the partisan foundations of legislative particularism in latin
TRANSCRIPT
The Partisan Foundations of Legislative Particularism in Latin America
Andrés Mejía-Acosta Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex [email protected]
Aníbal Pérez Liñán
Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh
Sebastián M. Saiegh Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego [email protected]
In this paper we argue that organizational practices within parties, more than national electoral rules, shape legislators’ incentives to initiate particularistic (narrow in scope and distributive in nature) legislation. We test this argument using a new dataset which comprises 1,906 bills initiated by the lower chamber in Paraguay (1992-2003) and 5,175 bills initiated by congress in Ecuador (1979-2002). We estimate the propensity of legislators to initiate particularistic bills as a function of district magnitude, the existence of closed lists, seniority, the size of the party, reelection rules, and the internal procedures employed by the party to nominate candidates. Our hypothesis is supported by the analysis. Ecuador, a highly fragmented party system with “amateur” legislators, is usually cited as a case where we should expect most bills to be distributive. However, once we control for strong party leaders, we see that their presence offsets the impact of candidate-centered electoral rules. Paraguay, on the other hand, has a relatively weak president and a closed-list PR system. Thus, it is usually seen as a case where strong parties and few particularistic bills should prevail. However, in practice, the fragmentation of parties into competitive factions has encouraged the proliferation of particularistic bills.
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1. Introduction
What factors shape the link between electoral institutions and the provision of public
goods? Economists and political scientists have argued that the design of electoral
systems can create incentives for legislators to cultivate personal loyalties among voters,
and thus encourage them to pursue particularistic policies in order to serve their parochial
constituencies (Ames 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995; Hallerberg and Marier 2004;
Nielson 2003; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005; Wallack et al. 2003).
According to this view, national electoral laws that promote intra-party
competition encourage candidates to cultivate personal reputations in their districts, while
laws that preclude intra-party competition strengthen the role of party labels in electoral
contests. Therefore, electoral systems encouraging intra-party competition are also likely
to create two legislative outcomes: particularism, because legislators will seek to advance
their careers by distributing pork in their districts (Ames 2001; Crisp et al. 2004); and
weak party discipline, because legislators will defy party leaders in order to protect their
personal reputation when constituency interests are in conflict with the party line (Ames
2001; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997). These incentives are seen as a source of
inefficient legislation hindering economic development.
We contend that incentives to pursue particularistic legislation originate not only
in national electoral laws, but also in the specific procedures used by political parties to
nominate candidates. Even though electoral laws may discourage intra-party competition
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(for instance, by adopting closed-list proportional representation with large districts),
individual party organizations may still structure the nomination process in different
ways. Competitive primaries may encourage leaders of different party factions to pursue
particularistic benefits for their strongholds, while candidate selection controlled by few
national party leaders may reduce those incentives.
We explore this issue by analyzing the behavior of legislators in two challenging
cases: Ecuador, a country with open lists and relatively low levels of particularistic
legislation (only about 20 percent of the bills initiated by legislators address local issues
or provide constituency service); and Paraguay, a country with closed-list PR and a high
proportion of particularistic bills (64 percent of the bills initiated by congress are local or
oriented towards constituency service) (Araujo et al. 2004; Molinas, Pérez-Liñán, and
Saiegh 2004).
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the
common wisdom about incentives to cultivate the personal vote and introduce our
hypotheses. In the third section we compare the electoral rules and patterns of bill
introduction in three settings: Ecuador (1979-95), Paraguay (1993-2003), and Ecuador
after the introduction of open-list PR (1998-2002). We show that legislative behavior in
these cases run against common expectations. In section 4, we address this puzzle by
modeling the propensity of individual legislators to introduce particularistic bills. The
conclusions indicate that organizational procedures for nominations, more than national
electoral rules, are critical to understand legislative behavior at the individual level.
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2. The Conditional Nature of Electoral Rules
According to the conventional wisdom, three institutional factors bolster the role of
national party leaders and reduce the incentives for particularistic legislation: a strong
leadership control over party labels, vote pooling (votes are counted, aggregated, and
translated into legislative seats at the party level and not at the faction or individual
level), and a ballot structure that allows voters to cast only one vote for a party list (Carey
and Shugart 1995; Nielson 2003; Wallack et al. 2003). This tradition has thus
emphasized the effect of macro-institutional variables (electoral rules at the national
level) on legislative incentives operating at the individual level.
However, the effect of aggregate institutions is sometimes hard to anticipate. The
most visible example of this problem is the conflicting expectations generated by first-
past-the-post (FPTP) systems. While Carey and Shugart coded FPTP systems as cases in
which parties present a fixed ballot (ballot=0), Wallack et al. (2003, 137) argued that
candidates’ individual popularity is very important to gain party nominations in single-
member districts (and thus coded ballot=1). Similarly, they questioned Carey and
Shugart’s interpretation of vote pooling at the party level under FPTP (pool=0), arguing
that “candidates do not receive additional electoral support if other candidates from their
party are successful in other districts” (Wallack et al. 2003, 138). They therefore treated
the effect of single-member-districts as akin to pooling at the sub-party level (pool=1).
