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The Pirabhakaran PhenomenonPart 47

Sachi Sri Kantha[15 November 2002]

Nuda Veritas on

THE MUSLIM FACTOR

Nuda Veritas, for those who are unaware, is the Latin expression

for naked truth [nudus = naked; veritas = truth]. There are quite

a number of analysts, among whom rank the prattling authors oftheBroken Palmyra book, who pretend to provide unvarnished

naked truth on affairs related to Eelam Tamils and Muslims. The

holes in their cloak of naked truth need to be exposed and this

chapter provides an aliquot of it.

Three inter-twined ingredients which contributed noticeably to

Pirabhakarans agenda in confronting the Sinhalese government in

the Eastern Front, since mid-1980s, were the land (state-aided

colonization which increased the Sinhalese populationsignificantly), the Special Task Force (STF) operatives (who were

established as the Sri Lankan version of the Gestapo-gang in the

early 1980s) , and the resident Muslim population. In the previous

two chapters, I had introduced two of these three ingredients,

namely the land issue and the STF operatives. In this chapter, I

will analyze the issue of Muslim factor and their circumstantial

link to the STF operations. This is undoubtedly an explosive

issue, even in the currently prevailing sustained peace-dialogue

atmosphere. But, I adhere to the spirit that historical facts need tobe discussed and cannot be glossed over for reasons of political

correctness.

The Muslim politics of playing the Eating the Cake and Having

It Game

In a commentary I wrote to the Tamil Times (London) in 1983,

before Pirabhakarans ascendancy, I had made the following

observations on the Tamil-speaking Muslims of Sri Lanka,

irabhakaran Phenomenon Part 47 http://www.sangam.org/PIRABAKARAN/P

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incorporating an open secret which Michael Roberts (then at the

University of Peradeniya) was brave enough to write. Excerpts:

The pattern adopted by the Muslim leaders in the

post-Independent era of Sri Lanka had been succinctly

described by academic Michael Roberts, as follows:

The Moor elites initially leaned towards an alliance with the

Tamils and other minorities so as to extract political

concessions from the British, but from the 1940s they have

tended to ally with the Sinhalese against the Tamils; with

wings in both the SLFP and UNP, they have revealed the

buoyancy of a cork and a Talleyrand an ability to stay

vigorously afloat at every political overturn; and they are

entrenched in the commercial sector. [Modern Asian

Studies, 1978, vol.12, no.3, pp.353-376]

It is my opinion that the reasons for the political allianceof Muslims with Sinhalese rather than Tamils can be listed as

follows:

(1) Minority within the minority complex: Muslims, being the

second largest minority group, feel that there is nothing to

gain by standing with the Tamils politically, since they fear

that this would result in their community ending up as

minority within a minority, in especially the Tamil speaking

areas.

(2) Urban-based political leadership: Although the Muslims

form approximately 35% of the population in the Batticaloa

district and more than 25% in the districts of Mannar,

Trincomalee and Puttalam, their political leadership had

emerged mainly from those residing in the Sinhalese areas.

For example, the political leaders of yester generation,

T.B.Jayah, Razik Fareed, A.C.M.Kaleel were Colombo-

based; and Badiuddin Mahmud also belonged to this

category, though he was a native of rural Sinhalese area. Even

the present political leadership of Muslims exhibits this

trend. Hence, these leaders do not identify themselves with

the ideals and emotions of the Muslim peasants who reside in

the traditional Tamil areas.

(3)Economic rivalry: Generally Muslims engage themselves

in minor commercial pursuits, though a significant proportion

of those living in the East coast are cultivators, herdsmen and

fishermen. Hence there had developed a measure of economic


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international furor involving USA, India and Sri Lanka, and

sullied the image of Eelam Tamils as hostage-takers.

Another glaring omission in The Broken Palmyra book is the

name of Badiuddin Mahmud, the prominent Muslim politician for

decades. His political antics alienated young Eelam Tamils who

faced admission to Sri Lankas universities in the post-1970

period, from the Sri Lankan mainstream. Among all the Muslim

politicians, as a servile bucket carrier to the Bandaranaikes,

Badiuddin Mahmud played with fire and lived to see its after-

effects. Thus it is not irrelevant to profile the career of this bucket

carrier to the Bandaranaikes from four angles, in chronological

order; viewed by a Sinhalese political rival (N.M.Perera), a Tamil

youth who suffered in the early 1970s from the adopted policy of

Badiuddin Mahmud (none other than myself, belonging to

Pirabhakarans age cohort) and two Muslims.

