the policy and institutional e ects of resistance in costa...
TRANSCRIPT
Research Group MEGA Mobilization, Extractivism,and Government Action
Work ing Paper No.2 | June 2018
Ludovico Feoli
The Policy and Institutional Effects of Resistance in Costa Rica’s Energy Sector: A Case Study
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ThepolicyandinstitutionaleffectsofresistanceinCostaRica’sEnergySector:ACaseStudyLudovicoFeoli,TulaneUniversityAbstractCostaRicahaschampionedastate-ledelectricitymodelpremisedonhydroelectricpower.Thishasenabledthecountrytoproduceareliableenergysupplywithuniversalcoverage,thatisrenewableandlow-carbon,thuscongruentwithitsidentityasaglobalenvironmentalleader.Thestate-ownedelectricalcompany(ICE),whichenjoysanearmonopolyingenerationanddistribution,andanabsolutemonopolyintransmissionandexport,hasdevelopedconsiderableexpertiseandtechnicalknow-howinhydroelectricpower.Thecompanyhasalsohadsignificantautonomyintheplanninganddevelopmentofprojects.SocialmovementscontributedtotheenthronementofICEbuthavealsomobilizedatvariouspointstocheckitspower.Thispaperexaminesthepolicyandinstitutionaleffectsofthisopposition.Itshowshowresistancetoitslatestmegaproject,Diquís,followsalongtraditionofsocialmobilizationintheelectricsectorandhaslaunchedadebateaboutthecountry’senergymodel.Introduction HydroelectricpowerhasbeenacentralcomponentofelectricitygenerationinCostaRicasince
thelatenineteenthcentury.Whenitnationalizeditselectricitysectorintheearlytwentiethcenturythe
countrychosehydroasitscentralaxisofdevelopment.Thestateutilitycompany,Instituto
CostarricensedeElectricidad(ICE),developedthenecessarytechnicalcapacitiesin-house,collaborating
withtheUniversityofCostaRica(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,84).Asthesolerepositoryof
technicalexpertiseandamonopolyoperator,itenjoyedconsiderableautonomyintheplanningand
directionofprojectsandsectoralpolicies.Thelarge-scaleprojectsitdevelopedbecameamatterof
nationalpride,andICEcametobecloselyidentifiedwitha“Tico”modelofdevelopment,basedon
socialsolidarityandenvironmentalprotection(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,72).Todaythecountry
enjoysvirtuallyuniversalcoverageintheelectricsectorwithsomeofthehighestpercentagesof
generationfromrenewablesourcesworldwide.Whenpolicyreformsatthebeginningofthiscentury
attemptedtoprivatizethesector,oneofthemostardentandsustainedsocialmovementsinthe
country’shistory,theanti-Combomovement,organizedindefenseofICE.Aswillbeseenbelow,this
wasconsistentwiththeroleplayedbysocialmovementsatthebeginningofthepreviouscenturyinthe
longchainofeventsleadingtothenationalizationofelectricityandtheestablishmentofstate
leadershipinthatsector.
However,inrecentyearsthecompany’sinfallibilityhasdiminished.Partialreformsinthe1990s
openedaspace,albeitlimited,forprivategeneratorsthat,togetherwithacoopsectorestablishedin
the1960s,havedriveninvestmentintoalternativerenewables.Theyhavecapitalizeduponthegrowing
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affordabilityofsmallerscaledeploymentsforrenewableenergysourcesthatarewelladaptedtothe
country’stopographyandclimate,includingwindandsolar,butalsomicro-hydro.Notonlyhasthis
chippedawayatICE’smarketdominance,butbycreatingapowerfulinterestvyingforgreater
liberalizationofthesector,ithasalsodiminisheditpoliticaldominance.
Atthesametime,ICEhasfounditselfatthecenterofthecountry’semergentsocio-
environmentalconflicts.Asawarenessoftheimportanceofwaterforeconomicdevelopmenthas
growninrecentyears,itscontrolhasbecomeincreasinglycontentious(ProgramaEstadodeLaNación
2013).Localcommunitiesclaimingsovereigntyovertheresourcehaveorganizedtodefendagainstits
usurpation,realorperceived.1Aswillbeseen,thisbuildsonalonghistoryofsocialmovements
assertinganddefendingthecountry’ssovereigntyoverhydraulicpower,andthestate’srolein
harnessingit.Despiteconsiderableinroadsingeothermalenergy,ICE’scontinuedrelianceonmega
hydrodevelopmentshasplaceditsquarelywithintheseconflicts.Abroadsocialmovementcomprised
ofenvironmentalists,localcommunityorganizations,andindigenousorganizationshasrepeatedly
opposedthesemegaprojectsoverthepasttwodecades.Paradoxically,twodecadesafteritsrescue
fromprivatizationbyonesocialmovementICEnowfindsitselfseverelychallengedbyanother.
Aswillbediscussedbelow,socialmovementshavemanagedtostopmegaprojectsinPacuare
andSaavegreandhavedetainedandseriouslyimperiledwhatICEconsiderstobeitskeyenergyproject
forthenext25years,theDiquísproject.AsIwillargue,thisstruggle,asothersbeforeitintheenergy
sector,hashadtangibleinstitutionalandpolicyimpacts.Ithaslaunchedadebateaboutthecountry’s
energymodelandpromptedaninstitutionalstruggleforthegovernanceoftheenergysector.Thefirst
involvesquestioningthecostandsustainabilityoflarge-scaleextractiveenergyprojects,the
consequencesofmonopolypower,andtheroleofprivateplayersintheenergysector.Thesecond
involvesthereassertionofexistentbutlatentpowersintheexecutivebranchtomakeICEamore
accountableplayer.
AsIwillalsoargue,thesedevelopmentscapitalizeonalonghistoryofsocialmobilization
surroundingthecontrolofvaluableenergyresources.Socialmobilizationopposingaprivateelectricity
monopolyintheearlyyearsofthesector’shistoryledtothecreationofapublicone,butsuccessive
mobilizationschippedawayatit,creatingmoreofahybridsectorwithnewmunicipal,coopand,more
recently,privateactors.Whilejusticehasbeenacontinuousmotivationformobilization,thediscourse
articulatedbysocialmovementshasevolvedsequentiallyfromadefenseofnationalsovereigntyover
1ThroughouttheCAFTAratificationprocess,forexample,unfoundedallegationsabouttheprivatizationofwaterwereamongtheissuesthatfueledmobilizationagainsttheagreement.
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powerresources,toaconcernwiththeaffordabilityandrelianceofelectricity,andfinallytoademand
foropenness,accountability,andenvironmentalresponsibility.Throughahistoricallygrounded
descriptionofthesemobilizationsthepresentcasestudyprovidesalongitudinalexaminationofthe
policyandinstitutionalimpactsofsocialmobilizationsintheCostaRicanelectricitysector.
InstitutionalandpolicyimpactsareexaminedintheframeworkestablishedbySilva(2017).
Withoutdiscussingtheframeworkatlength,andattheriskofoversimplifyingit,Iwillassumethat
impactscanbeeitherdirectorindirect.Directeffectsarethosewhereimmediateconsequencescanbe
tracedtotheactionsofsocialmovements,suchasthesuccessorfailureofaproject,ortheinfluencing
ofpolicybasedonmovementdemands.Indirecteffectsarethosewheremobilizationinfluencesallies
orpublicopinion,whichtheninfluencesoutcomesindependently.Effectscanalsobejointormediated.
Injointeffects,movementsinfluencepublicopinion,whichelicitspoliciesthatreflecttheirobjectives
frompolicymakersthataresensitivetopublicopinion.Inmediatedeffects,movementsachievetheir
objectivesbyallyingdirectlywithinstitutionalpoliticalactors.Astotheeffectsthemselves,theyinclude
agendasetting,policyinitiation,formulation,implementation,andfeedbackloops,aswellasformaland
informalinstitutionalchanges,includingnewformsofinclusionorexclusionandimprovementsinstate
efficacyandefficiency.
Historyofsocialmovementsandtheelectricalsector
CostaRicareliedonhydroelectricpowerfromtheearliestperiodofitselectrification.Itsvery
firstplant,inauguratedin1884with50kilowatts(kw)tolightthestreetsofSanJosé,washydroelectric.2
Sowerethosewhichbroughtelectricitytotheotherprovincialcapitals—Cartago(1892),Alajuela
(1895),andHeredia(1897)(delaCruz2004,159).Thecountry’sfirstmajorexpansionofgenerating
capacitywashydroelectric:twoplants(750kw)developedin1900bytheCostaRicanElectricLightand
TractionCompany,whichalsoranelectrictramsinSanJoséandwasownedbyMinorKeith(ofUnited
FruitCompanyfame),withathirdproject(1,000kw)followingin1912.Twolocalcompetitors
appeared,theCompañiaNacionaldeElectricidad(1911)andtheCompañíaNacionalHidroeléctrica
(1922),adding2,500kwand2,720kwofpower,respectively,allfromhydroelectricsources.Whenthe
pacificrailwayconnectingthecapitaltotheportofPuntarenaswaselectrifiedin1928,itwaswith
powersourcedfromanewhydroelectricplantinTacares.Allcapacityexpansionplansconsideredat
thetime,likethoseforelectrificationofthecentralvalley,ortheutilizationofsurplusenergyfromthe
2ItisnoteworthythatthisoccurredascanttwoyearsafterThomasEdisoninstalledthefirst-everpubliclightingandtransportationsysteminNewYorkCity.
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railroadproject,werebasedonhydroelectricpower(JiménezGómez2009,158).Infact,waterwas
increasinglyseenasanationalresource,vitaltothecountry’seconomicdevelopment.Asearlyas1910,
thelegislaturenationalized“allhydraulicforces”,reasoningthatifsuchforces“constitutenational
richessuperiorinvaluetoallotherresourcesofoursoil,itisthedutyofthestatetoconservethemfor
thegeneralinterest”3(JiménezGómez2009,156,RodríguezArguello2000,46).
