogether,theseinfringementsonRomania’s
sovereignty,notwithstandingthedissolutionofitsunity,contributedtowhatBoiahas
arguedweresignificantanti-Russian“nationalsentimentsofthepopulation.”263
Underthesecircumstances,independencefromMoscowwasasmuchCeausescu’s
personalasitwasapopulardesire.Asaresult,when,inAugust1968,hepublically
condemnedtheSovietinvasionofCzechoslovakia,hedidso“infrontofacrowdwho
wassolidarywithhimandreadytodefendtheircountryifSoviettanksweretocross
theRomanianborder.”264Ceausescupursueda“policyofautonomyintheWarsaw
Pact”265andclosenesstotheWestwhichfittedneatlyontopof,butalsofuelled,the
populardemandfordistancefromMoscow.Ontheotherhand,thenarrativeof
independencewithintheSovietspherecouldnotbuthavetoucheduponthesensitive
issueofthelossBessarabia.DuringtheCeausescuregime,thestate’spositiontowards
thematterwasre-evaluated:ifinahistorytextbookofthe1950stheannexationof
easternMoldovawasreferredtoasaliberation,266laterthestatepursueda“policyof
260Constantiniu(2011),p.498.261Boia(2012),p.108.262Constantiniu(2011),p.435.263Boia(2012),p.120.264Constantiniu(2011),p.500.265Ibid.,p.509.266M.Roller,IstoriaR.P.R.–ManualpentruInvatamantulMediu[TheHistoryoftheP.P.R.–ManualforSecondaryEducation](Bucharest:EdituradeStatDidacticasiPedagocica,1952),p.632.
109
supportinghistorianswhowerecriticaloftheSovietofficialposition.Theynever
directlyattackedtheSovietposition,butthroughouttheCeausescuperiod,historians
arguedthatMoldovawasaRomanianterritory.”267Oneshouldnotbesurprised,
therefore,thattheissueofBessarabiamaintaineditssaliencethroughoutthe
communistperiod.
Ontheotherhand,relationswithHungaryduringthecommunistperiodwereinmany
waysdefinedbytheiraffiliationtotheEasternBloc.WithinRomania,however,
resentmentagainstHungarianswasripenotleastbecauseoftheregime’seffortsto
keepthememoryofthethreattoTransylvaniaandthehistoricalsubjugationofits
Romaniancontingentalive.Roles,however,hadnowbecomesomewhatreversed;
afterhundredsofyearsofTransylvanianRomaniansbeingsubjectstotheHungarian
crown,theirstatenowcontainedanotinsignificantHungarianminority(around7%of
thetotalpopulation),‘inherited’fromtheannexationofTransylvania.Withthisin
mind,Ceausescu’sregimeandthetypeofnationalismitpursued,were,asCinopoes
argues,“markedinaparticularethnicway.”268Throughemphasisingcultural
uniqueness,nationalunityandpoliticalindependencefromMoscow,Ceausescuhad
glorifiedandmythologisedtheexceptionalismoftheRomanianpeopleandtheirstate.
Insuchcircumstances,theHungarianminoritystuckoutasspoilersoftheunitary
nation-stateandbecamethetargetofaconcertedpolicyofdiscriminationandforced
assimilation.AccordingtoGillberg,thisincludedthelimitingof“educational
opportunities[inthemothertongue,presumably];placenames[being]changedto
reflectRomanianheritagewhileremoving(…)[foreign]influence;officialsallegedly
chang[ing]birthcertificatestoreducethenumberofethnic(…)Magyarsbornin
Romania.”269
Theresultwas,undoubtedly,theoneintended–Romaniaisnowmoreethnically
homogenous,withthepercentageofinternalOtherssignificantlylowerthanatits
267S.D.Roper,Romania:TheUnfinishedRevolution(Florence,KY:Gordon&BreachPublishing,2000),p.126.268Cinopoes(2010),p.4.269T.Gilberg,NationalismandCommunisminRomania–TheRiseandFallofCeausescu’sPersonalDictatorship(Boulder,Colorado:WestviewPress,1990),p.177.
110
creation.270Moreimportantly,however,theemphasisontheSelf-Othercontrastin
rhetoriccoupledwiththediscriminationofminoritygroupsinpractice,has
perpetuatedtheperceptionthatHungarianswhohavenotbeenassimilatedcannotbe
trueRomanians:“howcouldyousayaHungarianisRomanian?(…)TheHungarianis
Hungarian!”271UltimatelythistypeofthinkinghasledtoanisolationoftheHungarian
communityfromRomanians–a‘back-toback’existence,asaninterviewrespondent
putsit272-andtheconstructionintheRomanianidentitydiscourseofanOtherfrom
within.Importantly,thishasasignificantimpactonhowRomaniansviewtheroleof
thestateinnegotiatingitspositionvis-à-vistheHungarianminority,aswellasthe
latter’sdemandsforculturalandpoliticalrecognition.Theperception,aswillbe
exploredinthefollowingchapteris,tothisday,thattheinterplaybetweenthestate
andtheHungarianminorityisazero-sum-gameandacquiescencetoanyoftheir
demandscomescontrarytotheprerogativesofanationalstate,andeventhreatensits
existencebecauseofboththerealandimaginedlinkbetweentheHungarianminority
anditskinstate.
Conclusion–Structure,AgencyandRomanianIdentity
Thischapterhasshownhowthehistoricalnarrativehasbeenconstructedinsucha
wayastohighlightthemainfeaturesofRomaniannessandtoemphasiseanidentity
narrativefittedtothepoliticalgoalsoftheera,namelythecreationandprotectionof
aRomaniannation-state.ThisconcurswithBrowning’sviewthatthehistorical
narrativeshowsthe“contingencyofdominantrepresentations”273oftheSelfand
Other.Neitherthisnor,perhaps,thethreethemesoftheRomanianidentitynarrative
areuniquetoRomanians.Whatis,however,peculiaristhecontinuationofthese
themesintothecontemporarynarrative,inthattheportrayalofboththeformative
eventsoftheRomanianpeopleaswellastherepresentationoftheSelfandOther
270AccordingtoBoia(2012,p.144)eveninTransylvaniathepercentageofHungarianshadgonedownfrom24.4%in1930to21%in1992,whilsttheproportionofRomanianshadincreasedfrom57.8%to73.6%inthesameperiod.271Boia(2012),p.213.272AnonymousD.,InterviewwithFormerMinisterofCulture,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,12.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.273Browning(2008),p.64.
111
haveremainedlargelyunchangedfromthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturyandup
tothisday.AlthoughcircumstancesandperceptionsovertheactionsofOthersplayed
theirpart,theroleofagency,andparticularlythatofCeausescu’sregime,hasbeen
paramountinensuringcontinuity.InCeausescu’sinteractionwiththeRomanian
identitynarrative,theimpactofagencyoverstructureappearsmostemphatically,
followingupontheassumptionsmadeinChapters1and2.Hisrole,asitturnedout,
wasnotinre-interpretingtheimageoftheSelfandOthers,butaugmentingthe
alreadyexistingportrayals.Therewas,therefore,analterationoftheidentitynarrative
duringhisregime,butitmanifestedthroughthereinforcementofitsoriginalfeatures.
ThereasonwhyCeausescu’sapproachwassuccessfulwhereearlypro-Moscow
communistshadfailedisthatthelatter’swastoodrasticadeparturefromtheoriginal
tenetsofthenarrative–closenesstoRussiaandsilenceonthelossofBessarabiawere
simplyuntenablepositionsforRomanians.Ceausescu,however,hadtheabilitytoalter
thenarrativeinthemannerhedidbecausetheversionofRomaniannesspursuedhad
tractionatsocietallevel.IndependencefromMoscowandthemythologizingof
Romanianuniquenesswereattractivepropositions,aswasraisingUnitytothestatus
ofnationaldoctrine.Assuch,Ceausescuworkedwithintheboundsoftheoriginal
versionofthenarrative,butactedtointensifytheSelf-Othercontrast.Ceausescu’s
regimeisthereforeresponsibleforthecontinuationand,atthesametime,
exacerbationofthemainfeaturesoftheidentitynarrative,asseveralgenerationsof
Romaniansbecamesocialisedinthisnewhypervariant.
AppraisingthelegacyofRomaniancommunismisnotaneasytask.Itsimpactonthe
state’seconomicsituationorindustryismorevisiblethanitseffectsonRomanian
mentality,whichareofinteresthere.TheregimeendedinarejectionofCeausescu,
buttheversionoftheRomaniannarrativeofidentityheperpetuatedwasnotas
readilyjettisonedastheregimeitself.Aswillbeexploredinthefollowingchapter,the
endoftheColdWarofferedanotheropportunityforthere-evaluationofitsmain
tenetsandthesettingofnewforeignpolicygoals.However,asshownbythe
contemporaryhistoricalnarrative,portrayalsoftheSelfandOthersremainlargely
unmodified.Thenextsectionwillexamineboththereasonsbehindandconsequences
ofthiscontinuity.
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Table2.MajorEventsofRomanianContemporaryHistoryandofRelationshipwithThreeOthers 1989(December)
ApopularrevoltseesthecaptureandexecutionofNicolaeCeausescu.ThecommunistregimeendsinRomania
1990 IliescuandFSNwinRomania’sfirstdemocraticelections.1991 IliescusignstreatywiththeSovietUnion,nullifiedbythelatter’s
dissolution,sixmonthslater.TheRepublicofMoldovaproclaimsitsindependence.UnificationwithRomaniaseemsimminent
1992 AshortcivilwarbreaksoutinMoldova.Transnistria,supportedbyRussiantroops,defeatstheMoldovanarmyandbecomesasecessionistregion.Unificationtalkstakeabackseat.Iliescuisre-elected.RomaniabeginsnegotiationswithRussiaonaBasicTreaty
1994 Underpressurefromtheinternationalcommunity,RomaniaandHungarybeginnegotiatingaPrincipalTreaty.RomaniasignsNATO’sPartnershipforPeace.
1995 RomaniatendersitsapplicationtotheEuropeanUnion.NegotiationswithHungarybreakdown
1996 RomaniarefusestosignTreatywithRussia.Iliesculoseselections.RomaniaandHungarysignthePrincipalTreaty;relationsbegintorecover.
1998 ViktorOrban’siselectedinhisfirsttermasprime-minister.1999 HungaryaccedestoNATO.Romaniabeginsnegotiationsforaccession
toEU.2000 AccessionnegotiationstotheEUbegin.2001 ThePartyofCommunistswinpowerinMoldova.Relationsbetween
BucharestandChisinauareaffected.2002 StatusLawpassedinHungary.RelationsbetweenRomaniaand
Hungarysuffer.2003 RomaniaandRussiasignBasicTreaty.2004 RomaniajoinsNATO.HungaryaccedestotheEuropeanUnion.2007 RomaniabecomesamemberoftheEuropeanUnionalongside
Bulgaria2009 RomaniaofferscitizenshipandEuropeanpassportstoMoldaviansof
Romaniandescent.Pro-EuropeanfactionswinpowerinMoldova.2010 ViktorOrbanreturnstopowerinHungary.Aperiodoftension
betweenBucharestandBudapestbegins.TheDualCitizenshipLawispassedbyHungary.
2014 RussiaannexesCrimeaandwarbreaksoutinEasternUkraine.RomaniareactsbylobbyingforincreasedNATOpresenceintheBlackSearegionandstrengtheningitstieswiththeRepublicofMoldova.ElectionsinHungary-JobbikrunscampaigninRomania,Orbanisre-elected.
113
2015 OrbanpublishesphotosofHungariansecessionistregioninTransylvaniaonFacebook,promptingaggressiveresponsefromBucharest.
2016 RomaniaassumesgreaterNATOresponsibilitiesintheregion.Theanti-ballisticmissileshieldontheDeveselubasebecomesoperational.Pro-RussianIgorDodonwinspresidentialelectionsintheRepublicofMoldova.
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Chapter4.ContinuityRatherthanChange–Romania’sNational
IdentityintheTransitionEra
Introduction
ThischapterexaminesthemannerinwhichtheRomanianidentitynarrativehas
developedaftertherevolutionof1989andhowithasfedintothestate’sinternational
anddomesticbehaviourduringthetransitionperiod.Firstly,thevariantinplayatthe
timeoftherevolutionisexamined,withafocusontheparticularimplicationsthe
portrayalofSelfhadonviewsregardingtheroleandprerogativesofthestate.
Followingonfromthis,theeventsof1989anditsaftermatharebrieflyrecountedand
thechapterproceedstooutlinethemannerinwhichIonIliescuandhisparty,theFSN,
madeuseoftheidentitynarrativeinordertosecurevictoryinthe1990elections.A
subsequentsectionanalyseshowtheIliescuregimere-conceptualisedRomanian
identityinsuchawayastobuttressthenarrative’smajorfeatures,butremoveits
communistcomponent.TheargumentismadethattheagencyoftheIliescuregimein
interactingwiththestructureofthenarrativeiscrucialinunderstandingthevariantin
playinRomaniatoday.Finally,thechapterdiscussesthemannerinwhichtheidentity
narrativeinfluencedRomania’sforeignpolicyanddomesticagendas.Onthe
internationalfront,theprerogativeofensuringthesecurityofthestatedrawingonthe
themeofBesiegedFortressresultedinaunanimousdesiretojointheWestern
community.Assuch,themainforeignpolicygoalsarticulatedinthetransitioneraare
accessiontotheEUandNATO.Romania’sbehaviourtowardsachievingthese
objectivesis,however,ambiguous,showingadivergencebetweenrhetoricand
internationalbehaviour,ontheonehand,andcommitmenttowardsdomesticreform,
ontheother.ThechapterexaminestherootsoftheIliescuregime’sanxietytowards
changeintheperiodof1990-1996andhowthisaffectedtheintegrationprocesswith
regardstointernalreformandtheminorityquestion.Finally,thechapterconcludesby
arguingthatitisonlywhenthisattitudechanges,after1996,thatRomania’sdomestic
behaviourbeginstomatchuptoitsinternationalcommitments,andthegoalof
accessionbecomesthepredominantmotivationbehindstateaction.
115
Romaniain1989
Afternearlyhalfacenturyofcommunism,thewinterof1989sawthefallofthe
Ceausescuregime.TherevolutioninRomaniafollowedsimilaruprisingsinPoland,
Hungary,EastGermany,andCzechoslovakia,274andresultedinthetotaldisintegration
oftheEasternBloc.InordertounderstandthenatureandrepercussionsofRomania’s
anti-communistrevolution,whichstandsoutamongsttherestthroughitsbrutality,
butalso,arguably,itslackofsuccessincleansingthepoliticalclassofelements
pertainingtotheformerregime,onemustsetthediscussioninthecontextof1989
Romania.
ThepreviouschapterexploredhowCeausescu’sregimehadactedtocreateahyper
versionoftheRomaniannationalidentitynarrative,inwhichuniqueness,unityandthe
linktoagloriouspastwereemphasised.ThelegitimacyoftheRomanianCommunist
Partyrestedonitscapacitytoprotectthesevalues,whichbecamesedimentedinthe
mentalityofapopulationsubjectedtoitspropaganda.AsLucianBoiahasargued,“the
dominant,inasenseevensingular,discoursewas,duringCeausescu’stime,the
nationalistdiscourse.”275WhilstbuildingontheexistingfeaturesoftheRomanian
identitynarrative,Ceausescuhadinstilledinhispeopleaperceptionofthe
exceptionalismofthisnation;thepersonalitycultwhichascribedtohimalonethe
specialroleofdefendingitsinterestswenthand-in-handwiththisportrayal.Overall,as
Boiacontinues“thetakingoverandamplifyingofthenationalmythologyofthe
nineteenthcentury,distortedasitwas,conferredontotheregimecredibilityand
legitimacy,andtothedictatoranauraofpatriotism.”276Ceausescuwassuccessfulin
entrenchingtheseaspectsbutalsogivingtheidentitynarrativeaspecificfocus.
Romanianidentityisprimarilyinwardlooking;Romaniansareconcernedwiththe
preservationoftheiruniquenessand,inthis,thestateplaysacriticalrole.Thestateis
aninstrumentfortheprotectionoftheRomaniancharacter,andtheprerogatives
whichflowfromit–defenceofitsindependence,sovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.
274P.Cipkowski,RevolutioninEasternEurope(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,1991),p.120.275Boia(2011),p.140.276Ibid.,p.141.
116
Ceausescu’sregimewasparticularlyaptatimpartingthisview,andatachievingthese
goals–independencefromMoscowandtheisolationoftheHungarianminoritywere
notonlyrationalcoursesofactionsbutpartofthestate’sduties.Thisperceptionof
Romanianexceptionalismandtheroleofthestateasitsguardianareoneofthemost
lastinglegaciesofcommunismandimpactedthenatureofRomania’stransitionto
liberaldemocracy,influencingtothisdayportrayalsoftheSelfand,necessarily,of
Others.
IfonthisfrontCeausescuprovedefficacious,hewaslesssuccessfulinmanagingthe
socio-politicalandeconomicspheres.OneoftheaspectswhichsetRomaniaapart
fromotherEasternblocstatesistherejectionofGorbachev’spoliciesofPerestroika
andGlasnostwhichelsewheremeantaprocessofde-Stalinisationwithsignificant
liberalisationandeconomicreform,culminatinginthedevelopmentofcivil
societies.277CeausescurejectedthereformsproposedbyMoscow,accordingto
historianFlorinConstantiniu,fortworeasons:“therefusaltoreintegratewhatseemed
tohimtobeanew‘blocdiscipline,’”and“hisconservativedogmaticvision,opposedto
structuralchanges.”278Inotherwords,Ceausescuwasahard-liner,whoemployeda
quintessentiallyindividualtypeofruleanddidnotsuffertheinvolvementofMoscow
inhiscountry’sdomesticaffairs.Consequently,withthemediaremainingcensored
andthedevelopmentofciviloppositionmovements,suchasSolidarityinPoland,
prohibited,Romaniastoodoutamongstsocialistregimesas“oneofthemostilliberal
andrepressive.”279Ontheotherhand,thelivingstandardsoftheRomanian
populationunderadeterioratingeconomicsituationandunpalatablelevelof
involvementofthepoliticalinallareasofpubliclife280hadbecomeunbearable–
Djuvaragoesasfarasarguingthatthecommunistregime“spoiledoursoul.”281
Insuchcircumstances,identity-baseddiscoursewasnolongersufficientinmaintaining
thelegitimacyoftheregime.AsBoiapointsout,thepolicyworked“untilRomanians
277Cinopoes(2010),p.74-75.278Constantiniu(2011),pp.520-521.279C.Chen,‘TheRootsofIlliberalNationalisminRomania:AHistoricalInstitutionalistAnalysisofLeninistLegacy,’EastEuropeanPoliticsandSocieties17:2(2003),p.194.280Cipkowski(1991),p.125.281N.Djuvara(2010),p.262.
117
begantosufferofhungerandcold.Thegloriousshadowsofthepastcouldnotavert
neithertheeconomicdisaster,northeexplosionofsocialtensions.”282Thecontextof
1989wasoneinwhichtheRomanianpopulationwasdespondentandunrepresented,
withnooppositionstructure,politicalorcivil,aroundwhichtocoalesce.Asformer
ministerAnonymousD,argues,theprofileofRomaniancommunismwassuchthat“it
didnotprovideanynicheforlibertyasinPolandandHungary,inwhichthesingle
partyhadnointerlocutorwithwhomtonegotiateitshistoricexit,itsexitingthe
scene.”283Theconsequencewasaviolentuprising,whichclaimedover1.100
victims,284including,ultimately,therulingcouple–ElenaandNicolaeCeausescu–who
wereexecutedbysquadronafterashamtrial285onChristmasdayin1989.Romanian
communismfinishedinbloodshedandrepresentsadefiningmomentinthestate’s
history.TherevolutionpavedthewayforRomaniatoreformitstieswiththeWestern
communityandembarkonatransitionfromsocialismtoliberaldemocracyand
capitalism.Thatisnottosay,however,thatthecommunistlegacywasreadilyshed.As
Boiapointsout,“thehistoricmythologyaccumulatedin[Ceausescu’s]erasurvivedthe
dictator.Psychologicalconstellationshavealongerlifethanmaterialstructures.”286
Thatisallthemorethecaseasthecommunistinfrastructurewasnotaltogether
disassembled,asthefollowingsectionwillexplore.
RomaniainEarlyTransition–IonIliescuandtheUseofIdentityasElectoralTool
Thelackofafunctioningandpro-activecivilsociety,ontheonehand,andofapolitical
opposition,ontheother,hadsignificantrepercussionsonthenatureofthepower
strugglewhichfollowedtherevolution.Ineffect,thevacuumleftbythefallofthe
CeausescuregimecouldnotbefilledbyanyoneotherthanlowertierCommunistParty
officials.Thegeneralconfusionsurroundingtherevolutiondidnothingifnotfacilitate
thisprocess:thefigureheadswhohadmadetheirwaytothenationalbroadcaster
buildingafterCeausescu’sflight,suchasfuturepresidentIonIliescu,became
282Boia(2011),p.141.283AnonymousD(2014).284Constantiniu(2011),p.534.285Ibid.,pp.532-533.286Boia(2011),p.141.
118
associatedwiththeuprisingdespitetheirknowntieswiththeformerregime.287In
otherwords,asStanandZahariasummarise,“therevolutionresultedinelite
reproduction,notelitereplacement”288–in1989Romaniadidnotachieveabreak
fromitscommunistpast,butareshufflingofitsleadership.Themannerinwhichthe
politicalclassnegotiateditscommunistlinkswastodivertattentionfromthemby
eliminatingalltracesoftheParty.AsBoiapointsout,“itwasastrokeofgeniusto
dissolvetheparty(…).Suddenly,communismceasedtoexist,andno-onewas
communist,becausetheycouldnotbe.AformerdignitaryinCeausescu’sregimewas
justasnon-communistasaformerpoliticalprisoner.”289
Itsreplacementwasanall-encompassingpoliticalbodycalledtheFrontforNational
Salvation(FSN),whichwaspredominantlycomposedof“second-echelonCommunist
Partyofficials,communistdirectorsofstate-ownedenterprises,andSecuritatesecret
agents”290andledbyIonIliescu,whoseregimewasprovidingtheinterimstate-
leadership.BythetimeofRomania’sfirstdemocraticpresidentialandparliamentary
elections,in1990,several‘historical’parties,whichhaddominatedRomanianpolitics
intheinter-warperiodbutwereabolishedintheearlydaysofthecommunistregime,
hadbeenresurrected.TheseweretheNationalLiberalParty(PNL)andtheNational
Peasants’Party,whichhadaddedChristianDemocrattotheirtitle(PNTCD).Their
leaders,RaduCampeanuandCorneliuCoposu,andmanyothermembers,were
communistdissidentswhohadbeeneitherimprisonedorforcedintoexile,oftenboth,
bytheformerregime.Ifonehadassumedthattheoppositionstoodachanceof
curbingIliescu’srisetopower,theywouldhavebeendisappointedwiththeresultof
theelection.AsCipkowskipointsout,“IonIliescuwaselectedpresidentwitha
landslideof80%ofthevote.(…)The16millionelectorate,whichturnedoutinits
entirety,knewthatheandhisaidsintheFronthadbeenCommunistswhoworkedfor
Ceausescu.”291TheLiberalandPeasants’candidatesreceivedameagretenandfour
287Cipkowski(1991),p.144.288L.StanandR.Zaharia,‘Romania,’inD.OBeachain,V.SheridanandS.Stan(eds),LifeinPost-CommunistEasternEuropeafterEUMembership–HappyEverAfter?(Abingdon:Routledge,2012),p.186.289Boia(2012),p.148.290StanandZaharia(2012),p.186.291Cipkowski(1991),p.144.
119
percentofthevotes,respectively,whilstintheparliamentaryelection,theFSN
securedtwothirdsofseatswithonlysixandtwo-and-a-halfpercentforthehistorical
parties.292
Itmayseempeculiarthatafterabloodyrevolutionthefirstdemocraticmandatein
post-socialistRomaniawasoverwhelminglyofferedtorefashionedcommunists,as
theycontrolledboththelegislatureandtheexecutivebranches.Thereasonsbehind
thiselectoralresultareworthexaminingastheyrestonboththecircumstancesofthe
suffragebutalsoonthemannerinwhichIliescuandhispartyframedtheirpolitical
discourse.Onthefirstpoint,traditionalaccountsstressthefactthattheFSNcameinto
theelectionswithsignificantcapital,astheyweregoverningastatewhichin
communism,andstillatthispoint,controlledeverything.Aninfrastructurewasin
placewhichallowedthemtodisseminatetheirmessageand,moreimportantly,alter
thepublic’sperceptionsoftheiropposition.AsCinopoesargues,“animportantfactor
thathelpedFSNtostrengthenitsgriponpowerwasthefactthattheFrontgained
controlovervariousstatefacilities,especiallythepress,theradioandtelevisioninthe
earlydaysoftherevolution.”293Additionally,Romaniansatthetimewerevulnerable
tothesemachinations.Havingbeen“brutalised,poorlyeducated(…)andstarvedof
informationabouttherealworld,”294theywereinherentlysusceptibletothe
propagandaoftherulingparty.ThefactthattheFSNactedinthefashionofthe
formerregime,effectivelyarrestingthestateapparatusandusingatacticof
disinformationanddenigration,doesnot,however,capturetheentirestory.The
identitaryperspectiveemployedhereoffersanadditionalexplanationforIliescu’s
success,byfocusingontheroleplayedbythediscourseonidentityinlegitimisingthe
Iliescuregimeandensuringitselection.
ThechapterhasalreadyexploredtheversionoftheRomaniannationalidentity
narrativeinplayatthepointoftherevolution.Itwasonewhichdrewheavilyonthe
UnityandFoundationthemes,builtonnotionsofastrongconnectiontothepastand
aninherentexceptionalismoftheRomaniannation.Thecontinuityandaugmentation
292Boia(2012),p.152.293Cinopoes(2010),p.80.294Cipkowski(1991),p.145.
120
ofanidentitynarrativefocusedontheseelements,however,meansthatRomanians
werenaturallyresistanttochangeandsuspiciousoftheunknowninequalmeasureto
foreigninterference.Despitetheeventsoftherevolution,theseperceptionsdidnot
disappear.However,thebrutalityoftheoverthrowofcommunismmeantthat
“Romanianidentitywaswoundedandanxious.”295Thesecircumstancesnotonlymade
theFSNtheobviouschoice,butalsogaveIliescu’spartytheopportunitytoutilise
anxietiestowardsanuncertainfuturetoitsadvantage.Thepost-revolutionaryclimate
wasoneofgeneralconfusioninwhichcertainrumoursbegantospread,most
famouslyovertheactionsofforeign(particularlyRussian)‘terrorists’whoweresaidto
beattemptingtocapturethestateapparatus.296Whethertheseforeignelementswere
indeedactiveduringandimmediatelyaftertherevolution,orwhethertheywere
entirelyimaginedthreats–perhapsevendeliberatediversions–isopento
contention.297
Inanycase,theimagebeingportrayedwasoneofRomaniaasaBesiegedFortress–
outsideforceswerethreateningthesuccessoftherevolutionorthestate’soverall
independence,orevenboth.Theresurrectionofthethemeisnotsurprising,as
ensuringthesecurityofthestateanditspopulationisacrucialprerogativesetbythe
Romanianidentitynarrative,andoneofthemajorremitsofgovernmentwhich,atthe
time,wasnon-existent.Asaresult,thepotentialexistenceofforeignterroristsfuelled
asenseoffearandinsecurityamongstthegeneralpopulationandadesireforan
interimgovernmenttoemergeexpeditiously.Itshouldcomeasnosurprise,then,that
familiarfiguressuchasIliescuwerenotdismissedbecauseoftheirassociationwith
Ceausescu,but,tothecontrary,werewelcomedasrecognisedelementsofthe
establishment,and,therefore,notforeign‘terrorists.’FramedwithintheBesieged
Fortress,theunknownwasamuchmorefrighteningperspectiveforRomaniansthat
the‘evil’theywereaccustomedto.Asaresult,theFSN’srisetopowermustbesetin
thecontextoftheanxietieswhichdominatedpubliclifeatthetimeoftherevolution–
theprioritiessetbytheRomanianidentitynarrativewhichdrawonthethemeofthe
295Milca(2010),p.97.296Constantiniu(2011),p.533.297SeeBoia(2012),p.147.
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BesiegedFortressnecessitatedimmediateactiontowardstheestablishmentofa
climateofsecurity.Inthisvein,theFSNwerenotonlypartytotheliberationofthe
people,communiststhoughtheywere,buttheonlyavailableoptioninresolvingthe
perceivedsecuritycrisis.
Ontheotherhand,thepreceptsoftheRomaniannationalidentitynarrativealso
shapedtheFSN’sdiscourseandthemannerinwhichitportrayeditselfandits
opposition.Beyondtheirefficientutilisationoftheprintedandbroadcastmedia,
reformedcommunistsbuilttheirargumentsaroundelementswhichresonatedwith
theRomanianaudience.Therevolutionwasseen,conformingtothethemeofUnity
andBesiegedFortress,asahistoricalvictory,asharedendeavourofthepeopleanda
struggleforfreedomwhichcameatagreathumansacrifice.Thesimilaritiesbetween
itandtheGreatUnificationof1918wereapparent.Evenincontemporarytimes,the
associationisnotuncommon–in2002,MPIonSolcanuarguedduringaParliamentary
Debatethat“anarchovertime,linkingtheGreatUnificationof1December1918and
thePopularRevolutionof1989(…),leadsustothinkthatthegloriouspagesof
traditionandfightforfreedommustbecarriedonbytheyounggeneration.”298The
FSNhadalegitimatereasontoaffiliatethemselveswiththisendeavour,astheyhad
beenpartofit;moreimportantly,theyhadtheopportunitytohighlighttherealitythat
theiropposition,manyofwhomhadbeeninexile,hadnot.TheFSNcouldportrayits
oppositionasunrepresentativeoftheRomanianpeopleand,ratherunjustly,
unsympathetictowardstheirsuffering:“‘whileweweresufferingunderCeausescu,
theyhadcoffeeandcroissantsinParis’wasonepopularslogan.”299WhatIliescuand
FSNwereattempting,ultimatelysuccessfully,wasanotheringoftheiropponents.The
argumentwasthatonlythosewhohadfeltthehardshipofcommunismandhad
foughttooverturnitcouldleadRomaniaontoitsnewpath,becausetheyknewwhat
Romaniansneeded.AsjournalistIonCristoiuarguedin1990:
298I.SolcanuinParliamentofRomania,DezbatereParlamentara-SedintasolemnacomunaaCamereiDeputatilorsiSenatuluidin28noiembrie2002[ParliamentaryDebate-TheSolemnPlenarySessionoftheChamberofDeputiesandSenateof28November2002],28.11.2002,availablefromhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5372&prn=1dateofpostingunknown,[accessed30April2015].299J.G.Pilon,TheBloodyFlag–Post-CommunistNationalisminEasternEurope,SpotlightonRomania(NewBrunswick:TransactionPublishers,1992),p.66.
122
Thismassivelyimportantvotewastheconsequenceofanemotionalstateratherthanaprofoundanalysis(…).InoptingforMr.IliescuwhatmatteredwasthefactthattheothertwocandidateshadnotlivedthroughthedifficultrealitiesofCeausescu’sregimealongsidetheRomanianpeople.300
Whilstthistypeofdiscoursemayseemneedlesslyinflammatory,itreflectedpublic
opinion.AlthoughtheirelectoralpledgeofinstatingaWestern-typedemocracyin
Romaniacertainlyhaditsappeal,themessageofthesecandidateswastoofar
removedfromtheinterestsofthegeneralpopulationandtheirstyletooheavywith
foreigninfluences:“thevastmajorityofthepopulationwasgenuinelyterrifiedofthe
prospectofabow-tiewearingpresidentwithanoccidentaldiscourse[referringtoIon
Ratiu].”301Suspicionregardingthemotivesofthesecandidatesandtheirabilityto
servetheRomaniannationinitsstateatthetimehintedatthefactthatthepublic
preferredincrementalratherthanradicalchange.Fromthisperspective,Iliescu’s
arguablypopulist,butcertainlynationalidentity-focused,message,whosecampaign
posterscarriedtheslogan“APresidentforRomanianRebirth,”302provedmuchmore
successful.Ineffect,byplayingthenationalistcardandotheringhisopponents,Iliescu
usedtohisadvantagetheanxietiesandprioritiescreatedbytheRomanianidentity
narrative.Theargumentwasthathiswasapartywhichunderstoodthetraumaofthe
revolution,protectedRomanianvalues,andwouldpursueadirectioninbothits
domesticandinternationalagendawhichconformedtothem.
Theseconsiderationsshowthatidentity-relatedfactorsplayedasignificantroleinthe
establishmentandlegitimisationofthepoliticaleliteafter1989.Whatisrevealedis,
ontheonehand,areformedclassofcommunistswhoadoptedsimilartacticstothe
previousregimeinsecuringandmaintainingpowerandunderstoodthepublic’s
anxieties,butalsoapopulationwhichrespondedtoandsharedtheconcernsraised
300I.Cristoiu,‘UnVotIngrijoratorpentruFrontulSalvariiNationale[AWorryingVotefortheNationalSalvationFront],’Zig-ZagMagazin27.05.1990,availablefromhttp://www.nasul.tv/editorial-ion-cristoiu-din-anii-90-despre-victoria-zdrobitoare-fsn-alegeri/postedon10.12.2012,(authorofpostingunknown)[accessed30April2015].301M.Voinea,‘Documentar–Istoriaalegerilorprezidentiale.1990,IonIliescusipacalealedemocratieioriginale[Documentary–TheHistoryofPresidentialElections.1990,IliescuandTheFarceofOriginalDemocracy],’Politica,22.10.2014,availablefromhttp://adevarul.ro/news/politica/documentar-istoria-alegerilor-prezidentiale-1990-ion-iliescu-pacaleala-democratiei-originale-1_544685c80d133766a81eb935/index.html[accessed30April2015].302Ibid.
123
overthesuitabilityoftheiroppositiontoprovidetheleadershipthestateneeded.Ina
sense,theoverarchingattitudeofboththepoliticalelitesandsocietywasoneof
resistancetochangeandadesiretopursueadirectionoftransitioninkeepingwith
whatRomaniansperceivedasfamiliar–afocusonsolidarityand,totheextentitwas
attainable,continuity.Itisthecontentionofthisthesisthatthisperspectiveoffersa
moreaccuratepictureastowhyIliescuandFSNweresuccessfulintheearlystruggle
forpower,ratherthanthemosttraditionalassessmentthatthesocialists’state
capturealoneaccountsforthisvictory.
Romania’sContemporaryIdentityNarrative–ContinuityOnceMore
ThisprojecthasarguedthatoneofthehallmarksoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeis
continuityalongitsmajorfeatures.Thepreviouschapterexploredthereasonsbehind
thisconsistencyandascribedtotheCeausescuregimeaparticularroleintheprocess.
Ceausescu’sinteractionwiththestructureofthenarrativehadbeenoneofbuildingon
previousportrayalswhilstexacerbatingthecontrastbetweenSelfandOther,creating
thehyperversionwhichwasinplayatthetimeoftherevolution.However,the
uprisingandtheoverthrowofcommunismofferedtheopportunecircumstancesand
eventhenecessityforareevaluationofitsmajoraspects.Thiswasthetypeof
situationwhen,asdiscussedinthetheoreticalbackgroundchapter,amendmentsto
thenarrativestructurewerenotonlypossible,butrequired.Whatisclear,despite
this,isthatcontemporaryrepresentationsofboththeidentityandhistoricalnarrative
matchthoseofearlierperiods–see,forinstancethesimilaritiesbetween
Draghicescu’swork(1907)andtheassessmentsofConstantiniu(2011),Milca(2010)or
Djuvara(2010)303–whilstthecommunist-inspiredaspectsarenotablethroughtheir
absence.Inasense,onenoticesareturntothepre-communistnarrative,which
vindicatesSchifirnet’sargumentthat“aXIXcenturyRomanianisnotentirelydifferent
fromtheXXIcenturyRomanian”andthat“identitybecomesaconstantofthe
Romaniannationalcharacter.”304Accountingforthecontinuityofthenarrative
303Chapter3,whichdealswiththereproductionoftheRomanianhistoricalandidentitynarrativepresentsanumberofinstanceswherethereexistssignificantalignmentbetweenmodernandcontemporarysources.304Schifirnet(2009),p.474.
124
requiresanexaminationoftheroleofIliescu’sregimeanditsowninteractionwiththis
structure.
Earlytransitiongovernments,andIliescu’sinparticular(1990-1996),hadasignificant
challengeinrepairingthewoundscreatedbycommunismandtherevolution.Firstly,
Ceausescu’shypervariantwasnolongerfitforpurpose,notleastofallbecauseofthe
linksithadconstructedbetweenRomanianidentityandthepersonalityofanow
vilifiedleader.Secondly,thedownfallofCeausescu’sregimebroughtaboutsignificant
social,economicandpoliticalchanges.QuestionsregardingthenatureofRomanian
identitybeyondtheinfluenceofcommunism,aswellasRomania’splaceina‘new’
Europehadtobeanswered,for,asMilcahadpointedout,thepublic’sattitudewas
oneofgeneralanxiety.305Iliescuwasfacedwithaconundrum.Asaformercommunist,
hewasawareofhowpowerfulatooldiscourseonidentitywasinlegitimisingand
strengtheninganadministration–indeed,hehademployeditsuccessfullyduringthe
1990election.However,hecouldnotutilisethesamedevicesasCeausescuhad,as
thattypeofrhetoriccouldneverappealtoarevolutionarygeneration.Instead,one
wouldsuggestthatIliescuhadtwochoices:hecouldremodeltheidentitynarrative
withafocusonthe‘returntoEurope,’ineffectmovingRomaniaonfromthelong-
establishedinwardlookingexceptionalismwhichhadbeenthebuilding-blockofthe
narrativehitherto;orhecouldcontinueinthesametraditionbutdownplay,or
remove,communism’scontributiontoRomanianhistoryandidentity.Iliescuchosethe
latterofthetwo.LucianBoianoticesintheofficialdiscoursethe
PersistenceofprofoundisolationisttendenciesbeyondtheapparentembracingofEuropeanvalues.ReconstructingthepastinamannerwhichamplifiesautochthonicfactorstothedetrimentofEuropeandynamicsandinfluencecontinuestobepractised.306
Theargumentofthisprojectisthat,inwhatconcernsRomania’sportrayaloftheSelf
anditsOthers,thischoiceisvital.Iliescupursuedare-evaluationoftenetsofthe
Romanianidentitynarrativewhichabstractedcommunismfromthecountry’shistory
305Milca(2010),p.97.306Boia(2011),p.371.
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and“fix[ed]theattentionofcitizensontoalongertime-frame.”307Thefocusremained
onRomania’sgreathistoricalachievementsinthefightforunityandindependence:
theanniversaryofthecreationofGreatRomaniain1918,1December,becamethe
nationalday,whilstthe24January,theanniversaryoftheunificationofWallachiaand
Moldovain1859,becameacauseforpubliccelebrationandmilitaryparades.Thepre-
unificationstruggleinTransylvaniawasmarkedin1991throughavisitbypresident
IliescutoClujtocommemoratethesigningoftheSupplexLibellusValachorum,the
significanceofwhichwasexploredinthepreviouschapter.Theleadersinstrumentalin
therealisationofthesegoalswerealsorecognised,forinstancetheartisanof24
January,PrinceA.I.Cuzawasfashionedinto“theemblematicofficialfigureofthe
constitutionofmodernRomania.”308Gallagher’sassessmentoftheIliescu’sregimeon
thisissueisthat“itquicklyseemstohavegraspedthatifitprovedabletoredefinethe
pastinwaysthatsuiteditsownpoliticalagenda,thiscouldstrengthenits
legitimacy.”309
Beyondstatesponsoredmanifestationsandcelebrationssuchastheonesmentioned
above,thisdirectionwasalsopursuedbymeansoftheeducationsystem,and
especiallythroughthehistorycurriculum.Asthetellingofhistoryinaparticular
mannerisoneofthemaininstrumentsforthesocialisationoftheidentitynarrative,it
offersanavenueforidentifyingtheclaimsaboutRomanianidentitythestatewished
toreproduceorreconstruct.AsKorostelinapointsoutthiselement“iscrucialtothe
developmentofnationalidentitywithauthority-approvedcontentandmeanings.It
alsosuppressesorredefineseventsandinterpretationsthatcouldmaintainor
promotedevelopmentofalternativeethnic,political,religious,andregional
identities.310Fromthisperspective,theamountandnatureofchangeinhistory
textbooksafter1989wouldofferaninsightintotheregime’sapproachtoremodelling
oftheRomanianidentitynarrative.Itistelling,therefore,thatDutceac-Segesten,after
307T.Gallagher,RomaniaAfterCeausescu(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1995),p.108.308Boia(2011),p.370.309Gallagher(1995),p.107.310K.Korostelina,‘HistoryEducationandSocialIdentity,’Identity:AnInternationalJournalofTheoryandResearch,8:1(2008),pp.38-39.
