the pig and the postwar dream: the san juan island dispute
TRANSCRIPT
The Pig and the Postwar Dream:
The San Juan Island Dispute, 1853-1872,
in History and Memory
by
Gordon Robert Lyall
B.A., University of Victoria, 2011
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department of History
Gordon Lyall, 2013
University of Victoria
All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or
other means, without the permission of the author.
ii
The Pig and the Postwar Dream:
The San Juan Island Dispute, 1853-1872,
in History and Memory
Gordon Robert Lyall
B.A., University of Victoria, 2011
Supervisory Committee
Dr. Eric Sager Supervisor
Dr. Jason Colby Departmental Member
iii
Supervisory Committee
Dr. Eric Sager Supervisor
Dr. Jason Colby Departmental Member
Abstract
Historical events are framed by the actors of the time and then re-framed by subsequent
historians and the public. This thesis examines the historiography of the San Juan Island
Dispute, 1853-1871, known colloquially in the twentieth century as the “Pig War.” In 1859,
after an American settler on San Juan shot a pig owned by the Hudson’s Bay Company, the
American military and the British Royal Navy met in a tense stand-off resulting in a twelve
year joint-military occupation of the island. This conflict was the last border dispute between
the two nations. Following World War II, a message of peace became the dominant trope of
histories written about the “Pig War.” The term itself has come to represent this overarching
theme. With documents from the dispute, such as colonial despatches, official
correspondence and newspaper editorials, this thesis considers how the event was framed at
the time; and employing semiotics as a technique for discourse analysis, it examines how the
“war” was re-framed in the twentieth century. The thesis follows Alfred Young’s research on
antebellum America’s commemoration of the “Boston Tea Party,” with its message
appropriated by politicians, merging history and myth.1 The “Pig War” occupies similar
terrain as the reconceptualization of the event embodies its own message of a unique identity
for the Pacific Northwest, associated with the 49th
parallel as the world’s longest, most
peaceful, “undefended” border
1 Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1999).
iv
Table of Contents
Supervisory Committee ............................................................................................................. ii
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... iv
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ v
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... vi
Dedication ................................................................................................................................ vii
Introduction: The Pig and the Postwar Dream Part 1 ................................................................ 1
Chapter 1 “Some War, Some Pig” ........................................................................................... 21
Chapter 2 “A Pig that Nearly Caused a War” .......................................................................... 39
Chapter 3 “The So-Called Pig War” ........................................................................................ 50
Chapter 4 An “Imperial Pig” in the Pacific Northwest ............................................................ 63
Conclusion: The Pig and the Postwar Dream Part 2 ................................................................ 73
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 76
Appendix ................................................................................................................................ 100
v
List of Figures
1. Sketch of pig shooting from Julian Ralph’s 1888 article
2. Table of contents from John Long’s 1949 PhD dissertation
3. Cover page and table of contents from Sylvia Landahl’s 1943 unpublished manuscript
4. Brochure from San Juan Island National Historic Park’s 1972 Centennial Day
Celebration
5. By-line and title from Tom Inkster’s newspaper article
6. Cover and pig shooting from Betty Baker’s 1969 children’s book
7. Another page from Baker’s book
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Acknowledgments
First I would like to thank my advisor Eric Sager for his support and guidance.
Also, Lynne Marks, Jason Colby, and Elizabeth Vibert for their advice as my
thesis research developed into coherent thoughts. Further, I would like to thank
John Lutz and Wendy Wickwire for their faith and support during my time here
at Uvic- as well as the wonderful staff at the History Department. I could thank
almost the entire Uvic faculty as I am completing my seventh year at this
institution. I have immensely enjoyed my time here and this project is
bittersweet as it likely marks the end of my student life at this school. Outside of
the department, I wish to thank Janni Aragon for her advice on multiple projects
throughout my endeavours here. And I would also like to thank Mike Vouri and
the staff at the San Juan Island National Historic Park for their help during my
research (and for expediting our trip to the clinic for the extraction of a rock
from my two-year old’s nose). And finally a big thank you to my family for all
their help- without them, and their loving support, this project would not be
possible.
vii
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Richard Jenkins. By no means a
scholar, but the most loyal and loving brother anyone could ever ask for.
Introduction
The Pig and the Postwar Dream, Part 1.
A place to stay,
Enough to eat,
Somewhere old heroes shuffle safely down the street.
Where you can speak out loud,
About your doubts and fears.
And what’s more,
No-one ever disappears,
You never hear their standard issue kicking in your door.
You can relax,
On both sides of the tracks,
And maniacs,
Don’t blow holes in bandsmen by remote control.
And everyone has recourse to the law.
And no-one kills the children anymore.
- Roger Waters (Pink Floyd), “The Gunner’s Dream”
From the album, The Final Cut, 1983.
In his final album with Pink Floyd, Roger Waters asked, “what happened to the Postwar
Dream?”2 This question reflects what a lot of people have wondered since the conclusion of the
Second World War. Instead of a world of peace, there have been multiple international conflicts
from the 1950s until now. Waters designed the concept of the album in response to what he saw
2 Roger Waters, “The Post War Dream,” from the album, The Final Cut, 1983.
2
as the continuing belligerence of imperial nations. He viewed Great Britain’s participation in the
Falkland War as “jingoistic and unnecessary.”3 He created an album to address the impact of war
and imperialism on the psyche of people who live in the aftermath. He found that people have
become jaded, hardened and cynical. The “promise of a brave new world,” never did “unfurl[]
beneath a clear blue sky.”4
Waters was deeply affected by World War II. His father, Eric Fletcher Waters, a schoolteacher
and Communist Party member, was a conscientious objector to the war. But as the war continued,
he felt compelled to join the fight. Eric Waters was declared missing in action and presumed dead
when Roger was not even a year old.5 The loss of his father had a profound impact on how
Waters viewed the world and he expressed his feelings of great loss in his music. This album, as
well as the better known album “The Wall,” deals with the fragile psyche of a man who has lost
his father in combat. “The Final Cut” specifically addresses what Waters sees as a great betrayal
to the servicemen who had sacrificed their lives for the “Dream.”6
As the lyrics above suggest, the Postwar Dream is a world in which people can feel safe from
violence and fear. It is a world where the leaders of nations solve differences by negotiation and
not war. Unfortunately, it is a world that is still yet to exist. Hence, the album was originally
titled Requiem for a Post-War Dream because he laments the fact that such a dream has never
been realised.7 Waters shows that music is a viable genre with which to convey this message of
peace over war. Movies are also often thought of as a suitable genre. But what about the writing
of history?
Historians have debated their role in society for a long time. Some argue that it is simply the
historian’s job to research and report on the past. Others say that there is a moral and ethical duty
of the scholar to exert a positive influence on society. The relationship between history and
morality is complex. Often there are varying opinions on what a story means or what should be
emphasised. But sometimes, a story is so redolent with moral meaning that it becomes the
dominant narrative among historians and their audiences. This is what has occurred for the story
3 Wikipedia, “The Final Cut (album)” <accessed 01/12/12> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Final_Cut_(album).
4 Roger Waters, “Goodbye Blue Sky” from the album, The Wall, 1979.
5 Wikipedia, “Roger Waters” <accessed 01/12/12> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Waters.
6 Wikipedia, “The Final Cut (album)” <accessed 01/12/12> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Final_Cut_(album).
7 Ibid.
3
of a pig, shot dead in 1859, a single casualty in a war that never happened, the perfect example of
how conflicts could be resolved in a world of the Postwar Dream.
The “Pig War”
On June 15, 1859, Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) sheep farmer Charles Griffin recorded in his
farm journal, “an American shot one of my pigs for trespassing!!!”8 This shooting occurred on a
tiny island off the coast of Vancouver Island called San Juan. At this time, British colonists of
Victoria and American settlers of the Puget Sound were quarreling over ownership of this island.
After the pig’s death, General William Harney of the United States Army ordered troops to be
landed to occupy San Juan. Soldier William Peck wrote in his journal: “rumors of troubles
concerning the rights of ownership of the Island of San Juan in Puget Sound are going the rounds.
The case, simply stated, is General W.S. Harney, in behalf of the government of U.S., claims and
has taken possession of the Island per contra Governor Douglas of all the British Columbias
[who] insists upon it as property belonging to Hudson’s Bay Company, and as General Harney
has already sent U.S. troops there, it is feared a collision will occur.”9 In response to Harney’s
action, the British Royal Navy sent ships to contest the landing of American troops. After a tense
stand-off, it was decided that military forces representing both nations would reside on the island
in equal numbers until the dispute was settled. This joint military occupation lasted twelve years.
The settlement was ultimately decided by the German Kaiser in arbitration, and the island was
awarded to the United States; San Juan remains an American island today.
This event, or non-war, featured many colorful characters with personalities that would “tax
the skill of Hemingway.”10
They included: Harney, Captain George Pickett, of later Gettysburg
fame, James Douglas, the first governor of Vancouver Island and British Columbia, and, perhaps
8 Charles Griffin, Journals, Belle Vue Sheep Farm Post, 1854-1855 and 1858-1862. Hudson’s Bay Company
Records, microfilm, Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada). 9 C. Brewster Coulter, The Pig War, And Other Experiences of William Peck, Soldier 1858-1862, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers: The Journal of William A. Peck Jr. (Medford, Oregon: Webb Research Group, 1993), 93. 10
David Richardson, Pig War Islands (Eastsound, Wash: Orcas Publishing Company, 1971), 11.
4
most amazingly, an aging Winfield Scott, the “Great Pacificator” and veteran of the War of 1812
against Great Britain.11
David Richardson observes:
Most accounts of the Pig War center around the erring British owned porker, and its sudden demise
at the hands of the dead-eyed Yankee homesteader. But it was an altogether different kind of
piggishness that actually brought two frontier forces eyeball-to-eyeball in a confrontation designed
neither in London nor Washington. The chief engineers were in fact an American general who
wanted to be president, and a British governor who could not forget that he was a company man. At
stake in their egoistic contest: a gaggle of sparsely inhabited islands, smack in the middle of a
peaceful inland sea separating America’s Pacific Northwest from what is now British Columbia.12
A travel guide to San Juan comments, “a Friml or a Gilbert and Sullivan might well have used the
plot for one of their famous light operas.”13
However, the dispute at the time was seen as having
the potential to become a third major war between the two nations in less than a century.
Observer Viscount Milton explained, “on a just and equitable solution of the so-called San Juan
Water Boundary Question depends the future, not only of British Columbia, but also of the entire
British possessions in North America.”14
The original framing of this dispute was one of a
Manichean battle between American Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s advance guard,
the HBC. Adherents of Manifest Destiny claimed the Pacific Northwest was destined to be settled
by Americans; the only trouble with this was that the HBC already operated in the area. While
the HBC did not actively encourage colonisation by English immigrants it fiercely opposed
American presence.
By the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, historians placed this
dispute in the context of their respective nation building histories. For Americans, it was the
victory of Manifest Destiny over John Bull. For Canadian historians, as Jean Barman notes, the
dispute “underlined the necessity for law and order at the local level” and that the two colonies
11
Michael Vouri, The Pig War: Standoff at Griffin Bay (Friday Harbour, WA.: Griffin Bay Bookstore, 1999), 166. 12
Richardson, Pig War Islands, 14. 13
C.T. Morgan, The San Juan Story: Brief History, Tourist Guide, Pictures of Points of Interest, and 4-color map.
16th
Edition (Friday Harbor: C.T. Morgan, San Juan Industries, 1966), 5. 14
Viscount Milton, M.P., A History of the San Juan Water Boundary Question, As Affecting the Division of Territory
Between Great Britain and the United States (London: Cassel, Petter, and Galpin, 1869), 8.
5
needed to defend themselves, thus aiding the decision to Confederate with Canada.15
Chapter one
will show how the dispute unfolded, using correspondence and editorials from the time. Their
words display the serious tenor of the actors; they show how peace was a much sought-after goal,
although many doubted it was possible.
By the mid-twentieth century the theme of this story would evolve to fit the Postwar Dream. It
was held up as shining example of how leaders ought to solve their problems. It also comes to
define the region of the Pacific Northwest as the world’s safest and most peaceful place to be. As
Will Dawson proclaims: “the friendship that exists between the United States and Canada as
symbolized by the Peace Arch standing astride the Washington State-British Columbia border, is
among the world’s most admired and cherished achievements.” He continues: “never before in all
recorded history has a nation with the military might of the United States refrained of its goodwill
and intelligence from usurping the national rights of its physically much weaker neighbor. Never
before in all recorded history has the world witnessed such a near miracle of tolerance and
understanding between nations.”16
This unique event became a special identifier for the island
and the region. All modern histories about the event carry this didactic message of peace, and
works of fiction, such as a 2012 novel by Mark Holzen, also share this perspective.17
Chapter two
will chart the development of San Juan Island Dispute histories; and chapter three will address
the re-framing of the event to a theme of peace and how the pig became a focal point of the story.
Awareness of the pig’s contribution to the dispute has a long history dating back to the
occupation of the island. On August 24, 1859, while stationed on San Juan Island, Peck wrote in
his journal, “it seems present difficulties all arose from an unruly hog, of which there are plenty
here.”18
Coming from a regular “grunt,”19
this entry shows that the pig incident was a hot topic
around the island when the troops landed. The pig was later mentioned in official correspondence
15
Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2007), 79. 16
Will Dawson, The War That Was Never Fought (Princeton: Auerbach Publisher, 1971), vii. 17
In this story, the kids are told that it is sometimes more difficult not to fight than to fight, and the island dispute
was like them fighting over the comfy chair; Mark Holtzen, The Pig War (North Charleston, N.C: CreateSpace,
2012), 107-109. 18
Coulter, The Pig War, And Other Experiences of William Peck, 99. 19
Ibid. 12.
6
of the time, but not seen as an important detail of the dispute.20
It wasn’t until historical writers
heard of this pig that it became seen as a significant part of the story.
Immediately after the dispute, only people in Victoria were still talking about the pig.21
It was
an amusing anecdote from the “salad days” of the British colony. But, in 1888, Julian Ralph took
this anecdote and placed the pig on a pedestal. Not only does his title, A Pig that Nearly Caused a
War, imply that the pig was responsible for the whole mess, but he also transforms the pig into a
patriot (despite being a British boar).22
He concludes, “so, although the pig was merely in search
of something to eat (as pigs are, most of their time), and although Mr. Hubbs desired only to save
himself from the consequences of an angry act, America well may be grateful to both- especially
to the pig, for he lost his life for his country.”23
While this veneration of the pig was likely not
shared by any of his fellow Americans, the idea that it was a necessary factor in the dispute
crystallized by the end of the nineteenth century. In the decade following Ralph’s article, Major
John Brooke claimed “the originator of the quarrel which well-nigh brought two great nations
together by the ears, was a pig- a stupid, groveling pig.”24
By the turn of the century, the pig had
taken a prominent role in the dispute, but it did not fully take center stage until the event became
known as the “Pig War.”
In 1905, Charles McKay, one of the last survivors from the dispute, published his memoir in
The Washington Historical Quarterly. He never uses the term “Pig War,” but he relates in some
detail what he refers to as the “hog-scrape.” His narrative gives the impression that he was
prompted by an interviewer to talk about the pig.25
This focus on the pig, and its direct
20
United States Government. The Northwest Boundary. Discussion of the Water Boundary Question: Geographical
memoir of the Islands in Dispute: and History of the Military Occupation of San Juan Island: Accompanied by Map
and Cross-Sections of Channels (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1868), 149. 21
Julian Ralph, “A Pig That Nearly Caused A War.” St. Nicholas Magazine for Young Folks. Vol. XV, No. 5 (March
1888), 371. 22
Joseph Kinsey Howard, correctly and amusingly identifies the pig as an “imperial pig.” He says, “it was a
thoroughly British pig. It went where it listed and it ate what it damned well chose to eat, much to the annoyance of
Americans on San Juan;” Joseph Kinsey Howard, “Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig.” Montana: The
Magazine of Western History, vol. 5, no. 4 (Autumn, 1955), 20-21. 23
Ralph, A Pig That Nearly Caused a War, 374. 24
Maj. John Brooke, US.A. “San Juan Island,” Recreation (Edinburgh), Vol. IV (January 1896). 25
McKay says, “I said I would tell you about the hog scrape that nearly caused a war between two great nations. The
man by the name of Cutler had a farm with a small garden of potatoes. While we had to go forty miles across the
Straits in a rowboat, you will see that potatoes were potatoes. This Cutler potato patch was growing fine. One day a
hog belonging to the Hudson’s Bay Company broke into Cutler’s potato patch… [shoots pig] Then he went to the
7
connection to the war, carried on through the twentieth century. Joseph Kinsey Howard joked in
1955 that the treaty which settled the Oregon Question in 1846, contained “a loophole large
enough to admit a pig.”26
In 1971, David Richardson summed up the general attitude nicely: “it is
hard enough to believe that two great nations could come to the brink of war over a mere pig.”27
This line of thinking continues into the twenty-first century. Scott Kaufmann explains his interest
in the San Juan story: “a boundary dispute between the United States and Great Britain over the
island of San Juan nearly erupted into a military clash all because of the death of a pig. I could
not believe that such a seemingly minor event could have such enormous ramifications.”28
The
pig continues to enjoy the starring role in what has been viewed as a “near-miss” in the history of
nineteenth century Anglo-American relations.
But why blame this unfortunate pig for the international events that ensued? Likely, it is
because people desire reasons for events such as the San Juan Island Dispute. They look to
historians to answer the question of why. In 1961, E.H Carr proclaimed “the study of history is a
study of causes.”29
Although many historians would argue that there is much more to the study of
history than simply a search for causes, causation often plays a large role in historical
interpretation. Peter Hoffer observes “just as no one wants a diagnosis of their illness as
‘idiopathic,’ so no one wants a history without causation.”30
The Pig War is no different. The pig,
due to his rooting proclivities, became seen as the instigator of the conflict.31
In 1960,
Washington State Senator Warren Magnuson stated, “perhaps the best, if silliest, war this country
Hudson Bay agent and offered to pay for the hog, but the agent refused to take pay and said he would send for the
gunboat and have him arrested and taken to Victoria. The gunboat came to arrest him and I had to plead with Cutler
to hide, for I knew that Cutler was a good shot and was going to kill all that would come to arrest him;” Charles
Mckay, “History of San Juan Island,” The Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July 1908), 293. 26
Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig, 20. 27
Richardson, Pig War Islands, 11. 28
Scott Kaufman, The Pig War: The United States, Britain, and the Balance of Power in the Pacific Northwest,
1846-1872 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), xiii. 29
E.H. Carr, What is History? (New York: Random House, 1990), 87. 30
Peter Charles Hoffer, The Historians’ Paradox: The Study of History in Our Time (New York: New York
University Press, 2008), 65. 31
Although, in 1909, Meany did note that, “in late years an effort has been made to shift the responsibility of this
trouble from the pig to some sheep:” Edmond S. Meany, History of the State of Washington (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1909), 241.
8
ever fought was caused by the death of a rooting pig.”32
And E.C. Coleman ponders more
recently, “if only Lyman Cutler had attempted to get a law enacted rather than shooting Griffin’s
pig, how different might things have been.”33
This suggestion assumes that the island would not
have been occupied by American troops without the shooting of the pig. But there are often
multiple conditions that help create a historic event as opposed to a single cause.34
Historian Allan Megill comments “causation does not occur in a vacuum: hence it is always a
matter of assessing the relative strengths of various possible causes.”35
The pig, or more precisely
the shooting of the pig, alone could not have caused the conflict, and yet it is often cited as the
primary factor in the sudden escalation of the “war.” While there can be no doubt that the pig’s
death preceded an immediate military takeover of the island by American troops, it can never be
truly ascertained that the reason for the landing was this fatality, due to the existence of other
causing factors. What the pig offers is a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc.36
This is a logical
fallacy which bestows the power of cause to one event simply because it precedes another event.
Because the pig shooting immediately predates the occupation, it is labelled the cause. This
fallacy is a close cousin of concomitance which mistakes two coinciding events for one causing
the other.37
Yes, the pig was shot, then there was a private confrontation between Griffin and
Cutlar, and then Harney landed troops on the island in response to requests made by American
settlers to protect their interests. But this sequence of events does not make the pig the cause; it
simply makes it a link in a chain of events going back to the settlement of the Oregon Question in
1846.
