the ongoing populist revolution in latin america andrÉ mommen university

8/14/2019 The Ongoing Populist Revolution in Latin America Andr Mommen University

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THE ONGOING POPULIST REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICAANDR MOMMEN

University of AmsterdamJune 2006

TPS/ECPR Policy NetworkFourth Transdisciplinary Forum MagdeburgRevolutions: Concepts, Discourses, Practices of Revolutionary Action in Our TimeMagdeburg, July 7-9, 2006Universitt MagdeburgGermanyISBN 9072086937

INTRODUCTIONAs the turnover of capital increases so history itself speeds up.Geoffrey Kay

Since the 1980s Latin America is experiencing a still ongoing transition from

import-substituting industrialisation and authoritarianism to democracy and socialand economic reforms. Keywords as renovation, dynamism and democratisationhave been used in connection with liberalisation and privatisation. Import-substituting strategies were abandoned and replaced by monetary stabilisationprogrammes promoting export-led growth. The price these Latin American countriespaid was high. All experienced debt crises during their shift towards democracy.The irreversible reality of the globalisation process, with intense capital andtrade flows obliged these countries to adopt institutional transformations and toopen up their markets. At the other hand, neoliberal policy changes fostered thegrowth of social movements defending and representing the urban poor, the landlesspeasants, the Indians, and many rural workers threatened by the effects ofglobalisation. These groups are campaigning for more social protection, humanrights and a better stand of living.

In Latin America, blue-collar workers constitute a small share of the total workforce and the electoral challenges faced by leftist parties are greater than inEurope. To compete effectively, they will have to incorporate the middle classes,the informal workers and new social movements whose interests often conflict withthe unionised workers. The traditional means of reconciling such conflictinginterests is through populism, an electoral and policy strategy that has not onlybeen discredited, but is itself arguable inimical to the consolidation of botheconomic reform and democracy.Latin America is, with the exception of Colombia, becoming more sceptical aboutthe US. Economically, the commodities boom has demonstrated to a host of regionalgovernments that their predecessors set too low a price on the region's naturalresources when it allowed them to be exploited by foreign companies.In this paper we shall discuss some aspects of the ongoing revolution in Latin

America and the way Latin American populism is changing its own nature after twodecades of neoliberal experiments. Recent political changes in Brazil and Boliviawill be studied as cases. Both countries are symbolising important policy shifts.Though in 2002 Brazil elected the metal worker Lula as president, no fundamentalbreak with neoliberalism was consumed. In 2005, Bolivia elected cocalero EvoMorales as president after several years of social upheavals and growing politicalinstability. Morales promised to break with neoliberalism and to initiatesocialist reforms with the nationalisation of the oil and gas industry.


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THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND GLOBALISATION

The broadly accepted Washington consensus postulates that economies that havechosen to develop a high degree of integration with the capitalist world economyhave grown faster than those that have failed to do so. The problem is that manycountries, after having adhered to the policy fundamentals, had difficulties inchanging their economic policy. Their populations contested the ongoingliberalisation and privatisation schemes.In the Middle East and North Africa, reforms were postponed because of structuralobstacles. In the successor states of the Soviet Union, globalisation brought anew logic of interaction between society and the outside world under the aegis ofan oil and gas industries reorganized by the Moscow Kremlin. In Latin America,globalisation took the form of regional trading blocs. The United States andCanada formed with Mexico the core of NAFTA, while Argentina and Brazil dominatethe southern trade bloc MERCOSUR.

In the context of international integration in the Americas and the pathtowards a free-trade area in the Americas, the impact of the NAFTA on Mexicoseconomic and social structure are dramatic. Not only did NAFTA have a considerableimpact on the levels of economic integration within North America, but it had aconsiderable impact on trade orientation for both the US partners, Mexico and

Canada. The Mexican economy is today irremediably linked to that of the US.Economic liberalisation efforts, especially in the direction of Latin America,hurt most traditional interests of North Americas population. Clintonsglobalist view of foreign and economic policy, stressing human rights, peacekeeping, and financial liberalisation policies could trust on the service-orientedmiddle classes, not on the declining industrial sector with its blue-collarworkers. His administration fashioned a new set of economic policies promotingeconomic growth according to neoliberal prescriptions. At the same moment itsneoliberal synthesis appealed to the less advantaged portions of the former NewDeal coalition. Therefore, the Clinton administration had to restructure itselectoral base and to revise the Democratic Partys traditional ties with the bigunions and the protectionist industrial and agrarian lobbies. The Clinton yearscan be considered as a decade of neoliberal consolidation, not of a return to a