In1928,theAmericanandForeignPowerCompany,asubsidiaryoftheU.S.-basedElectricBond
andShareCompanygainedfinancialcontrolofallthelocalproducers,infactconstitutingamonopoly,
thatcametobeknownas“theTrust”.4Thisgeneratedconsiderableoppositionandledtothe
mobilizationofdiversecitizengroups.Numerousconcentrationstookplaceinthecapitalandprovinces
todenouncetheforeign-ownedmonopolyasaninfringementofnationalsovereigntyinasectorofkey
strategicimportance.OrganizedbytheComisiónObrera(Workers’Commission)theyweresoonjoined
byothergroupsliketheComitédeDefensadelaRiquezaNacional(CommitteefortheDefenseof
NationalWealth)andtheLigaCívica(CivicLeague)indenouncingthetransnationalmonopoly(dela
Cruz2004,161,JiménezGómez2009,137).TheCivicLeague,whichincludedsomeofthemost
prominentpublicintellectualsandpoliticiansoftheday,ledthecallforthepassageoflegislationthat
wouldempowerthestatetocontrolthemonopolyandregulatetheenergysector(RodríguezArguello
2000,42).Theresultwasthenationalizationofallelectricityderivedfromhydraulicforces—alreadya
reserveofthestate,asmentionedabove—andthe1941creationoftheServicioNacionaldeElectricidad
(SNE,NationalElectricityService),anewstateentitytoregulateandcontrolallaspectsofhydroelectric
extraction.ThisconstitutedCostaRica’sfirstsustainedsocialmobilizationintheelectricsectorwith
directinstitutionalandpolicyconsequences.Itsaffirmationofthestateasthestewardofelectricity
extraction,andhydraulicresourcesasaninherentlynationalenergysource,setthecourseforthe
developmentoftheelectricalsectorthroughoutthetwentiethcentury,andintothetwenty-first.
TheGreatDepressiongreatlylimitedtheinvestmentcapacityofthestate,sononewplants
wereaddedandthesectorcontinuedunderprivatemonopolyfortwoadditionaldecades.Atthesame
time,nationalizationstymiedprivateinvestment,greatlylimitingthequalityandquantityofenergy
supplied(León,ArroyoBlanco,andMonteroMora2016,103).Broaddissatisfactionresultedinnew
civicmobilizations,asinthecaseoftheAssociaciónNacionalparalaDefensadelConsumidorEléctrico
(NationalAssociationfortheDefenseoftheConsumerofElectricity),whichadvocatedfora“national”
3Asinsubsequentcases,translationfromtheoriginalSpanishlanguagesourcesaremyown.4Aformalmergeroccurredin1941withthecreationoftheCompañíaNacionaldeFuerzayLuz(CNFL),sanctionedbytheNationalCongress,witha25-yearconcessionandthegrantofanexclusivepurchaseoptiontotheCostaRicanstate.See(FernándezRobles1985,241-247).
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solutiontotheproblemsofenergysupply,echoingtheearliercallsoftheLigaCívica.Giventheinability
ofthenationalgovernmenttoprovidethissolution,thegroupsupportedeffortsatthemunicipallevel,
resultingintheCarrillosdePoáshydroelectricproject,startedin1946bythecityofHerediaand
completedin1951(ICEUndated-a,ESPH).Thisledtothecreation,in1949,oftheJuntaAdministrativa
delServicioEléctricoMunicipaldeHeredia(JASEMH),laterconvertedtotheEmpresadeServicios
PúblicosdeHeredia(ESPH).
Moresignificantchangescamein1949.Thatyearmarkedtheendofacivilconflictthatbrought
JoséFiguerestopower.5Hismovementespousedasocialdemocraticagenda,withanexplicitrolefor
thestateindirectingeconomicdevelopment.Itmovedswiftlytoimplementitthroughaseriesof
decrees,oneofwhichledtothecreationofICE.6Theneworganization’smandateincluded“taking
advantageofhydroelectricenergytofortifythenationaleconomyandpromotethegreatestwelfarefor
theCostaRicanpeople”(JuntaFundadoradelaSegundaRepública1949,1).Thechargeisclearly
compatiblewith,andcanbeseenasalogicalcontinuationof,thereasoningbehindthe1910
nationalizationofhydraulicresourcesandthe1928nationalizationofhydroelectricenergy.Thus,the
choiceofhydropowerasanationalimperativeandtheviewofitsdevelopmentasasovereignpublic
good,wereingrainedintheorganizationfromitsinception.
ICEdidnotimmediatelydisplacetheCNFL.7Infact,themultinationalcontinuedtoownthe
distributionlinesforalmosttwentyyearsmore,givingitconsiderableleverageoveritsnewborn
competitor,andtheabilitytochargehighelectricitypriceswithfrequentand—inlightofthepoor
qualityoftheservice—seeminglyarbitrarilylargerateincreases.Alvarenga(2005,Ch.3)describeshow
thissituationbecameacatalystforsocialprotestthatwouldbeemulatedinfuturemobilizations.She
portraystheemergenceofabroadsocialmovement,startingin1952,aroundthreekeygroups:The
JuntasProgresistas(ProgressiveCouncils),theAssociaciónNacionalparalaDefensadelConsumidor
Eléctrico(ANDCE,introducedabove),andtheAlianzadeMujeresCostarricenses(AllianceofCostaRican
Women,AMC).TheJuntasProgresistaswereneighborhood-basedcouncilsorganizedtoadvocatefor
localpublicworksandunitedinanationalfederation,althoughtheirmaininfluencewasinthecapital.
5AfteratransitionalperiodattheheadofaJunta,andcedingpowersothatthelegitimatelyelectedOtilioUlatecouldfinishhisperiod,FigueresfoundedtheNationalLiberationParty(PLN)andwaselectedtothepresidencyin1953.Thepartywaslargelydominantuntil1978,includinganadditionaltermforFigueres(1970-74),andhasremainedamongthemainpoliticalactors.6Otherinstitutionalreformsweretheabolitionofthearmy,thenationalizationofthebankingsector,andtheextensionofsuffragetowomen.ThesereformswereratifiedbyaconstituentassemblyandincludedintheConstitutionof1949.7ThebuyoutofElectricBondandShare’sstockinCNFLwouldnotbefinalizeduntil1967.
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TheAMCsoughttoeducatewomenabouttheircitizenshiprightsandadvocateforbetterhousing,
healthservicesandemployment.8
Inresponsetotheratehikes,theJuntasproselytizedonstreetcornerstodrivesupportersto
communitymeetings,whereprotestactionswerediscussed,agreedto,andlaunched.Keyamongthese
actionswerecitizenmarches,paymentstrikes,andapagones(blackouts).Thelattertwostrategies
wereeffortstocoordinateactionatthehouseholdlevelasashowofcollectiveforce.Thestrikeswere
aimedatdenyingpaymenttotheelectriccompany,whiletheapagoneswereintendedtoblackout
entiresectorsofthecitybyleavingthelightsoffatdusk.WhiletheANDCEwentdoor-to-doorcollecting
pledgestorefusepayment,thethreatofdisconnectiondissuadedmanyfromjoining,stymyingthe
paymentstrike.Buttheapagoneswerehighlysuccessful.Themarcheswerealsojoinedbyunion
members,students,andeventhechambersofcommerceandagriculture.Themovement’smessage,
broadcastthroughflyersandinterviewsinthepressandradio,soughttodelegitimizetheratehikesby
highlightingtheirinjustice.Eventually,however,itevolvedintoafull-throateddemandtonationalize
theCNFL.
In1958a45%increaseinelectricityratesdrovethemovementintoactionwithrenewed
strength.Bythisjunctureitsdiscoursewasfullynationalist.Amajorconcentrationwascalledfor
September15,1958,thecountry’sIndependenceDay.Thesymbolismwasunequivocal:itlinkedthe
movement’sstruggleagainsttheforeigncompanywiththefightagainstimperialoppression,wonfirst
duringtheindependencemovementagainstSpain,andthenagainintheNationalCampaignof1856-57
againstthefilibusteringWilliamWalker.“LetthepeopleofCostaRicareclaimwhatbelongstothem
legitimately—thelight,theenergyemanatingfromourrivers”(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,141),readone
editorialincitingparticipants.Allpoliticalforcesinthecountryjoinedthemarch,makingitaresounding
success.EventhePresident,MarioEchandi,spokeattherally,committing,intheheatofthemoment,
tofulfill“anaspirationofCostaRicansmanifestedthroughalltimes”,bynationalizingtheCNFL.Helater
retractedhimselfunderpressurefromtheopposition(PLN).9However,theepisodeissignificantintwo
ways.First,itshowscontinuitywiththeclaimforenergysovereigntyespousedbythesocialmovements
ofthepreviousdecades.Second,thepresident’sverbalvalidationoftheclaimsuggestsarecognitionof
8Thiswasnot,strictlyspeaking,afeministorganization,sinceitembracedtraditionalfemalerolesaspartofitsdiscourse.Whileitwaspluralist—asanalliancewouldbe—itwascloselylinkedto,andembracedby,thefarleftPartidoVanguardiaPopular.AsWickham-CrowleyandEckstein(2015,37)haveargued,womeninLatinAmericamobilizedforavarietyofsocio-economiccauseswellbeforedoingsoforgender-specificconcerns.9ThecommunistleaderManuelMoraspokeattherallyalso,makingEchandisusceptibletocriticismfromanti-communistsectors.ExpropriatinganAmericancompanyin1958entailedacomplexnationalandinternationalcalculusgiventhestageoftheColdWaratthetime.
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itsbroadbaseofpopularsupport,andthatthestate’sroleinsupplyingelectricityenjoyedwidespread
legitimacy.Themovementwasreassertingtheviewthatenergywasintimatelylinkedtopublic
wellbeingandthereforereclaimingitasarightofcitizenship.