32
Warren G. Magnuson, “One-shot War with England: It lasted for years and the outcome was decided by the
Kaiser. The total casualties: one dead pig.” American Heritage: The Magazine of History, Vol. XI, No. 3 (April
1960), 63. 33
E.C. Coleman, The Pig War: The Most Perfect War in History (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009),
200. 34
Although S.H. Rigby reminds us that conditions are not causes. For example, the condition of him being born
cannot be said to be a cause of him writing his article; S.H. Rigby, “Historical Causation: Is One Thing more
Important than Another?” History, Vol. 80, Issue 259 (June 1995), 234. 35
Allan Megill, Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to Practice (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2007), 7. 36
At the 2012 Qualicum History Conference, Ben Isitt suggested the pun that this was a case of “Post Hog! Ergo
propter Hog.” 37
Peter Charles Hoffer, The Historians’ Paradox: The Study of History in our Time (New York: New York
University Press, 2008), 72-73.
9
S.H. Rigby observed that answering any causation question often results in a laundry list of
causes.38
The island was already in dispute prior to the pig shooting and there were other
confrontations on the island, such as a sheep stealing incident, and a boundary commission, both
which paved the way for eventual settlement of the San Juan Question. Therefore, Rigby asserts
that the true historian will make a hierarchy of importance.39
Choosing the pig shooting as the
main cause is not incorrect in this sense; determining the most significant factor of an event is a
matter of interpretation. What it shows is that historians want to place an emphasis on this pig, for
reasons perhaps unknown even to themselves. Rosemary Neering comments this conflict could
have been called “the sheep war,” or the “customs inspector war,” after the sheep stealing
incident. Or she provocatively suggests that it could have been called the “you’re too damn
arrogant war.”40
Mike Vouri already proposed this line of thinking when he wrote an article
titled, “The San Juan Sheep War,” which focuses on the sheep incident.41
Nevertheless, the pig
retains center stage and embodies the message that it would have been “silly”42
if two great
nations went to war over the shooting of such a miserable animal.
The historiographical question of knowing an event in a particular way for particular reasons
will be considered in light of Alfred F. Young’s research on the naming of the “Boston Tea
Party.” Young observes that the dumping of tea in Boston Harbour was not referred to as the
“Boston Tea Party” until the 1830s. This prompts him to ask why, then, was it called in this
manner and so long after the incident? Young finds no reference to the term prior to 1835.43
Therefore, he attempts to locate the genesis of this term within a “twilight zone that lies between
living memory and written history… one of the favourite breeding places of mythology.”44
He
asserts, “the contest over names, I discovered, is part of a larger contest for the public memory of
38
Rigby, Historical Causation, 227. 39
Ibid., 227. 40
Rosemary Neering, The Pig War: The Last Canada-US Border Conflict (Victoria: Heritage House Publishing,
2011), 10. 41
Michael P. Vouri, "The San Juan Sheep War." Columbia Magazine, 14:4 (Winter
2000-2001). Digital Copy sent from author. 42
Warren Magnuson said: “Perhaps the best, if silliest, war this country ever fought was caused by the death of a
rooting pig;” Magnuson, One-shot War with England, 63; Joseph Howard called it, “the silliest war ever fought, a
war over a pig;” Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig, 21. 43
Alfred Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press,
1999), 156. 44
Ibid., 89.
10
the Revolution, a process I now think of as wilful forgetting and purposeful remembering of
American history.”45
Part of Young’s concern is over memory. How was the Boston Tea Party remembered? What
was the contest over this memory? Young finds that the private memory of one participant in the
Tea Party was appropriated by politicians for the purpose of promoting a public memory of the
event.46
Young asks what it meant to call it a “tea party” and not the “destruction of the tea.” He
suggests that the term may have existed in oral culture prior to the 1830s but all official language
referred to it as “the destruction of the tea.” He offers two explanations; one was a mocking of
British genteel customs with a gender and class reversal at play (working class men “making tea”
in the Boston Harbour, and having a tea party). The other lay in the political realm of American
Whig ideology and their attempts to disassociate themselves from the mob aspects of the
American Revolution; it was a playful way of making the revolutionary era seem “safe” and not
as violent as it was.47
The creation of the name occurred within the historical context of a political moment in
American history in which the public officials were fighting over the authoritative rights to the
country’s revolutionary history. Politicians attempted to tame its image in the public mind and
make it a positive political tool and a proud part of their heritage. Hence the name “Tea Party”
served to remove the historical event from its violent reality and place it in a mythical hierarchy
of great American deeds. For Young, the naming was an appropriation of the event by public
figures for political purposes. I view the naming of the Pig War in a similar light; the name
contains pejorative connotations towards international conflict and war. Postwar historians of the
Pig War generally view this narrative as a triumph of peace over irrational war. Young concludes
that names are “value-laden.”48
I find the “value-laden” aspect of the Pig War moniker to be this
theme of peace.
45
Young, The Shoemaker, xvii. 46
Ibid., 88-89. 47
Ibid., 163. 48
Ibid., xvi; Tina Loo also sees words in this context. She says, “words do not simply describe things; they are value-
laden. So when we use words we are both describing the world and making certain implicit judgements about it;”
Loo, Tina. Making Law, Order, and Authority in British Columbia, 1821-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1994), 6.
11
One scholar who offers a cogent analytical framework with which to examine the re-framing
of the San Juan Island Dispute into the Pig War is Hayden White. His (in)famous theory on
troping and modes of emplotment shows how stories are crafted with specific purpose, perhaps
not always consciously, with a tacit understanding of what the narrative is supposed to mean.
Alan Munslow says “White places his emphasis in the writing of history upon discursive
practices and determining tropes, offering a formal model which… allows historians to relate the
structures of narrative representation to the nature of historical change.”49
White offers four main
tropes which are defined by their “particular and, therefore, explanatory function.” Metaphor is
representational; metonymy is reductionist; synecdoche is integrative; and irony negational.50
I
argue that the Pig War story of the post-war era represents a story of peace through irony: a pig
was the only casualty in a war never fought.
White argues that historians do not objectively report the past but deploy language to define
concepts used. Munslow explains “troping means using metaphors to imply meaning and explain
events by altering our perceptions, forcing us to look again at objects and concepts from the
perspective of something different- signification and resignification.”51
It is this ability to express
ideas through signification that concerns me most. I examine the language and how the term “Pig
War” is employed to convey a specific message. Daniel Chandler asserts that “identifying
figurative tropes in texts and practices can help to highlight underlying thematic frameworks;
semiotic textual analysis sometimes involves the identification of an ‘overarching (or ‘root’)
metaphor’ or ‘dominant trope.’”52
Along with White’s theory of representation, I use semiotics,
the study of signs and language, to further aid my deconstruction of the term and the implications
it has on how the Pig War narrative is represented.
I take a semiotic approach because, as Callum Brown attests, “at the very root of all
knowledge, all learning, all academic subjects, all education, is language. Words are our very
49
Alan Munslow, Deconstructing History (New York: Routledge, 2006), 151. <accessed 02/08/12>
http://lib.myilibrary.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/Open.aspx?id=47836. 50
Metaphor is often used as an umbrella term for the other figures of speech; Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The
Basics. 2nd
Edition (New York: Routledge, 2007), 126. 51
Munslow, Deconstructing History. 52
Chandler, Semiotics, 126.
12
trade.”53
Words can be conceptualised as signs. A sign is anything that represents something
else54
and “sign analysis is a basic method of historical analysis.”55
Umberto Eco states that
“there is a sign every time a human group decides to use and to recognize something as a vehicle
of something else.”56
For example, “the woman, the moment she becomes ‘wife’, is no longer
merely a physical body: she is a sign which connotes a system of social obligations.”57
According
to Brown, “signs lumped together make a discourse.”58
It is through discourse that knowledge is
created and disseminated. Chandler argues, “we learn from semiotics that we live in a world of
signs and we have no way of understanding anything except through signs and the codes into
which they are organized.”59
Sign theory is a way to deconstruct the meaning intended behind the
use of certain language. I rely heavily on the work of Brown and Chandler as their books provide
a comprehensive overview of semiotic approaches designed for beginners to understand. I mainly
utilise the contributions of four major semioticians. These men are Ferdinand Saussure (1857-
1913), Charles Peirce (1839-1914), Roland Barthes (1915-1980) and Umberto Eco (b. 1930). The
work of these four men is foundational to semiotic theory.
Saussure is considered the father of modern semiology. According to Brown, until Saussure,
the study of language was just a history of languages, not a theory of them. Saussure’s biggest
contribution to semiotics is the observation that signs and ideas come into existence through the
interaction of language and speech, or in Saussurean terms, “langue” and “parole.”60
Every sign
has two parts- a signified and a signifier. The signified is the langue, the mental conception, of
the object; while the signifier is the parole, the sound or drawing, of the object. The signified is
53
Callum G. Brown, Postmodernism for Historians (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), 37. 54
Umberto Eco says that “semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything
which can be taken as significantly substituting something else. This something else does not necessarily have to
exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the
discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely
it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used ‘to tell’ at all. I think that the definition of a ‘theory of the
lie’ should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics;” Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 7. 55
Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, 47. 56
Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 17. 57
Ibid., 26. 58
Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, 59. 59
Chandler, Semiotics, 11. 60
Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, 34.
13
not the object itself, but “the pre-existing (or learned) mental conception of the object.”61
Early
scholars, like Saussure, placed the signified before the signifier, but new theories suggest the
opposite. After the rise of poststructuralism, most semioticians now argue that “written formats,
like prehistoric drawings on cave walls, precede the verbal, putting the signifier before the
signified.”62
For the Pig War story this distinction confirms that the term was created before it
came to represent the larger theme it does today.
Pierce was the founder of the American semiotic tradition. His “formal doctrine of signs” is
closely related to logic.63
Pierce designed a model of the sign which further develops how signs
operate at the level of communication. His model recognizes three working parts in a sign: 1.
“The representamen: the form which the sign takes (not necessarily material, though usually
interpreted as such)- called by some theorists the ‘sign vehicle;’” 2. “An interpretant: not an
interpreter but rather the sense made of the sign;” And 3. “An object: something beyond the sign
to which it refers (a referent).”64
The important part of the “Pig War” sign is the interpretant. The
sense that is made of the sign, that the Pig War was not actually a war, is shared by the authors
and readers of Pig War histories; without this understanding, the term “Pig War” would not make
sense.
Chandler points out that “thinking and communication depend on discourse rather than
isolated signs.” Saussure and Pierce were concerned with identifying language systems and
ignored the impact of discourse. For this reason some theorists have abandoned their frameworks
to focus on discourse and others have sought to “reformulate a more socially orientated
semiotics.”65
This occurred as part of the rise of poststructuralism. Whereas structuralists, such as
Claude Levis-Strauss, saw signs in terms of strict binaries with naturalized meaning,
poststructuralists challenged these structures as essentialism.66
Poststructuralists see signs and
their interpretants as social constructions, designed by both the creator and consumer of a sign.
According to Brown, poststructuralism is related to postmodernism, in the sense that it believes
61
Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, 35. 62
Ibid., 40. 63
Chandler, Semiotics, 70. 64
Ibid., 29. 65
Ibid., 109. 66
Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, 79.
14
history cannot be neutrally observed and reconstructed, but it also has its own theoretical
existence, which allows scholars to use the aspects of postmodernism they agree with but not
accept it in its totality.67
As Chandler explains, “while we need not accept the postmodernist
stance that there is no external reality beyond sign-systems, studying semiotics can assist us to
become more aware of the mediating role of signs and of the roles played by ourselves and others
in constructing social realities.”68
The work of Barthes and Eco exemplify this approach.
Barthes’ contribution to the field came largely after he made the switch from a structuralist to
a poststructuralist approach. Inspired by the work of Louis Hjelmslev and Levi-Strauss, Barthes’
main concerns were over connotation and myths. Barthes noted that Saussure’s model of the sign
focused on the denotation of its meaning at the expense of connotation. He argues the first order
of signification is denotation; connotation is the second order and derives from the denotative
sign; there can be multiple connotations to one denotative sign; and a signified can become a
signifier on the connotative level.69
For the Pig War, it is important to note that “tropes such as
metaphor generate connotations.”70
It is these connotations that create the meaning of a sign.
Chandler explains that connotation “is used to refer to the socio-cultural and ‘personal’
associations (ideological, emotional, etc.) of the sign. These are typically related to the
interpreter’s class, age, gender, ethnicity and so on. Connotation is thus context dependant.”71
The context for the Pig War story is that it was written by historians who were witnesses to
violent twentieth century conflicts. The connotations derived in the term “Pig War” are negative
thoughts about modern warfare and reflect the ideological standpoint of the authors for a specific
audience. This connotative function of the sign is to “construct” an addressee or “ideal reader.”72
The ideal reader is one who understands the interpretant of the sign as a message of peace,
despite the word “war.”
A related source of meaning to connotation is myth. Chandler asserts: “like metaphors,
cultural myths help us to make sense of our experiences within a culture: they express and serve
67
Brown, Postmodernism for Historians, 75. 68
Chandler, Semiotics, 11. 69
Ibid., 140. 70
Ibid., 140. 71
Chandler, Semiotics, 138. 72
Ibid., 194.
15
to organize shared ways of conceptualizing something within a culture.” For Barthes, “myth, like
connotation, can be seen as a higher order of signification… the mythological or ideological
order of signification can be seen as reflecting major (culturally variable) concepts underpinning
particular worldviews.”73
The worldview understood by the interpretant of the Pig War lies in the
story’s relation to the Postwar Dream. We live in a violent world that is long overdue for an era
of peace, and the Pig War expresses a desire for this Postwar Dream. Chapter three will show
how the writing of Pig War histories uses the term with this particular interpretant in mind.
Finally, Umberto Eco is concerned with “signs as social forces.”74
He views the meaning of a
term as a cultural unit. Eco says, “in every culture ‘a unit… is simply anything that is culturally
defined and distinguished as an entity. It may be a person, place, thing, feeling, state of affairs,
sense of foreboding, fantasy, hallucination, hope or idea.”75
Eco offers a semantic system as a
framework for semiotic method. His system declares:
(a) meanings are cultural units; (b) these units can be isolated thanks to the chain of their
interpretants as revealed in a given culture; (c) the study of the signs in a culture enables us to define
the value of the interpretants by viewing them in a system of positions and oppositions; (d) the
postulation of these systems makes it possible to explain how meaning comes into existence.76
In much simpler terms, for the Pig War story, there is a cultural value in place when the narrative
is told, which makes sense only when the opposite position is also considered. This method of
deconstruction is the recognition of absent signifiers, which are signifiers not included in the text,
term or code which “nevertheless influence the meaning of a signifier actually used.”77
As Mike
Vouri observes, “this is a story of peace,” not war.78
It is because there were such horrific wars
throughout the first half of the twentieth century that a story of peace became so idealized. This
message evolved along with the development of the term.
73
Chandler, Semiotics, 143, 145. 74
Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 65. 75
Ibid., 67. 76
Ibid., 83. 77
Chandler, Semiotics, 243. 78
Vouri, The Pig War, Acknowledgements.
16
The last important semiotic principle that guides this thesis is that signs “do not just exist; they
also grow.”79
Unlike the Saussurean model, which takes a synchronic view on language systems,
I believe, like many modern semioticians, that historical factors influence the meaning of signs
and they change over time.80
A very astute example of this change is illustrated in this Chicago-
based trade magazine. Written in 1918 it says:
Pink or blue? Which is intended for boys and which for girls? This question comes from one of our
readers this month, and the discussion may be of interest to others. There has been a great diversity
of opinion on the subject, but the generally accepted rule is pink for the boy and blue for the girl. The
reason is that pink being a more decided and stronger color, is more suitable for a boy; while blue,
which is more delicate and dainty is prettier for the girl.81
Today the choice of colour for boys and girls is the reverse for a variety of reasons. This shows
that signs and meaning are not static. A diachronic approach to this topic appreciates that what
was meant when people first said, “Pig War” may not have held the same meaning and/or
significance as it does today. Part of this project is to show how, over time, the theme of peace
became the meaning behind the term. This was a historical process.
To show the historical development of the peace theme, the historical profession of British
Columbia and the Pacific Northwest will be analyzed, with particular attention to the scholars
that contributed to the Pacific Northwest Quarterly over the last century. I will also draw upon
theories developed by scholars of empire such as Mary Louise Pratt. The purpose is to put a
spotlight on the European settler culture within this region and to display the Euro- North
American inscription of the past which has often been employed to give a sense of belonging to
the land. This approach is, in part, a response to Barthes’ style of discourse analysis which
attempts to evaluate “cultural assumptions” as problematic. Chandler asserts that “Barthes is a
hard act to follow, but those who do try to analyse their own cultures in this way must also seek
to be explicitly reflexive about their ‘own’ values.”82
As scholarship has arguably entered its
79
John Deely, Basics of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 23. 80
Chandler, Semiotics, 141. 81
Ibid., 156. 82
Ibid., 145.
17
“postcolonial” moment, it is important to take stock of what it means to live in a settler society.
Chapter four will investigate the relationship between the “Pig War” story, with its theme of
peace, and the history of Pacific Northwest settlement by Europeans.
Postcolonialism is a term with no universal meaning and therefore needs to be defined. For
some reason, since imperial ties between Great Britain and the United States were severed over
two hundred years ago, the postcolonial lens is not often applied to American scholarship and
history.83
Therefore, the question of a relationship between postcolonialism and the Pig War story
will be discussed in the Canadian context. Some scholars argue that postcolonialism is a method,
while others argue it is a condition. I believe it can be both. But to say only this is to muddy the
water. Neil Bresner argues, “if the postcolonial is understood primarily as a methodology, as I
think it should be, then it must also be understood primarily as an approach to a condition: the
colonial condition. Herein, I think, lies part of the reason for the slippage between understandings
of postcolonialism.”84
The problem for Bresner is that to say Canada is postcolonial is to ignore
the multiculturalism of the country; it adheres to only one version of the past, one of the
teleological and nation-building variety.85
Laura Moss agrees that “within Canada, nationalism
relies on a unified notion of nation that is outdated and exclusionary.”86
In the case of Canada,
some scholars believe it is a postcolonial nation because it is no longer a colony but a nation
under its own power; others argue that Canada remains in a colonial framework in consideration
of the Canadian Government’s relationship with its indigenous population. Instead of viewing
83
Jenny Sharpe argues that, “an understanding of the ‘postcolonial condition’ as racial exclusion offers an
explanation for the past history of ‘internal colonies’ but not the present status of the United States as a neocolonial
power. Although the naming of America as ‘postcolonial’ is intended to displace the center/periphery binarism
belonging to colonial systems of meaning, its effect has been to reconstitute the margins in the metropolitan center.”
Sharpe believes that a different “periodization” is required to appreciate recent migration to the United States and its
new geopolitical role. And, with European presence in North America, some could argue that Native Americans are
still being colonized. (In my view this may be true for Canada as well.- Gord); Jenny Sharpe, “Is the United States
Postcolonial?: Transnationalism, Immigration, and Race.” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 4, No.
3 (Fall 1995), 182-185. 84
Neil Besner, “What Resides in the Question, ‘Is Canada Postcolonial?’” In Is Canada Postcolonial? Unsettling
Canadian Literature. Laura Moss eds. (Waterloo, On: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 43. 85
Ibid., 44. 86
Laura Moss, “Is Canada Postcolonial? Introducing the Question.” In Is Canada Postcolonial? Unsettling
Canadian Literature. Laura Moss eds. (Waterloo, On: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 10.
18
postcolonial as the “nation” that has supplanted the “colony,” scholars must grapple with the
significance of being a settler (invader) society.87
I agree with Diana Brydon that the “post” does not mean “the end of colonialism, but [refers]
to what was framed under colonialism and remains after official colonialism is abandoned and
colonialism begins to be recognized as a major component of modernity.”88
The term colonialism
may have died sooner than the practice; it has been argued that institutional discourse has had a
role in the ongoing colonialism in both “settled” nations of the West and third world countries
predominantly of the East.89
Therefore, it is important to make discourse a dialogue across
borders and difference. As Brydon asserts, postcolonialism should not be a “Eurocentric theory;”
instead, it should be “a hybrid and emergent discourse struggling with the legacies of
Eurocentrism.”90
87
Anna Johnstone and Alan Lawson, on the process of settler culture: “In the founding and growth of cultural
nationalism, then, we can see one vector of difference (the difference between colonizing subject and colonized
subject: settler-indigene) being replaced by another (the difference between colonizing subject and imperial center:
settler-imperium). We can see this, with the benefit of postcolonial hindsight/ analysis, as a strategic disavowal of the
colonizing act. In this process, ‘the nation’ is what replaces ‘the indigenous’ and in doing so conceals its
participation in colonization by nominating a new ‘colonized’ subject- the colonizer or settler-invader;” quoted in
Diana. Brydon, “Canada and Postcolonialism: Questions, Inventories, and Futures.” In Is Canada Postcolonial?
