the philosopher as synthesizer

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EDUCATIONAL THEORY Winter 1981, Vol. 31, No. 1 @ 1981 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois The Philosopher as Synthesizer By Spencer A. Ward Social science is under pressbre from within and from without to demonstrate that its work is relevant for guiding practice and policy making in education and other social services. The current cuts in Federal funding for social science research pro- vide added impetus to demonstrate more convincingly the relevance of social sci- ence research. The Yearbook chapters were illuminating for me in thinking about why the relevance is not more effectively demonstrated and in suggesting what steps might be taken to make social science knowledge more useful. Much of this review consists of the building of a tentative conceptual framework which suggests interrelationships between the nature of knowledge and the usefulness of knowledge. The framework evolved out of my own interest in synthesis and out of my need for some larger framework from which to view the Yearbook chapters. I. GENERAL PERSPECTIVE Several factors make knowledge synthesis a useful focus for this review: 1) the relevance of the philosopher's concern with knowledge in general to knowledge synthesis; 2) the illustrations of issues in synthesis provided in the Yearbook chap- ters; 3) my hope that philosophers of education will undertake a more explicit syn- thesis function; and 4) the interest of NIE in doing synthesis and studying knowl- edge characteristics and the synthesis process. More generally, my own interest in usefulness of knowledge matches well with the aim of many of the Yearbook chapters to demonstrate how philosophy of education can contribute to educa- tional practice. In this review the Yearbook chapters will be drawn upon to examine the nature of knowledge, to highlight some aspects of knowledge synthesis, and to build a case for philosophers of education taking on a more explicit knowledge synthesis task. Although the focus of the review will be on the nature of knowledge synthesis and on the philosopher as synthesizer, the issues raised can be seen as relevant to the more general issue of how philosophers of education can use their special skills to contribute to educational research, practice and policy making. We usually think of synthesis as an academic pursuit, but the same skills are involved ~. in cur- riculum development,' policy analysis,' and analysis of evaluation finding^.^ NIE Interests in Practical Synthesis. Synthesis has been a specific interest of NIE since it began. That interest was highlighted in a 1976 survey which revealed that the Institute supported two to three hundred synthesis activities each year.4 A 1977 Spencer Ward, Dissemination and Improvement of Practice, National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C. 1. Paul De Hart Hurd, "Synthesis Processes Applied to Developing a Curriculum Frame- work," in Spencer A. Ward and Linda J. Reed. eds., Knowledge Structure and Use: Theory and Practice of Synthesis and lnterpretation (Washington, D.C.; National Institute of Education, forthcoming). 2. Robert F. Rich, "Knowledge Synthesis and Problem Solving." in Ward and Reed, Knowl- edge Structure and Use. 3. Richard J. Light, "Capitalizing on Variation: How Conflicting Research Findings Can Be Helpful For Policy," Educational Researcher 8 (October 1979): 7-1 1. 4. Spencer A. Ward, "Report of Survey of NIE Synthesis and Interpretation Activities" (unpublished paper, 1975). 51 VOLUME 31, NUMBER 1

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Page 1: The Philosopher as Synthesizer

EDUCATIONAL THEORY Winter 1981, Vol. 31, No. 1 @ 1981 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

The Philosopher as Synthesizer By Spencer A. Ward

Social science is under pressbre from within and from without to demonstrate that its work is relevant for guiding practice and policy making in education and other social services. The current cuts in Federal funding for social science research pro- vide added impetus to demonstrate more convincingly the relevance of social sci- ence research. The Yearbook chapters were illuminating for me in thinking about why the relevance is not more effectively demonstrated and in suggesting what steps might be taken to make social science knowledge more useful. Much of this review consists of the building of a tentative conceptual framework which suggests interrelationships between the nature of knowledge and the usefulness of knowledge. The framework evolved out of my own interest in synthesis and out of my need for some larger framework from which to view the Yearbook chapters.

I. GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

Several factors make knowledge synthesis a useful focus for this review: 1) the relevance of the philosopher's concern with knowledge in general to knowledge synthesis; 2) the illustrations of issues in synthesis provided in the Yearbook chap- ters; 3) my hope that philosophers of education will undertake a more explicit syn- thesis function; and 4) the interest of NIE in doing synthesis and studying knowl- edge characteristics and the synthesis process. More generally, my own interest in usefulness of knowledge matches well with the aim of many of the Yearbook chapters to demonstrate how philosophy of education can contribute to educa- tional practice.

In this review the Yearbook chapters will be drawn upon to examine the nature of knowledge, to highlight some aspects of knowledge synthesis, and to build a case for philosophers of education taking on a more explicit knowledge synthesis task. Although the focus of the review will be o n the nature of knowledge synthesis and on the philosopher as synthesizer, the issues raised can be seen as relevant to the more general issue of how philosophers of education can use their special skills to contribute to educational research, practice and policy making. We usually think of synthesis as an academic pursuit, but the same skills are involved ~. in cur- riculum development,' policy analysis,' and analysis of evaluation finding^.^

NIE Interests in Practical Synthesis. Synthesis has been a specific interest of NIE since it began. That interest was highlighted in a 1976 survey which revealed that the Institute supported two to three hundred synthesis activities each year.4 A 1977

Spencer Ward, Dissemination and Improvement of Practice, National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C.

1. Paul De Hart Hurd, "Synthesis Processes Applied to Developing a Curriculum Frame- work," in Spencer A. Ward and Linda J. Reed. eds., Knowledge Structure and Use: Theory and Practice of Synthesis and lnterpretation (Washington, D.C.; National Institute of Education, forthcoming).

2. Robert F. Rich, "Knowledge Synthesis and Problem Solving." in Ward and Reed, Knowl- edge Structure and Use.

3. Richard J. Light, "Capitalizing on Variation: How Conflicting Research Findings Can Be Helpful For Policy," Educational Researcher 8 (October 1979): 7-1 1.

4. Spencer A. Ward, "Report of Survey of NIE Synthesis and Interpretation Activities" (unpublished paper, 1975).

51 VOLUME 31, NUMBER 1

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52 EDUCATIONAL THEORY

planning conference on synthesis5 led to the commissioning of twenty papers on theoretical and practical aspects of synthesis.'j Many of those papers will be refer- enced in this review.

In addition to supporting numerous synthesis activities, the Institute program on Dissemination and Improvement of Practice has recently initiated planning for a new research area in Educational Knowledge Studies.' The new research area will encourage and support studies of knowledge characteristics and of processes involved in knowledge synthesis. Work in this new research area will contribute to development of more effective strategies for dissemination and use of knowledge in improvement of practice.

Phifosophers as Synthesizers. Since several of the chapters in the Yearbook illus- trate important aspects of synthesis and since philosophy is generally expected to look at broader knowledge issues, I have chosen to use the review to make a plea for philosophers to take a more active role in the practical synthesis of knowledge and in the study of the synthesis process as a means of building knowledge.

The idea of encouraging such a role for philosophers was occasioned by the discussions in the first two chapters by Soltis and Broudy of the evolving nature of the work of philosophy of education. Those authors appeared to be saying that philosophers of education have only infrequently been sought out as sources of wisdom in education (pp. 16, 17, 22) and that the field is exploring ways to be faith- ful to the broader perspectives of philosophy and to be relevant to specific topics in educational practice and policy making (pp. 28, 29, 33, 34, 35). Soltis also sug- gests (p. 17) that some philosophers of education will move into policy studies in which, I assume, synthesis functions will be important.

The synthesis orientation was further supported by Broudy's suggestion (p. 34) that one of the tasks of the philosopher of education is to clarify ideas and show their relationship to practice. That is a nice summary of the goal of the practical synthesis I will be discussing in this review. The Martin, Beck and Strike chapters also illustrate that the philosopher can bring to bear on the synthesis task distinc- tive and very important skills and perspectives. Those authors demonstrate a per- spective on how the issues which they are examining have been addressed, often in quite different terms, in the past and how the issues relate to broader questions in philosophy and education in the present. The skills involved in identifying under- lying assumptions, sharpening definitions and analyzing explicit and implicit con- flicts are also well illustrated in these chapters.