N.M.Pereras view, as told in 1975:

I have previously recorded the political peccadilloes of padre

Senanayake and padre Bandaranaike in pandering the Buddhist

Aryan sentiments in colonial and post-colonial Ceylon. [see, The

Pirabhakakaran Phenomenon, parts 44 and 45] Here I add a

primary source of evidence on the functioning of the Sinhala Maha

Sabha and on the manipulations of D.S.Senanayake and padre

Bandraranaike recorded by Badiuddin Mahmud, and retold by

Trotskyist Party leader N.M.Perera, in his statement delivered onSept.3, 1975 in the parliament, following removal from the post of

Minister of Finance. This I consider is a vital piece of document

originating from a leading Sinhalese political figure, excerpts of

which deserves inclusion. In N.M.Pereras words,

It is in connection with the pre-Hartal [Note by Sri

Kantha: i.e., pre-1953] political movement that Mr.

Bandaranaikes name comes in. I referred to the fact that the

history of the country could have been different had Mr.

Bandaranaike accepted the offer made by the Oppositionafter the Yamuna meeting. Yamuna was the name of the

house where Mr. Sri Nissanka lived. All those in the

Opposition to Mr. D.S. Senanayake met at Yamuna. We had

prolonged discussions at that place and we decided to offer

the Premiership in 1947 to Mr. Bandaranaike because we

realised that he could with our help command a majority in

the Parliament. I believe Mr. Sri Nissanka was our


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spokesman. I never said that I offered the Premiership. It was

an offer made by those who were in opposition to Mr. D.S.

Senanayake.

Mr. Bandaranaike refused the offer for very good reasons

from his point of view. I set out the two reasons that were

commonly talked about at that time. If anybody cares to read

the newspapers of that period, he or she will find that what Isaid was the common prevailing thought at the time.

What are the two reasons? First of all, his expectation that he

will be the next Prime Minister after Mr. D.S. Senanayake,

and, secondly, since he was not in political alignment with

the Left parties, he was not prepared to take a plunge into the

political unknown associated with the Marxists. This is a

historical fact. He never accepted the Socialist ideology as we

Marxists accepted it then and even later. He preferred to

accept a Ministerial post in Mr. D.S. Senanayakes Cabinet.

If he was a convinced and confirmed Socialist, he would

never have joined the UNP Cabinet. Is this historically

wrong? I have been faithful to history. I am sorry if history

hurts people. But I regret I cannot be guilty of distorting the

history of this country to suit any family prestige.

Now let me quote somebody who was very close to Mr.

Bandaranaike. He was the Secretary of the SLFP at its

inception and for a number of years thereafter. I have here thebooklet that was published. It was printed and widely

distributed. I quote from page 8: [Note by Sri Kantha: Here,

N.M. Perera introduces the description by Badiuddin

Mahmud.]

Those days I [i.e., Mahmud] asked him [i.e., Bandaranaike]

why the Lake House Press is continuing a campaign against

him. Thereupon, he spoke to me and said alright if you want

to know the secret about that I will tell you and he gave me

the details of that matter. In 1947, there was no party calledthe UNP. In the 1947 elections, the strongest party that went

before the people was not the UNP but the Sinhala Maha

Sabha. Dudley Senanayake, Sir John Kotelawela, E.A.

Nugawela, A. Ratnayake, C.W.W. Kannnangara and such

others were all members of the Sinhala Maha Sabha. On that

occasion, this party obtained about 40 seats. Mr.

Bandaranaike could then have become the Prime Minister. In


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1947, most people requested him to accept the prime

ministership, but displaying his good qualities and

expressing his sense of justice, he rejected the request. Let

the old gentleman Mr. D.S. Senanayake be the Prime

Minister. I have still time. I can consider it afterwards; were

the explanations that he then trotted out. Mr. D.S.

Senanayake met Mr. Bandaranaike and told him, Banda thistime give me the opportunity to become the prime minister.

After me, you will have that opportunity. Ask me for any

ministerial office, I will give that to you. That is the promise

that Mr. Senanayake gave on that occasion to Mr.

Bandaranaike. In this way, Mr. Bandaranaike deprived

himself of the opportunity he had to become the prime

minister of this country. Nevertheless, as Mr. Bandaranaike

himself expressed to me, what did Mr. D.S. Senanayake do?