Unsettling Canadian Literature. Laura Moss eds. (Waterloo, On: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 57;
Bresner, What Resides in the Question, 44; Len Findlay, “Is Canada a Postcolonial Country?” In Is Canada
Postcolonial? Unsettling Canadian Literature. Laura Moss eds. (Waterloo, On: Wilfred Laurier University Press,
2003), 297. 88
Brydon, Canada and Postcolonialism, 56. 89
Edward Said’s work famously shows how knowledge of the third world has been historically inscribed by Western
intellectuals. He says, “the orientalist reality is both antihuman and persistent. Its scope, as much as its institutions
and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present;” Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978),
44; Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994); In response to the question, “Is
Canada Postcolonial?”, Bresner responds: “No. It is not only that. Canada is not simply postcolonial because the
formulation suggests that the story of Canada is only and simply a narrative about its evolution out of a colonial
status, begging the chorus of questions about that inference outlined above. Canada is not postcolonial because the
very idea of Canada implied in the question is too univocal, monolithic, monocentric, monocultural;” Bresner, What
Resides in the Question, 48; Judith Leggat observes that “[Thomas] King argues that post-colonialism is not
applicable to Native literature, and that the label itself reinscribes many of the ideas of colonialism.” [Lee] Maracle
sees post-colonialism as a luxury which her people cannot afford, since they continue to live under colonial
conditions, both in their material lives and in their artistic expressions;” Judith Leggat, Native Writing, Academic
Theory: Post-colonialism across the Cultural Divide.” In Is Canada Postcolonial? Unsettling Canadian Literature.
Laura Moss eds. (Waterloo, On: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2003), 112; Findlay asks, “Has decolonization,
necessarily viewed as a domestic as well as an international project, been anything more than an illusion, the
persistence of old dependencies within the aura and aspirations of political independence? What has the empire
writing back or striking back amounted to in practice? Why is Said’s orientalism currently being challenged so
vigorously by Cannadine’s ornamentalism?”; Findlay, Is Canada a Postcolonial Country?, 297. 90
Brydon, Canada and Postcolonialism, 57.
19
Part of the project of postcolonial scholarship is to evaluate the cultural significance of history
and historical writing. This thesis investigates the historical writing of the Pig War while keeping
in mind that this is a region of the world still in a colonial situation. As this story centers on an
international conflict between a European and a North American nation, it is easily forgotten that
at the same time this is a story of dispossession. As the British battled with Americans for
territory, Native Americans struggled to maintain control over the lands they lived on for
thousands of years. The histories of the San Juan Island Dispute are not stories of
multiculturalism or of native resistance to settlement.91
I do not believe that such a historical
perspective is impossible, but it is still a long way off. Someday, perhaps, there will be a history
of the indigenous perspective on the Pig War. But for now, the best contribution to this issue I
can make is to turn the spotlight on the Euro-American/Canadian inscription of the historical
record.
Before I proceed, I wish to address two glaring ironies within this thesis. First is the focus on
the pig. By displaying how this Berkshire boar came to such prominence in the Pig War
narrative, I also place a great amount of significance on the pig. My attention to previous
historians’ focus on the pig elevates my focus on it to hyperbolic proportions. Second, by
highlighting the didactic theme of peace, and suggesting that there are strong connections
between this theme and the constructed historical identity of British Columbia and the Pacific
Northwest, it may seem at times that I am critical of this message. I wish to stress that this is not
the case. I think the message of peace is incredibly important, especially in the twenty-first
century which has already seen much violence since the 9/11 tragedy. War and violence should
be seen as archaic activities, but I fear it will be a long time before such a day arrives. Hence, I
write a thesis about histories that espouse the virtue of peaceful negotiations for world leaders.
This thesis is as much about my own values as it is about the historians and scholars I interpret.
91
There are a few mentions of aboriginals in most histories, but these are usual nods to a small fishing station on the
island, or that the island was not inhabited, or that American settlers were being harassed by “Northern Indians.” An
overview of these topics can be found in the following texts; Milton, A History, 256. United States Government. The
Northwest Boundary,133, 135-136, 149; Richardson, Pig War Islands, 43-44; Vouri, The Pig War, 34.
20
Chapter 1
“Some War, Some Pig:”92
The San Juan Island Dispute, 1853-1872.
Historians have not always agreed on what exactly constitutes the “Pig War.” Some think it
encompasses the entire San Juan Island Dispute, while others argue it refers more specifically to
the “affair of the pig” itself and the following military stand-off.93
Some end the Pig War with
the removal of the large American force and British Royal Navy, while still others see the
subsequent twelve-year military occupation as a part of the Pig War story.94
But all historians
agree that there was one necessary condition for the whole debacle. This was the “peculiar
language” of the 1846 Oregon Treaty.95
This treaty, signed by the British and American governments on June 15, 1846, was designed
to settle, once and for all, the Oregon question and to create a permanent border between the two
nations on the 49th
parallel. The “peculiar language” referred to was scripted in the first article of
the treaty as follows:
From the point on the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing
treaties and conventions between the United States and Great Britain terminates, the line of boundary
between the territories of the United States and those of her Britannic Majesty shall be continued
westward along the said forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, to the middle of the channel which
separates the continent from Vancouver’s Island, and thence southerly through the middle of the said
channel, and of Fuca’s Straits, to the Pacific ocean: Provided, however, That the navigation of the
whole of the said channel and straits, south of the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, remain free
and open to both parties.96
92
Vouri, The Pig War, 211; David Hunter Miller, San Juan Archipelago: Study of the Joint Occupation of San Juan
Island (Bellows Falls, Vermont: Wyndham Press, 1943), 52.
94
Vouri, The Pig War; Coleman, The Pig War; Neering, The Pig War. 95
Prevost to Campbell. Nov. 9, 1857. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary. 17. 96
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, cover page.
21
What the authors of this treaty neglected to take into account was that there was a cluster of
islands in the middle of “Fuca’s Straits” which made passage through the middle of the strait
virtually impossible. The water boundary would have to be made along the Haro Channel or the
Rosario Channel. If the boundary was chosen along the Haro, San Juan Island would belong to
the Americans; if the Rosario was chosen, the island would belong to the British. Neither side
could agree which channel was intended by the treaty.
Why there was such an oversight in this important treaty is not quite clear.97
British officials at
the time lamented, “it is much to be regretted that there was not annexed to the Treaty of 1846
any map or chart by which the true meaning of the expressions made use of in Article I of that
Treaty could have been authoritatively ascertained.”98
Historian John Long offers three
explanations: “the incompleteness or the inaccuracy of existing maps, a general failure to agree
upon the nomenclature of the Pacific Northwest, and, in many instances, the failure of negotiators
to employ such maps [that] existed [which referred] to the course of the boundary.”99
James
McCabe suggests that it may have been an issue of hastiness or laziness. He explains, “the
Americans neglected to insist that Haro Strait should be specified in the Oregon treaty, and the
British based their claim on incomplete information.”100
This vague article of the treaty became
the underlying condition of the disagreement over ownership of San Juan, which would continue
for the next twenty-five years.
The years between the signing of the treaty and the resolution of the San Juan Island Dispute
were uneasy ones in the relationship between American and British settlers in the Pacific
Northwest. As George Herring asserts, “the Oregon crisis brought out old suspicions and hatreds,
97
Interestingly, this is not the only significant cartographic error in 19th
century American boundary negotiations. In
1848, the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe, forming the border between the United States and Mexico, created a
subsequent boundary dispute. The confusion was based on the use of an 1847 map which placed El Paso half a
degree too far south and the Rio Grande two degrees too far west, placing the valuable Mesilla Valley and the Santa
Rita de Cobre mines in Mexican territory, which was unsatisfactory to American authorities. The dispute was settled
by the 1853 Gadsden Purchase. Richard Griswold del Castillo, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of
Conflict (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 55-61. 98
British Government, Correspondence Relative to the Occupation of the Island of San Juan by United States’
Troops. August to October, 1859 (London: The Foreign Office, 1859), 1. 99
Long, The San Juan Island Boundary Controversy, 65-66. 100
James O. McCabe, The San Juan Water Boundary Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 4.
22
nearly provoking an unnecessarily and costly war.”101
Although war was averted, the mistrust
between the two nations continued and frequent filibustering operations by Americans raised
alarm in British North America. On Vancouver Island, it was feared that Americans would
overrun the British colony. Governor James Douglas wrote to his superior in London that the
Wakefield system of colonization, which he was instructed to employ, could not hold up against
the American system of colonization, with their free land grants “prodigiously” strengthening the
American’s influence “in this part of the world.” He feared that Americans would soon seize the
British property under his care.102
For their part, Americans viewed conquest of the West as their “Manifest Destiny” and
politicians, spurred on by the Young America movement, pushed to revive the Monroe Doctrine
and assert claims to all of North America to the exclusion of every European power.103
Great
Britain represented a major obstacle to American progress. Sam Haynes comments, “allowing
their imaginations free reign, Anglophobes espied an evil empire of Mephistophelean
dimensions, convinced that Whitehall was secretly marshalling the full resources of British power
in a vast, insidious campaign against them.”104
He notes, at this time, “talk of a third war with
Great Britain” was prevalent.105
Yet, neither nation desired war. Great Britain was involved in
multiple global conflicts, most notably the Crimean and Opium Wars. And the United States,
already finished with one major war for territory with Mexico, suffered from internal political
strife which exacerbated regional tensions resulting in a civil war. A war in the Pacific Northwest
would have been an added strain to both governments.
For Americans in the region, “anglophobia and respect for Britain coexisted uneasily during
the antebellum years.”106
And for the British, fears of annexation and filibustering grew, as a
visible American presence around the colony of Victoria increased. Warren Magnuson, co-
101
George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 189. 102
Douglas to Newcastle. May 17, 1854. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial Despatches of
Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 103
Yonatan Eyal, The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828-1861
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 119. 104
Sam W. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2010), 8-9. 105
Ibid., 240. 106
Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 184.
23
creator of the bill for the San Juan Island National Park, commented, “it is difficult to exaggerate
the tensions that time and again brought British-American relations to the boiling point in the half
century following the War of 1812, or the skill and patience of responsible officials who
managed to control the militant popular sentiments on both sides of the Canadian border.”107
In 1850, James Douglas made his first attempt to secure San Juan and the rest of the islands as
British property by commissioning a small fishing station on the southern side of the island. But
according to Douglas, British occupation of San Juan was first initiated by “the Agents of the
Hudson’s Bay Company in the month of July 1845, and a notice to that effect, engraven on a
wooden tablet, was erected on an eminence near the South east point of the Island, a record which
is still in existence, but there was no real occupation of the Island, until [the] fishing Station was
established… and lastly their pastoral and agricultural establishment was commenced
by Mr Griffin in November 1853.”108
Douglas also authorized the construction of a sheep farm
under the management of Charles Griffin of The Puget Sound Agricultural Company, a Hudson’s
Bay Company subsidiary. On December 15, Griffin and a team of Kanaka sheepherders
commenced work on Bellevue Sheep Farm, with 1,350 sheep and other farm animals, including
some pigs.
At this time, Douglas also had his first confrontation with an American settler. Richard
Cussans’ timber operation on Lopez Island had caught the attention of the governor. The British
Foreign Office (FO) reported: “attempts seem to have been made by American citizens to occupy
the Arro Islands [sic].” The FO approved Douglas’s efforts to hold the islands as “a de facto
dependency of Vancouver’s Island, unoccupied by any white Settlement, either British or
American, excepting a fishing-station belonging to the Hudson’s Bay Company on the Island of
St. Juan [sic].”109
To execute these orders, Douglas issued a licence to Cussans on July 25,
forcing him to pay a duty of ten pence for every load of fifty cubic feet.110
Due to the high duty
imposed on his timber, Cussans abandoned his operation, costing him thousands of dollars in
wasted labour and logs, some 30,000 feet of it. Cussans reported this confrontation to U.S.
107
Magnuson, One-shot War with England, 63. 108
Douglas to Molesworth. December 13, 1855. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial
Despatches of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/12/12> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 109
British Government, Memorandum Respecting the Island of San Juan (London: The Foreign Office, 1859), 13. 110
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 88.
24
officials. In an affidavit on September 11, he swore, “I hereby certify that… I am an American
citizen; have located a tract of land on the island above referred to, believing it to be the property
of the United States; and that I have never given any security for the payment of any dues
whatever to the British government.”111
But despite his complaints, Douglas had temporarily
removed American presence from the islands.
Two years later, Americans returned to re-assert their claim. The American authorities, led by
customs collector Isaac Ebey, assessed the HBC farm $935 in back taxes for operations on the
island. As Griffin did not recognize American authority, he refused payment. In the middle of the
night, American Sheriff Ellis Barnes rowed ashore with some fellow Americans, stole several
sheep, and held a make-shift auction where he sold the sheep to his compatriots in order to make
up the taxes owed. Awoken by his Kanaka employees, Griffin rushed to the rowboats that were
clumsily being loaded with sheep. The Americans produced firearms to defend their flight and
succeeded in making off with 34 of the animals. Douglas described the sheep heist as an
“outrage.”112
He said: “this is an exceedingly annoying affair, and I most heartily regret that our
people though dispersed at their various occupations, and taken by surprise, did not shew [sic] a
more resolute bearing. The ‘Beaver’ was dispatched to their aid, and was within two hours of
catching the fellows in the act, and had she given chase, might have overtaken them and
recovered the abstracted property.”113
The FO reported: “we received from the Hudson’s Bay Company, and from the Colonial
Office, accounts of further aggressions on the part of the United States’ authorities upon the
Island of San Juan; and more particularly of the forcible seizure and carrying away from that
island of certain valuable stock sheep, in payment of taxes levied on behalf and in the name of the
United States of America.”114
The American government in turn received a bill from Griffin and
111
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 88. 112
Douglas to Grey. May 18, 1855. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial Despatches of
Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 113
Douglas to Secretary. April 19, 1855; in Shepard to Labouchere. Feb. 29, 1856. University of Victoria, Colonial
Despatches: The Colonial Despatches of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11>
http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 114
British Government, Memorandum, 13.
25
HBC for a sum of £2990 to compensate for the stolen sheep.115
The incident proved to both
governments that a resolution of the disagreement was necessary in order to avoid any future
collisions.
In 1857, a joint commission of British and American surveyors surveyed the islands to make a
decision as to whom the islands belonged. The British side was represented by Captain James
Prevost and the American side by Commissioner Archibald Campbell. The two men’s working
relationship was very strained and each stubbornly insisted on possession of San Juan. Campbell
related his difficulty to the Secretary of State: “being fully satisfied, from my own observations,
that the Canal de Haro is the main channel, and consequently ‘the channel’ intended by the treaty,
and being supported in this opinion by indisputable contemporaneous evidence of the highest
official character, I declined to accede to any compromise.”116
For Prevost, the wording of the treaty was his main concern. In his interpretation of these
words, the Haro Channel could not be the intended channel because it was not, in his opinion, the
most direct route to the mainland, whereas the Rosario was seen as a continuation of the Juan de
Fuca Strait.117
Campbell complained that Prevost had “a blind adherence to a tortured
interpretation of the meaning of the words of the treaty,” which appeared to Campbell as
Prevost’s “sacred act of duty.” Campbell continued, “this perverted reading of the treaty has been
his infallible guide throughout my connection with him. And he has so resolutely shut his eyes to
the light of the most authentic cotemporaneous evidence I have laid before him, not only of the
views of my government, but also of his own, that I sincerely believe, though one should rise
from the dead to confirm it, he would not give it credence.”118
For Campbell, the surveys of the
islands were more important than the “peculiar” language of the treaty.
The two men struggled to come to any compromise. Campbell accused Prevost of not having
the proper authority to settle the issue, while Prevost accused Campbell of being evasive in his
115
Lewis Cass, Letter from the Secretary of State, Transmitting A Report relative to the Occupation of the island of
San Juan, 1860 (36th
Congress, 1st Session), 9.
116 United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 11.
117 McCabe, The San Juan Water Boundary Question, 23.
118 United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 107.
26
responses and presence during negotiations.119
In fact, Prevost sometimes had trouble even
finding Campbell. On August 1, 1859, Prevost informed Douglas, “upon arrival there
[Semiahmoo Bay] I found that Mr. Campbell had been absent for about a fort-night, and I could
glean no information as to his probable position or movement.” He later reported, “Mr. Campbell
was then in the ‘Shubrick,’ professedly on a deer-shooting excursion.”120
While it appears that
Campbell had more on his mind than just a land survey, Prevost saw the graveness of the
situation in hyperbolic proportions. He wrote to Campbell:
I may remark that an act so unprecedented in the history of civilized and enlightened nations, and so
contrary to that natural courtesy which is due from one great nation to another, cannot be productive
of good, and may, in the end, entail such serious consequences that I am sure both you and I would
deplore to the last hour of our existence, any hesitation or neglect on our parts, to do all that lies in
our power to avert impending evil.121
He was disappointed in Campbell’s response:
I cannot recognize your pretensions to catechize me thereupon, and, therefore, I decline to return you
either a positive or negative answer to your queries… Notwithstanding the apparent air of
moderation with which you have clothed your words, there pervades your whole communication a
vein of assumption, and an attempt at intimidation, by exciting apprehension of evil, not well
calculated to produce the effect you profess so ardently to desire.122
119
Campbell said to Prevost: “the whole tenor of your correspondence… has led me, upon further reflection, to
apprehend that you were governed by instructions which virtually, if not positively, prohibited you from adopting the
Canal de Haro as the boundary channel, without reference to your own judgement thereupon. I will, therefore, be
obliged to you to inform me whether or not I am correct in this inference… I need hardly say that my instructions
left me entirely free to adopt that channel which should be found to correspond with the terms of the treaty and the
intention of the treaty makers.” Campbell to Prevost. Dec. 4, 1857. Prevost responded: “I beg to furnish you with an
extract from Her Majesty’s Commission, dated the 18th
December 1856, by which you will perceive that my powers
as Her Majesty’s First Commissioner for determining the aforesaid line of boundary are full and entire.” Prevost to
Campbell,. Dec. 8, 1857. In Milton, A History, 142-144; Prevost to the Admiralty, Aug. 6, 1859. British
Government, Correspondence, 47. 120
Prevost to Douglas. Aug. 1, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 32, 34. 121
Prevost is referring to the American military occupation of San Juan which occurred in the middle of this
correspondence: Prevost to Campbell, July 31, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 34. 122
Campbell to Prevost. Aug. 4, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 35.
27
Prevost notified the Admiralty that “Mr. Campbell’s replies were not only most unsatisfactory,
but they were little short of being insulting in their tone. He evaded the principal question at
issue, and he denied in angry and discourteous terms, any right on my part to catechize him on
the subject.”123
Campbell also told Prevost:
In my discharge of my official duties, it has ever been my desire and disposition to exhibit towards
you a spirit of courtesy and frankness. In my private relations, I have never been backward in
meeting your most cordial advances. But how far, outside of our legitimate official duties, you have a
right to expect me to reciprocate with you in a ‘friendly intercourse’ in my official capacity, as
Commissioner, is not for you alone to judge… It is hardly necessary for me to add that I am equally
desirous with yourself for the preservation of the peace and harmony which now subsist between the
United States and Great Britain, and which I trust most sincerely may long remain unbroken.124
Campbell also defended his actions to his government back home:
I came out here to do a fair and honest business- to carry out faithfully, on the part of my
government, a contract entered into with Great Britain. Although the language of the treaty is as clear
as day, and scarcely admits of more than one meaning, I did not plant myself upon its mere letter,
but, finding that the lapse of time, the changes of administration in our government, and selfish
interests on the part of the British government, instigated by the Hudson’s Bay Company, had
enveloped its meaning in an air of obscurity, I made diligent search for evidence which would throw
light upon the intention of the negotiators, framers, and ratifiers of the treaty, fully determined,
whatever might be the result of my investigations, to give due weight to it, without partiality, fear, or
favor.125
By 1859, Campbell and Prevost hit a stalemate in negotiations. Prevost offered a compromise
channel in the middle, which would have given the Americans the majority of the islands and San
Juan to the British. But Campbell rejected this. San Juan was the prize coveted by both sides, and
neither was willing to relinquish control of the island. As American gold miners, disappointed by
low gold yields on the Fraser River, began to settle the Puget Sound region, including San Juan
123
Prevost to the Admiralty. Aug. 6, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 47. 124
Campbell to Prevost. Aug. 8, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 116. 125
Campbell to Cass. Aug. 4, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 107.
28
Island, negotiations between Prevost and Campbell stalled; a confrontation between Griffin and
an American would soon intensify the dispute.