Finally, while Carey and Shugart treated FPTP systems as cases in which voters cast a
single vote for a party (votes=0), Wallack et al. treated them as cases in which voters cast
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a single vote for an individual (votes=2, equivalent to casting votes at the sub-party
level).1 Thus, while FPTP had the lowest score in the Carey-Shugart classification (an
additive score of zero), for Wallack et al. the system ranked high in the scale of
particularism (an additive score of three, similar to the rank Carey and Shugart gave to
Colombia). At the core of this disagreement seems to be an understanding of FPTP in the
British or in the American mold, which suggests that organizational dynamics (e.g., party
control of nominations) are assumed throughout the discussion (Cain, Ferejohn, and
Fiorina 1987, 12-15).
While we do not question that national electoral rules create particular incentives
for legislators to challenge party leaders and pursue particularistic policies, we contend
that important causal forces operate at lower levels of analysis: the district and the party
organization.
At the district level, leadership control over the party label interacts with district
magnitude to shape electoral incentives: in closed-list systems greater district magnitude
creates fewer incentives to cultivate the personal vote, but the opposite is true under open
lists or faction lists.2 In the first case, large districts make individual legislators harder to
1 The new coding rules adopted by Wallack et al. did not apply when hegemonic parties ruled the entire assembly; it was assumed that in those cases the party leaders held power over legislators’ careers. 2 For reasons of clarity, in this paper we use “closed lists” exclusively to refer to the electoral system in which parties present a fixed ballot, votes are pooled across the whole party, and voters cast a single vote. If leaders do not control access to ballots, pooling takes place at the sub-party level, and voters cast a single vote (e.g., Colombia before 2006) we refer to “faction lists” (even though lists are “closed” and the allocation of seats may follow a Hare procedure). The term “open lists” is reserved for systems in which parties present a single ballot that can be disturbed by voters, pooling takes place at the level of the party, and voters cast multiple votes (if voters cast a single vote, we refer to lists as “unblocked”). Faction lists and unblocked lists are not systematically analyzed in this paper, since they were not employed in Paraguay or Ecuador during the period under
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identify for voters and thus make credit claiming more difficult. Under open lists, in
contrast, large districts cast a greater number of candidates from the same party against
each other, and thus place a stronger premium on personal reputations. Although the
literature has recognized this conditional effect as part of the discussion of national
systems (Carey and Shugart 1995, 431; Crisp and Ingall 2002), acknowledgement of this
pattern suggests that legislators from different districts may face different incentives
under the same national electoral rules.
At the party level, procedures for candidate selection may vary across
organizations. For instance, in some party organizations the founder or top leader may
select all the candidates and rank-order the lists, in other parties a convention or a closed
primary may settle the issue, and yet in other parties an open primary may define the
ranking of the candidates (Alcántara 2004; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2004). As Siavelis
and Morgenstern have pointed out: “Open lists systems are said to provide incentives for
candidates to cultivate a personal vote. However, if magnitude is small and parties wield
a good deal of control over nominations, we may find much higher levels of party loyalty
and less of a tie to constituents, with important consequences for legislative behavior”
(Siavelis and Morgenstern 2004, 5). Conversely, closed lists may not discourage
particularism if competitive primaries require the organization of internal campaigns and
promote particularistic policymaking by legislators interested in building their own
political machines.
study, but we expect them to have properties similar to open lists with regard to the conditional effects discussed below.
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We can summarize the previous discussion in three hypotheses:
1. Other things being equal, legislators elected under closed-list systems (systems in
which parties present a fixed ballot, votes are pooled across the whole party, and
voters cast a single vote) will be less inclined to initiate particularistic bills than those
elected from open lists (ballots that can be disturbed by voters, even though pooling
takes place at the level of the party); however
2. Closed-list electoral systems will be less likely to discourage inefficient policy-making
when legislators are elected in small districts; and
3. Closed-lists electoral systems will be less likely to discourage inefficient policy-
making when parties nominate candidates through competitive primaries.
3. Case Selection
In order to explore those issues, we will compare the behavior of legislators in three
institutional settings: the Ecuadorian legislature between 1979 and 1995, the Paraguayan
lower chamber between 1993 and 2004, and the Ecuadorian congress between 1998 and
2004. Ecuador is treated as two separate cases because the electoral rules, as we show
below, changed significantly between 1996 and 1998. Together, the three settings offer
significant variation in both institutional design and legislative behavior.
Because Ecuador and Paraguay employed proportional representation throughout
the period under study, we focus our discussion on five aspects: the type of lists (open
versus closed), the size of the districts, the rules about reelection, the nature of the party
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system, the frequency and timing of legislative elections (concurrent with presidential
elections or not), and the internal party procedures for nomination.