126
examiningthemake-upofseveralpost-revolutiontextbooksreachesthefollowing
conclusion:
Astudycomparinghistorytextbooksbeforeandafter1989noticestheemphasisonthenationalaspectsandconcludesthatthemajorchangesproducedupto1996aretheeradicationfromtheoldtextofreferencestothecommunistideologyandthedisappearanceofobligatoryquotesfromNicolaeCeausescu.Butwhenitcomestochangesofsubstanceandthemannerinwhichthenationalcultureorthemeaningofhistoryareportrayed,thereisno"revolution"butaslowandsometimesimperceptible"evolution."311
Ineffect,theauthorsuggeststhat,apartfromarejectionofcommunism,thecontent
ofhistorytextbooksinthefirsthalfofthe1990sremainslargelyunaltered.Inother
words,post-1989generationsofpupilsareexposedtoasimilarapproachtoRomanian
historyaswerethegenerationsbeforethem.ThisisconfirmedbyUniversityof
BucharestEuropeanStudieslecturer,AnonymousE,whopointsoutthat“westudythe
samehistoryinschools,andhearthesamemessagespropagatedinpublic
discourse.”312
Intermsoftheidentitynarrative,thisensuresthecontinuityofportrayalsoftheSelf
andOther,whilstremovingthesharpnessinthecontrastpursuedbyCeausescu.This
means,ontheonehand,thatthemainfeaturesoftheRomanianidentitynarrative
becomefurthersedimented,but,ontheother,thatthecomplexeswhichemergefrom
themareequallyperpetuated.Memoriesofthepast,particularlyantagonismswith
thethreateningOthers,remainsalient,asdoesthethemeofBesiegedFortress.As
Boiapointsout,“theactualisationofaninsistenceonagloriouspastand
abandonmentinthistrapperpetuatesconfrontationwithothersandtheimmobilityof
theself.”313Intermsoftheportrayalofthelatter,therevolutionisasignificant
additiontothenarrativeonRomania’shistoryofstruggleforaffirmationand
independence.However,becausetheidentitynarrativeremainsinwardfocusedand
311Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.22.312AnonymousE,InterviewwithIRUniversityLecturer,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,12.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.313Boia(2011),p.390.
127
retrospective,theeventsof1989areportrayedasanindividualvictoryofthe
Romanianpeopleovertheiroppressors,inlinewithrepresentationsoftheunification
of1918,fromwhichemergesthe‘archovertime’betweenthetwo.
Thebroaderconsequenceofthisdepictionisthattheuprisingisnotsetinthecontext
ofthecontinentaldemiseofcommunism.Thisinadvertentlyhassignificant
repercussionsonRomanians’viewoftheirplacewithinthis‘new’Europe,particularly
whethertherevolutionsignalsa‘return’toit,orthechancetoenteritinearnestfor
thefirsttime.Inasense,Iliescumissedatrick;hecouldhaveremodelledtheidentity
narrativeinsuchawayastosubscribetheRomanianrevolutiontothePan-European
anti-communiststruggle.Instead,theRomanianrevolutionisportrayedonlythrough
itsinternalconsequences,ratherthanregionalones.TheresultisthatRomanian
exceptionalismisemphasised,notsomuchasuniquenessbutasisolationism.Much
likeBoiaarguesabove,anarrativefocusedonthenationalratherthanEuropean
dimension,inotherwordsonwhatsetsRomaniansapartfromOthersratherthan
whatbringsthemtogether,isoneofthemajordrawbacksofthecontemporary
narrativeonRomanianidentity.AsSchifirnetpointsout,theresultisthat“Romanians
arestillmodelledbytheirownhistoryandsocialworld,whichcontinuestoperpetuate
mentalitiesandwaysofconductwhichareincompatiblewiththemodernEuropean
typeofculture.”314Atthisearlystage,adiscrepancyarisesbetweenRomania,still
inwardfocused,andEurope,increasinglybroughttogetherbysharedvaluesanda
communitarianspirit.Thisdivergence,inthecreationofwhichIliescu’sgovernment
playsasignificantrole,willaffectthenatureandsuccessofRomania’stransition,as
willbeexploredinthefollowingsection.
ThissectionhasshownhowtheRomanianidentitynarrativewasremodelledinthe
early1990s,withafocusonthecontinuityofitsmajorfeatures,butwithan
eliminationofthecommunistaspect.TheagencyofIonIliescuandhisregimeare
paramountinunderstandingthereasonsbehindtheperpetuationofthenarrative,
confirmingtheassumptionsmadebytheprojectinChapters1and2,thatagentsmay,
indeed,interactwiththestructureoftheidentitynarrativeinmeaningfulways.
314Schifirnet(2009),p.478.
128
However,theconsequenceofthisre-evaluationinamannerwhichdownplaysthe
communistelementbutkeepsitsinsistenceonnationalvaluesandtheroleofthe
stateasenabler,isthattheanxietiesthesesedimentedclaimsaboutRomanian
identitycreate,especiallyinregardstochangeandchallengestostatesovereignty,
wouldcontinuetoinfluencebothelites’andthepublic’sattitudetowardstransition
duringthenexthalfofthedecade.
RomaniaintheTransitionEra–ForeignPolicyDirectionandDomesticReform
ArguingthatRomaniaremainedinwardlookingandretrospectiveisnottosaythatit
wishedtoremainseparatedfromthebroaderinternationalcommunity.However,this
particularrepresentationoftheSelfandOtherimpactedboththemotivationsbehind
theconstructionofitsforeignpolicyagenda,aswellasthemannerinwhichtransition
governmentswentaboutachievingthisgoal.Inparticular,theidentitynarrative
influencedRomania’stransition-erabehaviourintwospecificareas,oneofwhichset
theprerogativeofitsforeignpolicy,whilsttheotheractedasanobstacleinits
achievement.ThefirstisthepriorityofjoiningtheWestthroughaccessiontotheEU
andNATOinplaythroughouttransition;thesecondistheresistancetochangealluded
toabove,noticeablebothatsocietallevelandinthepoliciespursuedbytheIliescu
regime(1990-1996).Bothoftheseissueswillbeexaminedinturn.
DesiretoJointheWest–StrongercommitmenttowardsNATO
Identityoffersanalternativeavenueforunderstandingthemotivationsbehind
Romania’sforeignpolicyagendaafter1989.AlthoughEuro-Atlanticintegrationwas,
by-and-large,thegeneraldirectionpursuedbyallpost-socialiststates,inRomaniathe
identitynarrativeplayedasignificantroleinthedecisiontoadoptthiscourse.The
desiretojointheWesthaditsrootsinRomania’sownquestionsregardingitsrolein
theemergingregionalandinternationalworldorder.Moreimportantly,itwasalso
linkedtoidentity-basedprerogativeswhichdrawonthethemeofBesiegedFortress.
Ensuringthesecurityofthestateanditsprotectionfrom,particularlyRussianand
Hungarian,interferencewasamatterofpre-eminenceinthechangingenvironment
followingtheendoftheColdWar.AccessiontotheEUandNATOwherethetwomain
129
goalsformulatedforthesepurposesasmembershipoftheseorganisationswould
servedifferentbutinterrelatedobjectives.TheEUofferedRomaniaeconomicsecurity
andheldtheprospectoffutureprosperitywhilstaccessionguaranteedthatits
territorialintegritywouldbeacknowledgedandrespectedbyfellowmembers;inthis,
thedisputewithHungary,alsoacandidate,overTransylvaniawasofcritical
importance.Ontheotherhand,NATOofferedphysicalsecurityandwouldembed
RomaniaintheAmericansphereofinfluence,effectivelycounteringthethreatposed
byRussia.315Additionally,accessiontobothallianceswouldfinallyconstituteproof
thatRomaniahasbeenacceptedasamemberoftheWesterncommunity,afterhaving
languishedbehindtheIronCurtainforfivedecades.
Identity-relatedfactorsplayedacrucialpartinthearticulationofthesegoals,butalso
theintensitywithwhichtheywerepursued.Ontheseissuestherewascomplete
alignmentbetweenthepublicanditselites.PollsshowedRomanianswere
overwhelminglyinfavourofaccession–inthemid-1990s97%ofthepopulation
supportedRomania’sjoiningtheEU,316and95%itsenteringNATO,highestamongst
EasternEuropeanapplicants.317Ontheotherhand,butforabriefmomentin1991,318
thedirectionwasunanimouslypursuedbyallpoliticalpartiesandallsucceeding
transitiongovernments.ALiberalPartyYouthleaderinterviewedbytheauthor
outlinesRomania’s“constantpro-Europeanandpro-Americanforeignpolicycourse”
andthefactthat“afterthedefiningofthesetwodirectionsbyvastpoliticalconsensus,
anyevolutionswerenotofsubstance,beingatthemostissuesofnuance.”319Cross-
partyagreementoverthesetwogoalsisperhapsoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesof
Romania’stransition.InthecaseoftheEU,thisisevidentinthefactthat,when
Romaniaformerlysubmitteditsrequestformembership,“allparliamentaryparties
convenedataconferenceon21June1995,andsignedastatementagreeingtoa
315D.Turnock,‘Romania:ContemporaryGeopoliticalPerspectives,’Geopolitics6:1(2001),p.128.316Roper(2000),p.118.317Ibid.,p.123.318BeforetheendoftheColdWar,IliescusignedatreatyofalliancewiththeSovietUnionwhichremainedunratifiedbecauseofthelatter’sdissolutionsixmonthslater.Thefollowingchapterwillexaminetheissueinmoredepth.319AnonymousA,InterviewwithPNLPolitician,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,10.06.2014,email,Bucharest,Romania.
130
commonintegrationstrategy.”320AsforNATO,Boiahaspointedoutthatjoiningthe
TransatlanticAlliancehadbecomea“nearnationalobsession.”321Turnocksummarises
Romania’sagendawellwhenhestatesthatitwas“focusedunconditionallyon
integrationwithEuropethoughmembershipoftheEUandNATOwhichwoulddo
muchforthecountry’ssecurityinaregionhistoricallypronetoturbulence.”322
However,fromtheunanimousdesiretojointheWesttoattainingmembershipthere
remainstheimportantstepoftheaccessionprocess.Initscommitmenttoproveitself
aworthycandidate,Romaniaexhibitedanambiguousbehaviourwhichrequiressome
attention.Namely,thisreferstothestate’sapproachinwhatconcernstheEUand
NATO.AlthoughitwasamongstthefirststatestosubmititsapplicationforEU
membership,Romaniaquicklyfellbehinditsneighboursinaddressingthenecessary
criteria–negotiationsbeganin1999,andRomaniaonlyjoinedinthelaterwaveof
2007,alongsideBulgaria,threeyearsafterthebulkoftheEasterncontingent.The
identity-basedreasonsbehindthisdelayareexploredinfurtherdetailinthefollowing
section;fornow,itissufficienttoarguethatattherootliestheinabilityor
unwillingnesstomatchupthepaceofdomesticreformrequiredforaccessiontothat
ofitselites’rhetoricontheimportanceofattainingthisgoal.InitsrelationtoNATO,
ontheotherhand,Romaniawasabletoshowitscommitmentnotonlythroughwords,
butalsoaction.In1994itbecamethefirststatetosignNATO’sPartnershipfor
Peace.323By1996,ithadalso“participatedin960activitieswithNATOmember
forces.”324UnwaveringdedicationmadeitoneofNATO’smostreliablepartnerseven
beforeaccession,despitethefactthatithadbeenleftoutoftheexpansionwaveof
1997,againbecauseofthelackofdomesticreform.Ontheinternationalscene
however,theregionalandglobalclimateofferedopportunitiesforthestatetomake
itselfusefultotheUS–itsenttroopstoKosovo,AfghanistanandIraqandeventook
Washington’ssideontheissueoftakingAmericanservicemenfromunderthe
jurisdictionofinternationalcriminalcourt,goingagainsttheEuropeanposition.325As
320Roper(2000),p.118.321Boia(2012),p.160.322Turnock(2001),p.137.323Roper(2000),p.122.324Ibid.325Boia(2012),p.175.
131
Boiahasnoted,inreactiontothisaEuropeandelegate“askedrhetoricallywhether
RomaniawishestobecomeamemberoftheEUorthefifty-firststateoftheUS.”326
Thereis,therefore,adivergenceinRomania’sattitudetowardsaccessionregarding
internationalanddomesticbehaviour,whichmadeitscandidacyformembershipof
theEU,inparticular,morechallenging,but,conversely,portrayeditasausefuland
reliablepartnertoNATOinternationally.Here,workingfromanidentity-based
perspectiveprovidesparticularinsightintothereasonsbehindRomania’sbehaviour.A
traditionalexplanationmaybeeitherthatmembershipofNATOtookprecedenceover
accessiontotheEUor,alternatively,itwasconsideredamoreattainablegoal.Itis
likelythatbothare,toacertainextent,true.Roperarguesthat,inthelate1990s,“EU
membershipwasviewedasthemajorlong-termforeignpolicypriority,[while]NATO
membershipwasconsideredthemostimportantshort-termobjective.”327Itis
certainlyevidentfromRomania’saccessionexperiencethatfulfillingtheCopenhagen
CriteriaprovedmuchmorechallengingthanrespondingtoNATO’srequestsfor
support.However,inthisbehaviourthereisalsoaquestionofpriorityandthisis,toa
point,dictatedbyidentity-relatedprerogatives.ThecruxofRomanianconcernsis
security,especiallyinitsphysicaldimensionofensuringtheterritorialintegrityand
independenceofthestate,whichdrawsonthethemeofBesiegedFortress.
Particularlyinthecontextofahistoricallyvolatileregion,theprotectionoftheirstate
anditspro-Westerndirectionarecritical.Additionally,theportrayaloftheRussian
OthermeansthatMoscowisviewedasaconstantdangertoRomania’sindependence
anditspursuitofjoiningtheWesterncommunity.AnchoringRomaniaintheWest
throughthesealliancesisthemainmeasureofguardingfromtheRussianthreatand
regionalinstability,morebroadly.NATO,asamilitaryalliance,servesthese
prerogativesbetterthantheEU,andassuch,accessiontoitbecametheprimaryfocus
ofRomaniangovernments.ThisisevidentinRomania’sinternationalbehaviour,
explainingBoia’sdescriptionofitasa‘nationalobsession.’FormerForeignAffairs
MinisterandlaterheadoftheSecretService,TeoderMelescanucapturedthisview
whenhearguedthat“whiletheadjustmenttoEUstandardswouldimplyareasonable
326Ibid.327Roper(2000),p.122.
132
periodoftransition,securityneedsareimmediateandcanbecomestringent.”328In
otherwords,precedenceisgiventoensuringsecurityoverothergoals,suchasthose
satisfiedbyEUaccession,namelytheprospectsofeconomicsecurityandinclusionin
theEuropeancommunity.InitsrelationtoNATOanditsinternationalbehaviour,
therefore,Romaniaisguidedbytheprioritiesgeneratedfromhistoricallyenduring
claimsaboutitsidentity.
ObstaclestoAccession–ResistancetoChangeandInsistenceonStateSovereignty
TheprevioussectionoutlinedthemotivationsbehindRomania’sdesiretojointhe
Westandtheprioritisingoftheissueofsecurity,pursuedinternationallyprimarily
throughunwaveringcommitmenttoNATO.Ifintermsofitsforeignpolicyagendathe
directionwasclear,andremainedconstantthroughoutthetransitionera,thefirsthalf
ofthe1990swasaperiodwhenRomaniamadelittleadvancementonthedomestic
reformfront.Assuch,understandingtheidentitaryanxietiesbehindthisreluctanceto
enactmeaningfulreformrequiresananalysisofthebehaviouroftheIliescuregime,in
poweratthetime.Inasense,thepoliticalelitefailedtounderstandthattheaccession
processwouldrequireprofoundstructuralchangestothedomesticenvironment,inall
areasfromthesocio-politicaltotheeconomic.Althoughthenotionthatinternal
reformwasnecessarywasundoubtedlyrecognised,thelevelofpressurefromtheEU
andNATOonthenatureandpaceofthesedevelopmentswasdifficulttoreconcile
withRomanians’traditionalviewsontheroleofthestateandtheapproachoftheir
leaders.ThismayperhapsbemotivatedbyRomanians’viewsontheessential
separationbetweentheinternationalanddomesticspheresbutalsotheirperception
ofwhat‘Europe’actuallymeant.AsBoiahasargued,
Noteveryoneunderstandsthesamethingby‘entryintoEurope.’Manyfocusonthebenefits(…)preferringtoignorethestructuraltransformationsimposedbysuchadirection,thenecessaryre-elaborationofpoliticalandculturalreferencepoints,aswellastheinevitablelimiting
328Melescanu,citedinRoper(2000),p.122.
133
ofnationalsovereignty.TheycontinuetohopeforanintegratedRomania,butatthesametime‘untouched’initsperennialvalues.329
Therewas,asaresult,alackofawarenessthatachievingtheirforeignpolicygoals
requiredthatRomaniangovernmentsincurredcertainresponsibilitieslinkedtothe
internaltransitionfrompoliticalandeconomicsocialismtoafullyfunctioningliberal
democracyandcapitalistsystem,overwhichtheEUandNATOwouldexerta
significantlevelofscrutiny.Intwoareasinparticular,thesechallengeswereobvious
andbothareconnectedtospecificidentity-basedprerogatives.However,the
influenceoftheidentitynarrativeinthiscasedoesnotmanifestasaforeignpolicy
prioritybutas,Boiasuggests,aresistancetochangeofthefamiliarmodusoperandiof
theRomaniansystem,aswellastowardsexternalinvolvementinthedomesticaffairs
ofthestate,whichareperceivedasaninfringementofitssovereignty.
ResistancetoChange
ThenotionofaRomaniansocietyandpoliticaleliteresistanttochangehasbeen
exploredearlier,inthecontextoftheimmediateaftermathofthe1989revolution.
ThefactthattheIliescuregimereceivedasecondendorsementin1992inboth
parliamentaryandpresidentialelectionsmeantthathispartyofreformedcommunists
(renamedPDSR)shapedRomania’stransitioninthefirsthalfofthe1990s.His
mandatessawtheapplicationtenderedforEUaccessionandthesigningofNATO’s
PartnershipforPeace.Theprocessofinternalreform,ontheotherhand,which
entailedaprofoundreorganisationofthestate’spoliticalandeconomicsystems
focusedondemocratisation,liberalisation,transparency,accountabilityandthe
establishingofafree-market,wasslowandRomaniawasunabletocompetewith
otherEasternstates:bythemid-1990sRomaniahadfallen“economicallybehind
Poland,theCzechRepublicandHungary”and“wasseenbymanyasanti-reformistand
anti-democratic.”330
Traditionalaccountshavearguedthattheprocessofstaterebuildingwashinderedby
Iliescuhimselfwho,accordingtoGallagher,was“unabletoshake-offhiscommunist-
329Boia(2011),pp.275-276.330Roper(2000),p.65.
134
eraconditioning.”331Inotherwords,hestandsaccusedofpursuingreformthroughthe
tacticsoftheformerregime.GrossandTismaneanupointoutthat,atthepolitical
level,“Romania’seffortatdemocratisationhasbeenboggeddownbyitscommunist
legacy–widespreadpessimismandapathy,politicaldilettantism,clientelism,and(…)
corruption.”332Theapproachtoprivatisationofthehithertostate-controlledindustry
isarguedtobeamanifestationofthesetendencies.Gallagherobservesthatformer
membersoftheintelligenceservicesbenefittedfromresourcesandcontactsamongst
thepoliticalelites.333ThisresultedinstateassetsbeingsoldtothePDSR’sclientele,
ensuringthatthefirstgenerationofcapitalistbusinessmen,adefactonewsocialclass,
grewoutoftheoldnomenclature.Overall,Iliescu’seconomicpolicy,focusedon
incrementalratherthanradicalreform,resultedinthe“near-destructionofan
economy”334alreadyweakenedbytheformerregime.Hispoliciescouldnotbuthave
resultedinrisingunemploymentandaloweringoflivingstandards.335More
importantly,Romania’sresistancetochangegavetheWesterncommunitythe
impressionthatthe“pursuitofclosertieswiththeOccidentwaswithoutconviction
andstrictlycircumstantial”andthat“nogreatlovetowardstheWestorWestern
valueswasapparent.”336
ItisevidentthatthisattitudewaslargelyresponsibleforRomania’sdifficultrouteto
Euro-Atlanticintegration.However,thereisanidentitarydimensiontothiswhich
traditionalexplanationssuchastheonesabovecannotaccountfor.Theargumentof
thisthesisisthatthereactionaryattitudeoftheelitesreflectedthepublic’sanxiety
towardschange,particularlyinregardstotheroleofthestate,anareainwhichthe
communistlegacyontheidentitynarrativewaspowerful.AnonymousD,forinstance,
arguesthatatthelevelofpublicmentalitystillendurestheperceptionofthestateasa
provider:theexperienceofastrongsystemofstatewelfarehas“createdincitizensof
allcategoriesandalmostalllevelsofeducation,afeelingofentitlement.(…)They
331T.Gallagher,‘Romania’sDesiretoBeNormal,’ContemporaryPolitics4:2(1998),p.111.332P.Gross,andV.Tismaneanu,‘TheEndofPost-CommunisminRomania,’JournalofDemocracy16:2(2005),p.149.333T.Gallagher,RomaniaandtheEU–HowtheWeakVanquishedtheStrong(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,2009),p.19.334Gallagher(1998),p.113335Turnock(2001),p.124.336Boia(2012),p.157.
135
expectthestatetobethemaininvestor,toprovidequalityanduniversalhealthcare,
andacertainlevelofsalaryandincome.”337Thestate,intheRomanianperception,
mustremainactiveinthespheresofpubliclife,despitetheobviouslimitationinits
capacitytomaintaintheseservicesinademocraticcapitalistsociety.Boiahintstothis
viewaswellwhenhenotesthat“asaconsequenceoftraditionandhabit(…)
Romaniansappearmoreattractedtosymbolsreferringtonationalcohesionand
authoritythanthosecharacteristicofademocraticlife.”338Itisquestionable,
therefore,whetherblameforRomania’stroubledtransitionshouldbelaidsquarelyat
Iliescu’sdoor.Theroleofthestateasprotectorandacertaindesireforcontinuityand
anxietytowardstheunfamiliararenoticeableequallyattheeliteandsocietallevel.
Iliescuis,inthisvein,representativeofthegeneralattitudepervasivethroughoutthe
firsthalfofthe1990s.Inotherwords,onewouldmaketheargumentthat,iftheIliescu
regimewasill-equippedtorespondtothechallengesoftransition,sotoowasRomania
asawhole.
TheIssueofNationalSovereigntyandtheMinorityQuestion
Subscribedtoacertainextenttotheissueofreform,buttouchingonadifferent
anxietywhichdrawsontheRomanianidentitynarrativeistheinherentchallengeto
statesovereigntyposedbytheaccessionprocess.Theblurringofdomesticand
internationalpolicyisnowheremoreobviousthanintheHungarianminorityquestion.
TheSzeklerHungariancommunity,primarilyconcentratedinthreecountiesinthe
centreofthecountry,hadbeen,asexploredinthepreviouschapter,discriminated
againstbythecommunistregimeandavictimofitsnationalistdiscourse.Inthe
aftermathoftherevolutiontheirsituationbecameoneofthemoststringentissuesfor
theIliescuregimeandattractedsignificantattentionfromtheinternational
community.Theminorityquestionconcernedthetypesofrightswhichshouldbe
awardedtodifferentethnicgroupsbytheRomanianstate.Inthis,theHungarian
contingenthademergedasthemostvocalindemandinglegislationonbasicminority
grouprights,suchaseducationinthemothertongueoraccesstoadministrative
337AnonymousD(2014).338Boia(2011),p.372.
136
officesinareaswithsignificantHungarianpopulations.Thesedemands,however,were
unacceptabletoRomanians,asSilviuBrucan,oneofthetoppoliticalcommentatorsof
thedayarguedin1990:“theMagyarminoritywantstoeliminateatastrokeevery
harmfuleffectoftheassimilationcampaignbeganintheCeausescuperiod(…).The
Romanianssimplydonotunderstanddemandsofthiskind,andtheyevaluateallthis
asextremist.”339
ThisviewhasitsrootsinboththeportrayaloftheRomanianSelfandoftheHungarian
Other.IntermsoftheSelf,thisinterpretationdrawsonthethemeofUnityand
concernsthenatureoftheRomanianstateandethnicRomanians’positionwithinit.
Theemphasisisonbothsovereigntyandnationalunity,asthefirstarticleofthe
constitutionshows:“Romaniaisanation-state,(…)unitaryandindivisible.”340Asa
result,ethnicminoritiescouldbeextendedrightswhichdidnotcontravenethethree
principlesoutlinedabove,andindeedHungariansbenefittedfromthesameindividual
rightsasthemajority,aswellas“somecollectiverightssuchastheguaranteeofaseat
inthelowerhouseparliament.”341TheproblemarosewhentheHungarianminority
demandedcomprehensivegrouprightswhichwoulddifferentiatethemfromtherest
oftheRomaniancitizens,particularlyinregardstostateeducationinthemother
tongue,asmentionedearlier,andtighterculturallinkswithHungary.342This
contravenedthenotionthatallRomaniancitizenswereequalasithadtheimplication
thatthestatewouldofferextrarightstoaminoritygrouptherebydiscriminating
againstthemajority.Withinastatewhichwasmeanttobenationalandunitary,such
asRomania,thiswasanuntenablepositionasisclear,again,fromtheConstitution.
Whilearticle6(1)stipulatesthatnationalminoritieshavetherighttopreservetheir
ethnicidentity,343article6(2)qualifiestheserightsbystatingthat“theprotecting
339Brucan,citedinGallagher(1995),p.86.340ParliamentofRomania,ConstitutionofRomania(2003),Article1(1),[n.d.]availablefromhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_1&par1=1#t1c0s0sba1[accessed22December2016].341Roper(2000),pp.113-114.342Gallagher(1998),p.115.343ParliamentofRomania,ConstitutionofRomania(1991),Article6(1),[n.d.]availablefromhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act1_2&par1=1[accessed7July2015].
137
measurestakenbytheRomanianstate(…)shallconformtotheprinciplesofequality
andnon-discriminationinrelationtotheotherRomaniancitizens.”344
Thesituationwasfurtherexacerbatedbythefactthattheminorityinquestionwas
ethnicHungarian.TheportrayalofthisOtherasanexistentialthreattoRomania’s
territorialintegrityaugmentedsuspicionsoverthemotivesbehindthesedemands.The
themeofBesiegedFortressisevidentinRomanians’reactionandthearguably
excessivelevelofthreatperception.AsDragomanargues,“theHungariancommunity
waslargelysuspectedofdisloyaltyandevenofplottingTransylvania’ssecession.”345
Ontheotherhand,theinterestshownbyitshistoricalfoe,Hungary,inthe
emancipationofitsdiasporadidnothingbutfurtherexacerbateRomanians’distrust.
Forinstance,themainpoliticalarmoftheHungarianminority,theUDMR(the
DemocraticAllianceofHungariansinRomania)hadbeenestablishedwithfinancial
assistancefromHungary,346sendingoutaclearsignalofsupportfromRomania’s
neighbourforthedemandsoftheirbrethrenacrosstheborder.Evenmoreworryingly,
Hungary’sconservativeprimeminister,JozsefAntall,hadclaimedtobetheleaderof
“fifteenmillionHungariansinspirit,includingthefivemillionlivinginothercountries
thanHungary.”347WhatRomaniasawinthiswastheconcertedeffortofitswestern
neighbourtoaidtheHungarianminorityinachievingitsaimsand,insodoing,
threatenthesovereigntyandintegrityofitsterritory.IliescucapturesRomania’s
assessmentofthesituation:“governmentsandpoliticalforces(…)tendtousethe
noblepreoccupationwiththeprotectionofminorityrightsasasubstituteforputting
forwardterritorialclaims,whichotherwisecaninnowaybeacceptedbythe
internationalcommunity.”348
AsfarasRomanianswereconcernedthedemandsoftheHungarianminoritywere
seenasthreateningtheintegrityofthenation-state,andtheinvolvementofHungary
344ConstitutionofRomania–1991,article6(2).345D.Dragoman,‘NationalIdentityandEuropeanizationinPost-CommunistRomania.TheMeaningofCitizenshipinSibiu:EuropeanCapitalofCulture2007,’CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies41(2008),p.69.346L.J.KulcsarandC.Bradatan,‘PoliticsWithoutFrontiers:TheImpactofHungarianDomesticPoliticsontheMinorityQuestioninRomania,’CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies40(2007),p.303.347Ibid.,p.305.348Iliescu,citedinRoper(2000),p.116.
138
inthematterwasregardedasinterferenceinthedomesticissuesoftheirsovereign
nation.RathercontrarytoIliescu’sstatement,theissuewascomplicatedfurtherby
theinvolvementoftheinternationalcommunity.Inthebackgroundofincreasing
ethnictensionsandconflictsthroughoutEasternEurope,theWesthadtakenakeen
interestintheprotectionofminorityrightsinpost-communiststates,withtheOSCE
statingin1997thatthelegalstatusandprotectionoftheidentityofnational
minorities“weremattersoflegitimateinternationalconcernandconsequentlydidnot
constituteexclusivelyaninternalaffair”349ofstates.Theproblemofnationalminority
rightswasbecomingbothincreasinglyinternationalisedandakeyaspectofthe
accessionprocesstoWesternorganisations,afactreflectedintheEUandNATO’s
decisioninDecember1991“tomakeminorityrightsoneofthefourcriteriathat
candidatecountrieshadtomeetinordertobecomemembersofthese
organisations.”350Beforelong,theresolutionoftheminorityissueand,morebroadly,
thenormalisationinrelationsbetweenthetwostatesbecameaprerequisitefor
accession:“organisationssuchasNATOandtheEUwerecleartobothpartiesthat
signingabasictreatyandresolvingthestatusofethnicHungarianswascriticaltotheir
admissionintotheseandotherEuro-Atlanticstructures.”351
Inthiscontext,twoseeminglyconflictingidentity-relatedgoalswereinplay.Onthe
onehand,resolvingtheminorityquestionwasparamountinRomania’saccession
process,itsmainforeignpolicypriority.Ontheother,anyPrincipalTreatynormalising
relationswithHungarywouldinvolvealevelofcompromiseonissuesrelatedto
sovereigntyandunitytowhichfewRomanianswouldacquiesce,astheirprotection
wasamajorstateprerogative.IntheIliescuregime’streatmentoftheissuethe
antagonismisclearandforeigninvolvementindomesticaffairsremainedproblematic
throughoutthemandate:“formuchofthe1990s,thegovernmentresistedattempts
tointernationalisethestatusofethnicHungarians,”352insistingthattheissue,ifit
349OSCE,ImplementationMeetingonHumanDimensionIssues–ConsolidatedSummary,12-28November1997,p.15,availablefromhttp://www.osce.org/odihr/19941?download=true[accessed10January2017].350W.Kymlicka,‘TheEvolvingBasisofEuropeanNormsofMinorityRights:TightstoCulture,ParticipationandAutonomy,’inM.Weller,K.NobbsandD.Blacklock(eds.),TheProtectionofMinoritiesinWiderEurope(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2008),p.12.351Roper(2000),p.115.352Ibid.p.116.
139
existedatall,wasaninternalone.Consequently,negotiationsoverthePrincipalTreaty
betweenRomaniaandHungarybeganin1994andfellthroughin1995.Itwas
evidentlydifficultforthisregimetoacceptthattheirunderstandingofnationhoodand
citizenrightscontravenedthatoftheinternationalcommunityand,fromabroader
perspective,thattheseorganisationshadanybusinessquestioningit.More
importantly,herewasatstaketheregime’sowndomesticlegitimacy.Afterall,Iliescu
andthesocialistshadwontwomandatesonthebackofadiscoursefocusedon
“nationalunity,andevenunanimity,aroundcertainvalues(…).”353Anymovementon
theseissues,evenaimedataidingRomania’saccessionprocess,wouldhavedamaged
itscredibility.Maintainingofsovereigntyandtheprotectionofthenationalcharacter
oftheRomanianstatewerecrucialinthiscontext.
Someauthors,suchasDragoman,arguethatthisviewissharedamongstEastern
Europeanstates,whichtendtoregardthemselves“asmembersofethnicallybased
states.Itisstilldifficultforthemtothinkoutsidetheframeworkofthenationalstate
(…).”Therefore,headds,RomaniaandEasternstates,ingeneral,finditchallenging“to
conceivealimitationofthenationalsovereignty.”354Havingsaidthis,evenifonewere
toacceptthisfeatureascommonthroughoutEasternEurope,onewouldarguethatin
Romaniathedifficultyofovercomingtheissueofforeigninterferenceismagnifiedby
theportrayaloftheHungarianOther.Thereisanoticeableperception,atthelevelof
boththepopulationanditsleaders,thatanyconcessionstotheHungarianminority
causewouldautomaticallysnowballintodemandsforterritorialautonomyoreven
independence.AlthoughsometraditionalaccountshavesuggestedthatRomanian
eliteswere,ineffect,exploitingtheinsecuritiesofthemassesbyartificially
augmentingthe‘Hungarianthreat,’355theidentity-basedperspectivesuggeststhat
manyRomaniansindeedbelievedtherewasagenuinedanger,notleastduetoprime-
ministerAntall’sstatements,thatthestatewouldbreak-upalongethniclines,asithad
353Boia(2011),p.373.354Dragoman(2008),p.74.355SeeGallagher(1995).
140
inthepast.AsKulcsarandBradatanpointout,Romanianelitesdemonstrateda
“fixationthatautonomyofanykind(…)willeventuallyleadtosecession.”356
Asaresult,inthisissue,asinthatofdomesticreform,theidentitynarrativeinfluenced
Romania’sbehaviourandactedasanobstacletothestate’saccessiontotheEUand
NATO.Moreimportantly,thetransitiongovernment’sinabilitytonavigatethese
challengeseffectivelyshowstheessentialdisconnectionbetweenRomania’sviewon
theroleofthestateanditsprerogatives,andthoseoftheWesterncommunity.Itmay
simplybethecasethattheIliescuregimewasessentiallyunableorunwillingtoenact
thechangesnecessaryforadmissiontotheEuropeanclub.Ontheotherhand,itmay
bethat,duringearlytransition,Romaniansasapeoplewerenotpreparedtorenounce
certaintraditionalvaluesandthe‘national’directioninfavourofWesternisation.Itis
alsoplausiblethatbothinterpretationsaretrue,inthatanincompetentpolitical
leadershipstuckwiththefamiliarwhiletheiractionswereperceivedaslegitimatebya
publicwho,similarly,hadnootherreferencepointfortheirassessmentotherthanthe
perceivedpursuitofidentitarygoals.Inanycase,duringthetransitioneraitisinthe
periodbetween1990and1996thatidentity-relatedanxietiesmostobviouslyinformed
Romania’sbehaviourtowardsreformandtheminorityquestion.
TheRetreatofIdentitaryAnxietiesinthemid-1990s
Finally,oneshouldconsiderthequestionofwhytheconservativefacetofRomanian
societyshoweditselfsoprominentlyinthesefirststagesoftransition.Inaddressing
this,onewouldarguethattheidentitaryperspectiveemployedhereshedslightonthe
complexitiesofRomanianmotivationsforactioninamannerinaccessibleto
traditionalaccounts.Iliescu’sregimehadnotacquiredandmaintainedpowersolely
throughmachinationsandpropaganda,but,instead,wasreflectingaswellasshaping
theviewsofthebroaderpopulation.Fromthisperspective,theanswermaylieinthe
consequencesoftheshockcausedbytherevolution.AsHudsonhasputit,“thereare
times,particularlyinthewakeofgreatsystemicorsubsystemicchange,whena
nation-statemayencounterprofounduncertainty”357inaddressingthequestionof
356KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.307.357Hudson(2013),p.119.
141
‘whoarewe?’Inthesesituations,itisuptotheelitestooffersocietyanansweranda
direction.AsHudsoncontinues,“tobesuccessfulinsteeringthatdiscussion,these
forceswillhavetotapintodeepculturalbeliefsactivelysharedorlyingdormant
amongalargemajorityofthepopulace.”Moreimportantlysheadds,"insuchtimes,
theprimacyofthequestion‘whoarewe?’maytrumpallotherquestionsofsuccessor
failureorriskinforeignpolicy.”358Itisbeyonddoubtthatthesocialistsdidtapinto
alreadyexistingprofoundbeliefsandwereabletoperpetuatethem.Ontheother
hand,thisshowsaparticularpredilectiontowardsinertia,rootedinthecontinuityof
theidentitynarrative.Onewouldarguethat,between1990and1996Romania
adoptedareactionaryattitudeinatimeofprofoundsystemchange.Inotherwords,
post-revolutionaryanxietiesbornoutofuncertaintyoverthefuturewere,inmany
ways,compensatedinRomaniabyare-emphasisingofidentitarycertainties–
Romaniansmaynothaveknownwhattheywereheadingtowards,buttheyknewwho
theywereandwhattheystoodfor.Fromhereemergesthedisjunctionbetweentheir
foreignpolicygoalsandthehalf-heartedcommitmenttoenactchangesatthe
domesticlevel.
Muchlikeinthecaseofcommunism,however,anidentity-baseddomesticlegitimacy
couldonlysustaintheregimeforsolong.Astheeconomicsituationdeteriorated,and
itbecameclearthatRomaniawasfallingbehinditsEasternneighboursinthe
accessionprocess,thepublicreactedinthe1996electionsbyoustingtheIliescu
regime.Therewas,inthis,are-evaluationofidentitarypriorities.Inthesocialists’
placecamearight-wingcoalitionledbyafreshface,presidentEmilConstantinescu,a
universitylecturer.ThischangehadsignificantrepercussionsonRomania’s
developmentandthemannerinwhichitwasperceivedinternationally.Thecoalition
ranonamessageofcommitmenttoaddressingtheissueseitherignoredor
mishandledbythesocialists,particularlyintheareaofgovernmentspendingand
privatisation.359AccordingtoGallagher,“therewerewidespreadexpectationsthatin
1996aturning-pointhadbeenreachedwhichwouldenableagenuinetransitionto
358Ibid.359Roper(2000),p.82.
142
politicalandeconomicpluralismtogetunderway.”360Moreover,thischangein
governmentimprovedRomania’sprospectsofaccessionasit“sentasignaltotheEU
andNATOthatthecountrywaswillingtoaddressreform.”361Althoughthecoalition
governmenthadissuesofitsown,itslegacyremainsthatofspeedingupRomania’s
Westernaccessionprocess–duringConstantinescu’smandateRomaniabeganformal
negotiationswiththeEU(1999),signedthePrincipalTreatywithHungary(1996)and
enhanceditscooperationwithNATO.Moreimportantly,itselectionsignalledthe
entrenchingofthedemocraticprocess.AsGrossandTismaneanuhaveargued,their
victory“finallycreate[d]acultureofpoliticalalternationandfreepublicdiscoursethat
mostRomanianshadneverbeforeexperienced.”362From1996Romaniasawahealthy
alternationofleftandrightwinggovernments,allofwhichprioritisedthegoalof
accessionoverthatofprotectingnationalvalues,thesocialistsincluded.Ititistelling,
inthisview,thatRomaniagainedmembershipofNATOin2004,duringIliescu’sfinal
mandate.AlthoughRomanianconservatismstillheldswayoveranimportantpartof
Romaniansociety,identity-relatedanxietiesreceded,allowingforthedesiretojoin
theWesttobecomethepredominantattitudedrivingRomania’sbehaviour.EU
membershipwasfinallyattainedin2007,underpresidentBasescuandhisrightwing
coalition.
Conclusion
ThischapterhasexploredthenatureofRomania’sidentitynarrativeatthetimeand
afterthe1989revolution,andhowitfedintothestate’sbehaviourduringtransition.
Theperspectiveofferedherecomplementstraditionalaccountsofthestate’sdifficult
transition,byfocusingonhowtheidentitynarrativewasutilisedbytheIliescuregime,
butalsohowit,inturn,influenceditsbehaviour.Theroleplayedbyagencyinre-
conceptualisingtheclaimsmadeaboutRomanianidentityinthiscontextisvital,as
theseprovidethebasisforthecontemporarynarrative.Equally,identity-related
factorsarecriticalinaccountingforthepriorityofallofRomania’stransition
governmentstosatisfytheprerogativeofensuringthesecurityofthenewlyliberated
360Gallagher(2009),p.19.361Roper(2000)p.122.362GrossandTismaneanu(2005),p.152.
143
statebyaccessiontotheEUandNATO.Ontheotherhand,thecomplexesand
anxietieswhichdrawontheportrayaloftheSelfandOtherhadtheeffectofstymying
theseendeavours.Specifically,theresistancetochangeinthedomesticsphereand
insistenceonmaintainingnationalsovereigntyduringthe1990-1996perioddamaged
Romania’sinternationalprospects.Inthis,boththeIliescuregimeandbroader
society’sreactionaryattitudesplayedasignificantpart.Itwasnotuntiltheseanxieties
receded,underanewpoliticalleadership,thattheaccessiongoaltookprecedenceto
theprotectionofnationalvalues.
Beyondtheseconsiderationtwoimportantpointswhichemergefromtheperiodof
transitionasexaminedinthischapterare,firstly,theunanimitybehindthedecisionto
pursueEuro-Atlanticintegrationatbothpoliticalandsocietallevel,whichreflectsthe
pervasiveperceptionthatthisdirectionwasessential,andtheonlyoption,to
satisfyingtheprerogativeofensuringthestate’ssecurity.Thefollowingchapter,on
Romania’srelationshiponRussiawillexpandonthisnotionfromtheperspectiveof
thetwostates’bilateralrelations.Asecondpointwouldbethattherelationship
betweenRomaniaandHungaryisonebasedonsuspicionandanxietyconcerningthe
motivationsbehindtheiractions.Chapter6,ontherelationshipbetweenRomaniaand
Hungarywillexploretherootsandconsequencesofthisattitudeinmoredetail,
buildingontheaccountofferedhere.