The research literature relevant to education is growing rapidly. If that litera- ture is to have an impact, some discipline with a broad view must take on a syn- thesis task. I will use the Yearbook chapters to illustrate how philosophers of edu- cation are taking steps in that direction and will suggest further steps to be taken if they are to perform a synthesis function or, more generally, i f they are to make a more significant contribution to educational practice.

The next section will examine the nature of knowledge and how knowledge and synthesis are related. Subsequent sections will develop a model of the activities involved in synthesizing knowledge for practitioners and will review approaches to synthesis, using the Yearbook chapters as examples. The Yearbook chapters stimu- lated the building of the model of synthesis, which in turn provides a context for the review of the Yearbook.

The discussion of knowledge highlights some of the problems in communicat- ing - whether among researchers, among practitioners, or between researchers and practitioners. For those of us primarily concerned with the dissemination or

5. Spencer A. Ward, "Report on Conference on Knowledge Synthesis and Interpretation"

6. Ward and Reed, Knowledge Structure and Use. 7. Educational Knowledge Studies Research Area Plan (Draft), (Washington, D.C.: Na-

(Report of Conference held in Washington, D.C., July 11-12, 1977) (unpublished paper, 1977).

tional Institute of Education, 1981).

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PHILOSOPHER AS SYNTHESIZER 53

the use of knowledge to improve practice, a continuing concern is with what we can say or write which will be useful in facilitating improvement of practice.

11. RELATIONSHIP OF SYNTHESIS TO KNOWLEDGE

To provide a broader context for an examination of knowledge synthesis I will suggest relationships of synthesis to knowledge and to an emerging “sociocentric” view of knowledge. The sociocentric perspective, according to Soltis, includes the “recognition that knowledge cannot be separated from knowers, that human beings construct different knowledge systems, and that all knowledge is imbedded in the fabric of social life” (p. 98). Basically this involves the realizations that people see things differently and that the way individuals see things is influenced by their social settings.

Soltis notes the associated arguments that objective knowledge is not pos- sible and that we are left with complete relativism. His attempt in the bulk of his chapter to allay the threat of relativism to education was not reassuring. The ques- tion of whether there is any objective knowledge to be taught was still very real and was intensified in the Phillips chapter.

Phillips introduces his chapter with the assertion that science can provide guidelines for practice but that specific behaviors must be guided by the art of the practitioner (p. 237). This suggests a reasonable and limited goal for educational research. However, by the end of his discussion of relativism I was left wondering if science can lead to any knowledge on which the practitioner can rely.

The enigmatic and vaguely hopeful ending of the Soltis chapter, plus the enig- matic and apparently pessimistic endings of both the Phillips (p. 261) and McClellan (p. 288) chapters reflect for me the troubling implications of efforts to define what we mean by knowledge and knowing.

Soltis’s question of whether we know anything with enough certainty to teach to students is equally an issue for those concerned with dissemination and profes- sional development, i.e., what do we know which we can expect to be helpful to practitioners and policy makers?

I find it helpful in considering the impact of a sociocentric view of knowledge to examine four implications of the concept for our understanding of knowledge- implications for: 1) the conceptual structure of knowledge; 2) types of knowledge; 3) communication of knowledge; and 4) the processes of synthesis as knowledge building. The first two relate to the question of what we can know; the third relates to how we can communicate; and the fourth relates to how we can build knowledge.

Conceptual Structure of Knowledge. Both Soltis and Phillips in their chapters draw- ing on epistemology and history of science refer to competing or incommensurable paradigms for dealing with similar situations between and even within disciplines. Their use of the term paradigms was first confusing for me (and may be for others), since Kuhn refers to the social sciences as pre-paradigmatic. However, their use is consistent with Kuhn’s 1969 interpretation that pre-paradigmatic refers to lack of mature paradigms, rather than lack of paradigms8

The Soltis and Phillips discussions of paradigms do not emphasize differ- ences between mature sciences and pre-paradigmatic or immature sciences. From my own experience, however, I believe that their statements about the incomrnensura- bility of paradigms are applicable to social sciences as well as physical sciences. In addition, much work in cognitive scienceg is consistent with the Soltis and Phillips discussions in that it has demonstrated differences in individuals’ schemata and the influence of those schemata on what people perceive and remember in a situation or a

8. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 179.

9. Rand J. Spiro, “Understanding and Remembering Verbal Information: Implications of Psychological Research for Knowledge Synthesis,” in Ward and Reed, Knowledge Structure and Use.

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written document. Nevertheless, I feel wary about attempts to apply Kuhn's ideas, which are based on studies of physical sciences, to social sciences where knowledge is of a very different sort - basically involving the knower's knowledge of himiherself in contrast to knowing about nonhuman things and events.

The meaning of paradigm has been the source of significant confusion since Kuhn's 1962 book. In a postscript to the 1969 second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn attempted to sort out the meanings of paradigm by noting four "main sorts of components of a disciplinary matrix."1° The four com- ponents are "symbolic generalizations," "metaphysical paradigms," "values," and "exemplars" of problem-solutions.'l Kuhn struggles to identify which of those components is most appropriately called a paradigm. In my reading of the Soltis and Phillips chapters, I believe paradigm has come to be used to signify the basic conceptual structure of knowledge. That structure can best be thought of as the entire "disciplinary matrix," including all four components. In the rest of this re- view paradigm will be taken to have that broad meaning.

Kuhn states that the four parts "form a whole and function together" but are not "of a piece."'* His emphasis, however, is on the separate parts, rather than on their functioning together. My impression is that the disciplinary matrix or para- digm is a complex network, rather than four clearly separable things.

In addition to the use of paradigm as a broad and inclusive knowledge struc- ture, it is useful to highlight the first component of the "disciplinary matrix." Kuhn illustrates the "symbolic generalization" with several laws of physics. He notes that they function as laws and also serve to define some of the variables i n ~ o l v e d . ' ~ I will use the term conceptual framework or framework as approximately equivalent to Kuhn's "symbolic generalizations." The framework identifies and, by implica- tion, defines significant variables and their interactions in a situation. It might thus be considered the core of the paradigm. Frameworks might be represented schemati- cally as models, varying in their level of detail. In the Yearbook the only attempt to systematically spell out parts of a framework is seen in Ennis's (p. 145) general model of the components of the rational thinker.

The framework and paradigm are closely interdependent. We might conceive of a mutual maturing process whereby a preliminary framework is tested and revised, and as the other three aspects of a disciplinary matrix are developed, the framework evolves into an immature paradigm. As the immature paradigm is tested, revised, and accepted, it becomes a mature paradigm. In the maturing process the initial framework may change significantly.

In this review, framework will be used to refer to the conceptual structure of an area or discipline when no more complete paradigm has emerged. Since the emergence of a paradigm may not be obvious, the use of framework vs. paradigm is often arbitrary.

The concept of framework is important because it is so often neglected and because the Martin, Beck and Strike chapters, as discussed later, provide exam- ples of more inclusive frameworks. The related term, schema, will be used to refer to the conceptual structures in which knowledge is organized in human memory.

Regardless of the terms we use, a major point of Soltis and Phillips is that in social science we have competing frameworks (or paradigms) for describing most situations or events. Each framework leads to a distinctive view of a situation, dis- tinctive definitions of terms and distinctive statements of a problem. Most of the statements to be made about frameworks and paradigms might equally well be made about knowledge generally.

Types of Knowledge. Throughout the Yearbook the term knowledge refers to knowl- edge which is socially accepted, like a paradigm. It is the knowledge of a discipline

10. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 182-187. 11. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 184-187. 12. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 182. 13. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, p. 184.

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P H I L O S O P H E R AS S Y N T H E S I Z E R 55

or of a culture. In the Soltis and Phillips discussions of the relativism of knowledge they appear to contrast available knowledge in social science with some more com- plete or adequate knowledge.

In this context it is useful to distinguish the mature paradigms and knowledge of many of the physical sciences from the immature paradigms and knowledge of present social science. Kuhn examines the transition to greater maturity of paradigmsi4 and criteria for more mature paradigm^.'^ For our purposes the most interesting criterion is "guarantees that the truly clever practitioner will succeed."16 Unfortunately, that criterion is not defined or discussed and it is not clear whether the reference is to the practitioner as engineer (or teacher) or to the practitioner of re- search.

