the polictical implications of the theology of h. richard niebuhr - l. earl shaw

8/7/2019 The Polictical Implications of the Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr - L. Earl Shaw

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THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE

THEOLOGY OF H. RICHARD NIEBUHR

Forwell over a quarter of this century H. Richard Niebuhr, along

with his brother Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (who fled

Germany in the thirties), stood as one ofthe giants of American

Protestant religious thought. Though less well known than his

brother, Richard is perhaps more widely respected and has had

greater influence within theological circles. In fact, because of his

careful, penetrating, and creative scholarship, he has been referred

to as the "theologian's theologian." 1 Actually he was not a "syste-

matic theologian" as that term is normally understood in seminaries

and divinity schools; he was, as he claimed to be (and as his title at

Yale indicated) a philosopher of the Christian moral life. But since

for him theology and ethics were inseparable, a great deal of his

reflections and writings were on the nature and actions of God, as

well as reflections on man's appropriate response to God's nature

and actions.

The ManandHis Work

Helmut Richard Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri, in

1894, the son of a distinguished pastor (who fled to the United

States from Germany at the age of 17) in the German Evangelical

Synod of North America." He followed his older brother to Elm-

hurst College (1908-1912) and later to Eden Theological Seminary

(1912-1915). He pastored a church in St. Louis from 1916-1919,

during which he received an M.A. in history from Washington Uni-

versity. In 1919 he returned to teach at Eden. Feeling the need for

more intellectual development, he left Eden to continue his studies

at Yale in 1922, while he pastored a church nearby. After receiving

his B.D. and Ph.D. (writing a thesis on "Ernst Troeltsch's Philoso-

phy of Religion" under Professor D.C. Macintosh), he spurned an

offer to stay on to teach at Yale and returned to be President of

Elmhurst College in 1924. After a highly successful three years, he

i Clyde A. Holbrook, "H. Richard Niebuhr in AHandbook of Christian

Theologians,. eds.,. Dean Peerman and Martin Marty (Cleveland and New York:

World Publishing Co., 1965), p. 375 .2 For a more detailed survey of his life, see James Fowler, To See the King-

dom: The Theological Vision of H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Abingdon,

1974), pp. 1-8.


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54 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

yearned for the classroom and returned to the Eden faculty where

he taught until 1931 when he took a Yale professorship to teachChristian ethics, a position he held until his death in 1962 .

H. Richard Niebuhr was a dedicated and active churchman

throughout his life. He was an early advocate of church union and

ecumenical cooperation. His first major book, The Social Sources of

Denominationalism ( 1929 ) , 3 in a highly critical tone, pointed tohow economic, racial, regional, ethnic, nationalistic, and political

forces had molded churches in their own image. In a 1935 book,

Church Against the World

4

(with Francis Miller and WilliamPauck) he pointed to the "captivity" of the churches by the culture

and pleaded for the church's liberation and independence from

capitalism, nationalism, and humanism. In his masterful study of

1937 , The Kingdom of God in America, he seeks to provide a cor-

rective to some of his early writings, arguing in effect that socio-

historical factors cannot account for all religious belief and events.

That is, to use social scientific language, religion (specifically in this

case, the conception of the Kingdom of God) can be an independentvariable.

In 1941 he published one of his finest theological works, The

Meaning of Revelation,which Paul Tillich once referred to as "the

introduction to existential thinking in present American theology."7

A 1951 book, Christ and Culture explores the normative patterns

Christians have used to relate to the "world" or culure. Four years

later he edited (with Waldo Beach) Basic Christian Ethics.

In 1954-55, with the assistance of James Gustafson and DanielDay Williams, he directed a study of theological education in the

United States and Canada for the American Association of Theo-

logical Schools. The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry

a The Social Sources ofDenominationalism (New York: Henry Holt and Com-

pany, 1929).4

The Church Against the World (Chicago, New York: Willell, Clark andCompany, 1935), hereafter CAW.

5

The Kingdom of God in America (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1959),hereafter KGA.

6The MeaningofRevelation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941),

hereafter MR:7Paul Tillich, "Existential Thinking in American Theology," Religion in

Life X(Summer 1941), p. 4551.

s Christ and Culture (New York: Harper, 1951) hereafter CC.9Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Ronald Press, 1955).


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THEOLOGY OF H. RICHARD NIEBUHR 55

(1956)1 0 and The Advancement of Theological Education (1957)11

resulted from the study. A related book, The Ministry in HistoricalPerspectivel2was edited by Niebuhr and Williams.

His last book before his death, Radical Monotheism and West-

ern Culture (1960) 13 develops his central concept of radical mono-

theism and distinguishes it from the polytheistic and henotheistic

faiths in the history of Western science, religion, and politics. The

Responsible Self(1963) was published posthumously, but it can only

be regarded as prolegomenon to his projected opus on ethics which

religious academics had long anticipated.

Niebuhr is difficult to classify using the usual categories or labels

for schools of thought. In fact he eschewed such labels. Claude

Welch's characterization of his thought as "critical orthodoxy" will

serve as well as any. Welch writes:

This critical orthodoxy, as I shall call it, is characterized by less

animus toward liberalism than is present in some neo-Reformation

types of thought (especially those of the European variety). Indeed,

it includes what some interpreters would prefer to call a chastened

evangelical liberalism. Yet the distinctive complex of liberal the-

ology's doctrinal emphases has not persisted. . . . And where lib-

eralism was apologetic about the creeds and the biblical symbols,

this theology is happy to rediscover their meaning and continuing

relevance. It i s impressed less by the newness of an epoch in which

the past formulations must be radically revised and new principles

of authority articulated than by the perduring validity of the

central theological traditions. In this sense it may be called keryg-

maticand orthodox. Yet this is plainlya critical orthodoxy, incor-

porating many of the concerns of liberalism, its historicritical ap-

proach to scripture, its interest in relevance to culture, etc., and

there is an openness to new symbols that will not replace but will

interpret the classic statements. Further, this critical orthodoxy is

distinguished from its European counterpart by much less concern

to identify a depositum fidei or body of revealed truth or unchang-ing doctrinal content.

15

1o H. Richard Niebuhr, Purpose of the Chuch and Its Ministry (New York:

Harper and Brothers, 1957), hereafterPCM.11

The Advancement of Theological Education (New York: Harper andBrothers, 1957), hereafterATE.12 The Ministry in Historical Perspective (New York: Harper and Brothers,

1956 ) .13Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper and

Brothers, 1960), hereafterRMH,'C.1 4 The Responsible Self (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) hereafter RS.13 Claude Welch, "Theology" in Religion, ed., Paul Ramsey (Englewood

Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965).


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In a major article l6 published just two years before his death

in the Christian Century's "How My Mind Has Changed" series, henotes that a "purely objective critic" might say he had changed his

mind not once but twice-that in the 1930's he had deserted early

liberalism, which was an "ethics and religion centered way of think-

ing about God and man" and turned to what has been called

Barthianism or theology of crisis. It is true that in 1937 he had

penned perhaps his most quoted statement-a judgment on the

religious liberalism of the 19th and early 20th century that had

significant autobiographical dimensions: "A God without wrath

brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through

the ministrations of a Christ without a cross:" 17

This "purely objective critic," Niebuhr continues, might also

point out that in. the 1950's, Niebuhr had turned against Barthian-

ism in its later forms and seemed to resume contact with earlier

modes of theological thought. Niebuhr maintains that his convic-

tions and concerns over the 1930-60 period were not only con-

tinuous but also consistent" and that though the "external, rough

facts" were true, the implied interpretation of this "purely objective

critic" would be wrong. He admits his emphasis changed due to the

varying contexts. He wrote:

I believe that the Barthian correction of the line of march begun in

Schleiermacher's dayw as absolutely essential, but that it has ' becomean overcorrection and that Protestant theology can minister to the

church's life more effectively if it resumes the general line of march

represented by the evangelical, empirical, and critical movement.' $

He was particularly fearful that Barthianism had "gone back toorthodoxy as right teaching, right doctrine, and to faith as fides, asassent . " They tried to emphasize "right believing," exaltation ofChristianity as the "true religion," and the "primacy of ideas over

personal relations." Niebuhr concluded that by 1960 he felt a

greater kinship with the "theologians of Christian experience than

with theologians of Christian doctrine." 19

He noted that whereas in practical churchmanship his brother,

Reinhold, focused on the reform of the culture (which was alsothe great concern of the Social Gospel), he felt the times (1930's)

18 "Reformation: Continuing Imperative," Christian Century 77 - (March 2,1960 ) , pp. 248-251.