144
Chapter5.Romania’sRelationshipwithRussia–Survivinginthe
ShadowoftheGreatEasternPower
ARomanianstatesurroundedbySlavstatesmayseemforthe
enemiesoftheRomanianpeopleapleasantillusion;forRomaniansitisacalamity,whichforetellsnewbattles,adisaster,theonly
consolationtowhichisknowledgeoftheenduranceoftheRomanianpeopleanditshopeforvictory.363
Introduction
ThischapterexaminestheinfluenceoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeonits
relationshipwithRussia,whilstsettingthisinteractioninthebroadercontextof
Romania’sgeneralforeignpolicydirection.Thechapterbeginswithasectionon
Romania’spost-accessionforeignpolicyagendaandexpandsonthenotionthatalack
ofcoherentstrategyhasbeenthehallmarkofthestate’sinternationalbehavioursince
2007.Contrarytothisview,thethesisarguesthatthecurrentinternationalclimatehas
providedBucharestwithanopportunitybutalsothenecessityofconstructingaclear
strategyinwhichcurbingRussianexpansionismoccupiesanimportantrole.Following
onfromthis,themannerinwhichtheRussianOtherhasbeenportrayedwithinthe
Romanianidentitynarrativeisexplored,withanemphasisontheSelf-Othercontrast
andtherepresentationofRussiaasanessentiallythreateningforce.Fromthisthe
chaptermakesthecasethattheportrayaloftheRussianOthertranslatesinto
pervasiveattitudesofanxiety,suspicionandfearoverRussia’sactions,whichhave
impactedrelationsbetweenthetwostatessincethe1989revolution.Thechapter
continueswithaninvestigationoftheinteractionbetweenRomaniaandRussiaduring
transition,focusedontheidentity-relatedreasonsbehindthedifficultyofestablishing
normalrelations.Theanalysisisthenbroughttothepresentday,throughan
examinationofRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussiaafterthe2007accessiontothe
EU.Itisarguedthatcurrentregionalandcontinentaldevelopments,suchasRussia’s
363M.Eminescu,‘Inluptacupanslavismul[AtWarwithPanslavism],’Timpul(June1878),availablefromhttp://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/portret/articol/eminescu-rusia-vrea-s-mistuiasc-poporul-rom-n[accessed29December2016].
145
increasedinvolvementintheaffairsofEuropeanstatesandtheannexationofCrimea,
haveledtoacoolingofrelationsbetweenRomaniaandRussia.Additionally,the
repercussionsofRussia’sactionsand,inparticular,thedissonanceamongstEuropean
statesonwhatconstitutesaneffectiveresponse,areexplored.Thechapteroutlines
Romania’sposition,rootedintheaugmentationofitsalreadyexistingidentitary
anxieties,emphasisingitshard-lineapproachvis-à-visRussia,andMoscow’sreaction
tothisstance.Finally,thechapteroffersapredictionofthefutureofRussian-
RomanianrelationssetinthebroadercontextofRomania’sgeneralforeignpolicy
agendaandbasedonseveralscenarioscontemplatedbyRomaniansonthepotential
developmentofcurrentsituationsatplayinUkraineandacrossthecontinent.Two
issuesarespecificallyaddressed–theperceptionthatRussia’sinvolvementinthe
affairsofEUandNATOstatesisthreateningthecohesionandabilityofthetwo
organisationstocounterMoscow;andthefactthatRussia’sforeignpolicyagendahas
yettobefullyrevealed.Inthissetting,thesectionexaminesRomania’spotential
courseofactionanditsrepercussionsonRomanian-RussianandNATO-Romanian
relations.Theaimofthischapteristoutilisetheidentity-perspectivetohighlightthe
complexrationalewhichmotivatesRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussia,and
portrayingitasanautonomousactorthedirectionofwhomisnotdefinedsolelyby
alignmentwithitsallies.
ANoteonRomania’sContemporaryForeignPolicyandtheCurrentInternational
Climate
ThepreviouschapterexaminedRomania’spost-1989foreignpolicydirectionandthe
challengesposedbytransitionandtheaccessionprocess.Thethesiswillfollowon
fromthisaccountwithananalysisofitsrelationshipswiththreeactorswhichareall
crucialinunderstandingthestate’scurrentforeignpolicyagenda.However,before
turningtoRussia,thesubjectofthischapter,itisnecessarytoexpandonthecontext
inwhichthisinteraction,aswellasthosewithHungaryandtheRepublicofMoldova,
146
areset.ThisconcernsRomania’sforeignpolicydirectionsinceitsaccessiontotheEU
in2007,whichmarksthedefactoendofthetransitionperiod.364
Twoissuesemergedfromtheinterviewsconductedforthepurposesofthisprojectin
2014:firstly,thatthesingularinternationalgoalduringtransitionwasaccessiontothe
EUandNATO;andsecondly,thatoncethesewereachievedthereexistedasenseof
uncertaintyregardingRomania’scurrentforeignpolicyprerogatives.University
lecturer,AnonymousE,arguedthat“Romania’sstrategywasinfluencedbythetwo
targetsbutmyproblemisthatitisnotcleartomewhathappenedafter2007,(…)Iam
uncertainastowhatobjectiveswehaveonthehorizonforthefuture.”365Liberal
politicianandpoliticalscienceprofessor,AnonymousC,sharesthisview:“Iwouldsay
thatafter2004,andespeciallyafter2007,thedifferencebetweenhomeandEuropean
affairsdisappears,and,asaresult,ourforeignpolicyisfacinganidentitycrisis.”366
AnonymousB,alectureronmigrationpolicy,expoundsonthenatureofthis
challenge:“atthemoment,itisclearthatwemustplayacertaincard,butIamnot
certainwehaveidentifiedwhatthatis;because,ontheonehand,wemustnegotiate
ourforeignpolicyinthecontextoftheEUandNATO,butwemustalsopursueour
owninterests.”367WhatisrevealedisapictureofRomaniaasastatewhichhasbeen
givenadirection,onedictatedbyitsinternationalalliances.AnonymousAarguesthat
thisisclearinRomania’spositionwithintheEUandNATO:“InsidetheEuropean
Union,ithasbecomeaccustomedtotheroleoflaggard(…).Strategically,itisaligned
totheUnitedStates,whichdoesnotleaveroomformanynuances.”368Thequestion
thusarises,asAnonymousBalsonotes,ofwhatremainsofRomania’snational
interestsandtowhatextentthestateisshowinganylevelofindividualityinits
agenda.FormerCultureMinisterAnonymousDbelievesthisisnotthecase:“our
policyisalignment;wehavenonewtargets.(…)Romaniaisalmostimperceptible,
364AlthoughRomaniajoinedNATOin2004,thisthesisconsiders2007tobetheactualendoftransition,notleastbecauseitwastheareaofdomesticreformnecessaryforfulfillingtheEUaccessioncriteriathatRomaniafoundmostchallenginginitstransitionfromsocialism,ashasbeenexploredinthepreviouschapter.365AnonymousE(2014).366AnonymousC,InterviewwithPoliticalScienceUniversityLecturer,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,11.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.367AnonymousB,InterviewwithUniversityLectureronMinorityIssues,byI.Tartacuta-Lawrence,06.06.2014,tape,Bucharest,Romania.368AnonymousA(2014).
147
invisible,ithasnotmadeanyremarkablechoicesinitsforeignaffairs.(…)Ourforeign
policyis,ifyouwishtodescribeitinnegativeterms,mediocre;inpositiveterms,well-
behaved.”369
WhetheroneviewsRomania’sadoptionofEUandNATOgoalsasitsownaseither
naturalortroubling,thegeneralconsensusseemstobethat,asAnonymousC
summarises,“Romania’scapacityfordecidingonitsforeignpolicyismuchreduced
since2004;before2004,wehadacertainindependenceindecision-making;today(…)
thedegreeofEuropeanisationofRomanianforeignaffairsisveryhigh.”370Thespecific
areasofinterestforRomaniaarethoughttobetheBlackSearegionandtheEuropean
Neighbourhoodpolicy,371butalsoinstrengtheningtheEasternpartnership.372The
degreetowhichthestatehasbeensuccessfulinpursuingtheseavenues,however,is
consideredlimitedbytheseobservers,becauseoftherolealreadyassumedinthese
areasbymoreimportantregionalplayers,suchasPoland,373TurkeyorRussia.374These
viewsmayhaveindeedappliedin2014,whentheinterviewswereconducted.Whatis
undeniable,attheveryleast,isthattheclearforeignpolicydirectionwhichemerged
inthetransitionperiodwasnolongernoticeableinRomania’sinternationalbehaviour.
Thisthesisarguesthatthisisnolongerthecaseandthattheidentity-based
perspectiveofferedbythisthesismayshedlightonthereasonsbehindthis
development;eventsoverrecentyearshavealteredsignificantlytheinternationaland
regionalclimate.NestledwithintheEuro-Atlanticorganisations,Romaniaenjoyeda
senseofstabilityandsecuritywhichcouldexplainitspassivepost-accessionforeign
policy.Inthelastcoupleofyears,however,theequilibriumofEasternEuropeandthe
continent,moregenerally,hasbeenrockedbyeventslikethecrisisinUkraineand
Hungary’seasternshift.InternaldissensionbetweenEUstatesandrisingtensions
betweentheEuropeancommunityandRussiahaveprovidedtheopportunityandthe
necessityforRomaniatoplayamoreactiveroleontheregionalscene.Itsstrategic
369AnonymousD(2014).370AnonymousC(2014).371AnonymousB(2014),AnonymousC(2014).372AnonymousA(2014).373AnonymousE(2014).374AnonymousC(2014),AnonymousD(2014).
148
positionontheborderoftheEUandNATOwiththeEuropeanneighbourhoodand
Russiameansthatitnowhasanavenuetoassumegreaterresponsibilitiesasa
memberofthesealliances,butalsotopursueitsownnationalinterests.More
importantly,regionaldevelopmentshaveledtoareactivationofprofoundidentitary
anxietiesconcerningstatesecurityandare-evaluationofitspriorities;inotherwords,
theyhaveprovidedanimpetusforaction.Whatthefollowingchapterswillexamineis
thebilateralrelationshipsRomaniahasestablishedwithitstwosignificantOthers,
RussiaandHungary,anditsEstrangedSelf,theRepublicofMoldova.However,the
mannerinwhichRomanianegotiatesitspositiontowardstheseactorsmustbesetin
thecontextofthestate’sgeneralforeignpolicyagenda.Inotherwords,Romania’s
interactionwiththesubjectsofthethreecasestudiesofferhintsatthepartthestate
iscapableandwillingtoplayontheinternationalsceneinthecurrentcontext.More
importantly,thethesiswillportrayRomaniaasanactorwithdistinctinterestswhich
harnessesitsstrategicpositioninordertoachievespecificidentity-basedgoals.The
influenceoftheidentitynarrativeintheconstructionoftheserelationshipsandits
foreignpolicyagendawillbeexamined,revealingthecomplexmotivesbehind
Romania’sinternationalbehaviour.ThenotionthatBucharest’sdirectionmaybe
qualifiedsimplythroughalignmenttothatpursuedbyitsallies,asbothinterviewees
andtraditionalaccountsofRomanianforeignpolicymayargue,willbechallenged
throughouttheremainderofthisthesis.
Romania’sIdentityDrivenAttitudetowardsRussia–Distrust,FearandAnxiety
overSecurityandIndependence
Asperthemainassumptionsofthisthesis,onewouldarguethatRomania’s
contemporaryrelationshipwithRussiaisshapedbyitshistoricalnarrativeregarding
theirinteractionandthemannerinwhichtheseexperienceshavebeentranslatedinto
theidentitynarrative.TheparticularportrayaloftheSelfandOtherinfluences
Romanians’attitudestowardsMoscowandinformsinterpretationsoftheiractions.
Furthermore,thecontinuityofthehistoricalandidentitynarrativeleadsonetomake
twoinferences,whichapplyequallytotheothertwocasestudies:firstly,
representationsoftheRussianOtherhavebecomesedimented,ensuringthat
149
perceptionsarewidespreadandenduring;secondly,thereproductionofthehistorical
narrativealongthesamelinesasintheformativeperiodoftheRomaniannation-state
meansthatthememoryofpasteventsisparticularlyvivid.Asaresult,inorderto
understandthenatureofRomanianattitudestowardsMoscow,oneshouldsummarise
themannerinwhichtheRussianOtherhasbeensubscribedtothehistoricaland
identitynarratives.
ThechapteronthedevelopmentoftheRomanianidentitynarrativehasalready
outlinedtheimportanceofconstructingasharpcontrastbetweenSelfandOther.
DuringtheMiddleAgestheRomanianstates’modestconditionhadtobereconciled
withtheexceptionalismimplicitintheFoundationMyths.Theresultwasahistorical
narrativefocusedonself-victimisationwhichportrayedRomaniansascasualtiesofthe
expansionistandoppressivetendenciesofmorepowerfulOthers,whilstalso
emphasisingtheiruncannycapacityforresistingforeigninterference.Inidentitary
termsthistranslatesintothethemeoftheBesiegedFortress.AsBoiasummarises,
self-victimisationcreatesaperceptionthatRomanianshavebeen“thrownfromsideto
sidebythewavesofhistory.”375DrawingonthethemeofBesiegedFortressisthe
themeofUnity.Effortstocreateanindependentnation-statewhichbroughttogether
alltheRomanianregionswerelegitimatedbynineteenthandtwentieth-centuryelites
asvindicationforRomania’stroubledhistory.AllthemoreshouldtheRomanian
endeavoursucceedandbeacceptedbytheinternationalcommunity,asitsexperience
oftheMiddleAgeshadbeeninherentlyunjust.
ItisagainstthisbackdropthatRomania’sexperienceofinteractionwithRussiais
portrayed.AlthoughRussiaentersthescenemuchlaterthantheHungarianOther,its
impactontheRomanianstate’ssituationinthecontextofthethemesofBesieged
FortressandUnityisjustassignificant.Russia’sinvolvementintheaffairsofthe
Romanianprovincesbeginsinearnestinthenineteenthcentury,inthecontextofthe
longfoughtRusso-TurkishWars.Asthenationalprojectisonlyjustgettingunderway,
in1812,theTsaristEmpireannexesBessarabia,aterritoryhistoricallypartof
Moldavia.Thisinadvertentlymeansthat,whentheinitialunificationbetweenRomania
375Boia(2011),p.286.
150
andMoldaviatakesplace,itdoessowithouttheeasternhalfofthelatter–see[Figure
3].RussiathereforebecomessubscribedtothelistofpowerfulOtherswhichhave
stymiedtheunificationprocess,asDutceac-Segestenpointsout:representationsfocus
onthefactthat“thenationalunificationprojectsarehinderedbytheinterferenceof
empiresbothfromsouthandfromnorth.”376Amongstthem,particularlyinmodern
times,Russiaoccupiesanimportantplace,notleastbecauseoftheconsequencesof
itsinterferenceontheRomaniannationalproject.Althoughexternalcircumstances
weresuchthatBessarabiaeventuallyunitedwithRomaniain1918,Russiaremained
thesolegreatpowerintheEast.ItsinterestintheRomanianspace,aswellas
Bucharest’sinabilitytocounterit,wereconfirmedbyitsretakingofBessarabiain1940
–see[Figure5],thematterbeingsettledin1945,whentheregionwasincludedinthe
SovietUnion.Assuch,theimageofRussiaasthemainreasonbehindthefailureofthe
Romaniannationalprojectwascemented.Additionally,theSovietoccupationof
RomaniaaftertheSecondWorldWarandthepartitplayedintheinstallationofthe
communistregimehaveentrenchedtheperceptionofthisactorasanessential
threateningOther.Inthisview,RomaniatrulybecomesaBesiegedFortressasitwas
notonlyitsprerogativeforunity,butitsownsovereigntyandindependencewhich
wereatrisk.
Overall,theRussianOtherhasconsistentlybeenportrayedasanexistentialthreatto
thesurvivalofanindependentRomaniaanditsnationalproject.This,inturn,has
contributedtothecreationofdeep-seededresentmenttowardsMoscow.Asformer
advisorofthedirectoroftheRomanianIntelligenceService(SRI),R.I.Stefureacargues,
“anti-Russiansentiments[havebeen]fuelledthroughouthistoryand[are]deeply
entrenchedinRomanianconsciousness.”377Ifatthetimeoftheinstallationof
communismRomaniansalreadysharedthisviewor,asBoiaargues,“hadlittle
sympathytowardsanythingcomingfromMoscow,”378subsequentregimesdidnothing
ifnotexacerbatethecontrastbetweenSelfandRussianOther.AsBoiacontinues,
376Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.218.377R.I.Stefureac,Conflictulsecretdinspatelescenei–RomaniaversusRusia:50deaniderealitati,miturisiincertitudini.1964-2014[TheSecretConflictBehindtheScene–RomaniaVersusRussia:50YearsofRealities,MythsandIncertitude.1964-2014](Bucharest:Rao,2015),p.37.378Boia(2012),p.107.
151
becauseofCeausescu’sdiscourseandactions,inparticular,Romaniancommunism
“hadtheparadoxicaleffectofmovingRomaniaawayfromtheWest,withoutbringing
itclosertoMoscow.”379ThefailedattemptsatRussificationandthenational,anti-
MoscowdirectionpursuedbytheCeausescuregimespeaktothepotencyofanti-
Russiansentimentsatboththesocietalandpoliticalelitelevel,butalsoelites’
unwillingnesstochallengetheseperceptions.Thiswas,essentially,theportrayalofthe
RussianOtherinplayatthetimeofthe1989revolution.Thesheerfactthat,inits
aftermath,therumourspreadthatRussianterroristsweretryingtocapturethestate
apparatusistellingoftheentrenchedperceptionsoverMoscow’sinterestin
interferingintheaffairsoftheirstate.
ThisimageofRussiahastranslatedintoparticularattitudeswhichinfluenced,after
1989,notonlyRomania’srelationshipwithMoscow,butalsoitsgeneralforeignpolicy
direction.Specifically,therepresentationoftheRussianOtherasanexistentialthreat
isreflectedinapowerfulanxiety,suspicionandevenfearconcerningtheactionsand
influenceofthisactor.Inayehsummarisesthisbeliefwellwhenshenotesthat“there
is(…)littleaffinitywithRussiawithinRomaniansociety.Instead,thecomplicated
historicalrelationshipandthecountry’snon-Slavicoriginshavecontributedtoa
generaldistrustofRussia.”380Additionally,asBoiapointsout,“Romanianslookto
Russiaastosomethinghazyandnottoberecommended,somewhereintheEast.”381
ThegeneralviewisthatRussiaremainsagreatpowerbutthatitsinterestsnecessarily
goagainstRomania’s.AsAnonymousDargues,“therearefew,ifany,filo-Russians[in
Romania],”towhichheadds,“forobviousreasons.”382Becauseoftheperceptionthat
Russiahasinherentexpansionisttendenciesandismotivatedbyadesiretomaintain
andstrengthenitssphereofinfluence,therelationshipbetweenthetwostateswill
necessarilybeanuneasyone.AsambassadortotheUnitedStates,GeorgeMaiorhas
argued,thisisareproductionoftheirhistoryofinteraction:“relationsbetween
RomaniaandtheexpansioniststateswhichsucceededoneanotherintheEastern
379Ibid.,p.225.380A.Inayeh,‘Romania:LargelyImmunetoRussianPressures,’ininARegionDisunited?CentralEuropeanResponsestotheRussiaUkraineCrisis–EuropePolicyPaper,TheGermanMarshalFund,February2015,p.41.381Boia(2012),p.225.382AnonymousD(2014).
152
space,whethertheTsaristEmpire,SovietUnion,ornowtheRussianFederation,may
besubscribedtoaparadigminwhichdominatedhostilityoverfriendship,conflictover
cooperation.”383
Moreimportantly,duringtransitionthenotionthatthereexistsaninherent
antagonismbetweenRomania’sprerogatives,mostnotablyconcerningthe
independenceandsecurityofthestate,andRussianinterestsplayedanimportantpart
inthesettingofRomania’sagenda.Fromanidentitaryperspectiveoneisableto
revealthedesiretojointheWestasbeingrootedinboththeprioritiesderivedfrom
theportrayaloftheSelf,aswellasanxietiesconcerningRussia’spotentialrevivalofits
expansionisttendencies.PastexperiencesandtherepresentationoftheRussianOther
ensuredtheunanimouspursuitofapro-Westerndirectionaimedatsafeguarding
RomaniafrominterferencefromMoscow.Thequalityofbilateralrelationsbetween
RomaniaandRussia,ontheotherhand,willreflectthischoicetopursueaclear
demarcationfromMoscow.Inotherwords,Romania’saimofachievingEuropeanand
TransatlanticintegrationcouldnotbuthaveledtofurthercoolingofRomanian-
Russianbilateralrelations.
Russo-RomanianRelationsDuringtheTransitionPeriod
RelationsbetweenRomaniaandRussiawerecomplicatedduringtransitionnotonly
because,aftertherevolution,Romania“turnedtotheWest,”384asBoiaargued,but
alsobecauseofRussia’sownassessmentofthisagenda.Inasense,pursuingapro-
WesternagendaandmaintaininggoodrelationswithRussiaaremutuallyexclusive
directionsinwhatMoscowisconcerned.ReflectingthisviewisNew-Euroasianist
theoristAlexandrDuginwhosuggestedthatRomania,aspartofthebufferzone
betweentheWestandRussia,hadtomakeageopoliticalchoicebetween
‘continentalism’–sidingwith‘OldEurope’(France,GermanyandRussia)–and
383G.C.Maior,‘Studiuintroductiv–DespreConflictuldinspatelesceneidupa1989siprovocarileurmatorilorani[IntroductoryStudy–OntheBehindtheScenesConflictafter1989andtheChallengesofYearstoCome],’inR.I.Stefureac,Conflictulsecretdinspatelescenei–RomaniaversusRusia:50deaniderealitati,miturisiincertitudini.1964-2014[TheSecretConflictBehindtheScene–RomaniaVersusRussia:50YearsofRealities,MythsandIncertitude.1964-2014](Bucharest:Rao,2015),p.19.384Boia(2012),p.226.
153
‘atlanticism’–supportingGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates.385Accordingtothe
author,choosingthelatterwouldautomaticallybeperceivedbytheKremlinasan
“anti-Russianorientation.”386Romanianpoliticalcommentatorandformer
parliamentarian,CozminGusa,suggeststhat,throughitsunequivocalpursuitof
accessiontoNATO,Romaniadidindeedchoose‘atlanticism’tothedetrimentof‘Old
Europe,’effectivelypittingitagainstRussia.ReferringtoDugin’saccount,heargues
that“RussiawillviewRomaniaasanadversary,allthemoredangerousastheglobal
hegemon’s[i.e.theUSA’s]militarybaseswillspringuponRomanianterritory.”387
WhetherRomaniawasawarethatthiscoursewouldantagoniseRussiaor,indeed,was
inthepositionduringthe1990stomakeaconsciousdecisiontoreject‘OldEurope’is
debatable.388
Onewouldargue,however,thatjoiningNATOwasapriorityofRomanianforeign
policyintransitiondictatedbyitsidentity-drivenprerogativetoensurethesecurityof
thestate,includingagainstRussia’sactions.Intheseconditions,sacrificingdiplomatic
relationswithMoscowwouldhavebeenpreferablebecausetheend-gamewas
safeguardingitssecurityandindependence,andmembershipofNATOsatisfiedthat
goal.Onecouldgoevenfurtherandsuggestthat,totheextentthatgoodrelations
withtheUSAwereapriority,closenesstoMoscowwasared-linewhichno
governmentinBucharestcouldhavecrossedwithoutjeopardisingitsdomestic
legitimacy.Thewidespreadsentimentoverthe“unacceptabilityofvoluntary
alignmentwiththeEast,”389effectivelymeantthatapro-Westerndirectionwasthe
onlyavailableoptionforRomanianpoliticiansacrossthepoliticalspectrumduringthe
periodoftransition.AsBoiaargues,“somedopointoutthatRussiaisstillagreat
385A.Dugin,BazeleGeopoliticii–VolI:ViitorulGeopoliticalRusiei[TheFoundationsofGeopolitics–VolI:TheGeopoliticalFutureofRussia](Bucharest:Euroasiatica,2011),p.15.386Ibid.387C.Gusa,Imperialisminpostcomunism:Geopoliticadezordiniiinfostullagarsocialist[ImperialisminPost-Communism:TheGeopoliticsofDisorderintheFormerSocialistBloc](Bucharest:AdevarulHolding,2011),p.24.388SeeD.Dungaciu,‘Geopolitica,imperialism,postcomunismsidezordine–Unde(mai)suntemnoi?[Geopolitics,Imperialism,Post-communismandDisorder–WhereDoWe(Still)Stand?],epiloguetoC.Gusa,Imperialisminpostcomunism:Geopoliticadezordiniiinfostullagarsocialist[ImperialisminPost-Communism:TheGeopoliticsofDisorderintheFormerSocialistBloc](Bucharest:AdevarulHolding,2011),p.343.389Turnock(2001),p.123.
154
powerandnormalandtosomeextentfriendlyrelationswithitshouldbeestablished.
ThisseemstobetheleastofRomanians’concern.”390Theconsequencewas,however,
asAnonymousBacknowledges,that“certaindiplomaticlinkswith(…)Russiawere
lost.”391
Thereis,however,oneexceptionworthdiscussinghere.In1991,despitetheprofound
anti-Russiansentimentsnoticeableatthesocietallevel,Iliescuseemedunwillingto
renegelinkstoMoscow.RomaniabecametheonlyWarsawPactstatetosignatreaty
withtheSovietUnionwhich“gaveMoscowaneffectivevetooveranyRomanian
alliancewithaWesterncountryhaditnotbeenabrogatedbythecollapseofthe
SovietUnionsixmonthslater.”392AnonymousAqualifiesthisnowrarelydiscussed
eventofRomanianpost-socialisthistoryas“abizarreepisode.”393Onewouldargue
thiswas,indeed,apeculiarmoment–althoughIliescu’sdiscoursefocusedon‘national
rebirth,’herehewasignoringbothhiselectoralpromisesandthepublic’sresentment
towardsMoscow.ItmaybethatIliescu,likeGorbachev,believedthatcommunism
couldbereformedfromwithinandactedaccordingly.Itmayalsobethathewasone
ofthepragmatistsBoiamentions–acknowledgingthattheSovietUnionwasstillthe
super-powerintheregion,andthatmaintainingcloserelationstoitwascommon-
sensical.Others,suchasformercounsellorattheRomanianEmbassyinMoscow,
VasileBuga,arguedthatwhatcharacterisedtheearly1990swasa“broadstateof
confusion,generatedbytherevolution.”394Resistancetochangeandapredilection
towardsthefamiliarwere,ashasbeenexploredinthepreviouschapter,twoofthe
mainfeaturesoftheIliescuregime.Onedoubts,however,that,hadthetreatyever
beenratified,Iliescu’sdomesticlegitimacycouldhavewithstoodthepublicopinion
backlash.Inanycase,thisisaninterestingexceptiontothegeneraltrendofRusso-
390Boia(2012),p.226.391AnonymousB(2014).392Gallagher(2009),p.133.393AnonymousA(2014).394V.BugainC.Harsan,‘Romania-Rusia,Incotro?(V)[Romania-Russia,WhichWay?(V)],’RomaniaLibera,28.11.2007,http://www.romanialibera.ro/special/documentare/romania-rusia--incotro---v--112431[accessed11January2016].
155
Romanianrelationsthatshowsthatidentitaryanxietiesneednotalwaysprohibit
endeavoursofestablishinggoodrelations.
BythetimeRomaniaandRussiaresumednegotiationsonabilateraltreatyin1992,
however,anoppositioncapableofreflectingthepublic’spowerfulanti-Russian
sentimentshadcoagulated.Twoofthemostsignificantareasofcontentionregarded
historicalgrievancesovertheSovietUnion’streatmentofRomania.Thefirst
concernedRomania’snationaltreasureof93.5tonnesofDaciangold,395evacuatedto
MoscowduringtheFirstWorldWarandarrestedbyMoscowuponRomania’s
occupationofBessarabiain1918,nevertobereturned.Thesecondissuereferredto
theRibbentrop-MolotovPact(1939);morespecifically,RomanianswishedforMoscow
topublicallydenounceitscontent,whichoutlinedtheSovietUnion’sintentionto
recaptureBessarabia.Boththeoppositionandpublic“werepressurisingpresident
Iliescu”396toforcetheinclusionoftheseissuesinthetreaty.Russiarejectedthe
proposaland,atthelastmoment,in1996,Romaniadecidednottosignthe
agreement.Qualifyingthisact,ArmandGosu,AssociateProfessorattheFacultyof
PoliticalScienceoftheUniversityofBucharest,arguesthat,mostlikely,Iliescufelt
compelledbythestrongoppositiontoatreatywhichdidnotrecognisetheseareasof
disputebetweenthetwostatestorenegeonhiscommitmentofcooperationwith
Russia.397
Inthisstance,onenoticestheinfluenceofsedimentedbeliefsconcerningRomania’s
identityonbehaviourmostprominently.Re-iteratingtheassumptionsmadeinthe
introduction,theinter-subjectiveRomanianrationaleforactionreflectstheidentity-
basedprerogativeswhichflowfromthethemeofBesiegedFortress.Bothareasof
contentionwerecrucialinRomania’sassessmentofRussiaasathreateningOtherand
itselfasvictim-thetreasure,soprofoundlylinkedtotheiroriginsasapeople,was
stolenandtheirterritorialdismembermentdecidedbetweentwostatesmore
powerfulthantheirs.Assuch,rejectingatreatywhichdidnotrecognisetheseissues,
395Inayeh(2015),p.41.396A.Gosu,‘PoliticarasariteanaaRomaniei:1990-2005[Romania’sEasternPolicy:1990-2005],’Contrafort(RepublicofMoldova)1(135)(January2006),paginationunknown,availablefromhttp://www.contrafort.md/old/2006/135/958.html[accessed06.01.2016].397Ibid.
156
thoughobjectivelydetrimentaltoRusso-Romanianrelations,wasthepreferredoption
becausesigningitwouldhavebeentantamounttoacknowledgingRomania’sinferior
positionvis-à-visRussiaandtheforgettingofpastaggressions.Botheventssignified
transgressionsagainstRomania’sheritageandsovereigntyandcouldthereforenotbe
forgiven,thecostnotwithstanding.AlthoughIliescuhimselfwould,perhaps,havebeen
willingtosignthetreaty,thefactthathebowedtopublicpressureshowsthatthe
matterwasonewhichwoulddamagehisdomesticlegitimacy.Thiswasared-linethe
regimecouldnothavecrossed.Theconsequenceofrefusingtosignthetreaty,
however,leftrelationsbetweenRomaniaandRussiaonhiatus.
After1996,arguesformercounsellortotheRomanianEmbassyinMoscow,Vasile
Buga,thequalityofrelationsbetweenBucharestandMoscow“enteredintodecline,
becauseRomania’sforeignpolicyignoredthisspaceandaltereditspriorities.”398The
necessityofestablishingnormalbilateralrelationswithRussiarecededwiththe
electionofpresidentConstantinescuandhisright-wingcoalition,muchlikethe
identity-relatedanxietiestowardsreformmentionedinthepreviouschapter.Instead,
theemphasisnowfellontheaccessionprocesstotheEUandNATO.Therewaslittle
movementonthefrontuntil2003,interestinglyalsounderpresidentIliescu,when
Romaniaachievedthefirstofitsaccessiongoals.AccordingtotheRomanianleaderit
wasGeorgeW.Bushwhoencouragedhimtopursuea‘normalisationofrelations’with
Russia,ontheoccasionofRomania’sinvitationtojoinNATO.399Thetreatysignedlater
thatyeardidcondemntheRibbentrop-Molotovpactandacknowledgedtheissueof
theRomanianTreasure.However,questionswereraisedastowhetheritcouldheal
Russo-Romanianrelations.ParliamentaryDeputyGheorgheBuzatu,forinstance,
arguedthattheRussiancondemnationofthe1939pactwasanemptyconcessionand
theircommitmenttosetupacommissiontaskedwithstudyingexistingarchiveson
theRomanianTreasureissuewouldyieldlittleresult.400Moreimportantlyandtelling
398V.BugainC.Harsan(2007).399Iliescu,citedinA.Neagu,‘IonIliescu:RomaniaaavutointelegerecuFederatiaRusa,in2004,cuprivirelanormalizarearelatiilor’[‘IonIliescu:RomaniaStruckaDealWiththeRussianFederation,in2004,inWhatConcernstheNormalisationofRelations’],Hotnews,05.05.2014,http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-17172140-ion-iliescu-romania-avut-intelegere-federatia-rusa-2004-privire-normalizarea-relatiilor.htm[accessed24December2015].400Buzatu,inChamberofDeputies–ParliamentofRomania,DezbateriParlamentare–SedintaSenatuluidin3Noiembrie2003:16.DezbatereasiaprobareaproiectuluiLegiipentruratificarea
157
oftheanxietytowardsmakinganycompromisestowardsRussia,herhetoricallyasked:
“doweremainasalittlemousewhichpokesatanelephantandwhenwecrossa
bridge,wewhisperinitsearwarningithowmuchthebridgeisrocking?”401
Russo-Romanianrelationsdidnotsignificantlyimproveafterthesigningofthe2003
treaty.Thiswaspartly,accordingtoVasileBuga,becauseofRomania’sinabilityto
capitaliseonthetreaty’spotentialandthelackofa“clearandconsistentstrategy
aimedtowardsthedevelopmentofrelationswithMoscow.”402However,theformer
diplomatalsocitesRomanianpreconceptionstowardsRussiaasreasonsbehindthe
lackofauniformapproach:“theseprejudicesarelinked,largelyerroneously,to
distrustofRussia,whichisstillviewedthroughperspectivesconstructedinthepast.
Theseareconnectedtomomentsoftensionintheirinteractionandlesssoto
momentswhentheywerecollaborating.”403Inotherwords,memoriesofpast
experiencesstillcontributedtothecreationofanimageofRussiaasuntrustworthy,
andessentiallydangeroustoRomanianinterests.ThethemeofBesiegedFortressis
apparentinthisposition,whichledtoanambivalenceinRomania’sdealingswith
Russia.Ontheonehand,Bucharestwasawarethatanormalisationofrelationswith
Moscowwasinitsobjectivebestinterest.However,therewasaperceptionthatany
concessions,particularlyonissuesofnationalimportance,wouldplaceRomaniaina
vulnerablepositionvis-à-visRussiaandimpactitsabilitytonegotiatewiththisOther
onanequalfooting.IntransigencetowardsMoscowwas,conversely,asignofstrength
andthatRomaniawaschallengingitstraditionalsmall-statecondition.Thesetwo
antagonisticattitudesareattherootofwhatBugaarguescharacterisedRusso-
Romanianrelationsafter1990:“diplomaticactivityknewperiodsofre-launchand
recoil,whichjustifyitsqualificationasincoherentandinefficient.”404
TratatuluiprivindrelatiileprietenestisidecooperaredintreRomaniasiFederatiaRusa,semnatlaMoscovala4iulie2003[ParliamentaryDebates–SittingoftheSenateof3November2003:16.TheDebateandapprovaloftheLawforratifyingtheTreatyconcerningfriendlyrelationsandcooperationbetweenRomaniaandtheRussianFederation,signedinMoscowon4July2003],03.11.2003http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5565&idm=16[accessed08January2016].401SenatorBuzatu,inSenateDebate(2003).402VasilaBugainC.Harsan(2007).403Ibid.404Ibid.
158
Overall,workingontheintersectionofFPAandSCfromanidentity-basedapproach
providesparticularinsightintotherationalebehindRomania’sbehaviourtowards
Russiaduringtransition.Romania’sdesireforEuro-Atlanticintegrationwasnotonly
rootedinprerogativessetbytheportrayaloftheSelfbutalsoinanxietiesconcerning
Russia,basedonitsrepresentationasathreateningOtherthroughthelensofthe
BesiegedFortress.ItmayhavebeenthatRomanians,muchlikeDugin,viewedcordial
relationswithMoscowandapro-Westerncourseasincompatible.Inanycase,the
profoundanti-Russiansentimentsinplayatsocietallevelandtheambivalenceofelites
inmanagingdialoguewithMoscowresultedinastrainedrelationshipthroughout
transition.Inthisvein,reconciliationmayonlyhaveoccurredafterintegration,when
Romaniawasabletonegotiatethisrelationshipfromadifferentfooting.Asthe
followingsectionwillshow,however,thechanginginternationalcircumstancesand
perceptionsoverRussia’sownactionspreventedthisfrombeingthecaseand,instead,
resultedinanaugmentationofRomaniananxieties.
ContemporaryRusso-RomanianRelations
Ifbefore2007oneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofRusso-Romaniancontactwas
Bucharest’sambivalencetowardsameaningfullevelofinteractionwithMoscow,
Romania’saccessiontotheEUandNATOsettheirbilateralrelationshipinanew
contextandalteredthestate’spositionvis-à-visRussia.TheviewwasthatRomania
wasnowembeddedinasystemofallianceswhichguaranteeditsindependencefrom
Moscowandwouldallowittoplayagreaterdiplomaticroleintheregion,especiallyin
termsoftheEU’sNeighbourhoodpolicy.However,integrationposednewchallenges
forBucharestregardingitsmanagementofinteractionwithRussiafromwithintheEU
andNATO.AsNicolescuarguedin2010,Romania’spreferredoptionwouldbea
strategywhichkeepsRussiaatarm’slengthbutmaintainsthesupportofitsallies.
However,shenoted,“thefactthatthispartnershiphasworkedsofardoesnot
guaranteethefactthatitwillworkjustaseasilyinthefuture,sincetheWesthasless
instrumentsintheBlackSearegion(…)andRussia’spoliticalandeconomicinterestin
159
thispartisgreater”405thaninCentralandtherestofEasternEurope.Thereisa
recognition,therefore,thataccessioninitself,althoughitincreasestheinterestsofthe
EUandNATOtosupportRomaniainitsrelationswithMoscow,doesnotinitself
ensureabetterqualityofdialoguebetweenthetwostates.
Meanwhile,thealleviationofRomania’sidentitaryanxietiesregardingrelationswith
RussiaisnotonlycontingentonaccessiontotheEUandNATO,butalsoonhow
Moscow’sownbehaviourisinterpreted.AsoutlinedinChapter3,thethesisargues
thatchangestotheclimateandthere-evaluationofanactor’sprioritiesmayleadto
anxietiesrecedingor,conversely,becomingaugmented.Itisfeasibletopicturethe
opportunecircumstancesinwhichidentitaryanxietieswouldsubsideontheRomanian
side,wereRussiatoadoptaneo-liberal,evenpro-WesterndirectionthatRomania
perceivedasnon-threatening.Thiswas,indeed,thescenariowhichsawRomania’s
relationshipwithHungaryimprovedrasticallyinthelate1990s.AccordingtoGusa,the
RussianFederationdidadopta‘strategicidentity’ofthistypeunderGorbachevand
Yeltsinbetween1991and1993,when“itwasconsideredthat,asaresultofthe
concessionsmadetotheOccident,Russia’sinterestsinworldpoliticswouldbe
recognised.”406AnattitudeofopennesstowardstheWestmayhavebeenpartofthe
reasonwhyIliescupursuedafriendlyapproachtowardsMoscowintheearly1990s.By
thetimeofRomania’saccessiontotheEUandNATOandevenofthesigningofthe
bilateraltreatyin2003,however,Russiahadchangeditsstrategy.Itsforeignpolicy
agendahadbeenreorientedbyVladimirPutininadirectionwhichcouldonlycause
there-emergenceofRomanianconcerns.AsGeorgeMaiorsurmises,referringto
ZbigniewBrzezinski’spropositionofthreepossiblegeostrategicoptionsavailableto
RussiaafterthedissolutionoftheSovietUnion:
BetweentheoptionforanadvancedpartnershipwithAmerica,theemphasisonthenear-abroadasmainpreoccupationforRussia,eitherwiththeaimofeconomicintegration,orfortherebuildingofitsimperialcontrol,[and]theoptionforaEurasiancounter-alliancemeanttocombatAmericanpreponderanceinEurope,Russiafindsitself,today,somewherebetweenthe
405A.Nicolescu,‘ChangesinRomania’sForeignPolicyfromthePerspectiveofNATOandEUMembership,’RomanianJournalofEuropeanAffairs10:1(2010),pp.68-69.406Gusa(2011),p.210.
160
secondandthirdoptions.Russianexpansionismisnolongeratheoreticprediction,butaneffectiverealityoftheworldwelivein.407
Inotherwords,underpresidentPutin,Russiahasdisplayedare-awakeningofits
expansionisttendencies,inregardstobothitstraditionalsphereofinfluence,andits
self-perceptionasagreatpower,capableofcounter-balancingtheUnitedStatesata
globallevel.Inthisview,theEU’sEasternPartnershipandNATO’sexpansiontothe
bordersoftheformerSovietUnionrepresentthreatstoRussia’spositionasregional
hegemon.FromthisstemsRussia’soppositiontoWesterneffortsofestablishing
tighterlinkswiththestatesformerly,orstillperceivedaspart,ofRussia’sorbit.As
Nicolescupointsout,“Russia’sattitudetowardstheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy
andtheEasternPartnershipmorespecificallycontinuestobenegative,”408whilst
thereexistsaperceptionthatatthe“coreofalldifferencesbetweentheWestand
RussiaisthequestionofwhosesphereofinfluencetheSovietsuccessorstatesfall
into.”409Inthisview,theshortmilitaryinterventioninGeorgia(2008),atatimewhen
thestatewasnegotiatingclosertieswithNATO,speakstoRussia’snewdirection.
Itwasinthiscontext,therefore,thatRomaniahadtonegotiateitsnewstrategic
position.Euro-AtlanticintegrationmayhaveofferedRomaniaaguaranteeofitsstatus
asamemberoftheWesterncommunity,butRussia’sbehaviourdidnotleadtoan
ameliorationofitsidentity-basedanxietiesregardingitsintentions.Maior,for
instance,pointstoRussia’sexpansionisttendencies,suchastheinterventionin
Georgia,anditsincreasinglyvirulentEuroasianistandanti-Americandiscourseasthe
“seedsofsignificantlongtermrisks.”410Inotherwords,forRomanians,Russia
continuedtobeseenasathreat,notonlytotheirstate,buttothebroaderinterestsof
theWesterncommunity.IdentitaryanxietieshavemadeRomaniaacutelysensitive
andsuspiciousofRussianbehaviourand,asaresult,relationsbetweenBucharestand
Moscowdidnotimproveintheaftermathofaccession.
407Maior(2015),p.23.408Nicolescu(2010),p.69.409AnalystSergeiKaraganov,citedinNicolescu(2010),p.69.410Maior(2015),p.24.