I will use the terms paradigm and mature to refer to the major conceptual struc- ture for practitioners as for researchers - recognizing, however, that the nature of the paradigm components may be quite different and that maturity may have different criteria in practice than in research. We have no generally accepted termi- nology for describing more mature practical knowledge. I assume that the final criterion is that it is effective in guiding practice.

Kuhn's four parts of a disciplinary matrix" are discussed from the perspective of guiding research. It appears that some parts of a mature paradigm (and as- sociated detail and implications) would be common to the research and practice communities and that other parts would be peculiar to each community. We might visualize this as an hourglass (Figure 1) with the shared knowledge at the neck and the paradigms and the larger body of associated knowledge of each community linked to the shared knowledge.

In the social sciences practical knowledge would usually involve a cross-disci- plinary paradigm, since most areas of practice relate to several disciplines. Thus, the knowledge shared between research and practice would be interdisciplinary knowledge or parts of an interdisciplinary paradigm. Figure 2 suggests the cur- rent immature knowledge in social science. The broken lines in Figure 2 suggest

Practice Knowledge

Practice paradigm

Shared knowledge

1, *Research paradigm . _ -

Knowledge 1 Research \ Figure 1. Relationships among mature research

and practice knowledge

14. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 178-181. 15. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 179, 206. 16. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 179. 17. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 182-187.

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56 E DUCATI ONAL THEORY

Figure 2. Relationships among immature research and practice knowledge

the very limited sharing of knowledge between the research and practice commu- nities and among research disciplines and practice disciplines. A comparison of Fig- ures 1 and 2 highlights the differences between the more mature physical sciences and the immature social sciences.

I will refer to mature and immature paradigms and the associated bodies of knowledge as knowledge-in-general or accepted knowledge in contrast to the knowledge-in-use which Soltis refers to as specific to the individual and more directly related to the individual’s behavior (p. 110).

In the Educational Knowledge Studies research plan referred to earlier I have suggested a third category of knowledge, written or spoken knowledge, which might be considered as an artifact of knowledge-in-general and knowledge-in-use. This category was introduced because we usually deal with written or spoken knowledge and yet cannot be sure that it is an accurate reflection of either of the other types of knowledge. The other clue we have to the content of knowledge-in- general and knowledge-in-use is the behaviors of a group or community and the behaviors of an individual. More generally we might say that knowledge-in-general and knowledge-in-use are reflected in varying degrees in behaviors, such as writ- ing or speaking and teaching or gathering research data.

In a mature science we can assume a close match exists between knowledge- in-general and knowledge-in-use. We can also assume a general match between those two types of knowledge land written or spoken knowledge. However, even in mature sciences written and spoken knowledge appear to be less than com- plete.’* For example the mastery of research disciplines or practices, such as engi- neering, usually requires extended practice and personal contact with experts in the field, as well as the mastery of knowledge from books and journals.

In an immature science like education we cannot expect a close match be- tween knowledge-in-general and knowledge-in-use. As previously discussed, we are coming to the realization that in social sciences a given situation may be per- ceived and described quite differently depending upon the orientation of the ob- server.

As a result of the multiple paradigms, the match between written or spoken knowledge and either knowledge-in-general or knowledge-in-use becomes much more problematic in social science. An individual’s espoused (written or spoken) knowledge

18. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 191

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may also differ significantly from their knowledge-in-use.lg The knowledge in any written or spoken statement can be assumed to represent in varying degrees the idiosyncratic frameworks of the writer, the frameworks of the one of more research or practice communities to which the writer belongs and the writer's perception of the framework or paradigm of the audience for which the document is prepared. The definitions of terms, the statement of problems, and the guidance for behavior are determined by some interaction of those frameworks. Thus, in the social sciences, written or spoken knowledge are less certain reflections of an individual's knowledge- in-use or of a discipline's knowledge-in-general. In addition, written or spoken knowl- edge cannot represent a mature knowledge-in-general, since that does not exist in the social sciences. The complex environmental influences on behavior and beliefs are reviewed by WeigelzO and Holzner.zl

The incommensurable paradigms of social science thus lead to additional uncertainties or relativism in knowledge: 1) the relationship between research knowledge and practice knowledge is uncertain; 2) the relationship between knowl- edge-in-general and knowledge-in-use is uncertain; and 3) the relationship be- tween either of those and written or spoken language is uncertain.

Commun ica t i on of Knowledge. Based on the preceding discussion of the relativism of knowledge, it appears that a person can communicate hisiher knowledge only to persons who share hidher knowledge structures (e.g., paradigms) and pro- cesses of knowing. (Processes of knowing, e.g., the processes of assimilation, ac- commodation, and problem solving more generally, differ among persons and groups, but I will not pursue that here.) In addition to the major problems in con- ceptual content, communication among groups is further impeded by significant differences in style and format of presentation within and among different groups.

If we expect knowledge to be useful in a given school we probably need to know the relevant knowledge-in-use in that school, which may be different from the espoused knowledge or the knowledge-in-general of teachers. We still don't know much about how to determine knowledge-in-use, but research on schema theory and teacher decision makingz2 may soon enable us to do that.

As noted previously, the commitment of NIE and of philosophy of education to communicating knowledge to practitioners and policy makers leads to a shared concern with how we can be certain of the validity of knowledge and of its useful- ness to those groups. The following discussion provides a context for the further discussion of synthesis as a way to address those concerns.

Processes of Synthesis as Know ledge Building. In spite of the increasing need for and the more frequent performance of synthesis, little has been done to study the synthesis process or determine most effective approaches to synthesis. In recent years numerous papers have been written about quantitative approaches to synthesisz3 Jacksonz4 has done a survey of synthesis activities which highlights the lack of agreement on how to do synthesis and how to assess the adequacy of a synthesis. More re- cently Cooperz5 has suggested five stages of synthesis (or literature review) parallel

19. Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Theory in practice: increasing professional effective- ness (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974).

20. Russell H. Weigel, "Behavioral Implications of Knowledge: Lessons from the Attitude- Behavior Controversy," in Ward and Reed, Knowledge Structure and Use.

21. Burkart Holzner, "Social Processes and Knowledge Synthesis." in Ward and Reed, Knowledge Structure and Use.

22. Gerald Duffy and Linda Anderson, Conceptions of Reading, Final Report, IRT Research Series1 11 (East Lansing, MI: lnstitutefor ResearchonTeaching, Michigan State University, 1982).

23. Herbert J. Walberg and Edward H. Haertel, ed., "Research Integration: The State of the Art," Evaluation in Education: An lnternational Review Series, 4, 1 (1980).

24. Gregg 8. Jackson, "Methods for integrative reviews," Review of Educational Re- search 50 (1980): 438460.

25. Harris M. Cooper, "Scientific Guidelines for Conducting Integrative Research Reviews," Review of Educational Research (in press).

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to stages of research, and Ward26 has documented In detail a consensus-building approach to knowledge synthesis.

The Yearbook chapters help us to consider synthesis within a larger context and to reexamine the question of the impact of incommensurability on the relativism of knowledge and the possibility of synthesis. The concept of paradigm implies the acceptance of the paradigm by some significant number of persons. Paradigm thus implies a sociocentric view of knowledge. Work in the sociology of knowledgez7 also suggests that social settings influence the knowledge produced and the knowledge accepted as valid. In turn, the social setting is influenced by the knowledge accepted in that setting.

Placing synthesis in the context of Phillips' discussion of the history of science, we might think of the normal process of paradigm building and revision as a natural or informally structured synthesis and consensus-building process with some element of luck and relatively little planning. The term synthesis usually implies an evolutionary building of knowledge based on the analysis and integration of prior research findings. This is consistent with the Soltis (p. 108) and Phillips (p. 244) emphases on the importance of Lakatos's "evolutionist" position, in contrast to Kuhn's emphasis on a "revolution," which emphasizes a Gestalt switch in per- spective.28

Lakatos's reference to programs of scientific research as the context of para- digm shifts (p. 253) is also consistent with the equating of synthesis with knowledge building. However, Lakatos's reference to programs implies more rationality and coherence in the natural evolution of ideas than there is evidence in the social sci- ences to support. As with the synthesis process, we have only recentlyz9 begun to study the details of the processes involved in the natural building of paradigms or knowledge.