17 KGA, p. 193.18 "Reformation," p. 248.

19 Ibid., p. 249.


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dictated that reformation of the church should be his special task.

In the thirties, he called for a rejection of "cultural Protestantism"(see Social Sources of Denominationalism and Church Against the

World cited above) and a "return of the church to the confession

of its peculiar faith and ethics."2 0 (This partly explains the attrac-

tion of the early Barth, with his focus on the primacy of faith, inde-

pendence of the church and God's transcendence.) In the 1960's his

primary concern was still reformation of the church. But now he

was saying that the church's separation from the world had gone far

enough. We need an entrance into it without conformity to it. Hecalled for a "resymbolization of the message and life of faith in the

one God.j2 1 The oldphrases are worn out, they have become little

more than cliches; they no longer are able to grasp or communicate

the reality of existence before God.

It would be false to assume that Niebuhr's emphasis on the

reformation of the church illustrated a lack of concern with society

and its structures. The two concerns are interrelated. He ends his

review of how his mind has changed with these words:

I also believe, with both the prophets and, of all men, Karl Marx,

that the reformation of religion is the fundamental reformation of

society. And I believe that nothing very important for mankindwillhappen as a result of our "conquest" of space or as a result of the

cessation of the Cold War unless the human spirit is revived within

itself.2 2

Theology, Revelation and History

Niebuhr was convinced of the radically historical character of

human existence. He wrote, "I am certain that I can onlysee, under-

stand, think and believe as a self that is in time."2 3 Faith comes to

man "in history." But all knowledge is conditioned by the stand-

point or point of view of the knower. Niebuhr did not feel that ac-

ceptance of historical relativism (or historical relationalism) must

lead to agnosticism or cynicism. "Relativism does not imply sub-

jectivism and skepticism. It is not evident that the man who is

forced to confess that his view of things is conditioned by the stand-

point he occupies must doubt the reality of what he sees." 2 4 True

20Ibid.

2 1Ibid., p. 251.2 2 Ibid.23 Ibid., p. 249.2 4 MR, p. 18; see also p. vii.


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we view the universal from a relative and particular point of view

and we do not fully grasp or express it in our words but "it" stillmay exist. To some degree, knowledge of "reality" is subject to the

test of experience (and validation or corroboration) on the part of

our companions who look from the same standpoint in the same

direction, using the paradigms, concepts, etc., that have developed

over time in a common community. 2 5

One cannot even speak of theology (i.e. man's formulations and

critical thinking about the nature and acts of God and man's rela-

tion to God) or revelation (God's self disclosure) apart from history.Because we are historical beings we must see everything through

the medium of history. "We are in history as the fish is in the water

and what we mean by the revelation of God can be indicated only

as we point through the medium in which we live." 26

Niebuhr distinguishes between two types of history: external

history, the realm of theoretical reason, and internal history, the

realm of practical reason.27 The former refers to the "objective"

or "cause-effect" history viewed by the "detached" or "outside

observer" (i.e. detached as he can be). In internal history, the con-

cern is for the "meaning" of events for one's life. One participates in

internal history; he views things from the "inside" wearing the

same "lenses" or using the same paradigms and concepts of his fel-

low community members with that common history. In external

history (viewed from the outside) the value of an event is measured

by valency or strength (i.e. the effect, not the nobility of the value);

time is measured serially and society is viewed as an association of

atomic individuals related to each other only by external bonds.But in internal or "lived" history, value is measured by its worth

for selves; time is "in men," and society is a community of selves

personally and internally related. The two kinds of history parallel

the distinction developed by Martin Buber: written history involves

I-it relationships; inner history, an I-Thou relationship. Man

meets the eternal "Thou" in his inner history, he does not get in-

formation aboutGod.28

The revelation event takes place primarily in internal history.Niebuhr describes the meaning of revelation this way:

2 5 Ibid., p. 21.2 6 Ibid., p. 48.

27Ibid., pp. 59-73.2 8Ibid., pp. 146-7. See Martin Buber,I and Thou (Edinburg: T & T Clark,

1937).


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Revelation means for us that part of our inner history which illumi-

nates the rest ofit and which is itself intelligible. Sometimes whenwe read a difficult book, seeking to follow a complicated argument,

we come across a luminous sentence from which we can go forward

and backward and so attain some understanding of the whole. Reve-

lation is like that. In hisReligion in the MakingProfessor White-

head has written such illuminating sentences and one of them is

this: "Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special

occasions, and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occa-

sions." The special occasion to which we appeal in the Christian

church is called Jesus Christ,. in whom we see the righteousness ofGod, his power and wisdom. But from that special occasion we also

- derive the concepts which make possible the elucidation ofall the

events in our history. Revelation means this intelligible event

which makes all other events intelligible.29

Revelation provides us with that "image" by means of which

personal and common life become intelligible or take on meaning.

Revelation is not irrational; on the contrary it brings rationality,

coherence and wholeness. "Without revelation, reason is limited

and guided into error; without reason, revelation only illuminates

itself." 30 The supreme occasionfor revelation for the Christian is

Jesus Christ's history which is not simply viewed externally but

through faith as we participate in that history. He provides the

paradigm to interpret, and give "meaning" to our existence.

Obviously Niebuhr's theology is "confessional" rather than

apologetic. 31 He speaks from a faith perspective, "inside" a particu-

lar history. He cautions against self defensiveness (those who claimtheir "view" of ultimate reality is "true" or superior) as a cardinal

sin for Christians. There is no Christian God, only a Christian rela-

tion toGod. 32

Another idea (sometimes referred to as the "protestant princi-

ple") that underlies Niebuhr's work is that "the great source of evil

in life is the absolutizing of the relative, which takes the form of

substituting religion, revelation, church or Christian morality for.

God."33

Every statement, action or institution of men in history isrelative and finite.

29 Ibid.,p. 93 .

30Ibid., p. 121.31

Ibid., vii. See alsoRS, pp. 42-46.32RS, p. 45.33 MR, pp. viii-ix.


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Radical Monotheism

The principal theological motif for Niebuhr was radical mono-

theism or God 's sovereignty. In his review of his thought in 1960 he

said:

The fundamental certainty given to me.. . was that of God's

sovereignty. My fundamental break with the so-called liberal orem pirica l theology w as not due to the fact that it empha sized huma nsovereignty; to interpret it in that w ay is to fals i fy it in unjustifiablefashion. It was rather due to the fact that it defined God primarily

in value-terms, as the good, believing that good could be definedapart from God. And now I came to understand that unless beingitself, the constitution of things, the One beyond all the man y, theground of my being and of all being, the ground of its "that-ness"and its "so-ness," was trustworthy-could be counted on by whathad proceeded from it-I had no God at all. The change was not

a change of definition of God but of personal relations to my worldand the ground of the world, to the given nes s of l ife, history, mys elf .Since I came to that conviction or since it came to me, I haveworked considerably at the problem of the nature and meaning of

"value" and at efforts to understand the basic relation of the self tothat on which it is absolutely dependent. But the old theologicalphrase, "the sovereignty of God," indicates what is for me funda-

mental . 33

For radical monotheism the value center is the principle of being

itself; its reference is not to one reality among the many (as heno-

theism) but to the One (not three)3 5 beyond all the many from which

all derive their being and value. As faith (which Niebuhr defines

as both trust andloyalty)" it is reliance on the source of all beingfor the significance and value of self and of all that exists. "Mono-

theism is less than radical if it makes a distinction between the

principle of being and the principle of value." 37 This real God

is personal (unlike Tillich'sground of being); he is an independent

actor in history who confronts man as void, then enemy, then com-

panion and.friend.3 S

34 "Reformation," p. 248.3 5 F o r R i c h a r d N iebuh r's discuss ion of the doctrine o f the trinity, see "An

Attemp t at Theological Ana lysis of Missiona ry Motivat ion," N.Y.C. MissionaryResearch Library Occasional Bulletin, XIV (J a n u a ry , 1963), pp. lf; and "TheDoctrine of the Trinity and the Unity of the Church," Theology Today, III(October 1946), pp. 371-84.