In order to assess the behavior of legislators under each system (our dependent
variable), we analyzed 1,906 bills initiated by the lower chamber in Paraguay (1992-
2003) and 5,175 bills initiated by the unicameral congress in Ecuador (3,459 between
1979 and 1995, 1,372 between 1998 and 2002; and other 344 introduced in the
transitional period 1996-97). We coded the content of bills following Theodore Lowi’s
classic typology of public policy (classifying projects as distributive, redistributive,
regulatory, or other) and Taylor-Robinson and Diaz’s discussion of policy targets
(classifying the scope of bills as individual, local, sectoral, regional, or national) (Lowi
1964; Taylor-Robinson and Diaz 1999).3 For the purposes of this paper we defined as
particularistic (“pork”) those policies that are distributive in nature and narrow in scope
(individual or local).
3.1. Ecuador I (1979-1995)
Political parties in Ecuador are conventionally described as weakly institutionalized,
lacking stable rules and structures, without solid attachments to organized groups in
society and with highly volatile voters (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Jones 2005). The
rightist Social Christian Party (PSC) and the caudillo-based Ecuadorian Roldosist Party
3 The main purpose of each bill (generally stated in its title) was used for purposes of classification. Bills were coded as distributive when they allocated public funds (or other assets) to particular groups or individuals, redistributive when they sought to promote transfers of wealth across social sectors, and regulatory when they imposed rules or restrictions for specific activities. For the Taylor-Robinson and Diaz’s (1999) classification, we followed the coding rules described in the appendix to their study. We coded a primary and (if necessary) a secondary target level for each bill.
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(PRE) have traditionally competed for hegemony in the coastal area, whereas the
Christian Democratic Party (DP) and the Social Democratic Party (ID) have disputed
territories of the Andean and Amazonic Region. Despite high levels of party
fragmentation, these four political parties have captured most of the legislative seats and
consolidated electoral bailiwicks over time (Pachano 2004).
During this period, Ecuador had a two-tier unicameral congress formed by 12
legislators elected from a single nationwide district, and provincial legislators elected by
proportional representation according to the population of their provinces (21 districts in
1996). The number of provincial legislators varied from 57 in 1979 to 70 in 1996, for an
average district magnitude of 3.1. Seat allocation was done by closed list PR through a
combined Hare-D’Hondt electoral formula.
In the first democratic election after the transition (1979), all legislators were
elected for a five-year term. This calendar was altered by the 1983 constitutional reform.
After 1984, legislators were elected for two years if they represented a province and for
four years if they represented the national district. In addition, between 1979 and 1996
Ecuador did not allow for immediate legislative reelection. This system truncated
politicians’ incentives to pursue legislative careers: on average only 12 percent of the
legislators returned to congress after one term out of office (Mejía Acosta 1996).
Combined with the midterm legislative elections, term limits determined that congress
renewed over 85 percent of its members every two years.
The closed-list system gave party leaders strong nomination powers over their
party members, since they were able to control candidate selection and the order in which
candidates were placed in the party list (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 421; Morgenstern
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1996). Few political parties, such as the Social Democrats (ID) and the Christian
Democrats (DP) allowed provisions for primaries, and in most cases party leaders
influenced candidate nominations even when decisions were made in national
conventions (Freidemberg 2003). However, the "strength" of party leaders was diluted by
the fact that legislators were not able to seek immediate legislative reelection, and thus
they lacked incentives to build congressional careers.4
3. 2. Ecuador II (1998-2004)
A series of institutional reforms altered the nature of the Ecuadorian electoral system
between 1996 and 1998. The possibility of immediate legislative reelection was
proposed and adopted in 1994 by a constitutional plebiscite and implemented in the 1996
election (Mejia Acosta 2003). Reelection rates however remained relatively low.
Between 1998 and 2002, 27 percent of the legislators achieved immediate reelection and
on average about 52 percent of the legislators had some prior legislative experience.
In response to societal demands for greater participation and accountability, the
1998 Constitution introduced further changes to the electoral system. A 1997 plebiscite
adopted open-list proportional representation, forcing individual candidates to compete
for votes against other parties as much as against other members of their own party
(Pachano 1998). Under the current electoral law, voters have as many votes as
representatives are elected in the district, they select individual members from party lists,
and each party pools the votes obtained by its individual candidates. The total sum of
4 Although there is little evidence available, it is possible that legislators may have pursued alternative career paths outside the legislature, running for sub-national (municipal, provincial) offices or seeking appointments in the government bureaucracy (Pachano 1991).
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votes obtained by the parties determines the distribution of seats according to the d´Hondt
formula. In turn, seats are distributed within each party according to the number of votes
obtained by the candidates.
The 1998 Constitution also increased the number of legislators to 100, expanded
the number of national legislators to 20,5 and preserved the existing 21 districts (two
more provinces were added to the electoral map the following year). The average district
magnitude during this period increased to 4.5. Adoption of open-list PR was expected to
increase the legislators’ incentives to cultivate the “personal vote” (Carey and Shugart
1995; Hallerberg and Marier 2002) in a system with a preexisting tradition of strong local
and patronage politics (Conaghan 1995).6
The post-1998 period was characterized by a further territorialization of the electoral
arena. Party leaders strengthened their electoral bailiwicks in particular regions and
faced difficulties to invade other parties’ territories (Pachano 2004). The emergence of
new parties such as Pachakutik and Alvaro Noboa’s PRIAN occurred at the expense of
other organizations (the DP or PRE, respectively) but always within the same geographic
region (the Andes and the Coast). Pachakutik-Nuevo País (MUPP) entered the formal
political arena to represent a highly mobilized sector of indigenous population, mostly
concentrated in the jungle and highlands.