Traditionally synthesis is thought of with greater emphasis on the product (a synthesis) than on the process of synthesis. A number of terms are frequently used with no clear distinctions from synthesis. Some of those are literature review, meta-analysis, state-of-the-art, and interpretation. The two latter terms are more frequently related to practice while literature review, meta-analysis and synthesis are more frequently re- lated to research. In the most general sense synthesis can be used to refer to all efforts to relate knowledge, including previously unrelated or contradictory knowledge, and to show how it is relevant to a specific situation or topic.

The synthesis process is similar to the processes involved in problem solving, planning, policy making, and the development of the problem statement and hypoth- eses in a research project. The distinction is that synthesis is focused on creating new formsof knowledge, while the other activities are focused on solving aspecific problem or designing and interpreting a single research project. The distinction between synth- esis and policy analysis is less clear. Policy analysis is usually more focused on a problem or problem situation. However, as with synthesis, it is expected to provide a broad context as a basis for making policy.

Many textbooks and review articles are syntheses. Many articles in practitioner journals would also be considered syntheses. Synthesis can be done superficially and briefly or in depth over an extended period. Synthesis is not seen as an evalu- ative term. Little is to be gained by labeling one product a synthesis and another as something less than a synthesis. It is important, however, to be able to evaluate the usefulness of a synthesis. Four criteria which seem most important in deter- mining the adequacy and usefulness of a synthesis are addressed later in this review.

Synthesis in the disciplines might be considered to involve the explicating and detailing of the four parts of Kuhn's "disciplinary matrix." I have not seen an

26. Spencer A. Ward, "Documentation and Analysis of a Consensus-Building Approach to

27. See, for example, Holzner, "Social Processes and Knowledge Synthesis." 28. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 204. 29. Karin D. Knorr, "Producing and Reproducing Knowledge: Descriptive or Construc-

Knowledge Synthesis," in Ward and Reed, Knowledge Structure and Use.

tive?" Social Science lnforrnation 16 (1 977): 669-696.

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example of such a synthesis in the social sciences. In spite of the time and effort spent in disciplinary synthesis, we have no standard structure for social science synthesis .30

In this discussion, however, the focus is on synthesis of knowledge from re- search and practice to provide guidance for practice. For convenience we will refer to this as a practical (or pragmatic) synthesis. It might include frameworks for understanding situations, definitions of terms, guidelines for decision making, descriptions of practices, etc. Such a practical synthesis, if useful in guiding prac- tice, may lead to changes in disciplinary paradigms.

We might consider three general types of knowledge building or synthesis: 1) the informally structured knowledge building discussed by Soltis and Phillips; 2) the more traditional synthesis which requires little or limited consensus; and 3) a synthesis which requires broad consensus and will be discussed in the next section as formally structured practical knowledge synthesis. At the end of the next section, Figure 3 outlines a larger set of knowledge-building processes.

1 1 1 . FORMALLY STRUCTURED PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE SYNTHESIS

The Soltis and Phillips discussions of the incommensurability of paradigms suggest that our knowledge in social science is limited to a series of incomplete paradigms and that more complete paradigms must await new research and little- understood "revolutions." The lack of common definitions and measures associated with the incommensurability concept also suggests that such revolutions may not occur.

One approach to knowledge synthesis is to finesse the incommensurability. Three approaches to the finesse as suggested by Strike and Posner3' are: 1) look for actions on which people can agree, regardless of whether they agree about the reasons; 2) describe events in ways which are neutral to particular theories; or 3) use a bilingual approach, describing a given situation from the perspectives of several paradigms. Each of these has limited potential because of the nature of the interdependency of paradigms and associated behaviors and terms. However, in those situations where one of the three approaches is appropriate, its use may contribute to the development of a more inclusive framework.

Another approach, which will be the subject of the rest of this review, is the building of more mature frameworks which incorporate the knowledge of the sev- eral competing or incommensurable paradigms. Although philosophy, as seen in the Soltis and Phillips chapters, is committed to the relativistic and incommensur- ability views discussed above, the chapters by Martin, Beck and Strike suggest, by example, that we can move toward more mature paradigms. The concepts of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis in dialectical logic3z are helpful in conceptualizing the work in those three chapters. The synthesis, by taking a larger view of the situation, incorporates the competing frameworks or paradigms and makes sense of the prior disagreements.

The emphasis on building more inclusive (and more mature) frameworks is based on two assumptions. The first is that different research and practice groups and individuals each see or emphasize some part of the relevant factors in any situation; or, as Soltis suggests, different paradigms serve as different lenses for viewing the same situation (p. 106). The second assumption, based on the first, is that a more inclusive framework must integrate knowledge from different para- digms. Such a goal is consistent with Kuhn's discussion of the birth of new para- d i g m ~ . ~ ~

30. Gregg 8. Jackson, "Methods for integrative reviews." 31. Kenneth Strike and George Posner, "Epistemological Problems in Organizing Social

32. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Macrnillan & Go., 1961). 33. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 64, 65.

Science Knowledge for Application," in Ward and Reed, Knowledge Structure and Use.

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PHILOSOPHER AS SYNTHESIZER 61

We might think of Kuhn's processes of normal science and revolutionary sci- ence as happening within a discipline, but if social science knowledge is to help practitioners, a similar process is needed across disciplines. This suggests the need for revolutions (or evolutions) of a very broad scope - revolutions which humans may not be able to make through the usual informally structured knowledge build- ing. The human limits are both cognitive in terms of the limited number of variables that can be considered at one time and social in terms of the social supports needed for creative work - the kinds of supports sometimes provided by disciplines and departments, but generally absent across those.

In the previous section I suggested that synthesis can be seen as an approach to knowledge building. I am now suggesting that new frameworks and paradigms can be built. The nature of people and paradigms in resisting change suggests that interdisciplinary synthesis requires more supports than are usually provided. The supports, to be described later, constitute what will be referred to here as a formally structured practical synthesis, in contrast to the informally structured pro- cesses discussed by Soltis and Phillips. A similar process might be used to pro- duce a research-oriented synthesis, but that will not be discussed here.

Such practical synthesis would be quite different from that now frequently done in the disciplines. Most research-based syntheses present knowledge from only one of several potential perspectives and do not draw explicit implications for practice. If the practitioner is to use such a synthesis heishe must attempt to make sense of the conflicts with other perspectives, as well as the yet different perspec- tives of practitioners in general and of groups of professionals. Given that situation, the relative lack of usefulness of many such syntheses to practitioners is no surprise.

A formally structured approach to practical synthesis would include work with researchers and practitioners over an extended time period, using consensus approaches to build knowledge conceptually and socially. This approach would at- tack the problem of apparent unreliability of social science knowledge and provide a setting in which the characteristics of the paradigms of researchers and practi- tioners can be studied.

Drawing upon the preceding discussion of structures of knowledge, types of knowledge and processes of knowledge building, Figure 3 outlines major types of knowledge and processes of knowledge building.

In Figure 3 the rows indicate the knowledge outcomes (frameworks and con- tent) and the associated knowledge-building processes. The columns indicate some of the types of knowledge. The types of knowledge outcomes and processes indicated are not expected to include all the possibilities. The arrows at the bottom of the figure suggest that the processes associated with each type of written and spoken knowledge include specific processes, plus the processes associated with knowledge-in-use and with written knowledge processes to the right in the figure. We are actually only beginning to learn about the knowledge-building processes.

In a mature science each type of knowledge would represent or be generally consistent with the accepted paradigm. In an immature science or one with only incommensurable immature paradigms, there would be no necessary consistency of conceptual structure within or across the types of knowledge. If a formally struc- tured practical knowledge synthesis were effective it would move toward a mature knowledge for practice. This mature knowledge for practice is expected to include parts of a mature interdisciplinary paradigm for related research.

Many of the types of knowledge and processes indicated in the figure are not a major concern here. The purpose of the figure is to set the discussion in the broadest context and, hopefully, to avoid confusion with knowledge types and pro- cesses which we are not considering. The column on the left marked with 0 is the subject of the rest of this review.

factors Which Have Blocked Moving in That Direction. Several factors have inter- fered with doing such interdisciplinary knowledge building and to a lesser extent with disciplinary knowledge building. Three of the major factors are: 1) the assump- tion that it cannot be done; 2) the lack of long-term broadly based efforts (proce-

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dural structuring); and 3) the lack of attention to broader conceptual frameworks (conceptual structuring). The negative assumption is, perhaps, the most important factor and is contributed to by a) the academic norms; b) negative experiences with interdisciplinary efforts; and c) the belief that incommensurability makes the task impossible.