38RMWC.37Ibid., p. 32.3 8 See Fow ler, ToSee the Kingdom, pp. 59-60, pp. 151-200. N iebuhr often

quoted Al fred N orth W hitehea d, Religion in the Making (Cleveland: Meridian


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Radical monotheism is the conviction that nothing is absolute

save the one God. Negatively, this idea protects against all the false

absolutes and graceless gods that lead men up blind alleys. It

negates ("slays") all these little gods, such as race, religion, class,

nation, ideology, or sex, in which men have placed trust, sought

meaning, and given their loyalty. Positively the radical monotheism

idea is the affirmation that the principle of being, the one beyond

the many, is trustworthy. The God whom Jesus Christ points to is

both powerful and good. He ushers us into the inclusive, universal

community and creates an obligation which extends to all creation.Radical monotheism dethrones all absolutes short of the principle

of being itself; at the same.

time it "reverences every relative ex-

istence."3

Man's Sin and God's Grace

In the same 1960 article referred to above, Niebuhr cites two

other convictions (clearly interrelated and also relevant to radical

monotheism) that he came to during the 1930s: a) recognition of

man's lostness, sinfulness, and idolatrousness, and b) the under-

standing that trust in the ground of being is a miraculous gift."

The doctrine of human sinfulness is as central to any Christian

strategy of life as the doctrine of class struggle in Marxian strategy.

Though man's fundamental nature is "perfect," he is perverted

or corrupted. In dealing with ourselves and our neighbors we con-

front twisted, warped, "diseased" beings. Niebuhr rejects various

theories of evil that distinguish a moral elite from other individualsor classes in whom evil is supposedly concentrated. He also rejects

the romantic belief that men are good, and evil resides in "bad"

institutions. He rejects an evolutionary theory of evil that sees sin

resulting from cultural lag or immaturity.

Sin for Niebuhr is primarily a religious category, not a moral

one. Thus to say man is a sinner is not equivalent to saying he is

morally bad. Moral principles of right and wrong are relative judg-

ments-relative to the standard of morality presumed by them. Hewrites:

Ultimately morality is always driven back to the acceptance of a

Books, 1960), p. 16. "It (religion) is the transition from God the void to Godthe enemy to God the companion:"

39RMWC, p. 32.0 "Reformation," pp. 16-23.


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standard which is given to it, without which morality would be

impossible, but which is itself prior to all morality. The source ofthat s tandard is a lwa ys re l ig ion, not moral i ty . I t depends upon w hatman finds to be wholly worshipful, intrinsically valuable-in other

words, upon the nature of his god or gods. The "chief good" of

man is not the object but the presupposition of his moral choices,and h is posses sion of a chief good is the presu pposit ion of all moral

judgments w hich he or another passes upon him .41

Nor is sin to be confused with "creatureliness" or finitude per se or

even selfishness or sensuality.

The religious concept of sin "always involves the idea of dis-

loyalty, not of disloyalty in general, but of disloyalty to the true

God, to the only trustworthy and wholly lovable reality."4 2 God is

not worshipped as God. But sin is more, for men must be loyal to

something (e.g. themselves, their race, their nation, their machines).

Thus sin is not merely absence of loyalty, it is "wrong direction,"

"false worship." Men are in "active rebellion" against the wholly

loyal God. One consequence of this disloyalty and rebellion is con-

flict within the individual and within society and between societies.Sin also results in death-"death" of cultures, disintegration of the

self, destruction of society by strife. There are also moral conse-

quences (e.g. abuse of sex, greed, inhumanity of man to man).

Niebuhr addresses himself to the question of howmen can rebel

against God if he is not conscious of his disloyalty, i.e. he does not

consciously will rebellion. Such a question misses the point, for

Christianity is not primarily concerned with assessing blame or a s -

signing guilt, but diagnosing the true character of the situation and

the cure. Furthermore a dubious doctrine of freedom is implied by

the question. "The starting point of the doctrine of sin is not man's

freedom but man's dependence; freedom accounts for the fact that

men can be disloyal, not for the fact that he ought to be loyal."43

Don't assume man in "moral guilt" can exercise his "free will"and overcome his disloyalty and rebellion, thus putting aside his

sin. Men are completely impotent to rescue themselves from false

loyalties and their consequences. The will is always committed

or it is no will at all. It is either committed to God or to one of the

gods."44

Sinful man is thus "entrapped" in his idolatrous systems of

41 "Man the S inner," Journal of Religion, XV (July 1935), p. 225.42 Ibid.,pp. 276-77. -

43Ibid., p. 277.44Ibid., p. 279.


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meaning and value and cannot escape by "free will." As early as

1935 he had touched on the view that redemption from sin is pos-sible only by a reconciliation to God, "which cannot be initiated

by the disloyal creature."46

Writing twenty-five years later he says:

How it is possible to rely on God as inconquerably loving and re-

deeming, to have confidence in him as purposive person working

towards the glorification of his creation and of himself in his works,

to s a y to the great "It": "Our Father who art in heaven"-thisremains the miraculous gift. It is the human impossibility which

has been made possible, as has also the enlistment of these unlikely

beings, these human animals, ourselves, in his cause, the cause ofuniversal creation and universal redemption. So far as I could see

and can now see that miracle has been wrought among us by and

through Jesus Christ."

God's self revelation, correlated with man's faith, begins the

process of conversion, metanoia, the permanent revolution that con-

tinues into eternity.47

Christ and Culture

In Christ and Culture Niebuhr addresses the "enduring prob-

lem" of the relationship between Christ and culture (which includes

the world of government and politics). He surveys the principal

ways in which Christians have historically understood the norma-

tive relationship between Christ and culture. However, he recog-

nizes that his types are partly artificial constructs that cannot do

full justice to the rich complexity of history and do not conform

completely to any person or group's views or actions. Being thesocial existentialist he is, he makes two key preliminary points: 1)

there has not developed among Christians one single Christian

answer, and 2) a distinction must be made between Christ's answers

to the problem of human culture and Christians' answers (including

Niebuhr) which are relative to a particular, fallible standpoint in

history and culture. 48 Neither Christianity nor a particular church

can be identified with Christ.

Appropriately Niebuhr begins his investigation and analysis

with careful definition. When he uses the term "culture" or world

or civilization), Niebuhr has in mind the "total process of human

4 5 Ibid.4 s "Reformation," p. 249.47 RS, pp. 143-44.

4 8 CC, p. 2.


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activity and that total result of such activity. .. . ''40

Adopting

Bronislaw Malinowski'

s view of culture as the "artificial secondaryenvironment" which man superimposes upon the natural, an en-

vironment composed of language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs,

artifacts, social organization (including government), technical pro-

cesses, etc., he proceeds to specify, if not the "essence," some of the

chief characteristics of culture. Culture is social and the result of

human achievement. Further, the world of culture is a world of

values, for these human achievements are designed for an end or

ends, particularly what is "good for man." Its forms (of values) are

manifested in the temporal and material. However, cultural activity

is nearly always as much concerned with preservation as with realiza-

tion of values. Finally, man's cultures are pluralistic, composed of

many men in many groups and institutions with varied values,

goals, and interests.

In defining Christ he begins by pointing out and defining the

"virtues" of Jesus Christ. While making no claim for the superiority

of a moral description, he further suggests the picture that emerges

must be complemented by other interpretations. After examining

the virtues of love, obedience, faith, and humility, he concludes that

while any one of the virtues of Jesus (Niebuhr prefers to take them

all together) may be taken as the key to the understanding of

Christ's character and teaching, each is intelligible in its apparent

radicalism only as a relation to God." 50Jesus points beyond himself

to God, to the ground of being, the one beyond the many, to whom

Jesus is uniquely devoted and trusts absolutely.

Beliefi nJesus Christ by human beings in their various culturesmeans belief in God. Through the Son of God (a symbol for

Niebuhr) we can know the Father (another symbol). Niebuhr writes:

To be related in devotion and obedience to Jesus Christ is to be

related to the One to whom he undeviatingly points. As Son of God

he points away from the many values of man's social life to the

One who alone is good; to the One who alone is powerful; from the

many times and seasons of history with their hopes and fears to the

One who is Lord of all times and is alone to be feared and hoped

for; he points away from all that is conditioned to the Uncondi-

tioned. He does not direct attention away from this world to an-

other; but from all worlds, present and future, material and

spiritual, to the One who creates all worlds, who is the Other of

all worlds.