In spite of the adoption of open-list PR, party leaders soon reasserted their power to
control nominations. For a brief period, a 1995 reform allowed the participation of
5 The at-large district was eliminated in the 2002 election. 6 The fact that Ecuador has one of the worst malapportioned legislatures in Latin America, with a significant overrepresentation of rural over urban districts, should reinforce the parochially oriented nature of its legislators (Cox and Morgenstern 2002, Snyder and Samuels 2001).
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independent candidates without party affiliation, but by 1998 this provision had been
abolished. However, the 1998 reform allowed political parties to form electoral alliances
at the provincial level, slightly diluting the power of national party leaders to control
access to the lists.
3. 3. Paraguay (1993-2004)
Two large parties have dominated Paraguayan politics since the nineteenth-century: the
Colorado Party (National Republican Association, ANR) and the Liberals (Authentic
Radical Liberal Party, PLRA). The ANR has controlled the executive branch since 1947
and was one of the main pillars (together with the army) of the dictatorship of Gen.
Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989). When a military coup against Stroessner ignited the
transition to democracy in 1989, the ANR remained the most popular party (winning 67%
of the seats in the lower chamber in 1989, 50% in 1993, 56% in 1998, and 46% in 2003),
but the Liberals were able to re-organize and captured a significant proportion of
legislative seats, as well as the vice-presidency in the 2000 election. Smaller parties (the
Partido Revolucionario Febrerista, Encuentro Nacional, País Solidario, and Patria
Querida) and a Colorado splinter (Unace) have also been able to capture a few seats in
congress.
As part of the democratic transition, the 1992 Constitution established that
Paraguayan deputies (and senators) would be elected in concurrent elections every five
years and that they could be reelected indefinitely (article 187). The 1990 Electoral Code
(Law 1/90, article 273) abandoned the “incomplete list” electoral system employed
during the Stroessner era and adopted closed-list proportional representation (with a
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d'Hondt divisor). Article 118 of the 1992 Constitution explicitly required elections to be
conducted under proportional representation and successive modifications of the electoral
code (Laws 75/92; 834/96, article 258) preserved the d'Hondt procedure.
The Paraguayan Chamber of Deputies has 80 members who are elected to
represent 17 departments (Alto Paraguay, Alto Paraná, Amambay, Boquerón, Caaguazú,
Caazapa, Canindeyu, Central, Concepción, Cordillera, Guairá, Itapúa, Misiones,
Ñeembucú, Paraguarí, Presidente Hayes, and San Pedro) plus the city of Asunción
(Constitution of 1992, article 221). Given the demographic density of the departments,
this arrangement has created ten small districts (of magnitudes between one and three) six
medium-sized districts (magnitudes four to seven) and two large districts (magnitudes
greater than seven). The average district magnitude is 4.4.
The 1990 Electoral Code required political parties to nominate candidates
selected by “the direct vote of the party members” (article 35). The 1992 Constitution in
addition established that all “intermediate organizations” (political parties, trade unions,
and social organizations) should respect the voting rights established in the charter—
including the right to proportional representation (article 119). In practice, this meant that
political parties were required to conduct closed primaries (restricted to party members)
to conform candidate lists (Hernández Sánchez 2003). Given the need to nominate
candidates for municipal, congressional, and presidential elections (in addition to party
authorities), primary elections have been a regular occurrence. Primaries took place in
1989, 1991, 1992, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2002 (Barreda and Costafreda 2002,
106). Small parties occasionally circumvented this requirement by agreeing on a
“consensus list” and holding the mandated primary as a legitimizing procedure; but the
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main parties (the ANR and the PLRA) have organized their internal life around
competing factions that clash regularly at primary contests (Molinas, Pérez-Liñán, and
Saiegh 2004).
4. The Puzzle
Table 1 summarizes the main traits of the three electoral systems. Conventional wisdom
indicates that Ecuador II should be the most encouraging setting for the production of
particularistic legislation, followed by Paraguay and Ecuador I. In the first case, the
combination of open lists with medium-sized districts (an average district magnitude of
4.6 and a median magnitude of 5) would be generally expected to promote the
personalization of electoral campaigns. In contrast, the closed-list system employed by
Paraguay and by Ecuador until 1998 normally creates fewer incentives to cultivate the
personal vote. Although district magnitude was somewhat greater in Paraguay than in
Ecuador I (4.4 vs. 3.1), the imposition of strict term limits in Ecuador until 1996 probably
reduced the value of personal reputations, except in those cases in which legislators
intended to run for mayoral positions in their districts.
<Table 1 Here>
The distribution of particularistic policies, however, defies the initial expectations.