He summoned the Proprietor of the Lake House institutionand told him, from now on work towards the destruction of

Mr. Bandaranaike. I must mention that this is the biggest

political crime in the history of Lankas politics. In some

ways, the occurrence of a crime in this way may be treated as

the good fortune for this country. When you contemplate,

this, we cannot help feeling this because, if not for that crime,

perhaps Mr. Bandaranaike might not have gone along the

socialist path as he did. [Note by Sri Kantha: Thus ends,

N.M. Perera reproducing Badiuddin Mahmuds recollectionson his talks with padre Bandaranaike. Then, N.M. Perera

continued further as follows:

This is a Government publication published in September

1973 on the occasion of the Bandaranaike Commemoration

Day. This was culled out of a speech made by Mr. Badiuddin

Mahmud before the Buddhist Society of the Education

Ministry. What is the difference between what I stated and

the statement of Mr. Mahmud, who was so close to Mr.

Bandaranaike? He has said precisely what I said in differentlanguage. Is it a crime when I say this? Is it quite acceptable

when a member of the SLFP says it? Is there one law for the

SLFP members and another law for the LSSP members? This

is like the laws of the famous King Kekille. [Source: NM

Explains Statement on Removal from Government, an

undated 32 page pamphlet published as A Sama Samaja

Publication, pp.18-20]


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Sachi Sri Kanthas views, as written in 1977 and 1983:

[In the 1977 General Election, contesting in Batticaloa

constituency], Ex-Education Minister, Dr.Badiuddin

Mahmud, the self-claimed, undisputed leader of the Muslims,

who contested a seat for the first time in his so-called 50-year

span of political career, was pushed to 4th place and suffered

a humiliating defeat. [Tribune, Colombo, Aug.27, 1977.]It is also noteworthy to cite at this juncture, one folly of

the so-called undisputed leader of the Muslim community

(who had never been elected to parliament), Badiuddin

Mahmud, who was the Minister of Education between

1960-64 and 1970-77. Though he was successful moderately

in uplifting Muslim interests, he could not succeed

completely. The master tactician Badiuddin was, he requested

the Muslim youth to study in the Sinhala medium, raising

hopes that by switching to the language of the majority

community they would be better positioned to have their

share of government teaching posts. However, the effort of

Badiuddin backfired in the 1970s, when the Muslims,

educated in Sinhala medium entered the schools in Sinhala

districts. They were greeted by the racist slogan, Thambila

apita eppa. Then only, Badiuddin wisely learnt the folly of

courting the Sinhala language [Tamil Times, May 1983,

pp.16-17]

Views of two Sri Lankan Muslims in 2001-2002

It was the Muslim leaders like Sir Razik Fareed and

Badiuddin Mahmud who fervently campaigned for the

Sinhala Only policy which sought to make Sinhala the sole

official language of the country, replacing English. [Asiff

Hussein; The Obvious Link, Sunday Observer, Colombo,

June 10, 2001]

The provisions provided for in the Memorandum of

Understanding between the Government and the LTTE havetaken absolutely no account of them [i.e., Muslims] although

they account for a third of the Eastern Province, and, together

with the Sinhalese constitute two thirds of the population. It

has to be understood and recognized that the era commencing

from the 1978 Constitution had been a distinct

disadvantageous one to the Muslims. During this period

President J.R. Jayewardene chose to wash his hands off the


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problems that had been created for the Muslims. The

beleaguered Muslims were asked then to negotiate their

future with the LTTE and seek the solution themselves; for

the Muslims it was a position in many ways similar to the

position they are in today.

The situation then resulted in a cross-party Muslim

conglomerate led by Dr. Badiuddin Mahmud to travel toMadras, run from pillar to post, and conduct talks with the

LTTE and others to extract some accommodation. But today

unfortunately neither is there an overwhelming personality

like Dr. Mahmud nor an Eastern leader with the commitment

and capacity of M.H.M. Ashraff [Dr.H.M.Mauroof,

President, National Muslim Movement and ex-MP, SLFP;

The ethnic tangle and the dilemma for the Muslims,Daily

News, Colombo, Aug.13, 2002]