49Ibid., pp. 32-39.

5oIbid., p. 27.


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THEOLOGY OF H. RICHARD. NIEBUHR 65

Yet this is only half: the meaning of Christ, considered morally.

The other half has been indicated above by what was said about hislove of men in relation to his love of God. Because he is the moralSon of God in his love, hope, faith, obedience, and humility in thepresence of God, therefore he is the moral mediator of the Father's

will toward men. Because he loves the Father with the perfectionof human egos, therefore he loves men with the perfection of divineagape, since God is agape. Because he is obedient to the Father's

will, therefore he exercises authority over men, commanding obedi-ence not to his own will but to God's. Because he hopes in God,therefore he gives promises to men. Because he trusts perfectly in

God who is faithful, therefore he is trustworthy in his own faith-fulness toward men. Because he exalts God with perfect humanhumility, therefore he humbles men by giving them good gifts

beyond all their deserts. Since the Father of Jesus Christ is what

He is, sonship to Him involves the Son not in an ambiguous but in

an ambivalent process. It involves the double movement-with mentoward God, with God toward men; from the world to the Other,

from the Other to the world; from work to Grace, from Grace towork; from time to the Eternal and from the Eternal . to the

temporal. In his moral sonship to God Jesus Christ is not a medianfigure, half God, half man; he is a single person wholly directed asman toward God andwhollydirected in his unity with the Father

toward men. He is mediatorial, not median.5 1

Beliefin Christ and loyalty to his cause involves men ina double

movement from world to God and from God to world.

Niebuhr proceeds to delineate five principal ways in which

Christians have historically understood the relationship of Christ

and culture or "the world." At one end of the attitudinal spectrum(see figure 1) is "Christ against culture" (e.g. Tertullian, various

monastic and sectarian movements, Tolstoy) which emphasizes the

opposition of the two.62 The decision is posed as "either/or";

Christians, who as all men are basically good, must withdraw from

the hopelessly corrupt and sinful world. The tension between the

two poles is dissolved by abandoning the culture. At the other end

of the ;spectrum, the "Christ of culture" of "cultural Christianity"

type (e.g. Locke, Albrecht Ritschl, Abelard, early Christian Gnostics)recognizes a fundamental agreementbetween Christ and culture.

5 3

Christ is the moral teacher, he confirms what is best and he is part

of the social heritage to be conserved and transmitted. Thus there

51 Ibid.,pp. 28-29..5 2Ibid.,pp. 40-41 and chapter 2.53 Ibid.,p. 41 a n d c h a p te r 3 .


14/38

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER66

Figure 1

Christ and Culture Spectrum

(based on acceptance/rejection of culture)

0

zl0 .

a)~ '7c$

go;.:

cc :

UUu

a~

(I ) .

N ~~ ~ au

b U'Q

caU

to

C .) I i

is no tension. This "both/and" position seeks accommodation with

the world.

The other three mediating answers to the "enduring problem"

agree with each other in seeking to maintain the important dis-

tinction between Christ and culture, yet undertake to affirm both of

them in some respects. Obviously they differ from each other in how

they try to combine the two authorities. Theyall three focus on the

relationship between God and man, rather than Christ and cultureper se. They all recognize the universality and radicalness of sin,

even among the "best" or in supposedly holy ghettoes. Finally they

all three affirm the primacy of God's grace and the significance of

man's activities of obedience in the sphere of culture:

The "Christ-above-culture" or synthetic type (e.g. Clement of

Alexandria, Thomas Aquinas) perceive the relationship as hier-

archical yet harmonious.54

Similar to Christ of Culture types, Christ

is seen as the fulfillment of cultural aspirations and restorer of theinstitutions of the true society. However he is discontinuous as

well as continuous with culture; he has something that does not

arise out of culture. He "enters life from above with gifts which

human aspirations have not envisioned and which human effort

cannot attain unless he (Christ) relates men to a supernatural so-

ciety and a new value center."55 Unfortunately, from Niebuhr's

perspective, there is a tendency in this type to absolutize what is

relative, to reduce the infinite to the finite form and to "freeze" or

materialize what is dynamic.

The fourth type, "Christ-and-culture-in-paradox" (e.g. Luther,

St. Paul, Ernst Troeltsch), maintains a duality and opposition yet

inescapable authority of each.5 5

Tension is perennial; devotees of

54 Ibid.,p. 42; see also chapter 4.55 Ibid., pp. 42-3;and chapter 5.


15/38


this position refuse to accommodate Christ's claims to those of sin-

ful, corrupted secular society. They are similar in many ways tothe Christ-against-culture types, particularly in terms of percep

-

tion of secular society, but they do not withdraw. States, for ex-ample, are seen as a mere restraining force against sin rather than

agents of reform through which neighbors are helped toward a"better" life. Yet obedience to God demands obedience to the insti-

tutions of society. Man is a citizen of two worlds, subject to twomoralities that are seeminglyopposed. Some examples of this type

(e.g.Luther) see more dynamic interaction between the two poles

than others.The final type, "Christ-the-transformer of culture" (e.g., F.D.

Maurice, Augustine, Calvin), claims (similar to the first and fourthtype) that human nature is fallen and perverted and that this per-

version is reflected in and transmitted by culture. Yet this antithesisdoes not lead to separation or mere endurance of culture in a stateof perpetual agony. Rather a positive and hopeful attitude toward

human institutions and customs is affirmed because: "Christ is seen

as the converter of man in his culture and society, not apart fromthese, for there is no nature without culture and no turning off men

from self and idols to God save in society."5 Redemption of man-

kind and therefore culture is partially actual even in the presenttime. Whereas the dualist lives "in between the times," conver-sionists live in the Divine Now, where God dramatically interacts

with man; history becomes not the course of merely human eventsbut is also the story of God's mightly deeds as Creator, Judge, and

Redeemer and man's response to them.Which is the appropriate type from Niebuhr's perspective?

Obviously by the 1950's the last type was more congenial to Niebuhrbut even then he remained less than explicit, preferring to pointto the possibility of varying strategies. (Niebuhr had advocatedstrategic withdrawal in The Church Against the World in 1935,

for he perceived a cultural captivity of the churches, a bondage tosocial forces.) Recognition of his historicity, finitude, and humanity

prevented Niebuhr from saying that "thus and so" is the Christiananswer." He writes:

Yet one is stopped atone point or another from making the attemptto give a final answer, not only by the evident paucity of one'shistorical knowledge, as compared with other historical men, and

56 Ibid., p. 45; s e e a l s o c h a p t e r 6.


16/38


the evident weakness of one's ability in conceptual construction, as

compared with other thinkers, but by the conviction, the knowledge,

that the giving of such an answer by any finite mind, to which any

measure of limited and little faith has been granted, would be an

act of usurpation of the Lordship of Christ which at the same time

would involve doing violence to the liberty of Christian men and to

the unconcluded history of the church in culture.5i

A part of our discussion below on "the responsible self" will ex-

pand upon Niebuhr's "conversionist" position.

The Responsible Self

As a philosopher of the Christian moral life, Niebuhr was more

analytical than prescriptive, more interested in preparation for

action than application. Thus as an ethicist he was less practically

oriented than his brother. He seeks to lay bare the roots and criti -

cally inquire into the fundamental perspectives underlying Chris-

tians' moral lives. Niebuhr focuses more on the "deciding" than the

decision.Niebuhr distinguishes two principal, symbols and concepts that

men, including Christians, have used to apprehend the form of

their practical life and give shape to it in action: man as "maker"

and man as "citizen." To these he adds a third: man as answerer.

These images are more than symbols for they are derived from our

actual living. However aspecial experience for interpretation is

used to interpret allof experience; a part represents the whole.

Niebuhr openly admits further that his idea is a key not the key

for understanding the Christian moral life, including Biblical

ethics.58

The three approaches are summarized in the following

table.

The most common symbol or image has been that of man the

maker, the fashioner who, acting for an end or good, gives shape to

his acts and the world. Of course, people who have employed this

image have not been unanimous in the choice of ideals or ends nor

in their estimate of degrees or means of realization. The other major

image is that ofman-the-citizen, living under law. When we realizewe are persons, communities, and history, we do not have control

over the means and ends as suggested in the former symbol. Men

come to self awareness in the midst of mores, commandments, rules,

57Ib id., p. 232.