Anewperiodofsustainedsocialmobilizationoccurredin1962duringapaymentstrikeagainst
highelectricitypricesintheprovinceofCartago.Overtwenty-fiveconcentrationsofasmanyasfive
thousandresidentstookplaceoverseveralmonths,culminatinginaconfrontationwiththepolicethat
resultedinthreedeathsandmultiplewounded(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,Ch.4).WhilebythistimeICE
hadalreadybecomethelargestgeneratorinthecountry,itcontinuedtodependonCNFLformuchofits
distribution,asituationthatthelattercontinuedtoexploit.Effortswereafoottoincreasecentralization
oftheenergysector,butsignificantfragmentationstillexisted,particularlyattheregionallevel.The
SNEwasofficiallyinchargeofregulatingelectricityrates,butitscapabilitieswerescant,andtherefore
alsoitsauthority.Athermalfactorhadbeenapprovedasasurchargeonelectricitybillstocoverthe
costsoffuelandproductioninbunker-firedplantsconstructedin1958asastop-gapmeasuretodeal
withtheexistingpowershortage.Cartagosubscribersthoughtthemeasureimpactedthemunfairly,
particularlygiventhattheirownsupplyofelectricitywasspotty.Protestorswerethusmotivatedby
whattheysawaspricinginjustice.
Theywereunifiedinrefusingtopaytheirelectricalbillsasaformofprotest,employingteamsof
electricianstoreconnectservicewhenthecompanyseveredit.Themovementreliedonalocalradio
stationtobroadcastananti-hegemonicdiscourseandasarallyingpointforconcentrationsand
mobilizations.Thebasisofthatdiscoursewasregionalist,portrayingthecentralizationeffortsunderway
asausurpationofprovincialpower,exploitingthehistoricalresentmentofCartago’slossofthecapital
aftertheendofthecolonialperiod.Ironically,thecentralgovernmentvalidatedthoseclaimsby
choosingtorepressthemovementbyforce,endinginabloodyconfrontation.10Thecrisiswouldnotbe
fullyresolveduntil1964withtheestablishmentoftheJuntaAdministrativadeServiciosEléctricosde
Cartago(JASEC),thesecondinstance,withHeredia’s,ofamunicipalexceptiontoICE’smandateasthe
solesectoralactor.Itmarkedachangeintheaimsofsocialmovementsintheelectricalsector,where
theobjectofcontentionshiftedfromenergynationalismtopricinginjustice,andthetargetof
mobilizationbecameICE.
Newmobilizationsagainstpriceincreasesoccurredin1983.Whileacontextofsevereeconomic
crisisfundamentallyalteredthenatureoftheprotests,theydrewonthemechanismsdeveloped
10AlvarengapointstoanoverreactionduetoU.S.influenceandfearsofcommunistinfiltrationoftheprotestmovementatatimeofheightenedColdWartensionsduetotheradicalizationoftheCubanRevolution
8
historicallyinthesector,especiallythepaymentstrike,whilealsointroducingnewactionrepertoires
likestreetblockages.Yet,theirdiscoursefocusedmoreondemandingaccountabilityfromthestate
monopolythanonnationalistthemes,markingasignificantchange.Theinternationalriseininterest
ratesexperiencedintheaftermathoftheOPECoilembargoesseverelyimpactedCostaRica.Likeother
countriesintheregion,ithadsignificantlyincreaseditsforeignborrowingduringthe1970s,andthe
newconditionsmadeservicingthedebtimpossible.Thenationalcurrencydevaluedby500%and
inflationreached100%,seriouslycurtailingthepurchasingpowerofthecitizenryandplungingmillions
intosuddenpoverty.Thiswasastarkreversionoftrendsintheprevioustwodecades,whichhadseen
increasesinthesizeofthemiddleclassandaveragewages.Therewerefrequentstrikesdemanding
costoflivingadjustmentsbydoctors,teachers,governmentworkers,andagriculturalworkers,much
likeotherconsumerproteststhateruptedthroughouttheregioninthe1980s(Wickham-Crowleyand
Eckstein2015,32).Butthesegroupsunifiedwithothersintoasinglesocialmovementinresponsetoan
increaseinelectricityratesofalmost100%byICE.
Thecompanyargueditneededthehigherratestobeabletoserviceitsowninternationaldebt,
butthereisalsoevidencethatthegovernmentintendedtoreduceitsfiscalchasmbyusingtheratesas
aconcealedtax(Sojo2004,22).Yettheimpactontheaveragehouseholdwassuchthat,intheabsence
ofcorrespondingsalaryincreases,itwasunpayable.Seekingtoimposesuchahikeinacontextoffalling
realwageswasseenashigh-handedandinsensibleonthepartofICE,andtheresponsewasswift
(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,Ch.5).Communalorganizationsinneighborhoodsorganizedmarchesthat
quicklyspreadtotheprovincialandregionallevel.LocalComitésdeLucha(StruggleCommittees)
electedanationalcoordinatingcommittee,theComisiónCoordinadoraNacionalContraelAlzadelos
ServiciosEléctricos(NationalCoordinatingCommissionAgainsttheIncreaseinElectricityRates),
representing52unionsand140communalcommittees.TheCommissionsoonannouncedanational
paymentstrikeandacampaignofcivildisobediencethatincludedreturningelectricitybillstoICEor
publiclyburningthem.Communalcommitteeswenthouse-to-housecollectingthepaperbills,
convincingfamiliestojointhestrike,soreturningordestroyingthebillswasasymbolicdisplayofthe
movement’sstrength.Localcommitteesorganizedsentriesinneighborhoodstospotandobstruct
disconnectioncrewsfromICE,andreconnectionbrigadestoreestablishservicewhentheirpreventive
measuresfailed.ThesloganYonopagoelrecibodelaluz(“Idonotpaymyelectricbill”)wasbroadly
displayedonplacardsinmarchesandhousewindowsacrossneighborhoods.
WhenICEannouncedthatitwouldrespondwithmassdisconnections,themovement
barricadedkeystreetsaroundthecity,groundingactivitytoahalt.Thisnewactionrepertoire
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heightenedthevisibilityofthestruggle,butalsoraiseditsstakes.Sinceblockingstreetsisillegal,it
legitimizedrepressiveactionbytheauthorities.However,themovementwasgrowingnationalinscope
andhadwidespreadpublicsupport,sothatactionnevercame.Afteramajorityofdeputiesinthe
legislatureandmunicipalitiesexpressedsupportforthemovement,thenationalgovernmentordered
ICEtostanddownandreversetheincrease.Whileelectricitypriceswouldeventuallyincrease,the
movementwassuccessfulinassuringitwouldbeatagraduated,manageablepaceandinsettinglimits
totheautonomyofICEthroughtheinterventionofthecentralgovernment.
LikeCartagointhe60s,thismovementwasnotdrivenbyinstitutionalorideologicalfactors
relatedtoownershipofenergyresources,butbyperceptionsofpricinginjustice.UnlikeCartago,
however,itsdenouementwasnotlinkedtolocalautonomybecausethepriceincreasesoriginatedin
externalfactorsandtheirscopewasnational.However,thecrisisuncoveredthepotentialarbitrariness
withwhichamonopolymayact,evenifitisapublicone.Itseemstomarkanacknowledgmentthat
stateownershipisbyitselfinsufficienttoguaranteepubliclyinterestedactionsintheenergysector,that
blindtrustinstateinstitutionsisthereforeunwarranted,andthatitisuptothecitizenrytodemand
accountabilityandtransparency.Thesethemeswouldbecomerelevantagaininmobilizationsagainst
subsequentmegahydroelectricprojects.However,theywouldremainlatentasquestionsof
sovereigntytookoveragaininnewmobilizationsintheyear2000.
Thesemobilizationswereinresponsetothe“Combo”,asetofreformbillsinthelegislaturethat
soughtstructuralchangesintelecommunicationsandelectricity,twoareasthathadbeenthesole
purviewofICEsincethemidtwentiethcentury.11TheplansoughtagradualopeningofICE’stelecom
monopoly,greaterparticipationoftheprivatesectorinelectricitygeneration,andapartialopeningof
ICE’smonopolyinelectricitydistribution(Sojo2004,27).Thepoliticalelitearguedthechangeswere
essentialforraisingcapitalandpromotinginvestmenttosecurethecountry’senergyneedsandits
competitiveness.Unions,academics,andothersocialactorsobjectedtothereductionofICE’sremit,
settingupastruggleabouttheproperuseofpubliccapitalaccumulatedinstateenterprises(Alvarenga
Venutolo2005,269).Aswehaveseen,theideathatenergyresources“belongtoallcitizens”was
ingrainedintoICEfromitsfounding.Thecompanyhadcometobeseenasarepositoryofnationaltalent
thathadrisenaboveforeigninterestsandconquereddevelopmentalchallengesandthereforeasource
11ThebillthatconsolidatedseveralICEreforminitiatives(henceCombo)wasProyectodeleydeMejoramientodelosServiciosPúblicosdeElectricidadyTelecomunicacionesydelaParticipacióndelEstado.Thesereformshadbeenunderdiscussionsinceatleastthemid1990s,includinginanationalforum—ConcertaciónNacional—wheretheirgeneralcomponentswereestablishedwithinputsfrom,thoughnotnecessarilyagreementby,allsocialsectors.
10
ofcollectivepride(Solís2002,43).Bythe21stcenturyICEhadbecomecentraltothenationalidentity,a
keyfactorinachievingwhatthecountrysawasitsuniquemodelofdevelopment,centeredonhuman
solidarity.12Asstatedbyitsfoundingdirector,JorgeManuelDengo,ICE“overcametheskepticismabout
theabilityofCostaRicanstocompletegreatworkswhichbeforewereconsideredtheexclusiverealmof
foreigncompanies”(Dengo2004,77).Ithadachievedvirtuallyuniversalcoverage,reachingeventhe
remotestareas—whichwouldhavebeenunlikelyinacompetitivemarket—andhadsuccessfully
developedlarge-scaleandtechnologicallychallengingprojects(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,77).