An Analysis on Badiuddin Mahmud's politics

Analyzing the above-quoted passages from four observers,

spanning almost three decades from 1973 to 2002, the following

are apparent: (1) Badiuddin Mahmud was a Muslim politician who

aligned himself with the SLFP since its inception and he fervently

campaigned for the Sinhala Only policy. (2) Immense political

power he wielded, especially between 1970 and 1977, benefited

the Muslim community at the expense of the younger generation of

Eelam Tamils. (3) Though he was an unabashed pro-Sinhalese

politician for decades, when it came to the 1977 general election,

rather than contesting from Sinhala-dominated constituencies like

Beruwela or Gampola, he came carpet-bagging to Batticaloa to

contest the election, and he lost in that too. (4) When LTTE

gained ascendancy by extra-parliamentary means and came to

dictate terms, Badiuddin had to travel to Madras, run from pillar

to post, and conduct talks with the LTTE and others to extract

some accommodation, in the words of Mauroof. Whether LTTE

had to accede to Mahmuds political requests, in terms of inter-

ethnic harmony, is a moot point. But, contemporary Muslim

analysts never bother to question the morality of what their

political leaders like Badiuddin Mahmud did for four decades

(between 1947 and 1987) in suffocating the human rights of

Tamils, through the power they gained in the parliament as fence-

sitters and moolah worshippers.

As M.A. Nuhman, a recognized Tamil language poet and Muslim


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academic, noted perspectively, During the post-independence

period Eastern province Muslims seriously engaged in political

battles for seats in parliament. Political opportunism, coupled with

the scarcity of land, and economic competition created a mood of

suspicion and hostility between Muslims and Tamils in the region

and led even to some violent clashes in the 1950s and 60s. Later

developments resulted in ethnic segregation of these communitiesto a certain extent. [Essay: Ethnic Identity, Religious

Fundamentalism and Muslim Women in Sri Lanka,Dossier 21;

Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Sept.1988; accessed via

internet.] It is a given that opportunism is a key element in the

professional politician of any land. But the Muslim politicians of

Sri Lanka belong to a breed apart and deserve the tag Cunningly

Enterprising Opportunists (CEOs).

I qualify my tag with the following observation, which I recorded

in 1977. Relating to what Nuhman mentioned in passing as per

political battles for seats in parliament in the Eastern province, I

had observed:

Regarding the Tamil speaking Muslims of the EP [i.e.,

Eastern Province], in the past it had been a sad spectacle, that

the Muslim MPs elected on the FP [i.e., Federal Party ticket],

for example, (Mr.M.S.Kariapper Kalmunai;

Mr.M.M.Mustapha Pottuvil; Mr.M.C.Ahamed Kalmunai;

and Mr.M.E.H.Mohamed Ali Mutur) jumped on to thebandwagon of UNP or SLFP, after they entered the portals of

parliament. It is my humble opinion that this jumping over

the fence attitude practiced by the EP Tamil-speaking

Muslim politicos might have had a considerable impact on

the Muslim voters this time. They would have thought, (with

due apologies to the TULF- Muslim candidates) Why vote

for a TULF Muslim candidate, who most probably will jump

to UNP/SLFP later? It is better to cast the vote for the

Muslim candidate who is wearing the green label earlieritself? [A Reply to Fr.T.Balasuriya, Tribune, Colombo,

Dec.31, 1977]

I do not disagree with the assessment of M.A. Nuhman on

Badiuddin Mahmud, that indeed Mahmud was the widely

accepted Muslim political leader who contributed much to the

development of Muslim education in this country (i.e., Sri Lanka),

introduced the concept of Islamic music and dance and appointed


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Muslim women to teach these aesthetic subjects in Muslim

schools. [Essay: Ethnic Identity, Religious Fundamentalism and

Muslim Women in Sri Lanka,Dossier 21; Women Living Under

Muslim Laws, Sept.1988; accessed via internet.]

But the vital question is, at whose expense? the answer is: at

the expense of Eelam Tamils. Nuhman has recorded as follows:

In 1974 the Sri Lankan government introduced a system of

standardisation for the university entrance examination (that

is G.C.E.A/L) and a special quota for the backward districts

by which the Eastern province youths, both Tamils and

Muslims, were greatly benefited while the Jaffna Tamil

youths were badly affected. [Italics added by Sri Kantha for

emphasis.] The introduction of this new system paved the

way for better opportunities in higher education for Muslims

and created a new professional class and an educated eliteamong them. They are the more ethnically sensitive and

opinion making social groups. These groups were the base for

the new Muslim political leadership in the East and they

formed a Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim

Congress (SLMC) in 1980. [ibid]

The first sentence needs clarification. The then newly elected

SLFP-dominated government, for which Badiuddin Mahmud

served as the Minister of Education, introduced the ethnically

profiled, crude standardisation scheme from 1971. I speak with

authority, since I entered the University of Colombo from the

Colombo district in January 1972, after sitting for the G.C.E.