58RS, p. 65.


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Table I

Three Approaches to Ethics

Ethical Approach Image of Man Primary Question Action

1 . Teleological

("good")

Maker

(acts toward

some end)

What is my goal,ideal, or telos?

Seek the

highest good.

2 . Deontological("right")

Citizen

(acts inobedience to

law)

What is the lawand what is thefirst law of my life?

Obey the law

3 . Responsibility("fitting")

Answerer

(acts in

response to

others)

What is going on? Perform the

fitting

action

and laws-directions, prohibitions, and permissions. Again there

have been differences ofopinion over the content, priority, and pos-

sible conformity to the law. The third image, man-the-answerer,

seeks to understand history less by asking about the ideals toward

which men and societies have aimed or about the laws or norms they

have obeyed and more by inquiring into the challenges and in their

natural and social environment to which men and societies were

responding: The pattern of thought is situational, social, and inter-

actional.

Niebuhr associates the first image with teleological ethics, the

second with deontological ethics, and his own with the ethics of re-

sponsibility or cathekontic ethics. The table above represents thedifferences between the various ethical approaches. All answer the

question "What ought I do?" differently. Purposive or teleological

ethics seeks to answer the question by raising the prior question:

"What is my goal, end, or telos?" Similarly deontology counters with

"What is the law and what is the first law (or, ultimate law) of my

life?" Responsibility proceeds in every moment of decision and

choice to ask: `What is going on?" or "What is being done to me?"

Niebuhr notes that ifwe use value terms the differences among thethree approaches can be indicated by the terms: the good, the right

and the fitting. He writes: . . teleology is concerned always with

the highest good to which it subordinates the right; consistent deon-

tology is concerned with the right, no matter what may happen to

our goods; but for the ethics of responsibility the fittingaction, the

one that fits into a total interaction as response and anticipation


18/38


of further response, is alone conducive to the good and alone is

right.

"59

In his theory of responsibility a person responds to action upon

him in accordance with his interpretation of the latter action and

with his anticipation of response (answer) to his response (i.e. the

agent is accountable). Finally all of this takes place in a "continuing

community" (social solidarity) of other agents (or "selves"). 60 The

self is always in relationship to others and is governed by these rela -

tions; he is always in dialogue with another.

The content of a Christian's actions would not necessarily differ

from nonChristians, but Christians "interpret" the world and thus

responsible actions differently. But one cannot move deductively

from faith to decision. For Niebuhr, the "Christianized" version of

the ethic of responsibility affirms "God is acting in all decisions

upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to his

action."61Man relates to others in the context of God's presence and

action. So the question "What is going on?" becomes "What is God

doing?" and the agent asks, "What is the fitting response to God's

actions in this situation?" The indicative has priority over the im-perative; the principle of oughtness is rooted in "isness." Our

"theology," of course, provides the lenses or perspective or paradigm

through which we see, interpret, and respond to ourselves, others

and the universal realm of being. Niebuhr for analytical purposes

only (since these actions are not really separable) sees God active

in all events-as Creator, Governor, and Redeemer."

God is creator of all and sovereign over all. "Whatever is, is

good." since all is from God. Being and value are inseparable. Man'sexistence and value are from God: The "faith-knower" perceives

that he and his companions in being (not just fellow Christians)

are co-members of an inclusive commonwealth of being, and that

this commonwealth is unified under God, who is absolutely trust-

worthy. To the Creator allbeing is valued being and thus the object

of redemptive care. In response man is to accept and affirm the

creation, seek to understand it, to cultivate it, and to participate

in his own limited way in creative use of it:

God also governs and sustains us; he is sovereign over history.

This is not to say that intentions in finite actions or events are his

59 RS,pp.

60-61.6o RS, pp. 61-65.61 RS, p. 126.62See James Gustafson's Introduction to RS.


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THEOLOGY OF H. RICHARD NIEBUHR 7 1

or that all consequences that result share in his cause. Rather, as a

whole, divine governance and judgment are working so as to redeemand incorporate man's action into the divine action of God. God

limits us through other creatures as well as in our finitude. The

fitting response is characterized by acceptance of God's divine judg-

ment (and our limitations), repentance, self denial (not asceticism),

and conscientious participation or "cooperation" with God in re-

sistance of evil in society, in order that God's redemptive and crea-

tive will may be done.

Finally God acts redemptively to reconcile and restore. We can

trust God for the preservation of our worth and can act in expecta-

tion of God's final victory, which' is already assured. We have been

reconciled. James Fowler's splendid book on Niebuhr's thought

sums up the actions of God as redeemer this way:

From a human point of view we are being slain all day long. But

our interpretation of our life of response in accordance with thatviewpoint has been decisively interrupted by the teachings and ac-tions, the death and vindication of Jesus-who appeared in our

history as a ma n, and w ho is present in the comm unity o f interpreta-tion formed around him. As exemplar and mediator of radical faithin the faithfulness of the power by which we are, he has embodieda New Covenant which lays bare the fiduciary structure of the rela-

tion between God and man and between man and man, and whichinvites a con scious joining of a unive rsal comm unity of faithfulnes s.From the ab i li ty to trust , w hich Jesus as the N ew C ovenant inaugu-rates , flow s a new ma ster interpretat ive image for personal li fe a nd anew philosophy of history: We are being saved. Ultimate power inhistory and nature is one with ultimate goodness; both strain tow arda restoration, fulfillment, and completion (perfection) of being.

s3

Man is called to respond to this divine action in forgiveness (ac-

ceptance of it in humility and to forgive others), freedom, and

trust. Freed from legalism, insecurity, and fear of death, he can trust

God and relate to others (and God) lovingly. (Note we are called

upon to obey not love, but God.) We are "turned around" and our

values are transformed and directed to the true center of value. We

can participate in the process of reconciliation. Because of man's

recognition of his "center of value" he is freed to deal creativelywith personal and social situations as they are encountered and re-

spond with inventiveness and ingenuity to the challenges in order

to meet the need of his neighbor (any member of the universal com-

munityof being and value).

83 Fowler, To See the Kingdom, p. 164.


20/38


We should be careful to note that the ethics of redemption is

not an ethics of the redeemed but a response to the redeemer. Thereare no "saints" in history, even the "redeemed" remain sinners.

The concluding chapter of Christ and Culture contains an ex-

tremely lucid summary of the character of the Christian's ethical

decision making, whether responding to God as Creator, Judge, or

Redeemer:

In faith, becausewe believe, we are made aware of our relativity

and our relatedness; in faith our existential freedom is acknowl-

edged as well as actually exercised in the context of our dependence.

To decide in faith is to decide in awareness of this context. To

understand that context as best he may is as much the duty of the

believer as to do his duty in the context.

What is meant here may be made clearer by an examination of the

character of . the decisions we make in the freedom of faith. They

are made, it appears, on the basis of relative insight and faith, butthey are not relativistic, They are individual decisions, but not indi-

vidualistic. They are made in freedom, but not in independence;they are made in the moment, but are not nonhistorical. 64

Interpretation of Politics

Man is inescapably social and thus inescapably political. We live

in dialogue, developing into selves and responding to action upon

our selves in society. Man's sociality is primordial, not derivative.

Politics, which Niebuhr uses interchangeably with "social construc-

tion,"0 5 is part of the world of culture from which we cannot and,

responsibly speaking, should not seek escape. Speaking out of hisradical monotheistic framework described above, Niebuhr says:

The redeemer is the Father of all things who has created men not

only in spiritual society but also in domestic political and economic

society. Hence it is impossible so to separate response to the judg-

ment of God from politically necessary action as to make religious

life an affair of repentance while political action remains essentially

unrepentant, self confident action in the defense of our values.G6

Empirically speaking, Niebuhr observes the often close corre-spondence and dialectical relationship among the general ideas

64CC, p. 234.65 "The Idea of Covenant and American Democracy," Church History XXIII

June, 1954), p. 127. See also RMWC, p. 118.66 "War as the Judgment of God," Christian Century 59 (May 13, 1942),

pp. 631-32.


21/38


'Western men hold about their own constitution, that of the societies

and of the world in which they live.