Whilesometimesatoddswiththecitizenry,ithaddoneallthiswhilesimultaneouslyprovidingenergy
securityatcompetitiveprices.13Tomany,ICE,whilenotflawless,wasanationalpatrimony,theresultof
sacrificesmadebyseveralgenerationsofCostaRicans.Pollsshowedthat72%ofthecitizenryopposed
itsprivatizationatthetime(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,85).
Inthiscontext,theCombowasperceivedasastealthprivatizationeffortthatwaslikelyto
benefitthesamepoliticalelitesthatwerepromotingit(AlvarengaVenutolo2005,277,Chavezand
CortésRamos2013,88,Solís2002,40).14Oneofitsprovisionspurportedlyopenedupnationalparksfor
energyprojects,ahighlyunpopularprospect(Cartagena2010,53).Thebillsparkedangerinmany
sectorsandunleashedamassivesocialmovementthatwasunprecedentedinitsscale(Solís2002,33,
ChavezandCortésRamos2013,89).WhilethevariouslaborunionswithinICEhadacentralrole,this
movementlackedacentralizedcoordinatingmechanismanditsmainactorswerenolongercommunity
basedorganizations.Atitscorewasaloosecoalitionofactorswithdifferingbutnotnecessarily
contradictorydemands,includingecological,feminist,andreligiousorganizations,unions,agricultural
workers,taxidrivers,andstudents.Thesediverseorganizationsarticulateddifferentgoals.Some
marchedtoprotestprivatization,whileothersmarchedtoprotestwhattheysawasself-interestedand
corruptpoliticalelites.Stillothersmarchedtodemandspecificconcessionsincludinghighersalaries
(unions),therepealofspecifictaxes(taxidrivers),orthepaymentofspecialcompensations
12InICE’sspecificcase,profitsfrommorelucrativeareas,liketelecommunications,subsidizedelectricityratesandcostlynetworksthatservicedfewerusersinremoteruralareas(Sojo2004).13Howreasonablepricesare,isamatterofconstantdispute.IndustrialistsclaimtheyarehighandICE,anditsdefenders,thattheyarelow.Bothprovidealternativedatabolsteringtheirclaims.Someevidencesuggestselectricitypricesarelowerthantheregionalaverageintheresidentialmarket,buthigherthanaverageintheindustrialmarket(Sojo2004,30).Asdiscussedbelow,morerecentevidencesuggestspriceshavelosttheircompetitiveness,partlyasaresultofcostoverrunsandinefficienciesinmegaprojects(seeLaNación,August6,2017,“AtaquesInfundadosContraelGrupoICEPretendenDestruirModeloEleéctricoCostarricense”;January5,2018,“CompetitividadEnergéticaseApaga”).DebatealsoragesregardingthecomparabilityofpricesbetweenICWandprivategenerators(see(Castro2008,Alvarado2009,Durán2009)).14Thetwotraditionalpartiesthathadalternatedinpowersincetheendofthe1948civilconflicthadenteredintoa“pact”toadvancethereform,seenbymanyasasuspiciousformofcollusion.
11
(stevedores).Inthisway,themovementdrewstrengthfromnumbersasitgavevoicetodifferent
groupstoventtheirangerandfrustrationagainstthestate,whateveritssource,withtheperception
thatacherishedpublicassetwasfallingpreytoobscuredesignsservingasanamalgamatingfactor(Solís
2002,39,Sojo2004,25).
TheComboprotestersdrewonthememoryof1983andadoptedstreetblockagesandmarches
astheirmainrepertoireofaction.Afterweeksofvirtuallyparalyzingthecountry,thegovernment
relented,scrappingtheproposedreforms,eventhoughtheyhadbeenapprovedbythelegislature.15
Thiswasasignificantturningpointinthehistoryoftheelectricitysector:anelite-drivenliberalization
effortthatwasseveralyearsinthemakingandthatcouldhavefundamentallyaltereditsstructurewas
stoppedshort.Theanti-Combomovementthereforeresultedinasignificantdirectpolicyimpactby
keepingICEunderpublicownershipandpreservingitsroleasaprivilegedactorintheelectricitysector.
ThismeantthecontinuationofICEasadominant,verticallyintegratedentitythatplans,designs,
constructs,generates,transmits,anddistributesthebulkofelectricityinthecountry(Portolés2011).
Aswehaveseen,themunicipalconcessionsgrantedtoHerediaandCartago,16inwhichsocial
movementsplayedasignificantrole,weretwoexceptionstoICE’smonopoly.However,being
concessionstolocalgovernmentstheydidnotalterorchallengetheconceptofenergysovereignty,as
electricalpowerremained,insomewayoranother,inthehandsofthestate.Wenowturntoconsider
twootherexceptions:ruralelectrificationcoopsestablishedinthe1960s,andalimitedopeningto
small-scalegenerationbytheprivatesectorinthe1990s.
Cooperativas
Bythe1960sonlyabout50%ofthepopulationhadaccesstoelectricity.ICEstruggledwiththe
taskofexpandingelectriccoverageduetoashortageofcapitalandthehighlyfragmentednetworkit
inherited.ItwasthereforereceptivetoassistanceofferedbytheU.S.underKennedy’sAlliancefor
Progress,forthedevelopmentofruralelectrificationprojectsusingthecoopmodel,whereruralcoops
purchasebulk-powerfromICEanddistributeelectricityforoff-gridsettlementsandagricultural
businesses(Barnes2011,262).Whiletechnicallyprivate,coopsareconsideredaformof“social
enterprise”,giventheirwidelydistributedownership,wherenoindividualcanexerciseacontrolling
interest,andtheirdirecttiestothecommunity.Thisanalogizestheirroletothatofthestateas
15Asafinalblow,theConstitutionalCourteventuallydeclaredthenewlawunconstitutionalonproceduralgrounds.16Alajuelareceivedaconcessionalso,butitwaslaterabsorbedbyICE.
12
purveyingtothepublicgood.Asaresult,didnotinciteanyformofoppositionandwereseenas
compatiblewiththestate’senergysovereignty.
Fourruralelectriccoopswerecreatedinremoteareasbetween1965and1972:
Coopeguanacaste,Coopesantos,Coopelesca,andCoopealfaroruiz(Madriz-Vargasetal.2016,2).They
operatetodateunderspecialconcessionareaswhichcanbesubstantial.Forexample,
Coopeguanacastecoversanareaof3,915Km2,almost8%ofthenationalterritory,andtodayhasover
70,000members,reachingover100,000peoplewithelectricityprovision.In1989theruralcoops
createdConelectricas,aconsortiumtodeveloprenewableenergygenerationundernewprovisions
enablingprivateactors(seebelow).
PrivateGeneration
AmorefundamentalalterationoftheelectricalregimecamewiththepassageofLaw7200in
1990,andfouryearslaterlaw7508,whichallowedtheparticipation,albeitlimited,ofprivate
generatorsinthesector.Thelawspassedwithoutsignificantoppositiondespitetheirobviousimpacton
ICE’smonopolyandtheirimplicationsforthenotionofenergysovereignty.Ifstatestewardshipofthe
sectorwasasimportantashasbeendescribed,whyweretheselawsunopposed?Apotential
explanationliesinthelimitingconditionsimposedbyeconomiccrisisandtheneedtosupplythecountry
withtheelectricityitneeded.17
Asdiscussedabove,severeeconomiccrisisintheearly1980susheredinaperiodofstructural
reformsandfiscalstringency.Therelativeautonomyenjoyedbydecentralizedstateinstitutionswas
seriouslycurtailed.Wheretherewerefinancialsurpluses,theywerecollectedtohelpreducethe
government’soveralldeficit.Consequently,investmentbudgetswereconstrained,raisingquestions
aboutICE’sabilitytomeetfutureenergydemand(JiménezGómez2009,186).Thelargeleadtimesof
hydroelectricprojects,whichwerealsoincreasinglyquestionedbyenvironmentalgroups,pointedto
thermalback-upsasinevitabletoguaranteeenergysecurity.Therisingcostofoilininternational
marketsmadethisanonerousburdenforthestate.18Underthecircumstances,thenotionthatthe
statehadreacheditsnaturallimitsandshouldconsidercedingspacetoprivateactorsbegantogain
credence,possiblybluntingoppositiontotheapprovalofthetwonewlaws.Movementconcernsand
17Someauthorsarguethatcollusionbetweenpoliticaleliteswithinterestsinthesectorwasadriverofthereforms(GonzálezOandSolísAvendañoo2001,SolísAvendaño2006).However,thatdoesnotexplaintheabsenceofopposition.18Weathervariabilitywouldbeaddedtothesefactorsinthemid2000sasadroughtin2007seriouslycurtailedhydroelectricitysupplies.
13
formationcanbecontingentonshiftingpoliticalandeconomicconditions(Wickham-Crowleyand
Eckstein2015,39).
Law7200authorizedgenerationbycoopsandprivatefirmsbutonlyfromrenewablesources
notexceeding20,000KWperproject.Thelawrequiredatleast65%oftheownershipstakestobe
CostaRican,andcappedtotalenergygeneratedbyallnewregisteredentrantsat15%ofthenational
electricalsystem’stotalinstalledcapacity.ThenewproducerscouldonlyselltheirenergytoICE,andit
inturnwasobligatedtopurchaseit.Law7508expandedthelimitperprojectto50,000KW,andthecap
onoverallgenerationbyanadditional15%ofinstalledcapacity,forcompetitivepublicbidcontracts
underthe“Build,Operate,Transfer”(BOT)modality,whereICEbuystheelectricitygeneratedduringthe
lifeofthecontract,butthephysicalplantistransferredtoICEatitsconclusion.Allprivateprojects
wouldrequireastateconcessionforwaterusewhichwouldbelimitedindurationtotwentyyears19,but
couldberenewed.Hencebypurposelylimitingtheopeningthroughcapitalrequirements,individual
andaggregatecapacitylimits,andmarketrestrictions,policymakerscouldclaimthemantleof
pragmatism,solvingtheproblemofelectricityprocurement,whilestillprotectingthegeneralgoalof
energysovereignty.