(a) Most knowledge building occurs in academic settings in which the incen- tives are linked to disciplinary success. Publication and academic advancement are easier if work is in a clearly defined discipline. Similarly, synthesis and development are generally less respectable activities than disciplinary research. Most university instruction and graduate study is in the disciplines and the Ph.D. dissertation is usually expected to be narrowly focused. The result of this academic experience for students and professors is aset of norms which tend to narrow rather than broaden one’sview. In addition, persons trained in that setting have little opportunity to learn or practice the cognitive and interpersonal skills required for building more inclusive frameworks.

(b) With the repeated assertion that advances in the social sciences require interdisciplinary efforts, a number of such projects have been attempted. Unfor- tunately many of those efforts have been frustrating because of such factors as competitive interactions and the lack of clear goals. Similarly, past efforts at con- sensus building, such as the use of Delphi techniques, have not been seen as con- tributing to knowledge building. They have not dealt with the conceptual frame- works involved or have been at too high or too low a level of abstraction. Either too high or too low a level of abstraction can be used to avoid the points of major con- troversy. Other problems with consensus building are that the persons involved have not represented all the relevant perspectives (resulting in blind spots) or that the group falls into a group-think pattern34 where knowledge is not challenged, or a compromise position is accepted to avoid conflict.

(c) The nature of paradigms and the different types of knowledge help us to understand our difficulties in knowing, communicating, and building new knowl- edge. However, an understanding of those factors can be used either to contribute to building more inclusive paradigms or as a reason to not attempt such building. In the Soltis and Phillips chapters I perceive that the concept of incommensurabil- ity contributed to a relativistic view of knowledge and to a general assumption that consensus cannot be reached (p. 34). However, the links between incommensur- ability and relativism are not direct; the intervening implicit and crucial assumption is that because of the incommensurability of paradigms, more mature frameworks cannot be built or must await a “revolution,” which is unlikely, at best.

The emphasis on incommensurability tends to obscure another aspect of the paradigm. As discussed earlier, paradigms related to a given situation can be thought of as lenses, through which we can see different parts of the situation. We might think of those paradigms as being complementary. For example, the behavioral and cognitive views of learning would be considered incommensurable. In my experience they each also describe an aspect or type of learning, and I have seen skilled teachers who function as though they believed that both paradigms are relevant in describing learning and teaching.

I suggest that a concept of complementarity should receive equal attention to that of incommensurability. Complementarity is also consistent with an evolu- tionary view of knowledge building.

Without an equal emphasis on complementarity, the concept of incommensurabil- ity can be too easily seen as sanctioning and reinforcing the boundaries among the disciplines and sub-disciplines and, thus, discouraging interdisciplinary efforts. In the emphasis on the incommensurability concept and the lack of emphasis on what I have labeled the complementarity concept, we have a nice example of the impact of the social setting, in this case the university and the academic norms, on the acceptance of a paradigm which supports the existence of the academic structures and norms.35

34. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Group Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972). 35. Holzner, “Social Processes and Knowledge Synthesis.”

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From the above discussion we might think that the relativistic position and the assumption that more mature knowledge cannot be built are ways to avoid hard work. I think, however, that the negative assumption is better seen as a mani- festation of a tendency of people, in response to their very limited (7 + 2) cognitive capacity, to simplify their complex world by building paradigms or partial para- d i g m ~ . ~ ~ Once those paradigms are built people tend to cling to them and build social structures, like research disciplines, to protect themselves and their para- digms from the threat of new knowledge.

From a more positive side the concept of incommensurability alerts us to the complexity of the synthesis task and to the need to take into account in planning synthesis activities the differences in terms, definitions and measures existing be- tween paradigms as well as the complex social processes involved in the accep- tance of existing and new paradigms.

The other two factors mentioned above which have interfered with doing interdis- ciplinary consensus building and contributed to the negative assumptions are the procedural and conceptual structuring of such efforts. Procedurally, these efforts have usually been attempted by small groups for short periods or by larger groups for even shorter periods and with little attention to the conceptual, affective and accountability supports needed for such high-risk endeavor^.^' Conceptually, relatively little effort has been put into the complex task of building and revising more adequate conceptual frameworks. Frameworks have been ignored or rather carelessly created.38 As will be discussed later, the Martin, Beck and Strike chapters provide examples of building more inclusive frameworks within which synthesis might begin.

Agryris and Schon, in studying organizational planning and problem solving, have suggested that the improvement of practice often requires looking beyond the available approaches and knowledge to examine the underlying assumptions and to build new knowledge. Their "double-loop'' learning39 model and the asso- ciated interpersonal skills are also helpful in thinking about knowledge building.

Kuhn discusses the importance of anomaly and crisis in scientific revolution^.^^ This review is based on the assumptions that the procedural and conceptual struc- ture of the process, as well as the norms of participants, also play a major role in scientific revolutions. The discussions in the rest of the review indicate ways to overcome the blocking factors by establishing clear criteria of success and provid- ing appropriate procedural and conceptual structures.

Iv. CRITERIA OF MORE MATURE KNOWLEDGE

In this section the Yearbook chapters are drawn upon for positive and negative examples of four criteria of adequate knowledge or adequate synthesis. The four criteria are:

1) inclusiveness: address significant variable sand interactions, making sense

2) unequivocalness: use and provide a basis for unambiguous use of terms; 3) practicalness: provide guidance for practice; and 4) consensus: represent a consensus - i.e., be acceptable and relevant

of available data;

to researchers and practitioners.

The Yearbook chapters suggest that the first two of these factors are areas of special

36. George A. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two," Psychological

37. Ward, "Documentation and Analysis of a Consensus-Building Approach to Knowledge

38. Ward, "Documentation and Analysis of a Consensus-Building Approach to Knowledge

39. Argyris and Schon, Theory in Practice. 40. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 52 and 66.

Review 63 (1956): 81-97; and Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 64-65.

Synthesis."

Synthesis."

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interest and expertise of philosophers of education; that the third is an area of increas- ing interest; and that the consensus building may be useful to philosophers of educa- tion. Activities associated with each of the criteria have two general outcomes: the first is to contribute to building a more inclusive framework, and the second is to contribute to the social validation and acceptance of the resulting knowledge.

The four criteria are interactive and overlapping. The goals of the formally struc- tured practical synthesis are inclusiveness, unequivocalness and practicality. The test of those is consensus. One could also say that the goal is consensus on the inclusive- ness, unequivocalness and practicality of the synthesis. Thus, in consensus building there is also a building of inclusiveness, unequivocalness, and practicality. I assume that the associated processes are interdependent, so achieving consensus on any one of the first three criteria requires achieving consensus on the other two; consensus is defined in terms of the first three criteria; and, in turn, the achievement of those three criteria is defined in terms of consensus. Because of the interactions among the criteria, many issues and activities discussed under any one criterion could be seen as equally relevant to one or more of the other criteria.

The following discussion deals with both the criteria and the approaches to achieving them. The criteria and approaches are related specifically to formally structured practical synthesis. Much of this discussion may also be relevant to research synthesis and to knowledge building more generally. The four criteria provide a needed cross-disciplinary accountability.

Inclusiveness. Inclusiveness can be thought of on several dimensions, including: 1) the range of relevant variables (e.g., feelings, thoughts and behaviors); 2) the range of abstract and concrete (or practical) (e.g., theory and practice); and 3) the range of general and particular (or specific) (e.g., teaching style and teaching be- haviors). Martin, in her chapter on curriculum, emphasizes the importance of con- sidering all the relevant variables. She suggests that value judgments, as well as rational analysis, must be used in planning curriculum and that “development of such central aspects of human existence as action, feelings and emotion” (p. 46) should be considered.

On this dimension of the range of variables considered, a writer is faced with the danger of attempting to include all the relevant variables, which is often an impossible measurement task and often so complex to discuss that the reader is lost. One approach to confronting this danger is to examine the variables included in current relevant paradigms, analyze weaknesses in those paradigms, and then develop a new framework, which provides order to the variables and interactions. This approach is nicely illustrated in the Yearbook in the chapters by Martin, Beck and Strike.