Their efforts at self control (ethics), at social construction (politics),and their attitudes toward their ultimate environment (religion) arein consequence inf luenced b y similar ideas.

6 7

Thus in the contemporary world there appears to be:

real similarity among: the conceptions of the ultimate environmentas a field of forces; the idea of political society as a grouping ofpersons in tension, in conflict, in polar opposites, in alliances, inbalance and again the picture of the person as a being in whomunconscious drives, aggressions and fears, moving powers of onekind and another, are held together in more or less stable unity.

68

In both descriptive and normative terms, Niebuhr rejects the

amoral view of politics that sees it as a struggle for power among

purely self-interested individuals or groups, with mortality being

merely an instrument of power or rationalization. Speaking specifi-

cally of national self-interest (though clearly within the context of

the essay he is referring to any group self-interest) he writes:

To a theologian a political science that works only with the idea ofnational self-interest seems very much like the sort of theology

which constructs its understanding of man with the use of the ideaof sin only without reference to that good nature which sin pre-suppose s and of which i t is the corrupted exp ression. 69

Such a political (or theological) view is regarded as inadequate

and misleading by Niebuhr. It does not account for the relevant

phenomena; the theory fails to describe accurately the practice.For example, the analyst of political power must recognize in asurvey of religious movements that "there is something not wholly

explicable in terms of self interested will to power." 70

True, man is self interested and he does try to extend his power.

But that is only part of the picture for man is also concerned with

values beyond the self and "desires not only power but also enjoy-

ment of the good. . . . ''71 (We shall develop this further with re-

67 "The Idea ofCovenant," p. 127.68Ibid., p. 128.69RMWC, p. 67.70 "The Protestant Movem ent and D emocracy in the United States," Religion

in American Life, Vol. 1: The Shaping of American Religion ed . Jame s WardSm ith and A. Le land Jame son (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University Press, 1961),p. 22. S e e a ls o p p . 28-29.

71 "Wa r as C rucifixion," Christian Century (April 28, 1943), p. 513.


22/38


gard to Niebuhr's theory of war.); There is a strange intermixture

of justice and injustice on both sides of political conflicts and inmost social movements. Political groups, especially nation-states,

base their existence on the loyalty of their members, not only on the

members' fears and desires for benefits, but also by pledging their

loyalty to important and usually "transcendent" causes. Thus the

trust and loyalty to the group is extended to the group's cause, as

well as the group as a cause. 7 "

Niebuhr also rejects anethic primarily based on this "amoral-

self interest-power" theoryofpolitics. He describes the "defensive"

ethics that usually correlates with such a theory:

Ou r actual ethics, personal and s ocial, is to a large extent ana lyzableas defense ethics or as ethics of survival. It is the ethics of self-maintenance against threatening power that is not identifiable withany specific agency we meet but rather with a movement or a law inthe interaction of all things, a law of our history. In our ethics ofself-defense we act toward the realization of no ideal, unless con-t inuing in exis tence is an ideal ; w e obey no law of reason, unless the

law that reason itself must constantly defend itself and the body isa rational. law. With our ethics of self-defense or survival we cometo each pa rt icular occasion w ith the unde rstanding that the w orld isfull of enemies though it contains some friends. Hence we respondto all actions upon us with an evaluatory scheme: beings are eithergood or evil, they belong to the class of the things that ought to beor those that ought not to be. And ultimately the distinction be-tween them has to be made by reference to the way they support ordeny our life, whether this be our physical or spiritual or socialexistence.

7 3

Historically speaking, Niebuhr thinks the "structure of things"

makes such an assertion-counter assertion cycle destructive for all

involved andfor many innocents in the long run. (See the inter-

pretation of war as crucifixion below.) We must break the cycle

or at least modify it.

But Niebuhr's rejection of defensive ethics has a more funda-

mental basis for rejection. Behind such an ethical stance, "deep in

our minds" is a myth or interpretative pattern of the metahistory,

within which men understand their own particular histories andbiographies. Niebuhr writes of this pervasive myth:

It has variant forms. It appears as the story of. recurring cycles, of

golden, silver, bronze, and iron ages, or of the round of personal

72;

R'1VI WC, p; 67.73RS, pp. 98-99.


23/38


rebirth and death. It apears as the story of the infinite progress of

a particular species, this human kind, moving outward into space

with its conquests, forward in time with victories over nature, but

leaving behind in its past forgotten, dead generations. And that is

the great overarching myth. It is the almost unconquerable picture

in the mind, of everlasting winter lying on the frozen wastes of ex-

istence before a ll its time and after all its time, or, otherwise, ofall-destroying fire raging before and after the brief interval of its

life upon our planet or in our galaxy. It is the image of myself

as coming to that future when there is no more future. It is that

understanding of the society, into whose action I fit my actions, as

bound with all the tragic empires of history toward the eschaton,beyond which there is no healing of diseases, no resurrection. It has

scores of forms, no doubt, this mythology of death. But all its forms

lead to the same interpretations in the present; to the same way of

evaluating the beings with whom we are compresent by dividing

them into the good and evil. And all the forms lead to the ethos

of defense, to the ethics of survival.74

Christianity (as does some other religions) challenges this al-

ternate myth and thereby attacks the ethos of defense. It redefines

our conception of the "fitting" by questioning our picture of thecontext within which we act. The mythology of death is revised

into a history of life, and with it a redefinition of what. is a fitting

response in a lifetime and a history "surrounded by eternal life,

as well as by the universal society of being. "75

As indicated above, this is not a purely "spiritual" ethic or ethic

of withdrawal, it is an ethic of life in the world-politics, economics,

family, etc. Nothing is regarded as beyond the scope of redemption

-not the political nor the economic nor the spiritual. But this isnot an argument for a utilitarian or perfectionist morality, that is,

the `"effort to translate Christian faith and Christ into `socially

useful force' or new moral ideal." Though Christianity has social

imperatives and social relevance, repentance practiced for the sake

of such social fruits or efforts "is a bad kind of magic." The im-

perative of Christianity "does not ask whether the love of neighbor

will bring forth a society in which all menwill love their neighbors;

it acts in hope, to be sure, but love and justice are its immediate

commands and not its far off goals." 76

The society of love is an impossible human ideal. "It is not an

7 .4Ibid., pp. 106-7.

75Ibid., p.107.76 "Utilitarian Christianity," in Witness to a Generation ed. Wayne Cowan

(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1966), pp. 24445.


24/38


ideal toward which we can strive, but an `emergent,' a potentiality

in our situation which remains unrealized so long as we try to

impose our pattern, our wishes upon the divining creative process." 11

Man's role is not to build utopias, but to eliminate the weeds and

till the soil so the kingdom of God can grow. His method is not ode

that focuses on a quest for perfection or acting perfectly (or on basis

of an applied perfect ideal). Rather he tries to clear the road for

repentance and forgiveness. Such an approach may break the cease-

less cycle of assertion and counter assertion by individuals and

societies. We are to respond, as Jesus, to what we see God is doing

in the world (including politics) in which sin and finitude are also

present.

Because of man's sin, the restraint of evil, (partly the responsi-

bility of the political order), particularly moral evil, is a necessary

element in every plan for conduct of life. Social discipline as well.

as social freedom is a characteristic of communities. But Niebuhr,

aware of man's tendency to see his rules as God's rules, offers three

qualifications for restraint.' s First, Christian restraint too is "re-

straint of sinners by sinners not by the just." In restraint weacknowledge our equality with the restrained, equality in sinfulness,

disloyalty, and relativity. No "moral"" elite is to rule. We must dis -

pel our illusions: "The double illusion we have about ourselves-

about the goodness of our power and the power of our goodness;

the double illusion also that we have about our enemy, the evil of

his power and the power of his evil." 7 Second, "any restraint im-

posed on the basis of human sinfulness must avoid the temptation of

falling into moralism; it must be medicinal rather than vindictive,construction rather than destructive; if it uses force, which it will

be loath to employ, it will use it only in this way; knowing that

force cannot redeem but only prevent some external consequence

of sin. Third, this "interum" strategy of restraint of evil, unlike

later Puritanism, must be "wholly subordinated to the strategy of

reconciliation."