Advanced Level exam in Dec.1970, as the second batch which

passed this ethnically profiled, crude standardisation scheme. Even

Tamil ethnic students who studied and sat the university entrance

exam from Colombo were badly bruised by this racist

discriminatory treatment. I should also add that the university

entrance exam held in Dec.1970 was the last one, in which

students sitting for the natural science subjects (Chemistry,

Physics, Botany and Zoology) were examined with both the theory

and practical components. Following an uproar by the Tamil

Student Federation (Tamil Maanavar Peravai) largely emanating

from the Jaffna peninsula, Mrs. Bandaranaikes Cabinet led by

Badiuddin Mahmud tampered and refined (if that is the

appropriate word!) the then executed university admission criteria

to what Nuhman mentions as and a special quota for the


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backward districts by which the Eastern province youths, both

Tamils and Muslims, were greatly benefited. The Tamil Student

Federation was the incubator for the Tamil militant movement

which eventually led to the birth of LTTE.

In sum, Badiuddin Mahmud contributed immensely to the Muslim

community first and foremost, and by his bucket-carrying servility

contributed markedly to the Sinhalese leadership as well. If in

1988, his conciliatory approach to the LTTE was rebuffed

indirectly, the reasons are self-explanatory.

The Loyalty dilemma of Muslims

Pirabhakarans LTTE has had the distinction of engaging Sri

Lankan armed forces and Indias army. But an overlooked fact is

that LTTE also has to wage a covert war against the plans of

Pakistans Generals and Intelligence operatives, who were major

backers of the Sri Lankan establishment in arsenal and technicalhelp. This is a 20 year-old history, beginning from 1982, even

before the active Indian interest on the Eelam Tamil issue. Given

the ever-volatile nature of the Indo-Pakistan political

brinkmanship, it may not be even wrong to infer that Indira

Gandhi, the then prime minister of India, became strongly

interested in the political issue of Eelam, only because Zia ul Haq,

the then dictator of Pakistan, had already planted his boots into

the Colombo camp.

It takes years for truth to show its appearance. But, it eventually

appear in bits and pieces after the departure of the leading actors

of that period, namely Indira Gandhi, Zia ul Haq and

J.R.Jayewardene. To quote a passage from the bookThe Dilemma

of an Islandby Meril Gunaratne, the ex-Director General of

Intelligence & Security,

The Special Task Force comprising of policemen, and

versed in paramilitary skills, should be the ideal organisation

to release a body of troops to the umbrella organisation. Irecall General Tissa Weeratunga, former Army Commander,

narrating a discussion he had with late President Zia ul Haq

in Pakistan in 1982.

After listening to General Weeratunga concerning the

situation in Jaffna, the President of Pakistan had said,

General, your problem is that you do not have anything

between the Army and the Police. The President of Pakistan


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was trying to drive home the point that a paramilitary Police,

rather than the Army, should be mobilised in the early stages

of terrorism. The STF was yet to be born at the time General

Zia ul Haq made this comment.

It may be possible that the STF is deployed excessively in the

north and east today [Book excerpt entitled, Combating

Terrorism in Colombo,Daily News, Colombo, August 31,2001]

It is pertinent to think about what has been the stand of the

Muslim leaders in Sri Lanka since 1983? Though linked by the

common language of Tamil, while Eelam Tamils have an emotional

identity with India for cultural reasons, Muslim politicians in Sri

Lanka have shown a strong emotional bond with Pakistan in

preference to India, on the basis of religion. How many Muslims in

Sri Lanka can speak the languages of Pakistan (Punjabi, Sindhi,Pashtu, Siraki, Urdu and Balochi)? Did any one of the Muslim

leaders (M.H. Mohamed, A.C.S. Hameed, Badiuddin Mahmud,

Alavi Moulana, M.H.M. Ashraff) make a moral representation to

Pakistans Generals and Intelligence operatives - on behalf of

Tamils to refrain from supplying military hardware and software

to the Sri Lankan government because the actions of STF are

hurting the Tamils badly in the Eastern Front. From the political

platforms, the Muslim leaders in Sri Lanka had praised the deeds

of M.A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, in separating from India.But why they have not bothered to support the same demand, when

it was made by Chelvanayakam or Amirthalingam or Pirabhakaran,

is not a mystery.