161
ThemainperceptionmotivatingRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussiatodayisthat
MoscowispursuingareturntogeopoliticsandthereformingofitsSoviet-erasphere
ofinfluence,whilstitalsosearchestodestabilisetheEUandNATOfromwithin,
threatening,atitsmostprofoundlevel,Romania’ssenseofsecurityofferedby
membership.Recentregionalandcontinentaldevelopmentshavecementedthis
interpretationofRussia’sintentionsandhaveaugmentedanxietiesovertheissueof
security.Atsocietallevel,anti-Russiansentimentsarepervasive:accordingtoa2016
INSCOPpoll,61.5%ofRomanianshavenegativefeelingstowardsMoscow,whilst,
conversely,49.7%believetheUSAisthemainallycapableofprotectingtheirstatein
caseofanationalsecuritythreat.411Ontheotherhand,thepossibilityofaregional
militaryconflictisnowviewedasoneofthemostpressingcausesfornational
concern.412Fromthisperspective,itisclearthattheconflictinUkrainehashada
significantimpactonRomanians’threatperceptions.
Intermsofthestate’sbehaviourinreactingtoMoscow’snewdirection,thereare
severalstrandswhichdeserveattention.Ontheonehand,asMaiorhasargued,
Romaniahasbeenacutelyawarethatbeforeswitchingtoanaggressiveexpansionist
agenda,signalledbytheannexationofCrimea,Russiasuccessfullyemployedasoft
approachinrelationswiththeWest.Thishasresulted,inrecentyears,initsinclusion
intheG8,and,asMaiorpointsout,a“political-economicandevenstrategicopenness
showntowardsRussia(withoutmanyinhibitionsorrestraints)bysomeEuropean
states.WewouldmentionFrance,Germany,Italy,HungaryandGreeceinparticular,
butthelistisnotexhaustive.”413OnewouldarguethatRomaniawould,whether
appropriateornot,becompelledbyitsidentitaryanxietiestoviewanysuchattempts
atbuildingbridgeswiththeWestwithscepticism,andwiththedistinctimpressionthat
Russiansoft-powerisbutathinveneermaskingtherealpolitikapproachwhichhas
411INSCOP,Barometrul–AdevaruldespreRomania:SimpatieTari[Barometer–TheTruthaboutRomania:SympathytowardsStates],March2016,availablefromhttp://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/INSCOP-raport-martie-2016_simpatie-tari.pdf[accessed23December2016].412INSCOP,Barometrul–AdevaruldespreRomania:DirectiaTarii,SursedeIngrijoraresiPerceptiaasupraVietii[Barometer–TheTruthaboutRomania:TheDirectionoftheCountry,CausesforConcernandPerceptionsoverLivelihood],November-December2015,http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Directia-sursele-de-ingrijorare-si-perceptia-asupra-vietii1.pdf[accessed23December2016].413Maior(2015),p.28.
162
characterisedtheKremlin’sforeignpolicy.Indeed,thisisnoticeableinthestate’s
policyofaimingforeconomicindependencefromRussia.AsMaiorpointsoutthat,
“althoughithastried,Russiawasprevented(…)fromacquiringstrategicsectorsof
Romanianindustry.Todaywearemuchbetterpreparedtodefendoursovereignty
againsttheseinfluencesanddangers.”414Intheenergysector,inparticular,Romania
hasmadeapointoutoflimitingRussianimports.AsInayehshows,itsintakeofRussian
gashadgonedownin2013toonly10%,from25%ayearearlier.415Additionally,asof
2016,RomaniaisthirdamongstEuropeanstatesintermsofitsinternalenergy
production–only17%ofitsrequiredenergyisimported,comparedtoover60%
averagedacrosstheEU.416
ThisistestimonytoRomanians’prerogativesofensuringindependencefromMoscow,
butalsoitssuspicionoffellowEUstateswhicharenotwaryofrelyingonRussian
resources.TheRomanianmediahaveincreasinglyfocusedonthefactthatseveral
EuropeanstateshavestrengthenedeconomiclinkswithRussia,andincreasedthe
continent’sdependenceonRussianenergyimports.Thisisonesuchevaluation:“many
statesfromwithintheEUhavebeenaccusedoverthelastfewyearsofmaintaining
dangerouslinkstoRussia,astheyhavesupportedenergysectorprojectswhichwould
deepenrelianceonthe‘GreatBear.’”417AdifferentsourcehighlightsRussianfinancial
supportforEuropeanextremistpartiesandthefactthat“formerpoliticiansareco-
opted,nottosaybought,toserveRussia’sinterestsandthoseofRussiancompanies
suchasGazprom.”418Thereis,therefore,awidespreadperceptionthatEUstatesare
eitherunawareorignorantoftheRussianthreat.IfRomania’sownrelativeeconomic
independencefromMoscowoffersitasignificantleverageintheirbilateralrelations,it
414Ibid.,p.31.415Inayeh(2015),p.40.416D.Ionascu,‘Romania,altreileastatcaindependentaenergeticadinUniuneaEuropeana.IubireafatadeRusiavinepeconducta[Romania,thethirdstateintheEuropeanUnionintermsofEnergyIndependence.LoveforRussiaFlowsDownthePipeline],’Adevarul,21.09.2016http://adevarul.ro/economie/stiri-economice/romania-treilea-stat-independenta-energetica-uniunea-europeana-iubirea-fata-rusia-vine-conducta-infografie-1_57e2b1065ab6550cb8dcd28f/index.html[accessed23December2016].417Ibid.418C.Campeanu,‘CumneaparamdeRusia[HowToDefendOurselvesfromRussia,]RomaniaLibera,4January2016,http://www.romanialibera.ro/politica/institutii/analiza--cum-ne-aparam-de-rusia-lui-putin--403565[accessed23December2016].
163
isacauseforconcernthatthealliesRomaniareliesonforsupporteitherhavea
diminishedcapacityorarenotwillingtopursueastrategyofdetachmentfromRussia.
Thefullextentofthisissue,however,isrevealedinthecontextofinternational
reactionstoRussia’sshiftfromwhatMaiorcalleda“hiddenwar”toa“phaseof
geopoliticalaggressiveness,markedbytheaccumulationofnewterritories.”419The
perceptionisthattheannexationofCrimeasignalledRussia’sreturntoanexpansionist
agenda.Anidentity-basedapproachmayshedlightonwhatthisdevelopmentmeans
forRomania.Itsstrategyhadbeenatwo-prongedapproachofensuringitsown
detachmentfromRussia,aswehaveseen,whilstsupportingthestrengtheningofties
betweentheEuropeanNeighbourhoodnextdoortoitandtheWesterncommunity.
ThisappliesnotonlytoUkraine,but,moreimportantly,totheRepublicofMoldova,a
statetowardswhichRomanianshaveanidentitaryaffinity.TheconflictinUkraine
thereforeexacerbatedRomaniananxietiesontwofronts–ontheonehand,the
annexationofCrimeahasmeantthatRomanianandRussianterritorialwatersarenow
adjacent.ThishasbroughtRussiatoanunpalatableproximitytotheRomanian
territory,asthenpresidentTraianBasescupointedout:“letusseewhatwillhappenin
Crimea,140milesfromtheRomaniancoastontheBlackSea,whichforafrigate
meansatenhourmarch.”420Ontheotherhand,thisdevelopmenthasraised
questionsastowhetherRussia’sagendahasfullybeenrevealed.Somehavesuggested
thatRussia’sultimatesecuritygoal“istocomeclosertothe‘mouthsoftheDanube,’”
highlightingthefactthat“thishasbeenahistoricendeavour,andtherecentexcessive
autonomistsignalsfromtheSouthoftheRepublicofMoldova(…)areclearsignsof
theactivemeasurespreparingforthisenterprise.”421Thishassevereimplicationsfor
Romania’sowninterestsintheRepublicofMoldova,thepro-Westerndirectionof
whichiscrucialinsecuringclosetiesbetweenBucharestandChisinau.
419Maior(2015),p.29.420PresidentialAdministration,‘DeclaraţiadepresăapreședinteluiRomâniei,domnulTraianBăsescu,inurmareuniuniiConsiliuluiEuropeanpetemasituațieidinUcraina[PressStatementofthePresidentofRomania,Mr.TraianBasescu,aftertheEuropeanCouncilMeetingontheSituationinUkraine],’MinistryofForeignAffairsPressCentre,(March2014)http://ue.mae.ro/local-news/958[accessed27December2016].421Maior(2015),p.30.
164
Asaresult,theconflictinUkraineisatthetopofRomania’sforeignpolicyworriesand
itsbehaviourtowardsRussiainthiscontextistellingofthematter’surgency.Romania
wasthefirststatetoqualifytheannexationofCrimeaasanactofaggressionagainst
Ukrainiansovereignty422andhas,sincethen,supportedthesendingofaidtoKievand
theimpositionofeconomicsanctionsagainstRussia.423Themainperceptionofthe
EU’sapproachtotheUkrainiancrisis,however,isthatithasnotbeencommittedto
counteringMoscow’sexpansionistpolicy.ThisviewissummarisedbyDanDungaciu,
presidentoftheBlackSeaUniversityFoundation(FUMN):“itisclearthatcertainEU
actorswishtolifteconomicsanctionsagainsttheRussianFederation,toresume
commercialrelationswithitandsaythatwarwithRussiaisnotworthit.”424Thisplaces
Romaniainadelicatepositionwhichincreasesitsvulnerability:“Romaniarisksto
remainisolated,nexttoPolandandtheBalticstates,betweenRussiaanditsEuropean
accomplices.”425Thereis,therefore,theperceptionofagrowinggapbetween
EuropeanstatesthatareacutelysensitivetoRussianexpansionism,andthosefor
whomfriendlyeconomicrelationswithMoscowtakeprecedenceoverensuring
EuropeanNeighbourhoodstability.
Thisdivergenceinthreatperceptionandinterestshasrevealedthedifficultiesofthe
EuropeanUnionwhichare,toanextent,inherentinitsnature,ofansweringthe
challengeposedbyRussianexpansionismtothestabilityandsecurityofEastern
Europe.Moreover,disagreementoverresponsestotheUkrainiancrisishasdrivena
wedgebetweenallieswithintheEU,threateninginternalharmonyandtheirfuture
cooperation.Inthiscontext,beingtheadvocateofahard-lineapproachtoRussia’s
behaviour,Romania,muchlikePolandandtheBalticstates,haveturnedtoNATOfor
support.SincetheannexationofCrimea,BucharesthaspushedforanincreasedNATO
422BasescuUkraineStatement(2014).423PresidentialAdministration,‘DeclaratiaDomnuluiPresedinteTraianBasescu,lafinalulReuniuniiConsiliuluiEuropeandelaBruxelles[StatementbyPresidentTraianBasescu,attheEndoftheEuropeanCouncilMeetinginBrussels],’MinistryofForeignAffairsPressCentre,(March2014)http://ue.mae.ro/local-news/963[accessed27December2016].424Dungaciu,D.,‘Interviu:Obataliestrategicafaraprecedent–investitiileamericane,maiimportantedecatscutuldelaDeveselu[Interview:AStrategicBattlewithoutPrecedent–AmericanInvestment,MoreImportantthantheDeveseluShield],’OraNoua,16.112016http://www.oranoua.ro/dan-dungaciu-o-batalie-strategica-fara-precedent-investitiile-americane-mai-importante-ca-scutul-de-la-deveselu/[accessed23December2016].425Campeanu(2016).
165
presenceintheEasternbufferzone.Onewouldarguethat,becauseofitstougher
stanceonRussia(comparedtotheEU)anditsmilitarycapability,NATO’sinvolvement
intheregionisbecomingincreasinglyvitaltotheachievementofRomania’sforeign
policygoals.UndertheprotectiveumbrellaoftheNorthAtlanticalliance,Romaniais,
forthefirsttimeinitsmodernhistory,abletoadoptaproactive,ratherthanpassive,
approachinthisrelationship.TheresistancedimensionoftheBesiegedFortressnow
takesadifferentform.Romania,alongsidePoland,isnowaccommodatingan
operationalballisticmissiledefencesystemand,atcurrentpresidentIohannis’
request,426aNATOForceIntegrationUnitandtheMultinationalDivisional
HeadquartersSouth-EastwereinauguratedinDecember2015.427NATOnaval
exercisesconductedinRomania’sterritorialwatersintheBlackSeahavebeen
increasinginnumber,notleastinresponsetosimilarRussianactivitiesaroundthe
CrimeanPeninsula.Finally,beyondits‘opendoors’policytowardsAmericanNATO
forces,RomaniahasstrengtheneditsbondswithitsregionalNATOallies–in
November2015,itco-hostedamini-summitinBucharest,bringingtogether
representativesofNATOmembersfromtheBalticstatesandEasternEurope.Theaim
was,accordingtotheRomanianForeignAffairsMinistry,tosenda“strongsolidarity
messagesupportingtheideathatthereisaneedtobolsterthecapabilityofthe
Alliancetorespondeffectivelytolong-termchallengesarisingfromdevelopments
generatedbythesecuritysituationintheEasternandSouthernNeighbourhood.”428
Overall,itisclearthatRomaniaisnotonlyfulfillingitscommitmentstowardsNATO,
buttakinginitiativeandengagingwithitsallies,bothinternationalandregional,in
combattingthesecuritycrisisitsensesbrewinginEasternEurope.
TothisbehaviourRussiahasrespondedinanaggressivefashion:inApril,aRussian
generaldeclared,referringtoPolandandRomania,that“nonnuclearpowerswhere
426I.Enache,‘RomaniavagazduiarmamentgreuAmerican:tancuri,artileriesialteechipamentemilitarevorfitrimiseintara[RomaniaWillHostAmericanHeavyArmament:Tanks,ArtilleryandOtherMilitaryEquipmentWillBeSenttoTheCountry],’Mediafax,23.06.2015http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/romania-va-gazdui-armament-greu-american-tancuri-artilerie-si-alte-echipamente-militare-vor-fi-trimise-in-tara-14490264[accessed13January2016].427NATO,”RomaniaCanCountonNATO”SaysSecretaryGeneralinBucharest,02.07.2015,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_121532.htm[accessed13January2016].428RomanianMinistryofForeignAffairs,BriefingofStateSecretaryforStrategicAffairsDanielIoniţăonResultsofMeetingofHeadsofStatefromCentralandEasternEurope,HeldinBuchareston4November2015–PressRelease,11.12.2015,http://www.mae.ro/en/node/34602[accessed13January2016].
166
missile-defenceinstallationsarebeinginstalledhavebecometheobjectsofpriority
response.”429ThecommanderoftheRussianStrategicRocketForceswenteven
furtherwhenhesuggestedthat“theevaluationofspecialistsshowsthattheAmerican
antimissilesystems(…)willnotbeabletowithstandanintenseattackbyRussian
strategicunits.”430ThistimeRomaniahasremainedsteadfast,notleastduetotheUS’s
assurancesofsupport–inresponsetoRussia’scomments,formerprime-minister
Pontaassertedthecountry’sposition:“Romaniacannotbeintimidatedwiththreats!
Theanti-missileShieldisfundamentaltoournationalandregionalsecurity.”431This
exchangetellsussomethingaboutRomania’sinterpretationofitsownstrategic
positionwithinNATO’sEasternflank,butalsothenewfootingfromwhichitmanages
itsrelationshipwithMoscow.AsNATOishardeningitslineindealingwithMoscow,
thisstateisabletoutilisetheframeworkofferedbytheNorth-Atlanticalliancein
ordertoalleviateitsownanxietiesconcerningMoscow,while,atthesametime,
increasingitsownprestigeasavaluableandproactivememberoftheorganisation.
BecomingthevanguardofNATO’sdefencelineagainstRussianexpansionismis,
perhaps,thenicheRomaniahasbeentryingtoestablishforitselfsinceaccession.
Inanycase,itscommitmenttothiscourseofactionisdictatednotonlybyalignment
tothedirectionpursuedbytheorganisation,butalsobyprerogativesemergingfrom
itsidentitynarrative,particularlythatofensuringitssecurityandindependencefrom
Russia.Insodoing,thepoliticalleadershipisreflectingthegeneralattitudeofthe
population:anINSCOPpollof2014showedthatnearlytwothirdsofRomanians
believethattheUkrainianconflictposedathreattotheircountry(64.4%)whilst69.7%
429Gen.ValeryGerasimov,citedinP.Sonne,‘RussiaThreatensNATOOverMissileShield,’TheWallStreetJournal,16.04.2015,http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-threatens-nato-over-missile-shield-1429185058[accessed13January2016].430M.Gen.SergeyKarakayev,citedinDraghici,‘RusiaavertizeazaRomania:“Sistemeleantirachetanuvorputearezistaunuiatacintens”[RussiaWarnsRomania:“MissileDefenceSystemsWillNotWithstandIntenseAttack”],’Gandul,16.12.2015,http://www.gandul.info/stiri/rusia-avertizeaza-romania-sistemele-antiracheta-nu-vor-putea-rezista-unui-atac-intens-14922084[accessed13January2016].431VictorPonta,citedinI.Bojan,‘AvertismentulRusieipentruPoloniasiRomania:Dacaleplacesafietinte,estealegerealor[‘Russia’sWarningtoPolandandRomania:IfTheyLikeBeingTargets,ItIsTheirChoice],’Mediafax,24.06.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/avertismentul-rusiei-pentru-polonia-si-romania-daca-le-place-sa-fie-tinte-este-alegerea-lor-reactia-lui-victor-ponta-14495363[accessed13January2016].
167
wouldsupportanincreaseinfundingfortheRomanianmilitaryinthiscontext.432
Romania’shard-lineapproachcannotbematchedbytheEU,firstlybecausethis
organisationdoesnotpossessthenecessaryinstrumentstocounterRussiaeffectively
(inRomania’sview),and,secondly,becauseithasbeenunabletounanimouslydecide
onthedirectionandmagnitudeofitsresponse.TheinternaltensionswithintheEUare
evidentinGermany’soppositiontotheEasternflank’srequestforanincreasedNATO
presenceintheregionexpressedduringthe2015mini-summit,“forfearof
exacerbatingtensionsbetweenRussiaandtheEU.”433However,thisthesiswould
suggestthat,regardlessofexternalpressuresfromtheWesternEuropeanUnion,and
atthedangerofaninternalriftbeingcreatedbetweenwhatDugincalled‘Old’and
‘NewEurope,’Romaniaisunlikelytoalterthisconfrontationaldirection,becauseof
theperceptionthattheonlymannerinwhichtotackleRussianexpansionismisto
respondinkindtoitshard-lineapproach–increasedmilitarisationisseenasthesole
viablecourseofaction.
Inthiscontext,Russo-Romanianrelationsareperhapsmoretensetodaythanthey
haveeverbeen,atleastsincethetimeCeausescuwasannouncinghisstate’s
oppositiontotheinvasionofCzechoslovakia.MoreorlessveiledthreatsfromMoscow
continuetoemergeandthesearewidelypublicised.AsrecentlyasDecember2016,
Agerpres(theRomaniannationalnewsagency)wascitingVladimirPutininhis
assessmentthatRussia’s“militarynuclearforcepotentialmustbestrengthened,first
ofallwiththehelpofrocketsystemscapableofguaranteeingthepiercingofcurrent
orfutureanti-ballisticmissileshields.”434Statementssuchasthis,however,willonly
cementRomania’sviewthattheEU’smoderateapproachtotheUkrainiancrisisisnot
432INSCOP,Barometrul–AdevaruldespreRomania:SimpatiecatreTari–SituatiadinUcraina[Barometer–theTruthaboutRomania:SympathyTowardsStates–theSituationinUkraine],February2015,http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/INSCOP-02.2014-Simpatie-tari-si-situatia-din-Ucraina.pdf[accessed24December2016].433I.AnghelandC.Hostiuc,‘SummitNATOlaBucuresti,esentialpentrusecuritateaEstului[NATOSummitinBucharest,EssentialtotheSecurityoftheEast],’ZiarulFinanciar,03.11.2015http://www.zf.ro/eveniment/summit-nato-la-bucuresti-esential-pentru-securitatea-estului-14871569[accessed13January2016].434PutincitedinS.Popescu,‘Retrospectiva:PoliticadeexternasisecuritateaRusiei2017[Retrospective:Russia’sForeignandSecurityPolicy2017],’Agerpres,23.12.2016,http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/12/23/retrospectiva-politica-externa-si-de-securitate-a-rusiei-in-2017-09-51-01[accessed23December2016].
168
fitforpurpose,andthattheonlyviableresponseistheproactivedirectionpursuedby
NATO.Inthecurrentstateoftheirrelationship,RomaniastillviewsRussiaasan
existentialthreatthroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortresstheme.Havingsaidthat,
whathaschangedisthepositionfromwhichRomanianegotiatesitsresponse:ifinthe
pastitsreactionconsistedofself-victimisationandwasfocusedondamagelimitation–
suchasaculturalrejectionofRussification–todayRomaniahasmorefreedomtoact,
andasignificantpublicmandatetodoso.
Astheseentrenchedbeliefsdrawnfromtheidentitynarrativebecomethedominant
influenceoverRomania’sbehaviourtowardsRussia,anxietiesoverthelatter’s
expansionismcanonlybealleviatedbythepursuitofaproactiveandaggressive
foreignpolicytowardsMoscow.However,ifthiscourseshouldbeacausefor
dissensionamongstitandfellowEUcolleagues,Romaniaiswillingtoincurthecost.As
thissectionhasshown,thestatehasbeencriticalofEUmemberstates’ambivalence
towardsRussia’sactions.AlthoughitremainsdedicatedtocooperationwiththeEUin
termsofextendingeconomicsanctions,itisclearthatRomaniaseesthesemeasures
asinsufficient.Moreimportantly,fromtheRomanianperspective,theEUis
underestimatingthethreatposedtoregionalstabilityandsecurity,andisprioritising
economicintereststoitscommitmenttowardstheEasternPartnership,bothofwhich
areplayingintoRussia’shands.WhatismostimportantisthefactthatRomaniahas
foundaroleforitself,bothwithintheEUandNATO.ThecriticismsleviedatRomania’s
lackofaclearforeignpolicydirectionsinceaccession,inthisperspective,nolonger
apply.Thecurrentinternationalclimateisassuchthattheopportunityandnecessity
havearisenforRomaniatoconstructanintelligibleandcoherentagendaoftackling
whatisperceivedasanexistentialthreattothestateandregion’sstabilityand
security.Moreover,astheprerogativesfromwhichthisagendaemergeareidentity-
based,andthereforesharedbybothelitesandthebroaderpublic,theresultisthat,
unlikeotherpolicies,thisdirectionispursuedconsistently.Tellingofthisfactisthat
Romaniahasneitherwaverednoraltereditspositionsince2014,althoughTraian
BasescuwasreplacedbythemoremoderateKlausIohannisaspresident,andthe
technocratDacianCioloshastakenoverfromsocialistVictorPontaasprime-minister.
AltogetherthismeansthatRomania’sforeignpolicyagendaisrootedinarationale
169
morecomplexthantraditionalFPAapproachesmightassume,asidentity-related
prerogativesarepowerfulmotivatorsforthisstate’saction.Itisthecasethatthe
nationalidentitynarrativeindeedplaysanimportantroleinshapingRomania’s
internationalbehaviour,anditsrelationshipwithMoscow.
FutureDirectionsforRusso-RomanianRelations
ThequestiononeshouldconsidernowiswhatthefuturemightholdforRusso-
Romanianrelationsandwhattheimpactofthisinteractionmightmeaninthebroader
contextofregionalstability.Therearetwospecificareasofinterestinregardstothe
relationshipbetweenBucharestandMoscow,bothofwhichhavebroader
repercussionsintermsofRomania’sperceptionsofitsEuropeanalliesanditsrole
withintheEUandNATO:thefirstisthelevelofRussianinvolvementintheaffairsof
thecontinentand,asacorollary,theviewthatmanyEuropeanstatesareexhibitinga
Russia-friendlyattitude;thesecondconcernsRussia’sownactionsandforeignpolicy
agenda.BothoftheseareascauseanincreaseinthreatperceptionsregardingRussia
andtheaugmentationofthethemeofBesiegedFortress.Thatisbecausetheexternal
risktoRomania’ssecurityposedbyMoscowisnowdoubledbydissentand
ambivalencetowardsthisactorfromwithintheEuropeancommunity.
Thefirstdimensionconcernstheperceptiondiscussedearlier,thatRussiahasaimedto
entrenchthecontinent’srelianceonitsresources,therebyforcingamoremoderate
responsefromtheEUonitscampaigninUkraine.Thisiscoupledwiththeriseto
powerofpoliticiansmoreamenabletowardstheKremlininvariousEUstates,whichis
alsoseenaspartRussia’sstrategyor,attheveryleast,asplayingintoit.Thisviewis
summarisedbyMaiorwhoarguesthatRussiahasemployedtacticswhichseekto
“feednationalistoptionshostiletoliberaldemocracy(Hungary)(…)doubled,evidently,
bymeasuresaimedatestablishinganeconomicdependence.”435Amongstthestates
whichareexhibitingpro-RussianattitudesorcloseeconomiclinkswithMoscow,the
nationalnewspaperRomanianLibera(FreeRomania)citesGermany,Greece,Italy,
Hungary,theCzechRepublic,Slovakia,AustriaandFrance.436Altogetherthese
435Maior(2015),p.27.436Campeanu(2016).
170
examplesbuildapictureofatrendinEuropeanpoliticsinwhichRussiaisnolonger,or
toalesserextent,beingviewedasasignificantthreat.Dungaciusummarisesthiswhen
hearguesthat“thereisatendencyintheEuropeanspace[toadoptamoremoderate
approachtowardsRussia]towhich,slowly,moreandmoreforcesarerallying.”437For
Romania,thisdevelopmentaugmentstheanxietiessubscribedtothethemeof
BesiegedFortress.TheperceptionisthatEuropeisbeingattackedfromwithin,andthe
riftthatisgrowingbetweenstateswithdifferentlevelsofthreatperception
concerningtheKremlinisthreateningtheinternalstabilityoftheEUandNATO,aswell
astheircapacitytocurbRussianexpansionism.
ThescenariowhichemergesfromthisviewisthatEuropewillbecomeastrategic
battlefieldbetweenproandanti-Russianpositionswhichwilldecidethedirectionand
breadthoffutureRussianexpansionsofitssphereofinfluence:“itisclearthatthe
RussianFederationwillaimtowinbackcertainareasofinfluence,andtomakecertain
thatthe(…)Westernfrontdoesnotadvancetowardsit.Thatwillbethebattle.”438
Fromanidentitary-basedperspective,onewouldsuggestthat,inthisinternalstruggle,
Romaniaislikelytoremainresoluteinitsstanceashard-liner.Thatisbecausean
exacerbationofitsperceptionsasBesiegedFortress,increasinglyisolatedinits
proactiveapproach,canonlybeansweredbysteadfastresistance.Externalpressures
fromitsEuropeanalliesareunlikelytobesufficienttocausearetreatofthese
anxieties,whichareextremelyheightened.Instead,Romaniawillprobablycontinueits
strategyofensuringeconomicindependencefromMoscow.Intermsofitsalliances,it
willlikelyfocusonpartnershipswiththoseforceswhichhavebeenunequivocalintheir
stanceonRussianexpansionism–PolandandtheBalticstates,ontheEasternflank,
andtheUSA.ThisviewissharedbyMaior,whoarguesthat“thecompleteinternal
consolidationonalllevels–political,military,economic–doubledbythe
strengtheningofcooperationframeworksintheareaofnationalandEuro-Atlantic
security,istheonlyscenarioinwhichwecanbuiltadialoguewithRussiainterms
dignifiedforus.”439WhatisclearisthatRomaniawillaimtoremainanimportantactor
437DungaciuforOraNoua(2016).438Ibid.439Maior(2015),p.33.
171
ontheEasternflankandharnessitsstrategicpositiontoensureincreasedNATO
presenceinitsterritory,andcloseinteractionwithitslikemindedallies.However,for
boththeinternalcohesionoftheEuropeanUnion,aswellasforRusso-Romanian
relations,thismaycauseadditionalstrain.Despitethis,Romaniaiscompelledbyits
identitaryprerogativesrelatedtothesecurityofthestatetopursuesuchadirection,
costsnotwithstanding.HowthistypeofcoursemightaffectregionalstabilityandEast-
Westrelationsmorebroadlyremainstobeseen.
IfthefirstissueconcernedRussia’sthreattoRomania’ssecurityviainterferenceinthe
affairsoftheEuropeancommunity,thesecondreflectsRomania’sanxietiestowards
Russia’sactionsinUkraineasarisktoanotherofitsforeignpolicypriorities,thepro-
WesternfutureoftheRepublicofMoldova.TheperceptionisthatRussia’sagenda
maycontainplansforfutureenlargementofRussia’ssphereofinfluence.Inconcrete
terms,themainfearreferstothepotentialpushfromtheKremlinforafederalisation
ofUkraine.ThisviewwasexpressedbyformerpresidentBasescuin2014:“in
Romania’sopinion,theobjectiveoftheRussianFederationis,firstly,thefederalisation
ofUkraine.(…)ItisclearthatRussiawantsadestabilisationofUkraineinordertogain
controloverit,completely,orpartially.”440Beyondthefactthatthisdevelopment
wouldbringtheRussianspheretoRomania’sborders,aconnectionisimmediately
madebetweenthesituationinUkraineandtheoneintheRepublicofMoldova,its
EstrangedSelf.
Similarly,MoldovahasitsownfrozenconflictwitharegiondominatedbyRussian
speakers–Transnistria.Inthiscontext,anymoveagainstthesovereigntyofUkraine
maysnowballintoathreattotheindependenceoftheRepublicofMoldova,a
relationshipwhichRomaniaprioritises.Inasense,theprerogativeforsecurityand
distancefromMoscowisextendedbyRomaniatoMoldovabecauseoftheirperceived
identitarysameness.Asacorollary,theanxietiesinherenttotheBesiegedFortressare
440Hotnews,‘TraianBasescu:RussiadorestefederalizareaUcrainei/UnuldintreobiectiveurmarestecateritoriulcontrolatdeRusiasaajungapanalabratulChilia,vecheafrontieraaRomanieicuURSS[TraianBasescu:RussiaWantstheFederalisationofUkraine/OneoftheObjectivesisthatRussianControlledTerritoryWouldReachtheChiliaArm,Romania’sOldFrontierwiththeUSSR],’13.05.2014,http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-17246835-ora-18-30-traian-basescu-sustine-declaratie-presa.htm[accessed23December2016].
172
alsoprojectedontothisstate.AsDungaciusummarises,“anyfederalisationofthe
UkrainewillgiveideasthattheconflictinTransnistriamayalsoberesolvedthrough
federalisation(…).IamafraidthisiswhatisinstorefortheRepublicofMoldova.”441
ThefactthatRomaniahasintensifieditssupportfortheRepublicofMoldova,both
throughNATO442butalsointheirbilateralrelations-ithas,forinstance,begun
supplyingitwithgasinorderto“alleviateitsdependenceonRussia”443-speaksto
concernsoveritsfuture.Romaniaisundoubtedlyawarethatthiscourseofactionwill
antagoniseRussiabeyondsimplytheissueofintensifyingNATOpresenceintheregion.
AsCampeanupointsout:“Romaniawillbeputinthefiringlineifitdoesnotwishto
seeMoldovabecomeaRussianexclave.”444Havingsaidthat,becauseoftheidentitary
affinitywithChisinau,RomaniaviewsMoldovaasanotherBesiegedFortressanditself
ashavingadutytointervene.Asaresult,theriskoffurtherantagonisingRussiais
insufficienttoforceRomaniatodivertfromthiscourse.
Itis,however,onthemannerinwhichRomaniamightbestaidMoldovathatissues
mightariseintheRomanian-Americanpartnership.Specifically,overthelasttwo
years,thenotionthataprecipitationofthesituationinUkrainewhichwoulddirectly
threatenMoldova’sindependencemightbeansweredbyanadhocunification
betweenRomaniaanditseasternneighbourisgatheringimpetus.Althoughthis
matterwillbediscussedatlengthinthechapterdedicatedtoRomanian-Moldovan
relations,sufficeittosayfornowthatsuchadevelopmentisconsideredaplausible
441DanDungaciucitedinFundatiaUniversitaraaMariiNegre[BlackSeaUniversityFoundation](viaRealitateaTV),DanDungaciu:‘RusiavaincepeoofensivadiplomaticanemiloasainUcraina.’CeriscaMoldova[DanDungaciu:‘RussiaWillBeginaRuthlessDiplomaticOffensiveintheUkraine.’TheRisksforMoldova],25.03.2016,http://fumn.eu/en/dan-dungaciu-rusia-va-incepe-o-ofensiva-diplomatica-nemiloasa-in-ucraina-ce-risca-r-moldova-video/[accessed07April2016].442RomaniahasbeenanactivesupporterofMoldova’sincreasedcooperationwithNATOandtheEU.Tothisend,aftertheNATOsummitinWarsawearlierthisyear,presidentIohannisemphasisedhiscommitmenttotheEasternPartnershipandhailedthe“inclusion,forthefirsttimeinaNATOSummitFinalStatement,asaresultofourundertaking,adistinctparagraphreferringtotheRepublicofMoldova.”(Iohannis,citedinPresidentialAdministration,‘DeclaratiadepresaaPresedinteluiRomaniei,domnulKlausIohannis,sustinutalafinalulSummituluiNATOdelaVarsovia[PressStatementfromtheRomanianPresident,Mr.KlausIohannis,GivenattheEndofNATOSummitinWarsaw],’09.07.2016,http://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/declaratia-de-presa-a-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-sustinuta-la-finalul-summitului-nato-de-la-varsovia[accessed28December2016].)443Innayeh(2015),p.41.444Campeanu(2016).
173
scenarioevenbyKlausIohannis,withtheimportantcaveatthatitisalong-termplan
andTransnistriacannotformpartofthedeal.445Evenso,onewouldargue,thisevent
wouldposeasignificantchallengetobothRomania’salliesandRussiaintermsof
responseandmayfurthercomplicateNATO-Russianrelations.Whatisclearisthat
Romania’scommitmenttotheRepublicofMoldova,basedontheiridentitaryaffinity
andtheportrayalofMoldovaasanEstrangedOther,farsurpassesthatofitsallies.
PerceptionsoveraMoldovaunderthreatfromRussiawouldrequiresometypeof
response,butthemilitaryoptionis,bothpragmaticallyandforreasonstodowith
Romania’sanxietiesoverengagingRussia,unlikely.Inthissituation,unificationwould
beaplausibleandpublicallymandatedcourseofaction–atthemomentaround70%
ofRomanianssupportit.446Itisclear,however,thatRussiawouldviewitasanattack
onitssphereofinfluenceand,equally,Americawouldbeunlikelytofavoursucha
solution.ThiswasmadeclearrecentlywhentheAmericanambassadortoChisinau
expressedhisopinionthatunificationbetweenRomaniaandMoldovawouldnotbe
practicalorresolveMoldova’ssituation.447Inresponse,however,theRomanian
Senateadoptedanofficialreplywhichqualifiedthestatementas“surprisingand
worrisome,aswellasreceivedwithlackofsatisfactionbypublicopinionin
Romania.”448Overall,itisclearthatitisinthisissuemorethananyotherthatcracks
mayappearinRomanian-Americanrelations.
WhatRussia’sreactionmaybetoaMoldo-Romanianunificationisdifficulttopredict–
attheveryleastitcouldleadtoacompletebreakdownofdiplomaticdialogue
betweenBucharestandMoscow.Thefactthatthisscenarioisevencontemplatedby
Romania,meanwhile,tellsussomethingofRomania’sconcernsoverthefutureand
445Iohannis,citedinF.Peia,‘Iohannis:OunirecuBasarabiaesteposibila,darnuinviitorulapropriat[Iohannis:UnificationwithBessarabiaisPossible,butNotintheNearFuture],’Agerpres,09.11.2016.http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/11/09/iohannis-o-unire-cu-basarabia-este-posibila-dar-nu-in-viitorul-apropiat-21-11-10[accessed10November2016].446INSCOP,‘Barometru–AdevaruldespreRomania:RepublicaMoldova[Barometer–TheTruthaboutRomania:TheRepublicofMoldova],’July2015,http://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/INSCOP-07.2015-Republica-Moldova.pdf[accessed23December2016].447A.M.Luca,‘RomanianSenateAdoptsOfficialReplytoUSAmbassadorPettit’sStatementsonMoldova,’Agerpres–EnglishVersion,20.09.2016,http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2016/09/20/romanian-senate-adopts-official-reply-to-us-ambassador-pettit-s-statements-on-moldova-13-07-00[accessed28December2016].448Ibid.
174
howitconsiderspositioningitselfvis-à-visRussia.Fromthisperspective,itisunlikely
thatthequalityofRomanian-Russianrelationswillimprove,butforareverseofcourse
bytheKremlin.AprecipitationoftheUkrainiancrisis,conversely,wouldposea
significantchallengetothestabilityandthesecurityoftheregion,andRomania’s
responsemayaugmentthesituation.Inanycase,itisclearthatBucharest’soutlookis
oneconcernedwithsatisfyingtheprerogativeofstatesecurity,bothofitselfandthe
RepublicofMoldova.Inordertoachievethis,onewouldarguethatitwillsacrificeits
diplomaticrelationswithRussiaandalignitselfwiththehard-lineapproachpursuedby
NATO.Havingsaidthat,weretheRepublicofMoldovatocomeunderdirectphysical
threat,itsownnationalinterest,rootedinasenseofsharedidentitywiththeeastern
neighbour,wouldpotentiallysupersedeitscommitmenttoNATO.Inthissituation,all
therelationshipsmentioned,betweenRomaniaandRussia,NATOandRussiaand
NATOandRomania,wouldcomeunderseverestrainandtherepercussionsofa
unificationofRomaniaandMoldovamayfurtherdestabilisethefragileequilibrium
whichexistsinEasternEuropeatthemoment.
Conclusion
Overall,thischapterhasexploredthenatureofRomania’srelationshipwithRussia,
fromtheperspectiveofRomania’snationalidentitynarrative.Thisapproachsheds
lightonthemannerinwhichentrechedportrayalsoftheSelfandRussianOtherhave
resultedinawidespreadandenduringsenseofanxiety,suspicionandfearconcerning
Russia’sactions.Workingfromthisangle,themannerinwhichtheseattitudeshave
influencedRusso-Romanianrelationssince1989becomesapparent.Intermsofthe
mainresearchquestion,theyhavefedintoRomania’sforeignpolicyagendabysetting
distancefromMoscowasapriorityandcloserelationswithitasared-line.Russia
continuedtobeseenasathreateningOtherthroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortress
themethroughouttransitionandthisaccountsforthestate’sambivalencein
negotiatingthisrelationship.Furthermore,recentdevelopmentsbothwithintheEU
andinUkrainehaveconfirmed,inasense,Romania’sportrayalofRussiaandhaveled
toanaugmentationofthethreatperceptionovertheprerogativeofsecuritynotjust
ofitself,butalsoofitsEstrangedSelf,Moldova.Undertheprotectiveumbrellaoffered
175
byNATO,resistance,Romania’straditionalreactiontothesenseofbesiegement,now
takesadifferentform,thatofahard-lineapproachtocurbingRussianexpansionism.
Romania’scurrentpatternofbehaviourtowardsRussiafollowsthisparticular
rationale,onemotivatedbyidentity-basedprerogativesandmadepossiblebythe
state’sstrategicposition.Itis,inasense,theexacerbationofidentitaryanxietiesthat
havemadeRomaniaassumearoleofgreaterresponsibilityintheregionandallowed
ittofinditsfootingwithintheEUandNATO.Inthisvein,theutilityofstudyingthe
behaviourofasmallstateisrevealed,asRomaniahasshownitselfcapableandwilling
topursueitsowngoals,informedbyitsuniqueidentitynarrative.Havingsaidthat,
beingastateofstrategicsignificanceinanenvironmentinfragileequilibriummeans
thatRomania’srelationshipwithRussiahasabearingonthewholeandnotjustits
constitutiveparts.Whetheranormalisationofrelationsispossibleiscontingentonthe
retreatoftheseidentitaryanxietiesandthereforerestsonRussia’sfuturebehaviour
and,ofcourse,Romanians’perceptionofit.Inanycase,thesecurityofthestateand,
asacorollary,thatoftheRepublicofMoldova’s,willlikelycontinuetobethemain
identity-basedprerogativemotivatingRomania’sownactionstowardsRussia.
176
Chapter6.Romania’sRelationshipwithHungary–Managinga
LegacyofaThousandYearsofConflictandDiscord
Atruemotherwillneverconsoleherselfwiththedismembermentofachild,(...).ForusTransylvaniacannotexist
butwhole,partofourbody.Forothers,sheonlyrepresentshistoricalambitionsorfeudalcastlesbuiltonthesweatof
generationsofRomanianslaves.Forusshemeanseverything:past,present,futureornon-existence.Wedidnotcomefrom
anywhere;wewerebegot,bornandraisedoutoftheTransylvanianland.449
Introduction
ThischapteranalyseshowenduringbeliefsemergingfromtheRomanianidentity
narrativehaveinfluencedthestate’sbehaviourtowardsitswesternneighbour,
Hungary.Firstly,asectionisdedicatedtothemannerinwhichtheHungarianOther
hasbeenportrayedwithintheidentitynarrativeandhowthehistoricalnarrativehas
reinforcedtheimageofHungaryasanessentialthreattotheRomanianstate.The
argumentisthattheconsistentandpredominantrepresentationofHungaryasa
threathasresulted,similarlytoRussia,inanattitudeofdistrustandanxiety,hereover
territorialintegrityandsovereignty.ThisperceptionisaugmentedasHungaryisseen
asbothanexternal,butalsointernalOther,becauseofthesignificantMagyarminority
inTransylvania.ThefollowingsectioncoversHungarian-Romanianrelationsduringthe
transitionperiod,withafocusonthedifficultiesofreachingagreementonaPrincipal
Treaty.ThechallengesarearguedtohavebeenrootedinRomania’srejectionofthe
notionofgrouprightsfortheHungarianminorityasmuchasinbeliefsthatany
concessionstotheHungariancausemayleadtoterritorialrevisionism,bothofwhich
areconnectedtotheafore-mentionedidentitaryanxieties.However,thissectionalso
addressestheimprovementofHungarian-Romanianrelationsintheaftermathof
leadershipchangesinbothstates,whichledtoaretreatofanxietiesandallowedfor
anunprecedentedlevelofpoliticalandeconomiccooperation.Inthebackground
however,itisarguedthattraditionalsuspicionsofHungaryenduredatthesocietal
449L.Rebreanu(1941,reprinted1977),p.208.