Martin takes the dominant framework of liberal education, Hirst’s “forms of knowledge,” as a focus of her critique. By an analysis of Hirst’s framework and the criticisms of that framework, she arrives at criteria for a more adequate framework. Using those criteria Martin suggests a larger framework of those factors required for the development of a person (pp. 53-55). With this larger framework she sug- gests that policy makers can identify which part of the whole public education will address (pp. 57-58).

Beck describes several currently respected views of values education and shortcomings that have been found in each of them. He then suggests a new frame- work which uses what appear to be strengths from each view and takes into account the objections to each. He finally tests his new framework by comparing it to his- torically significant philosophical views of values education.

Strike takes a similar approach in analyzing two apparently contradictory philo- sophical bases for desegregation. Having shown how each has been an inadequate guide to judicial desegregation decisions he suggests a larger framework which incorporates major concepts of each of the original two.

The approach of each of these three chapters can be thought of as finding a synthesis which resolves the conflict between a thesis and anti-thesis. The syn- thesis in each case uses concepts and terms from the original frameworks and

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places them within a larger framework in which the original apparent conflict is resolved. As a result of this approach to the analysis, a reader familiar with the field can readily relate to the new framework because its relationships to currently domi- nant frameworks and their associated terms are well delineated.

Each of the three chapters can be thought of as providing an initial step in a new synthesis or in the building of a paradigm. Further steps in defining concepts and implications may indicate problems with the framework and suggest needed modifications. My review of the Yearbook can be considered as an attempt - akin to that of Martin, Beck and Strike-to build a larger framework in the area ad- dressed by the Soltis and Phillips chapters. This later part of my review is an attempt to move beyond the framework to provide some details and implications for building knowledge.

The approaches of Martin, Beck and Strike follow the same principle as some recent synthesis efforts in education. Light4' and L a d a ~ , ~ * in their analyses of Fol- low-Through Program evaluations and of research on note-taking effects, found that conflicting outcomes of studies do not necessarily indicate that one or both are poorly done or that there are no real significant differences. Conflicting findings often mean that different variables have been measured or that some of the vari- ables having a significant effect on the outcomes were not measured. Although they do not discuss frameworks, their reports imply the need for more adequate conceptual frameworks and the usefulness of outcome studies as signals of vari- ables and interactions which must be included in an adequate framework.

The meta-analysis of empirical findings has also provided a powerful approach to identifying additional significant variables. The building of frameworks or the- ories has not been a concern of most persons doing meta-analysis, as reflected in this quotation from Glass:

We have addressed the problem of synthesizing the findings of diverse studies rather than that of synthesizing educational concepts and theories. Educational research was dust-bowl empiricism when we found it, and it is no tidier for our mini~trations.4~

In contrast Hunter, Schmidt and Jackson discuss meta-analysis as an important tool in theory d e ~ e l o p m e n t . ~ ~ The meta-analysis of findings of outcomes of direct and indirect instruction by Peterson45 provides an illustration of how meta-analysis can be used to untangle apparently contradictory findings and suggest parts of a larger framework for teaching and learning basic skills. Peterson demonstrates that the different approaches to instruction tend to produce different student outcomes. Thus, a more adequate framework is suggested - one which must include different student outcomes, as well as different types of instruction.

The second and third dimensions of inclusiveness (abstract-concrete and general-particular) are closely related and can be considered special cases of the first dimension in that they deal with types of variables. The use of abstract and general terms is important in identifying patterns which can be used to make sense of situa- tions. The use of abstract and general terms also increases the possibility of equivoca- tion (p. 151). Although there is danger of getting lost in an unlimited and unorganized collection of specifics, there is equal or greater danger of getting lost in equivocation

41. Light, "Capitalizing on Variation." 42. Harold Ladas, "Summarizing research: A case study," Review of Educational Re-

search 50 (1980): 597-624. 43. Gene V. Glass, "Synthesizing Empirical Research: Meta-Analysis," in Ward and Reed,

Knowledge Structure and Use. 44. John E. Hunter, Frank L. Schmidt and Gregg B. Jackson, "Integrating Research Find-

ings Across Studies" (East Lansing, MI: Dept. of Psychology, Michigan State University, May

45. Penelope L. Peterson, "Direct Instruction Reconsidered," in Penelope L. Peterson and Herbert J. Walberg, eds., Research on Teaching: Concepts, Findings and Implications (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corp , 1979).

1981).

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with abstractions and generalizations. (The problem of equivocation is discussed in the next section .)

Soltis suggests that the educator should aim for sense-making and being able to act effectively (p. 107). The general is necessary to organize and make sense of situations and specifics are necessary to define the abstractions and to provide guidance for effective action. The ideal is not to take the general or the specific extreme, but to work toward a combination of both into networks of abstractions and generalizations linked with concrete and particular variables and implications for practice. This approach is consistent with the approaches to the range of vari- ables dimension discussed above.

The criteria of inclusiveness, as well as the examples of work by Beck, Light, Ladas and Peterson, illustrate the concept of complementarity discussed previously. The situation in much of social science is reminiscent of the story of the blind men examin- ing different parts of an elephant and arriving at very different perceptions of the whole creature. The concepts of complementarity and inclusiveness suggest that the blind men would have a better understanding of an elephant i f they shared their observations about thedifferent parts and sought a new framework which would account for all their findings.

Unequivocalness. Although Ennis, in his chapter on rational thinking, is concerned with classroom instruction, his discussion and examples apply equally to the con- duct of philosophy of education and to synthesis. A pervasive problem in education is the use of terms with "impact equivocation" (p. 151). This is particularly im- portant since words can have very different meanings, and researchers often give terms a less common meaning. No matter how carefully a term is defined, the reader or listener will tend to give the term the meaning with which heishe is most familiar. Thus, although the writer or speaker is attempting (often laboriously) to be unambiguous, the impact is equivocation (p. 151).

Unfortunately Ennis does not examine the implications of multiple competing paradigms and the impact equivocation that almost inevitably results during at- tempts to examine an issue across disciplines or across research and practice. Ennis's quote from Wittgenstein of "language gone on a holiday" (p. 166) well de- scribes the situation in many such efforts.

The importance of the clarifying and defining functions for philosophy of edu- cation is suggested in Broudy's summary of what educators can expect from phi- losophy of education: "clarification and elucidation of concepts and arguments," including the use of "terms in one way rather than another so that ambiguity, equivo- cation and vagueness can be eliminated" (p. 34).

The analysis or evaluation of meanings or definitions to avoid equivocation is discussed by Ennis (pp. 177-180). That discussion and examples of such analysis in several of the chapters, especially those by Kerr and Strike, provide useful guid- ance for performing this important function. However, in addition to the commit- ment to clear and unambiguous terms some philosophers appear to have a fascina- tion with impact equivocation. This is seen in Soltis's use of Elkind's description of "accommodation as 'changing one's action to fit the environment' and assimilation as 'changing the environment to fit the action' " (p. 110) and in Phillips's reference to paradigms as forms of life or games (pp. 240-241). In both cases the gratuitously offered second definitions are confusing and tend to undercut the usefulness of the concepts in their more common definitions.

As one way to avoid equivocation Ennis appears to favor "ordinary-language philosophy of education" in which "greater attention is devoted to getting clear about the ordinary (that is, standard) meaning of terms and to insisting that a term be used in its ordinary sense" (pp. 165-166). In discussing the ordinary-language approach to philosophy Ennis makes a statement which contains a clue to one rea- son why the approach has not been successful: "A primary reason for trying to determine what a word really means is to avoid employing it as though it expressed a different concept, thereby confusing ourselves and others" (p. 166). The nature of our language and of knowledge is that many words have very differentreal meanings

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depending upon the context or upon the associated paradigm. The achievement of unequivocalness and clarity will depend upon a construction (rather than a discovery) of clearer and agreed-upon uses of crucial terms. When we face the reality that many meanings are real but that we need to agree upon terms so we can get to work and can learn from each other’s research, we may be able to proceed. The acceptance of such agreed-upon terms would take much time and support. Here, as in other aspects of practical knowledge synthesis, is crucial.