Privateactorsmovedquicklytocapitalizeontheopportunitiescreatedbytheselaws.The
momentumproducedbythereformsledtheadministrationofJoséMaríaFiguerestoproposeamore
integralrestructuringofICEin1996.Someofthechangeswereimplementedadministratively,leading
towhathasbeencalledthe“corporatization”ofICE(ChavezandCortésRamos2013,90).Essentially,
theysoughtthefunctionalseparationofthecompany’skeybusinesses—electricityand
telecommunications—andtheintroductionofmanagerialstructuresakintothosefoundinmodern
corporations.Moreambitiouschangesinvolvingprivatizationoftelecommunicationsandabroadening
oftheprivatesector’sroleintheelectricitysector,wouldhavetobetackledbynewlegislation.The
lattersetofreforms,ultimatelytakenupbytheadministrationofMiguelÁngelRodríguez,ledtothe
chainofeventsculminatinginthe“Combo”,asrecountedabove,anddidnotadvanceintheelectric
sector.20
By2014privatesectorgeneratorshadreachedthe15%limitestablishedinlaw7200andthere
were81projectswaitingtoqualifyundertheBOTquota(Sancho2014,Fornaguera2014).Withrecent
capacityadditionsbyICE,theproportionofprivategenerationdroppedslightlytoabout12.2%in
directlyoperatedand12.6%inBOTplantsin2016(Alvarado2017).Numerousbillsinthelegislature19Expandedto25yearsin2009byLaw8723.20Thetelecommunicationssectorwasopenedtocompetition,albeitwithICEretainingitsroleasakeyplayer,asaresultofCAFTAandensuingreforms.
14
havesoughttoraiseoreliminatethislimittoexpandprivateparticipation,buttheyhavenotprospered
(Fornaguera2014).Theviewthatelectricityshouldbetreatedasapublicserviceisstillentrenched,and
therearemanywhoviewthepartialopeningofthesectorasaregrettablebetrayaloftheCostaRican
modelthatshouldbereversed(Álvarez2005,Durán2005).Environmentalorganizationsareamongthe
mostardentadvocatesofthisview,buttheircritiquealsofocusesonICE.Theyaccusetheorganization
ofopaquenessandunaccountability,butalsoofhavingrelinquisheditsstewardshipoftheelectrical
sector.Someblamethisonthevenalityofitstopexecutiveswhotheyaccuseofcolludingwith
politiciansandprivategeneratorstoexploitthesectorfortheirownbenefit(Durán2005,12),echoing
thecritiquesofsocialmovementsduringtheCOMBO.Theycallforre-centeringtheorganizationonits
originalcharge,emphasizingthenotionsofenergynationalism,thatenergyresourcesbelongtothe
citizenryandshouldthereforeneverbeexploitedforprivategain.Whenitis,suchanappropriationof
publicwealthcallsformobilization.
SocialprotestsagainstHydroelectricProjects
Thepartialopeningoftheelectricsectortoprivategeneratorsincreasedthenumberof
hydroelectricplants,andthisresultedinsocialmobilizationsatthenationalandlocallevels(Álvarez
2005,8).Resistancewasnotexclusivelyagainstprivateoperators.ItalsoextendedtoICE.Anditdrew
uponthenotionsofsovereigntyexpressedhistoricallyinthesector,whichheldthatwaterandits
derivedenergyshouldnotbesubjecttoprivateappropriationyetreinterpretingitbyassigningthe
sovereignrightstothecommunitieswheretheresourceswerelocated,notthestate.Thisclaimwas
justifiedbythenotionthatcommunitiesareco-locatedwiththeresourceandhencehaveafirstrightto
it,butalsothattheysuffertheimmediateconsequencesfromitsexploitation.Suchconsequencesrange
fromtheexhaustionofwaterflows,toenvironmentalimpacts,andsometimesthedisplacementof
entirecommunities.
Akeyactiontostopfivehydroelectricprojects(oneofwhichwasICE’s)in1998wasalegal
challengeraisedbythecommunitiesofRivasandGeneralViejo,inPérezZeledón,questioningtheir
constitutionality.Thesomewhatunexpectedresultwasthat,inexaminingtheclaim,theConstitutional
Courtconcludedthatthelegalreformsthathadenabledprivategeneration(laws7200and7508)had,
intheprocess,createdalegalvoidwithregardtotheregulationofwaterconcessions.Aswehaveseen,
theServicioNacionaldeElectricidad(SNE)wasestablishedin1941toregulatehydraulicconcessionsfor
electricitygeneration.ThenewlawsabolishedSNEandcreatedanewregulatoryentity,theAutoridad
ReguladoradeServiciosPúblicos(ARESEP,RegulatoryAuthorityforPublicServices).Whiletheattributes
15
ofthisnewagencypertainingregulationofelectricitygeneration,transportation,anddistributionof
electricitywereclear,theCourtruledthatthenewlawsdidnotprovideanadequatelegalframeworkto
substitutetheSNE’spreviousroleregulatingwaterconcessionsforelectricitygeneration.Interestingly,
theCourtaddedthateventhepreviousSNEframeworkhadbeensupersededbydevelopmentsinthe
ensuingdecades,mostnotablytheadditionoftherighttoahealthyandecologicallybalanced
environmenttotheConstitution.21Insuchacontext,regulatingconcessionswouldrequiremorethan
simplydeterminingthehydrologicalcapacityofabasin:itwouldalsohavetoensurethepreservation
forfuturegenerationsofthewateritselfaswellasrelated,constitutionallyprotectedresourceslikethe
localfauna,ecosystems,climate,navigabilityofwaterbodies,andaestheticandscenicenjoyment(Sala
ConstitucionaldelaCorteSupremadeJusticia2000).22Bydeclaringtheabsenceofsuchaframework
theCourteffectivelycreatedalegalvoidwithnopublicbodyempoweredtoregulateconcessions.This
stoppedthenewprojects,butalsoaffectedthosealreadyinexistencethatwouldatvariouspointsin
timerequirearenewaloftheirwaterconcessions.
Thesituationwasnotresolveddefinitivelyuntil2009(elevenyearslater!)whenthenational
legislatureadoptedtheLeyMarcodeConcesiónParaelAprovechamientodelasFuerzasHidraúlicas
ParalaGeneraciónHidroeléctrica(FrameworkLawforConcessionstoUtilizeHydraulicForcesfor
HydroelectricGeneration),law8723.Itspromulgationcanbeseenasapolicyeffectofthesocial
mobilizationthatledtothepronouncementoftheConstitutionalCourt.Whilethemovement’saimwas
tostopthehydroprojectsinitsimmediatecommunity,initslawsuititexpresslyallegedtheabsenceof
acompetentauthoritytoregulateconcessionsduetotheeliminationofSNE,thekeypoint
acknowledgedbytheCourt(SalaConstitucionaldelaCorteSupremadeJusticia2000).Theresultant
newlawempoweredtheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergytoregulateconcessions,and
modernizedthelegalframeworkbyincorporatingreferencestoenvironmentalandbiodiversitylawsas
wellastothoseregulatingtheelectricalsector.23
AnotherkeyinstanceofresistancewasthedrivebycommunityorganizationsintheSarapiquí
basintoopposea30,000KWhydroelectricprojectproposedbytheESPH(thepublicgeneratorofthe
Herediaprovince,describedabove).Usingahighlyinnovativestrategy,sixteenorganizationspushedfor
amunicipalplebiscitein2000proposingthatthebasinbeelevatedtothestatusof“naturalhistorical
monument”andthereforeofflimitstodevelopment(Vázquez2000).Whileparticipationwaslow(13%
ofeligiblevoters)itpassedbyalargemajority(CorderoUlate2007,LoaizaandVázquez2000).Thiswas21In1994,Article50.22Therulingreferencesthe1992RíoDeclarationonsustainabledevelopmentforemphasis.23Article7,law8723.
16
unprecedentednotonlyinitselfbutalsobecauseitwasthefirstplebisciteofitskindtobeheldinanyof
thecountry’s81municipalitiessincetheyweremadepossiblein1970.24Whilenotbindingwithregard
tonational-levellegislation,itrepresentedastrongassertionbythecommunityofitspositionagainst
publicandprivatedevelopers,politicallylegitimated.Theresultsoftheplebiscitewouldbeusedto
challengeICE’sCariblancohydroelectricprojectaswellasthreeothersbyprivatedevelopersinthe
ensuingmonths.
Theplebiscitestrategywassoonadoptedbyothercommunities.In2001community
organizationsinGuácimoproposedaplebisciteonaruletobananyprofit-drivenuseofitsaquifers.It
passedwiththesupportofover97%ofvoters,effectivelybanningtheintendedhydroelectric
developmentsplannedfortheregion.Athirdplebisciteoccurredin2005inTurrialba,organizedby
community,indigenousandenvironmentalorganizationsinresponsetoICE’slongstandingandhighly
controversialmega-projectonthePacuareriver.Thevotecamedownagainstthehydroelectricproject
by97%andICEdesistedfromit(LaNación2005).However,thisappearedtobemerelyatactical
retreat.Thecompany’sleadership,followinguponitshistoricsuccessandaccumulatedknow-howin
hydroelectricity,wasconvincedthatmega-projectsweretheonlytechnicallyviablealternativetofulfill
thecountry’slong-termenergyneeds,andthatithadtoproceeddespitecommunityresistance,ifnot
byforcethenbyguile(Durán2008,11).Giventhelimitednumberofpotentialsites,theycontinuedto
promotePacuare’sadvancement.Inresponse,themovementopposingtheproject,whichincluded
communal,environmental,andindigenousorganizationsremainedorganizedandvigilant.Sincethe
localplebisciteresultscouldbeoverriddenbynationallegislation,theymobilizedtosecureadecree
fromthenationalgovernmentthatwouldcommittorespectingthatoutcome.Theyalso“nationalized”
theissuebylinkingittoothersocio-environmentalconflictssurroundingwater,mining,realestate
development,andpetroleumextraction(ForoNacional2009).Althoughittookadecade,adirectpolicy
impacteventuallycameintheformofanExecutiveDecreeofficiallyexcludingthePacuareandSavegre
riversfromhydroelectricprojectsfor25years(EFE2015).