June 15, 1859, exactly thirteen years after the signing of the Oregon Treaty, was the “day of
the pig.”126
Lyman Cutlar,127
an American settler on the island, had built himself a small dwelling
accompanied by a potato patch, near Charles Griffin’s farm, on one of the company’s most
valuable sheep runs. Cutlar’s potato patch was targeted by Griffin’s grazing Berkshire boars. As
historian Edmond Meany quipped, “Cutler told Griffin to keep that pig out of his potato-patch.
Griffin told Cutler to keep the potatoes out of his pig.”128
The pig was not to be told what to do.
When Cutlar found that the pig had once again rooted his potatoes, he shot it near the treeline
beside his homestead. According to Cutlar, he then went to Griffin’s farm and offered to pay for
the destroyed animal. Griffin rejected this offer and instead demanded $100 for the pig, which
Cutlar found too steep and refused to pay. Cutlar later reported to American authorities that he
was subsequently informed, in “manner and language… both insulting and threatening,” that he
would be taken to jail in Victoria if payment was not made.129
HBC Director A.G. Dallas denied
these charges.130
Griffin was concerned that this pig shooting incident was only one of many conflicts he was
going to have with American “squatters,” as more of them settled on the island. He reported to
Douglas that “an outrage was committed here today.” He continued: “a man of the name of
Cutler, an American, who has very recently established himself on a prairie occupied by me and
close to my establishment, he has dug up about one third of an acre in which he planted potatoes
and partly very imperfectly enclosed, my cattle and pigs had free access to his patch, one of my
pigs, a very valuable Boar, he shot this morning some distance outside of this same patch and
126
Thompson, Erwin N. Historic Resource Study: San Juan Island National Historical Park (Denver: National Park
Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1972), i. 127
There is no consensus on the spelling of Cutlar’s last name. I will defer to the assertion of Pig War expert and San
Juan Island National Historic Park historical interpreter Mike Vouri that the spelling is with an “a” as in “Cutlar”
and not “Cutler.” 128
Edmond S. Meany, History of the State of Washington (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), 240. Oddly,
Alfred Tunem says, “Mr. Cutler told Griffin to keep his pig out of the patch, but Griffin merely told Cutler to keep
the potatoes out of the pig.” An almost verbatim quote of Meany with no citation. Tunem Alfred, “The Dispute over
the San Juan Island Water Boundary.” The Washington Historical Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (April 1932), 136. 129
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 184. 130
A.G. Dallas to Harney. May 10, 1860. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 260.
29
complains the animal was destroying his crop.” Griffin then described the confrontation he had
with Cutlar adding that Cutlar came with “threatening language to openly declare he would shoot
my cattle if they trespassed near his place.” Griffin feared that “such outrages unless checked in
the commencement will render my position here not only a dangerous one as far as I personally
am concerned but also the position of my Herdsmen.” Griffin informed his superiors that he
“distinctly” told Cutlar that the American “had not a shadow of a right to squat on the Island and
much less on the centre of the most valuable sheep run.” Cutlar replied that “he had received
assurances from American authorities in Washington Territory that he had a right, that it was
American soil and that he and all other Americans squatting or taking up claims would be
protected and their claims recognized as being established on American soil.”131
This attitude,
which exemplifies a strong belief in Manifest Destiny, is what caused Griffin to fear that his farm
land would soon be overrun by Americans.
Griffin’s fears proved accurate. General William S. Harney, in command of the Pacific troops
soon became aware of activities on San Juan and used them to assert American military control
of the island. News of the threat issued by Griffin and Dallas to Cutlar reached Harney; he
informed his superiors, “I had ordered the company from Fort Bellingham to San Juan Island to
protect the American citizens residing on that island from the insults and indignities which the
British authorities of Vancouver’s Island did not hesitate to offer them on every occasion.”132
Observing the American military movements, Griffin reported to his superiors. In the evening
of Tuesday, July 26, 1859, Griffin “received intelligence of the arrival of a steamer in Griffin
Bay.” The next morning he went to investigate and found “the United States’ steamer
‘Massachusetts’ had also arrived, with a party of soldiers on board.” Griffin went down to the
wharf and met with the Commander of the “Jefferson Davis” who informed him that “the United
States’ Government was landing these forces to build a military station on the island.”133
A few days later, Captain James Hornby wrote: “this morning, I perceive the Americans have
formed a camp about 200 yards from the beach, in which they have two howitzers; the ground
rises considerably behind the camp, and on either side, at a distance of about 300 yards, it is
131
BC Archives, Old MS K/RS/Sa5, San Juan Island Correspondence, etc., 1959, Volume 1 of 5. 132
Harney to Adjutant General. Aug. 7, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 150. 133
Memorandum by Charles Griffin. July 28, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 57.
30
flanked by woods… I am assured that the force at the disposal of the American Captain consists
of 50 soldiers, with the two howitzers above mentioned, and about the same number of armed
civilians; and if they take to the bush, the Magistrate does not see how they could be arrested, at
the same time that they might be expected to commit serious depredations on the cattle of the
Hudson’s Bay Company.”134
British authorities saw that the Americans were digging in to take
possession of the island.
Harney ordered Captain George Pickett to occupy the island. On July 27, Pickett issued Order
No. 1:
1. In compliance with orders and instructions from the General commanding, a military post will be
established on this island, on whatever site the commanding officer may select.
2. All the inhabitants of the island are requested to report at once to the commanding officer in case
of any incursions of the Northern Indians so that he may take such steps as he may deem necessary
to prevent any future occurrence of the same.
3. This being United States’ territory, no laws other than those of the United States, nor Courts,
except such as are held by virtue of said laws, will be recognized or allowed on this island.
By order of Captain Pickett135
This movement was met with outrage in Victoria. Calls for a response in kind were made.
However, Douglas was instructed by the Colonial Office “not to land troops in the island, or to
take any further steps without instructions from this Department or from Lord Lyons, unless the
Americans should endeavour to remove by force the British Magistrate from the island, or unless
such steps should be required for the protection of the lives and property of British subjects.”136
The principal officers at Vancouver Island and British Columbia met on August 1 to discuss their
options. They determined “it appears probable that, if a collision take place at San Juan,
insurrectionary and filibustering movements will ensue both in Vancouver’s Island and British
Columbia, the great majority of the inhabitants being either citizens of the United States or
imbued with their feelings.” Therefore the committee concluded, “it is in our opinion impossible
134
Hornby to Captain De Courcy. July 30, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 59. 135
British Government, Correspondence, 13. 136
Newcastle to Douglas. Sept. 29, 1859. British Government. Correspondence, 44.
31
to raise any local militia which could be depended upon, without exciting a number of foreigners,
most of whom are extremely well-affected in time of peace, but, under the pressure of
filibustering expeditions, would be compelled to declare on their side… We consider it under
these circumstances more prudent to abstain from everything that can excite a collision at
present.”137
Combating filibustering had become a recurrent activity for the Royal Navy in the
1850s. In the spring of 1857, the British aided Cornelius Vanderbilt in defeating William
Walker’s conquest of Nicaragua.138
Frequent confrontations between American filibusters and the
Royal Navy in Central and South America made the naval officials in Victoria nervous about
exciting a large American population in Victoria at the time. No troops were sent.
Instead, the Royal Navy deployed warships stationed at Esquimalt to keep a close eye on
American activities. On August 2, the Plumper was sent to Griffin Bay with 46 marines and 15
Royal Engineers.139
In total, over the following two months, five ships were emplaced, hosting
artillery of 167 guns and personnel of 1,940 sailors.140
The ships were positioned in the bay to
watch the American camp with their broadside guns targeted, thus threatening the hold Pickett
had over the island. Captain Granville Haller lamented: “we had violated the military maxim:
‘Never do what the enemy would like you to do!’ for we had concentrated in a place where the
enemy could keep us as completely as if we had been corked up in a bottle- a la General Butler
on the James River.” In Haller’s view, the Americans were trapped on the island and “the English
were masters of the situation… They knew it.” This was “a threat far more humiliating than if
they had landed, because neither Pickett nor Casey had means to force the Tribune to withdraw
from their American harbor, nor from its insulting menace.”141
An American soldier noted the same mismatch in his journal: “files of the New York Herald
gives anything but a correct view of the situation here. It represents the forces, land and naval, of
137
British Government, Correspondence, 69. 138
Robert E. May. Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2002 139
Vouri, The Pig War, 117. 140
These ships were; The Flag-ship Ganges (840 guns, 84 men), the Tribune (31 guns, 325 men), the Pylades (21
guns, 325 men), the Satellite (21 guns, 325 men), and the Plumper (10 guns, 125 men); United States Government,
The Northwest Boundary. 167. 141
Haller, Granville O. San Juan and Secession: Possible Relation to the War of the Rebellion- Did General Harney
Try to Make Trouble with English to Aid the Conspiracy?- A Careful Review of his orders and the Circumstances
Attending the Disputed Possessions During the Year 1859 (Tacoma: The Tacoma Sunday Ledger, 1896), 13.
32
each side about equal, whereas the British have at the very least four times as much as much in
either land or sea force as ourselves, and in case of an encounter, will whip us like the devil, and
we shall have the pleasure of being told we did not fight when we get home. Indeed, if we should
be so fortunate as to get there at all.”142
The situation looked grim and a military confrontation
appeared likely.
To avoid bloodshed, Douglas made an appeal to Harney. He wrote: “I must call upon you, sir,
if not as a matter of right, at least as a matter of justice and of humanity, to withdraw the troops
now quartered upon the island of San Juan, for those troops are not required for the protection of
American citizens against British authorities, and the continuance of those troops upon an island
the sovereignty of which is in dispute, not only is a marked discourtesy to a friendly government,
but complicates to an undue degree the settlement in an amicable manner of the question of
sovereignty, and is also calculated to provoke a collision between the military forces of two
friendly nations in a distant part of the world.”143
Although war was likely not Harney’s primary
objective, he was too immersed in his role as protector of American interests to withdraw any
troops. Later commentators, such as Haller, would speculate that Harney desired a war with the
British for political reasons.144
When General Winfield Scott arrived, he commented, “if [the
dispute] does not lead to a collision of arms, it will again be due to the forbearance of the British
authorities; for I found both Brigadier General Harney and Captain Pickett proud of their
conquest of the island, and quite jealous of any interference therewith on the part of higher
authority.”145
Harney and Pickett had brought Manifest Destiny to this tiny island without
permission from their government.
142
Coulter, The Pig War, And Other Experiences of William Peck, 132. 143
Douglas to Harney. Aug. 13, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 172. 144
Haller believed that Harney and Pickett, as Southerners, attempted to drag the U.S. into a war with England so
that the South could succeed in their aspirations of independence. Haller, San Juan and Secession, 5. Another
American officer on the island during the dispute, Captain Lewis Hunt, believed that it was a conspiratorial plot to
give the Americans a common enemy. He said in a letter, “I am confident that this whole imbroglio is a disgraceful
plot involving General Harney, a dull animal, Mr. Commissioner Campbell, a weak, wordy sort of man; Captain
Pickett, to some extent, whose main fault perhaps has been bad judgment in allowing himself to be used as a tool by
the main conspirators.” Keith Murray, “Pig War Letters: A Romantic Lieutenant’s Account of the San Juan Crisis.”
Columbia: The Magazine of Northwest History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1987), 11, 17; Vouri cautions that there is no
proof that a conspiracy ever existed. Vouri, The Pig War, 84. 145
Scott to the Secretary of War. May 14, 1860. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 213.
33
In Victoria, citizens wondered why the British claim to San Juan was not asserted with more
urgency. They saw the American military movement as a direct threat to their sovereignty as a
British colony. The British Colonist reported: “every new feature in the movements of the forces
of the United States, in relation to the occupation of San Juan, indicates a disposition to fortify,
colonize, and render it as much a part and parcel of the United States, as San Francisco.”146
And
then a few days later: “we must defend ourselves for the position we occupy to-day, would make
the iron monument of Wellington weep, and the stony statue of Nelson bend his brow.”147
British
Colonist editor, Amor De Cosmos, claimed “our forces should have been landed.”148
This was a
suggestion that did not seem unreasonable to Douglas, but his superiors and his council all
warned him against such action. As Captain Michael De Courcey explained, “in consequence of
the territorial right of the Island of San Juan being still in dispute between the two nations, I
considered it highly essential to do everything possible to prevent a collision with the United
States’ forces, and not disturb the amicable relations existing between the two countries, more
particularly at the present time when it was not improbable that Great Britain might be involved
in the war raging in Europe.”149
Since it was still not in the British interest to wage an overseas
war with the Americans, British officials sought peaceful solutions. The Foreign Office was
greatly relieved when they heard General Harney was to be replaced by General Scott in order for
more amicable negotiations to proceed.150
Scott’s solution, eventually accepted by Victoria’s officials, was to set up a joint military
occupation. He said: “without prejudice to the claim of either nation to the sovereignty of the
entire Island of San Juan now in dispute, it is proposed that each shall occupy a separate portion
of the same by a detachment of Infantry, Riflemen, or Marines, not exceeding 100 men, with
their appropriate arms only, for the equal protection of their respective countrymen in their
146
The British Colonist. August 15, 1859. University of Victoria, The British Colonist: Online Edition, 1858-1910.
<Accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 147
The British Colonist, “Reply to Governor’s Message about San Juan,” August 17, 1859. University of Victoria,
The British Colonist: Online Edition, 1858-1910. <Accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 148
The British Colonist, “Why Were Not Troops Landed at San Juan!” August 17, 1859. University of Victoria, The
British Colonist: Online Edition, 1858-1910. <Accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 149
British Government, Correspondence, 54-55. 150
Russell to Prevost. Oct. 5, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 52.
34
person and property, and to repel any descent on the part of hostile Indians.”151
Appropriate arms
meant that there would be no “employment of cannon.”152
Thus, a joint military occupation of the
island by both nations commenced.
During this occupation of San Juan, General Scott reported “everything tranquil in these
islands.”153
However, the political tensions on Vancouver Island and Washington Territory
heightened as both sides viewed the dispute as a sign that their respective governments were not
doing enough to protect their rights. Editorials in the press showed an intense dislike for each
other. The British Colonist suggested a bribe to Americans would have been better than allowing
them to set foot on the island. De Cosmos said: “common sense and dollars should have been
sent. The dollar, the Americans worship. If dollars had been used, a different interpretation of the
treaty might have been made.”154
From Washington Territory, the Pioneer and Democrat
claimed, “we firmly believe that no Representative of British authority should be permitted for a
moment upon that soil, if his presence there was to indicate British dominion. We believe the
floating of British colours as a token of British occupancy over the Island of San Juan offensive,
invasive, and unjustifiable.”155
The editor of this paper clearly saw the San Juan Island Dispute as
a continuation of the epic battle between America’s Manifest Destiny and the antagonisms of
John Bull. The previous day, the paper stated, “it remains to be seen if the Government of these
United States are of the same complexion, or if we are the legitimate sons of the men of ’76 and
’12 ‘who knew their rights, and knowing dared maintain them.’”156
The New York Herald agreed:
The aggressive spirit of the British Government, always encroaching where it can find a pretext,
must be resisted, and now is the opportune time to do so effectively… but the fact is, that they
neither know nor care what the lawful boundary is; if they can acquire an additional piece of territory
by bamboozling or bullying us, that is all they care. She must be watched and checked, or she will
filch her neighbour’s territory upon some pretext or other. Hence the necessity of meeting her claims
151
Scott to Douglas. Oct. 25, 1859. British Government, Part II. Correspondence Relative to the Occupation of the
Island of San Juan by United States’ Troops. October 1859 to July 1860 (London: The Foreign Office, 1860), 35. 152
Hammond to Secretary of the Admiralty. Dec. 22, 1859. British Government, Part II. Correspondence, 29. 153
Scott to Floyd. Oct. 27, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 190. 154
The British Colonist, “Reply to Governor’s Message about San Juan,” August 17, 1859. University of Victoria,
The British Colonist: Online Edition, 1858-1910. <Accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 155
The Pioneer and Democrat. Aug. 13, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 86. 156
The Pioneer and Democrat. Aug. 12, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 95.
35
to the Haro Islands boldly, and upholding our right to every inch of ground on the north-western
frontier to which the Treaty stipulation entitle us. There must be no compromising or yielding,
though we should be compelled to bring the controversy to a bitter end.157
Both British and American press were sure of their right to the island and urged decisive action.
The public’s militancy was acknowledged by both political entities. Lord Russell issued a
memorandum to the Foreign Office which stated, “Sir E.B. Lytton considered the possession of
that island so indispensable to the safety of British Columbia, and, if surrendered to the
Americans, so certain to result in feuds, and even war, that he regarded it of the highest
importance that the claim of the British Government to the island should be firmly adhered to.”158
Marshall Moore, Governor of Washington Territory, argued, “having already conceded from the
line of 54-40 to that of the 49, for the sake of peace, neither the honor nor the interests of the
United States will admit of further surrender of right.”159
Senator Jacob Howard agreed: “we
must reckon with her hilt to hilt; we must then mark down the future boundaries of this country
with the point of a sword.”160
Victorians saw the concessions the other way. They argued that Britain had already given up
British interests below the 49th
parallel by agreeing to the Oregon Treaty and further concessions
would be an insult to British interests in the area. They insisted, “the Island of San Juan is of no
importance to the United States, except in an aggressive point of view in case of a rupture
between the two nations, which God forbid should ever happen; but in case of such a calamity the
possession of it would be of the most vital importance to us, for without it, communication with
British Columbia could be cut off, the prosperity of Vancouver Island completely destroyed, and
the magnificent project for connecting it with the British North American Provinces
frustrated.”161
Although immediate action was requested by settlers in the area, the San Juan
157
The New York Herald. Sept. 29, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 97. 158
British Government, Memorandum, 22. 159
Marshall F. Moore, Memorial of the Governor of Washington Territory and other Citizens of said Territory. 40th
Congress, 3rd
Session. <accessed 02/19/12> http://ia600404.us.archive.org/10/items/cihm_16426/cihm_16426.pdf. 160
Howard, Jacob M. Speech delivered in Executive Session of the Senate, April 16, 1869. <accessed 02/19/12>
http://ia600404.us.archive.org/0/items/cihm_15254/cihm_15254.pdf. 161
The British Colonist, “Memorial of the Inhabitants of Vancouver Island. Sept. 5, 1859. University of Victoria,
The British Colonist: Online Edition, 1858-1910. <Accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/.
36
water boundary question was not pressing enough in London or Washington to find a quick
resolution.
Soon after, the island question became a side note in greater affairs between the United States
and Great Britain. In the wake of the American Civil War, and the subsequent Alabama claims, in
which the U.S. demanded compensation for British participation on behalf of the Confederate
Army, San Juan became an afterthought. This concerned British colonists and the Canadian
government. In 1869, George Cartier and William McDougall wrote a letter to London urging
them not to forget about the island, as past reparations and negotiations between Great Britain
and the United States resulted in a great loss of territory on the Canadian side, such as a large
portion of New Brunswick.162
In Victoria, while the matter of Confederation with Canada was
being discussed, De Cosmos reminded the legislature how unsafe they had felt during the San
Juan stand-off.163
The lack of any decisive action by the British government over the island made
it clear that the colony was not a priority.
One legislative member argued that Confederation was an “Imperial necessity.” He said to his
fellow colonists: “we must look to our own interests… We are told that Great Britain desires to
get rid of all her Colonies.164
His observation was astute, as the Colonial Office indeed found its
many overseas colonies a heavy financial burden, including Vancouver Island and its “de facto”
dependency. After receiving the news that Douglas paid the marines stationed at Esquimalt
£2000, Blackwood asked, “is it necessary to maintain the Royal Engineers or Marines any longer
in V. Couver Isd on acct [sic] of the San Juan difficulty? It is prejudicial to the interests of B.
Columbia where the services of the Engineers are so pressingly wanted for the laying out of
Roads… to keep them away from the Colony.”165
And Douglas reported to the CO that “the
Wagon Road from [Port] Douglas through the valley of the Harrison River to the upper Fraser,
beyond the mountains, has been necessarily retarded by the withdrawal of the Royal Marines for
162
Canadian Government, San Juan Island.- Claims of Canada for losses and damages sustained by Her Majesty’s
subjects, in repelling Fenian Invasion.- Protection of the Fisheries. Laid before Parliament by Command of his
Excellency the Governor General (Ottawa: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1869), 3. 163
British Columbia Legislative Council, Debates on the Subject of Confederation with Canada. Reprinted from the
Government Gazette Extraordinary of March, 1870 (Victoria: Richard Wolfenden, Government Printer, 1888), 75. 164
Ibid.,13. 165
Blackwood in Douglas to Newcastle. Dec. 3, 1859. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial
Despatches of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/.