Ecuador II is in fact the case with the lowest rate of pork initiation (6 percent of all bills),
followed by Ecuador II (12 percent) and by Paraguay (48 percent). The high
particularism of Paraguayan legislators is puzzling not only from the point of view of the
electoral system, but also from the perspective of the party system: the small Ecuadorian
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parties tend to have clear regional bailiwicks, while the dominant Colorado Party is likely
to internalize the costs of inefficient policymaking at the national level.
The apparent randomness of the policymaking patterns presented in Table 1 may
be explained by the organizational dynamics of the nomination process. In Ecuador,
nominations tend to be dominated by powerful leaders who (even under open-list PR)
control access to party lists, while in Paraguay the electoral laws have imposed a system
of closed primaries. In the following section we explore this problem more systematically
and examine to what extent organizational dynamics alter the legislative incentives
created by closed-list proportional representation at the individual level.
4.1. Individual-Level Analysis
In this section, we estimate a model of bill initiation for a cross-section of individual
Paraguayan and Ecuadorian legislators. The sample consists of 3,273 observations on
1,235 legislators for the periods 1979-2002 (Ecuador) and 1993-2003 (Paraguay). The
response variable, (“Pork”) indicates the number of particularistic bills (local-
distributive) initiated by a given legislator in a particular year.
With respect to the predictors, we consider the following indicators of district
magnitude and of the parties’ organizational dynamics:
1. District Magnitude. This variable indicates the number of legislative seats
assigned to a district. It ranges from single-member districts to districts where the
magnitude is equal to twenty seats. (Sources: Araujo et. al. 2004 and Molinas et.
al. 2004).
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2. Nomination Mechanism. This is an ordinal index that captures the nomination
process in a given legislator’s party. It takes the value of 0 when candidate
selection is in the hands of a national party leader; a value of 1 if candidates’
nominations are controlled by national directorate; a value of 2 if candidacies are
determined by a national convention or a primary with a single list; and a value of
3 if politicians have to compete in a closed primary to secure a candidacy. The
coding of nomination procedures was coded based on several studies of party
organizations (Sources: Freidenberg 2003; Hernández Sánchez 2003).
3. Closed List. This is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if voters are
presented with a list of candidates and the order of the list of candidates on the
ballot cannot be altered. It takes the value or 0, otherwise. (Source: Araujo et. al.
2004 and Molinas et. al. 2004).
Regarding our empirical findings, and the statistical methods that we use to
generate them, a couple of points are in order. First, as Brambor et. al. (2006) note, the
intuition behind conditional hypothesis is captured quite well by the use of multiplicative
interaction models. Therefore, given the conditional nature of the arguments presented in
the previous section, we need to include as covariates a series of interaction terms. The
two additional variables DM*Closed (District Magnitude * Closed List) and
Nom.*Closed (Nomination Mechanism * Closed List) are thus included in the analysis.
Our second concern has to do with the estimation of the model. The problem is
the following: when a legislator introduces a piece of legislation that is particularistic in
nature, this decision affects the overall number of bills that he/she is willing to introduce.
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Therefore, the number of bills a legislator introduces in a particular year (a proportion of
which will be particularistic) is endogenously determined. The implications of
simultaneity for econometric estimation are well known in the literature.7 For simplicity,
suppose that a legislator’s “pork legislation” function is embedded in a very simple
model of two equations:
P B= + + [1]
and an equilibrium condition
B P NP= + [2]
where P (particularistic legislation) and B (bills) are endogenous variables and NP (non-
particularistic legislation) is an exogenous variable.
The parameters of the “pork legislation” function that must be estimated are
(the intercept) and (the slope, or marginal propensity to introduce pork). Consider
though the problem of estimating this function regressing particularistic legislation on the
total number of legislative initiatives introduced. Suppose the disturbance in the pork
function jumps up. This directly increases the number of particularistic bills, which
through the equilibrium condition increases the total number of bills proposed. But the
total number of proposals is the independent variable in the pork function. Thus, the
disturbance in the pork function and the regressor are positively correlated. An increase
in the disturbance term (directly implying an increase in pork) is accompanied by an
increase in the number of proposed bills (also implying an increase in the number of
particularistic bills).
7 The problem is quite similar to the textbook example of a Keynesian system of a consumption function.
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When estimating the influence of the total number of proposals on particularistic
legislation, however, the OLS technique attributes both of these increases in “pork”
(instead of just the latter) to the accompanying increase in proposed legislation. This
implies that the OLS estimator of the marginal propensity to introduce particularistic
legislation will be biased upward, even asymptotically.
A natural response to this estimating problem is to use an instrumental variable
(IV) approach. This technique is a general estimation procedure applicable to situations
in which the independent variable is not independent of the disturbance. If an appropriate
instrumental variable can be found for the total number of bills a legislator proposes, the
instrumental variable technique provides consistent estimates. The big problem with this
approach, of course, is finding appropriate instrumental variables; exogenous variables in
the system of simultaneous equations are considered the best candidates since they are
correlated with the endogenous variables (through the interaction of the simultaneous
system) and are uncorrelated with the disturbances (by the assumption of exogeneity). In
this case, we will use the number of “policy” proposals (“Non-Pork”) as our instrument.