The perfidy of the Muslim political leaders belonging to the

Sinhalese ruling parties in arranging military support from

Pakistan for the Sri Lankan armed forces has remained an

unmentionable theme in the anti-LTTE tracts of the cluster of

quasi human rights activists, who fault the LTTE for its

anti-Muslim activities. The J.R. Jayewardene regime did

implement the 1982 suggestions on dictator Zia ul Haq and

established the dreaded Special Task Force section in 1983. Here

is a self-laudatory passage from the website of Sri Lankan Police,

which appears under the sub-heading The Birth of the Special

Task Force. To quote,

The nucleus of the Special Task Force (STF) was formed in

1983, drawing on policemen already in service and having


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them trained by the Army in the handling of Infantry weapons

and given basic training in jungle operations. The first few

Platoons formed were deployed mainly to provide support for

police stations in the North of Sri Lanka.

The level of the STF was considerably enhanced in 1983 with

the introduction of crack former Special Air Service (SAS)

teams to provide specialized training in all aspects of counterinsurgency and counter terrorist operations. By the year

1987, the STF had taken over the control of the Batticaloa

division from Kiran, right down to Potuvil in the South and

were deployed in Company formation in no less than 15

camps. When the Indian Peace Keeping Force was introduced

into Sri Lanka, the STF was dominating the ground in the

Batticaloa division, having scored several successes against

the terrorist groups. Normalcy was restored with the life of

the citizen proceeding without interruption, trains and busesrunning as usual and having the proud record of not having a

single STF camp come under attack from the LTTE from

1983 right up to the time that the IPKF moved into the

Batticaloa division. [source: website www.police.lk]

Tale of two American Jesuit Priests in Batticaloa

Despite the unspecified several successes recorded in the above

blurb until 1987, Anderson brothers in their book, War Zones

(1988) had described the trauma caused by the STF operations to

the Tamils in the Eastern Front. [see, The Pirabhakaran

Phenomenon part 46] The several successes of STF caused the

loss and disappearance of thousands of Tamil civilians.

One particular disappearance was that of Eugene J. Hebert, an

American Jesuit priest stationed in Batticaloa. It became

internationally known via theInsightmagazine (Washington DC),

only because his brother-in-law J. Hubert Dumesnil of Lafayette,

Lousiana, contributed a letter to this magazine, incorporating the

last letter written by this disappeared priest Hebert to one of hisfriends. I provide below this published letter by J.Hubert

Dumesnil, under the caption: Missing Priests Own View of Sri

Lanka. [Insightmagazine, Dec.10, 1990]

Your cover story of Oct.22 on Sri Lanka, describing the

vicious conflict between the Sinhalese and the rebel Tamil

Tigers, is excellent.

The American Jesuit, the Rev.Eugene J.Hebert, reported


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then began arrests of innocent citizens, looting, killings and

burning on public roads to terrorize the people, etc. I had to

supervise the burial of two, a man and a woman, who had

been killed, put into a sack and thrown off the bridge into the

lagoon just in front of St. Sebastians Church. They had been

in the water three days before we were able to get the army to

let us bury them.There has been some improvement lately. The Peace

committee, a group of citizens of which Harry Miller [a

fellow Jesuit in Batticaloa] is a very active member, has made

many representations to the Army authorities. Their efforts

have stopped the burning of bodies on the public roads and

there has not been any persons thrown off the bridge for two

weeks now. But the arrests of boys, mostly innocent,

continue.

Two past presidents of the Citizens for Peace Committee

have been shot and killed, including the parish priest of the

Cathedral. But Harry Miller, using his American citizenship

as a partial protection, does what he can to alleviate the

sufferings of the poor people. Father Selvaraj, a young

diocesan priest, was killed a month ago because he was a

Tamil. Another young priest, Father Ambrose, was stoned by

the Muslims as he passed through their village taking a boy

to the hospital. He is in intensive care in Colombo. He was

flown there by air force helicopter. He is just beginning to

recognize people and can now take food through the mouth.

Enough of our trials. The Lord continues to take care of us.