New Deal. The Bush years give the impression that Clintons policy mix based onneoliberal economic incentives and job creation for the poor, has received aneoconservative correction based on tax cutting, hug spending deficits andmilitary built up with a return to classic big stick imperialism.Economic liberalisation in Latin America is characterized by political instabilitymarked by state strikes and upheavals, repression and corruption. Within thecontext of high inflation and even hyperinflation during the 1980s, the failure ofheterodox monetary stabilisation plans (in particular, the austral and cruzadoplans), pressures exercised by multinational institutions for the adoption ofmarket reforms and intensive ideological propaganda promoting the Washingtonconsensus. This seems to be even more necessary for peripheral economies inneed of foreign capital for their economic growth.The transition of import-substituting industrialisation to a free-trade regime has

been badly managed in many Latin American countries. The road to growth wasobstructed by monetary crises and social conflicts. The final collapse of theArgentine economy proved that the IMF-inspired monetarist strategy was wrong. Therise of neopopulist and social movements proved that neoliberal reforms havecreated a solid base for a newly formed alliance of industrial workers, landlesspeasants, and the urban poor in the slums. The neoliberal policy regimes becameungovernable, generating pressures to move beyond the Washington Consensus. Theoutcome was the construction of an amended neoliberal policy regime a neoliberalprogramme of macroeconomic policies combined with a new anti-poverty social policyand the institutionalisation of a new economic model. Not only the economics offree trade per se but the philosophy of liberalisation as well in a socio-


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political context where nationalism, statism and public redistribution of welfareare rooted in the public value system, have led Latin America further and fartheraway from the implementation of these values over the years.Neoliberal reforms implemented under conditions of re-democratisation of theformerly dictatorial and military regimes reinstalled the rule of law and creatednew possibilities and frameworks for intermediary groups and structuresstrengthening civil society.The popular classes experienced the brunt of the sweeping structural reformsassociated with the neoliberal policy reforms. Subsequent rounds of reformsinduced a widespread transfer of property, productive resources, and incomes fromthe working class and the mass of direct (agricultural) producers to an emergingcapitalist class of investors and entrepreneurs having close links withmultinational industrial and financial capital.Neoliberal reforms created a flexible labour market and export facilities formultinational firms. The sustained increase in poverty has forced many men andwomen into informal work, generally carrying out subcontracted low-paid work athome or itinerant. In Mexico, the maquiladora system of production, initially setup in 1965 in order to facilitate the implementation of a subcontracting industryof exportation in the North, is free trade zone of production under a specialregime. By 2001, maquilas accounted for 51 percent of total exportations, up from40 percent in 1992. Today, the system attracts workers from the interior of Mexico

who use the maquiladora as a gateway to the US. Multinationals arrived after theNAFTA Treaty was signed and put an end to the previously existing smallbusinesses. The effects of the establishment of maquilas have been familydisunity, uncontrolled urban growth, a lack of public and social services andinsecurity. The State withdrew and allowed companies to take over social security.However, pro-government unionism has been eroding. The Unin Nacional deTrabajadores and the Frente Nacional Mxicano managed to break the monopoly of theConfederacin de Trabajadores de Mxico (CTM). Meanwhile, the Mexican Governmentsupported more the sindicalismo blanco than the CTM, because it serves thecorporate interests.

WHAT IS POPULISM?

Virtually all studies of populism in Latin America attest to the existence ofspecial bonding between leaders and followers. The usual sources for politicalhistory, however, do not penetrate deeply into these bonds, which are essentiallypsychic phenomena. For example, we know that Latin American populism is highlysensorial yet we cannot measure its impact. Followers experience it emotionallyand intimately. For the masses, populism consists of speeches, music, movement,smells, tastes, crowds, excitement, and even intoxication. It sparks anticipationand arouses passions. Populist leaders become addicted to the gratification ofmass adulation and responds physically as well as psychically to the venerationtheir followers displays. So populism could become a powerful force in the nationswhose politics it impels.