Achieving unequivocalness requires an inclusive framework or paradigm, which in turn includes or implies unequivocal definitions. Thus, the explication of frame- works provides a basis for definitions. It also appears from the Martin and Strike papers that the careful analysis of terms helps to surface problems in a framework and to move toward a more inclusive or mature framework. The analysis of mean- ings, as with the analysis of frameworks discussed in the preceding section, also helps to show the relationship of a new framework and its terms to currently ac- cepted frameworks and terms and thus helps to facilitate communication and acceptance of a new framework.

Pracficalness. The criterion of practicalness would be applied chiefly by the in- volvement of expert practitioners in the formulation of the initial synthesis, in the review of early drafts of the synthesis, and in the review and field testing of the practical implications provided in more complete drafts. This criterion includes perception of usefulness by practitioners and empirical evidence of effectiveness in facilitating im- proved practice. The criterion of practicalness provides an intermediate and obtainable goal and a basis for testing knowledge - a basis which is generally free of the disci- plinary paradigm conflicts. Where persons do not agree on a definition of effective practice, knowledge synthesis can be organized around the achievement of two or more outcomes.

The questions of relativeness of knowledge are most effectively challenged by the reality that many practitioners are very effective. This suggests that those expert practitioners possess something we might think of as a mature knowledge-in-use. The criterion of practicalness relies upon that knowledge-in-use. Formally structured prac- tical knowledge synthesis might serve as a procedure for explicating in written and spoken knowledge form the knowledge-in-use of the expert practitioner. This process is related to that used in the NIE-funded Interactive Research and Development on Teaching project in which groups of teachers, a researcher, and a staff developer worked together on a researchlsynthesis

The disciplines serve the important function of providing limits on the data to be considered so researchers can work without being overwhelmed. However, as sug- gested earlier, there is the almost inevitable result that some significant variableswill be left out unless there is some larger measurable accountability such as practicalness. In add ition, the criterion of practicalness forces the synthesizers to relate the synthesis to the frameworks of practitioners. Thus, the result is more likely to be useful to prac- titioners.

The criterion of practicalness has been suggested by others. Martin refers to Dewey’s efforts “to combat the tendency of educators to separate reason from emo- tion, thought from action, education from life” (p. 51). One of the editors’ notes also refers to Dewey’s argument that “if there is to be a science of education, the ultimate test of its theory must be made in actual practice” (p. 236). The dependence of knowledge-in-use on practical experience is suggested by Soltis’s discussion of Piaget’s views of learning as focusing on the interdependence of knowledge with action: “Using schemata developed by engaging the world, the individual acts, and these schema are continually modified and made more useful in the very act of taking on the world” (p. 110).

46. William J. Tikunoff, Beatrice A. Ward and Gary A. Griffin, Interactive Research and Development on Teaching, Final Report (San Francisco, CA: Far West Laboratory for Educa- tional Research and Development, 1979).

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The chapters by Beck and Strike provide examples of drawing upon "practice" or "life." Beck briefly describes four approaches to instruction in values education and apparent inadequacies of each. Strike refers to legal cases and controversy. By examin- ing actual practice and problems with practice, they identify variables which are relevant. Each then draws on relevant literature in philosophy to build a more adequate description of practice and theory.

Of the eleven chapters I find Beck's chapter on values education to be most clearly focused, most coherently organized and most helpful in understanding a situation and suggesting directions for practice. Beck's reference to materials (p. 195) suggests that the work which contributed to his paper was part of an extended practice-focused curriculum planning effort in Ontario. In that effort, extending over several years, parents, practitioners, educators and researchers were involved in intensive discussions over the goals and content of i ns t r~c t i on .~ ' Although Strike does not indicate a personal involvement in the legal debates, he has delved into the legal literature sufficiently also to have a feel of the practical issues.

In chapters by Beck and Strike the use of practice-based knowledge has con- tributed significantly toward building knowledge of practical and academic interest.

Consensus. Most syntheses done by an individual or small group ignore some variables and interactions which other equally "expert" persons consider to be important. Often the disagreement involves major differences on implications for practice. If experts disagree about its adequacy, the synthesis tends to become one more document in the flood which the practitioner must evaluate.

One might say that the R and D community should not worry about consensus but should present whatever knowledge is available and let the practitioner take what works, since practitioners are different and can be expected to find different knowl- edge useful to them. The large and rapidly expanding literature and the limited time of the practitioner makes such a laissez faire approach unsatisfactory. The practi- tioner lacks time and skills for extensive searching and generally expects someone else to provide some assessment of the validity of knowledge. From the perspective of the staff developer or disseminator, the laissez faire approach does not assist them with their task of sorting out the knowledge which will be presented to practi- tioners in practitioner journals, preservice education, or in-service courses.

This sorting is now accomplished through an informally structured consensus- building process with no consistent criteria and little attention to underlying as- sumptions and conceptual frameworks. In such a situation the review and revision of knowledge is usually limited, and research findings tend to be accepted in toto or rejected. In a formally structured process we would expect the review and revision to lead to more mature knowledge because other persons can be expected to perceive the original writer's blind spots and to identify other variables or interactions which should be included.

In addition to the above case for consensus building, Glaser has provided evidence of its importance and feasibility. In the 1973 report48 of a study of factors which contributed to the success of applied social service research projects he emphasized the importance of the original developer basing the development on knowledge which had been shared with many experts and modified based on their reactions. In a later project, synthesizing knowledge on chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,49 Glaser found repeated situations where experts differed strongly but could reach agreement after an analysis of previously ignored variables. The resulting practical synthesis product was widely accepted in the professional community.

47. James R. MacLean, "Forward to the Basics - Ontario Style." in Linda J. Reed and

48. Edward M. Glaser and Samuel H. Taylor, "Factors influencing the success of applied

49. Edward M. Glaser, "Using behavioral science strategies for defining the state-of-the-

Spencer A. Ward, eds., Basic Skills Choices and lssues (St. Louis: CEMREL, forthcoming).

research," American Psychologist 28 (1 973): 140-1 46.

art," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 16 (1980): 79-92.

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The expectation in consensus building is that agreement will be reached on how to describe a situation and on implications for practice. In some situations the best that might be achieved is agreement on two or three competing views. Those competing views would provide a basis for two or three separate syntheses and should help to identify areas of needed research. Some important factors in the consensus building process have been discussed previously in the section on factors which have blocked moving toward formally structured practical knowledge synthesis.

Consensus building involves review of the literature and review of drafts of the synthesis by experts. The Yearbook chapters do not illustrate the process of review by experts but do illustrate the results of the literature review. The review of literature activity ideally will surface alternative frameworks, data to challenge or support frameworks, and specifics to clarify and define terms. However, both the review by experts and the literature review are of limited value if they are restricted to literature and experts that represent only the initial synthesizer’s perspective. I agree with Kerr’s point that much more research is relevant to teaching than can be found under the label “research on teaching” (p. 90).

In contrast to the positive examples in the Yearbook chapters of the other three criteria, the examples of consensus building through the literature review process are negative, but nevertheless instructive. The Yearbook chapters gener- ally illustrate a very limited use of the relevant literature. The literature referenced is almost all from philosophy. No efforts are made to draw upon research or evalua- tion studies to support positions or to help identify ideas.

Several areas of research are particularly relevant and missing. Kerr makes no reference to findings from the considerable recent research on teaching - a liter- ature with which researchers and practitioners are increasingly familiar. Although I was impressed with Beck’s chapter, I found myself wanting a basis for accepting some of his assertions-e.g., a reference and brief summary of the relevant re- search on basic values (p. 196). Soltis and Ennis make no reference (except for a discussion of Piaget) to more recent work on schema theory in cognitive psychol- ogy. That, plus work by Argyris and Sch6n5O on knowledge-in-use would add sig- nificantly to the richness of the discussion and to the sense that philosophers know about and think about closely related work. In the Ennis chapter the lack of refer- ence to the research on problem solving is confusing. He emphasizes rational pro- cesses and ignores the evidence that problem solving or rational thinking involves a complex interaction between rational processes and adequate schemata related to the problem-solving s i t ~ a t i o n . ~ ’

The lack of reference to other related literature can result in an inadequate understanding of the subject under discussion, confusion of how the discussion relates to other research, and questions about the legitimacy of the assertions made. Just as in consensus building with persons, the review of the literature con- tributes to legitimacy of the new document. If the new document references and shows the relationship of the document to other knowledge which the reader be- lieves to be relevant, then the new document would presumably be considered more valid by that reader.