While Niebuhr recognized how much sin and human problem

(a s .well as human need) remained the same in the best of all pos-sible worlds, he recognized some of the peculiar problems of the

modern day. He writes:

77 "Communication," Christian Century49 (April 6, 1932), p. 447.78The three discussed in this paragraph are from "Man as Sinner," p. 280.7

9 "The Illusions of Power," Christian Century Pulpit, 3 3 (April, 1962), p.


25/38


The conditions of our times are such that human selfishness is given

an especial opportunity to assert itself. The fault does not lie onlywithin human nature,-it lies within the social structure to which

this human nature must make its adaptation."

There is thus a structural dimension of sin and Niebuhr calls for a

strategy of direct attack and redemption (by the church and indi-

viduals) upon the social units of society, including nations, races,

classes, and other groups. In language that anticipates the language

of the Kerner report by over 30 years, Niebuhr writes: ``. . the

amount of honesty, purity and love which persons can exercise

while they participate in the dishonesties, impurities and hateful-ness of capitalism, nationalism and racialism is very limited.

"si

Men must be concerned with doom and salvation, sin and redemp-

tion, that is social as well as individual in character.

Niebuhr advocates three general propositions regarding the duty

of Christians as he faces political decisions. First, the issue at any -

particular time and place is less an issue about the specific form or

content of actions (i.e. specific prescriptions) than of "the context

in which each specific action is carried out."s

' - - Actions and events,like words, derive their significance from their context of meaning.

Thus one first directs his attention to the preceding (including

motivation) and(expected) succeeding acts. Two people or groups

may perform the same act (viewed from external history), but the

context and meaning for each may be quite different. For example,

the religious question is not celibacy or not, but whether regardless

of the alternative chosen, it is not an isolated act, but the action is

part of a life of continuous responsibility, made meaningful andeffective in life-long devotion.

Thus it is the "interpretation" of the context that is crucial for

Niebuhr-interpretation for him that is rooted in radical mono- -

theism which sees God as governing. and redeeming. He would ask

first, "How is the one who affirms loyalty to the One beyond the

many to interpret the world in which people vote, power shifts to

the executive, and weapons become more destructive?" One's theol-

ogy should aim to help people see their immediate perplexities, joys,

80 "Christianity and the Social Problem," blagazin far Evangelische Theologieand Kirche, 50, pp. 279.

81 The Attack Upon the Social Gospel," Religion inLife 5 (1936),p. 78.

82The three propositions discussed in the following paragraphs are found in

"The Christian Church in the World's Crisis," Christianity and Society, VI (Sum-mer 1941), p. 11.


26/38


and sufferings in the light of ultimate meaning, to live as citizens

in the inclusive society of being, and to relate their present choices

to first and last decisions made about them in the totality of human

history by sovereign power. 83 Of particular significance for Niebuhr

is the view that no matter how mysteriously and hidden, God is

ruling, divine justice is being done, even divine mercy is taking

place in the midst of suffering. Even in the case of Pilate, Jesus noted

Pilate would have had no power over him except it had been given

him from above by God. He writes:

Yet where the confidence in the actuality of the divine governmentis present, the ordering of life must go on as a serious yet somewhattentative and temporal affair. New measures are called for to meet

new opportunities or to exercise new repentance for sin. The im-

pending judgment of God on the sin of slavery, of racial discrimina-

tion, of international conflict, or of Protestant disunity itself, must

be anticipated rather than some moral la w of nature enforced. Atthe same time, within a world under the government of God aconsiderable freedom prevails: not a freedom to decide the ultimate

issues, but the freedom of those who are responsible in limited

spheres of action and who can devise seriously meant yet temporaland tentative organizations or modes of action somewhat adequate

to the occasion.84

For him, faith illuminates the human condition; it colors how one

"reads" the situation.

Niebuhr's second general proposition regarding the duty of

Christians holds that the important political and institutional ques-

tions about ownership of property, human rights, war and peace,

are religious questions for they are questions about the context (oralternative interpretations of the context) of political decisions.

The great conflicts are not simply conflicts between "interests" and

"ideologies"; they are conflicts between "faiths"-religions of

egoism, nationalism, racialism, and universalism. Social injustice,

war, and misery are rooted in "false faiths."

Niebuhr's Radical Monotheism and Western Culture examines

the contemporary henotheistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic faiths

of modern man as they find expression in religion, politics, and

science. As we have seen men are so created that they cannot and

do not live without faith. They must trust in a "god" which gives

meaning to their lives and to which they give trust and loyalty.

83 PCM, p.3.84 "Protestant Movement," pp. 46-47.


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Politics is filled with the language of loyalty. Part of the social solu-

tion, so to speak, is loyalty to the true God, a turning from falsegods. Niebuhr notes that today the "chief rival" to monotheism is

henotheism (one god beyond others) in its social form: "That social

faith which makes a finite society, whether cultural or religious, the

object of trust as well as of loyalty and which tends to subvert even

officially monotheistic institutions, such as the churches." 85

The foundations of any civilization rest on deeper convictions

than usually acknowledged. The democratic life, as well as art,

literature, and science derive their ultimate orientation from re-ligious faith.8" Niebuhr recognized that democracy too could be-

come a social faith; he was thus concerned to avoid henotheism by

renewal of the foundations of a democratic civilization so the struc-

ture would endure.

One thing that gives Western politics its character is the presence in

it of a ferment of monotheist conviction and a constant struggle

of universal with particularist faith. National faith is forever being

qualified by monotheism. It will not do, to be sure, to say that the

American nation is intensely God-fearing in a monotheistic sense

of God; there is too much evidence to the contrary. Yet God-

fearingness, as reverence for the principle of all being and for its

domain, i s present among us and is in almost daily conflict or

tension with our large and smal l social faiths.87

He did not maintain religious faith (particularly Protestantism)

produced democracy; he was content to point to several parallels in

historical development and various beliefs. In my opinion democ-

racy, particularly when expressed in a form that protected minorityrights and kept the future open, had a special attraction to Nie-

buhr.S 8 His concepts of the "protestant principle," divine sover-eignty, justification by faith, and universal order of being and value

all seemed to have their best possible political expression in some

forms of democracy (though he never identified or confused radical

monotheism with democracy). Niebuhr consistently sought to un-

derstand, interpret, and evaluate particular democratic institutions

and principles in light of the fundamental tenets of his religious

faith.

8 5RMWC, p. 11.8e PCM, p. ix .8 7RMWC, p. 69.88 See "Faith, Works and Social Salvation," Religion in Life I (1932); "The

Protestant Movement and Democracy in the United States"; "The Idea of Cove-

nant and American Democracy"; RMWC, chapter 5.


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Thethird general proposition for Niebuhr calls for Christians to

organize and shape their political actions in such a way as to expressconfidence in and loyalty to the principle of being itself, the God of

Jesus, as well as forgiveness of sin. 8 9 Our loyalty gives direction and

form, though not immediate content, to our morality. As a result of

radical monotheism all causes and communities are called to reach

beyond their partiality toward universal community of being and

universal responsibility.

Love of the neighbor is required in every morality formed by a

faith; but in polytheistic faith the neighbor is defined as the one

who is near me in my interest group, when he is near me in thatpassing association. In henotheistic social faith my neighbor is my

fellow in the closed society. Hence in both instances the counter-

part of the law of neighbor-love is the requirement to hate the

enemy. But in radical monotheism my neighbor i s my companion

in being; though he is my enemy in some less than universal con-

text the requirement is to love him. To give to everyone his due is

required in every context; but what is due to him depends on the

relation in which he is known to stands0

All moral norms and virtues receive a universal form, they are' trans-

formed in "context" of radically monotheistic faith.

Niebuhr should not be misunderstood. He does not accept un-

critically the status quo. To affirm "Whatever is, is good," is not to

say "Whatever is, is right." Niebuhr writes: "In their relations to

each other and to their principle, these many beings in the realm of

being are often wrong and grievously so. They are enemies to each

other as often as friends, but even enemies are entitled to loyaltyas fellow citizens of the realm of being."91 No faith can be radically

monotheistic and not be concerned with the political conditions

that enslave people, economic conditions which cripple them, and

the social conditions which exploit them.

On questions such as coercion or nonresistance (discussed below),

private ownership or public ownership of property, the real ques-

tion is not force or how property is owned, it is the intention of the

agent and the utilization (and consequences) in the context, inter

-

preted by one's faith perspective. The questions relevant to uni-

versalism or self interested nationalism as reasons and beneficiaries

come to the forefront. Responsible Christian social action has three

8 9 "The Christian Church in the World's Crisis," p. 16.