Batticaloa is better off than the other sections of the Eastern

and Northern provinces. To get to the information you

requested, the fiscal year of the ETI [the Eastern Technical

Institute, a trade school that was then run by Father Hebert]

ends on March 31. I had really planned to write to U.S. AID

[the Agency for International Development] for another grant.We are running rehabilitation courses for ex-militants and

other youth. Every four months we train 20 boys in welding,

20 in refrigeration repairs and 25 in house wiring. Every six

months we train 15 in radio and TV repair. These courses are

being funded by Norad and a Canadian group. This is in

addition to our regular three-year course in general

mechanical trades. So we are short on space and I had hoped

to get U.S. AID to fund the extension of our buildings. But it


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is impossible to get estimates or do anything now. There is

very little activity in the town now. Only in the last few days

have a few of the shops opened. Even the ETI, which was

able to function in the worst days, is hardly working now. We

open part of the morning only. Only the staff comes. None of

the boys dare to come on the streets until conditions improve.

Pray for us. God willing, things will be changed by the time Iwrite again. We are used to vast fluctuations in fortune.

Sincerely in Christ,

Eugene J.Hebert, S.J.

[Handwritten] Dont know when you will receive this letter.

Father Eugene Hebert was 63, when he disappeared in 1990. Hewas the first and only American to suffer this fate in Eelam

territory, and now after 12 years, it can be reasonably assumed that

he had been killed but not by the LTTE. Who killed Father

Hebert? In his last letter, Fr. Hebert had noted the killing of Father

Selvaraj around July 1990 because he was a Tamil and that

Father Ambrose was stoned by the Muslims. Father Hebert also

mentioned about fellow Jesuit Rev. Harry Miller in his letter. Fr.

Miller is still living, and he was met by Edward Gargan, theNew

York Times correspondent an year later, whose report appeared in1991, with the caption, Tracking Death in Sri Lanka: A Priest

chronicles the Civil Wars Tragic Consequences. I reproduce it in

full for record, since reference was also made about Fr.Heberts

disappearance.

Batticaloa, Sri Lanka - The other day, the Reverend Harry

Miller walked into the parched scrub land outside this

war-weary town. He walked until a couple of young men with

automatic rifles materialized from the landscape to escort him

to their camp. It was the local headquarters of the guerrillaarmy of ethnic Tamils the so-called Tamil Tigers who are

fighting to establish a separate state on this island.

They had kidnapped this guy, said Father Miller, 65, his

native Louisiana lilt skewed by a South Asian cadence

nurtured over the last 43 years here. They wanted him to

provide them with 75,000 rupees, about $1,875. Hes a

pensioner working on our Peace Committee. I told them,


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Youre not going to get any money from him even if you kill

him. Finally, I gave them 10,000 rupees and hes back. For

Father Miller, it was a routine day, perhaps a bit better than

routine because for the first time in a while he had saved a

life. More often in the last year, though, it has been

chronicling the deaths and disappearances of thousands of

local people that has consumed the New Orleans Jesuit.In a corner turret of the high school he once ran, Father

Miller records each death, each disappearance, each buried

body, each pile of ashes, all the final product, he says, of

arrests and roundups of Tamils by the Sri Lankan Army and

police. He tells the tale of what happened to Kockkadicholai

village in July. There was this army tractor going along

hauling some things and the Tigers blew it up and killed the

soldiers, he said. The army came back and massacred the

people of this village, 123 dead and 40 in the hospital. Theyburned 350 kadjan houses, coconut-leaf houses. They just

shot the people. Fifty-six of the bodies were burned, 67 were

buried. It was the army. No doubt about it.

They feel free to burn bodies at the roadside because nobody

will testify against them. They feel free to throw boys in wells

because nobody will testify against them. They feel free to

kick boys in the head because nobody will testify against

them. They feel free to dispose of 2,700 citizens of

Batticaloa.

Behind his battered wooden desk, Father Miller flips through

page after page listing the names of people who are no longer

found in Batticaloa, names that the Peace Committee has

compiled and sent to the local army and police commanders

seeking information. The committee, a group of local people

put together by Father Miller, badgers the authorities for

explanations. Rarely do they get any; more often than not, it

is subtle threats of violence that filter their way. Already,two presidents of the Peace Committee have resigned, Father

Miller said. They were afraid for their families.

For nearly a decade the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan

armed forces have battled for control of the eastern part of

this island. The Tigers say they fight for the rights of the

Tamil ethnic minority, for years discriminated against by the

majority Sinhalese; the Sri Lankan forces battle to preserve


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Tigers? Not by objective reasoning, since Fr. Miller had informed

correspondent Gargan about the kidnapping of a member of the

Citizens Committee by the Tamil Tigers. Evidence of torture as

presented by Fr. Hebert and Fr. Miller was tilted towards the Sri

Lankan army and police (inclusive of the STF operatives). It

should be noted that the STF operatives were recruited exclusively

from the Sinhalese and Muslim ethnic groups.