We recognize that the assumption that the number of policy proposals is
exogenous is an oversimplification. In fact, it is likely to depend on the number of
particularistic bills and the total number of proposals. The assumptions can be made more
realistic by increasing the size of the model, but then its mathematical complexity also
increases. This complexity, in turn, affects the likelihood that the system will be
identified. Therefore we will stick to a two-equation model.
There two additional, and substantively good reasons to keep it simple. First, from
a statistical point of view, the number of “policy” proposals has the properties of a good
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instrument: it is highly correlated (.96) with the total number of bills that legislators
introduce in a given year, but uncorrelated with the number of particularistic bills.
Second, since we are agnostic (an in fact, quite ignorant) about what affects a legislator’s
propensity to introduce “policy” proposals, we can take this variable as an indicator of
those unmeasured factors that make them “tick”.
Finally, for identification purposes (i.e. to avoid overidentification), we will
estimate two separate models: one to assess the effect of conditional effect of district
magnitude and closed lists on a legislator’s marginal propensity to introduce pork; and
another one to estimate the conditional effects of nomination rules and closed lists.8 Table
2 presents our empirical results. The estimated coefficient for the instrumented variable –
total number of bills—can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to introduce
particularistic legislation. It represents the amount of additional particularistic legislation
proposed by a legislator resulting from his/her initiation of an additional bill. As
expected, it lies between 0 and 1, and it is statistically significant.
< Table 2 Here >
Regarding our main variables of interest (District Magnitude, Closed List and
Nomination), the first thing to notice is that, as predicted, they have a conditional effect.
Let’s take a look first at the effect of closed lists on the introduction of particularistic
legislation. In order to make a proper interpretation of the results we have to keep in mind
that the effect of closed list on “pork” depends on a third variable, district magnitude.
Therefore, the coefficient reported on Table 2 is meaningless (i.e. it captures the effect of
closed list when district magnitude is zero!).
8 For a review of the order and rank conditions for identification see Greene (1997), Chapter 16.
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The solid line in Figure 1 illustrates how the marginal effect of closed lists
changes across the observed range of district magnitude. The dotted lines show 95%
confidence intervals around these estimates. Notice that the effect of closed lists on a
legislator’s propensity to introduce particularistic legislation increases as the district
magnitude becomes larger. This finding runs contrary to our second hypothesis.
< Figure 1 Here >
Although the conditional effect is substantively small (legislators elected under
closed lists in extremely large districts are expected to introduce less that one additional
particularistic bill on average), this result is clearly at odds with the conventional wisdom
regarding the role of open lists and personal vote seeking in the production of
particularistic legislation. However, as we argue in this paper, it is perfectly consistent
with the idea that even with closed lists legislators may have to compete with one another
at the primary stage. Moreover, as Table 2 indicates, the conditional effect of district
magnitude on particularism under open lists (closed=0) is null (it is slightly negative, but
statistically indistinguishable from zero). On the other hand, under closed lists, district
magnitude has a small but positive and statistically significant effect on the introduction
of particularistic legislation. In sum, the results show that large districts with closed-list
PR are not inconsistent with the introduction of particularistic bills.
With respect to the interactive effect of closed lists and the nomination process on
a legislator’s behavior, the results presented in Table 2 are consistent with our third
hypothesis. When candidate selection is in the hands of a few national party leaders,
closed lists have no effect on the amount of particularistic legislation that is proposed
(notice the negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero coefficient on table 2).
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However, as figure 2 shows, the effect of closed lists on pork initiation is positive and
statistically significant as the nomination process becomes more competitive. Under
closed lists, a legislator who competed in a closed primary to secure a candidacy would
almost triplicate the amount of particularistic legislation proposed by a legislator selected
by a national directorate.
< Figure 2 Here >
As table 2 shows, the effect of the nomination rules under open lists is also null.
However, under close lists, the marginal effect of the nomination rules is quite important.
For example, we predict that a legislator who was selected by primaries rather than by the
national leadership of his/her party would introduce a full additional particularistic bill.
4.2. Sensitivity and Robustness
The use of simultaneous equations and samples such as the one in this paper, inevitably
raise concerns about the sensitivity of the results. To address these potential problems, we
estimate a series of additional models with different model specifications and with
somewhat different sample sizes.
In this case, the identification strategy involves a different model specification for
the instrumental variable. Namely, we estimate the total number of proposals using the
following predictor variables:
1. Member of Presidents’ Party. This is a categorical variable that takes the value
of 1 if a legislator belongs to the president’s party, and zero otherwise. (Source:
Araujo et. al. 2004 and Molinas et. al. 2004).
21
2. Seniority. This variable indicates the amount of time (in years) spent by a
legislator as a member of his/her respective legislature. (Source: Araujo et. al.
2004 and Molinas et. al. 2004).