AsICEcoexistswithanumberofsmallprivategeneratorstheelectricitymarkethassome
measureofcompetition,butitismonopsonistic,withICEremainingthesolebuyer,andmonopolisticin
theareasoftransmissionandexport.Pricesarenotmarket-determinedbutsetbyaregulatory
authority(ARESEP).Themainpolicyquestiongoingforwardisthuswhethertoreverttoafullypublic
systemorbroadentheremitofthemarkettothoseareascurrentlydirectedbythestate(Vargas2009).
Themainpoliticalcleavageisindeterminingtherelativerolesthatwillbeplayedbythecompeting
24Onlytwootherplebisciteswereheldatthemunicipallevel,bothtodealwithpoliticalboundaries.
17
actors.
WhileICEcontinuestoenjoyconsiderablepopularity,ithasalsocomeupagainstchargesof
high-handednessandinsularity25,anditsinsistenceonmega-projectshasfacedresistancefromsocial
movements.However,thosemovementscontinuetoadvocateforwaterandelectricityas
constitutionallyprotectedrightsandarethereforealsoresistanttoprivategenerators.These
generatorshavebecomewellestablishedandareapowerfulinterestintheirownrightthatenjoysthe
supportofindustryandsomepoliticalsectors.Theyadvocateforgreatercompetitioninthesectoras
thewayforwardtogreaterefficiencyandlowerenergyprices,andamorediversifiedmixofrenewable
sourcesastheroutetoenergysecurity.
ThecampaignagainstDiquís
TheDiquíshydroelectricprojecthasbecomethefocalpointforthedebateaboutthefutureof
theenergysectorinCostaRica.ItisthelargesthydroelectricprojectinCentralAmericawithaplanned
capacityof650MWandanestimatedcostof$2.6billion.Itsdamwouldbe173metershighwitha
reservoircoveringover7,000hectares,915ofwhichwouldbeinindigenousreservations(ICEUndated-
b).Stretchingbackasfarasto2005ithasbeentheobjectofmultiplelawsuitsandprotests.Opponents
objecttotheextractivistnatureoftheprojectanditsenvironmentalimpactsbutalsowhattheyclaim
hasbeenanarbitrary,high-handedandevenillegalapproachonthepartofICE.Thegovernment
decreedtheprojecttobe“ofnationalinterest”in2008,butthecompanyhadalreadybeenonsitefor
threeyears.Itsfootprintwassizeable,withcampsforheavymachineryandlargeworkercrews,and
tunnelsexcavatedtoextractmaterials,allostensiblyaspartofpreliminaryfeasibilitystudies.Tobein
compliancewiththelaw,however,thoseworksshouldhavebeenprecededbythedecree,notthe
otherwayaround.Moreover,thedecreeitselfshouldhavedrawnevidencefromanenvironmental
impactstudy,anenvironmentalstrategicstudy,anevaluationoftheconvenienceofchangingtheland
use,aconsultationprocesswiththelocalcommunity,andaconsultationprocesswithanyimpacted
indigenouscommunities(Sagot2012).ThelatterstemmedfromobligationsacquiredthroughCosta
Rica’sratificationofthe1989ILOConventiononIndigenousandTribalPeoples(#169),butforwhichno
protocolexistedatthetimeofthedecree.26Theabsenceoftheserequirementssuggeststhedecree
25Jokinglyreferredtoas“repúblicasoberana”(sovereignrepublic)insomecircles,asdeclaredbyformerpresidentandNobelPeacePrizeOscarAriastoLaPrensaLibre,August23,2016,“ÓscarArias:‘Somosunmontóndeimbéciles…’”;andasstatedtomebytheMinisterofEnvironmentinapersonalinterview.26Itwouldnotbecreatedbythegovernmentuntil2018.
18
wasinviolationofnationalandinternationallaw.ThegovernmentofOscarAriasseeminglytreatedit
asacursorystepinaprocesswhoseoutcomeithadpredeterminedinfavorofICE.27
Asidefromthequestionablelegalityoftheseactions,thewayinwhichICEproceededalso
generatedabacklash.Itsconductwasseenasdisrespectfulanddismissiveoflocalinterestsand
concerns.Durán(2012,8,12)describesICEasentitledandcondescending,believingitselfableto
“enteranyplace,atanytime”withoutbeingrequiredto“stopthecountry’sprogressforanysmall
groupofpeople”andactingasif“rivers,communities,andthecountrybelongedtoitsothatitcould
imposeonthemwithoutanyqualms.”AsstatedbyMayidHalabi,presidentofSIICE,aunion
representingICEengineersandprofessionals,thisstemsfromaninstitutionalethosdeveloped
throughoutthecompany’slongstandingandundisputedregencyoftheenergysector.28While
groundedinitstechnicalandorganizationalsuccessesithasnowbecomedated.Itsrelianceon
hydropowerhasinhibitedthegrowthofalternativeenergysources,withtheexceptionofgeothermal,
whichisitselflimitedbythefactthatmostunexploitedsourcesareinprotectedareas.29Ithasalso
blindedtheorganizationtothegrowingsocietaloppositiontomegahydropowerprojects.
Organizationsmobilizedtoopposetheprojectatthelocallevelandwerejoinedby
environmentalorganizations,bothnationalandinternational.IndigenousgroupsliketheFrentede
DefensadelosDerechosIndígenasdeTérrabaFDIT(TérrabaIndigenousRightsDefenseFront),the
AssociacióndeMujeresManodeTigre(HandoftheTigerWomen’sAssociation)andtheAsociación
CulturalIndígenaTeribe(TeribeCulturalIndigenousAssociation)ledthelocalopposition,andreceived
supportfrombroaderindigenousgroupsliketheMesaNacionalIndígenadeCostaRica(CostaRican
NationalIndigenousTable),nationalenvironmentalgroupslikeFundaciónNeotrópica,PRETOMA,and
APREFLOFAS,nationalsocialorganizationslikeAsociacióndeIniciativasPopularesDitsö(Popular
InitiativeAssociationDitsö),publicuniversities,andtransnationalorganizationslikeREDLAR(Cordero
Ulate2015).30
However,alocalcommunityorganization,theAsociacióndeDesarrolloIntegraldeTérrabaADIT
(TérrabaDevelopmentAssociation),didnotopposetheprojectandauthorizedICEtoconductstudieson
therightbankoftheTérrabariverin2009,creatingtheappearancethattheprojecthadthe
endorsementofthecommunity(CorderoUlate2015,16).Thiswasloudlydenouncedbyopposing
27SeeRoseSpalding’sstudyoftheminingsectorinCostaRicaforirregularitiessurroundingtheCrucitasdecreeissuedbythesameadministration.28Personalinterview,June28,2017.29TheMinsterofEnvironmentandEnergyreferredtoICEasa“hydrocephalicorganization”duringourpersonalinterview,alsohighlightingthispoint.30SeealsoEnvironmentalJusticeAtlas,http://bit.ly/2GDs867
19
groups,openingastruggletodefinewhowerethelegitimaterepresentativesofthecommunity.
UnderlyingthestrugglewasthefactthatamajorityofthelandwithinCostaRica’sindigenousterritories
isheldbynon-indigenouspersons,mostlyasaresultofsquattersettlements.31Theseterritoriesare
inalienable,andthestateisobligatedtorectifythesedefactoholdingsbutformanyyearshasfailedto
doso.Theindigenousminority,atriskofbeingsilencedandsidelinedfromtheprocess,organizeda
CouncilofElderstorepresentitandchallengethelegitimacyofADIT,workinginconjunctionwithFDIT
andotherorganizationstorequesttheinterventionofJamesAnaya,UnitedNationsspecialrapporteur
forindigenousrights.MeetingwithgovernmentrepresentativesinGenevaAnayaarrangedasitevisit
andpublishedafullreportwithhisfindingsinMayof2011.Thereportnotedhowlandtenureviolated
therightsofindigenouspeoplesandquestionedthelegitimacyofrepresentationbyorganizationslike
ADIT.Moresignificantly,itclearlystatedthatnoprojectcouldgoforwardlegallythatdidnotsatisfythe
rightofpreviousconsultationoftheaffectedindigenouscommunities.Sincenomechanismexistedfor
thatpurposethiswasenoughtostoptheprojectinitstracks,andithasremainedinsuspensesince.
Socialmovements,coalescedaroundtherightsofindigenousgroups,thusmanagedtotemporarilystop
themegaprojectbyappealingtointernationallawandmultilateralagencies.Thisdirectimpactwould
alsoleadtoanindirectpolicyeffect,sevenyearslater,asthegovernmentwasforcedtoissueastatute
regulatingandestablishingtheproceduresforamechanismofpreviousconsultationofindigenous
peoplesininstanceswheretheirterritoriesareimpactedbydevelopmentprojects.
Theresultingdebateaboutthefutureofthesector:diversification,competition,oversight.
YettheprojectremainsatthecoreofICE’sdevelopmentplans.Itsmostrecentlong-term
electricgenerationplanstates:“OuranalysesshowthedevelopmentstrategywiththeDiquís
hydroelectricprojectcomingonlinein2026tobethemostrobustexpansionplantosatisfydemand
growthinthenexttwodecades.TheDiquísstrategyprovidesoptimaleconomicandenvironmental
resultsinanydemandscenario…”(ICE2017,2).Thecompany’sdirectorforplanningandelectrical
development,JavierOrozco,hasmadethecaseforDiquísinmultipleinterviewsandop-edarticles.32
Buttheoppositionfromsocialmovementshasplacedtheprojectonthepublicagenda,generatingan
opendebateaboutitsconvenienceamongvarioussectors—includingthestateitself—andbringing
manyofitselementsintoquestion.