177
level.Followingonfromthis,thechapterdiscussesthecurrentsituationofrelations
betweenBucharestandBudapest.ItexplorestheinfluenceofViktorOrban’snew
nationalistdirectionandeasternshiftwhicharearguedtohaveledtoare-emergence
andaugmentationofanxietiesconcerningRomania’sterritorialintegrityand
sovereignty.Therelationshipbetweenthetwostatesisrevealedtohavesuffered
significantlyinthiscontext,asdoubtsareraisedoverHungary’srespectofRomania’s
sovereignty,butalsoitscommitmenttowardsitsWesternallies.ThetheoryofTrojan
HorseHungary,asapro-RussiandestabilisingforcewithintheEUandNATOis
presented.Thechapterendswithapredictionthatbilateralrelationsbetweenthetwo
statesarelikelytocontinuetocool,asthereislittleindicationthatBudapestwill
changeitsforeignpolicydirection.Additionally,thepotentialrepercussionsofan
Eastern-leaningHungaryinthecontextofanincreasinglyfragileequilibriumbetween
pro-Russianandpro-WesternattitudeswithinEuropeisexploredinreferenceto
severalscenariosbeingconsideredinRomania.Themostworryingconcernsthe
West’s–andthereforeRomania’s–inabilitytocounterRussia’sattemptsatexpanding
itssphereofinfluenceasaresultofinternaldiscordandHungary’spotentialbenefits
fromsuchdevelopments.Theargumentofthischapteristhatprofoundbeliefsabout
thenatureoftheRomanianSelfandHungarianOtherarecriticaltounderstandingthe
relationshipbetweenthetwoactors,particularlyinthecurrentclimateofuncertainty.
Romania’sIdentityDrivenAttitudetowardsHungary–DistrustandAnxietyover
TerritorialIntegrityandSovereignty
MuchlikeRussia,HungaryoccupiesaspecificplaceintheRomanianimaginary.
Romania’sbehaviourtowardsitswesternneighbourissimilarlyinformedbyattitudes
rootedintheportrayaloftheSelfandOther.Additionally,asaresultoftheirhistorical
interactionandthemannerinwhichthesehavebeentranslatedintheidentity
narrative,bothHungaryandRussiahaveemergedasessentialthreateningOthers.
However,therearesomeimportantdifferencesbetweenRussiaandHungary,bothin
termsoftheirstatusandtheirpositioningvis-à-visRomania.Firstly,Hungaryisnota
super-power.AsBoiarightlypointsout:“sheispaintedasagreatpower–which,
obviously,itisnot–capableofsurmountingRomania,twoandahalftimesitssizeand
178
population.”450Inotherwords,onewouldnotexpectforRomania’straditionalanxiety
rootedinitssmall-stateconditiontomanifestinitsrelationswithHungary.Secondly,
theperceivedantagonismandconflictofinterestwithRussiaover,forinstance,the
RepublicofMoldova,shouldnotapplyinthissecondrelationship,asHungary’spost-
socialistforeignpolicydirectionhasmirroredRomania’sown.AccessiontotheEUand
NATOwereHungary’sprimarygoalsalsoandthetwoarenowpartnersandalliesin
thetwoorganisations.ItitnonethelessthecasethatHungaryisviewedasan
“hereditaryenemy.”451
Theidentitaryperspectiveemployedbythisprojectmayshedlightonthereasons
behindthisperception.Specifically,onewouldarguetheylie,firstly,inthecontinuity
ofthehistoricalandidentitynarratives,whichhaveledtothesedimentationofa
particularimageoftheHungarianOther.EquallyimportantistheextentofHungary’s
involvementintheaffairsoftheRomanianprovinces,andlater,theRomanianstate.
WhatdifferentiatestheportrayalofHungaryfromthatofRussiaisthefactthatthe
formerplaysaroleinallthethreemajorthemesoftheRomanianidentitynarrative.
HungaryentersRomanianhistoryataformativestageofthethreeprovinces,andtheir
relationshipis,fromtheverybeginning,conflictual.AssuchtheFoundationMythsare
meanttoemphasisethesharpcontrastbetweenSelfandHungarianOther,noticeable
inthedifferentoriginsofthetwopeoples–Latinversusnon-European–theirreligious
affiliation–bornintoEasternChristianityversusCatholicconverts–and,thedispute
overtheircommonhabitus–theownershipofTransylvania.Thislastelement,of
course,feedsintothethemeoftheBesiegedFortress;aswasexploredinChapter3,
duringtheMiddleAgesTransylvanianRomanianswereoppressedanddeniedpolitical
rights.InTransylvania,therefore,Romaniansweresubjugatedandheldcaptiveintheir
ownterritory,victimsoftheexpansionismofthemorepowerfulHungarianOther.
Consequently,theregionholdsasymbolicsignificanceinHungarian-Romanian
relations,asDutceac-Segestennotes:“mythsofterritorysuchasTransylvania(…)are
commoningrandnarrativesofnationsasplacesofsacredorigin,wherethevirtues
450Boia(2011)p.279.451Ibid.p.255.
179
andpurityofthenationalsoularesafeguarded.”452ThisispreciselyhowtheRomanian
historicalnarrativehasportrayedthesituationofTransylvanianRomaniansintheir
relationtotherulingHungarians.
Evenmoreimportantly,theplightofTransylvaniaasanunjustly-occupiedRomanian
territoryisextrapolatedtotheentireRomanianpeoplewithinthethemeofUnity.In
modernity,Transylvania,alongsideBessarabia,becomesthekeystoneoftheRomanian
nationalproject,andtheperceptionthatRomanianswithintheseterritoriesare
persecutedandpreventedfromunifyingdoesnothingbutexacerbatetheSelf-Other
contrast.WhenTransylvaniafinallyjoinsRomaniaintheaftermathoftheFirstWorld
War–see[Figure4],thegrandunificationisseenasavictoryofRomaniansagainst
themorepowerfulHungarianOther.However,theissueofownershipofTransylvania
isyetunsettled,asHungaryoccupiedthenorth-westoftheregionin1940–see
[Figure5].AlthoughthisterritorywasreturnedattheendoftheSecondWorldWar,
thiscementedinRomanianstheviewthatTransylvaniaremainsacontestedterritory,
andthatHungaryrepresentsaninherentthreattothephysicalintegrityofthestate.
ThisexplainstheperpetuationoftheimageofHungaryalongthesamelinesasbefore
1918.AsBoiapointsout,despitethefactthatHungaryisnolongeragreatpower,
“Transylvania(…)appearsasanamorphousentity,susceptibletobeextractedfrom
theRomaniannationalensemble.”453
TheviewthatHungaryhasbeenaconquerorandoppressoroftheRomanianpeople
is,therefore,historicallyenduringandwidelyaccepted.Equally,theperceptionisthat
shehasalsobeenanobstacletotheachievementofunityandindependence,the
mainidentity-drivengoalofthemodernperiod.Finally,Hungary’sdominionover
Transylvaniahashadanotherimportantconsequence,whichisthefinalfacetof
Romanian-Hungarianantagonism:alargeHungarianminorityonRomanianterritory.
ThefactthattheHungarianOtherisbothwithinandwithoutRomaniahashadan
impactonboththeportrayaloftheSelfandoftheOther.Inregardstotheformer,as
Fischer-Galatihaspointedout,theroleofthestatewastoprovide“aterritorialand
452Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.183.453Boia(2011),p.279.
180
psychologicalframework”inwhichRomanianscould“solveofteninsolubleand
unsurmountableproblemsenfamille.”454Inotherwords,thewholepointof
establishingaRomanianstatewasthatitwouldbeanation-state,aninstrumentfor
theprotectionanddevelopmentoftheRomanianethnicelement.Asaresult,the
Hungarianminority,asanOther,cannotbutbetreatedwithsuspicion,asintruders
intothenationalspace,asBoiapointsout:therelationshipbetweenRomaniansand
Hungarianswascharacterisedby“frustrationanddistrust.(…)TheywereallRomanian
citizens,butthespiritualdistinctionbetweenRomaniansandothersremained.”455This
viewwasonlyexacerbatedduringcommunism,whentheemphasisonnationalunity
andtheexceptionalismoftheRomaniancharacterled,ashasbeenpreviously
explored,toasharpeningoftheSelf-Othercontrast.
Overall,thehistoricalandidentitynarrativehaveconsistentlyportrayedtheHungarian
OtherasathreattoRomaniansand,throughmanyofitsownactions,Hungaryhas
confirmedandhelpedperpetuatethisview.TheperceptionthatneitherHungarians
withinnorwithouttheRomanianterritoryhaverenouncedtheirrightofownershipof
Transylvaniaisattherootoftheantagonismbetweenthetwostates.Inthis
Romaniansfeelboththeunityandintegrityoftheirstateatrisk.Additionally,thefact
thattheexistenceofaHungarianminoritywithintheirbordersoffersBudapesta
reasontointerfereintheaffairsoftheRomanianstateisalsoseenasathreattoits
sovereignty,ashasbeenexploredinChapter4.Allofthesefactorstakentogether
explainwhyHungarycontinuestooccupysuchanimportantplaceintheRomanian
imaginary,throughthelensoftheBesiegedFortress.Ultimately,thisimageofHungary
hastranslatedintoaconsistentattitudeofdistrustandsuspiciontowardsthe
motivationsbehindthisactor’sbehaviour,andanxietiesoverthestate’s‘true’
intentionsregardingTransylvania.Thisisevidentatasocietallevel,where,asofMarch
2016,54.3%ofthepopulationhadnegativefeelingstowardsHungary.456AsBoia
argues,whereHungaryisconcerned,“extremeopinionsreachmythicalproportions
andtheintensityofapsychosis,”457reflectingperceptionsofHungaryasanexistential
454Fischer-Galati(1970),p.9.455Boia(2012),pp.97-98.456INSCOP(March2016).457Boia(2011),p.278.
181
threattotheRomanianstate.Dutceac-Segestenmeanwhilebelievesthatdisputeover
Transylvania,oratleasttheperceptionofit,“makesalmostimpossiblethepresence
ofpositivestoriesaboutcohabitationandgivesbirthtomanystereotypes.”458
Althoughpowerfulanxietiesdonotremovethepossibilityofinter-statecooperation
altogether,thefollowingsectionwillshowthatRomania’sbehaviourtowardsHungary,
particularlyintermsofsensitivitytoitsrhetoricandtheconnectionitseekstobuild
withitsdiaspora,isprofoundlyinfluencedbytheseattitudes.
Hungarian-RomanianRelationsDuringtheTransitionPeriod
AsChapter4hasalreadypointedout,thetransitionperiodposeddifficultchallenges
forRomaniaintermsofnegotiatingitscommunistpastaswellasitsregimeand
population’sgeneralresistancetochange.Itisinthiscontextthatrelationsbetween
BucharestandBudapestduringthistimeshouldbeunderstood.Specifically,
rapprochementbetweenthetwostateshadtobeachievedagainstthebackdropof
decadesofnationalistpropagandaandanarrativeonidentitywhichemphasised
RomanianexceptionalismandthethemeofUnity.Fromthis,wehaveseen,wasborna
policyofassimilationofand/ordiscriminationagainsttheHungarianminoritywhich
alienatedthecommunityfromthemajorityofthepopulation.AlthoughHungaryhad
fewavenuestoinfluenceRomaniandomesticaffairsduringtheColdWar,bythelate
1980stheissuehademergedasaprominentdiscussiontopic,“withcriticismtowards
Ceausescu’sregimebecom[ing]frequentandmoreimportantlypublicinHungary.”459
Itwasevidentthatintheaftermathoftherevolution,theminorityquestionwould
becomeacontentionpointbetweenthetwostates.
Identity-drivenattitudes,bothinwhatconcernstheportrayaloftheSelfandOther,
playedamajorpartinthedebateovertheminorityquestion.Hungarianswereasking
foracompletereversaloftheassimilationpolicyandthelegislatingonbasiccollective
rightsprotectingtheirculturalconnectiontoHungary,butalsoguaranteesthat,as
Hungarianethnics,theywouldbeintegratedintoRomaniansociety.Someofthese
propositionsdidnotrepresentanissue–thegovernmentwasquicktoallowforseats
458Dutceac-Segesten(2011),p.223.459KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.303.
182
inthelowerchamberofparliamenttobeawardedtominoritygroups,Hungarians
included.460Indeednegotiationonaresolutionoftheminorityquestionwere
conductedwiththeDemocraticUnionofHungariansinRomania(UDMR,)the
community’sofficialpoliticalplatform.ForRomanians,however,thereexistsavery
importantdistinctionbetweenpoliticalintegrationandallowingfortheproliferationof
Hungarianculturalelementswithinitsnationalterritory.AsGallagherargued,the
“politicalagendaofminorityrightsandculturalautonomychallengessomeofthecore
valuesoftheRomanianstate.”461IssuesarosewhenHungariansmadedemands
includingfortheestablishmentofaHungarianconsulateinthecityofCluj
(Transylvania),Hungarian-languageuniversitiesandculturalcentreswithbooksand
otherresourcesinthemothertongue.462Thevaluesunderthreathereconcernthe
viewthatRomaniawasanationalstate,withasingleofficiallanguage(Romanian),and
inwhichnodiscriminationonbasisofethnicitywaspermissible.Inthiscase,itwas
thoughtthatofficialminoritygrouprightswoulddiscriminateagainstthemajorityof
thepopulation,asdiscussedinChapter4.Therefore,severalprinciplesontheUDMR’s
agenda,suchas“therecognitionofHungarianminorityasa‘constitutivefactor’ofthe
Romanianstateaswellasbeingan‘independentpoliticalsubject’”463weremade
impossible.
Behindtheseworries,however,wastheever-presentquestionregardingTransylvania.
TheperceptionwasthatanyconversationonenhancedrightsfortheHungarian
minoritywouldleadtocompromisesonterritorialautonomy,andeventuallythe
breakupofthestate:“someRomanianpoliticiansmaintainedthatthediscussionon
minorityrightswasapretextforterritorialrevisionism.”464Theanxietyovermaking
concessionsonautonomy,whetherculturalorpolitical,issummarisedwellby
Turnock:“Hungarianseverywherehaveanunderstandablesenseofnostalgiaforthe
territorialarrangementspre-1918whichRomanianscanscarcelyacknowledgeasa
historicalfactforfearofofferingsomeconcessionsoversovereignty.”465Theissueis
460Roper(2000),pp.113-114.461Gallagher(1998),p.115.462Roper(2000),p.114.463KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.307.464Roper(2000),p.116.465Turnock(2001),p.122.
183
thattheminorityquestionconcernednotonlyHungarianswithinRomania,butalso
theirkin-state.TheperceptionthatHungaryhadnotaltogetherrenounceditsclaim
overTransylvania,coupledwiththedemandsoftheHungarianminority,ledmanyto
believethattherewasaconcertedeffortbythisOthertoundermineRomanian
sovereigntyandthreatenitsterritorialintegrity.AsDragomanargued:““theHungarian
communitywaslargelysuspectedofdisloyaltyandevenofplottingTransylvania’s
secession.”466TheobviousconnectionbetweenthepoliticalarmoftheHungarian
community,theUDMR,andBudapestwasalsorecognised,asthelatterhadbeen
establishedwith“financialhelpfromHungary.”467AddtothisthefactthatHungary’s
right-wingprime-ministerJozsefAntallstatedhisdesiretobetheleaderoffifteen
millionHungarians‘inspirit,’fiveofwhomwereinthediaspora,468itisapparentwhy
Romaniansmadetheleapfromculturalrightstoterritorialdismemberment.Overall,
theofficialpositionwasthattheminorityissuewas“purelyadomesticissue”469and
Hungary’sinvolvementinthematterwasespeciallyundesirable.Attherootofthis
stancewereundoubtedlyanxietiesemergingfromthethemeofBesiegedFortress,
concerningHungary’sinterferenceinitsdomesticaffairs,andthethreatitposedto
Romania’sterritorialintegrityandsovereignty.
However,notleastduetothepressuresexertedonthetwostatesbytheinternational
communitytoresolvetheissueandsignaPrincipalTreaty,Bucharestsatdownto
discusswithitstraditionalfoeaproblemconcerningwhatitperceivedtobeinthe
domesticsphere.Negotiationsbeganin1994,withRomania’spositiononthe
unconstitutionalityofgrouprightsremainingunchangedsince,asTurnockargues,
“nationalists(…)donotunderstandhowchargesofdiscriminationcanarisefrom
legislationthatappliesequallytoallRomaniancitizens.”470Foritspart,Hungary
focusedonacertainarticle11oftheCouncilofEuropeRecommendation1201.This
provisionstatedthat“inareaswheretheyareamajority,ethnicminoritiesshould
have‘attheirdisposalappropriatelocalorautonomousauthoritiesor…haveaspecial
466Dragoman(2008),p.69.467KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.303.468Ibid.469Roper(2000),p.116.470Turnock(2001),p.122.
184
statusmatchingthespecifichistoricalandterritorialsituation.’”471Inotherwords,the
HungarianminorityinRomaniawouldbeallowedacertaindegreeofself-governance
andpreponderanceinareasofTransylvaniawheretheyareinmajority.Unsurprisingly,
acceptingthatsuchanarticlebeincludedintheTreatywasseenasencouraging
Hungarians’claimsforpoliticalandadministrativeautonomy,pursuedinparallelby
theUDMR.ForRomanians,theperceptionwasthatthiswouldhavebeenaslippery
slopetowardsthedisintegrationoftheirstateand,amidstbroadpoliticaloppositionto
inclusionofthisarticleintheTreaty,negotiationsfellthroughin1995.AsKulcsarand
Bradatanpointout,whatmadereachingconsensusonaTreatysodifficultwas
“Romanianelites’fixationthatautonomyofanykind(andespecially
territorial/administrative)willeventuallyleadtosecession.”472
Whetherthisanxietyisjustifiedornot,itformstheprimaryrationalewhichguides
Romania’srelationswithbothitsHungariancommunityandtheirstateoforigin.The
areasofterritorialintegrity,ofthenationalcharacterofthestateanditssovereignty,
threatenedherebothfromwithin–autonomyforminorities–andwithout–
Hungary’sinvolvementintheissue–areofextremesensitivityforthepoliticalclass
andthewiderpublic.Salatcapturesthisintheformofatellingstatisticfrom2006,
that“theideaofethnicautonomyissupportedby85%oftheHungariansin
Transylvania,[whilst]only13%oftheRomaniansegmentoftheTransylvanian
populationisreadytoacceptthisarrangement.”473Thesamesplitisnoticeableon
otherissuessuchaseducationinthemothertongue,supportfromtheHungarian
government,andtheuseofHungarianasanofficiallanguageofcommunicationin
stateinstitutions.474Consequently,theattitudeofthepublicmatchesthatofits
leadership,inthatmakingconcessionstotheHungariancauseconstitutesared-line,
thecrossingofwhichmaythreatentheessentialvaluesonwhichtheRomanianstate
isbuilt.
471Roper(2000),p.119.472KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.307.473L.Salat,‘ARapprochementwithoutReconciliation:Romanian-HungarianRelationsinthePost-CommunistEra,’inA.E.B.Blomqvist,C.IordachiB.Trencsenyi(eds.),HungaryandRomaniaBeyondNationalNarratives–ComparisonsandEnlargements(Bern:PeterLang,2013),p.683.474Ibid.
185
Theseattitudesnotwithstanding,RomaniansandHungarianswentbacktothe
negotiationtablein1996,thistimewiththemoremoderateConstantinescuandGyula
Hornatthehelm.Constantinescu’sgovernmentwasmuchmoreamenabletoreaching
agreementwithHungary,asitwouldhavebeenbeneficialtowardsRomania’s
Europeanintegrationprospects.Havingsaidthat,eventhisleadershipcouldnotignore
theanxietiesofthegeneralpublic,northoseofthesocialistopposition.Assuch,whilst
RomaniaacquiescedtoRecommendation1201,itpushedforaclause“thatconfirmed
the‘inviolabilityoftheircommonborderandtheterritorialintegrityoftheother
Party.’”475Additionally,theTreatyspecifiesthattheRecommendation“doesnotrefer
tocollectiverights,nordoesitobligatePartiestograntthosepersonstherighttoa
specialterritorialautonomystatusbasedonethniccriteria.”476Inotherwords,
Romaniaacceptedthatacertain‘specialstatus’maybeofferedtoHungariansinareas
inwhichtheyformedthemajority,butthiswasnottobeconfusedwith
institutionalisedgroupsrights.Furthermore,theRomanianstateincurredno
responsibilitytograntautonomyonthebasisofthisspecialstatus.Evenmore
poignantly,therecognitionofbordersasinviolablewouldhavebeentantamount,for
Romania,toanadmissionthatTransylvaniabelongsinRomaniaand,therefore,a
renunciationofHungary’sownershipofit.However,thiscompromisedidnotplease
eitherthenationalistsortheUDMR;bothdenouncedit,presumablynotforthesame
reasons.477
Nonetheless,thisfirststepsignalledachangeintacticbyRomaniainitshandlingof
theminorityquestion–althoughcollectiverightshaveneverbeenformalised,
concessionsbegantobemade.Anexampleofthisisthefactthatin1997,Hungarians
weregiventherighttobeschooledintheirmothertongue,aswellastousetheir
languageincourtsoflawandatlocaladministrationlevel.478Overall,afterthesigning
ofthisTreaty,theminorityquestion,atleastintermsofitsinternationalramifications,
recededinsalience,despitethefactthattheUDMRstillcampaignsforgreater
territorialautonomyfortheHungariancommunity.Furthermore,thetrendthat,after
475Roper(2000),p.121.476Ibid.477Ibid.478Gallagher(1998),p.115.
186
Constantinescu’scomingtopower,theaccessionprocesstakesprecedenceoverother
identity-relatedgoalsholdsinthiscase.Itwouldseemasthougharemarkabledétente
happenedintheaftermathofthePrincipalTreaty,whichsawaretreatofthe
identitaryanxietiesregardingtheHungarianthreattoRomanianintegrityand
sovereignty.Attemptsweremadeatbuildingthisrelationshipaccordingtocompletely
differentreferencepointsthanthoseoftheirhistoricalinteraction.AsSalatpointsout,
thusbegan“achapterofco-operationunprecedentedinthehistoryofthetwostates”
with“variousformsofdialogueandconsultation(…)subsequentlyinstitutionalised,
includingregularjointmeetingsofthetwogovernmentsandconsultationsofthe
presidentsofthetwoparliaments.”479Examplesofinstitutionalisedcooperationarean
IntergovernmentalMixedCommissiononCollaborationandStrategicPartnership
(1997),aMixedCommissiononEnvironmentalProtection(1997),andevenajoint
Hungarian-RomanianBattalionestablishedin1998.480Moreimportant,perhaps,was
theestablishmentofaEuro-regioncoveringHungary,RomaniaandSerbiawhich
“encouragesgreaterpermeabilityonthewesternfrontierandreversesthexenophobic
nationalistviewofcross-bordercooperationasalaunchingpadforHungarian
imperialism.”481
Havingsaidthat,theargumentofthisthesisisthat,whilstchangestotheinternational
environment,inthiscasethepresenceinHungaryofamoderategovernmentledby
thesocialistGyulaHorn,mayresultinaretreatofidentity-relatedanxieties,itisnot
thecasethattheseattitudesdisappearaltogether.Instead,distrustandsuspicionof
HungaryarepowerfuldispositionswhichdrawonenduringclaimsaboutRomanian
identityand,assuch,couldnothavebeenwrittenoffbyatemporaryameliorationof
theirrelationship.Similarly,ontheotherside,Hungarians’concernsregardingtheir
minorityinRomania,althoughputonthebackburnerbythesocialistgovernment,
479L.Salat(2013),p.655.480RomanianMinistryofForeignAffairs–RomanianEmbassyinHungary,RelatiiBilaterale–RelatiiPolitice[BilateralRelations–PoliticalRelations],[n.d.],http://budapesta.mae.ro/node/167[accessed02.01.2017].481Turnock(2001),p.129.
187
remainedanissueofcontention,especiallyfortheconservativeoppositionparty,
FIDESZ.482AsSalatargues,
Therapprochementattheinterstateleveldidnotmanage(…)togenerateanewnarrativecapableofgivinguptheoldgrievancesbelongingtothepast.Beyondthefaçadeoftheoutstandingintergovernmentalco-operation,thepublicdiscourseinthetwocountriesremaineddominatedbypatternsofmutualmistrustandprejudice,thedominantidentitystructuresarestillconflicting(…).483
Inotherwords,whileonthesurfaceprogresshadbeenachieved,thefundamental
internaltensionsenduredandallthatwasneededforthere-emergenceofthe
traditionalantagonismbetweenthestateswasachangeinthepoliticalscenery.That
cametopassin1998,whentheHungarianSocialistsweredefeatedinthenational
electionsbytheright-wingFIDESZ,ledbythenationalistViktorOrban.Theinfluenceof
thissingleindividualinthepresent(andquiteprobablyfuture)interactionbetween
RomaniaandHungarycannotbeoverstated.Inhistwospellsingovernment–1998-
2002and2010onwards–Orbanhaspushedforanagendawhichhasincreasingly
beenstrikingattheheartofRomaniananxietiesconcerningHungary.Ashiftinboth
rhetoricandbehaviourtowardsradicalnationalismandapro-Russianattitudehave
ledtoareactivationofthethemeofBesiegedFortressinregardstoHungary,and
frustratedrelationsbetweenBucharestandBudapestbeyondanacceptablelimitfor
stateswhicharenotonlyneighbours,butpartnerswithintheEUandNATO.
Orbanhasbeendescribedasa“gifted,popularstrongman”butalsoas“restlessand
combativewithleaningstowardsmegalomania.”484Duringhisfirstgovernment,
cooperationbetweenRomaniaandHungarycontinued,particularlyasBucharestsaw
thispartnershipasthe“thecoreoftheprocessofconsolidatingsecurityintheregion
ofsoutheastEurope,actingasalinkintheEuro-Atlanticsecurityarchitectureofwhich
482KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.308.483Salat(2013),p.655.484I.Traynor,‘BudapestAutumn?HollowingoutDemocracyontheEdgeofEurope:PremierViktorOrbanisBlowingaChillWindofChangethroughHungary,’TheGuardian30.10.2014,availablefromProQuest,http://ezproxy.lib.le.ac.uk/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1621309093?accountid=7420[accessed16March2016].
188
Hungary[was]nowamember,”485asof1999whenitjoinedNATO.Thetide,however,
waschanging.Orban’snationalistorientation,whichfeaturedaconceptionofthe
nationasnotbeingconstrainedbythebordersofthemodernHungarianstate,
becamethecornerstoneofthisnewgovernment’spolicyagendabothdomestically
andinternationally.AssociologistBozokiargues,thisextra-territorialnational
unificationformsoneofthepillarsofOrban’s‘newpolitics.’486Tothatend,the
Hungariangovernmenthaspursuedanagendaaimedatundoingthedamageofthe
TreatyofTrianon(1920)andbringingtogethertheHungarianswithinandwithoutthe
state,inamodernversionofGreaterHungary.ThemostproblematicofOrban’s
policiesduringtransitionwastheStatusLaw(2002),whichwas“designedtogive
certainrightsinthekincountrytominorityHungariansabroad.487Benefitsincluded
seasonalworkingpermits,travelandeducationbenefits,socialsecurityprovisionsand
healthbenefits.”488
WorkingattheintersectionofFPAandSCfromanidentity-basedperspectiveoffers
insightintoRomania’sperceptionsofthisOther’sactionsasessentiallythreatening.As
thestatewiththelargestHungarianpopulationintheregion,forRomaniathislaw
“conjur[ed]up(…)thespectreofirredentism.”489DespitethefactthattheStatusLaw
was(onewouldsuspectintentionally)non-political,focusinginsteadonsocio-cultural
andeducationalrights,theextraterritorialityaspectinherentinitsscope–namelythe
awardofcertainbenefitswitheffectinthekin-statetoaspecificcategoryofcitizensof
anotherstate–wasintenselyproblematic.NotonlydidtheStatusLawallowHungary
tobecomedirectlyinvolvedinthelivesofRomaniancitizens,buildinglinksbetween
themandaforeignstate,but,bysettingaparttheHungarianminorityfromtherestof
thepopulation,itresultedinto“discriminationamongRomaniancitizensbasedon
ethnicity.”490Ithadbeenpreciselyforthisreason(orpretext)thatRomaniahad
485Turnock(2001),p.131.486Bozoki,citedinA.Deak,‘HungarianDances–theOriginsandtheFutureofViktorOrban’sRevolution,’LithuanianAnnualStrategicReview11:1(January2013),p.153.487SpecificallyconcerningminoritiesinRomania,Slovakia,Slovenia,Croatia,SerbiaandtheUkraine.488KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.309.489TheEconomist,ViktorOrban,anAssertiveHungarian;Charlemagne,02.03.2002,availablefromExpandedAcademicASAP,http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA83561677&v=2.1&u=leicester&it=r&p=EAIM&sw=w&asid=3021d7995063e2094a889236f980fcb7[accessed16March2016].490KulcsarandBradatan(2007),p.309.
189
refusedtograntminoritygrouprightstotheHungarianminorityinthe1990s,butnow
Hungarywasunilaterallyembarkinguponanagendawhichultimatelyachieveda
similargoalbydifferentmeans.Despiteregionalopposition,thelawwaseventually
passedwithanoverwhelmingmajoritybytheHungarianparliament,resultinginan
increasinglycloselinkbetweentheHungarianstateanditsdiasporainneighbouring
states.
ForRomanians,meanwhile,the‘spectreofirredentism’wasquicklybecominga
certainty,astheoldidentitaryanxietiesandsuspicionstowardsHungary’sintentions
andmotivationsbehindtheStatusLawwerecomingbacktothefore:
Theratificationofthe‘StatusLaw’bytheHungariangovernmentproducedapowerfulnegativepublicopinionreaction(…).Inthiscontext,Hungarywasaccusedthat,whilethe‘StatusLaw’doesnotexplicitlystipulatetheannexationofTransylvania(…)andthereconstitutionofGreaterHungary,themannerinwhichthelawwasadoptedspoketothisHungariandesideratum.491
Inotherwords,Romanians(aswellasSlovakians,Ukrainians,Serbs,etc.)were
naturallyscepticalofOrban’srhetoric,specificallyhisinsistenceonthenotionthathis
modernpost-stateconceptionofthenationdemandedonlya“spiritualandcultural
reunificationoftheHungarianpeople,”492ratherthanapolitical/physicalone.
Romanians,however,havearadicallydifferentunderstandingofnation/statehood.As
Dragomanhasargued,“Romanianswillseethemselvesasmembersofanationandof
anation-state.Itis,therefore,difficultforthemtoconceivealimitationofthenational
sovereignty.”493Assuch,anyHungarianargumentthatseekstodown-playthe
significanceofbordersor,indeed,theoverallrelevanceofthenation-statein
contemporarypoliticswillbeseenasadirectchallengetoRomania’ssovereigntyand
itsphysicalintegrity.Coupledwithhisemphasisonthesymbolic‘GreaterHungary’and
othermeasuressuchas“settingtheTrianonMourningDay,”494Orban’sagendadid
491R.M.Vadean,Relatiileromano-ungareincontextulintegrariiinstructurileeuropeenesieuroatlantice–1989-2010[Romanian-HungarianRelationsintheContextofEuropeanandEuro-AtlanticIntegration–1989-2010](Iasi:Lumen,2011),p.110.492OrbancitedinTheEconomist(2002).493Dragoman(2008),p.74.494Deak(2013),p.154.
190
littlebutreactivateRomanians’anxietiesconcerningHungary’sinterest,notonlyinthe
welfareofitsminorityinRomania,butalsoinrenewingitsclaimoverTransylvania.
ItistellingoftheimpactthatOrbanandhisFIDESZhaveonRomanian-Hungarian
relations,that,oncehelosthismandatetotheSocialistsin2002,contactbetweenthe
twocountriesimprovedsignificantly.Overthelasthalfdecadeoftransition,the
relationshipbetweenBucharestandBudapestregainedsomeoftheimpetusofthe
late1990s.Startingwith2005,forinstance,therewerefourjoinedannualsessionsof
thetwogovernmentsand,beginningin2006,alsofourannualmeetingsofthe
intergovernmentalMixedCommissiononEconomicCollaboration.495Rather
poignantly,neitherofthesemeetingstookplaceafterFIDESZcamebackintopowerin
2010.Thisthereforeconfirmstheassumptionsofthethesis,concerningtheretreat
andre-emergenceofidentitaryanxietiesinspecificcontexts.Whilstthedominant
portrayalofHungaryasadangerisperpetuatedinthehistoricalandidentity
narratives,theattitudeofanxietytowardsitsactionsandintentionscan,toalarge
degree,bealleviatedbyperceptionsofasustained,positiveandnon-threatening
behavioursuchasthatexhibitedbyBudapestintheperiodswhensocialistswerein
power.Ontheotherhand,thethemeofBesiegedFortresscomesbacktothefore,as
anxietiesarereactivatedandaugmented,whenperceptionsoverthisOther’s
intentionsarereversedbyachangeindirectionandrhetorictowardsanationalist
agenda,witnessedduringAntalland,later,Orban’smandates.Perhapsprecisely
becauseRomaniakeepsacloseeyeondevelopmentsinBudapest,itselfasignof
distrust,ithasbeenacutelyawareoftheseshiftsinBudapest’soutlook,andaswillbe
exploredinthefollowingsection,hasreactedtothembyalteringitsbehaviour
towardsitswesternneighbourconsiderably.
ContemporaryHungarian-RomanianRelations
RomaniajoinedNATOin2004andtheEUin2007;HungarybeatRomaniabyfiveyears
inachievingmembershipoftheformer,andthreeyearsforthelatter.Inasense,the
factthatRomanialaggedbehindHungaryandtheotherCentralEuropeanstatesin
495RomanianEmbassytoBudapest(dateunknown).
191
fulfillingtheaccessioncriteriamayactuallyhavecontributedtothecooperationofthe
2000s.ApossibleexplanationforthisbetteringofrelationshipswasHungary’sown
pro-Westerndirection.Inotherwords,theperceptionthat,inherentinitsdesireand
ultimatesuccessofintegratingintheEuro-Atlanticstructures,wasacommitmentby
Hungarytorespectthevaluesoftheseorganisations.Onewouldarguethat,for
Romania,theinviolabilityofborderswithintheEUandthemutualprotectionoffered
byArticle5oftheNATOTreatyoncollectivedefence496offeredtheprospectthat
Hungarycouldneveragainconstituteathreattoitsterritorialintegrity.Fromthis
perspective,EUandNATOmembershipprovidedtwobenefits–itmovedRomaniaout
oftheEast,eliminatingthethreatposedbyRussia,andmadeHungaryitsformalally,
therebymakingitnigh-onimpossibleforTransylvaniatore-emergeasacontested
issue.
However,ifrapprochementwasnoticeableatthelevelofbilateralrelations,there
existsignsatsocietallevelthatthepublic’sfeelingstowardstheHungarianminority
endured.AccordingtoSalat,astudyof2006revealedthatyoungRomanians(15-25
yearsold)“considerthatHungariansinRomaniahavetoomanyrights,”despitethe
lackofformalgrouprights,“theyaredisturbedbythefactthattheHungarian
languageisspokeninpublic,andtheyfirmlyrejecttheideaofautonomy.”497Itwould
seemasthoughthefundamentalissuesbetweenRomaniansandHungarians
concerningthethreatofthelattertothenationalcharacterofthestatecontinued
amidstincreasedbilateralcooperation.Distrust,therefore,remainedacharacteristic
ofRomanians’relationtoHungarians,anditisagainstthisbackdropthatoneshould
assesscurrentRomanian-Hungarianinteraction.
ThatisallthemorethecaseasOrban’ssecondspellasprime-minister,whichbeganin
2010andcontinuestothetimeofwriting,hasseenanevensharpershiftinHungary’s
rhetoricandbehaviourthanhisfirst,whichhasresultedinanaugmentingofthreat
perceptionsregardingHungarythroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortresstheme.
Firstly,thepronouncednationalistdiscoursethatinthe1998-2002periodemphasised
496NATO,TheNorthAtlanticTreaty,04.04.1949,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm[accessed06April2016].497Salat(2013),p.684.
192
thespiritualunificationoftheHungariannationsymbolisedintheStatusLawwasnow
offeredapoliticaldimension.In2010,theDualCitizenshipLawwaspassed,which
stipulatedthatcitizenshipwastobegrantedexpeditiouslytoHungarianslivingabroad,
providedthattheir“originfromHungaryisprobable”andtheir“Hungarianknowledge
isproven.”498Furthermore,forthisacceleratedprocessofawardingcitizenship
“neitherresidenceorsubsistenceinHungary,noratestonknowledgeofthe
constitution[was]required.”499Asaresult,thelawpavedthewayformillionsof
HungarianethnicslivinginneighbouringcountriestoreceiveaHungarianpassport–
indeedby2016,accordingtoAgerpres,around785.000peoplehadtakenadvantageof
thislooseningofthecitizenshiplaw,halfofwhomwerereportedtohavebeen
Romanian.500Perhapssurprisinglyatfirstglance,thebacklashagainsttheDual
CitizenshiplawwasfairlysubduedinRomania,withthevastmajorityofthepolitical
leadershipremainingquietonthematter.Certainly,thereactiondidnotcomparein
intensitywiththeoneinSlovakia–wherethegovernmenttookthedecisionto
“revokeSlovakcitizenshipforanyonewhoacquireitofanotherstate,”501ameasure
clearlyaimedatdissuadingtheoverhalfamillionoftheirowneligiblecitizensfrom
applyingforHungariancitizenship.
TheassumptionsmadebythisprojectregardingRomaniananxietiesoverretaining
sovereigntyandthenationalcharacterofthestatemay,atfirst,seemchallengedby
Romania’sreactiontothislaw.ThisisespeciallythecaseasRomaniaishometothe
largestHungarianpopulationoutsideofthekin-stateandtherhetoricsurroundingthe
DualCitizenshipLawwasladenwithmentionsofdue‘reparationsoverthepainful
498J.Toth,‘Update:ChangesintheHungarianCitizenshipLawandAdoptedon26May2010,’EuropeanUnionDemocracyObservatory,19.07.2010,http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/recentChanges/Hungary.pdf[accessed24.03.2016],p.2.499Ibid.500G.Stefan,‘CNMT:Peste785.000demaghiaridinafaragranitelorausolicitatcetateniaungara;jumatatesuntdinRomania[Over785.000HungariansfromabroadhaveappliedforHungarianCitizenship;HalfComefromRomania,’Agerpres03.02.2016http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/02/03/cnmt-peste-785-000-de-maghiari-din-afara-granitelor-au-solicitat-cetatenia-ungara-jumatate-sunt-din-romania-14-28-44[accessed24.03.2016].501J.R.Haines,‘Hungary:GoingintheWrongDirection?ViktorOrban’s‘Illiberal’HungaryLooksEastward,’ForeignPolicyResearchInstitutes,E-Notes,September2014,http://www.fpri.org/article/2014/09/hungary-going-in-the-wrong-direction/[accessed09.03.2016].
193
injusticesofTrianon.’502OnewouldexpectthatRomaniamusthaveperceivedthis
behaviourasthreateningtoitsstateintegrityandsovereignty,yet,unlikeSlovakia,it
keptsilent.Thereasonbehindthisseeminglypeculiarbehaviour,onewouldargue,
wasthefactRomaniahad,itself,onlyrecentlypassedsimilarlegislationconcerningthe
RepublicofMoldova(2009),underwhichthestateofferedMoldovansofRomanian
ethnicityRomanian,andthereforeEU,citizenshipandpassports.Fromthis
perspective,speakingagainstHungary’sDualCitizenshipLawwouldhavebeen
tantamounttoopeningRomaniatocriticismagainstitsownpolicyofbuildinga
strongerconnectiontotheRepublicofMoldova.WhatoneseesinRomania’s
behaviour,therefore,isanorderingofpriorities–Romania’sdesiretostrengthenlinks
withitsdiasporainMoldovatrumpedthethreatinherentinHungary’scourseof
action.However,byreactinginthisway–or,rather,notreacting–toHungary’s
policy,RomaniawasgivingViktorOrbanandFIDESZastakeinitsdomesticpolicyanda
politicalplatformintheMagyardominatedareasofTransylvania,asHungarianethnics
becameHungariancitizens.
Thishasresultedinsomeratheroddsituationsoverthelastfewyears,whichhaveled
toacoolingofRomanian-Hungarianrelations,oneofthemindirectconsequenceof
theextensionofvotingrightsinHungarianelectionsthroughtheCitizenshipLawto
thediasporainTransylvania.Thefar-rightnationalistsJobbikranpartoftheir2014
parliamentaryelectionscampaigninRomania,withpeopleinseveralcountiesin
TransylvaniareceivingleafletsonJobbikevents,andwhichencouragedthem“totake
partintheelectionsinHungary,asdecisionstakeninBudapestwouldinfluencethe
fateofMagyarsinTransylvania.”503ThiswasasteptoofarforRomanians,who
recognisedthatthemessageandsheerpresenceoftheradicalnationalistsJobbik
wereboundtoreignitethedisputeoverthestatusoftheHungarianminorityin
502M.Picard,‘Budapestoffrelanationalitéhongroiseauxmagyars[BudapestOffersMagyarsHungarianNationality],’LeFigaro18.05.2010,http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/05/18/01003-20100518ARTFIG00637-budapest-offre-la-nationalite-hongroise-aux-magyars.php[accessed29March2016].503D.Pacala,‘JobbikisifacecampanieelectoralainCovasna,Harghita,MuressiBrasov[JobbikIsRunningitsElectoralCampaigninCovasna,Harghita,MuresandBrasov],’Mediafax,12.03.2014,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/jobbik-isi-face-campanie-electorala-in-covasna-harghita-mures-si-brasov-12250448[accessed29March2016].