37
service on the Island of San Juan, but the work is still being prosecuted by a Detachment of Royal
Engineers under the command of Captain Grant. That force is however insufficient to make much
impression this season, on a work of such magnitude.”166
Without enough man power to build the
infrastructure of the new colony, colonial officials viewed marines on San Juan as a heavy and
questionable expenditure.
Payment for idle marines represented a major point of contention within the British
government on the status of the colonies. Many British politicians such as Gladstone and the
Peelites were wondering why they had to pick up the bill for these colonial concerns. The
payment of troops created such a large bill for the Colonial Office that when Merivale was
authorised to allocate £5000 for more military support to San Juan, he was also instructed to
inform Douglas that the colony was to ask for no more money.167
Blackwood concurred and
pointed out that “the former charge [of] £2000, having arisen in consequence of the American
occupation of San Juan, the War Office was asked to provide for it.”168
This reflects the CO’s
resistance to paying for the military occupation of the island. As McCabe observed, the objective
of the CO was to encourage colonies to prepare for independence for their own sake and to spare
the mother country from her burdens.169
Margaret Ormsby comments, “the suggestion of the
Colonial Office that Canada might assume the financial and military responsibility for British
Columbia was not unwelcome at Ottawa, where the national ambitions of the new government,
and of the business interests which supported it, extended to the outer limits of the continent.”170
British officials did not see the island as important to the needs of the Empire as local
colonists did and the matter was allowed to go to arbitration under the Treaty of Washington of
1871.171
McCabe considers the Treaty of Washington “a triumph for the principle of arbitration
166
Douglas to Lytton. Aug. 23, 1859. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial Despatches of
Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 167
Hamilton to Merivale. Sept. 5, 1859. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial Despatches of
Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 168
Blackwood in Douglas to Newcastle. Dec. 3rd
1859. University of Victoria, Colonial Despatches: The Colonial
Despatches of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 1846-1871. <accessed 10/10/11> http://bcgenesis.uvic.ca/. 169
McCabe, The San Juan Water Boundary Question, 17. 170
Margaret A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver: Macmillan, 1964), 236. 171
For a detailed treatment of the negotiations and subsequent Treaty of Washington see: Long, The San Juan Island
Boundary Controversy, 331-563; Hunter Miller, Northwest Water Boundary: Report of the Experts summoned by the
German Emperor as Arbitrator Under Articles 34-42 of the Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, Preliminary to his
Award dated October 21, 1872. Miller, eds. and trans. (Seattle: University of Washington, 1942).
38
[and] undoubtedly represented a great step forward in Anglo-American relations.”172
As
European nations, such as Italy and Germany, were uniting and militarizing, friendly American
relations became crucial to England; therefore the matter of San Juan was not as important as a
strong economic and military partnership with the United States.
Britain accepted a German arbitration decision, following the logic of Dr. Ferdinand Grimm,
which stated, “most in accordance with the true interpretation of the treaty… is the claim of the
Government of the United States that the boundary line between… should be drawn through
Haro Strait.”173
In 1872, the British troops on the island were ordered to vacate their garrison and
the island became officially American territory.
This saga, to become known as the “Pig War,” is today considered a minor event in Anglo-
American relations. Because there was no war, it does not receive the same kind of attention as
the Revolutionary War or the War of 1812. But, as the language used by the nineteenth century
press and officials suggests, the occupation of San Juan was seen as the marshalling stage for a
third major war. American soldiers, such as William Peck, were mildly amused by the pig
shooting story; but this amusement was overshadowed by a real concern that they would soon be
embroiled in a futile and costly battle with the British.174
British officials were even less amused,
and very much alarmed that they may be engaged in further continental warfare on the “edge of
empire.” And yet, despite all this concern, San Juan would soon be forgotten as the United States
dealt with the trauma of a civil war while Great Britain re-evaluated her colonial situation. The
San Juan Island Dispute would be “relegated to the status of a vignette, a footnote in history.”175
172
McCabe, The San Juan Water Boundary Question, 104. 173
Miller, Northwest Water Boundary, 29. 174
Coulter, The Pig War, And Other Experiences of William Peck, 93-132. 175
Tim O’Gorman, The Pig War, MA Thesis (Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho, 1980), 4.
39
Chapter 2
“A Pig That Nearly Caused a War:”176
How a Berkshire Boar Went Down in History.
Historical writing on the San Juan Island Dispute went through what I identify as four distinct
phases leading up to the Postwar period. First, there was a construction of memory, where details
of the event were foggy and the story was told to amuse more than anything else. The second
period was of nation-building type histories; early twentieth century historians placed the dispute
within the context of forming Washington State and British Columbia. The third period, from
approximately 1920-1950 (with some overlap from the second period and into the fourth), is
more difficult to define. It was a period of mid-twentieth century historical writing which did not
find the San Juan Island Dispute particularly important, and its significance almost forgotten.
After World War II, however, a new resurgence of interest in the dispute, with a focus on the
peaceful settlement, led to the fourth period of Postwar (or Pig War) historians. This last period
perseveres up to the twenty-first century and represents the dominant perspective on the meaning
of the Pig War.
By the end of the nineteenth century, stories of the San Juan Island Dispute were few. Some
were early prototypes of state forming histories, such as Hubert Howe Bancroft’s version in his
well known “History of British Columbia.” Others were written for political purposes to justify
personal actions taken during the dispute, such as presentations made by Granville Haller in the
1890s. And still others were written for general amusement and recreational purposes, such as a
piece, in 1896, by a retired American officer promoting the island as a sportsman and nature
lover’s “paradise.”177
The story was also told as an amusing anecdote to entertain late-nineteenth-
century youths.178
176
Ralph, A Pig That Nearly Caused a War. 177
Brooke, San Juan Island. 178
Ralph, A Pig That Nearly Caused a War.
40
In 1888, an article by long time contributor to Harper’s Magazine, Julian Ralph, appeared in
the St. Nicholas Magazine for Young Folks. Ralph discovered an event so strange and yet unheard
of, a mere seventeen years after its conclusion, that he felt it would be a wonderful little piece of
anecdotal history to share with a younger generation. He wrote: “in no history that I have been
able to find, and in no popular book of reference that I have seen after a great deal of searching, is
there any account of the fact that in the year 1859 a pig almost plunged us into a war with Great
Britain. Yet when I was in the beautiful, rose-garnished English city of Victoria, on Vancouver
Island, close to the Pacific coast of Washington Territory, I found many English subjects who had
a great deal to say about that pig, and about the mischief caused by it.”179
Ralph’s tale was a mix
of historical facts and hearsay and an example of how quickly events and actors can be forgotten,
altered, and/or mythologized. After recognizing a dearth in historical material on the San Juan
Island Dispute, Ralph relates his version of the story, complete with inaccurate geographical
locations, wrong names and incorrect occupations.
Ralph’s version of the main event went as follows: “a man named Hubbs, who was pasturing
sheep on the southern end of the island of San Juan, had for a neighbour, on the north end, a man
named Griffiths. This Griffiths was employed to raise pigs for the Hudson’s Bay Company, that
old and famous institution which has existed for two hundred and fifty years.”180
(See appendix A
for a great illustration of the pig’s demise). This beauty of a sentence incorporates all the errors
above noted. To quickly assess the damage: Hubbs was a customs collector residing on the island
near Charles Griffin’s (not Griffiths) sheep farm. Griffin was not there to raise pigs and Lyman
Cutlar (not Hubbs) was not there to raise sheep. Griffin had a sheep farm and Cutlar was a
homesteader with a potato patch. Finally, the HBC farm was established on the south end of the
island; the British garrison, built for the joint-military occupation, was situated on Garrison Bay
at the North-Western end of the island.
In Ralph’s defense, documents on the event were not as readily available to him as they were
to twentieth century and current historians. And the correct names of the immediate actors in the
179
Ralph, A Pig That Nearly Caused a War, 371. 180
Ibid., 372.
41
pig incident were not even known by everyone at the time of the dispute.181
But the interesting
aspect of this version is that he recounts this story after interviewing citizens from Victoria. What
his piece shows is how a collective memory can quickly mythologize an event. Victorians were
no longer sure who did what exactly, but they were able to recount the general idea of what
happened and that the story starred a pig.
This article offers some early signs, in the semiotic sense, of how the dispute would be
historically constructed over the next century. During this time, the event was never referred to as
the “Pig War” but there are similar connotations surrounding how Ralph presents his story. His
emphasis on the “pig that nearly caused a war,” connotes mere mischief or a delightfully innocent
story from America’s past in the 1860s. The absent signifier in this manner of presentation is that
the 1860s were an incredibly turbulent and violent time in American history. The tragedy of the
American Civil War profoundly shaped the psyche of the American people in the late nineteenth
century. This story was a distraction from the generally violent memories of the 1860s. Ralph
commented:
Our country was then on the eve of a war the most awful in all history, and this comparatively slight
incident made but little impression upon our people, all wrought up, as they were, over the great
questions which turned upon the issue of that terrible conflict. It was very different with the people of
Victoria and the great island of Vancouver. Theirs was then, and has since been, a peaceful existence,
and the shock and excitement caused when one of their pigs all but brought war to their doors made a
deep impression on their minds.182
Ralph suggests that this “war that was never fought,” was a merely a “slight incident.”183
It was
only fretted over by Victorians who generally lived a “peaceful existence.” Hence his framing of
the Pig War story was also about peace, not in a didactic sense, but in a therapeutic sense for an
audience dealing with the fallout of a devastating war. This is not very dissimilar from the
Postwar Dream, but it lacked the prescriptive function that historians would give to their histories
181
William Peck records in his military journal that it was a “Mr. Sawyer” who shot the pig instead of Cutlar.
Coulter, The Pig War, And Other Experiences of William Peck, 99. 182
Ralph, A Pig That Nearly Caused a War, 371. 183
Dawson, The War That Was Never Fought.
42
a century later. But to suggest that Victorians’ existence in the middle of the nineteenth century
was “peaceful” ignores the violent process of colonization of the time. Ralph was likely unaware,
or neglectful of the fact, that during this period Aboriginal peoples were dying from disease,
being moved from their homes, threatened with “gunboat diplomacy,” and violently resisting
colonial efforts as well, as in the case of the Chilcotin War of 1864.
Ralph’s piece reflected how the San Juan story was largely anecdotal at the end of the
nineteenth century. But as the United States and the British Commonwealth moved toward
rapprochement, the greater impact of the San Juan Island Dispute was on the verge of becoming
part of American and Canadian history. The turn of the century saw a rise in interest for the San
Juan story. Historians wanted to show how this dispute fit into the larger history of their nation-
states. A state-forming political context, unique to Bancroft’s work in the nineteenth century,184
became in vogue by the early twentieth century. It was within a desire to form national,
provincial and state identities that early twentieth century historians followed Bancroft’s
example.
Bancroft was the first historian to recognise that the dispute held positive implications for
American-Canadian international relations. In a very small part of his extensive histories on the
Pacific Coast, he concluded his section on San Juan by stating, “great was the disappointment of
the people of British Columbia, [but] the award was most courteously accepted, and within a few
weeks orders were given by the imperial government for its troops to evacuate San Juan. The
greatest good feeling had all along existed between the officers and soldiery, and three hearty
cheers were given by the Americans on the departure of the royal marines.”185
This celebration of
an amicable settlement would become a large part of the “Pig War” story, but for early twentieth
century historians it was not nearly as important as how the event was part of their own local
history. This kind of history emphasised the important role pioneering families had in the
development of the modern society. The pig held very little weight to the story and was seen as a
minor side note in the larger story of settlement.
184
Chad Reimer observes that Bancroft’s “unifying theme [was] the region’s move into civilization and into history
itself.” Chad Reimer, Writing British Columbia History, 1784-1958 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 37. 185
Hubert Howe Bancroft, The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft: Vol. XXXII, History of British Columbia 1792-1887
(San Francisco: The History Company, 1887), 638.
43
Early twentieth century interpretation of the Pacific Northwest comes predominantly from
prominent historians, Frederick Jackson Turner and Edmond Meany. According to John Findlay,
although Meany was friends with, and greatly influenced by, Turner, these men had different
perspectives on the significance of the West. Where Turner saw the frontier as “closed,” Meany
saw it as a land of vast potential. Findlay also argues that Meany was “disinclined to think in such
interpretive terms” as Turner because he had a closer association with “living pioneers.”186
While
they may have had differences in interpretation, these men did share a belief that American
settlement of the area was natural and inevitable, and that it was the inherent desire of Americans
to be free which shaped this settlement. The settlement of the West by pioneers was what gave
the region its identity.
In an effort to show how Turner shaped American historical thought, Rush Welter argues that
Turner’s interpretation of the frontier lay in the mythical standing Manifest Destiny and
Jacksonian Democracy had on the American psyche. These two phenomena were closely related
through their common western orientation, and have been viewed as what protected America
from the detrimental effects of overgrowing metropolises witnessed in Europe.187
As BC
historian Richard Mackie observes, “the Oregon Trail migrations of the early 1840s provided an
evocative founding myth of a promised land won through endurance and struggle.”188
Indeed, for
Turner, Meany, and other Pacific Northwest historians up to World War II, the region was not
entirely unique from American history but was American history. The West was where all the
grand American ideals were realized.
Turner identified "pioneer individualism” as the basis for successful democracy,189
and of
utmost importance in American history.190
Meany likewise applauded the pioneer spirit,
proclaiming, “let us, in profound gratitude, clasp the hands of the white haired remnants of that
186
John Findlay, “Closing the Frontier in Washington: Edmond S. Meany and Frederick Jackson Turner.” The
Pacific Northwest Quarterly Vol. 82, No. 2 (April 1991), 67. 187
Rush Welter, “The Frontier West as Image of American Society 1776-1860.” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly,
Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 1961), 2-3. 188
Richard Mackie, Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific 1793-1843 (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 1997), xxiv. 189
Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (Madison: State Historical
Society of Wisconsin), 15. <accessed 2/25/12>
http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/pdocs/turner_frontier.pdf. 190
Ibid, 2.
44
noble band of men and women, but above all let us press forward, carrying the torch of
enlightened progress given to us by the pioneers.”191
The Pacific Northwest of this time was
saturated with pioneer culture. Meany viewed the San Juan Island Dispute as a great victory of
American pioneers over the “bravado and grasping boldness on the part of the Hudson Bay
Company and its backers.”192
A pioneer identity for the Pacific Northwest during Meany’s period was constructed as a
Manichean battle between Americans and the HBC. The San Juan Island Dispute offered a
perfect model of this conflict. As there existed one HBC farm surrounded by a smattering of
American settlers on the island, it was a microcosm of the larger battle. In 1931, Alfred Tunem
placed the blame for the dispute squarely on the shoulders of the HBC observing “later on, when
conflict actually began, the Hudson’s Bay Company did everything within its power to have
England hold San Juan Island, and the British Government did everything possible short of war
to make her claim for Rosario Straits as a boundary effective.”193
He also claimed that “the
Hudson’s Bay Company’s officials urged the Indians of the north to molest the American citizens
in order to frighten them from the island. The British subjects were never disturbed.”194
There is
no proof that the HBC or Douglas ever did such a thing; in fact, there is more evidence that the
British aided settlers in the Puget Sound region with defense from such attacks.195
The
scapegoating of the HBC was typical for American historians of the time.
The nation-building historians of the early twentieth century were able to build on the
abundant evidence of hostility between pioneers and the HBC in the nineteenth century. At the
time of the San Juan Island Dispute, they were indeed very suspicious of each other. For
example, in 1859, Commissioner Campbell wrote back to Washington, “the British government,
191
Edmond Meany, “First American Settlement on Puget Sound.” The Washington Historical Quarterly Vol. 7, No.
2 (April 1916), 143. 192
Meany, History of the State of Washington, 242. 193
Alfred Tunem, “The Dispute over the San Juan Island Water Boundary.” The Washington Historical Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 1932), 45. 194
Alfred Tunem, “The Dispute over the San Juan Island Water Boundary.” The Washington Historical Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 1932), 196. 195
Tunem cites an unknown source speaking at the 35th
Congress; his evidence amounts to little more than political
hearsay. Alfred Tunem, “The Dispute over the San Juan Island Water Boundary.” The Washington Historical
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 1932), 196; Evidence of the British helping Americans can be found in a memorial of
the San Juan residents to General Harney in which they thank the British authorities for protection given. Memorial
of American Citizens on San Juan To General Harney, United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 149.
45
instigated by the Hudson’s Bay Company, have long coveted the possession of the island.”196
Despite American citizens praising the HBC for protecting them from attack by Native
Americans, General Harney informed his superiors that he ordered troops to San Juan to
“protect” Americans from HBC “indignities.”197
The resentment Harney harbored for the HBC is
shown in the many dispatches he sent about them. Harney was a hero to the pioneers and more
importantly his character and actions provided the early Pacific Northwest historians with an
iconic HBC conqueror, despite the fact that his anti-HBC obsessions were inconsistent and
incoherent.198
At the turn of the twentieth century, British Columbian historians were also in their “pioneer”
phase of historical writing.199
But at the same time they were intent on differentiating themselves
from the American experience. Like American historians they wanted to legitimize their society,
but wanted to do it in a way that was uniquely Canadian.200
Frederick Howay defended the HBC
from American historians by pointing to the violent American experience on the frontier.201
And
E.O.S. Scholefield argued “with the advent of the Hudson’s Bay Company the history of British
196
Campbell to Cass. Sept. 3, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary,119. 197
Harney to the Adjutant General. Aug. 7, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 150. 198
Vouri asserts that much of this hatred stems from the mentorship provided to Harney by Andrew Jackson. He
says, “the influence of Old Hickory manifested itself time and again in Harney’s stormy career. Jackson harbored a
hatred for the British resulting from a trauma suffered as a boy during the Revolutionary War… Harney took notes
and soon formed his own pathological hatred for all things British;” Vouri, The Pig War, 53; Harney was never able
to decide how much influence the HBC had on the British government or if it was the British government controlling
the HBC. In August 1859, he was convinced that Douglas “commands the British navy in the Sound. This accounts,
in some measure, for the use of the British ships of war in the supervision of the interests of the Hudson’s Bay
Company. Harney had been informed that the Royal Navy has never been used for HBC services, yet he was not sure
he believed this. Later that month, he would accuse the HBC of instigating Native attacks to drive Americans from
lands they occupied. He said, “I knew the exacting policy of the Hudson’s Bay Company would not hesitate to adopt
any measure deemed necessary to insure their success, for their history has shown this.” The next month, Harney
downgraded the HBCs level of power, stating, “I trust the British government will see how useless it will be for them
to attempt to maintain a course of conduct that exposes them to the reflection of having used unworthy means to
obtain that which they have no claim, and showing the Hudson’s Bay Company to be a willing cat for extracting the
chestnuts from the fire.” Harney now figured the HBC was simply a pawn in the control of the British Empire. Either
way, the Hudson’s Bay Company was an obstacle to what John O’Sullivan referred to as America’s “high destiny.”
Harney to the Adjutant General. Aug. 7, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 151; A.G.
Dallas to Harney. May 10, 1860. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 260; Harney to Adjutant
General. Aug. 29, 1859. United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 178; Harney to Scott. Sept. 14, 1859.
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 182; John L. O’Sullivan, “The Great Nation of Futurity” in
Major Problems in American Foreign Relations Volume I: To 1920 (Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Peterson eds.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2005), 198. 199
Reimer, Writing British Columbia History, 34. 200
Ibid., 34, 44. 201
Ibid., 92.