90RMWC,p.34.91Ibid., p. 38 .


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starting points: a) Christian revelation and faith; b) analysis of the

self as agent; and c) understanding the social and political struc-tures in which one acts. 82 This means that right understanding

of the context, information and explanations, drawn from political

science, sociology, psychology, etc., become an indispensable ele-

ment of responsible decision making. For Niebuhr as for many

others "politics is the art of the possible."'

War and International Conflict

Although Niebuhr's theological interpretations of history re-

mained remarkably consistent from the early thirties on, his specific

applications of his theory of responsibility varied somewhat. The

Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931-32 occasioned one of the

most heated exchanges between him and Reinhold Niebuhr. In this

article on The Grace of Doing Nothing" (1932) he observes that

it is when individuals and societies "stand aside" from a conflict

(such as the Japanese aggression), before they know what their rela-

tions to it really are, when they seem to be condemned to doingnothing; that their moral problems become greatest. He asks: "How

shall we do nothing?" Even inactivity affects history. He rejects

three kinds of inactivity: 1) that of the pessimist who sees the world

going to pieces and grimly responds to it with his inactivity; 2) that

of the opportunist who sees only the clash of self interested nations

and waits hoping later to exploit the situation for his benefit; and

3) that of the frustrated yet morally indignant (some so-called

pacifists) who temporarily sit on the sidelines and hurl violent in-

vective and judgments on the aggressor-a situation that may well

result in explosive forcible entry or in apoplexy.94

Interestingly Niebuhr explicitly suggests for Christian inactivity

a strategy that selectively borrows from the Communist model-

a faith stance that informs a way of doing nothing, that offers more

hope, a longer vision and a realistic program for noninterfering ac-

tion. Communists see nothing constructive that they can do in the

present situation, but that, "rightly understood this situation is

after all preliminary to a `radical' change which will eliminate the

9 2 CC, ch. 7, especially p. 234. See also James Gustafson, "Christian Ethics and

Social Policy" in Faith and Ethics, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper andBrothers, 1957), pp. 119-39.

9 3 RS, p. 52.

9 4 "The Grace of Doing Nothing," Christian Century 49 (May 23, 1932),pp. 378-380.


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82 THE "POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

conditions of which the conflict is a product." Though there is no

hope for good or justice in the present order, there is a steadfast

faith in the future. Misery of war often precipitates revolution. The

present crisis is theoretically perceived by them as:

an opportunity, not for direct entrance into the conflict, nor for

watchful waiting of those who seek self interest, but for the labor-

ious process of building up within the fighting groups those cells of

communism which will be ready to inherit the new world and be

able to build a classless international commonwealth on the ruins

of capitalism and nationalism.95

Niebuhr's way of doing nothing rests on the faith in a real God

who acts in history. Simply because men can do nothing construc-

tive does not mean nothing constructive is being done, even

though seemingly "impersonal" forces inevitably usher in a new

kind ofworld with lasting peace. The history of the world is not

only judgment, it is also redemption. The seeds of self interest, in

individuals and collectives, must bear their bitter fruit, but God's

mercy lies beyond this judgment.

Niebuhr delineates some important differences between inac-

tivity of Communists and radical Christians. The Christian recog-

nizes that his inability to act constructively is due in part to his own

faults and failings, which are similar to the "offender." Thus such

intervention by the Christian would be "less than disinterested. "

American Christians should see the need for a great deal of rigor-

ous self analysis and renunciation of both self interest and any sense

of superior righteousness.

Reinhold Niebuhr responds in such way as to indicate that heand his brother must have been having a prolonged discussion

(argument!) over pacifism as a categorical. Reinhold attacked

some things not in Richard's article yet omitted reference to many

key points. Reinhold saw the article as a plea for pacifism and

ethical purity built upon the radical application of the ethic of

love. (Incidentiaily love is not mentioned in Richard's article.)

Reinhold asserts that it is unrealistic to think that a kingdom of

pure love will emerge out of the conflicts, revolutions, and othercatastrophies of history; rather "judicious use of force in the pur-

suit of the love ideal is the only responsible goal for Christians. 96

In a final rejoinder, Richard pinpoints the key difference.

96 Ibid.,p. 379.96 "Must We Do Nothing," Christian Century 49 (March 30,'1932); pp. 415-17.


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Whereas Reinhold's God is outside history, Richard sees God as

"always in history"-as structure in things, as the source of allmeaning, as a creating will and as ultimately redeemer. Against

Reinhold's view that the history of mankind is a perennial tragedy

which can derive meaning only from a goal that lies beyond history,

Richard's "eschatological faith" asserts that history, destruction,

and tragedy, the ultimate outcome of self assertion, is only the pre-

lude to fulfilment (love) in history. Richard repudiates the charge

of a faith in progress (for evil grows as well as good) and implies

the society of love is impossible of human attainment.97

Though Reinhold Niebuhr may have missed the theological

subtleties of Richard's argument, he did not misperceive the radical

pacifist position that personally resulted from Richard's stance

toward war in the early 1930's. In an important unpublished 1933

paper in which he adopts a position he attributes to Jesus, Richard

writes:

The strategy of Jesus, the Jewish revolutionary, centers in the prin-ciple of repentance, faith, forgiveness, innocence, suffering judg-

ment. It is impossible for man to take the kingdom by violence, byself assertion; he has no means adequate to this purpose. But it ispossible for him, in repentance, to anticipate the judgment, to giveup the attempt to preserve or extend the dying system and so to

hasten its des truction.98

Niebuhr thus advocates total nonresistance and forgiveness.

On the occasion of a split that developed in the Fellowship of

Reconciliation in 1934,when his brother and a minority left the

organization because they felt it necessary to recognize the possible

necessity of use of force in restraining aggression or violence,

Richard attacked the reasoning of the majority (while expressing

sympathy for their stand). The majority was primarily utilitarian

in their advocacy of nonviolent coercion as more effective and thus

more pragmatic in securing ideal goals: It was not the pacifism

of nonresistance but the pacifism of nonviolent aggression which

characterized the whole movement.199 The authentic pacifism,

modeled after Jesus, is not designed purely to convert the opposi-

tion to one's own point ofview. Niebuhr adopts his stance of non-resistance, not because it is likely to be more "successful," but in the

97 "A Communication," p.447.98 Quoted in Thomas R . ,McFaul, "Dilemmas in H. Richard N iebuhr's Ethics,"

Journal of Religion, 54 (J a n u a ry , 1974), p. 41.99 "The Inconsistency of the Majority," World Tomorrow, 17 (January 18 ,

1934), p. 43.


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name of reconciliation of all men to God, exemplified by the cross

event.

Never again does Niebuhr argue for such a clear cut stance. By

the early forties he has adopted a position which allows for the pos-

sibility of coercion based on the nature and interpretation of the

"context" inwhich the action takes place. In 1941, as he reflects

upon America's entry into the war, he does not support either

coercion or nonresistance. Rather he offers a third position: "The

real issue of our time is between internationalism and national-

ism."100 The decisive focus is now on the reasons ormotivation for

refraining or entering the war and which action is expected to

serve the universal or international interests. This position is not

merely theoretical, for only one year later he writes: "If that duty

involves, as I believe it does, resistance to those who are abusing

our neighbor. . . ,"lol The absolute nonresistance stance is gone,

and he seems to have adopted a modified utilitarian (within a given

context) approach-though his position is still rooted in radical

monotheism which affirms and values a universal community of

being.The events of the Second World War pressured Niebuhr to

carry the logic of his radical monotheism to its final conclusion.

Three Christian Century articles, published within a year of each

other, distill and develop his interpretation of the meaning of that

war. As expected, his radical monotheism asserts that God is acting

in war. Niebuhr begins by asking, "What is God doing?" and then

turns to man's response to that divine action.

Three themes, all sounded in less developed and less coherentform, in prior writings, emerge. First, war is the judgment of God

on the self centeredness of all nations, all churches, and all man-

kind-a judgment that includes all of life, not just the "spiritual"

side. Before God there can be no. contention about the relative

the polictical implications of the theology of h. richard niebuhr - l. earl shaw

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