One statement which appears in Fr. Heberts last letter that

Battiacaloa is better off than the other sections of the Eastern and

Northern provinces. received independent confirmation from

Newsweeks correspondents Tony Emerson and Steve Le Vine in

March 1991, reporting from Trincomalee. It carried the caption

Black Shirts in Sri Lanka. Excerpts are given below:

Black Shirts in Sri Lanka: Rise of disappearances

In the beautiful harbor of Trincomalee, capital of SriLankas northeastern province, ethnic Tamils whisper of

security men who come at night, wearing black shirts and

pants, and announce that you are wanted for questioning.

No one knows how many Tamils have disappeared from

Trincomalee, apparent casualties of a new phase in Sri

Lankas eight-year-old civil war. The Sri Lankan Army is

pressing a campaign to purge civilian areas of rebels from the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who are fighting for an

independent state in the northern and eastern regions. FromBatticaloa, south of Trincomalee, human rights observers

report that in the last nine months, 2,000 Tamil youths have

been arrested on unknown charges and have not been seen

since.

It will be difficult to count the missing in Trincomalee, an

increasingly silent and empty city. Last June the Liberation

Tigers broke a 13-month truce by massacring scores of police

officers. [Italics added for emphasis by Sri Kantha, for a later

analysis on the 600-700 missing policemen killed by the

LTTE.] The Colombo government responded by dropping

barrel bombs, oil drums filled with burning liquid, in

civilian neighborhoods to smoke out the rebels. Nationwide,

more than 4,000 people have died in rebel ambushes and

Army reprisals since that time; in Trincomalee, an estimated

one fourth of the 350,000 residents have fled the fighting and

Army manhunts not always to safety.


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Soldiers have searched for rebel suspects in some of the 30

refugee camps that now ring Trincomalee. A leader of one

camp, near the village of Nilaveli north of Trincomalee, said

that 84 men were detained in a series of Army sweeps last

year. One refugee who returned said he was locked in a

prison that held about 350 men. They tied my hands behind

my back and kept a blindfold around my eyes. I hardly ate fortwo weeks, he said. I was finally released with 15 (men).

We dont know what happened to the others. The camp

leader, who requested anonymity, said only 45 of the 84

detainees are accounted for. The others disappeared or have

been killed. We dont know.

The apparent Army crackdown on civilians has not improved

its position on the battlefield. The rebels still hold sway over

much of the northern and eastern provinces, except in big

cities where government forces guard roadblocks by day andusually retreat to barracks by night. Diplomats in Colombo

say President Ranasinghe Premadasa, considered pragmatic

but occasionally ruthless, has given Army hard-liners until

June to gain the upper hand, or he may attempt to reopen

peace talks. An Army surge seems unlikely, but so is a Tiger

victory. In the Trincomalee district, the army estimates that

the rebels are outnumbered by at least 10,000 to 800.

Most Tamils in Trincomalee wont discuss the

disappearances, even under the cloak of anonymity. Ive

stopped working in human rights because its not wise

anymore, says a formerly outspoken advocate. A local relief

official said he seeks an escort from international

organizations just to deliver medicine to the refugee camps.

Another adds, We dont get involved with human-rights

issues. Our lives literally depend on it. A citizens committee

set up by the military to represent refugees directs inquiries

about missing persons back to the Army. Brig. Siri Pieris,

Army commander in the Trincomalee district, said he had

received no official complaints of disappearances, but was

investigating the reports nonetheless [Newsweek

International edition, March 25, 1991, p.39]

One can guess that Brig. Siri Pieris should have some oblique

sense of humor. Also of note is the date of this reports

publication March 25, 1991. This was nearly two months before


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Rajiv Gandhis assassination in Sri Perumbudur. The passing

remark by Emerson and Le Vine regarding President Premadasa

giving the Army hard-liners until June to gain the upper hand, or

he may attempt to reopen peace talks, when linked with the

torture and killing of Tamils in the Eastern Province by the STF

operatives (as recorded by Father Hebert, Father Miller and

correspondents Emerson and Le Vine) might have been of somesignificance which has gone un-noticed, after Rajiv Gandhis

assassination on May 21, 1991. [To be continued.]


the pirabakaran phenomenon 47

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