46
Columbia really commences. The early history of Canada on the Pacific is, in fact, but the story
of the occupation of this western land by that company.”202
For these historians, the men of the
HBC and the British authorities were the heroes. The British actors of the San Juan Island
Dispute were lionized for their heroics in the same manner Americans worshipped their
champions. Scholefield proclaimed, “great credit is due to Sir James Douglas for the manner in
which he conducted affairs during this crisis. It is certain that only by his diplomacy and tact a
great disaster was averted.”203
Thirty years later, assessments of Douglas became more balanced;
Walter Sage noted Douglas’s attitude was “more bellicose than that of the naval commanders.”204
The next phase of San Juan history is one of a slight dearth. The major work done on the San
Juan Island Dispute primarily was that of David Hunter Miller. Miller was a well-known
American lawyer and treaty expert, who famously drafted the covenant of the League of Nations
and headed the U.S. delegation to the 1930 Hague Convention for a codification of international
law. His work on the dispute was to publish verbatim some of the official correspondence from
the dispute as well as the arbitration decision.205
For historians of the period, the San Juan Island
Dispute was not seen as an event worth spilling much ink over. For example, in Donald
Creighton’s well known works on Canadian history, San Juan is not mentioned once, despite both
the Alabama claims and the Treaty of Washington being discussed.206
Edgar McInnis couches
San Juan within the claims and the treaty, but does not explain what the dispute was.207
In Colony
to Nation, Arthur Lower dedicates a subordinate clause in one sentence to San Juan.208
More locally to BC, Margaret Ormsby offered a handful of sentences to San Juan, framed in
the older state-forming historical context. She concludes: “now that San Juan Island had been
awarded by the Emperor of Germany to the Americans, everyone on Vancouver Island was
determined, for reasons of security, prestige and commercial benefit, to have the railway terminus
202
Scholefield, E.O.S. British Columbia Before Confederation: Some odds and ends of early history, from 1776 to
1864 (Victoria BC?: s.n., 1899? Microfilm), 64. <Accessed 28/05/12> http://archive.org/details/cihm_14299 . 203
Ibid., 68. 204
Walter Sage, Sir James Douglas and British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1930), 280. 205
Miller, Northwest Water Boundary; Miller, San Juan Archipelago. 206
Donald Creighton, Dominion of the North: A History of Canada (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1957); Donald
Creighton, The Story of Canada (Boston: The Riverside Press, 1959). 207
Edgar McInnis, Canada: A Political and Social History (Toronto: Rinehart and Co., 1958), 317-322. 208
Lower, Arthur. Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 361.
47
at Esquimalt.”209
Ormbsy’s perspective was shaped by her mentor Sage and the writing style of
Creighton.210
Her analysis of San Juan was a reiteration of the early twentieth century position
and written with a large scope as in Creighton’s work. By writing a BC history, San Juan clearly
needed to be addressed, but in a similar fashion to her contemporaries it did not get a very close
look, for reasons I cannot explain.
By the end of this mid-twentieth century period, there was also development in the American
perspective on the HBC. In 1960, George Frykman proclaimed, “the time is propitious for a
careful consideration of the basic concepts involved in the writing and study of American history
and particularly, of the history of the Pacific Northwest.”211
He criticised earlier historians for
adopting a focus too negatively influenced by the perspectives of pioneers, asserting, “historical
thought in the pioneer phase provides the people with a poor vehicle for interpretation since it is
all anchor, with no sail or rudder.”212
Frykman argued that historians needed to look beyond the
pioneer settlement and recognize other aspects of the region’s history.
When the Washington Historical Quarterly, previously edited by Meany, was cancelled after
Meany’s death, the emergent Pacific Northwest Quarterly (PNQ) was designed to be much more
methodologically professional. Consequently, the PNQ “devoted less attention to Northwest
pioneers than its predecessor and far more attention to the scholarship of historians.”213
The
works of Meany and Turner were put under a critical lens and their assertions scrutinized. Rush
Welter applauded Turner for being an interpretive visionary, a “poet,” but not a very good
historian.214
Missing from Turner and Meany’s vision of the Pacific Northwest was how
intimately, and positively, linked this American history was with the Canadian history of the
HBC.
Keith Murray’s 1961 article, “The Role of the Hudson’s Bay Company in the Pacific
Northwest History,” answered the call and placed a greater, more positive, emphasis on the HBC
influence in Pacific Northwest history. Murray argued, “while [the HBC] no longer plays a
209
Ormsby, British Columbia, 256. 210
Reimer, Writing British Columbia History, 129-134. 211
George Frykman, “Regionalism, Localism the Pacific Northwest in American History.” The Pacific Northwest
Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 1952), 251. 212
Ibid., 254. 213
Findlay, Closing the Frontier, 69. 214
Welter, The Frontier West as Image, 6.
48
significant role in Northwest affairs, its first decades were of such profound importance to the
opening of the old Oregon Country and British Columbia that it is difficult to tell of its
contributions without seeming to indulge in wild exaggeration.”215
Murray identified the early
pioneer emphasis as a reason for the lack of scholarly attention to the HBC. He commented:
Curiously, the Americans who wrote the early history of the Northwest were singularly reluctant to
give the Company credit for the role that it did play in the governing and development of the region.
Partly, of course, this was due to the fact that many of those who wrote the accounts had unhappy
personal quarrels with the management of the Company, or were so deeply suspicious from prior
indoctrination that every act of the Company was looked upon as part of a sinister conspiracy by an
organization of foreigners to destroy honest American citizens going about their daily business on
American soil.216
Murray recognized many grievances recorded against the HBC. But he disproved these
arguments.217
Tying his work into a Pacific Northwest identity, Murray concluded that, “the
hundreds of thousands of adults who have moved to the state of Washington in the 20th
century
and their children, born in the last few decades, need constantly to be reminded of the past in
order to understand the present. An unprejudiced study of the Hudson’s Bay Company is
essential to this understanding.” He pointed to a project by the Washington State Historical
Society, in which they searched for descendants of employees of the HBC, as an example of the
importance to include the HBC in the historical narrative.218
By the early 1970s, more historians
publishing in the PNQ were writing about the HBC and British influence on the territory, thus
solidifying this historiographical “turn” in Pacific Northwest history.219
Murray’s book, The Pig
War, is exemplary of this HBC turn and the new positive imagining of the HBC’s role in Pacific
Northwest history. He rejects Tunem’s assertion that the HBC was to blame for the conflict over
215
Keith Murray, “The Role of the Hudson’s Bay Company in Pacific Northwest History.” The Pacific Northwest
Quarterly. Vol. 52, No. 1 (January 1961), 24. 216
Murray, The Role of the Hudson’s Bay Company, 30. 217
Ibid., 30. 218
Ibid., 31. 219
Stuart Anderson, “British Threats and the Settlement of the Oregon Boundary Dispute.” The Pacific Northwest
Quarterly. Vol. 66, No. 4 (October 1975), 153-160; Barry Gough, “British Policy in the San Juan Boundary Dispute,
1854-72.” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly. Vol. 62, No. 2 (April 1971), 59-68.
49
the island. He cites Thomas McCabe’s earlier work affirming an international relations oversight
as the cause of the ownership confusion.220
Murray argues that any aggressive or potential war
mongering came from American military personalities, such as General Harney and Captain
Pickett, and to a lesser extent British Columbian Governor James Douglas.221
This interpretation
has been shared by subsequent historians.222
Murray’s book is also the first influential work to explicitly refer to this event as the “Pig
War.” The new use of this term appears to coincide with a shift in emphasis on the event; by the
mid-twentieth century the event goes from being the San Juan Question, a small part of a larger
battle for state and territory, into the “Pig War,” a story of negotiation and peace. The pig would
become the focal point of the story and the “hook” to catch potential readers, while the overall
theme of peace is emphasised and intertwined with this new moniker. From this point on,
historical writing on the San Juan Island Dispute carries this theme of peace. How this theme
came to dominate the narrative, and what meaning comes with such a particular construction of
the story, warrants further investigation.
220
Murray, The Pig War, 23. 221
Ibid., 7, 5. 222
Vouri, The Pig War; Kaufmann, The Pig War; Coleman, The Pig War; Neering, The Pig War.
50
Chapter 3
“The So-Called Pig War:”223
Language and History
On October 15, 1859, four months after the pig was shot, The London Illustrated Times published
an article titled, “The San Juan Difficulty.”224
During the same year, The New York Herald and
The New York Times were trying out a wide variety of names: “The Boundary Difficulty,”225
“Affairs at San Juan,” “The Boundary Question,” and a more actor specific, “Commissioner
Campbell and the San Juan Difficulty.”226
Other variations included, “The North-Western
Boundary Dispute With England,”227
“The San Juan Quarrel,”228
and the popular, “Imbroglio at
San Juan.”229
British actors at the event largely referred to it as “the difficulty.”230
Viscount
Milton termed it the “San Juan Water Boundary Question,” which would also be used by early
historians.231
But whether it was called “The Affair of the Hog,”232
“The Episode of the Pig,”233
a
“dispute,”234
“trouble”235
a “controversy,”236
or nothing at all,237
one thing is clear, in print, it was
not being called the “Pig War.”238
223
United States Government. An act to authorize the establishment of the San Juan Island National Historical Park
in the State of Washington, and for other purposes. (80 Stat. 737) Sept. 9, 1966. In Kelley June Cannon, San Juan
Island National Historical Park Administrative History (Seattle: National Park Service, 1997), 165. 224
The Illustrated London News, “The San Juan Difficulty,” October 15, 1859. 225
New York Times, Sept. 24, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 83. 226
New York Herald, Sept. 24, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 85-86. 227
New York Herald, Sept.. 27, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 91. 228
New York Times, Sept. 30, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 97. 229
The Washington Intelligencer, Sept. 24, 1859. British Government, Correspondence, 81. 230
Commander R.C. Mayne, Four Years in British Columbia and Vancouver Island. An Account of their Forests,
Rivers, Coasts, Gold Fields, and Resources for Colonisation (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1862), 39.
Scott to Douglas. Nov. 2, 1859. British Government, Part II. Correspondence, 40;. A.G. Dallas to Harney. May 10,
1960. British Government, Part II. Correspondence, 82. 231
Milton, A History, 8; H.F. Angus, F.W. Howay and W. Sage. British Columbia and the United States: The North
Pacific Slope from the Fur Trade to Aviation (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1942), 128; Brooke, San Juan Island;
E.H. Wilson, “San Juan Island,” The Beaver (September 1927), 70. 232
Bancroft, The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft, 616. 233
Sage, Sir James Douglas and British Columbia, 265. 234
Scholefield, British Columbia Before Confederation, 68. 235
F.W. Howay, British Columbia: The Making of a Province (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1928), 183.
51
One of the earliest documents to use the term “Pig War” in print is a 1949 PhD dissertation by
John Long Jr. His thesis is called “The San Juan Island Boundary Controversy,” which shows
that Long did not think of the whole dispute as the Pig War. However, he labelled one chapter of
the paper the “‘Pig War’: the Harney-Douglas Conflict”239
(see appendix B). For Long, the
immediate fallout after the pig shooting was the Pig War. How he came to know this term, or
whether by some coincidence he coined it, is unknown. The mystery is that no scholar prior to
Long made use of the term and its use did not immediately catch on after the publication of his
thesis. It is also strange that Long wrote his thesis at Duke University and lived his life on the
East Coast of the United States.240
All other use of the term, before its universalization in the
1960s, comes from the Puget Sound region, which has led to my speculation, and that of some
San Juan Islanders, that the term originates from the island. Long admits that all his knowledge of
how the dispute was seen at the local level comes from outside sources and not from his own
research.241
So how Long came to know or employ the term is very odd. Perhaps his time in the
American military during the Second World War exposed him to some of the region’s vernacular.
In 1958, Lucille McDonald published an article in the Seattle Times titled, “Where Did San
Juan Island’s ‘Pig War’ Begin?”242
As far as my research reveals, this is the first time the term
“Pig War” appeared in print in the Pacific Northwest. It comes after Long’s thesis, but it is
significant that it appears in a Seattle newspaper and not from any paper out of state. This is my
first clue that it may, in fact, be a local term. In 1955, Joseph Howard Kinsey published an article
titled, “Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig” for Montana: The Magazine of Western
History.243
Although separated by one state line and a mere three years, there is no use of the
236
Sage, Sir James Douglas and British Columbia, 235. 237
Ormsby, British Columbia, 129, 185-6, 235, 256. 238
Vouri’s research has produced the same hypothesis. In a 2008 interview he says: “It is a 20th century iteration… I
have never seen it in 19th century documents.” The San Juan Journal, “The Pig War: Little-known facts about the
joint military occupation of San Juan Island.” July 27, 2009. <accessed 25/07/12>
http://www.sanjuanjournal.com/lifestyle/51619202.html. 239
Long, The San Juan Island Boundary Controversy, 200. 240
Ibid., 594-595. 241
Ibid., iii-iv. 242
Lucille McDonald, “Where Did San Juan Island’s ‘Pig War’ Begin?” The Seattle Sunday Times Magazine,
November 2, 1958. 243
Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig.
52
term “Pig War” which suggests that there existed a geographical barrier to the term’s use. But
this still does not offer proof that the term originates from San Juan Island itself.
During my research trip to San Juan in August 2012, the name’s origin was among the
questions I hoped to address. After discovering McDonald’s article, I gained confidence that the
term was from the Pacific Northwest, but I still needed some kind of evidence that it was being
used on the island before McDonald wrote her piece. While digging through the archives at the
San Juan Island National Historic Park, I found exactly what I was hoping for. In one of the many
files on the Pig War residing at the American Camp office, tucked away in a folder, lay an age-
stained manuscript authored by Sylvia Rank Landahl. Written in 1943, this unpublished
document contains “The Pig War” as one of its sub-headings (see appendix C). With no previous
use of the term in print elsewhere across the globe, this virtually unknown document is strong
evidence that the term was first being used on the island.244
Long’s almost simultaneous use of
the term remains a mystery, but Landahl’s connections to the island and to the Pig War are solid.
In 1930, Landahl married Frank Rosler and joined one of the oldest pioneer families on San
Juan.245
Frank’s grandfather was Christopher Rosler, who, as a 26 year old man, first came to the
island in Captain Pickett’s infantry force.246
The Rosler homestead still stands nearby the
American Camp. As a part of this family, Landahl undoubtedly heard many of the tales from the
pioneering days and was likely immersed in the colloquial language used to describe the event.
Thanks to her efforts to write a history of the island, I have some evidence that the term “Pig
War” was floating around the island before it dominates print histories in the 1960s.
Further proof that this term is an island term comes from the Loyal Order of the Moose,
Friday Harbour Chapter. In 1964, the Order issued a resolution on the value of a national park
stating that “the sites concerned in the border dispute, known locally as the Pig War, are in danger
244
There are two other events that have been called the “Pig War.” One took place in the same era in Texas between
a French diplomat and a hotel owner over the Texan’s “marauding pigs,”
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mgp01; the second, also referred to as the “Customs War” took
place in 1909 Serbia, and was a blockade on Austro-Hungarian imported pork. It is seen as one of the many causes of
World War I, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pig_War_(Serbia); Sylvia Rank Landahl, San Juan County, unpublished,
at SJINHP Archives, 1943. 245
Sylvia Rank Landahl, Some Rosler- Landahl Family History, unpublished, at SJINHP Archives, Jan. 1972. 246
1860 U.S. Census, San Juan Island Precinct, San Juan P.O., Enumerated 27, 28, 29, June 1860.
53
of being lost [my emphasis].”247
The Order appears proud to take ownership of the term for the
island, but it has not always been employed so positively by all San Juan residents. In a
mysterious newspaper article, with great tongue in cheek, Al Cummings wrote:
Some of us who live in the beautiful San Juan Islands tend to bridle a bit when someone refers to our
area as ‘The Pig War Islands.’ It’s hardly an appellation to be proud of. It summons up fantasies of
porkers wearing funny hats and marching around with muskets over their pork shoulders- all very
Orwellian. It seems a trifle unfair, too. After all, nobody calls San Francisco ‘The Earthquake City,’
or Chicago ‘Fire Town.’ It’s one of those little historical tidbits without which we could live quite
nicely.248
Cummings likely wrote this in the 1980s, but it reflects the attitude some residents also took in
the early 60s when the creation of a “Pig War” National Park was being discussed.
In April 1965, at the 89th
National Congress, San Juan Island resident Sam Buck testified that
he wished to go on record as being opposed to the park being named the “Pig War National
Park.”249
The mayor of Friday Harbour agreed. He said, “on this matter of the pig, we have tried
to appease our British Columbia neighbours. We have sent pigs over there. They have sent them
back. They have sent pigs over here, and we have sent them back. So the ‘Pig’ part should be
forgotten.”250
The shooting of the pig was seen as a distraction from the theme of the park that
residents of the island hoped to emphasize. Etta Engeland, of the San Juan Historical Society,
clarified, “a few years ago, a little ceremony took place down at the water front, in which a pig
was given back to the Canadians. It was all in the spirit of geniality and good fun, but how many
other places in the world can boast of such a relationship between two countries? The affair of the
pig has been remembered over the years, probably because it piques the imagination; but it
should be seen in its proper perspective; as a symbol of the much larger issue.”251
Peter Ristuben,
247
United States Government, Pig War National Historic Park Hearing before the subcommittee on the Interior and
Insular Affairs, Untied States Senate; Eighty-Ninth Congress. First Session on S. 489. A Bill to Authorize the
establishment of the Pig War National Historical Park in the State of Washington, and for other purposes, April 17,
1965 (Washington: US Government, 1965), 142-143. 248
Al Cummings, “Where the Boaring War was Fought,” From a newspaper, at SJINHP Archives, no date or name. 249
United States Government, Pig War National Historic Park Hearing, 79. 250
Ibid., 80. 251
Ibid., 76.
54
of the Washington State Historical Society agreed: “I would recommend the name ‘San Juan
National Park’ rather than ‘Pig War National Park.’ The significance of the jurisdictional dispute
is that it did not escalate into war but was settled by pacific means.”252
Much of the argument
circled around the use of the word “war” in a park about peace.
Proponents for the park being called the “Pig War” National Park used the same argument to
support their cause. Roger Pegues, representing the Western Outdoor Clubs testified: “I must say
that I prefer the colorful title of ‘Pig War’ to the mundane and meaningless title, ‘San Juan.’ The
words ‘Pig War’ add meaning. They connect the park to a crucial occurrence in our history. In
addition, the very significance which those words connote symbolizes the irrationality of going to
war when disputes can otherwise be solved.”253
The chair of the committee, Senator Alan Bible,
was willing to defer to Senators Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson on the name.254
Jackson
claimed that “it has always been described as the Pig War Monument, but this does cause some
problems, because they think we are spending a lot of money on a pig war out here. But from a
historical point of view, the area and the problem has been referred to as the ‘Pig War
Conflict.’’255
In 1966, it was decided to nix the “Pig War” moniker. The enabling legislation declared that
the park “shall be known as the San Juan Island National Historical Park and shall commemorate
the final settlement by arbitration of the Oregon boundary dispute and the peaceful relationship
which has existed between the United States and Canada for generations.”256
The name may not
have survived but the important message of peace and the friendly relations the U.S. held with
Canada remained and would become the dominant trope of histories written about the “Pig War”
from the 1960s on.
In 1971, the National Park released a prospective which outlined this important message. The
prospective presented “the park’s major interpretive theme to be the Pig War, ‘its cultural and
political circumstances, and most important, the idea… that discord and dissension between
252
United States Government, Pig War National Historic Park Hearing, 34. 253
Ibid., 86. 254
Bible said: “so far as I am personally concerned, I will defer to Senator Jackson and Senator Magnuson on this
problem. I have had four children and I have had more trouble finding names for them, and I lost every battle with
my wife; my wife has won every battle;” Ibid., 17. 255
Ibid., 17. 256
United States Government. An act to authorize, 165.
55
nations can, if subjected to rational behaviour, lead to justice and friendship and a feeling of well-
being, and also to a realization of the senselessness of freewheeling attitudes and clashes of
arms.’”257
The park maintains this thematic position today. In a resource guide the park designed
for Washington State school teachers, the park reaffirms the importance of their message. In the
introduction to the curriculum package, they state:
The best lesson about the Pig War is that there was no war. In the end, the dispute was resolved
peacefully through arbitration. Although one country won control of the San Juan Islands, both
countries were winners. The British and Americans together surveyed the international land
boundary line and next resolved the water boundary by agreeing to arbitration in the Treaty of
Washington. Today, the international border between the United States and Canada is the longest
unfortified boundary in the world and certainly the most peaceful. This the greatest lesson of the Pig
War.258
From academic histories to children’s literature, this theme would become the main focus of what
the pig means to the Pacific Northwest. The pig becomes a symbol of peace and anti-imperialism.
In his 1955 article, Joseph Howard connected anti-imperial attitudes to the San Juan story.
Howard views the shooting of an “imperial pig,” and the backlash that ensued, as a symbolic
example of the aggressive nature of imperialism. Written at the end of the McCarthy era, Howard
connected the slogan of “Manifest Destiny” with other slogans his American readers would
associate with pejorative connotations such as “For Fuehrer and Fatherland” and “All Power to
the Soviets,” thus displaying his left leaning politics and disdain for American imperialism.259
His explicit message was that war happens when land ownership is contested by belligerent
nations and that this will always occur as long as countries are imperialist. This was a pressing
concern for Howard’s generation as memories of the Second World War and the Korean War
were fresh, and international tensions between the U.S.A and the Soviet Union threatened to take
257
Cannon, San Juan Island National Historical Park Administrative History, 137. 258
San Juan Island National Historic Park, The Pig War: Conflict and Resolution in the Pacific Northwest, A
Resource Guide for Washington State Teachers. (Friday Harbor: San Juan Island NHP), 98. <Accessed July 23,
2012> http://www.nps.gov/sajh/forteachers/upload/Trunk-1.pdf. 259
Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig, 20.