31Someholdersdohavetitlesobtainedingoodfaith,althoughtheirlegalityisquestionableduetothestatutorylimitationsimposedonpropertyinindigenousreserves.32See,forexample,LaNación,August23,2017,“LaImportanciadeElDiquís”;July12,2017,“EmbalsesSustentanDiversidaddeMatrizEléctrica”;June5,2017,“ICEinsisteenqueDiquíses‘Esencial’”).
20
TheMinistryofEnergyandtheEnvironment(MINAE)supersedesICEastheofficialstateentity
responsibleforplanninginthesector,butaspreviouslymentioned,pastministershavebeencontentto
delegatethatroletoICE,allowingitwidelatitude.ThischangedundertheSolísadministration,withthe
ministeractingexpresslytorecoverthatleadershiprole.IncontrasttoICE’sbetonmega-electricity,
MINAE’sNationalEnergyPlan—developedthroughabroadlyconsultativeprocess—openlyembraces
thegoalofamorediversifiedenergymatrixthatcapitalizeson“non-conventionalrenewables”suchas
biomass,wind,andsolar,butalsoadiversifiedgenerationplanthatcapitalizesondistributedaswellas
centralizedoptions(MinisteriodeAmbienteyEnergíaMINAE2015,75,71).Asaresultofthisplan,the
MinisterhasstatedpubliclythattheconstructionofDiquísis“notwritteninstone”33.Thissuggestsa
jointeffectwherebytheactionofsocialmovementsinfluencedpublicopinionregardingtheinadequacy
ofICE’sapproachandtheministerreactedtotheperceivedinadequacies.Thiswasinturncompounded
bytheevidenceputforwardbyindependentpartiesthatchallengesthemodelthatICEinsistsupon.
TworecentreportsbytheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBankhighlightedthelargepotentialthatexists
invariablerenewablesources(windandsolar)anddistributedgeneration(EchevarríaBarberoand
MongeGuevara2017,Ackermanetal.2017).Thestudiesestimatetheexistenttransmissionnetwork
canabsorbanadditional400MWineachofsolar,wind,anddistributedgeneration,whichlessensthe
rationaletoargueforalargecapacityhydroprojectlikeDiquís.
In2015and2016CostaRicageneratedalmost99%ofitselectricityfromrenewablesources.As
hasbeenreported—andcelebrated—worldwide,thecountrytotaled904dayswhereelectricitywas
generatedsolelyfromrenewablesourcesbetween2015and2017,averagingover300daysperyearin
thelastthreeyears.Thepercentageofelectricitygeneratedfromrenewablesourcesgrewfrom90%in
2014to99.7%in2017.34Thepreponderanceofthispower(75%)camefromhydrosources,with
geothermalandwindprovidinganadditional13%and10%,respectively.Biomassaccountedforless
than1%andsolarforapaltry0.01%(RojasNavarrete2017,34).Thishighlevelofrelianceonhydrohas
beencitedbyMINAEasproblematicgivenexistentexpectationsofhighervariabilityinrainfallpatterns.
Atthesametime,thecountryhaslargepotentialcapacityinwindandsolar.Thenortheasternregionof
Guanacastehassomeofthebestwindresourcesworldwidewithaveragewindvelocityof12m/sand
capacityfactorsabove40%,andthepotentialofsolarenergyishighovertheentirecountry(Ackerman
33LaNación,July22,2017,“CostodePlantaHidroeléctricaElDiquísseDuplicóenCincoAños”.ThiswasreaffirmedtomeinaprivateinterviewwiththeMinisterJune26,2017.34Thissignificantachievementwasduetoinstalledrenewablecapacity,butalsofavorableweatherconditions.Overthe2011-14periodrenewablesrepresentedabout90%ofgenerationwhich,whilestillsignificant,meantthecountrygenerated983GWhfromhydrocarbons.Climaticfactors,especiallytheimpactofElNiñoonrainlevels,remainasignificantcontingency.
21
etal.2017,3).Thesesourcescouldbeusedtosubstitutethermalsourcegenerationduringthedry
season,andtoavoidexcessivedrawdownofhydroelectricresourcesduringthewetseason.Ackerman
etal.(2017,10)highlightthat,becausewindandsolararemodularsystems,generationcapacitycanbe
increasedquicklyandgradually,inresponsetoactualdemand.Thisviewisendorsedbyprivate
generatorswhoconsiderthemselveswell-suitedtoprovidethesekindsofprojectsbutarehindered
fromdoingsobytherestrictivelegalframeworkcurrentlyinplace.
Incontrast,largehydroprojectslikeDiquíshavelongleadtimeswithheavyupfrontinvestments
dictatedbyuncertainestimationsofenergydemand.TheevidencesuggeststhatICEhasoverestimated
thisdemandoverthepastfewyears(ICE2017,44,Lara2017,MongeGuevara2017),overshootingthe
scaleofelectricgenerationcapacityrequired.Atthesametime,thecompanyhasunderestimatedthe
costofdevelopingitsprojects,incurringseriouscostoverruns(Díaz2018,Egloff2018b).35The
combinationofbothfactors—overcapacityandrunawaycosts—hasbeenblamedfordrivingelectricity
priceshigher(Lara2017,Egloff2018a).36Ithasalsocontributedtotheerosionofpublicconfidencein
themega-projectmodelchampionedbyICE,callingintoquestiontheneedforDiquís(EcheverríaMartín
2017)butalsotriggeringinquiriesbyaspeciallegislativecommission,ARESEP,andtheGeneral
Comptroller,andcomplaintsaboutICE’slackoftransparencyandaccountabilityaswellasits
administrativecapabilities.37Theshiftinpublicperceptionwasacknowledgedbythecompanyitselfina
full-pageadinwhichitclaimedthat“media,political,andinstitutionalpressures”wereseeking“to
dismantleCostaRica’ssuccessfulelectricitymodel.”38
Thatmodel,reliantasitisonhydroelectricsources,hascomeunderincreasingscrutinyby
environmentalorganizationsandindustrytradegroups.Theoppositionfromenvironmental
organizationsstartedwiththePacuareandSavegrecampaigns,asdescribedabove,andhasnow
generalizedtoopposingalluseofdamsduetotheirpurportedimpactsonecosystemsandrural
communities(CorderoUlate2007,233,2015,11).Theconsensusamongcivilsocietyseemstobefora
moratoriumtoexploitinghydraulicsources(EsquivelRodríguez2014,3,22).Environmentalistshave
gonefromviewingICEasanallyfocusedonnationalandpopularinterests—whichtheystaunchly
35Reventazón,thelatestmega-projecttocomeonline,isestimatedtohavemorethandoubledincost,from$757millionattheoutsetto$1.6billionatcompletion.SeetheeditorialtoLaNación,August21,2017.SeealsoDiarioExtra,December5,2017,“PoromisionesdelICEyJaseccostodeToroIIIsubió$90mills.”36LaNación,January11,“Urgebajarcostodeenergía”;LaNación,April5,2017,“IndustrialesacusanalICEyCNFLdeencarecerelectricidadporineficiencia”.37LaNación,April6,2017,“DiputadospidencuentasaICEyCNFLporimpactodeinversionesentarifasdeluz”;Crhoy.com,January29,2018,“Diputadoslereprochan‘chambonadas’apresidentedelICE”,https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/diputados-le-reprochan-chambonadas-a-presidente-del-ice/38LaNación,August6,2017,page3A.
22
defendedduringthemobilizationsagainsttheCOMBOandlaterCAFTA—todenouncingitisasellout.
TheyaccuseICEofbeing“productivist,anti-ecologicalandanti-indigenous”,ofwantingto“export
energywithoutregardtotheenvironmentalandsocialimpactswithinitsowncountry”andsacrificing
“itstoutedsocialsolidarityinfavorofcorporatistinterests.”39Onmorepragmaticgrounds,theypoint
totherisksofrelyingsoheavilyonhydropower,whichisexpectedtobenegativelyimpactedbysevere
droughtsinthecontextofachangingclimate(EsquivelRodríguez2014),aclaimechoedbyprivate
generatorsandothersintheprivatesector(Alvarado2017).
Industrytradegroups,ontheotherhand,blamethemodelforthehighcostsofelectricityinthe
country,whichtheyclaimmakesthemuncompetitiveinternationally(Díaz2018,Egloff2018a,b).40A
recentreportfromCEPAL(RojasNavarrete2017)suggeststhatthecountry’selectricityratesareinfact
thehighestinCentralAmerica.TheCostaRicaninvestmentpromotionagency,CINDE,claimsthatthis
hasresultedinlostforeigndirectinvestmentandcallsforopeningtheenergysectortoincrease
competitionandforceICEtoreduceoperationcostsandavoidprojectcostoverruns(Lara2018).
Finally,privategeneratorsalsoquestiontheoverrelianceonhydroandsuggestICEresistsalternative
renewablesnotfromtechnicalreasonsbutentrenchedinterests.Megaplantsareasecuresourceof
employmentforthelargeandspecializedlaborforcethatthecompanyhasdevelopedovertheyears.
Privilegingthemcrowdsoutcapacityinsolarandwind,whichprivategeneratorsclaimtheycould
provideeffectivelyandcompetitively.