194
Romania.PresidentBasescuqualifiedJobbikas‘extremist’504andwarnedthat
Bucharestwouldtakeactionagainstactivethreatsagainstitssecurityandstability:
“ourobjectiveisthatHungarianpoliticiansdonotutiliseelectoralcampaignsinorder
tomakestatementswhichcontravenetheRomanianConstitution,theruleoflawand
the[reasonable]behaviourofaguestwhilstinforeignterritory.”505
Itisapparent,onewouldargue,whatparticulararticlesoftheConstitutionBasescuis
referringto–thereisnoroomforHungarianradicalnationalisminthe‘national,
unitaryandindivisible’stateofRomania,andanysuchmessagewillbeseenasan
attackonRomaniansovereigntyanditsnationalprerogatives.Consequently,the
MinistryofInternalAffairsannouncedthatJobbikcampaignerswouldformallybe
declaredpersonaenongrataeandbannedfromenteringRomanianterritory,soasto
“pre-emptanyeventswhichmayaffectpublicorderornationalsecurity.”506It
becomesapparentthat,whiledualcitizenshipforRomanianMagyarswasaconcession
Romaniafeltobligedtomake,alimithadtobedrawnconcerningthelevelof
involvementofHungarianorganisationsintheaffairsofthestateanditscitizens.Itis
clearthat,astheformalconnectionbetweentheHungarianminorityanditskin-state
hasstrengthened,Romaniahasincreasinglybecomemoresensitiveto,andless
toleranttowards,anyperceivedattemptsbyHungarytointerfereintheminority
question.
BeyondJobbik’sinvolvementintheelectioncampaign,Orban’sownbehaviourhasled
toastraininrelationsbetweenBucharestandBudapest.Inparticular,thediscourseon
theirrelevanceofnationalbordersasanobstacletoHungarianunityhastranslated
intoactionswhichhaveamplifiedRomania’sinterpretationsofBudapest’sbehaviour
asirredentist.Perhapsthebestillustrationoftheseheightenedtensionsisanevent
504Ibid.505Basescu,citedinV.Anghel,‘MAI:S-adecisINTERZICEREAintrariiintaraaunorcetateniungaridinJobbiksialtetreiformatiuni[MIA:ItHasBeenDecidedthatCertainHungarianCitizensfromJobbikandThreeOtherOrganisationsAretoBeBANNEDfromEnteringtheCountry],’Mediafax,14.03.2014,http://www.mediafax.ro/social/mai-s-a-decis-interzicerea-intrarii-in-tara-a-unor-cetateni-ungari-din-jobbik-si-alte-trei-formatiuni-12266590[accessed29March2016].506RomanianMinistryofInternalAffairs,DeclaratiedepresaapurtatoruluidecuvantalM.A.I.[PressBriefingbytheM.I.A.OfficialSpokesperson],14.03.2014,http://www.comunicare.mai.gov.ro/arhiva.php?subaction=showfull&id=1394818102&archive=1395902350&start_from=&ucat=9&[accessed30March2016].
195
whichtookplacein2015.AfteravisittoaHungariansummeruniversityinthe
RomaniantownofBaileTusnad,Orbanpostedaseriesofphotographsofinsignias
featuringmapsofGreaterHungaryandtheso-calledSzeklerland,507ageographicunit
unrecognisedbyBucharest.508Thispromptedanenergeticandforcefulreactionfrom
Bucharest,withtheofficialstatementfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairsalsocoming
viaFacebook:
Thepromotion,bytheHungarianprime-minister,oftheserevisionistsymbols,completelyunacceptableandcontrarytothe(…)[PrincipalTreaty]of1996,(…)andtheconstitutionalorderinRomania,doesnotbyanymeanscontributetothe‘streamlining’ofHungarian-Romanianrelationsortheestablishmentofaclimateoftrust(…).AslongastheHungarianpartydoesnotprove,beyonddoubt,thatitiswillingtoabidebythepolitical-juridicalparametersagreeduponbybothRomaniaandHungaryintheaforementioneddocuments,thebilateralrelationshipwillnotbecomebalancedorbuiltonmutualtrust.509
InthisonecanseethecomingtotheforeofRomaniananxietiesconcerningHungary’s
truemotivationsforactionthroughthelensofBesiegedFortress.Thementionofthe
PrincipalTreatyisnotbycoincidence,asthisrecognisedtheinviolabilityofRomania’s
bordersbyHungary.Throughhispost,butalsohispoliciesandrhetoric,ViktorOrban
isperceivedtorenegeonHungary’scommitmenttorespectRomania’sterritorial
configurationandsovereignty.Fromthisperspective,nomeaningfulleveloftrustcan
existbetweentheRomanianandHungariansides.Asaresult,unlessHungarychanges
direction,theMinistry’spostsuggests,therelationshipbetweenthetwocountrieswill
remainimbalancedandmarkedbysuspicionanddistrust.Moreimportantly,the
reactionfromRomania’sleadershipisoneintunewiththegeneralfeelingsofthe
population.InNovember2015,anationalsurveyshowedthat17%ofRomanianssee
507Mediafax,ViktorOrbanapostatimaginicusimboluriale‘Ungarieimari’si‘TinutuluiSecuiesc’[ViktorOrbanHasPostedPictureswithSymbolsof‘GreaterHungary’and‘Szeklerland’],26.07.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/viktor-orban-a-postat-imagini-cu-simboluri-ale-ungariei-mari-si-tinutului-secuiesc-reactia-mae-foto-14641262[accessed30July2015].508SzeklerlandistheterritorialunitwherethemajorityoftheHungariancommunityisconcentrated.MostinitiativesregardingautonomyandsecessionoftheMagyarminorityfocusonthisregion.509RomanianMinistryofForeignAffairs,StatementConcerningViktorOrban,deliveredonFacebook26July2015,https://www.facebook.com/mae.romania/?fref=nf[accessed31March2016].Theemphasisistheauthor’sown.
196
Hungaryastheirgreatestenemy,withonlyRussiascoringahigherscore(35%).510
WhatisseenhereisareactivationoftheoldanxietiesoftheBesiegedFortress,anda
responsefromRomaniawhichconformstotheseperceptions.Interventionsofthis
typeareanotheridentitaryred-line,andanaggressiveresponseistheonlylegitimate
courseofactionincounteringHungary’sirredentism.Thispositionwasexpressedby
formerprime-ministerVictorPontawhosaidthat“ViktorOrbancomplimentedme,he
toldmehehadhadagreatrelationshipwiththeRomaniangovernmentuntil2012[i.e.
theyearPontabecameprim-minister],andafterwardshedidnot,”addingthat
“Romanianswillnotacceptagovernmentwhichwouldmaintaingoodrelationswith
ViktorOrban.”511
Fromthispointon,althoughformalcooperationwithintheEUandNATOcontinued,
onewouldarguethatrelationsbetweenRomaniaandHungarycooledsignificantly.
Thesewerebutacoupleofexamplesofbilateralskirmisheswhichhintattherift
buildingbetweenthetwostates.Furthermore,thistrendhasbeenexacerbatedby
Hungary’seasternshiftinitsgeneralforeignpolicydirection,theseconddimension
whichshouldbediscussed.Specifically,certainelementsofOrban’srhetoricand
behaviourhavecastdoubtoverHungary’scommitmenttotheEuro-Atlanticalliancesit
isamemberof.TheviewisthatOrbanhas“transformedthecountryinwaysthat[are]
inconflictwithmanyoftheEU’scorevalues.”512Particularly,Hungaryseemstobe
looseningtieswithitsWesternpartnersinfavourofcloserlinkswiththeEast,
particularlyPutin’sRussia.AsamemberoftheEU,Hungaryvocallyopposedthe
economicsanctionsleviedagainstRussia,and,in2014,struckadealallegedlyworth
tenbillioneuros513withMoscowtoexpandthenuclearpowerplantatPaks.Whilst
510M.Mihalache,‘SondajIRES:Rusia,consideratecelmaimaredusmanalRomaniei’[‘IRESPoll:Russia,SeenasRomania’sGreatestEnemy’],Adevarul,27.11.2015,http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/sondaj-ires-rusia-considerata-mai-mare-dusman-romaniei-cunosc-romanii-despre-produsele-rusesti-1_565889827d919ed50ea6bf8d/index.html[accessed24December2015].511Ponta,citedinA.Moise,‘Ponta:Orbanmi-afacutuncomplimentcandaziscapanain2012s-aintelesfoartebinecuRomania[Ponta:OrbanComplimentedMewhenHeSaidThat,until2012,HeHadGoodRelationswithRomania],’Mediafax,27.07.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/ponta-orban-mi-a-facut-un-compliment-cand-a-zis-ca-pana-in-2012-s-a-inteles-foarte-bine-cu-romania-14646464[accessed30July2015].512K.Verseck,‘HungaryEyesCloserTieswithRussia,’DeutscheWelle,02.02.2015,http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-eyes-closer-ties-with-russia/a-18230319?maca=en-rss-en-eu-2092-rdf[accessed05April2016].513Ibid.
197
economicdependenceonRussianenergyofseveralEUmemberstates,Germany
included,hasbeenthemajorimpedimentinEurope’sadoptingastrongstanceagainst
Russia’srecentactions,Hungaryhasaddedadogmaticdimensiontoitsreasonsfor
resistingtheembargo.
Duringaspeechatthe2014HungariansummeruniversityinBaileTusnad,where,one
yearlater,hewouldtakethenowinfamous‘GreaterHungary’photos,Orban
questionedthecontemporaryrelevanceoftheWesternliberalmodelanditscapacity
toremaincompetitiveinaglobalisedworld.Thesuggestionwasthatitissystemssuch
asthoseinChina,TurkeyandRussia,“thatarenotWestern,notliberal,notliberal
democracies,maybenotevendemocracies,[that]aremakingnationssuccessful.”514In
ensuringhisstate’scompetitiveness,thefocusforOrban,too,wouldthereforebethe
nation,ratherthantheindividual:“theHungariannationisnotasimplesumof
individuals,butacommunitythatneedstobeorganised,strengthenedanddeveloped,
andinthissense,thenewstatethatwearebuildingisanilliberalstate,anon-liberal
state.”515Theessenceofhismessage,especiallyinthecontextinwhichitwas
delivered–totheHungariandiasporainRomania–wasthat‘newnationalism’would
dominateHungary’sagenda,itscommitmentstoWesternvaluesapotentialobstacle
tothecountry’ssuccess.Inthisview,thesimilaritieswithPutin’sowndogmaare
apparent;coupledwithHungary’seconomicventureswithRussia,theevercloser
connectionbetweenBudapestandMoscowshouldcomeasnosurprise.
Fromanidentitaryperspective,onemayshedlightonthemagnitudeandreasons
behindRomania’sconcernoverthisshift.RussiaandHungaryarealreadyseenasthe
twogreatestthreatstotheRomanianstate,astheIRESsurveyshows.516The
annexationofCrimeaandfrozenconflictsintheDonbashavereactivatedanxieties
concerningRussianexpansionism,particularlyinregardstotheRepublicofMoldova.
Similarly,thischapterhasdiscussedhowOrban’srhetoricandpolicyfocuson‘Greater
Hungary’haveamplifiedtensionssurroundingthestatusoftheHungarianminority
514C.,Toth,‘FullTextofViktorOrban’sSpeechatBaileTusnad(Tusnádfürdő)of26July2014,’TheBudapestBeacon,29.07.2014,http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/10592[accessed05April2016].515Ibid.516IRESstatisticinMihalache(2015).
198
andevenownershipofTransylvania.Assuch,friendshipbetweenBudapestand
Moscowinthecurrentinternationalclimateaugmentstheperceiveddanger.Thisis
thecombinationoftwoseparateareasrelevanttothethemeofBesiegedFortress.On
theonehand,Hungaryisathreatinitself.Ontheother,membershipoftheEUand
NATOareseenastheessentialsafeguardsagainstRussia.Hungary,however,asa
fellowmember,underminesthese‘insurancepolicies’throughitseastward-looking
agenda.ThepossibilityofHungarybecomingaTrojanHorseinsidethesetwo
organisationswoulddestabilisethemfromwithin.ThetheoryofTrojanHorseHungary
isnotuniquetoRomania,butitdoesstrikeaparticularchordwiththisstate,asitplays
onthealreadyexistinganxietiesconcerningtheintentionsofthisactor,and
compoundstheindividualHungarianandRussianthreats.Thisviewiscontendedby
DanDungaciuwhohasstatedthat,inrespecttoHungary,“wearedealingwitha
‘cleverdick,’(…)fromwithintheEuro-Atlanticspace,whoisplayingadoublegame”
arguingthat“RussiaisnotoppositeofEurope,butitspartner.”517Itisthistypeof
message,hecontinues,coupledwithageneralanti-Westerndiscourse,thatthreatens
theEuropeanprojectaltogether.518
OnemaygatherfromthisthatRomaniaviewsHungarynotonlyasathreattoitself
but,throughitsassociationtoRussia,asadestabilisingactorwithintheEUandNATO.
Coupledwiththepro-RussianattitudesofotherEuropeanstates,thedangerisonly
magnified.ItisbecauseoftheimportanceofHungaryintheRomanianimaginary,
however,thattheTrojanHorsetheorysopreoccupiesRomania.Thenationalistand
easternshiftstogetherconfirmforRomaniansthefactthatsuspicionanddistrustof
theirwesternneighbourwerewellfoundedand,consequently,anxietiesconcerning
Budapest’sbehaviourareaugmented.Inthisview,therelationshipbetweenRomania
andHungaryhasreachedaleveloftensionsimilartothatintheearly1990sandthis
shouldcomeasnosurprise.Theargumentofthisthesisisthattodaythemain
referencepointsofRomania’spositiontowardsHungaryarenolongertheprinciplesof
517DungaciuinFundatiaUniversitaraaMariiNegre[BlackSeaUniversityFoundation],Dezbatere:PunteaMoscova-BudapestapesteUcrainasiRomania[Debate:TheMoscow-BudapestBridgeovertheUkraineandRomania],18.02.2015,http://fumn.eu/urmariti-inregistrarea-integrala-a-dezbaterii-puntea-moscova-budapesta-peste-ucraina-si-romania-18-februarie-2015/[accessed06April2016].518Ibid.
199
cooperationandinterdependencedictatedbymembershipoftheEuropean
community,buttheidentity-drivenprerogativesofkeepingherfrommeddlingin
Romania’sdomesticaffairsandensuringthestate’ssecuritybyevercloser
collaborationwith,particularlyAmerican,NATOforces.Onewouldarguethat,as
identitaryanxietiesareexacerbated,distancefromthetraditionalfoeistheonly
permissiblecourseofaction.Inthissense,theidentity-perspectiveemployedhere
capturesthecomplexmotivationsbehindRomania’sinteractionwithHungary,and
highlightsthered-linestheidentitynarrativecreates,oneofwhichisclosenessto
Budapestincurrentcircumstances.
FutureDirectionsforHungarian-RomanianRelations
Whatremainstobediscussednowisthepotentialfutureofrelationsbetween
BudapestandBucharestbyreferringtoscenariosbeingconsideredinRomaniaatthe
moment.PickinguponthediscussionintheintroductionandChapter1onthe
necessitytostudythebehaviourofsmallstates,onewouldarguethat,whilstitistrue
thatRomaniaandHungaryarenotmajorinternationalplayers,thefactthatthetwo
areallieswithintheEUandNATOmeansthatthestabilityoftheregionandthe
efficiencyofthetwoorganisationrests,atleastinpart,ontheirabilitytocooperate
andmaintainatleastcordialdiplomaticrelations.However,forRomania,thedirection
thatBudapestseemstohaveadoptedrecentlymakesconciliationanalmost
impossibleoption,butforachangeindirectionbyBudapest.Themostworrying
scenariosarethosewhichconcerntheroleHungarymightplayinthestand-off
betweentheEUandNATO,ontheonehand,andRussiaontheother,allofwhich
subscribetothethemeofBesiegedFortress.
Romania’sreservationsandcriticismtowardsstateswhichhaveeitherfailedtoassess
thedangerposedbyRussianexpansionisminUkraine,orhavedisplayedpro-Russian
attitudeshasalreadybeendiscussedinthepreviouschapter.Inthespecificcaseof
Hungary,however,theanxietyiscompounded.Forinstance,Romaniahasproven
sensitivetothefactthatOrban’s‘GreaterHungary’includesacommunityinUkraine,
intheregionofTranscarpathia.Asaresult,theRomanianmediawerequicktopickup
onasuggestionmadebyAnneApplebauminTheSpectatorthatViktorOrbanmay
200
haveavestedinterestinRussia’scampaignintheUkraine,regardingTranscarpathia:
“asmallsliceofthatfabledlostterritory[i.e.GreaterHungary]isnowpartofUkraine
—apointtheRussianforeignministeralsobroughtup,curiously,inMunich.Perhaps
thiswasahint:ifRussiasuccessfullypartitionsUkraine,maybeBudapestwillgetaslice
too.”519ThroughthelensoftheBesiegedFortresstheme,theworryisthat,asa
memberofNATO,Hungarywouldbeunwillingtoadoptastrongpositionagainst
Putin’spotentialpartitionofUkrainetherebyunderminingNATO’sEasternEuropean
flank’scapacityintacklingtheensuingsecuritycrisis.WithHungarystandingtoprofit
fromafederalisationofUkraine,theentireviabilityofNATOasanactorcapableof
withstandingandcounteringRussianexpansionismwouldbeindoubt.ForBucharest,
thiswouldsignalthattheprotectiveumbrellaofferedbyNATOmembershipmayturn
outtohavebeenanillusionandthesecurityprerogativemembershipsatisfiesmaybe
undermined.Additionally,RussianadvancesinUkrainemighthaverepercussionson
thefateoftheRepublicofMoldova,astatethepro-Europeanfutureofwhichisof
particularsignificancetoBucharest,foridentitaryreasonswhichwillbediscussedin
thefollowingchapter.Dungaciusummarisedthisviewwhenhearguedthatthe
adoptionofthefederalsolutioninUkraine“willgiveideasthattheconflictin
Transnistriamayalsoberesolvedthroughfederalisation(…).Iworrythatnotall
occidentalswillbeopposedtothisandthosewhohavethepowertoopposeitwill
not.”520ThelossofMoldova,itsEstrangedSelf,totheRussianspherewouldbe
perceivedascatastrophicinRomania,ascloserelationswiththisstatehavebeenat
thetopofitsforeignpolicyagendasinceitsaccessiontotheEuro-Atlanticprojects.
Inessence,Hungary’spotentialroleasaRussianTrojanHorseinsidetheEUandNATO
isseenbyBucharestasoneofthegreatestdangersfacingEasternEuropeansecurity,
butalsotheRomanianstateitselfand,asacorollary,Moldova.Thespreadofthe
RussiansphereofinfluenceintoUkraineandMoldovawouldmeanthedistance
RomaniahasbeenbuildingbetweenitselfandRussiawouldbethreatenedandits
519Applebaum,citedinL.Stan,“RelatiaUngaria-RusiapoateinfluentasirelatiaRomania-Rep.Moldova[TheRelationshipbetweenHungaryandRussiaMayInfluencetheRelationshipbetweenRomaniaandtheRepublicofMoldova],”InfoPrut,20.02.2015,http://infoprut.ro/36670-dungaciu-relatia-ungaria-rusia-poate-influenta-si-relatia-romania-rep-moldova.html[accessed05April2016].520DungaciuforFUMN(2016).
201
interestsintheRepublicofMoldovairremediablydamaged–indeedMoldovamay
ceasetoexistasasovereignstatealtogether.Worsestill,ifHungarywereawarded
TranscarpathiaandwithNATOimpotenttocurbRussianaggression,therewouldbeno
guaranteethatHungary’sclaimoverTransylvaniawouldnotbeentertainedby
Moscow.AlthoughthisnotionhasnotbeenaddressedbyBucharestpoliticians,ithas
beendiscussedinthemedia.Recently,theRomaniannewsnetworkB1pickedupona
commentbyVladimirPutinthat“ifsomeonewantstostartrevisitingtheresultsof
WorldWarII,well,let’strytodebatethattopic.Butthenweneedtodebatenotonly
Kaliningradbutthewholething(…).There’salsoHungaryandRomania.”521The
RomaniannetworkquotesHungarianreactionstothisstatement,suchastheopinion
that“PutinraisedeyebrowsamongRomaniansandraisedhopeamongsome
Hungariannationalists,bysuggestingthatreviewingthepostWorldWarIIborder
betweenHungaryandRomaniacouldbeontheagenda,ifpeoplequestionRussia’s
bordersandterritories.”522InthesescenariosareatplaymanyofRomania’smajor
anxietiessubscribedtothethemeofBesiegedFortress–itssecurityandindependence
fromMoscow,Moldova’spro-Westerndirection,andevenRomania’sownterritorial
integrity.
Thisfinalscenariomayseemimplausible,butitisnonethelessthecasethat
considerationssuchasthiscapturethestrainedrelationshipbetweenRomaniaand
Hungaryandhintatthefactthatthissituationcanonlycontinue,undercurrent
circumstances.Thatisbecausethelevelofsuspicionandanimositybetweenthetwo
statesisbeingfuelledbyHungary’spursuitofitsnationalistandpro-Easternagenda.In
aclimateinwhichtherearedoubtsoverwhetherOrbanfavoursanalliancewithhis
partnersinthetheEUandNATO,orPutin’sRussia,itisnotsurprisingthatthese
sequencesofeventsarebeingconsidered.Russia’srhetoric,meanwhile,ishavinga
521Bloomberg,PutinDiscussesTrump,OPEC,Rosneft,Brexit,Japan(Transcript),05.09.2016,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-05/putin-discusses-trump-opec-rosneft-brexit-japan-transcript[accessed02January2017].522HungarianPress,citedinB1,UngariaredeschidesubiectulpretentiilorteritorialeasupraTransilvaniei:PresamaghiaracomenteazaafirmatiileluiPutinprivindreconsiderareagranitelor[HungaryReopensDiscussionoverTerritorialDemandsoverTransylvania:HungarianPressCommentsPutin’sStatementConcerningReconsideringBorders],06.09.2016,http://www.b1.ro/stiri/externe/ungaria-redeschide-subiectul-pretentiilor-teritoriale-asupra-transilvaniei-presa-maghiara-comenteaza-afirmatiile-lui-putin-privind-reconsiderarea-granitelor-foto-video-161145.html[accessed02January2017].
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destabilisingeffectontherelationshipbetweenRomaniaandHungary,andissowing
discordamongstEuropeanallies.Thisonlyaddstothechallengesposedbythe
Eurosceptictrendthatissweepingthecontinent,andbythespateofRussophileswho
havewonelectionsinEasternEuropeanstates.Themostworryingoftheseis,
unsurprisingly,theRepublicofMoldova,wherethepro-RussianIgorDodonwas
electedpresidentinNovember2016.AnalliancebetweenHungaryandRussia,
doublednowbytheriseofRussophilesintheRepublicofMoldovameansthatthereis
aworryingpotentialeasternalignmentamongstsomeofthemostcrucialactorsinthe
constructionofRomanianforeignpolicy.AsDungaciupointedout,“theBudapest-
Moscowaxishasanewcomponent–theoldBudapest-Chisinau-Moscowaxis,which
willcausegreatproblemsforRomania.”523
Theperceptionis,ashasbeenexploredinthepreviouschapter,thatRomaniais
becomingincreasinglyisolatedandbesiegedontheEasternflank,caughtbetween
fragilestates,suchasUkraineandMoldova,Eastern-facingHungary,andRussiaitself.
Theimplicationsofthissituationforthefuturestabilityandsecurityoftheregion,but
alsoforthepotencyofNATOtocurbRussianexpansionismand,perhaps,theviability
oftheEuropeanprojectaltogether,areuncertain.Dungaciubelievesthatthiswillbea
“strategicbattlewithoutprecedent”andthattheissueisoneof“balance”524between
pro-Russianandpro-Westernattitudes.TheresistanceaspectoftheBesiegedFortress
themesuggeststhatRomania’spositionwillbeunwaveringinitscommitmenttoa
hardapproachtoRussianexpansionism.However,Hungary’spositionisperceivedas
equallysteadfastintheoppositedirection.Inthesecircumstances,itisdifficulttosee
areconciliationbetweenthetwostates,particularlybecauseofbroader
considerationsregardingthefutureofTransylvaniaandMoldova.Sincethisanimosity
permeatesthroughthepoliticalleadershipintoRomaniansociety,itisalsodifficultto
envisageexternalpressurebeingenoughtoforcearesolution.Asmentionedearlier,
publicanti-Hungariansentimentsarepervasiveandanygovernmentwillingto
compromiseinthisstand-offwouldhaveitslegitimacyinstantlyeroded.Inconclusion,
onewouldarguethatRomaniaandHungaryareheadingtowardsanunbridgeable
523DungaciuforOraNoua(2016).524Ibid.
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levelofoppositionwhichmay,atitsheight,severelyaffectthestabilityofEastern
Europe,andtheinternalcohesionofboththeEuropeanUnionandNATO.
Consequently,notawardingthisbrewingconflicttheattentionitdeservesmay,inthe
nearfuture,comebacktohauntanalystsandpolicy-makerswhomightbetemptedto
writeitoffasaquintessentialexampleofBalkanskirmishes.
Conclusion
ThischapterhasexploredthenatureofRomania’srelationshipwithHungarywith
referencetohistoricallyenduringclaimsaboutitsidentity.Workingwithintheareaof
overlapofFPAandSChasallowedthisthesistocapturethecomplexrationalebehind
Romania’spositionvis-à-visHungary,byfocusingontheidentitaryanxietiesemerging
fromtheportrayalsofSelfandHungarianOther.Themainassumptionmadebythe
project,namelythatsedimentednarrativesonidentityinfluencebehaviourthrough
theanxietiesandprerogativestheycreateisconfirmedbythiscasestudy.Anxieties
overterritorialintegrityandsovereigntyimpactedRomanian-Hungarianrelations
throughoutthefirsthalfofthe1990s.However,thenotionthatthesemayrecedein
opportunecircumstancesisalsoconfirmedbythedétenteofthelate1990sand2000s.
Havingsaidthat,theenduranceoftheseattitudesshowsinthefactthatpublicdistrust
towardsHungarydidnotdisappearevenasbilateralrelationsbetweenthetwostates
wereflourishing.Finally,thethesisarguesthat,inthecurrentcontextofViktor
Orban’spronouncednationalistandeasternshift,anxietieshavebeenaugmentedtoa
criticallevel,becomingthemainreferencepointinBucharest’snegotiatingofits
relationshipwithHungary.InasettingofsystemicchallengesfacedbytheEUinlight
ofeconomicdependenceonandconflictingapproachestowardsRussia,Romania’s
perceptionthatitisaBesiegedFortress,caughtbetweenfragileandpro-Russian
states,hasbeenexacerbated.Inthislight,thepatternofbehaviourtowardsHungary,
oneofthemainproponentsofthisshift,isonefocusedoncriticismofitsgeneral
directionandlimitingitsinvolvementinRomania’sdomesticaffairs.Despitethefact
thattheriftbuildingbetweenBucharestandBudapestisthreateningregionalstability
andmay,indeed,playintoRussia’sownagenda,conciliationwithHungaryisunlikely,
becauseofthelevelofthreatperceptioninregardstoitsplansforTransylvania.As
204
anxietiesareattheirheight,Romania’scontemporarybehaviourtowardsHungaryis
dominatedbytheidentity-drivenprerogativestoensurethesecurityandintegrityof
thestate,andRomanians’unquestionedsovereigncontroloverit.
205
Chapter7.Romania’sRelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldova–
TwoStates,OnePeople?
PoorBessarabiansisterYou,theholiestofall
InvainyourmotherasksyouIfyouliveinfreedom.
Wakeupyou,benumbednation
BecauseifintheheatofcoldcalculationsWeloseBessarabiaoncemore
WetoowillbelostforeverThereisnowhereforourbrotherstoturnAndtheywaitinvainforasignfromusBessarabiaistakenawayonitscross
Andwecontemplateitwithablankstare.525
Introduction
ThischapterexaminesthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenRomaniaandthe
RepublicofMoldovafromtheperspectiveofitsnarrativeonnationalidentity.Thefirst
sectionexplorestheportrayalofMoldovaintheRomaniannarrative,andthefactthat
BessarabiaisrepresentedasanEstrangedSelf,ratherthananOther.Fromthis
representationemergetheidentity-derivedattitudeswhichshapeRomania’s
behaviourtowardsitseasternneighbour,namelythatRomaniaperceivesithasa
vestedinterestinthefateofthisstateandadutytoensureitssecurity,pro-Western
directionandmaintainaspecialrelationwithit.Followingonfromthis,thenext
sectionexaminesMoldo-Romanianinteractionsduringtransition,emphasisingtherole
Moldova’sambivalencetowardsitsownidentity,butalsootherdomesticandexternal
factors,haveplayedinpreventingthetwostatesfromunifyingand,later,complicated
theirspecialrelationship.Itisarguedthat,asaresultofthesecircumstances,
BucharestchangeditsgoalsfromunitingwithMoldovatosupportingitsintegration
525Romanianfolksong:T.StepaandA.Paunescu,‘SoraBasaraba/BaladapentruBasarabia[BessarabianSister/BaladforBessarabia],’CenaclulFlacara[TheFlameLiteraryCircle],Vol.12(2008).
206
process,alongsideRomania’sown.AsubsequentsectionisdedicatedtoRomania’s
contemporaryrelationshipwiththeRepublicofMoldovaintheaftermathofthe
former’saccessiontotheEUandNATO.ThethesishighlightstheeffortsBucharesthas
madetostrengthenthisrelationship,whilstalsoremaininganadvocateofChisinau
withtheEUandNATO.However,regionaldevelopments,mostnotablythecrisisin
EasternUkraineandMoldova’sdomesticpoliticalturmoilhavecreatedanxietiesin
Bucharestoveritsneighbour’sfuture.Thefinalsection,therefore,examinestwo
specificscenariosconcerningpossibledevelopmentsregardingUkraineand
TransnistriawhichmayputatriskMoldova’spro-Westerndirectionandevenits
independenceandsovereignty.Thepotentialoutcomes,thatofacomplete
breakdownofrelationsbetweenBucharestandChisinau,andofanadhocunification
incaseoftheoutbreakofaconflictbetweenMoldovaandTransnistria,areexploredin
termsoftheirrepercussionsonregionalstabilityandEast-Westrelations.The
significanceofthischapteristhatitexploreshowidentitynarrativesmaygenerate
affinitiesaswellasanxietiesandexaminesthemannerinwhichtheseattitudesimpact
boththebilateralrelationshipbetweenthetwostates,aswellasregionalstability
morebroadly.
Romania’sIdentityDrivenAttitudetowardstheRepublicofMoldova–Affinityfor
theEstrangedSelf
Muchlikeintheothertworelationshipsexploredsofar,entrenchedclaimsabout
identityplayasignificantroleininfluencingRomania’sattitudes,andthroughthis,its
behaviourtowardstheRepublicofMoldova.Similarlytothepreviouscase-studies,the
particularrepresentationofthisactorisdeeplysedimentedintheRomanian
consciousness,andthecontinuityofthehistoricalnarrativehasensuredthatthe
historyofinteractionbetweenRomaniaandMoldovaisespeciallyvivid.However,this
iswheresimilaritiesbetweentherepresentationofthisOther,andthoseexplored
previously,end.Sofar,thefocushasbeenonhowtheidentitynarrativehascreated
profoundanxietieswhich,particularlyinthecurrentinternationalclimate,accountfor
increasinglytenserelationsbetweenthisstateanditstraditional‘foes’Russiaand
207
Hungary.PickinguponWaeverandHansen’sargumentabouttheSelf/Othernexus,526
however,itisalsothecasethat,inthesamewayitcancreateenduringanti-Other
sentiments,profoundbeliefsaboutidentitycanalsoleadtotheestablishmentof
indeliblelinksbetweenRomaniansandthoseseentobe‘likethem.’TheRepublicof
Moldova,Romania’sdirecteasternneighbour,and,moreimportantly,itspeople,are
preciselysuchanentity.Boththehistoricalandidentitynarrativeshavegenerated,
fromtheRomanianperspective,atleasttheperception,ifnotthecompletereality,of
asharedidentitybetweenthetwopeoples.Infact,Romaniansoftenrefertothe
RepublicasRomania’s‘sister,’andMoldovansastheir‘brothers.’527Moldovais
thereforenotportrayedasanOther,inthestrictsenseoftheterm;rather,
representationsofthisactoremphasisetheidentitarysamenessbetweenRomanians
andMoldovansand,assuch,thisneighbourisperceivedmoreaccuratelyasan
EstrangedSelf.
Figure6.TheRepublicofMoldovainhistoricalandgeographiccontext.Inred,thecontemporary
526HansenandWaever(2002).527ArecentexampleistheleaderoftheSocialistParty,LiviuDragnea,quotedinA.TobiasandV.Magradean,‘Dragnea:TrebuiesaexisteoimplicaremaimareaRomanieiprivindRepublicaMoldova,esoranoastra[Dragnea:RomaniaMustBeMoreInvolvedinRegardstotheRepublicofMoldova,SheIsOurSister],’Mediafax,08.07.2015,http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/dragnea-trebuie-sa-existe-o-implicare-mai-mare-a-romaniei-privind-republica-moldova-e-sora-noastra-14563168[accessed9July2015].
208
territoryoftheRepublic;inpink,RomanianMoldova;inorange,formerMoldavian(andRomanian)territoriesannexedbyUkraineaftertheSecondWorldWar;inlightredattheeasternborderoftheRepublic,thesecessionistregionofTransnistria.Source:S.I.Cepleanu(2011).Seelistoffiguresforcompletereference.
Thisportrayalisrootedinboththeintertwinedhistoryofthetwostatesandintheir
similaridentitymarkers.TheterritorywhichisnowtheRepublicofMoldova,also
knownasBessarabia,formed,forthebetterpartofthehistoryoftheRomanian
provinces,theeasternhalfofMoldavia–forthisandMoldova’soverallterritorial
evolution,see[Figure6].Thatmeans,ineffect,thattheFoundationMythsapply
equallytoMoldovaastheydotoRomania.TheiroriginsareDaco-Roman,their
languageisLatin-itis,ineffect,“indistinguishablefromRomanian,”528theirreligionis
Orthodoxyandtheirethnicityis,implicitly,Romanian.Bessarabiansare,forallintents
andpurposes,identicalfromthisperspectivetotheirbrothersacrosstheRiverPrut
(nowtheborderbetweenthetwostates)intheRomanianpartofMoldavia.Equally,
theirhistoricalexperienceoftheMiddleAgesandofthebeginningofModernitywas
sharedwiththeirfellowMoldavians.529Asaresult,thereexistsanindeliblehistorical
andidentitarylinkbasedontheFoundationMythsandthemeofBesiegedFortress
betweenthisterritoryandRomaniaproper.AsLucianBoiasummarises,thishas
createdinRomaniansthesensethatBessarabiansare,ineffectthesameasthem:
“theybelongedtoMoldavia,thenRomaniaandtheyspeakRomanian;theyare
therefore,Romanian,bornRomanian.”530TheissueofBessarabiaand,indeed,what
setsitapartfromRomaniaproperarelinkedtoeventswhichbeganin1812andhave
ledtotheforcedseparationofthetwostates,theauthorofwhichwasRussia.
PreviouschaptershavealreadyexploredthecircumstancesofthelossofBessarabiain
theaftermathofaRusso-Turkishwar,atatimewhentheRomaniannationalproject
wasonlyjustgettingunderway.ForDjuvara,forinstance,thereexistsa“dramaof
Bessarabia”whichstartsin1812when“welose[it]forthefirsttime.”531Thedrama
continuedasBessarabiaunitedwithRomaniain1918butwasreturnedtoRussiaasa
528Magocsi(2002),p.151.529Forpurposesofavoidingconfusion,thethesiswillusethetermsBessarabiaandMoldovainreferencetotheterritoryoftheRepublicofMoldova,andthatofMoldaviaforthehistoricalregionfromwhichitwasseparatedin1812.530L.Boia(2012),p.245.531Djuvara(2010),p.172and170.
209
resultoftheSovietultimatumof1940.BucharestenteredtheSecondWorldWarto
recovertheregionbutthedefeatofGermanyconsecratedtheultimateseparation
betweenthetwostatesandMoldova’sincorporationintheSovietUnion.Thisreality,
coupledwiththefactthat“theSovietUnionpermittedverylimitedcontactbetween
RomaniaandMoldova”532duringtheColdWar,hashadasignificantimpactonboth
theportrayaloftheSelfandtheRussianOther.Bessarabiais,ontheonehand,the
newBesiegedFortress;itsunjustseparationfromRomaniapropermeansthatthe
prerogativedictatedbythethemeofUnity,thatallRomaniansshouldbebrought
togetherinasinglestate,remainsunfulfilled.Ontheotherhand,theregion’srightful
unificationwiththemother-statehasbeenupsetbytheactionsofanOtherwithno
justifiedclaimsoverthisterritory.533TheissueofBessarabiais,consequently,oneof
thethornyareasofcontentionbetweenBucharestandMoscow.Inthiscontext,
Moldovansareseenasvictimsofanoppressiveforeignforce,muchlikeRomanians
hadbeenthroughoutmuchoftheirhistory.Thereisaprojection,therefore,of
Romanians’troubledexperienceontotheregionofBessarabia,whichstrengthensthe
affinityoftheformertowardsthelatter.Tellingofthisisthefactthatthecommunist
regimeofNicolaeCeausescuhadapolicyof“supportinghistorianswhowerecriticalof
theSovietofficialposition,”namelythatMoldovarightlybelongedtoRussia,and
instead“arguedthatMoldovawasaRomanianterritory.”534Thenotionthat,even
duringcommunism,theviewthatBessarabiahadbeeneffectivelystolenfrom
Romaniawaspropagatedisproofofhowentrenchedthisbeliefisamongst
Romanians.
TheresultoftheportrayaloftheRepublicofMoldovaasanEstrangedOtherhasledto
thedevelopmentofaparticularattitudetowardsthisstate,dominatedbythe
perceptionofsameness,orasignofequalitybetweenthetwostates.Whilsttheymay
beseparateentitiesthereexistsapowerfulsensethatbothRomaniaandMoldovaare
inhabitedbythesamepeople.Thismeans,ontheonehand,thatBucharesthasa
vestedinterestintheaffairsofChisinauandmaintainingcloserelationshipswithitis
532Roper(2000),p.125.533SeeBoia(2012),p.94orConstantiniu(2011),p.286.534Roper(2000),p.126.
210
paramount.AsAnonymousDhasargued,Moldovarepresentsan“obsession”535for
Romania.Ontheotherhand,thematterofapotentialre-unificationhasneverbeen
takenoffthetablecompletelysincetheendoftheColdWar.Theresultofthis
identitaryaffinityisthatMoldovaoccupiesaveryspecialplaceintheRomanian
imaginary,asoneofitscriticalrelationshipswhichspeaksdirectlytotheprerogatives
setbyitsnationalidentitynarrativeinregardstothethemeofUnity.Oneshouldnot
forgetthat,aslongasBessarabiaremainsanindependentstate,theRomanian
nationalprojectisincomplete.Theseperceptionshavehadasignificantimpactonthe
interactionbetweenthetwostates,bothbeforeandafterRomania’saccessiontothe
EUandNATO.Inlightofcurrentregionaldevelopments,thisaffinitymay,however,
haveseriousrepercussionsonthestabilityofEasternEurope,aswillbediscussedin
followingsections.
Moldo-RomanianRelationsDuringtheTransitionPeriod
TheRepublicofMoldovarepresentstheareaintheEastRomaniansaremost
concernedwith.UnlikeitsrelationstoRussiaandHungary,Romaniawasverykeento
establishastrongconnectionwithChisinauandinitiallypursuedtheavenueofre-
unificationintowhatwouldhaveapproximatedthecontoursofGreaterRomania.536
Indeed,evenamongstWesternobserversthisoutcomeseemedinevitable.537The
wavesofoptimismandnationalismofthelate1980sandearly1990s,however,never
materialisedintoaunionsimilartothatofEastandWestGermany.Thereasonswhy
thatwasthecasehavetodowithbothexternalandinternalcircumstances,butmay
alsohaveanidentitarydimension,bothofwhichrequiresomeattention.
AtthemomentofthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Romania’spositionontheRepublic
ofMoldovawastheoneoutlinedabove:thesenseofasharedidentitywithMoldova
hadneverwaned,fuelled,asithadbeen,bythesocialistnationalistpolicyof
Ceausescu.Ontheotherside,Moldovatoowasexperiencingsomethingofanational
535AnonymousD(2014).536See[Figure4].Onesays‘approximate’because,asisevidentfrom[Figure6],certainMoldovanterritorieswereannexedtoUkraine.537SeeCash(2007)orPanici(2003)forinstance.
211
awakening.UnderGorbachev’sglasnostpolicypro-Romanianoppositiongroupshad
coalescedintoapoliticalformation,thePopularFrontwhichhadbeenpushingfor
“linguisticandculturalfreedom.”538Morebroadly,theFrontwasaskingforaformal
recognitionofthelinkbetweentheMoldovanandRomanianlanguagesandthe
essentialdemarcationbetweentheirrepublicandMoscow.In1989theFront
summonedalargescalerallywhichwasattendedby500.000people“carrying
RomanianflagsandplacardswrittenwithLatinlettersanddenouncingtheMolotov-
RibbentropPact[and]theSovietannexationofBessarabia.”539ThePopularFrontwon
the1990electionsandwhen,inAugust1991,Moldovadeclareditsindependence
fromtheUSSR,Romaniawasthefirsttorecognisethenewstate’ssovereignty.540With
apro-Romaniangovernmentatthehelm,itseemedasthoughtheSovietdominion
haddonenothingtodampentheRomaniannessofMoldovans.Indeed,asBoiaargues,
“theRepublicofMoldovaseemedreadytothrowitselfinRomania’sarms.Romanian
(andnot‘Moldovan,’asitwascalledintheSovietera)wasdeclaredtheofficial
languageandeventhecoloursoftheRomanianflagwereadopted:red,yellowand
blue.”541Evenmorepoignantly,Romania’santhem,Awaken,Romanian,becamethe
newrepublic’snationalanthemalso.