Populism uses political mobilisation, recurrent rhetoric and symbolsdesigned to build heterogeneous multi-class coalitions led by sectors of the urban

middle-classes. Populism responds to the problems posed by economicunderdevelopment and proposes strategies of accelerated industrialisation throughredistributive measures. Its main enemy is the landed oligarchy and foreigncapital allied with local elites. Populist economic policies aim at gaining fullcontrol over national resources in order to finance import-industrialisationprogrammes. Its economic policies include budget deficits stimulating domesticdemand, nominal wage increases combined with price controls to effect incomeredistribution, and exchange-rate control or appreciation to cut inflation and toraise wages and profits in non-traded-goods sectors.In general, Latin American populism has exhibited three interconnected features.First, it has been dominated by paternalistic, personalistic, often charismatic


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leadership and top-down mobilisation. Second, it has involved multi-classincorporation of the masses, especially urban workers but also middle-classsectors. Third, populists have emphasized integrationist, reformist, nationalistdevelopment programmes for the state to promote simultaneously redistributivemeasures for populist supporters and, in most cases, import-substitutionindustrialisation.Populism has been most common in Latin America where competitive party systemshave been weak and military interventions frequent, as in Peru, Argentina,Ecuador, and Brazil. In those countries, populists have filled the vacuum createdby the weakness of civilian political institutions. By contrast, populism has beenuncommon in nations with strong party systems and relatively non-interventionistmilitaries, including Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela (after 1958), Uruguay, and,in many respects, Chile, which has never been ruled by a mesmerizing leader of amulti-class urban movement committed to rapid elevation of the workers andhothouse industrialisation. Charismatic figures have rarely been successful inChile because of the highly Europeanised, institutionalised, and durable politicalparties. Organisations filling the ideological spectrum, left little room forpersonalistic mass mobilisation or independent adventures.Populism and its aftermath have dominated the political history of modern LatinAmerica. Much of the style and rhetoric of politics derives from populism. Moreimportant, some seemingly unbridgeable schisms in today's society can be traced

directly to populism. While populist movements attract the support of masses ofpeople, they simultaneously repel major sectors of society. Populists definethemselves as the saviours of the nation and their opponents as enemies of thepeople. Thus politics revolve around movements that win strong allegiances butexclude their enemies. This contributed in the past to a cycle of militarytakeovers that ultimately produced massive violence, involving both the militaryand civilians.Populism addresses certain problems, but it also produces new ones. A key populistlegacy is leadership style. The leader, whether in power or exile, dominates hisparty for long stretches. The party might undergo internal struggles, but once theleader has settled them, his rule is unchallengeable. Within the Peronist Party,this role of caudillo was borne by two men; the baton of Juan Pern was eventuallypicked up by Carlos Menem. This pattern of leadership is more noticeable within

the Radical Party, which even after ceasing to be populist retains its style.Hiplito Yrigoyen was followed by Marcelo T. de Alvear, Ricardo Balbn and RalAlfonsn. They continued to dominate their Radical Party after their popularityhad faded with the public at large. Even when the parties adopted attributes of"modern" politics, such as conventions, they continued to be dominated by strong-willed leaders.The 1980s were a decade of crisis in Latin America. In Peru Sendero Luminoso ateaway at the legitimacy and authority of elected presidents. In the wake of violentconfrontations, the villagers of the central sierra organised self-defence units,or rondas campesinas. And thus Senderistas and ronderos faced each other in thesame upland regions.If, as dependencistas assert, the locus of power in less-developed societiesreside in the capitalist metropolis, then the popular sectors are excluded from

the political arena and have no chance for successfully challenging the powerstructures, for which reason many dependencistas urge for a complete and immediatebreak with world capitalism. If, on the contrary, the locus of power is internal,then the relevant arena is one in which the popular sectors do have at least apotential for political self-help. Indeed, populist policies made the masseswinners in the political game, rather than losers. Populists provided moreopportunities for the masses to improve their lives. At its very core, Mexicanpopulism addressed the needs of the people, mainly the poorest classes. Unlike theneoliberals of the Fox Administration who govern Mexico today, populists spoke forgovernment action to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth. Populism inMexico resembled European social democracy and the U.S. concept of the welfare