Insum,thereappearstobeajointeffectoperating,inwhichsocialmovementshaveimpacted
thepolicyagendabyquestioningICE’sextractivemodel,andstateofficialshaverespondedtothose
impactsbymodifyingtheirapproachtopolicies.AstheProgramaEstadodelaNación(2013,210)has
indicated,socialmobilizationhasbecomeakeyfactoraffectinghowtheCostaRicanstateapproaches
projectsthatimpacttheenvironment.Atthesametime,MINAEhasrecognizedtheneedtogivelocal
groupsgreatervoiceandparticipationindecisionsthataffectthem,throughnewmethodologiesfor
citizenparticipation,guaranteedaccesstoinformationabouthydroelectricprojects,andconsideration
ofcommunityinterestsintheassessmentofsocio-environmentalimpactsandtheirmitigation
(MinisteriodeAmbienteyEnergíaMINAE2015,53-54,87,EsquivelRodríguez2014,3).Ithasalso
acceptedthatpublicregulatoryentitiessuchasSETENA—theentitychargedwithapproving
environmentalimpactevaluations—havebeenlaxintheirscrutinyofICE,alegacyfromdecadesof
uncontesteddominancebythestatecompanyintheenergysector,andanestablishedpracticeofgiving
39Ambientico,September2012,p.2-3.40SeealsoLaNación,April5,2017,“IndustrialesacusanalICEyCNFLdeencarecerelectricidadporineficiencia”
23
ICEconsiderableleewayinplanningandexecutingmajorprojects,settingenergyprices,andself-
regulating.Butaswehaveseen,thisautonomywascontestedbysocialmovementswhenitwas
believedtobeusedarbitrarily,whetherbecauseofitsimpactonenergypricesoritsthreattoriver
basinsandotherprizedenvironmentalassets.Asaresult,thegoodwillandpublictrustthecompany
enjoyedhaserodedandregulatorshavebecomemoreassertive.ARESEP,forinstancehasstopped
rubber-stampingpriceincreasesproposedbyICE,limitingitsabilitytopassontoconsumersprojectcost
overruns.MINAE,foritspart,hasmovedtotakecontroloftheenergyplanningprocesswithina
beefed-upplanningdepartment(MinisteriodeAmbienteyEnergíaMINAE2015,84).41
Conclusions
Thecurrentresistancetolarge-scalehydroelectricprojectsinCostaRicafollowsalong-
establishedtraditionofsocialmobilizationwithintheelectricitysector,datingbacktotheearly
twentiethcentury.Ihavearguedthatthesemobilizationshaveproducedmultiplepolicyand
institutionaleffects,bothdirectandindirect,assummarizedinTable1.Ihavealsotracedtheevolution
oftheprotestdiscoursethatthishistoryreflects,fromanearlyfocusonenergynationalism,toissuesof
energyaffordability,demandsforopennessandaccountabilityfromthestateutility,andfinally,a
demandforenvironmentalaccountabilityandrespectoflocaland,especially,indigenousautonomy.
Thehistoricalexaminationinthisstudysuggeststhatmobilizationhasbeencontinuousacross
timeandthatithasproducedalegacyofrepertoiresonwhichmovementshavedrawnrepeatedly.The
anti-dammovementsstartinginthelate1990sexemplifytherelevanceofsustainedactiontoachieve
movementgoals,andhowachievingsuchgoalsmayrequireadiversityofpolicyimpacts.Whilethe
PacuareandSavegrecommunities,forexample,wereabletostophydroelectricprojectsbychanging
policiesatthelocallevel,ittooktenadditionalyearstoobtainanexecutivedecreethatexcludedthem
atthenationallevel.Andthatexclusionisstillnotpermanent.Intermsofthehistoricalrepertoire,
ideationalfactors,suchasthenotionofenergysovereignty,havebeenusedrepeatedlytodrive
mobilization,forexampleinfavorofthenationalizationofelectricityinthefirsthalfofthetwentieth
century,andthenindefenseofnationalizationattheendofthecentury.Atthesametime,while
nationalistsentimentshavenotdisappeared,theydidnotdriveoppositiontoapartialprivatizationof
electricitygenerationinthelate1980s,suggestingtheirimpactonmobilizationmaybecontingenton
shiftingeconomicandpoliticalcircumstances.Materialgrievancesdrovemobilizationsinthe1950s,
1960s,and1980s,withmovementsrepeatedlydrawingonsuchtacticsaspaymentstrikesandstreet
41WithintheenergysubsectoroftheMinistry(“DirecciónSectorialdeEnergía”),the“SecretaríadePlanificación”.
24
blockagestoopposewhattheysawaspricinginjustice.Theassertionoflocalandindigenousautonomy
toprotectcommunityresourcesagainstdevelopmentdrovemobilizationagainstmegahydroprojects
fromthelate1990stothepresentday.
WhileICEhasawell-establishedreputationfortechnicalexcellencyandhasbeenalongstanding
sourceofnationalpride,thesemobilizationssuggestthatitspowerandautonomyhavebeen,and
remain,contested.Integratedutilitymonopolieshavetheadvantageofacaptivecustomerbaseand
stabledemand,whichallowsthemtoplanwithinalong-termhorizon.Theycanbuildcapacityto
accommodategrowthandrespondtopeakdemand,whilepassingcostsalongtoconsumers,without
risk.Yet,intheabsenceofstrongregulation,thisabilitycanreduceincentivestoremainefficientand
increasethepropensitytospendonmanagementandemployeeperks(Helm2017,207).Projectcost
overrunsandhighelectricitypricessuggestthismayhaveoccurredinCostaRica,andsocialmovements
havemobilizedinresponse.Theiractionshaveresultedindirectpolicyshifts,asthesuspensionof
Diquísshowsmostrecently.Butbyplacingtheseissuesontheagenda,movementshavealsogenerated
abroaderconversationaboutICE’srole,pushingthestatetoexertamoreproactive,butalsomore
representativeregulatoryrole.
Thedebatehasalsospilledoverintoabroaderquestioningofthelarge-scaleextractiveenergy
modelpredominantinthecountry.Movementshavedenouncedthesignificantsocio-environmental
impactsofhydroelectricprojects,rangingfromthedisplacementofentirecommunitiestoalterationsin
riverflows,sedimentation,thelossofforestcover,thedestructionofwetlands,andnumerousrelated
environmentalrisks.Environmentalistshavealsopointedoutthatmegahydroplantshavesignificant
carbonfootprints,andarenotaslow-emissionastypicallyclaimed(AstorgaGatgens2012,24).While
ICEinsistsonthecentralityoftheextractivemodel,criticspointtoitshighfixedcostsandlonglead-
timeswhilehighlightingthemodularityandflexibility,aswellastheuntappedavailability,ofvariable
renewablesourceslikesunandwind.Thedebatereflectsalargeronetakingplaceatthegloballevel,
drivenbyrapidtechnologicalchangeanddecarbonization.Itpositsthattheexistingenergy
architecture,whichiscentralized,command-and-controloriented,andextractive,isbeingreplacedbya
newone,which“willbedistributive,mobile,intelligent,andparticipatory”(Seba2014,3).Thisisan
adversescenarioforcentralizedutilitieslikeICE:“buildingsmall-scaleonshoreandoffshorewindand
fittingsolarpanelsarehardlyskillsthatcompaniesspecializinginlarge-scalepowerstationsarelikelyto
have”(Helm2017,211).Ontheotherhand,itdovetailswiththeinterestsofprivategenerators
clamoringforgreaterparticipationintheCostaRicanenergymarket.
25
WhilesocialmovementshavemobilizedtokeepICEaccountabletheydonotnecessarilyoppose
theinstitutionperse.Muchlessdotheyfavoranexpansionofprivategeneration,whichtheyseeasan
appropriationofwaterandenergy,nationalandpublicresourcestheysaybelongtoeveryone.ICE
remainspopular,steepedinitsidentityasstewardofthecountry’senergysovereignty.Butits
adherencetoamega-extractivemodelseemslikelytocontinueencounteringresistance.Whetherthe
organizationrespondsadaptively,asithasdoneinthepast,willbeakeyquestionforthefuture
developmentoftheelectricitysector.
26
Table1.MovementPolicyandInstitutionalImpactsintheCostaRicaEnergySector
Movement Impact Type
LigaCívica,ComisiónObrera,ComitédeDefensadelaRiquezaNacional
NationalizationofelectricityCreationofSNECreationofICE
DirectpolicyimpactDirectinstitutionalimpactIndirectinstitutionalimpact
AsociaciónNacionalDefensaConsumidoresEléctricos(ANDCE)1949,Cartagocitizens1962
MunicipalelectricitygenerationCreationofESPH/JASEMH
DirectpolicyimpactDirectinstitutionalimpact
JuntasProgresistas,ANDCE,AlianzadeMujeresCostarricensesanti-ratehikemovement1952,1958
CallsfornationalizationofCNFL,reinforcesnotionofenergysovereignty/nationalism
Agendaimpact
Protestmovement1983,ComitésdeLucha,ComisiónCoordinadoraNacionalContraelAlzadelosServiciosEléctricos
GraduatedrateadjustmentsDemandsforaccountabilityandtransparencyofICE,dangersofmonopolyactor
DirectpolicyimpactAgendaimpact
Anti-dammovement1990s Exposedregulatoryvoidregardingwaterconcessions,frozenewprojectsandrenewalsfor11yearsEmpoweredMINAEtoregulateconcessionsandmodernizedlegalframework
DirectpolicyimpactIndirectpolicyimpact
Anti-COMBOmovement2000 StoppedliberalizationandopeningofenergysectorReinforcednotionofenergy/waterassovereignresources
DirectpolicyimpactAgendaimpact
Localcommunitiesmobilizedagainsthydroelectricprojects
UseofmunicipalreferendumforpopularparticipationinextractivedecisionsStoppedprojects:Sarapiquí2000Guácimo2001Turrialba2005Pacuare/SavegreExecutiveDecree2015
InstitutionalimpactDirectpolicyimpactsDirectpolicyimpact
IndigenousmobilizationagainstDiquís,withenvironmentalorganizations
RecourseagainstUnitedNations,SpecialRapporteurReport2011Statuteforpreviousconsultationofindigenouspeoples2018QuestioningofICE’sextractivemodelPortrayalofICEasheavy-handedandunaccountableactor
InstitutionalimpactIndirectpolicyimpactAgendaimpacts
27
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