56
the two nations to the brink of head-to-head conflict. Howard called for rationality and an
awareness of political action so that war could be prevented.260
Howard was an early proponent of the conclusion that the “rational” decision makers in the
dispute were those who sought to prevent violence, such as Baynes and Scott. He states: “Harney
and Pickett were spoiling for a fight; but on the other hand, it was the forbearance and common
sense manifested by two other professional fighting men which saved America and Britain from
plunging blindly into the silliest war ever fought, a war over a pig.”261
As discussed, the
erroneous, or perhaps ironic, claim here is that the war was over a pig and not the island itself.
Keith Murray, however, followed this line of thinking and credited “responsible men” from each
country for preventing war. He echoes Howard stating, “in 1859, as it is in the last third of the
twentieth century, such rational behaviour in international affair was rare, and the incident
deserves more attention than it has received by historians.”262
Murray, at the height of the Vietnam War, argued the world was still being plunged into
“irrational” wars. He concluded his book:
In his very long life [James Crook] witnessed other wars started over incidents as trivial as the killing
of the San Juan pig mushroom into murderous affairs which destroyed the lives of hundreds of
thousands of people… He was also aware that here, on his own land, men of good will and common
sense had not allowed such a catastrophe to begin. Thus this tiny dot of earth on the beautiful bay
will always be a reminder that senseless wars over insignificant causes do not need to happen.263
The last sentence from this quote was also printed inside a 1972 brochure from the National Park,
commemorating Centennial Day (see appendix D). During the ceremony held that day, the park
reaffirmed its purpose to commemorate the peaceful settlement of the Pig War. This message had
heightened importance for Americans as the Vietnam war divided the public on the war’s impact
at home.
260
Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig, 23. 261
Ibid., 21. 262
Murray, The Pig War, 7. 263
Ibid., 77.
57
The Vietnam conflict also had a significant influence on the purpose and design of the national
park. In 1965, while US troops were being deployed overseas, Congressman Lloyd Meeds
announced that the park “will stand at the westernmost end of the longest unguarded international
border in the world to signify a milestone in the history of our national maturation. By this
monument to a petty incident that nearly brought war between two nations, we make an
important contrast with the 105 years of peaceful co-operative negotiation of mutual problems
and differences between the United States and Canada. That is a record all the world should
carefully note.”264
The message was that international border disputes could be peacefully
resolved as opposed to developing into multi-nation war.
The new General Management Plan for the park, issued in 2008, revitalized this message in
the post-911 climate. The plan states that the “San Juan Island National Historical Park is the
only site that illustrates, in its dramatic and largely intact physical setting, how war can be
averted and peace maintained through positive action by individuals and governments- a
powerful message in unsettled times.”265
In the same year, when asked about his book on the Pig
War, and what he hoped would be the lasting impact of the book, Mike Vouri, a Vietnam veteran,
replied, “world peace. I’m not kidding. The Pig War could’ve escalated into a tragic conflict.”266
The fact that there was no war is the essence of this story. Historians of the Pig War, following
Murray, recognised this. Vouri said, “despite the word ‘War’… the story is about peace.”267
The
Pig War stands as this ideal of “rational” thinking overcoming “irrational” behaviour and
avoiding war. E.C. Coleman continues the accepted discourse, describing the event as “an act that
found governors and generals eager for war, politicians and diplomats vying for position,
presidents and prime ministers posturing, whilst sailors, soldiers and marines, from both sides,
learned the value of co-operation and common sense- a lesson still to be learned by their
leaders.”268
His final thought displays the didactic element of the Pig War narrative.
264
United States Government, Pig War National Historic Park Hearing, 8-9. 265
National Park Service, San Juan Island National Historical Park: Final General Management Plan and
Environmental Impact Statement. (Friday Harbor, WA: San Juan Island National Historical Park, 2008), 1. 266
The San Juan Journal, “Interview with ‘Pig War’ author Mike Vouri; book signing Friday, 6:30 p.m. at museum.”
August 21, 2008. <accessed 25/07/12> http://www.sanjuanjournal.com/lifestyle/27247989.html. 267
Vouri, The Pig War, acknowledgements. 268
Coleman, The Pig War, 212.
58
Another good example of this prescriptive function lies in the subtitle of a colorful article by
Tom Inkster titled, “The War of the Pig: The Peaceful San Juan Dispute of 1859… A War in
which the only casualty was a pig- the way all nations may eventually learn to conduct their
wars” (see appendix E).269
Clearly this is a suggestion that the best war is no war. Attempts to
have this message of peace taught to children also go back to the 1960s. In 1969, Betty Baker
published a children’s book titled “The Pig War.” Although loose with historical details, it stayed
true to the message of peaceful negotiation over violent conflict270
(see appendix F). Currently,
this book is listed on a website, organized by a group called Teach Peace Now, which features
recommended “peace education books.”271
This message of peace, dominant in the twentieth century, was not the universal message
during the San Juan Island Dispute. As a measure of the extent of change, consider the words of a
former HBC employee who witnessed the events of the conflict:
War is the order of nature! Race upon race, fish upon fish, the sea upon the shore and the shore upon
the sea. To do, is to undo; organized life would over-people the world. Yes rot it out, without this
war of life on life. Yet no nation should be permitted by man to overgrow his good. The British
Empire, Russian America and China are already too prolific with overgrown monsters. There is too
much room there and the more they grow, the more they are insatiate. Strange, but our happiness is
in destruction. A good appetite is to consume. Love is to consume, inventions to consume. Universal
peace would never do. It would in the march of centuries eat up its own farrow, as the Scotch lady
said to the sow.272
This attitude, so contrary to the message of the Pig War National Park and the modern histories
of the event shows how the message of peace was a re-framing by mid to late twentieth century
269
Tom H. Inkster, “The War of the Pig: The Peaceful San Juan Dispute of 1859… A War in which the only casualty
was a pig- the way all nations may eventually learn to conduct their wars.” From a newspaper, at SJINHP Archives,
no date or name. 270
Betty Baker, The Pig War: An I CAN READ History Book. Pictures by Robert Lopshire. New York: Harper and
Row, 1969. 271
Teach Peace Now, “Great Books,” <accessed 05/07/12> http://www.teachpeacenow.org/. 272
Howay, F.W., William S. Lewis and Jacob A. Meyers, “Angus McDonald: A Few Items from the West.”
Washington Historical Quarterly, 8:3 (July 1917), 226.
59
historians and the public. Due to the horrific lessons learned after both World Wars and the
Vietnam War, an antiwar rhetoric became the prevailing lesson of the Pig War.
Anti-war rhetoric is key to understanding the ideology behind naming this event the “Pig
War.” A semiotician would view the significance of the term “pig” within the surrounding
connotations it has in “webs of meaning,” to use a Geertzian phrase.273
First, the term “pig” is
often used derogatorily to describe a person who is uncouth and unrefined. To use the term “Pig
War,” then, suggests that to go to war over a pig would have been a decision made by people who
possess these negative qualities. This is Young’s “value-laden” aspect of the name. By calling
this event the “Pig War” there is an implicit argument that people who start wars are pigs and
piggish in their behaviour.
This is what Pierce would call the “interpretant” of the sign. It is the sense that is made of the
sign.274
When people use terms such as “Pig War,” negative connotations towards war are
generated. It is similar to British expressions “I’ve had a pig of a day,” or “I’ve made a pig’s ear
of it.” Or another term, “pigs on the wing,” which refers to unexpected and unwanted company,
deriving from World War II aviation lingo signifying an enemy approaching on a pilot’s
blindside.275
All of these statements feature the word “pig” and contain pejorative connotations
which are the essence of the interpretant.
In order to further appreciate this use of the term “pig,” it is necessary to take into account
what Saussure emphasises as “paradigmatic relations” in signifiers. Paradigmatic relations exist
along with syntagmatic relations. As Daniel Chandler explains, “the ‘value’ of a sign is
determined by both its paradigmatic and in syntagmatic relations. Syntagms and paradigms
provide a structural context within which signs make sense; they are the structural form through
which signs are organized into codes.” Whereas the syntagmatic relations refer to other words
within the text, which allow statements to make sense, the paradigmatic relations are concerned
273
Geertz says, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one is
search of meaning;” Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture.” In The
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5. 274
Chandler, Semiotics, 27. 275
“Pigs on the Wing” is also the name of a two part song in the 1977 Pink Floyd Album, Animals. Thus tying Roger
Waters in to this thesis once more.
60
with intertextual signifiers which are absent from the text.276
In other words, the choice of using
the term pig, whether conscious or not, has a direct impact on how recipients of the message
perceive the event. It would not have this same impact if another word was chosen, for example
“sheep.” Although it could have been the “Sheep War,” this choice of term will not garner the
same emotional and intellectual response as the “Pig War.”
Chandler maintains “there are no ideologically neutral sign-systems: signs function to
persuade as well as to refer. Valentin Voloshinov declared that ‘whenever a sign is present,
ideology is present too.’ Sign-systems help to naturalize and reinforce particular framings of ‘the
way things are,’ although the operation of ideology in signifying practices is typically
masked.”277
This is the sign function of labelling the dispute “Pig War.” It is an ideological
attempt to shame people with any proclivity to justify war. In the framework of Pig War histories,
there is no such thing as a justifiable war. As observed earlier, this message becomes the moral of
the story; and Hayden White asks rhetorically, “could we ever narrativize without moralizing?”278
White provides another analytical framework within which the language and troping of the
“Pig War” histories can be evaluated.279
In White’s terms this story can be considered a
“romantic comedy.”280
The narrative of the Pig War follows that there was a romantic
emplotment of good triumphing over evil after a series of comedic errors. As Murray argues, “the
whole affair has been treated as a huge joke… but there were almost as many possibilities for
international catastrophe when the pig was shot as when an heir to the throne of Austria was shot
fifty-five years later.”281
Unlike the devastating result of Duke Ferdinand’s assassination, the
fatality of the pig avoided catastrophe and through its comedy of errors produced a story of
peace. In the language of the Pig War historians, it was a victory of the “cool heads,”282
who
276
Chandler, Semiotics, 84. 277
Ibid., 214. 278
Hayden White, The Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 25. 279
White adopts his “theory of emplotment” with the four modes as “romance,” tragedy,” “comedy,” and “satire,”
from Northrop Frye; Chandler, Semiotics, 159. 280
Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1973), 10. 281
Keith Murray, The Pig War, 7. 282
Scott Kaufman, The Pig War: The United States, Britain, and the Balance of Power in the Pacific Northwest,
1846-1872 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004.), 184.
61
avoided bloodshed, over the “hotheads”283
who demanded military action. Still in White’s terms,
this tale is troped in an ironic mode, meaning that it represents the opposite of what happened.284
Simply put, the “Pig War” was not a war.
According to Chandler, irony is the “most radical” of the four main literary tropes.285
This is
because, while irony often works within clear binary oppositions, it is not always easy to decipher
statements that are ironic, or to tell when people are being ironic. Chandler explains: “the
evaluation of the ironic sign requires the retrospective assessment of its modality status. Re-
evaluating an apparently literal sign for ironic cues requires reference to perceived intent and to
truth status. An ironic statement is not, of course, the same as a lie since it is not intended to be
taken as ‘true.’”286
The Pig War, once explained, is understood not to be a war. Chandler asserts
that use of irony, such as the case for the Pig War, is often intended as a form of humour. But
“frequent use may be associated with reflexiveness, detachment or skepticism.”287
Perhaps the
Postwar use of the term Pig War suggests a dark skepticism towards the notion that a world of
peace could actually exist. Yet Pig War histories contend that peace is possible.
Finally, within White’s framework, the ideological function of the story is one of liberalism
and progress. The story imagines a time in the future when things will improve, not through
radical means but by a gradual change.288
In the Pig War story, this change is a move from
international conflict to peaceful settlement. For White, ideological work is also a trait of the
contextualist mode of explanation, which seeks to explain an event within the “context” of its
occurrence. The context Pig War historians emphasize is that in the mid-nineteenth century, war
between Great Britain and the United States was perceived as a very real threat. Yet, this event
was a rare case of peace, an element that historians of the San Juan Island Dispute acknowledge
as the essence of this story and the ideal method of conflict resolution for the future.
283
Keith Murray, The Pig War, 7. 284
Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1973), 34. 285
Chandler, Semiotics, 134 286
Ibid., 135. 287
Ibid., 135. 288
White, Metahistory, 25.
62
Allan Megill identifies three purposes of historical writing: a state-affirming function, a
critical and negating function, and a didactic function.289
The early histories of the San Juan
Dispute fell under the first category. However, the Pig War story which has emerged in the
Postwar period is of the third variety, hope for a better future. Megill personally prefers the
second function; he finds the didactic function to be honourable yet somewhat unjustifiable.290
This is because he wonders if historians have the authority to prescribe for the present and
future.291
His is a valid concern. In troubled times, however, many people often find comfort in
stories such as the Pig War, as it reflects their desires for a better, safer, future than the past or
present.
289
Megill, Historical Knowledge, Historical Error, 27. 290
Ibid., 27. 291
Ibid., 37.
63
Chapter 4
An “Imperial Pig”292
in the Pacific Northwest:
San Juan Island and Colonial History
The theme of peace makes the Pig War story an important component of Pacific Northwest
history. Will Dawson concludes his book by stating, “discussions between nations over problems
may take up time, but they are infinitely preferable to the impetuous, warlike behaviour of men
like General Harney. Where war leaves bitterness, peaceful settlement leaves friendship. Instead
of forts bristling with guns looming over the Puget Sound and British Columbia, there stands near
Blaine, Washington State, the 67-foot-high Peace Arch, the only arch of its kind in the world.”293
Dawson makes the important connection between the Pig War story and the monuments of peace
that stand along the 49th
parallel, giving credence to the idea that the Pacific Northwest is a
uniquely peaceful place in the world. But this narrative serves to obscure much of the violence
that accompanied the colonial experience. It suggests that the region was settled by Europeans
with diplomacy and was relatively bloodless, a theme that encompasses the larger story of
settlement in the Pacific Northwest.
This theme of peaceful settlement has found a home in the historiography of the Pacific
Northwest. George Frykman concluded his 1960 article on regionalism and nationalism, by
stating that “the initial British American rivalry for this Oregon Country and the subsequent
unique joint-occupancy and peaceful division gave the Pacific Northwest a traditional
homogeneity which might well serve as the inspiration for international cooperation in many
spheres.”294
The same year, Herman Deutsch proclaimed that Oregon, or “Old Oregon,” the fur
trading region before it was divided into Oregon State and Washington State, “was the product of
292
Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig, 20-21. 293
Dawson, The War that was Never Fought, 107. 294
Frykman, Regionalism, localism, 256.
64
natural expansion and was neither purchased nor won by force of arms.”295
With the exception of
the Whitman Massacre, and a few other skirmishes, this settlement was seen as relatively free of
violence, something that hasn’t been said for the California experience.296
There has been a push, over the last fifty years, to recognize the Pacific Northwest as a distinct
cultural region.297
California is often held up as the antithesis of this region. William Lang
observes that the Pacific Northwest identity is “a mixture of who we say we are to ourselves and
what others perceive us to be, plus this equation’s feedback- who we say we are not.”298
It seems
people from the Pacific Northwest are not Californians. John Findlay, at the Center for the Study
of the Pacific Northwest, observes that people from this region “have developed strong opinions
about California and Californians in recent times. Oregon actually led the way during the 1970s,
with a both humorous and serious campaign to keep Californians away. Washington and Idaho
became more vociferous during the 1980s and 1990s.” Findlay identifies this antagonism as a
nativist response to an influx of Californians into the Pacific Northwest. He argues that this “anti-
California sentiment” has had detrimental effects on the cultural identity and represents an “ugly
form of bigotry.” He also suggests that this distinction between Pacific Northwesterner and
Californian may be “mistaken,” as Californians have been migrating into the region for a long
time and migration is not a recent phenomenon.299
In a 1973 study, Raymond Gastil asks “how useful is it to think of Oregon, Washington, and
parts of Idaho and Montana as forming a region distinct from that of California?”300
After taking
stock of prior attempts to label geographic areas as regions, such as Howard Odum’s
“sociological-economic” approach and Daniel Elazar’s religious and “population origin”
295
Herman J. Deutsch, “The Evolution of the International Boundary in the Inland Empire of the Pacific Northwest.”
The Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 1960), 64. 296
Obviously this ignores native experience. 297
For this essay, I follow Frykman’s 1952 assertion that this region consists of “Oregon, Washington, Idaho,
western Montana, and British Columbia.” Frykman, Regionalism, localism, 251. 298
William Lang, “Failed Federalism: The Columbia Valley Authority and Regionalism.” In The Great Northwest:
The Search for Regional Identity. William G. Robbins eds. (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2001), 66. 299
John Findlay, “Lesson 1:Who Belongs in the Pacific Northwest?” Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest.
<accessed 02/03/12>
http://www.washington.edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom%20Materials/Pacific%20Northwest%20Histo
ry/Lessons/Lesson%201/1.html. 300
Raymond Gastil, “The Pacific Northwest as a Cultural Region.” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 4
(October 1973), 149.
65
approach, which he prefers.301
Gastil takes his own cultural/ locational tack to this topic. He
argues that migration from different eastern regions led to a difference in Northern Pacific and
Californian cultures. He acknowledges that there are linguistic similarities between all residents
of the West Coast, but, despite these similarities, “a good case can be made for dividing the area
at the Oregon line.302
There is a strong suggestion in literature that southern California has a
different culture from the rest of the coast.”303
A large part of this distinction is the settlement of
the Pacific Northwest by farmers, traders, and lumberjacks, as opposed to gold prospectors. The
California gold rush experience lends itself to the image of lawlessness in the settlement of the
West, an image not shared by those in Oregon and Washington State. Suggestions of a unique
cultural identity for the Pacific Northwest, as well as cultural connections to British Columbia,
have been debated for decades.304
The strong aversion to any association with California reveals an idealistic position embedded
in twentieth century Pacific Northwest historiography. This position believes that the region has
developed culturally and materially distinct histories from that of California. However, the
historical record shows that there were many links between the Golden State and the Pacific
Northwest, particularly British Columbia. For a start, Oregon farmers benefited from the
301
Gastil, The Pacific Northwest, 147-148. 302
Ibid., 149. 303
Ibid., 156. 304
At the 1941 Pacific Northwest History Conference, no historians from British Columbia were invited. Attending
historian, Vernon Carstensen suggested that this was because BC was unlikely to be thought of as part of the Pacific
Northwest. But, a couple years prior to the “HBC turn” in Pacific Northwest historiography, at the 1957 Pacific
Northwest History Conference, keynote speaker, John Binns declared, “British Columbia, by reason of its political
allegiance, is a special case, but I cordially invite it to join [in the scholarship of the Pacific Northwest], and I hope
that the presence of Canadians here indicates something more than associate membership.” This presence of Western
Canadian scholars suggests that BC was becoming a part of the regional identity. In 1996, this link between BC and
the American region was addressed by the Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest at a conference titled, “On
Brotherly Terms: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies.” The name suggests that this conference
positively viewed the historical connection between the two nations on the West Coast. An excellent iconographic
example of this shared history exists in the symbol that appears on the 1972 Centennial Brochure for the National
Historic Park. This symbol is the American and British national flags cross cut and fused together. It also adorns the
cover page of the San Juan National Historic Park Administrative History, on the maps provided in the book, and is
featured prominently at the park, on all of the signage and pamphlets. Vernon Carstensen, “The Good Old Days or
the Bad Old Days? History and Related Muses in the Northwest in the 1930s” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol.
68, No. 3 (July 1977), 105; John H. Binns, “Northwest Region- Fact or Fiction?” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly,
Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 1957), 68; Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest, Mission and History, <accessed
02/03/12> http://www.washington.edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/About%20Us/Mission%20&%20History.html.