Thiseuphoria,however,wasshortlived.TheyearsofSovietrulehadchangedthe
ethniccompositionoftheMoldovanstate–only65%ofitscitizenswereethnic
Romanians,whilstamongsttheminoritiesnearly14%wereUkrainianand13%
Russian.542Therefore,Chisinau’spro-Romaniandirectionmayhaveappealedtotwo
thirdsofthepopulation,butithadthereverseeffectontheotherthird.AsCashpoints
out,“pro-unificationrhetoricgeneratedsignificantfearandanxietyamongethnic
minorities,contributingtothedevelopmentoftheTransnistrianandGagauzconflicts
intheyearsfollowingindependence.”543Indeed,soonaftertheMoldovan’s
governmentintentiontopursueaunionistpolicybecameclear,Transnistriaand
538Roper(2000),p.125.539A.Panici,‘RomanianNationalismintheRepublicofMoldova,’TheGlobalReviewofEthnopolitics,2:2(January2003),p.39.540Ibid.,p.46.541Boia(2012),p.246.542Magoci(2002),p.152.543J.R.Cash,‘Origins,Memory,andIdentity:‘Villages’andthePoliticsofNationalismintheRepublicofMoldova,’EastEuropeanPoliticsandSocieties,21:4(2007),p.590.
212
Gagauzia544proclaimedthemselvesrepublicsseparatefromChisinau.WiththeGagauz
Chisinaumanagedtosettlethedisputeinapeacefulmanner,offeringtheregion
specialautonomousstatusinDecember1994.545
Transnistria,however,wasadifferentmatter.EastoftheDniesterthepopulationwas
initsmajorityofRussianorUkrainianethnicityandaRussianregiment,knownasthe
14thArmy,wasstationedinitsterritory.TransnistriawasalsothefocusofSoviet
industrialisationand,althoughitmakesuponly8%ofthecountry’sterritory,it
accountedfor40%ofitsoverallindustrialoutput546and87.5%ofitselectricenergy
production.547Inotherwords,theregionwascriticaltoMoldova’seconomicstability
andconstitutedRussia’smainleverageinitsrelationstoChisinau.Civilwareruptedin
1992,whenChisinauattemptedtooverthrowthesecessionistgovernmentinTiraspol.
However,theTransnistrianforces,whichbenefittedfromtheactivesupportofthe
2.600strong14thArmyanda“substantialstockpileofSovietweaponry,”548quickly
emergedvictorious.Asaresult,Transnistriabecameasecessionistregion,proclaiming
itselftheTransnistrianMoldovaRepublic,itsexistenceacknowledgedbyitsmain
benefactor,Russia,butunrecognisedbyChisinau.Astalematehadbeenreached,
unsurpassedtothisday,withneithertheMoldovansnorTransnistriansopento
compromiseandwithRussiahappytomaintainthestatus-quoofafrozenconflict.
Throughoutthis,Romanianevergotactivelyinvolved,acting,instead,onlyasa
“diplomaticsupporterofMoldova.”549Whetheranxietiesoverapotentialclashwith
Russiawereattherootofthishesitationisdifficulttoassess.Whatthisepisodeproves
isthatre-unificationwasnotasstraightforwardanaffairasthethetwostateshad
expected.BothRomaniaandMoldovahadchangeddramaticallysincetheinter-war
period.ForBucharest,Moldovawasrevealedasafragilestatewithpowerfullinksto
544TheGagauzpeopleareethnicallyofTurkicdescent,butwhohaveadoptedOrthodoxy,ratherthanIslam,astheirmainreligion.545Magocsii(2002),p.151.546A.Sanchez,‘The‘Frozen’Southeast:HowtheMoldova-TransnistriaQuestionHasBecomeaEuropeanSecurityIssue,’TheJournalofSlavicMilitaryStudies,22:2(2009),p.158.547Panici(2003),p.47.548E.Korosteleva,‘Moldova’sEuropeanChoice:‘BetweenTwoStools?,’Europe-AsiaStudies,62:8(2010),p.1268.549Roper(2000),p.126.
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Moscow,theveryentityRomaniawasattemptingtodistanceitselffrom.Moldova,
similarly,foundthatRomania“wasbyfarnosocialoreconomicparadise”550andcould
notofferanalternativeavenuetoRussia.Beyondthat,unlikeRussia,whichhadmade
itsinteresttokeepMoldovainitssphereofinfluenceclear,Romanianevermadeany
decidedefforttokick-starttheunificationprocess.551Thesewereseriousimpediments
tounification,and,astheinitialeuphoriaofMoldova’sindependencedissipated,they
becameinsurmountable.Thetwostatesbegandriftingapart.First,in1992,when
negotiatingaBasicTreaty,theycouldnotagreeon“howtodefinethenatureofthe
relations(whethertheyare‘brotherly’or‘neighbourly’).”552In1994,Chisinautooka
furthersteptowardsdelineatingtheMoldovanandRomanianpeoples:theRomanian
anthemwasreplacedwithanoriginalhymn,OurLanguage,whilsttheconstitution
statedthattheofficialstatelanguagewastobeMoldovan,ratherthanRomanian.553
TherealitythatMoldovaandRomaniawouldremainseparatestateswasultimately
confirmedin1994,whenanationalreferendumshowedthat95%ofMoldovans
wishedfortheircountrytoremainindependent.554
Workingfromanidentity-basedperspective,however,mayofferadditionalinsight
intothereasonsbehindthefailedunificationproject.ForRomanians,ontheonehand,
therehasneverbeenanyquestionthattheyandtheMoldovansarethesamepeople,
andthatMoldova-thestateistheartificialcreationoftheSoviets.Thisisreflectednot
onlyintherhetoricitsleaders,whocontinuetorefertoMoldovaas‘oursister,
Bessarabia,’555butalsointhefactthatthenotionhasneverbeenchallengedbyany
politicalparty.Instead,onenoticesthat,alongsideRomania’spro-Westerndirection,
onthisissuealonethereexistscompletepoliticalalignment.AnonymousDcaptured
thisviewwhenhearguedthat“thereexistsacertainobsession,whichinawayis
legitimateandcanbeconsideredrational.”556Panicialsonotesthat:“allpartiesin
550Panici(2003),p.42.551Cash(2007),p.591.552I.Angelescu,‘NewEasternPerspectives?ACriticalAnalysisofRomania’sRelationswithMoldova,UkraineandtheBlackSearRegion,’Perspectives,19:2(2011)-SpecialIssue:IdentityandSolidarityinForeignPolicy:InvestigatingEastCentralEuropeanRelationswiththeEasternNeighbourhood,p.131.553Panici(2003),pp.43-44.554Ibid.,p.43.555LeaderofthePSD,LiviuDragnea,citedinTobiasandMagradean(2015).556AnonymousD(2014).
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Bucharestagreedthattheannexationin1940wasillegal,thattherewasnoquestion
aboutthetrueRomanianidentityoftheMoldovans(…),andthatinanidealworldthe
twostateswouldcertainlybejoinedintoareconstitutedGreaterRomania.”557This
viewreflectsthepositionofRomaniansociety,76%ofwhomsupportedapotential
unificationwiththeRepublicofMoldovain2013.558Soingrainedisthispositioninthe
Romanianmentalitythatitmayitselfhaveactedasanobstacletounification.AsCash
argues,overwhelmingconsensusatbothsocietalandpoliticallevelmeantthat
“‘Bessarabia’neveremergedasawedgeissuethatcouldincreaseoneparty’spower
overthatofothers.”559BecausetheMoldovanquestionwasnotcontested,itwasnot
anissueofmajorsalienceand,consequently,neverrepresentedamajorforeignpolicy
priority.Thefact,however,remainsthatRomanianssharetheconvictionthat
MoldovanandRomanianidentitiesareanalogous,andthereforethatunificationis
justified.
Ontheotherhand,whethertheMoldovansstill‘feel’Romanianisanaltogethermore
complexissue.DespitetheresurgenceofRomaniannationalisminthelate1980s,the
subsequentcoolingofrelationsbetweenChisinauandBucharestwasasymptomof
Moldova’sstruggletodecideonitsownidentity,arealityacutelyfeltontheotherside
oftheRiverPrut.ThequestionLucianBoiaasksispertinent:“aretheystill
Romanian?”560ThefactisthatBessarabia,separatedfromtherestofMoldaviain
1812,wascutawayfromtheotherRomanianregionsatatimewhentheprocesses
aimedatunificationweregatheringpace,atbothpoliticalandpsychologicallevels.
ThequestionthereforeiswhetherthethemeofUnitywaseveraspowerfulin
Moldovaasithadbeeninthekinstate.Romaniaitselfcameintoexistencewithoutthe
Bessarabians,whowere,instead,thesubjectofintenseRussification.Intotal,
BessarabiaspentunderthreedecadesaspartoftheRomanianstate(1918-1940and
1941-1944),comparedtoaconsiderablylongerperiodofinfluencefromRussia(nearly
557Panici(2003),p.45.558IRES[TheRomanianInstituteforEvaluationandStrategy],AgendaPublica–Semnifiactiasarbatoriide1Decembrie.VizitaPremieruluiChineiinRomania[PublicAgenda–theSignificanceoftheCelebrationof1December.TheChinesePrime-Minister’sVisittoRomania],29November2013,http://www.ires.com.ro/uploads/articole/ires_agenda_publica-1_decembrie_2013.pdf[accessed31.05.2016],p.9.559Cash(2007),p.591.560Boia(2012),p.245.
215
150years),who,conversely,hadmadeaconcertedefforttoengineerthesenseofa
uniqueMoldovanidentityandstrengthenthelinksbetweenChisinauandMoscow.
Asaresult,asearlyastheinter-warperiod,Bessarabianolongerperfectlymirroredits
Romaniancounterpart.RomanianadministratorsattemptingtointegrateBessarabia
intothenewlyexpandedstate,“werefacedwiththetaskofconvincingethnic
Moldovansthattheywere,infact,ethnicRomanians.”Thisandthebroaderprojectof
statebuildingencountereddifficulties“becauseethnicMoldovansheldRussian
languageandcultureinhighesteem.”561Itwouldseemasthoughthenation-building
processembarkeduponbyBessarabiaunderRussianauthorityhadtakenroots,afact
whichBucharestfailedtorecognise,anditseemsapparentthatthegapbetween
MoldovaandRomaniawasnotfullybridgedduringtheunificationperiod.Thefifty
yearsoffurtherRussiandominationaftertheSecondWorldWarwouldonlyhave
deepenedthecleavagebetweenthetwo.AsPanicipointsout,“theauthoritarian
politicalsystemoftheSovieteraputapremiumonMoldovannationalaffiliationand
oftensparednoexpenseintheefforttoengineerone.”562Amongsttheactions
undertakenonewouldhighlightthealphabetchangefromLatintoCyrillicandthe
adoptionofRussianasasecondnationallanguage.AllthewhileinCeausescu’s
RomaniatheidentitynarrativewasemphasisingthethemeofUnityandtheRomanian
nationalcharacter,inMoldovathenation-buildingprojectwasaimedintheopposite
directionandwasmeanttoinstilthebeliefthatoneithersideoftheircommon
border,theRiverPrut,existedtwodifferentpeoples.This,inasense,explains
Moldovans’ambivalencetowardsclaimsthattheiridentityis,infact,Romanian.Boia
emphasisesthiswhenhearguesthat“MoldovadoesnotresembleRomania.(…)
RomanianBessarabiansareofadifferentsort.Theirculturallevelislowerthanin
Romania,andtheRussianhallmarkissubstantial.Thepastcannotbeundone,thisis
theoutcome.”563Ineffect,Boia’simpliedoutcomeisthatthesamehistoricalprocesses
whichreinforcedRomanians’convictionsthatMoldovaisrightfullyapartofRomania
561Cash(2007).P.592.562Panici,(2003),p.37.563Boia(2012),p.246.
216
mayhaveledMoldovanstoquestionthisverynotion,andmayhavekick-startedthe
developmentofasenseofaunique,Moldovan,nationalidentity.
Inanycase,oncetheeuphoriaoverapotentialre-unificationsubsided,dialogue
betweenthetwostatesbecamemorecomplicated.AsAngelescuhasargued,
”relationsbecametenseafter1993,andafterthetensionspassed,therelationshave
beengradually,butslowly,improving,”564asRomaniareconciledwiththenotionthat
unificationwasnotaviablesolution.Therestillexistedthebasisforaspecial
relationship–theborderbetweenthetwostateswaspassportandvisafree,565and
thesocio-culturalconnectionwasstrengthenedthroughaprogramofofferingschool
textbooksanduniversityscholarshipstoMoldovanstudents.566However,interaction
betweenBucharestandChisinaubecamestrainedoncemorewiththerisetopowerof
thePartyofCommunists.Thefactthattheyattractedasignificantelectoral
percentagein1998andremainedaforceinMoldovanpoliticswellintothetwenty-
firstcentury567signalledtoRomaniatheRepublic’sambivalencenotonlytowardsthe
typeofrelationshipthetwoshouldmaintainbutalsoitscommitmenttopursuinga
pro-Westerndirection.WiththeCommunistsinpower,thegovernmentinChisinaudid
muchtothreatenthisrelationshipandwithit,Romania’sappetiteforestablishing
closertieswithMoldova.AsPanicipointedout,in2002thePartyofCommunistsled
byVladimirVoronindeclaredaRomanianmilitaryattachépersonanongrataand
announceditwasconsideringrejectingthatyear’stwothousanduniversity
scholarships.568
Overall,thefactthatthedomesticpoliticsofitsclosestneighbourwereoncemore
dominatedbycommunistsdampenedRomania’saplomb;itcertainly,attheveryleast,
raisedquestionsastowhetherMoldovawishedtoescapetheRussiansphereof
influenceatall.InlightofRomania’sowndifficulttransition,thismeantthatrelations
withtheRepublicofMoldovacouldnotbeprioritisedovertheaccessiongoal.AsCash
564Angelescu(2011),p.130.565Panici(2003),p.46.566Ibid.567ThePartyofCommunistswasareconstitutedversionoftheCommunistPartyoutlawedin1991,setupin1993.Inthe1998parliamentaryelectionstheysecured30%ofthepopularvoteandin2001theywonaparliamentarymajority.OnthisseePanici(2003).568Ibid.,p.50.
217
argued,whilst“nationalidentityisdeeplyimportanttothepoliticalprocess,(…)
regionalpowerbalances,economicinterestandpragmatisminethnicrelationshave
heldswayinforeignpolicydevelopments.”569Romania,therefore,limiteditsapproach
tothatofsupportingMoldova’sownaccessionprocesstotheEUalongsideitsown.570
However,onewouldmakethepointthat,onceMoldova’sambivalenceoverits
Romaniannessbecameapparent,andwasdoubledbytheriseofthePartyof
Communists,whathappenedinRomaniawasareshufflingofitsidentity-based
priorities.ThegoalofunificationwouldhavehadpreponderanceoverthatofEuro-
Atlanticintegration,becauseofthesignificanceofthethemeofUnityintheRomanian
identitynarrative.ThefactthatIliescu,whowasgenerallyresistanttochangeand
dubiousinhiscommitmenttowardstheaccessionprocess,pursuedthisdirection
outrightintheearly1990sspeakstotheimportanceofthisdesideratum.Under
presidentConstantinescu,however,asaperceptionemergedthatMoldovawaseither
notyetreadyforthisstep,orhadapro-Easternagenda,theissueofunificationwas
movedtothebackburner,allowingforthemorepragmaticgoalsCashmentionsto
becomepredominant.Thesetoo,meanwhile,hadapowerfulidentitarydimension,as
thedesiretojointheWestwasmotivatedbytheprerogativeofensuringthestate’s
physicalandeconomicsecurity,aswellasitsdistancefromMoscow.Inconclusion,
onewouldarguethatbothgoalsaremotivatedbyidentity-drivenconsiderations,but
whatchangedinthe1990sandearly2000swastheirorderofpriority,muchlikeinthe
caseofHungarian-Romanianrelationsofthesameperiod.Asthenextsectionwill
explore,onceaccessionbecamereality,thepolicyofpursuingclosertieswithChisinau
camebacktotheforeofRomania’sforeignpolicyagenda.
ContemporaryMoldo-RomanianRelations
Despiteperiodsduringthetransitionwhenrelationsbetweenthetwostateswere
particularlyuneasyandRomaniaprioritiseddifferentforeignpolicygoals,socio-
economicandculturallinksbetweenthetwocountriescontinuedandonlyintensified
afterRomania’saccession.Buildingontheassumptionsmadebythethesisinthe
569Cash(2007),p.592.570Angelescu(2011),p.132.
218
introductorychapters,inthisrelationship,again,onenoticestheprimacyofidentity-
basedprerogativesinthepursuitofindividualforeignpolicypriorities,namely
ensuringcloserelationswithMoldova.Thistranslatedineffortstoencourage
Moldova’stransitionfromsocialism,itspro-Westerndirection,andmostimportantly,
strengtheningtheethnicRomanianelementatthesocietallevel.Becausetheborder
arrangementbetweenthetwostatescouldnolongercontinueafterRomania’s
enteringtheEuropeanUnion,Bucharesttookthedecision,in2009,toofferall
MoldovansofRomanianethnicityaRomanian,andthereforeEuropean,passport.
Additionally,asignificantnumberofRomaniancompanieshavebeenregisteredinthe
Republic(around650)andRomaniaranksamongstthetenmostimportantforeign
investorsinthestateintheperiodof1994-2008.571Romaniaalsopledgedtooffer
Moldova100millioneurosbetween2011-2014,572inaidof“oneofEurope’spoorest
countries.”573Theculturalconnectionwasmaintained,withRomaniastillproviding
RomanianlanguagetextbooksanduniversityscholarshipsforMoldovanstudents.
FinallyRomaniahasactedasanadvocateforMoldova’sownEUintegrationefforts,
withformerprime-ministerPontaannouncingRomania’smissiontoachieveMoldova’s
Europeaninclusionby2019,whenRomaniatakesoverthepresidencyoftheunion.574
Asasidenote,thisdeclarationtookplaceimmediatelyafterMoldovasignedthe
AssociationAgreementwiththeEU,attheEasternPartnershipSummit,inVilnius
(2013).
Whetherthisaimistrulyfeasibleinthecurrentcontextornot,Romania’s
commitmenttodrawingMoldovaclosertoitselfandWesternEuropeis
unquestionable.Ofcourse,thefactthatafterthe2009parliamentaryelectionsthe
leadershipofMoldovaswitchedtoapro-Europeanandpro-Romaniancentre-right
coalitionwouldalsohaveaidedthesedevelopments.TheperceptionthatinChisinau
sitsagovernmentwhichiscommittedtothecountry’spro-Westerndirection
alleviatesRomaniananxietiesovertheextentofRussia’sinvolvementintheiraffairs
571Angelescu(2011),p.133.572Ibid.573G.Bosse,‘TheEU’sRelationswithMoldova:Governance,PartnershiporIgnorance?,’Europe-AsiaStudies,62:8(October2010),p.1291.574AnonymousD(2014).
219
or,attheveryleast,theextenttowhichtheleadershipiscomfortablewiththis.Inany
case,itisclearthat,especiallysince2007,relationswiththeRepublicbecamea
priorityforBucharest.ThroughthelensoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,the
reasonsbehindthisappearstraightforward.Romaniahasconsolidateditsposition
bothwithinEuropeandasNATOpartner.Now,establishingevercloserrelationswith
ChisinaugoesbeyondbilateralagreementsbetweenthetwostatesandRomaniahas
additionalleveragetotempttheRepublic.Bucharestnowembodiesnotonlyitssister
state,butalsoallEuro-Atlanticvaluesaswellasthepotentialbenefitstobereaped
frompursuingapro-Westerndirection.Fromanidentitaryperspective,whatisclearis
thatRomania’saffinitytowardsMoldovadidnotdisappearduringthedifficultperiod
oftransition;itsinfluenceoverBucharest’sbehaviourrecededtemporarilybecauseof
perceptionsovertheMoldovandomesticclimateand,consequently,analterationof
Romania’sownpriorities.However,asexternalcircumstancesbecameopportune,it
re-emerged,thusprovingtheenduranceofthisidentity-basedattitude.
Therealityis,nonetheless,thatwhatLucianBoiacalledtheRussian‘hallmark’is
indeedstillverypowerful.TherearetwoaspectsinparticularinwhichRussia’s
dominationovertheRepublicofMoldovaismostprominent–theeconomicandthe
political/strategicspheres.Ontheonehand,theRepublicisoneofEurope’spoorest
statesanditis,almostentirely,dependentonRussia.Firstly,Moldovahastoimport
nearlyallofitsenergysupplies575and,althoughRomaniabegansupplyingitelectric
powerin1998576andgasin2014,Russiaremainsitsmainsourceofgasimports,which
accountforover60%ofitsenergyconsumption.577Intermsoftrade,ontheother
hand,althoughtheEUhasbecomethe“maindestinationforMoldovanexports,”578
theRussianFederationremainsthemostimportantsingleimporterofMoldovan
goods(40%),579withanigh-onmonopolyonMoldova’swinetrade.Theseareboth
significant,astheymayact,astheyhaveinthepast,asleversforRussiatoput
pressureonChisinauandcurbMoldova’sWesternaspirations.AsKorostelevaargues,
575L.V.Fokina,‘EconomicCooperationBetweenRussianRegionsandMoldova,’ProblemsofEconomicTransition,47:12(April2005),p.80.576Panici(2003),p.46.577Fokina(2005),pp.80-81.578Bosse(2010),p.1303.579Fokina(2005),p.80.
220
“Russiahas(…)usedvariouseconomicmeanstonegotiateitspoliticalleverage,such
asthesuddenreductionsinthesupplyofgas,oilandelectricityinthewinterof2005-
2006afterthefailuretoreachagreementontheKozakMemorandumfor
Transnistria,”580butalsothrougharecentembargoonMoldova’swineexportswhich
“wereusedtodisciplineMoldovaforitsincreasinglydefinedleaningtowardsthe
West.”581Inotherwords,Russiahasnotrefrainedfromusingitshardpowertokeep
Moldovafirmlywithinitscontrol.InthefaceofsuchdecidedactionfromMoscow,and
withaEuropeanUnionambivalentinitscommitmentstowardstheEuropean
Neighbourhood,582itisdifficultforMoldovatodisentangleitselffromRussia’ssphere
ofinfluence.
TheseconddimensionworthyofdiscussionconcernsTransnistriaandRussia’sown
strategicagenda.TheseparatistregionfunctionslargelyasaRussianenclavesince,
beyondthepresenceofthe14thArmy,Russiasubsidises“asmuchas80%ofthe
Transnistrianbudget”and“hasissuedpassportstosome150.000residentsofthe
region.”583Assuch,ithasavestedinterestintheregionandtherefore,intheaffairsof
Chisinau.Additionally,RussiahasallowedTransnistriatoacquiresignificantdebtsto
Gazprom,tothevalueof3.8billiondollars,nearlydoublethatoftheUkraine’s(2
billiondollars).584IfintheUkrainethisdebtresultedinacut-offofgassupplywhich
inadvertentlyaffectedtheentirecontinentin2009,considerablylesspressurehas
beenputonTiraspoltoclearitscredit.585ThatmaybebecausetheTransnistriandebt
givesMoscowascendancyinitsrelationshipwithChisinau,particularlyinregardstoa
potentialresolutiontotheTransnistrianconflict.Russiafavoursafederativesolution
whichwouldresultinapower-sharingagreementbetweenthegovernmentsin
TiraspolandChisinau,whichtheMoldovans,particularlyitspro-Westernparties,
wouldlikelynotacquiesceto.586WereMoldova,however,tosearchforadifferent
580Korosteleva(2010),p.1279.581Ibid.582SeeBosse(2010)foramoredetailedaccountoftheunequalpartnershipbetweentheRepublicofMoldovaandtheEuropeanUnion.583N.PopescuandL.Litra,‘Transnistria:ABottom-UpSolution,’EuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations,63(September2012),p.4584Ibid.,p.2.585Korosteleva(2010),p.1279.586PopescuandLitra(2012),p.5.
221
solution,whetheracentralisedreintegrationorevenaunificationwithRomania
withoutTransnistria,RussiamaydemandthedebtbeclearedbyChisinau.AsDmitry
Rogozin,Russiadeputyprime-ministerandPutin’srepresentativeinTransnistriahas
stated,“ifMoldovawillnotrecogniseTransnistria,thenitmeansthatthegas
consumedbyTransnistria(…)isMoldova’sdebt,andMoldovashouldpayforit.Who
else?”587
Itisobvious,therefore,thatTransnistriarepresentsamajorissuefortheRepublicof
Moldova,bothasadomesticconcern,butalsoinitsrelationswithRussia.Aneven
greaterthreat,however,isthatafrozenconflictsuchasthisisalwaysliabletobe
reactivated.Russiahasproven,bothinGeorgiain2008andinUkrainein2014,thatit
willnothesitatetoutilisetheseproblemregionstopursueitsownforeignagenda.In
thiscontext,Moldova’sgeopoliticalpositioningasabufferstatebetweenNATOand
Russiaisalsosignificant.AttheRiverPruttheCISandNATOhaveadirectborder,and
theinstalmentandoperationalizationoftheballisticmissileshieldonRomanian
territoryhasbeentakeninMoscow,ashasbeenshowninpreviouschapters,asa
directchallengetoRussia.AsGusahaspointedout,“quiteobviously,Russiawishesto
transformtheEuropeanflankoftheCIS–Ukraine,Belarus,Moldova–inaveritable
bastioncapableofrejectingEuropeanandAmericanpresenceintheregion.”588Ifthis
assessmentiscorrect,thenthepro-WesternshiftofbothUkraineandMoldovaof
recentyearsmustbetakenasdirectthreatstotheRussiansphereofinfluence.
Additionally,ifRussia’sresponsetothisdevelopmentinUkraineisanythingtogoby,it
hintsattherisksMoldovafacesinpursuingaWesternandpro-Romaniandirection.
Thisexplains,coupledwiththegeographicproximityofMoldovatotheUkraine(the
latteractuallyengulfstheformerandtheonlysectionofMoldovawhichdoesnot
borderUkraineisitswesternfrontierwithRomania),Bucharest’sconcernoverrecent
regionaldevelopments.Fromthisperspective,MoldovaisindeedaBesiegedFortress,
587Rogozin,citedinPopescuandLitra(2012),p.5.588Gusa(2011),pp.225-226.
222
threatenedbotheconomicallyandphysicallybytheTransnistrianissue,aregionwhich
recentlyrestateditsdesiretoannexitselftoRussia.589
AlthoughRussiahasnotyetrespondedtothisrequest,recentdevelopmentswould,
nonetheless,haveunsettledbothChisinauandBucharest.Theviewisthatbothstates
haveanimportantstakeintheUkrainianconflict,becauseofthestrikingsimilarities
betweenTransnistriaandCrimea.ThedevelopmentsinUkrainehaveundoubtedly
strengthenedperceptionsofMoldovaasaBesiegedFortressandfromthisstems
Romania’scurrenteffortstopushforcloserrelationsbetweenMoldovaandNATO590
andactasanadvocateforChisinauinitsnegotiationswiththeEuropeanUnion.Forits
ownpart,thepro-EuropeangovernmentinMoldovahasintensifieditscontactwith
NATOinparticular:in2016itreachedanagreementontheestablishmentofaNATO
LiaisonOfficeinChisinau.591Moreimportantly,duringthepressconferencewherethe
announcementwasmade,SecretaryGeneralofNATO,JensStoltenbergreiterated
NATO’spositionthatit“respects(…)Moldova’sterritorialindependence,integrityand
sovereigntyandNATOalliesdonot,andwillnot,recogniseTransnistria.”592
Therefore,onecouldarguethatRomaniaandMoldovahavefoundanequilibriumin
therelationship–RomaniaactsasasupporterandadvocatesthecauseofMoldova,
keepingtheissueofTransnistriaontheinternationalagenda,whileMoldovaremains
committedtopursuingapro-Westernagenda.Thediplomaticrelationshiphaving
improvedsignificantly,RomaniaalsosupportsMoldova’sdisentanglementfromRussia
byprovidingfinancialaidandanalternativesourceofenergyimports.593Thatbeing
said,theinternalissueswhichinthetransitionperiodcomplicatedBucharest-Chisinau
589L.Bogdan,‘AmabsadorulruslaUE:RusianuintentioneazasaanexezeTransnistriasauoricealtaregiunedinlume[RussianAmbassadortotheEU:RussiaDoesNotIntendtoAnnexTransnistriaorAnyOtherRegionoftheWorld],’Mediafax,17.04.2014,http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/ambasadorul-rus-la-ue-rusia-nu-intentioneaza-sa-anexeze-transnistria-sau-orice-alta-regiune-din-lume-12481474[accessed14January2016].590See,forinstance,PresidentIohannis’statementaftertheconclusionoftheNATOSummitinWarsaw(2016).591AnnouncementbySecretaryGeneralofNATOStoltenberg,inNATO,JointPressPoint–withNATOSecretaryGeneralJensStoltenbergandthePrimeMinisteroftheRepublicofMoldova,PavelFilip,29.11.2016,http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_138326.htm?selectedLocale=en[accessed29December2016].592Ibid.593Inayeh(2015),p.41.
223
interactionaremakingacomebackinMoldova’sdomesticpolitics.Withoutgoinginto
toomuchdetail,aseverecaseofembezzlementwhichtranslatedintothe
‘disappearance’of1billioneurosfromitsbankingsystemin2014,ledtothefallof
Moldova’spro-Europeangovernmentandtheprosecutionofitsprime-minister.A
periodofchaoswasfollowed,inearly2016,bytheestablishmentofanew
governmentputtogetherbyalocaloligarch,VladimirPlahotnyuk(suspectedtohave
been,atleastinpart,responsibleforthetheft),whichwasmetwithviolentprotestsin
Chisinau,organizedbybothpro-Russianandpro-WesternandUnionistfactions.594The
consequencesoftheseinternaleventsaretwo-foldandhavesignificantimplications
forMoldova’scurrentandfutureforeignpolicydirection.
Firstly,disillusionmentwiththeaccusedgovernmentshasresultedinasurgeof
supportforthepartieswhichfavourclosertieswithMoscow,nowinopposition.
AccordingtoanIPPpollfromNovember2015,acombinedtotalof50%ofthe
populationwouldvoteforoneofthreepro-Russianparties–OurParty,thePartyof
SocialistsoftheRepublicofMoldova,andthePartyofCommunists.595Asimilarpoll
fromApril2016showedIgorDodon,theleaderoftheSocialists,tobethepopular
frontrunnerforthepositionofpresident(29.3%),whilesupportforthethreepartiesis
at55%.596SincethenDodonwonthepresidentialelectionswhichtookplacein
MoldovainNovember2016,confirmingthepopulation’sshifttotheleftand,
consequently,theEast.Althoughbythetimeofwriting,thepresident-electhasyetto
beinvestedandMoldova’sleadershipisprovidedbyPavelFilat’spro-European
coalition,itisbeyonddoubtthatthiselectionand,weretheresulttorepeatitself,the
parliamentaryelectionsexpectedtotakeplacenextyearmightdestabilisethisnew
foundequilibriuminMoldo-Romanianrelations.
594V.Josu,andJ.Hawk,‘TheEconomicandPoliticalCrisisinMoldova,’SouthFront,publishedinGlobalResearch,24.01.2016,http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-economic-and-political-crisis-in-moldova/5503229[accessed03June2016].595InstitutuldePoliticiPublice[InstituteforPublicpolicy](RepublicofMoldova),BarometrulOpinieiPublice–noiembrie2015[BarometerofPublicOpinion–November2015],08.12.2015,p.23,http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&id=760&idc=156[accessed01May2016].596InstitutuldePoliticiPublice[InstituteforPublicpolicy](RepublicofMoldova),BarometrulOpinieiPublice–aprilie2016[BarometerofPublicOpinion–April2016],04.05.2016,pp.40&47,http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf[accessed20June2016].
224
Thesearethetypesofchangeincircumstanceswhichthisprojecthasarguedleadto
anaugmentationofidentitaryanxietiesandthiswas,indeed,thecase,onbothsides
ofthePrut.InRomania,theelectionswereintenselymediatised,includinginthe
nationalnewsagency,Agerpres.AlthoughRomania’spositiontowardsthetwo
candidates–Dodonforthepro-RussiansandMaiaSanduforthepro-Europeans–was
officiallyneutral,theaffinityoftheformertowardsMoscowandhisvarious
statementsconfirmingit,suchasthefactthataspresidenthewouldvisitfirst
Moscow,thenBrusselsandonlyafterwardsBucharest,597wereemphasised.Asfor
Moldovaitself,thisshifttothelefthasbeencounteredbyaresurgenceofpro-
Romanianattitudes.InacontextinwhichtrustinthepoliticalclassinMoldovaisatan
alltimelow–intheAprilsurvey49%ofthepopulationansweredittrustednoneof
Moldova’spoliticalfigures598–agrassrootsorganisationhasbeensetuptorebuild
thestate’sconnectionwithRomania.Themovement,calledtheCivicPlatform‘Action
2012,’iscomprisedofpro-unionistNGOsfromRomania,Moldova,theUSandseveral
Europeancountries,andproposesatwo-prongedpoliticalandsocialplanwhichwould
seeunificationachievedin2018.599Theplatformencouragesthesetupofa
frameworkinbothstateswhichcouldadministrativelymanagetheunificationproject.
In2015,forinstance,itlobbiedBucharestfortheestablishmentofinstitutionswhich
wouldeasetheprocess–apresidentialcommissiontaskedwithanalysingtheimpact
ofunification,apermanentjointMoldo-Romanianparliamentarycommissionanda
RepublicofMoldovaOffice,directlysubordinatedtotheprime-minister.600Onthe
socialside,theplatformisappealingtothepubliconbothsidesoftheborderto
strengthenlinksbetweenthetwostates.Uponsigninguptotheproject,individuals
597Agerpres,CetateniiRepubliciiMoldovaisialegpresedintele,intr-unscrutinalcaruirezultatdepindederataparticipariilaurne[MoldovanCitizensChoosetheirPresidentinanElectioninwhichtheResultDependsonTurnout],11.11.2016,http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/11/11/cetatenii-republicii-moldova-isi-aleg-presedintele-intr-un-scrutin-al-carui-rezultat-depinde-de-rata-de-participare-la-urne-13-41-59[accessed11November2016].598IPPBarometer(April2016),p.36.599UnionistPlatform‘Action2012,’OfficialWebsite,http://actiunea2012.ro[accessed20June2016].600Agerpres,Platformaunionista‘Actiunea2012’solicitainfiintareaunorinstitutiiresponsabiledegestionarearelatieicuRepublicaMoldova[UnionistPlatform‘Action2012’RequeststheEstablishingofInstitutionsResponsiblewithManagingRelationswiththeRepublicofMoldova,12.07.2015,http://www.agerpres.ro/social/2015/07/12/platforma-unionista-actiunea-2012-solicita-infiintarea-unor-institutii-responsabile-de-gestionarea-relatiei-cu-republica-moldova-17-26-50[accessed20June2016].
225
aresuggestedtoundertakevarious‘actions,’whichrangefromRomanianlanguage
bookdonationstowardstheRepublic,tolobbyinglocalcouncillorstotwintheirtown
withoneinMoldova,apen-palprogram,tonamebutafew.601Inshort,whilstata
politicalleveltheplatformisengagingwithstategovernment,atthesociallevelitis
pursuingasofterbottom-upapproachmeanttobringRomanianvaluesintoMoldovan
dailylifeandconstructpersonalrelationshipsbetweenindividualsandcommunities.
Overallthisendeavourshowsthatthereisappetite,atleastincertaincircles,forthe
developmentofMoldo-Romanianrelations,andperhapseventowardsthe
achievementofthemainprerogativesetbytheRomanianidentitynarrative–unity.
AlthoughitiscertainlydifficulttoforeseehowtherelationshipbetweenBucharestand
Chisinauwillbeimpactedbyrecentregionalanddomesticdevelopments,the
identitaryperspectiveemployedherewouldsuggestthatMoldova’sambivalence
towardsitsidentitymaynowactasanenablerratherthananobstacle.Thatisbecause
RomaniamaystillharnessitsspecialrelationshipwithMoldova,andthehesitation
noticeableatsocietalandpoliticallevelsofturningfullytowardsRussia,aswellasits
positionwithintheEUandNATO,todrawMoldovatowardstheWest.Whatisclear,
however,isthat,becausethemainreferencepointinthearticulationofitsagenda
towardsMoldovaistheiridentity-basedaffinity,Romaniaislikelytoremainresolutein
itsendeavourtokeepitsneighbourclose.Thisisallthemorethecaseasanxieties
concerningboththesituationinUkraineandpro-RussianattitudeswithinMoldova
haveheightened.AsInayehpointsout,Romanians“arewaryofpotentialmoveson
SouthernBessarabia”602andthisisoneofitsmainmotivatorsforaction.Moldovais
increasinglyperceivedasaBesiegedFortressandconcernstowardsitsfuturecanonly
beansweredthroughBucharestofferingitsupport.
FutureDirectionsforMoldo-RomanianRelations
ThissectionwillexaminesomeofthedirectionsrelationsbetweenRomaniaand
Moldovamaytakeand,inturn,theirrepercussionsonthestabilityandsecurityofthe
601Ontheirwebsite,thePlatformadvertises‘100Actions’tobringforththeunion.Seewww.Actiunea2012.ro.602Inayeh(2015),p.42.
226
region,butalsotheirpotentialimpactonrelationsbetweenboththeseactorsand
Russia,ontheonehand,andtheWesterncommunity,ontheother.Thisanalysismust
besetinthepeculiarcontextofRomaniaandMoldova’sstatuswithinEasternEurope:
whilstoneisanincreasinglyactivememberoftheEUandNATOontheEasternflank,
theotherisintheCIS,partoftheRussiansphere.Asaresult,inasettingofgrowing
tensionsbetweenEastandWest,herearetwoactorswithaspecialrelationship,which
onemaycallkin-states,onoppositesides.Thismeans,ontheonehand,thatRomania
hassignificantcommitmentstowardsitspartners,butalsoanindividualinterestinthe
fateofanactorexternaltothesealliances.Ontheotherhand,italsoimpliesthatthe
developmentsinUkrainecreateadditionalanxietiesforRomaniaregardingMoldova’s
futuretothatofitsallies.ThatisbecauseRomaniaviewsMoldovaasanEstranged
Self,andthereforeprojects,toacertainextent,itsownprerogativeoverensuringthe
physicalsecurityofthestatetoitsneighbour.Themaintypesofscenariosbeing
consideredinbothBucharestinChisinauconcernRussia’sownstrategicagendafor
expansionofeitheritsterritoryorregionalinfluence,bothofwhichhave
repercussionsintermsofthethemesofBesiegedFortressandUnity.
AsoftscenarioconcernsapotentialdiplomaticresolutionofboththeUkrainiancrisis
andtheTransnistrianfrozenconflictthroughfederalisation,orinanycase,apower-
sharingagreementwhichwouldseepro-Russianforcesfromtheseparatistregionsof
DonbasandTransnistriahaveaccesstotheleadershipstructuresofthesetwostates.
WhetherthefederalisationofUkrainewouldbeachievedfirstandwouldresultin
pressureontheTransnistrianquestiontoberesolvedinasimilarmanner,603orthe
powershiftinChisinaumaycausethesituationtobereversed,aswasarguedrecently
byMoldovanpoliticalanalystOazuNantoi,604issomewhatinconsequential.Whatis
significantistheoutcome,whichwouldsee,asthelatterhasnoted,“theRepublicof
Moldova[transformed]inapseudo-state,paralysedfromtheinsideandcontrolledby
603TraianBasescumakesthispointasearlyas2014,whilstDanDungaciureiteratesin2016;Seechapter5fordetails.604Digi24.ro,‘OazuNantoi:FederatiaRusanuarenevoiedeTransnitria,cidetoataRepublicaMoldova[OazuNantoi:TheRussianFederationDoesNotNeedTransnistria,ButtheRepublicofMoldovaasaWhole],’Timpul,19.12.2016,http://www.timpul.md/articol/oazu-nantoi-federatia-rusa-nu-are-nevoie-de-transnistria-ci-de-toata-republica-moldova-101856.html[accessed29December2016].
227
Russiafromtheoutside.”605Theimpactofthisdevelopment,inidentitaryterms,
wouldbecatastrophicforMoldo-Romanianrelations,butalsofortheRomanian
consciousness.
Thespecialrelationthisstatehasestablishedwithitsneighbourwouldlikelybe
terminatedinsuchcircumstances,asMoldovaturnedtotheEast.Moreimportantly,
thiswouldimpactontheSelfmostprominently.Romania’sinabilitytoprotectanactor
therelationshipwithwhomisviewedas“anextremelyimportantnational
objective,”606wouldrevealitssmall-stateconditiononcemoreanditslackofstrength
vis-à-visRussia.Inasense,abreakdownofrelationsbetweenRomanianandMoldova
wouldbetantamounttoanother‘loss’ofBessarabiaasthelyricsatthebeginningof
thischapterdescribedit.SubscribedtothethemeofBesiegedFortress,and
irreparablydamagingtheongoingnationalprojectofbuildinglinkswiththisstate,this
isaworstcasescenario.Therepercussionsofsuchadevelopmentonregionalstability
intermsoftheexpansionoftheRussiansphereofinfluencearedifficulttoforeseeand
itislikewiseproblematictoenvisageRomania’sreaction.Whatisclear,however,is
thatthiswouldhaveasignificantimpactonRomania’srelationshipwithMoscow,but
mayalsoleadtoahardeningofitspositionwithinNATO–againasaformofresistance
tobesiegement–whilstsupportforpro-EuropeanfactionsinMoldovawouldlikely
continue.Thenotionofastand-offbetweenRomaniaandRussiaontheborderofthe
RiverPrutisnotimpossibletoenvisage.Nantoicapturesthisriskwellwhenheargues
thatRomaniashouldbecarefulinmanagingthissituationlestitmaysoonbe
confrontedwith“RussiansoldiersalongtheRiverPrut.”607
Havingsaidthat,asecond,hardscenarioisalsobeingconsidered.Thisconcernsa
potentialmilitaryinvasionofUkraineorareactivationofthefrozenconflictin
Transnistria,eitherofwhichwouldputMoldova’ssovereigntydirectlyatrisk.For
instance,thenotionthatTransnistriacouldbeutilisedbyMoscowinitsstandoffwith
NATOandtheconflictinUkraineisonewhichworriesbothChisinauandBucharest.