There is a parallel between Martin’s emphasis that curriculum should not ig- nore feelings, emotions and procedural knowledge (pp. 41, 42) and the extent to which philosophy of education ignores empirical data on events in the physical world. The following paragraph from Martin’s concluding section suggests the need of edu- cation to be based on a broader curricular paradigm. The same statement might be addressed to philosophy of education which tends to ignore the non-philosophy parts of the world in its reference base.

50. Argyris and Schon, Theory in Practice. 51. Jill Larkin, John McDermott, Dorothea P. Simon and Herbert A. Simon, “Expert and

Novice Performance in Solving Physics Problems,” Science, 208 (1980): 1335-1342; and Arthur S. Elstein, Lee S. Shulman and Sarah A. Sprafka, Medical Problem Solving, An Analysis of Clini- cal Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).

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What does matter is that the received theory of our day - the forms of knowledge theory - be replaced by a more general curricular para- digm, whether that be a paradigm of liberal education or not: one that does not ignore the forms of knowledge, but reveals their proper place in the general scheme of things as but one part of a person's education: one that integrates thought and action, reason and emotion, education and life; one that does not divorce persons from their social and natural contexts; one that embraces individual autonomy as but one of many values. What mat- ters, in other words, is that a new paradigm become established that ad- dresses itself, not simply by default, to the whole of that education which is valuable (pp. 57-58).

I hope for the sake of the legitimacy and respectability of their discipline that philosophers of education will increasingly look beyond their own literature. Tak- ing on an explict synthesis function would force them to do that and would facili- tate communication with related disciplines.

V. ACTIVITIES IN FORMALLY STRUCTURED KNOWLEDGE SYNTHESIS

This section will draw upon the Yearbook and the preceding discussion to provide a tentative model of activities involved in formally structured practical knowledge synthesis. One might think of this model as representing a combination of a synthesis activity and a development activity. Development has a tradition under Federal support of repeated iterations with modifications based on problems in use of the previous version. Most development activities, however, were not based on an extensive synthesis of the research literature but usually on one re- search perspective.

The model proposed here involves four types of activities and two phases. Fig- ure 4 suggests the relationships among the activities and phases. Extensive inter- action occurs among the activities throughout each of the two phases.

A comparison with Cooper's suggested five stages of the literature review process (problem formulation, data collection, evaluation of data, analysis and interpretation, and public pre~entat ion)~' will highlight the reason for use of the proposed model. Cooper's five stages probably reflect more accurately the typical review and analysis of Literature. His five stages imply a sequential ordering of ac- tivities, while the four activities and two phases suggested here emphasize an on- going iterative process with an analysis and interpretation process tying the activi- ties together at one moment and over time. The four activities and two phases will be discussed below.

Development of a Framework. Although the ultimate goal of this activity is the de- velopment of a paradigm and eventually a mature paradigm, in most areas of social science we must first develop more inclusive frameworks. This activity would involve aspects of Cooper's evaluation of data, analysis and interpretation, and problem formu- lation. Framework development is most like Cooper's first stage of problem formula- tion, but problem formulation often does not attend to the relevant frameworks. We have previously reviewed how personal frameworks (schemata) and disciplinary frameworks or paradigms determine what a person sees and what they consider important. Simon and others have emphasized that a person'sframework is the basis of their formulation of a problem statement.53 By not making explicit and examining the framework and associated assumptions we can arrive at an inadequate statement of the problem and perpetuate the problem in what Argyris and Schon refer to as single loop learning.54

In synthesis, research, and practice the framework or paradigm provides a basis for defining terms and relationships among terms. In varying degrees the

52. Cooper, "Scientific Guidelines for Conducting Integrative Research Reviews." 53. Larkin, et a/. , "Expert and Novice Performance in Solving Physics Problems." 54. Argyris and Schon, Theory in Practice.

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Synthesis with

consensus

Figure 4. Interactions among four activities over time to produce a synthesis

framework or paradigm also identifies factors and interactions to be considered by the practitioner in planning and decision making. For all of these reasons the framework development is placed at the center of the triangle, indicating that it is influenced by, and in turn influences, each of the other activities.

Development of Detail and Implications. The distinction between development of a framework and development of detail and implications is relative and based on the level of detail. If we think of knowledge as sets of interconnected or potentially intercon- nected frameworks, then the “detail and implications” can be thought of as frameworks which explicate meanings of terms and practice implications of those “frameworks” produced by the development of a framework activity. In a synthesis process we might think of a framework such as those suggested by Martin, Beck and Strike as a first-level or core framework. Other levels of detail are to be developed, such as what human growth and human needs include and the settings and behaviors needed for people to achieve those things.

Review of Literature and Interaction with Experts. These activities would include Cooper’s data collection, evaluation of data, analysis and interpretation and part of the public presentation. The framework would guide the initial literature review and would be modified based on the findings in the literature and in the interaction with experts.

Initial and Consensus Phases. The two phases of knowledge building include: the initial synthesis building, and the on-going review and revision of consensus build- ing. Any specific synthesis product might be seen as a first step toward a new ac- cepted framework or paradigm. The initial framework and detail of the synthesis may be performed by an individual or a small group and may be based solely on past experience or upon extensive reading of the literature and discussion with experts.

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The revisions in the second phase may require a complete rewriting of the framework and may lead to another person or persons taking responsibility for the revision. Although any involvement of more than one person and any review of the literature contribute to consensus building, for this discussion we will con- sider consensus building to be that phase after a first draft of the synthesis has been prepared. This consensus building phase requires a degree of openness and flexibility not necessarily required for the initial synthesis building.

Synthesis has typically been done in the initial phase only. The consensus phase activity has been a more informal process based on reviews, panel discussions, etc., with no accountability to use the feedback for a revision of the original syn- thesis.

If consensus building works, the reviewers would find themselves in agreement with the revised version. As this process is extended to a majority of those consid- ered expert on a topic, the new document will have acquired acceptance and a sociocentric validation.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

The Yearbook chapters, by example and by specific issues addressed, have helped me to better understand synthesis, particularly the development of frame- works. I hope this discussion of synthesis will also be helpful to philosophers.

Although the chapters suggest that the discipline has many areas for creative work, the diffuseness of some of the chapters, and the increasing demand that edu- cational research be relevant to practice, suggest the value of a more explicit em- phasis on synthesis. The tenuousness of social science funding suggests more generally that social science needs to more effectively demonstrate that their re- search has relevance for improving practice. synthesis is often done, as repre- sented in review articles, textbooks and monographs. Such synthesis activities, however, usually represent a limited view of the world - limited by the frameworks or paradigms of the synthesizer and the lack of accountability for addressing related variables in a broader literature, and for being responsive to critiques of a broader audience.

Many philosophers have a wide and historically long-range perspective which equips them for framework building and critique. Their training in analysis of fun- damental assumptions (p. 169) and their lack of commitment to any more limited body of empirical research are important qualities of the synthesizer.

If philosophers are to initiate or otherwise involve themselves in explicit knowledge synthesis, the criteria, activities and phases outlined above may be useful. In such efforts the synthesizer needs to: 1) aim for a style and organization of writing which is conducive to being read by other researchers and practitioners; 2) utilize a broad range of literature relevant to the topic addressed; and 3) actively involve practitioners and researchers from relevant disciplines in review and revision of frameworks and in explication of implications for practice and policy making. The synthesis task generally requires more attention and a broader interdisciplinary approach. If philosophers don't move in that direction social science may suffer and philosophers may find that their work has an increasingly limited audience. I suggest that an emphasis on synthesis, as described here, would strengthen and enrich the discipline.

Formally structured synthesis activities should also provide a rare opportunity to study the processes of knowledge building. In such an ongoing interactive approach to synthesis the inevitable conflicts among holders of different frameworks and paradigms would provide an opportunity to study the frameworks, paradigms and schemata of practitioners and researchers, as well as to study how people change and avoid changing these knowledge structures.

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