66
California goldrush through trade of flour, fresh meat and lumber.305
Secondly, the nineteenth
century trade communication between San Francisco and Vancouver Island is well known.306
Finally, the Fraser River gold rush brought much traffic and influence from California. During
the rush, Mathew Begbie observed that this temporary migration brought to the colony a “great
preponderance of the California or Californicized element of the population, and the paucity of
British subjects.”307
Commander Mayne lamented, “the new-found mineral wealth of British
Columbia had attracted from California some of the most reckless rascals that gold has ever given
birth to.”308
But Californian’s transient nature was equally matched by other pioneers to BC who
have also been characterized by their “high level of mobility associated with a male frontier.”309
As Jean Barman asserts, “the transient male labourer symbolized British Columbia just as farmer
still characterized much of the rest of Canada.”310
Even though many of these Argonauts would leave as the gold fields dried up, their influence
and presence would not completely disappear. Many of these disappointed fortune seekers, such
as Lyman Cutlar, would come to settle in the Puget Sound region and on San Juan Island. Others,
such as British born brothers, William and Thomas Ladner, founders of the small community on
the Fraser Delta which holds their name, would stay in British Columbia. Their political and
philosophical ideas, and that of their children, were indelibly shaped by their experiences on the
California Trail and in the gold mines.311
Also, Daniel Marshall argues that “California mining
culture appropriated the Native cultural landscape of the Fraser and brought with it the ethnic and
305
Ormsby, British Columbia, 142. 306
John Belshaw shows that the Nanaimo coal industry relied on the San Francisco market equally with San
Francisco’s reliance on Nanaimo coal. John Douglas Belshaw, Becoming British Columbia: A Population History
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 33. Barman calls nineteenth century San Francsisco, “British Columbia’s gateway to
the world;” Barman, The West Beyond the West, 99. 307
Quoted in Sage, Sir James Douglas and British Columbia, 249. 308
Mayne, Four Years in British Columbia, 52. 309
Ruth Sandwell, Contesting Rural Space: Land Policy and the Practices of Resettlement on Saltspring Island,
1859-1891 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 138. 310
Barman, The West Beyond the West, 132. 311
In his family history, Leon Ladner spends a great deal of time rejecting Marxism. He says, “the ultimate result, in
my opinion, unless restrained by an informed, educated public, will be dictatorship of one kind or another for
Western countries attempting to superimpose state socialism in democratic institutions born of freedom and requiring
freedom if they are to persist.” He holds his father and uncle’s pioneer experience as an example of positive
individualism. Ladner asserts, “the lives of the Ladners will tell the story from the point of view of the ordinary ‘self-
made- men’ who faced almost insurmountable obstacles, life-and-death struggles. They pioneered in a virgin country
and succeeded by virtue of great strength of character and determination;” Leon Ladner, The Ladner’s of Ladner: By
Covered Wagon to the Welfare State (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1972), 3, 9.
67
racial tensions that marked the California goldfields.” He asserts that it was Joseph Trutch’s
experience in California that gave him “an affinity for California-type place names” which he
used to name some of the reserves laid out for BC Aboriginals. He argues “the erasure of Native
sovereignty through the use of California-like place names not only disconnected Natives from
the physical geography of the river but also from the very soul of Native culture.”312
Thus, the
California experience had many tangible effects on the psyche of European settlers to the region
as well as its original inhabitants.
Another similarity between the California experience and that of the Pacific Northwest,
underappreciated by early twentieth century historians, is the amount of violence that
characterised them both. It is well known, through stories about lynch mobs and Vigilance
Committees that California was a bloody settlement. And wars with Native Americans were often
discussed. In 1885, A.J. Bledsoe wrote a 450 page tome about the violent struggles to protect
settlers in Northern California from attacks by Native Americans. Pacific Northwest history, at
this time, mitigated the importance of wars with Native groups, choosing rather to emphasize an
exceptionally quiet settlement. However, the 1850s were ripe with Native conflict in the
Washington Territory; and, as B.A. McKelvie’s 1926 study shows, the BC experience also had its
fair share of “Indian Troubles.”313
Measurements of violent experience have often been used to further distinguish American
from Canadian western settlement. Jeremy Mouat notes that the British Columbian gold rush
experience has given the “common dichotomy” of “lawful Canadians” versus “unlawful
Americans,” or in the words of Donald Worster, the “Wild West” of the US and the “Mild West”
of Canada.314
But Making Western Canada, edited by Elizabeth Jameson, contains articles which
challenge “uncritical histories of a peaceful, orderly, and Anglo-centric Canadian West.”
Jameson argues scholars need to analyze how the two conceptions of settling the West differed.
Why was America lawless while Canada lawful and orderly? She asks, “were these differences
312
Daniel Marshall, “Mapping the New Eldorado: The Fraser River Gold Rush and the Appropriation of Native
Space.” In New Histories for Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada’s Native Pasts. Ted Binnema and Susan
Neylon eds. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 135-136. 313
B.A. McKelvie, Early History of the Province of British Columbia (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1926), 70. 314
Donald Worster, “Two Faces West: The Development of Myth in Canada and the United States,” In Terra
Northwest: Interpreting People and Place. David H. Stratton eds. (Pullman, Wash.: University of Washington Press,
2007), 25.
68
real, or were they narrative strategies to explain national development?”315
The historical record
suggests that each settlement experience produced its share of violence.
For the Pig War, the notion of a pig as the only casualty of the conflict is not entirely correct.
It was a coincidental death during a dispute that also coincided with a few violent deaths of
humans in its duration. For example, Isaac Ebey, customs inspector of the island during the
1850s, had his head removed by a group of Native Americans he quarreled with. Also there was
the bizarre murder of two men near the island during the occupation;316
as well as the tragic case,
at the very end of the joint-occupation, of a San Juan resident, known by the nickname Kanaka
Joe, who robbed and killed a few people on the island, most notably the Dwyers, leaving an
orphaned child.317
There were also deaths (accidental as well as natural) of a few of the soldiers
who served during the occupation. These are a few examples, beyond the pig’s death, of fatalities
during the settlement of the San Juan Question. These are not generally connected to the “Pig
War” as they contradict the single fatality thesis.
The emphasis of this San Juan story and the general settlement of the Pacific Northwest as a
peaceful endeavour can be seen as a form of what Mary Louise Pratt calls “anti-conquest.” In her
315
Elizabeth Jameson, “Introduction” in Making Western: Essays on European Colonization and Settlement.
Catherine Cavanaugh and Jeremy Mouat eds. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1996), xv. 316
Commander Mayne describes the incident in his 1862 essay: “Mr. Griffin told the story thus. He was sitting in his
balcony one summer afternoon, watching a vessel working her way up the Strait, when he saw two boats, each
containing one man, pull past in the direction of Victoria. He was rather surprised at seeing them thus single-handed,
but at that time, when the gold-fever was raging fiercely, every sort of boat was employed to cross the Strait, and he
concluded that they were two Americans, making their way from Bellingham Bay to Victoria. They had hardly
rounded the point, just beyond the farm, and passed out of his sight, when a small canoe with a single Indian shot
past in the same direction. There was nothing in all this to attract particular notice, and Mr. Griffin was surprised
when, an hour or so later, two boats, which he at once recognised as those that had so lately passed, drifted into view,
floating back, to all appearance, empty. A canoe was at once sent out to them, when one was found empty, and in the
other lay the body of a white man, shot, but not pillaged,- even the provisions that were in his boat being untouched.
Who shall say who his murderer was? Had his white companion shot him, landed, and pushed off his boat?- for,
except in the boat in which the murdered man lay, not a drop of blood could be seen. Or had the Indian killed him,
and had his companion, on seeing the fatal shot fired, leapt overboard, and been drowned? If so, it was revenge, for
nothing was taken from the boats; perhaps in the performance of that duty which is still considered ‘sacred’- if one
may use the word- among the Indians- of taking a life for a life;” Mayne, Four Years in British Columbia, 40-41. 317
Although the Dwyer murder happened immediately after the San Juan dispute was settled, David Richardson
reports that the Dwyer murder deeply affected Victorians and that Charles McKay, a participant in American
activities during the 1859 stand-off, knew the convicted murderer, Kanaka Joe, very well, but was also a long time
friend of Henry Dwyer so he went to Victoria to testify. Kanaka Joe was hanged in March 1874 at Port Townshend.
For detailed accounts of the murders see: Richardson, Pig War Islands, 159-175; and for a first-person account see:
Jo Bailey-Cummings and Al Cummings. The Settlers’ Own Stories: San Juan: The Powder Keg Island (Friday
Harbor, Washington: Beach Combers, Inc., 1987), 121-127.
69
study of eighteenth century European travel writing, Pratt observes that the rhetorical strategy of
the authors was to portray foreign land in South Africa as virtually uninhabited to give the
impression that European presence was uncontested.318
She argues, “as the Khoikhoi are
deterritorialized- extracted from the landscape in which they still live- they are thus taken out of
economy, culture, and history too… the anti-conquest ‘underwrite[s]’ colonial appropriation,
even as it rejects the rhetoric, and probably the practice, of conquest and subjugation.”319
English
poet Rupert Brooke, in 1913, described BC as “an empty land” where Europeans “can find
nothing to satisfy the hunger of the heart. He requires haunted woods and the friendly presence of
ghosts.”320
Chad Reimer comments that Brooke was clearly “blind” to the “history of the peoples
who had occupied the region for millennia and had created a land more truly spiritualised than
any newcomer could fathom.”321
As Adele Perry observes, historians of BC tend to “neutralize
colonialism by describing it as ‘settlement.’”322
Colonists at the time of settlement would not have been worried about this process. For them,
the dispossession and displacement of the previous inhabitants was inevitable- the peaceful
settlement of the island was a reality because the United States and Great Britain did not go to
war and Europeans did not die in bloody conflict. For the San Juan story, as the focus remains on
the pig and the peaceful negotiations, the actual violence and land appropriation of the region by
European settlers gets lost in a narrative about rational and successful division of territory by a
colonising body. This position ignores the experience of the colonised.
This is not to say that Pig War and San Juan histories have been completely void of
acknowledging Native presence on the island. But mentions of Natives have been short with
reference only to the historical record of the European colonisers. This record recognizes a single
antagonistic role for Natives during the dispute. For example, the American Government, in the
1860s, reported: “it was often made the cause of complaint by the American citizens that these
pirates [natives] received too friendly a welcome at the Hudson’s Bay Company’s station on
Vancouver’s Island, where the authorities seemed to accord to them belligerent rights…
318
Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992), 59-60. 319
Ibid., 53. 320
Quoted in Reimer, Writing British Columbia History, 3. 321
Ibid., 3. 322
Perry, On the Edge of Empire, 196.
70
allowance, however, should be made for the excited state of feeling naturally arising from the fact
that while the American citizens were being plundered and murdered, the Hudson’s Bay
Company were almost entirely exempt from these outrages, and comparatively on friendly terms
with the Indians, whose incursion may be said to have had for their object plunder of Americans,
and traffic with the Hudson’s Bay Company.”323
HBC “meddling” was a common complaint of
American settlers and proponents of Manifest Destiny throughout nineteenth century westward
expansion.
Much of American settlers’ concerns came from the violent greeting they received from
“Northern Indians.” But attacks were not as common as settlers feared. Vouri, relying on the
work of BC historian Barry Gough, asserts that these groups of Natives never attacked HBC
facilities for fear of reprisal from the company’s “gunboat diplomacy.”324
Although attacks on
Americans did occur, the HBC presence in the area mitigated large-scale attacks. Despite the
American government’s concern over the HBC involvement in Native raids, settlers on San Juan
praised the HBC for its help. In a memorial to General Harney, they wrote: “in the year one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, the house of the United States inspector of customs for
this island was attacked and fired into in the night by a party of Indians living on this island, and
known as the Clallams, and had it not been for the timely aid of the Hudson’s Bay Company, the
inspector would have fallen a victim to their savage designs.”325
A few nineteenth century
European and American documents are the bulk of information on the Native perspective of the
dispute. Most historians have not viewed the island as very important to Natives because at the
time of the dispute it was only being used as seasonal fishing grounds and not inhabited in the
European sense. Richardson comments that it was “recurring outbreaks of disease” which led to
the abandonment of the island as a place to live.326
The tacit understanding of this comment is
that San Juan was once a thriving hub of Native activity and due to increased European presence
was almost entirely abandoned by its previous inhabitants.
323
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 135-136. 324
Vouri, The Pig War, 34. 325
United States Government, The Northwest Boundary, 149. 326
Richardson, Pig War Islands, 235.
71
To this day, the Pig War narrative remains consistent in its Eurocentric perspective. When
tourists, arriving at Victoria Harbour, disembark from their cruise ships, and enter one of the
many curio shops, they will find, on a rack of history books about Victoria, Rosemary Neering’s
2009 book, “The Pig War: The Last Canada-US Border Conflict.” This book, as well as Scott
Kaufman’s academic study, is one of the latest books to be written on this topic, and it merely
continues the same “peace” theme that originated in the 1960s. Ultimately what has been
presented in the standard Pig War story is an erasure of the colonial implications entwined in this
narrative. A great example of this can be seen in Betty Baker’s children’s book. While there is no
harm intended, it is striking to see images of a bemused Native on the island, witnessing the
dispute. What was likely an attempt to acknowledge the presence of Natives comes across as a
naïve conception of colonialism in nineteenth century Pacific Northwest. While settlers dispute
an “unoccupied” island, this young Native boy, oddly wearing the attire of people from the
Plains, is seen smiling, or in this particular case laughing, throughout the book, as he watches the
conflict unfold; as if he approves of the whole matter (see appendix G). While the narrative of the
Pig War stresses peace, and this is a noble perspective, the violence and turbulence which
surrounded the settlement of the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia, including San Juan
Island, cannot be ignored.
In the twenty-first century the story is slowly approaching a new re-framing. The San Juan
National Historic Park has reconfigured its historic prospectus “to incorporate a broader range of
themes, including pre-European history and the natural environment.”327
This is the third
significant shift in interpretation for the park. In 1971, the park’s major interpretive theme was
the Pig War and the theme of peace which I have framed as part of the Postwar Dream.328
Since
1984, the park has been guided by an interpretive prospectus which focused solely on the military
period of San Juan history. However, thanks to visitor feedback, the park discovered that, more
recently, “many also wanted the interpretive program of the park to be expanded to include
American Indian history and cultural practices, which would add some ‘historic realism and
327
National Park Service, San Juan Island National Historical Park: Final General Management Plan and
Environmental Impact Statement. Friday Harbor, WA: San Juan Island National Historical Park, 2008), 163. 328
Ibid., 137.
72
interpretive balance’ to park programs.”329
In 2008, in response to visitor input, the park proposed
“Alternative C” which was the park’s preferred direction. This plan was designed to “broaden the
scope of resource management and interpretation programs to emphasize the connections and
interrelationships between the park’s natural and cultural resources. New facilities, trails and
programs provide opportunities for visitors to understand the importance of the park’s natural
resources in defining the cultural landscapes and influencing the settlement and historic events of
San Juan Island.”330
Diana Barg, cultural resource program manager for the Samish Indian Nation
commented, “enhancing the interpretation of Native American culture and prehistory through
consultation will strengthen an important element of the Park, San Juan Island and the visitor
experience.”331
She supported Alternative C. With the support of local Native groups, as well as
the public and businesses, the San Juan National Historic Park enacted Alternative C which will
address most of my postcolonial concerns mentioned in this thesis.
329
National Park Service, San Juan Island National Historical Park, 237. 330
Ibid., 29. 331
Ibid., 268.
73
Conclusion
The Pig and the Postwar Dream, Part 2.
In my rear view mirror,
The sun is going down.
Sinking behind bridges in the road.
And I think of all the good things,
That we have left undone.
And I suffer premonitions,
Confirm suspicions,
Of the Holocaust to come.
The sun is in the east,
Even though the day is done,
Two suns in the sunset,
Could be the human race is run.
- Roger Waters (Pink Floyd), “Two Suns in the Sunset”
From the album, The Final Cut, 1983
Roger Waters holds little hope for the future of mankind. His apocalyptic vision suggests that he
does not believe the Postwar Dream is possible. The historians of the Pig War have a much more
optimistic outlook. In their opinion, world leaders could follow the example of their heroes and
choose peace over war. This positive imagining of the Postwar Dream is couched in the
mythology of a peaceful settlement in the Pacific Northwest, an image that this thesis has shown
to be problematic and questionable.
74
Myth is laced into the Pig War story in many forms. For example, a famous Admiral Baynes
quote, utilised by most Pig War historians, was likely a colourful fabrication. According to the
popular version of the story, when Admiral Baynes arrived at Victoria, and heard of the
tribulations on San Juan, in particular about how war was looming, he purportedly sighed, “tut,
tut, no, no the damned fools.”332
No historian has been able to find this quote in the historical
record, except in the memoirs of HBC servant, Angus MacDonald.333
It is likely that Baynes
never uttered this fantastic phrase, yet due to its elegance and laconic simplicity, it finds its way
into the history pages. Reasons for this are likely connected to the same logic that has guided
historians of the Postwar Dream framework. Baynes is touted as one of the “cool heads” who
diffused tensions and saved the island from military conflict. His famous phrase becomes the
slogan for proponents of peace. As the narrative goes, his experience in war made him wise and
he knew that peace was preferable to bloody war. Therefore, the Pig War story needs this
mythical phrase, because those who solve conflicts violently are “damned fools.”
But there is no part of the narrative as largely mythological as the pig’s role. There are no
images of the actual pig, just as it had no recorded name. Yet it became venerated, as if it was an
unknown soldier. As Murray declares “the only fatality in the affair was an unnamed and
nondescript pig. This unwilling sacrifice on the altar of international discord has achieved a local
kind of swinish immortality, however, and in the Pacific Northwest the conflict that developed
after his death bears a reference to him- as indeed it must- since there was no other victim to
honor.”334
When people visit the park, often their first question is where was the pig shot? I
confess that my first trek through the park was also to the supposed site of the pig’s demise. It has
become a pilgrimage to those who wish to honour the life and death of a simple animal that got
caught up in an intense rivalry for territory and conquest.
The pig becomes a reminder, albeit an odd one, of the senselessness of war. “War is war no
matter how you slice it,” says Howard, “and the instant case is often forgotten in the problems
war brings with it. America’s Manifest Destiny, however, no longer dictates that we shall fight
332
Interestingly, Murray does not use this quote, but all the subsequent Pig War historians do. Vouri uses it as his
heading for chapter 11 in his book. He is careful to note that this quote came “purportedly” from Baynes, but not
conclusively; Vouri, The Pig War, 126; Coleman, The Pig War, 97; Neering, The Pig War, 78. 333
Howay, Angus McDonald, 196. 334
Murray, The Pig War, 7.
75
over a pig.”335
Howard, in 1955, declared the West frontier closed and, therefore, American
settlement complete. In naïve optimism, Howard imagined the end of American imperialism,
which should have ushered in an era of peace. Through hindsight we know that this was not the
case. Vietnam was around the corner and two wars with Iraq punctuated half a century of
American military involvement abroad. This suggests that Waters may be more correct in his
portrayal of a mythical and unattainable Postwar Dream.
At the time of the dispute, people saw a real danger for international conflict, a third war
between the United States and Great Britain in less than a century. But more pressing political
concerns for each nation made the San Juan Question, ultimately, a minor one. This is how the
event was treated for the following hundred years; historians wrote little about it as compared to
“bigger” events such as Canadian Confederation and the American Civil War. The San Juan
Island Dispute was intertwined with both these events and, consequently, the settlement of the
dispute was recognized as an insignificant by-product of them. But a semiotic study of the mid-
twentieth century re-framing of the narrative shows that after World War II a greater, more
significant, story emerges. This story generates a didactic message of how leaders ought to solve
conflicts diplomatically as opposed to violently. This powerful message has come to be the main
point historians have when writing about the event; the dispute was not just a minor incident in
nineteenth century Anglo-American relations, but a great example of peaceful conflict resolution.
“Pig War” historians elevated the subject from near historical obscurity to greater humanist
importance. In this process some of the colonial implications of the event are often forgotten but
the mission of Pig War historians is laudable for its commitment to peace.
When people are first told of the San Juan Island Dispute, naturally, their first question is, why
do we call it the Pig War? The straightforward answer is because in 1859 an American settler
shot a pig owned by the HBC and this was the only casualty of the conflict. Offered in this thesis
is a more complex answer. It involves the historical and political context of the term’s genesis, as
well as the didactic message intended by its use. By analyzing the logic behind the Pig War story
and how it was constructed, this thesis shows how something as simple as a name can carry
powerful and persuasive ideological meaning.
335
Howard, Manifest Destiny and the British Empire’s Pig, 23.
76
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Appendix A
From: Julian Ralph, “A Pig That Nearly Caused A War.” St. Nicholas Magazine for Young Folks.
Vol. XV, No. 5. March 1888, 371-374.
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Appendix B
From: John W. Long Jr., The San Juan Island Boundary Controversy: A Phase of 19th
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1949.
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Appendix C
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Archives, 1943.
103
Appendix D
104
Appendix E
105
Appendix F
106
Appendix G
From: Betty Baker, The Pig War: An I CAN READ History Book. Pictures by Robert Lopshire.
New York: Harper and Row, 1969.