PopescuandLitrapointoutthat“Russiahasalsoraisedthepossibilityofdeployinga
605Ibid.606AnonymousC(2014).607Nantoi(2016).
228
radarstationinTransnistriatocountertheRomania-basedUSelementsoftheAnti-
BallisticMissileshield.AndtherehavebeenreportsthattheRussianpeacekeeping
forcecouldbeturnedintoamilitarybaseinTransnistria.”608Morerecently,Moldovan
newsagencyPublikahighlightedthepossibilitythatUkrainecouldbeattackedby
RussiafromthedirectionofitsborderwithTransnistria.609Overall,thefactthat
Moldovahasforeigntroopsonitsterritorywhichcouldbefashionedintoaninvasion
forceorabastionagainstNATOisaworryingprospect–Moldovacouldoffera
gatewayforaRussianinvasionofOdessa,whilstTransnistria’sproximitytoRomania
wouldmakeitanidealbaseforRussianretaliationagainstincreasedNATOpresencein
theregion.Inanycase,itisquestionablewhetherinanescalationofthesituationin
UkrainethefragilestalematebetweenChisinauandTiraspolcouldhold,particularly
takingintoaccountTransnistria’sownagendaofannexingitselftoRussia.
Inthesecircumstances,awarbetweenMoldovaandtheseparatistregionisnotoutof
thequestionandthiswouldposeaseriousquestionforRomaniaintermsofresponse,
asanyperceiveddangertoMoldova’sstabilityandsovereigntywouldresultinan
augmentationofthethemeofBesiegedFortressandRomaniawouldfeelcompelledto
react.Whilstthemilitarysolutionhasneverseriouslybeenonthecards–afterall,
Romaniadidnotintervenein1992–apotentialsolutionmightbeofferedbyanadhoc
unificationbetweenthetwostates,whichwouldeffectivelyputMoldovaunderthe
protectiveumbrellaofRomania’sinternationalallies.RomanMihaies,apolitical
scientistinChisinauhasarguedthat:
UnificationmaytakeplaceonlyinthecontextofahumanitariancatastropheintheRepublicofMoldova,suchasawarwithseparatistTransnistria(…),andtheinternationalcommunityandgreatpowerswouldbefacedwiththetaskofsavingthepopulation,oneofthesolutionsbeingarapidunificationwithRomania.610
608PopescuandLitra(2012),p.5.609Publika,Avertisment:RusiaarputeaatacaUcrainadindirectiaregiuniitransnistrene[Warning:RussiaMayAttachUkrainefromtheDirectionofTransnistria],28.05.2015,http://www.publika.md/avertisment-rusia-ar-putea-ataca-ucraina-din-directia-regiunii-transnistrene_2317861.html[accessed29December2016].610UnionistPlatform‘Action2012’,InterviewwithRomanMihaies–‘Incazderazboi,RomaniasiRepublicaMoldovas-arputeauni[InCaseofWar,RomaniaandtheRepublicofMoldovaMayUnite],’Ziare,13.09.2014,http://www.ziare.com/europa/moldova/in-caz-de-razboi-romania-si-rep-moldova-s-ar-putea-uni-interviu-1321146[accessed03June2016].
229
Thismayseemanimplausiblescenario;however,thereasonswhyitshouldnotbe
discountedfromanidentitaryperspectiverestonMoldova’sambivalencetowardsits
‘Romanian’identity.Panici’s2003assessmentthatMoldovanpartiescontinue“to
formaspectrumrangingfromthosesupportingsomeformofpoliticalunionwith
Romania,thoseinfavourofindependence,tothosedesiringsomedegreeof
reintegrationwithRussiaandtheformerSovietrepublics”611stillholdstruetoday.The
issueofunificationbecomesamatterofbalancebetweenthesedirectionsand
historicalexperiencehasshownthatintimesofcrisis,suchasthedisintegrationofthe
SovietUnion,Moldovanpro-Romanianattitudesarelikelytoemerge.Itmayjustbe
thattheriskposedbyanoutbreakofconflictinTransnistriawouldtipthebalancein
thefavourofunification,asMihaiesimplies.Thiswouldbeapossibleresponseto
besiegementand,forRomania,itwouldsatisfytwoidentity-relatedpriorities:itwould
servetobringMoldovaoutofRussia’ssphereonceandforallandensureitssecurity,
butwouldalsosatisfythemainprerogativedictatedbythethemeofUnity.Therefore,
fromanidentitaryperspective,thescenarioisindeedplausibleparticularlyinacontext
ofvolatility,astheissuedependslargelyonMoldova’spositiononunification.As
AnonymousCargues,theperceptionisthat“reunificationcanbeachievedtomorrow
ifthereisconsensusbetweenBucharestandChisinau.”612
ThematterisincreasinglybeingconsideredinRomanianandMoldovancircles.The
UnionistPlatform‘Action2012’isamanifestationofthesedevelopments.Likewise,in
RomaniaincreasingnumbersofRomanianpoliticiansandcommentatorsarediscussing
theissueofunification.FormerpresidentTraianBasescu,nowleaderofthePopular
MovementParty,hasassumedtheunificationwithMoldovaasaprimarynational
objectiveofhispoliticalformationandhasacquired,attheirfirstelection,26seatsin
theRomanianParliament(proportionaltojustunder5.5%ofthevote).613This,
coupledwiththefactthatinJuly2015,67.8%oftheRomanianpopulationsupported
611Panici(2003),p.44612AnonymousC(2014).613K.Olteanu,‘Retrospectiva2016:Alegerilelocalesiparlamentareinprim-planpolitic[Retrospective2016:LocalandGeneralElectionsinthePoliticalForeground,’Agerpres,http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2016/12/30/retrospectiva-2016-alegerile-locale-si-parlamentare-in-prim-plan-politic-formarea-guvernului-in-2017-cu-prim-ministru-desemnat-la-a-doua-propunere-16-53-17[accessed30December2016].
230
Action2012’sgoalofre-unificationin2018614istellingofthefactthatplatformssuch
ashisaregatheringmomentum.
Whilstunificationmayleadtoanalleviationofanxietiescausedbytheaugmentation
ofthethemeofBesiegedFortress,andsatisfyforRomaniatheprerogativeofUnity,
theimplicationsforregionalstabilityandthestate’srelationshipwithitsalliesand
Russiamaybesevere.ThepositionoftheUSonthematterwashintedatwhenthe
ambassadortoChisinausaidthatunificationwouldnotbepracticalorarealsolution
toMoldova’sproblems.615WhilstNATOhasbolstereditsrelationswithChisinauover
recentyears,notleastthroughtheestablishmentoftheLiaisonOfficementioned
previously,ithasshowninthepastthatitsappetiteforcooperationwithstateswithin
Russia’ssphereofinfluenceislimitedbyitsdesiretomaintainanon-conflictual
relationshipwithMoscow.CertainlyRussia’sinterventioninGeorgiain2008settled
theissueofthatstateachievingNATOmembership.Assuch,aunificationbetween
RomaniaandMoldovawouldfurthercomplicateanalreadydifficultco-existenceinthe
BlackSearegion.FortheEU’spart,equally,anunplannedenlargementintheEast
wouldbringuntoldconsequences.OneoftheintervieweesbelievesthattheEuropean
integrationofMoldovaaspartofRomaniawouldbeactivelysupportedbytheEU,as
throughitsCohesionFund“poorerregionsoftheRepublicwouldbeprioritisedahead
ofotherlessdevelopedregions[ofEurope,presumably].”616However,inaEuropean
Unionalreadysufferingfromenlargementfatigueandtheriseofapan-continental
trendofEuroscepticismdoubledbypro-Russianattitudes,aswellasunderstrainfrom
therefugeecrisis,onewouldsuggestitisunlikelythattheorganisationwould
welcomethisterritorialexpansion,especiallyifitwerefacedwithafaitaccompli.
Itfollows,therefore,thattheunificationprojectmayhavecomplexrepercussionson
bothEUandNATOrelationswithRussia,butalsoonRomania’sownrelationswithits
Westernallies.Thestabilityandsecurityoftheregionmay,itself,beputunderthreat.
Romania,however,maynotbesensitivetothesepotentialissuesbecausethematter
ofunificationisperceivedaslegitimateandacrucialidentity-relatedgoal.Toputit
614INSCOP(July2015).615AccordingtoLuca(2016).616AnonymousC(2014)
231
anotherway,thismaybeanothermatteroforderingpriorities–ifintransition
RomaniasacrificedgoodrelationswithadifficultgovernmentinChisinautoprioritise
accession,nowitmaybethatthegoalofprotectingMoldovaandachievingunitytakes
precedenceoveritsinternationalcommitments.Thefactthatareorderingofidentity-
relatedprioritiesmayoccurintheopportunecontextisoneofthemainassumptions
ofthisthesisandperceptionsoveraMoldovaunderthreatwouldcreatejustsuch
circumstances.
Thisreality,thischapterargues,shouldworrytheinternationalcommunity,becauseof
Romania’sgeopoliticalpositiononthefringesoftheEUandNATOandattheborder
betweentheEuropeanEastandWest.Todownplaythissecondscenario,however
implausibleitmayseemnow,istoignorethefactthatRomania’sactionsmaycritically
altertheweakequilibriumandstand-offwhichexistsbetweentheRussianFederation
andtheEuro-Atlanticpartners.Ontheotherhand,Romania’ssuspicionofthefederal
solutionhintsatariskwhichisdownplayedbytheinternationalcommunity,namely
that,whilstpowersharingmayonthefaceofitsettletheconflictsinUkraineand
Moldova,itwouldalsoinherentlyofferRussiaanavenueforbuttressingitssphereof
influence.ThiswouldhaveseverelyimpactthebalanceofpowerwithinEastern
Europeanddiminishtheallies’capacitytocounteranyfurtherexpansionistmoves.It
wouldalso,onewouldargue,impactRomania’sconsistentpro-Americanand
Europhileattitude.AsGusahasnoted,Romaniaisatthemoment,“probablythemost
pro-AmericanstateinEurope,”617whilstpollsconsistentlyshowthattheEurosceptic
trendsweepingthecontinenthasyettoaffectit.618However,ifthereisonewayin
whichtoalienatesuchanotherwisereliableally,itistodownplayorignorethe
situationofMoldova,thefateofwhomisattheverytopofRomania’sforeignpolicy
agenda,alongsideensuringitsownsecurity.Attheveryleastatsocietallevela‘lossof
Bessarabia’wouldbeacatastrophe,andsomeoftheblamewouldlikelybelaid
squarelyatthedooroftheinternationalcommunity.
617Gusa(2015),p.225.618EuropeanCommission(2014),StandardEurobarometer82/Autumn2014–OpiniaPublicainUniuneaEuropeana[PublicOpinionintheEuropeanUnion]NationalReport–Romania,http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_ro_ro_nat.pdf[accessed13July2015].
232
Conclusion
Inconclusion,thischapterhasexploredtheidentitaryaffinityRomaniahastowards
theRepublicofMoldovaandhowthishasshapedthestate’sbehaviourtowardsit.The
identity-basedperspectiveemployedbythisprojectoffersanalternativeavenuefor
understandingthenatureandrootsofthisrelationship.Intermsofthemainresearch
question,theattitudeofaffinitytowardsMoldova,basedonitshistoricallyenduring
portrayalasanEstrangedSelf,hasfedintoRomanianbehaviourthroughits
commitmenttoensurethepro-Westerncourseofitsneighbourandthebolsteringof
theirrelationship.However,thischapteralsoconfirmstheassumptionsofthisthesis
thatidentity-relatedgoalsmaybecomedeprioritisedinspecificcontexts–anexample
ofthisistheabandonmentofthegoalofunificationinthe1990s.Havingsaidthat,
Romania’sEuro-Atlanticintegration,andthemorerecentregionaldevelopmentshave
risenMoldovatothetopofRomania’sforeignpolicyagenda,substantiatingthe
enduranceofthisaffinity.InthisrelationshiponemayseemostclearlyRomania’s
abilitytopursuespecificgoalswhich,whilsttheymaybeinalignmentwiththeposition
ofitsallies,aremotivatedbyitsindividual,identity-basedprerogatives.Projecting
theseprerogativesconcerningtheSelfontotheRepublicofMoldovameansthatthe
developmentsinUkrainereflectinanxietiesregardingMoldovansecurity,
independenceandsovereignty,augmentingperceptionsoftheEstrangedSelfasa
BesiegedFortress.Importantly,thesechallengesareseennotonlyasMoldova’sown,
butRomania’saswell,andthishasimpactedthelatter’sstanceonRussian
expansionismandstrengtheneditscommitmenttowardsChisinau.
ThepatternofbehaviournoticeableherefollowstherationaledictatedbyRomania’s
identity-basedpriorities,ofkeepingMoldovaclosetoitselfandtheWest,while
counteringRussianinfluenceoverit,throughharnessingitspositionwithintheEUand
NATO.Havingsaidthat,theunificationscenario,increasinglyconsideredinBucharest,
confirmsthethesis’earlyassumptionsonthestate’scapacitytopursuedirections
whichmaydivergefromthoseofitsallies.Fromthis,bothRomaniaandMoldovamay
becomesourcesofregionalinstability,contingentonfuturedevelopments,particularly
withinMoldovandomesticpoliticsandTransnistria.Whetherthebehaviouroftwo
233
smallstatesmayupsettheequilibriumofEasternEuropeandcomplicaterelations
betweentheEuro-AtlanticorganisationsandRussiamoregenerally,remainstobe
seen.Whatonewouldargue,however,isthattheexistenceofkinstatesoneitherside
ofthisgrowingriftbetweenEastandWestshouldbeacauseforconcernforall
involved.
234
Conclusion
Apeopleabandonedatthejunctureofstormswhichstrikehere
centuryaftercenturyandwillalwaysblowovertheselandsofplentyandinthepathofmarchingarmies.ChildofRomelostinthe
wildernessforeverrenewedbybarbarians,sofewamongstsomany.(…)Anyotherswouldhavescatteredacrosstheworld.Sweet
homelandshavebeendesertedforless.Weremain.Swordinhandandonguard(…).Andhereweare,stillathome!619
Thisthesisaimedtoanswerthequestion‘Whatistheimpactofnationalidentityon
Romania’spost-socialistforeignpolicyagenda?’Assuch,ithasengagedwiththe
developmentofthisstate’snationalidentitynarrative,thesourcesofitscontinuity
andsedimentationofitsmainthemes,andthemannerinwhichithasinfluenced,inits
presentversion,Romania’sinternationalbehavioursincetheanti-socialistrevolution
of1989.Thetaskwascomplex,notleastbecauseoftheinter-disciplinarynatureofthe
studyproposed.However,thepresentthesishashighlightedthecomplexitybehind
thisstate’smotivationsforactionand,moreimportantly,theroleplayedbyidentity
narrativesinthearticulationofnationalinterestanddirectionsforforeignpolicy.At
theendofthisendeavour,itisimportanttotakestockofthemainargumentsone
mightdrawfromtheanalysispresentedandtheircontributiontothebroaderfield.
WorkingintheareaofoverlapbetweenSCandFPAmeantadoptingahybridapproach
whichofferedparticularinsightintothestudyoftheinfluenceofenduringclaims
aboutnationalidentityonRomania’sinternationalbehaviourandagenda.Thestudy
tookfromcriticalconstructivist/postructuralistFPAtheconceptionofidentityasa
discursivestructureanddevelopedanarrativetheoryofnationalidentity,inwhich
storiesabouttheSelfandOthersprovidethelensthroughwhichstatesviewtheworld
andtheirplacewithinit.Thethesisadoptedaconcernwiththedevelopmentofthe
Romanianidentitynarrativeandthereasonsbehinditscontinuity.Byhighlightingthe
619N.Iorga,‘CetindIstoriaRomanilor[ReadingRomanians’History],’NeamulRomanescXXXV:136(23.06.1940),inG.Ivascu,andA.Tanasescu(eds.),CumpănaCuvântului1939-1945[TheSweepoftheWord1939-1945](Bucharest:Eminescu,1977),p.183.
235
tellingofhistoryasthemainvehicleforthesocialisationoftheidentitynarrative,the
projectarguedthatstoriesabout‘whowewere’legitimateparticularrepresentations
oftheSelf,itsinterestsandrelationshipswithOtherswhicharerelevantin
contemporarycircumstances.Byexaminingthelinkbetweenthehistoricalnarrative
andidentityconstruction,theprojectoutlinedthemainthemesoftheRomanian
identitynarrativeastheFoundationMyths,andthoseofBesiegedFortressandUnity.
ThesethemesplayacriticalroleintheportrayaloftheRomanianSelf,butalsointhat
ofitssignificantOthers,theimageofwhomisgeneratedthroughprocessesof
differentiationandassociation.Ontheotherhand,drawingonSCanditsexpress
interestintohowcultureinfluencesstatebehaviour,butalsoontheworkofWaever
andHansen,thethesisadoptsamorestructuralistapproachthanmostcritical
constructivistsandpostructuralists.Thisisexpressedintheviewthatthestructuresof
identitynarratives,socialconstructsthoughtheyare,maybecomeentrenchedwhen
reproducedoverlongperiodsoftime.Assuch,theyareespeciallyresilienttochange
anddifficulttodisplaceundertheactionofagents,offeringthenarrativesparticular
stability,relativetothedegreeoftheirsedimentation.Itisfromthisthattheproject
drawsitsassumptionthatidentitynarrativestructurescananddohaveaninfluence
onstatebehaviour.Thethesishasshownidentity-relatedfactorstoimpactnotonly
thestrategicsphere,SC’smainconcern,butgeneralstatebehaviouraswell.Thatis
nottosaythatthestrategicdimensionwasignored;tothecontrary,inRomania’s
relationshipwithNATOduringtransitionandwithRussiainthecurrentcontext,the
useofforceandmilitarisationwererevealedasimportanttoolsinRomania’ssecuring
ofitsnationalobjectives.Inotherareas,however,suchasintherelationshipwith
HungaryandMoldova,orinitsgeneralpro-Westerndirection,thethesishas
emphasisedtheinfluenceofidentity-relatedconsiderationsonRomania’sforeign
policybehaviourmorebroadly,bringingthestudyclosertothemoreexpansive
agendaofFPA.
Bypositioningitselfinthemiddlegroundonthestructure-agencydebateand
emphasisingtheprocessesofsocialisationandsedimentationofidentitynarrativesthe
projectwasabletoaccountforthecross-generationalconsistencyoftheRomanian
narrative,whilststillascribingagencyaspecificandimportantrole.Thisapproachhas
236
allowedthethesistoexaminebothagents’interactionwiththestructureofthe
identitynarrative,withafocusontheregimesofCeausescuandIliescu,aswellasthe
mannerinwhichthenarrative,inturn,impactedtheperceptionsandactionsof
agents.ByarguingthatthestructureoftheRomanianidentitynarrativeisenduring
andrecognisingthefactthatagentsare,themselves,socialisedinaparticularversion
ofit,thethesishascontendedthatagentsarelimitedintheirabilitytoalterthe
structuredrastically.Acknowledgingtherelationbetweenthetwoassuchallowedthe
projecttoexplainwhattypesofalterationswerepossible,suchasCeausescu’s
emphasisingofcharacteruniquenessandUnity,orIliescu’seliminationofthe
communistcomponent,andwhichwereimpossiblebecausetheydeviatedtoomuch
fromtheoriginalversion,suchastheattemptsatRussificationandtheportrayalof
Russiaasafriendduringthe1950s.Workinginthismiddlegroundhastheimplication
that,whilstchangestothenarrativearepossible,theyarenotanecessityand,indeed,
intheRomaniancase,thisexplainsthecontinuityoftheidentitynarrativealongits
majorfeatures.
Followingonfromthis,functioningatthecrossroadsbetweenSCandFPAallowedthe
thesistoexploretheconnectionbetweenelitesandthebroadersociety,asmembers
ofacommunitysocialisedinaparticularversionoftheidentitynarrative.Theproject
showedhow,whenitcametoidentity-drivenprerogatives,theretendedtobe
consistentalignmentbetweenthepositionofRomanianelitesandthatofthegeneral
population.TheunanimousdesiretojointheWest,thedeep-seededanti-Russian
sentiments,distrustofHungaryoraffinitytowardsMoldovaareallexamplesofsuch
instances.Additionally,wehaveseenthat,ifelitestrytodeviatefromthegeneral
position,aswasthecasewiththetreatynegotiationswithRussiain1996,societal
pressuremaybepowerfulenoughtoforcethemtochangecourse.Therefore,the
pursuitofidentity-basedprerogativesintheRomaniancaseisoftenamatterof
maintainingdomesticlegitimacy,limitingelites’freedomofaction.Thethesisargues,
muchinthespiritofDoty’showpossiblequestions,620thatentrenchedidentity
narrativescreatered-lineswhichgovernmentsmaynotcross,lesttheirlegitimacybe
severelydamaged.ThisviewhasofferedadditionalinsightinRomania’spursuitofa
620Doty(1993).
237
hard-lineapproachtoRussiaanditseffortstolimitHungarianinterferenceinits
domesticaffairs,aswellastheendeavourstoestablishcloserrelationswiththe
RepublicofMoldova.
Onadifferentnote,theidentitaryapproachemployedbythisprojecthasprovidedan
avenueforofferingalternative,identity-relatedexplanationsforRomania’sbehaviour,
bothinternationallyanddomestically.Inthetransitionperiod,forinstance,thethesis
addsanotherdimensiontothediscussionsurroundingRomania’sstaggeredprogress
ondomesticreform,anditsunwillingnesstoallowforoutsideinterferenceinthe
minorityquestion,whichitperceivedasaninternalaffair.Thenotionthatanxiety
towardschangestothestatusquoandalimitationofstatesovereigntywerenotonly
Iliescu’scommunistautomatismsbuttheywereattitudesinplayatsocietallevel
explainsnotonlyhiselectoralsuccessduringtheperiod,butalsowhyRomaniafound
negotiatingthetransitionperiodsodifficultinthefirsthalfofthe1990s.Similarly,in
Romania’scontemporarybehaviourtowardsRussia,HungaryandMoldova,onedoes
notnoticesolelyalignmenttothepositionpursuedbyitsallies,buttheinfluenceof
individualspecificidentity-relatedgoals.Therefore,thethesisarguesthatthereexists
apatternofbehaviourinalltheseinstanceswhichconformstoRomania’sidentity-
basedprerogatives.InthecaseofRussia,thismanifestsasahard-lineapproachtoits
perceivedexpansionism,inwhichthestateisharnessingitsstrategicpositiononthe
edgeofNATO.WithHungary,thepatternconsistsofanefforttodistanceRomania
fromthisactorwhilstmaintainingtheveneerofcooperationdictatedbytheir
membershiptotheEUandNATO.Finally,withtheRepublicofMoldova,itconsistsof
attemptstostrengthenthelinksbetweenthisstateandtheWest,includingRomania,
whilstdrawingitoutofRussia’sshadow.Thispatternofbehaviour,althoughapparent
intheempiricalevidence,cannotbeaccuratelyaccountedfor,onewouldargue,
withoutanunderstandingoftheidentitydimension.
Anovelelementofferedbythisthesis,whichstemsfromitsconstructivistapproach,is
theanalysisoftheretreat/augmentationofidentity-relatedfactors.Inacknowledging
thattheirinfluenceonbehaviourisnotconsistent,butcontingentonexternal
circumstances,orperceptionsoverthese,andagents’priorities,allowedthethesisto
238
tracethemannerinwhichparticularidentitaryanxietiesorgoalsrecededorre-
emergedinspecificcontexts.Examplesofthesearetheretreatofanxietiestowards
changeduringtransition,theabandonmentofthegoalofreunificationwiththe
RepublicofMoldova,orthedétentewithHungary,duringthe1990s.Inthose
instances,changesinthesituation,namelythequalityoflifeunderIliescu’sregime,
andthecomingtopowerofcommunistsintheRepublicofMoldovaandthesocialists
inHungary,triggeredareorderingofprioritiesinwhich,incidentallythesameinall
threesituations,thegoalofEuro-Atlanticintegrationtookprecedenceoverother
identity-relatedconsiderations.However,thethesishasalsoshownhow,inthe
currentclimate,Hungary’seasternshift,Russia’sactionsinUkraineandeven
Moldova’sownquestionsaboutitsidentityhaveledtoare-emergenceofthese
elements,resultinginthepatternofbehaviouroutlinedabove.Ineffect,whatthe
analysispresentedherehasdemonstratedisthat,whilstidentity-relatedfactorsmay
movetothebackgroundwithchangesintheenvironment,becauseofthe
sedimentationoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,theseattitudesareliabletobe
reactivatedinopportunecircumstances.Thatiswhythethesisarguestheissueof
unificationwithMoldova,whetherapprovedbyitsEuro-Atlanticpartnersornot,isnot
anoptionwhichcannotbetakenoffthetable,asitisrootedinprofoundconceptions
ontheroleofthestatetoprovidesecurityandintheprerogativessetbythethemeof
Unity.
Finally,followingonfromthepointsaboveandbuildingontheworksofRasmussen
andBrowning,621theaimofthisthesiswasalsotoshowthatthestudyofsmallstates,
suchasRomania,isausefulendeavourasminorpowersarenotonlycapableof
developingpowerfulidentitynarrativeswhichinfluencetheirbehaviour,butthat,in
volatileenvironmentssuchasthatofEasternEuropetoday,theiractionsmayhavea
bearingonregionalstability.Indeed,thethesishasshownhowRomaniaisacting
autonomouslyvis-à-visHungary,straininganalreadytenserelationship.Equally,in
relationtoRussiaandMoldova,RomaniaisharnessingitspositionwithintheEUand,
especially,NATO,andtakinginitiativeinbotheffortstocounterRussiaandtodraw
MoldovaclosertotheWest.However,Romaniahasalsoshownitselfwillingtogo
621Rasmussen(2005),Browning(2006,2007,2008,2010).
239
againstthegrain,inadoptingaharderstanceagainstRussiathanmanyofitsWestern
andEasternEuropeanpartnersandinconsidering,atleastincertaincircles,the
possibilityofareunificationwiththeRepublicofMoldova.Inthisvein,itisapparent
thatthisstateismotivatedbyamorecomplexrationalethantraditionalaccounts
wouldassume.Therefore,understandingRomania’spatternofbehaviourandthe
reasonsbehinditbecomesausefulandimportantendeavourinlightofitspotential
repercussionsonregionalstability.
ThenotionofRomaniaasanautonomousactor,whoseagendaisnotsolelydictated
bythedirectionpursuedbyitsallies,impliesacertainlevelofunpredictabilityofits
futurebehaviourfromtheperspectiveofmainstreamFPAaccounts.However,working
attheintersectionofconstructivistSCandFPAandadoptinganidentity-based
perspectiveoffersthetypeofinsightwhichmakesRomania’sbehaviourintelligible
and,therefore,toacertainextent,predictable.Thefinalsectionofeachcasestudy
chapteroffersjustsuchpredictions,basedonthecontinuationofcurrent
circumstancesandinreferencetothescenariosbeingconsideredinRomaniaatthe
moment.Whatthesescenarioscaptureistheheightenedlevelofanxietyconcerning
recentdevelopmentsandtheirpotentialconsequencesonwhatRomaniansviewas
theirnationalinterests.Assuch,theyofferhintsatboththelikelihoodthatidentity-
drivenprerogativeswillcontinuetobecrucialinthearticulationofRomania’sfuture
foreignpolicyagenda,butalsoatthetypesofbehaviourwhichareviewedaspossible
orimpossible.AbandoningtheRepublicofMoldovainthecaseoftheoutbreakofwar
withTransnistria,forinstance,isared-line.Sotooisadoptingamoremoderatestance
towardsRussiaandHungary.Whatthebalancewillbebetweenidentitaryanxieties
andpriorities,ontheonehand,andexternalpressure,ontheother,isdifficultto
foresee.Itis,nonethelessthecase,thisthesisultimatelyargues,thatRomaniais
playinganincreasinglyimportantroleintheregionand,inthesecircumstances,the
identitydimensionofthissmallstate’sforeignpolicyagendaandthecomplexesit
createsshouldbeofinteresttoobservers.
240
FinalConsiderations
Therearefewfinalissueswhichshouldbeaddressed.Theseconcernparticular
questionswhichcouldberaisedovertheutilityoftheapproachemployedhereandits
potentialapplicationtoothercasestudies.Thefirstpointrelatestotherelative
strengthofidentity-basedconsiderationscomparedtothatofotherfactors,most
notablyexternalpressures,ormorepragmaticreasonsforadoptingaparticularcourse
ofaction,suchaseconomicbenefits.Therearecertainly,particularlyintransition,
instanceswhenRomanianswantedsomethingbutcouldnotachieveit–e.g.
unificationwithMoldova–ordidnotwantsomethingbutdiditanyway–e.g.the
PrincipalTreatywithHungary.Inthisvein,thethesishasacceptedthatidentity-based
goalscanbede-prioritisedifsituationsarenotopportune.Itcould,however,bethat
actorsactuallyhavebroaddiscretioninorderingpreferencesandprioritisingpragmatic
goalsallowedorforcedbyexternalcircumstancesoveridentity-basedones.Thisisa
difficultissue,because,iftheformeralwayssupersedesthelatterinimportance,then
anidentity-basedapproachcanneverofferaconvincingexplanationforbehaviour.
Rather,amaterialistaccountwouldbesufficient.
Tothisonewouldrespondthattheorderingofpreferences,orwhatisperceivedas
possibleorpermissibleinacertaincontext,dependsasmuchonexternal
circumstancesasitdoesonthesalienceofidentityfactorsatthatpointintime.In
otherwords,thestrongerthelatterare,thelesslikelytheyaretobeoverriddenby
otherconsiderations.Forinstance,duringtheearly1990stherewasconsiderable
pressureonRomaniatoreachagreementwithHungaryoversigningaPrincipalTreaty
whichwouldnormaliserelationsandsettletheminorityquestion,butidentity-based
anxietiesoverthelimitingofitssovereigntyandtheinvolvementofBudapestinits
internalaffairspreventeditfromdoingso.Itwasknownthatthiswouldresultina
slowingofRomania’saccessionprocess;inotherwords,failuretosignatreatywould
haveanobjectivelynegativeeffectonitsintegrationprospects,butthispressurewas
insufficienttocauseitsleadershiptochangecourse.Theambivalenceoverprioritiesin
transitionwasonlysolvedlateron,whentheseanxietiesrecededandaccession
becamethepredominantgoal.Fromthis,onewouldmaketheconjecturethat
241
externalcircumstancesmay,indeed,leadtoare-orderingofprioritiesbutthatthe
contextmustbeassuchastofirstlyallowfortheretreatoftheidentity-based
anxieties.Thesame,onewouldargue,wasthecasewithunificationwithMoldova,
wherethereexistedawill,buttheperceptionwasthatitwasstrongeronthe
RomaniansidethanonMoldova’s.Ultimately,thewillremainsbut,sinceittakestwo
totango,theachievementofunificationiscontingentonMoldova’sdecisiononthis
course.Inotherwords,thesalienceofthisprerogativeisnotsufficienttooverride
externalpressuresbecauseofMoldova’sambivalenceandthisremainsthecasetothis
veryday.Overall,however,andashasbeenpointedoutthroughout,incurrent
circumstancesofheightenedanxieties,particularlysurroundingtheareaofstate
security,identitaryconsiderationsareincreasinglybecomingthemainreferencepoints
foraction,makingthemmoredifficulttosupplantbyotherfactors.
Asecondissue,whichbuildstosomeextentontheissueabove,relatestothenotion
thatclaimsaboutidentityare,indeed,enduringandhaveanimpactonbehaviouror,
conversely,theyaremoreofaninstrumentutilisedbyactorsinlegitimatingtheir
actions.Thisconnects,toanextent,totheagency-structuredebate.Theviewofthis
thesishasbeenthat,becauseagentsarewithinratherthanwithoutsociety,theyare
inthemselvessocialisedinaparticularversionoftheidentitynarrativewhichlimits
theircapacitytointeractwithit,intermsofalteringitdrastically.Thereare,ofcourse,
instanceswhenagentshaveutilisedidentitaryprerogativesfortheirownbenefit,as
wasthecasewithIliescu’shandlingofthe1990campaign.This,however,doesnot
meanthattheyaresubtractedoroutsidetheinfluenceofthenarrativealtogether.If
anything,Iliescu’sconservativeapproachtoreformshowsthathesufferedfrompost-
revolutionaryidentitaryinertiamorethanmost.Thereareotherinstances,however,
wherethereseemstohavebeenadrasticdeparturefromtheoriginalnarrative.
AlthoughitisdifficulttofindsuchaninstanceintheRomaniancase,itisworth
consideringthatofHungaryunderViktorOrban.Althoughtheparticularitiesofthe
Hungariancasearenotthedirectremitofthisthesis,itdoesseemsomewhatpeculiar,
undertheassumptionsofthisproject,thatOrban’seasternshiftwaspermissible.After
all,Hungary’sinteractionwithRussiahasbeentroubled,notleastbecauseofthe
latter’sinvasionof1956aftertheHungarianrevolution.Inthesecircumstancesitis
242
difficulttoimaginehowOrbanmighthavelegitimatedacloserelationshipwithRussia
atdomesticlevel,unlessthereisasignificantmalleabilityofthestructureofthe
identitynarrative.Thisisallthemorethecaseastheeasternshiftwascoupledwitha
pronouncednationalistrhetoricwhichcorrespondstoidentitarycomplexesrelatedto
thetraumaoftheTreatyofTrianon(1920)andtheterritoriallossessubsequenttoit.
Tothisonewouldanswerthatthekeyisinthenatureofinteractionwiththestructure
oftheidentitynarrativeand,specifically,anorderingofidentity-basedpriorities,
similarineffecttowhatCeausescuachievedinRomania.ForOrban,thecorner-stone
ofhisregimeisthe‘newnationalism,’withitsemphasisonbuildinglinkswiththe
Hungariandiasporasinneighbouringcountriesandhealing,toacertainextent,the
woundsofTrianon.Inotherwords,Orban’sregimehasaverystrongidentity-related
component.TherefashioningofagreaterHungariannation,whetherphysicallyor
spiritually,wouldseemtobeapriorityandfromthisstemstheantagonismwith
Romaniaanditsotherneighbours.Itisalsoclear,however,thatsuchapositionis
somewhatantagonisticwiththeprinciplesonwhichtheEUandNATOarebuilt,
particularlysurroundingrespectofotherstates’sovereigntyandborders.Russia,on
theotherhand,hasshownitselfmuchmoreamenabletoquestioningthecurrent
shapeandstructureofEasternEuropeandoffersadogmaticavenueinalignmentwith
Hungary’sown.Inthissense,onewouldargue,Orbanmaylegitimatefriendshipwith
RussiaasnecessaryfortheattainmentofHungary’sprimarygoalofbringingthe
Hungariannationclosertogether.Inotherwords,hemayreshuffletheorderof
prioritiesinsuchawayastomakethemovepermissible.Inthisinstance,Russiamay
notbeafoebutafriendtoHungary.Havingsaidthat,onewouldarguethatsucha
changeindirectionwouldnotbepossibleinRomania,ifsimilarconsiderationwere
appliedtotheRepublicofMoldova,becauseofthedeeply-seatedanti-Russian
sentimentsatsocietallevel.Itwaspossible,however,tolegitimatecloserrelations
withHungaryafter1996,whentheaccessiongoalbecamepredominant.Itisnotout
oftherealmofimagination,therefore,thatcertainreinterpretationsoftheidentity
narrativeandareorderingofprioritiesintheHungariancasemayresultinsucha
course.Butthatcanonlybepermissibleifoneidentitarypriorityissubstitutedby
another.Inotherwords,thatpermutationsworkwithinthealreadyexisting
243
frameworkandthereexistsabeliefthattheachievementofonegoalismadepossible
bytherenouncingofanother.Inthisview,sedimentedclaimsaboutidentityremaina
powerfulmotivatorforaction,albeitwithalteredreferencepointsandpriorities.
AfinalissuewhichshouldbeaddressediswhetherRomaniaisuniqueinthestrength
andconsistencyofitsidentitynarrative,and,ifso,whatthiscasestudycouldbringto
thefieldofresearch.ItistruethattheRomanianexampleispeculiar,fromthe
continuityoftheidentitynarrativeandthepresenceofasingledominantnarrativeto
theobviousalignmentofallpartiesonissuesofforeignpolicy.Itisequallythecase
thatotherstateshavedevelopedalternativenarrativesofidentityorhavepartiesthe
approachofwhichhasamoreobviousideologicalcomponent.Inthissense,theutility
ofthepresentendeavouristhatitshowstheextenttowhichprofoundlyheldbeliefs
emergingfromsedimentedidentitynarrativescanbecomeadominantfactorin
influencingbehaviourinveryspecificcircumstances.ItisobviousthattheRomanian
contextisnotonewhichmaybeappliedtoeverystate,asthenatureand
developmentofidentitynarrativesiscontingentontheuniqueexperiencesofthat
particularstate.However,themethodologyusedherecouldofferanavenueinto
exploringtheevolutionandinfluenceofidentitynarrativesonotherstates’behaviour.
Tracingtheprocessofthedevelopmentoftheidentitynarrativeandtheextentto
whichportrayalshavebecomeeitherentrenchedorhavebeenalteredbyagentsisthe
keytounderstandingwherecertainrepresentationscomefrom,howpowerfulthey
are,andinwhatdirectionortowardswhatgoalstheymayinfluencebehaviour.Inthis
sense,theprocessmaybeappliedtoanystate,whetherornottheidentity
componenttoitsbehaviourisobvious,orwhetherthereappeartobemultiple
narrativesatplayovertime.Whatmayberevealedisthattheinteractionbetween
agentsandstructuresismorecomplexthanintheRomaniancase,orthatcertain
assumptionsarechallengedbyalternativenarratives,or,indeed,thattheinfluenceof
thesenarrativestructuresonbehaviourisnotaspowerfulinsomecasesasitisin
others.Overall,onewouldargue,theutilityofthisendeavourisasmuchinthe
outcome,acasestudyofararelyresearchedactor,butalso,potentially,inofferingan
alternativeavenueforthestudyofidentityanditsrelationshipwithstatebehaviour.
244
DirectionsfortheFuture
Inconclusiontothisprojectoneshouldconsiderthefuture,bothofthesituationin
EasternEuropeandthatofRomanianidentity.Itisplausible,indeedprobable,that,
untilthechallengestheregionfacesareresolved,atleastintermsofRomania’s
perceptions,identity-relatedconcernswillcontinuetoplayanimportantroleinthe
articulationofthisstate’sforeignpolicyagenda.Moreimportantly,ifthesituations
discussedthroughoutthisthesisescalateitisplausiblethatRomania’sreactionswillbe
shapedbyidentitaryconsiderationsratherthansolelydictatedbythedirection
pursuedbyitsallies.Inanycase,explainingorpredictingRomania’sbehaviourin
currentcircumstanceshingesonanunderstandingofitsidentity-relatedanxietiesand
priorities.ThepartthatRomaniamightplayineithertheresolutionorthe
augmentationofthesechallengesremainstobeseen.
AsforthefutureoftheRomanianidentitynarrative,itwillbeinterestingtosee
whetherthesedevelopmentswillleadtore-evaluationsofitsmajortenets.Overthe
lasttenyears,sinceaccessiontotheEU,theidentitynarrativehaschangedvery
little.622Certainly,Romanianelites’rhetorichasafundamentalEuro-Atlantic
component,noticeable,ashasbeenexplored,inthestate’seffortstojustifyitsstance
againstRussiaandtosupporttheRepublicofMoldova.Havingsaidthat,itis
questionablewhetherintegrationhasalteredRomania’sviewsoftheSelforitsOthers
significantly.Thatisbecause,onewouldargue,Romaniaviewsmembershipofthetwo
organisationthroughtheprismofitsownnationalinterest.Accessionwasameansto
anendofensuringsecurityagainsttheRussianthreatandamoreprosperousfuture.
Membershipisstillaninstrumentinsatisfyingthesecurityconditionanditisnow
beingextendedinaidofMoldova.WithHungary,thisassociationmeansthatthereare
inherentlimitstotheamountandnatureofinterferenceBudapestcanexertuponit.
Inthislight,whetheraEuropeanversionoftheRomanianidentitynarrativewill
emergeisdebatable.Thisis,certainly,thedirectioninwhichitistravellingasanatural
622Thisconclusionisdrawnbothbyexaminationofhistoricalsources–Constantiniu(2011),Djuvara(2010),etc.–butalsoassessmentsbyauthorssuchasBoia(2011,2012)orDragoman(2008)whohavepointedouttheenduranceofperceptionsofRomaniaasanationalratherthanEuropeanstate.
245
consequenceofincreasedcontactandinterdependencewithEurope.Claimsabout
Romanianidentity,however,areparticularlyenduringandanyalterationstothe
narrativetoaccommodateforthisEuropeancomponentwouldhavetobegradualand
contingentonagents’desiretoconstructsuchaportrayal.Thereisaparadoxin
Romania’sviewsofEurope:ifontheonehanditispowerfullyEurophile,thereisno
obviousdesiretorenounceitsnationalvaluesforEuropeanones.Rather,ifEurope
mayindeedaltertheRomanianidentitynarrativeitwilldosobysupplementingrather
thanreplacingfeatures.Romania’smoveoutofthenation-statephasewillbeslow,
particularlyasthisistheonlyroleforthestateeverconceivedinitsidentitynarrative.
Therefore,whilstitisnotinconceivablethatthestoryofRomanianidentitywillevolve,
asitisnatural,thetimeframewouldlikelybealongone.Inanycaseitisunlikelythat
thiswouldoccurduringcurrentchallengesfacedbytheEuropeanprojectasawhole.
246
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