3. Electoral Year. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there is
an election in that particular country/year, and zero otherwise. (Source: Araujo et.
al. 2004 and Molinas et. al. 2004).
4. Reelection. This is a categorical variable that takes the value of 1 if reelection is
allowed, and zero if its is constitutionally banned. (Source: Araujo et. al. 2004 and
Molinas et. al. 2004)
We estimate the number of particularistic proposals initiated by an individual
legislator as a function of these predictors and our variables of interest (district
magnitude, closed lists, nomination rules). We also take into account the fact that those
legislators who do not propose any bills at all might be different from those who do
propose legislation, and thus have an effect on our results. Finally, we also consider the
opposite case: the possibility that those legislators who propose a disproportionate
amount of bills (more than two standard deviations above the mean) are different.
Therefore, we estimate our full model using four different samples: the full
sample, one excluding those legislators who do not propose a single bill, one excluding
those legislators who propose more than 10 bills per year, and a sample excluding both
the non-productive and the hyper-productive legislators. Table 3 shows the estimates for
the different sample sizes.
< Table 3 Here >
22
Finally, given the nature of the data and the high incidence of legislators who do not
initiate any bills at all, we also estimate the base model using zero-inflated negative
binomial maximum-likelihood regression. 9 In this way, we can also explore the
determinants behind a legislator’s decision to propose no bills in an entire year. For ease
of interpretation, in Table 4, we report coefficients transformed to incidence rate ratios
(and their 95% confidence intervals). So, for example, a coefficient taking a value
between .62-.95 means that an increment in our independent variable of interest is
associated with a 38%-5% decrease in the incidence of bill initiation.
< Table 4 Here >
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are quite robust to the different model
specification and to the different sample sizes. Legislators who belong to the president’s
party tend to introduce less pieces of particularistic legislation. For example, the results in
Table 4 suggest that a legislator who is a co-partisan with the president will introduce
between 38% and 5% less particularistic bills compared to a legislator who does not
belong to the president’s party. Another interesting finding is that deputies initiate at least
one piece of legislation, but are less likely to initiate additional legislation when they are
in the campaign trail. They are also more likely to initiate bills (including pork) when
they can seek reelection.
More importantly, the conditional nature of the electoral effects can be clearly
seen. The findings in Table 3 show that neither district magnitude nor closed lists by
themselves have a statistically significant effect on the individual production of
9 The data do not seem to be over-dispersed. Therefore, we also run these models using a Poisson count specification. The results, of course, are very similar.
23
particularistic legislation. It is the interactive effect of these variables and the nomination
process what positively affects “pork” introduction. The results obtained from the zero-
inflated model are very similar. Legislators elected under closed lists are more likely to
introduce at least one piece of particularistic legislation. However neither closed lists nor
nomination by themselves have a statistically significant effect on additional pork
introduction.
Against the conventional wisdom represented by hypotheses 1 and 2, deputies
elected from closed lists are as likely to initiate pork as those legislators elected under
open lists (and legislators elected under closed lists are more likely to initiate pork when
they represent large districts). However, consistent with out third hypothesis, these
legislators are more wiling to initiate pork when they face competitive primaries to
determine the composition of the closed lists.
5. Conclusions
The idea that the organization of a legislative body reflects the electoral incentives
faced by its members is a cornerstone of the American politics literature. In contrast, the
field of comparative politics has been mostly concerned with how national electoral rules
shape legislative incentives elsewhere. In order to make this problem tractable, most
comparativists have made heroic assumptions linking national electoral laws to
legislators’ incentives, and those in turn to actual patterns of policymaking. This strategy
has allowed analysts to use electoral rules as crude but efficient proxies for legislative
24
behavior in cross-national studies (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Hallerberg and Marier
2004; Johnson and Crisp 2003; Nielson 2003).
Our analysis, however, indicates that the organizational control of the nomination
process (which may vary from country to country and even from party to party under the
same electoral system) may be the key determinant of legislative incentives to pursue
particularistic policies. Open-list electoral systems may not encourage credit-claiming
strategies when party leaders filter access to the lists, and closed-list systems may
encourage particularism when party leaders face competitive primaries to determine the
composition of party ballots. As noted by Siavelis and Morgenstern, “centralized or
decentralized patterns of selection are possible with both open and closed lists. (…) We
must uncover how processes of candidate choice interact with the discipline-dampening
incentives of open list systems (…and) we must determine the extent to which the two
variables together elicit effects that neither alone would produce” (Siavelis and
Morgenstern 2004, 5). The analysis of legislative behavior in Paraguay and Ecuador
suggests that more extensive research on the nature of party organizations will be
required to address questions of policymaking and party discipline systematically in the
future.
25
Tables and Figures
Table 1. Institutional Configurations and Policymaking Patterns in Three Cases
Case Ecuador I Paraguay Ecuador II (1979-1995) (1993-2003) (1998-2002)
PR Lists Closed Closed Open Reelection Not allowed Yes Yes Modal Nomination Procedure Party leaders Closed primaries Party leaders District Magnitude:
Average 3.1 4.4 4.5 Median 3 6 5
Policymaking Patterns: Percent Non-local 71% 34% 85% Percent Local 29% 66% 15% Percent Pork (local & distributive) 12% 48% 5% N (bills) 3,459 1,906 1,043
Notes: Average district magnitude is the total number of seats divided by the number of districts. Median district magnitude is the district magnitude corresponding to the median legislator (in the average year for the period). Bills are defined as non-local if they are broad in scope; as local if they are narrow in scope; and “pork” if they are distributive in nature and narrow in scope (affecting individuals or municipalities). The total N corresponds to all bills initiated by the legislature (lower house in the case of Paraguay) during the period.
26
Table 2. OLS and IV Estimates of Bills and Pork Initiation
Response Variable Response Variable Response Variable Total Number of Bills Particularistic Bills Particularistic Bills Policy Proposals 1.112*** (0.006) District Magnitude -0.003 (0.006) Nomination -0.044 (0.055) Closed List 0.146* -0.008 (0.075) (0.072) DM*Closed 0.041*** (0.007) Nom.*Closed 0.274*** (0.058) Bills (Instrumented) 0.096*** 0.106*** (0.005) (0.005) Constant 0.221 -0.103 -0.109 (0.022) 0.067 (0.062) N 3273 3265 3272 R^2 0.91 0.15 0.17 Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < :001, **p < :01, *p < :05 two-tailed.
27
Figure 1
Marginal Effect of Closed Lists on Pork Introduction as District Magnitude Changes
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
District Magnitude
Ma
rg
ina
l E
ffe
ct o
f C
los
ed
Lis
ts
Mean
Figure 2
Marginal Effect of Closed List on Pork Introduction as Nomination Changes
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0 1 2 3
Nomination Rules
Po
rk
In
itia
tio
n
28
Table 3. OLS and IV Estimates of Bills and Pork Initiation
Full Sample Sample Excluding Non-Productive Sample Excluding Hyper-Productive Sample Excluding Both Response Variable Total Bills Particularistic Total Bills Particularistic Total Bills Particularistic Total Bills Particularistic Policy Proposals 1.112*** 1.103*** 1.107*** 1.008*** (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) President’s Party 0.101**
(0.043) -0.077* (0.039)
0.163** (0.058)
-0.065 (0.053)
0.063* (0.037)
-0.119** (0.035)
0.103* (0.051)
-0.129* (0.049)
Seniority -0.031*** (0.008)
-0.004 (0.007)
-0.041*** (0.011)
-0.005 (0.011)
-0.026*** (0.007)
-0.001 (0.006)
-0.031** (0.009)
0.002 (0.009)
Electoral Year -0.087** (0.037)
-0.126*** (0.032)
-0.112* (0.049)
-0.126** (0.043)
-0.094** (0.032)
-0.135*** (0.029)
-0.138** (0.042)
-0.159*** (0.041)
Reelection
0.258*** (0.038)
0.231*** (0.051)
0.323*** (0.051)
0.285*** (0.065)
0.202*** (0.033)
0.161** (0.047)
0.227*** (0.044)
0.186** (0.061)
District Magnitude -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) Nomination -0.046 -0.048 -0.022 -0.025 (0.049) (0.067) (0.044) (0.061) Closed List 0.127 0.189 0.129 0.201 (0.101) (0.135) (0.091) (0.124) DM*Closed 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.017** 0.021** (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) Nom.*Closed 0.161** 0.194** 0.163** 0.205** (0.054) (0.072) (0.048) (0.067) Bills (Instrumented) 0.104*** 0.095*** 0.059*** 0.015 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) Constant 0.157 -0.215 0.266 -0.278 0.256 -0.107 0.509 -0.037 (0.043) (0.094) (0.059) (0.129) (0.038) (0.085) (0.054) (0.121) N 3272 3265 2447 2445 3167 3165 2342 2340 R^2 0.92 0.35 0.90 0.32 0.85 0.22 0.80 0.15 Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < :001, **p < :01, *p < :05 two-tailed.
29
Table 4. Zero-Inflated Model of Pork Initiation
No Pork - Logit Estimates (Standard deviations)
Pork Initiation – Risk Ratios (95% confidence intervals)
President’s Party .96 .77* (.69) (.62-.94) Seniority .08 .98 (.09) (.93-1.03) Electoral Year -1.67** .66*** (.58) (.53-.81) Reelection -17.44*** .86 (1.17) (.61-1.21) District Magnitude -.18* .92* (.11) (.85-1.01) Nomination .09 1.11 (.62) (.63-1.95) Closed List -21.01*** .79 (2.48) (.27-2.32) DM*Closed .21 1.12** (.13) (1.03-1.22) Nom*Closed .62 1.13 (.86) (.63-2.02) Constant 19.43 (1.36) Non-zero obs. Zero obs. Wald chi2 Prob > chi2 Log pseudolikelihood
2413 852 124.62 0.000 -2693.723
*** significant at .001, ** significant at .01, *significant at .05 two-tailed.
30
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