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state. Mexican populism also contained nationalism and corporatism. The formermeant promoting economic development using mainly Mexican capital. The latterentailed efforts by the government to build up labour, farmer, middle-class, andeven business associations and to integrate them into the state itself, or ratherto be intermediary between the rank and file and the leaders.Between a Mexican state that emerged as hegemonic and a Peruvian state that neverstabilised because it marginalized popular political cultures, the difference isstriking. When in Peru social control became a central imperative in theconstruction of the post-war state, authoritarianism emerged as much from thefailure of mediation by village intellectuals and other intermediate elites as itdid from a renewed alliance with the landowners. Are indigenismo, Senderismo, APRApopulism and the socialism of Jos Carlos Maritegui aspects of the same so-calledAndean utopia? However, the fact that imperialist domination in Peru has hithertobeen exercised principally through enclave exploitations of agro-extractiveresources and the fact that industrial production from the very outset showed onlyweak growth under the control of foreign companies, the national bourgeoisie wasnot able to establish its hegemony. Nationalist movements were therefore headed bypetty-bourgeois intellectuals and technico-professionals with no ties to thepopular masses.Populism began late in Brazil because entrenched antidemocratic political leadersresisted opening up the system to broad participation. But by mid-century populism

reached a fever pitch. During the 1950s nearly a dozen figures fought for nationaloffice in populist fashion, and they left a major imprint on the politicalculture. The military takeover of 1964 brought the demise of the so-calledPopulist Republic, the most intense political arena in the Americas at the time.After a decade of repressive government, the military began to allow more openparticipation again, and a few of the old-timers returned and managed to winstate-level offices. None of the elder populists could get a clear shot at thepresidency, however, and the promising career of newcomer Fernando Collor de Melocrashed two years into his term as president. By the mid-1990s the populist stylein politics seemed destined to fade from the scene, replaced by more moderateapproaches.Populism arose in Peru in the 1930s to fill a need for a more modern, inclusivepolitics for the masses. The old regime could no longer respond to the powerful

social and economic changes brought on by urbanisation after World War I. This wasespecially true in and around the capital of Lima. The old political elite wasmorally and politically bankrupt. The early 1930s witnessed the rise of two strongpopulist movements, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA, AmericanRevolutionary Popular Alliance) led by Vctor Ral Haya de la Torre, and theelectoral machine of Luis M. Snchez Cerro. These two competing campaigns usheredin a new era, yet the populists were shut down by mid-decade by the army and theforces of reaction.Five decades later, Peru experienced a populist resurgence with the Apristagovernment of Alan Garca (1985-90). His presidency also replaced one that wasbankrupt in the eyes of the people. After the breakdown of Garcas government,neopopulism emerged with by Japanese descendant Alberto Fujimori. His election in1990 was a watershed in the countrys history. Fujimorismo was marked by a visible

increase in political activity by the working classes of Lima, but the unions didnot represent a real obstacle to Fujimoris policy shift. They had been weakenedby the growth of the informal economy and the economic crisis. The divided leftremained very critical of Fujimoris orienting the economy to the external marketsand his privatisation programme, but was divided and unable to mobilize the urbanand rural masses into a united front. Fujimori mobilized the votes of the lowerclasses and the mestizos against the party elites, not against the oligarchy.During the 2006 presidential campaign Perus populism gained a new momentum withcandidate Ollanta Humala. The latter pledged to legalize all coca production,arguing that the coca leaf could be used for legal products, such as tea,toothpaste, and even as a foodstuff. His position on coca was part of a broader,


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populist, anti-Peruvian elite campaign. Given the way coca is woven into thehistory and culture of the Andes, it is his position on the leaf -- which manyPeruvians consider sacred -- that is critical. In 2006, Humala launched hiscampaign for the presidency, winning the first round of voting against APRA-candidate Alan Garca. As the opinion polls had forecast, Alan Garca defeatedHumala by an ample margin in most coastal areas and in greater Lima, regionsmaking up modern Peru. Humala won two-thirds of the votes in the southern andcentral Andes, where many people are of indigenous descent and have seen littlebenefit from economic growth.This reveals how some class strata in Peru have become associated with the modern,internationally linked capitalist sector, while others remain rooted in thetraditional national sectors, especially subsistence agriculture, small-scalemanufacturing, much of the service economy. Therefore, modern dependencistaclass analysis having surpassed comprador generalisations, in the 1970s alreadyargued that the key to external control is found in the fractionalisation ofdomestic class structures.Nowhere else but in the Andean region of Latin America have leaders of a failedcoup gone on to win presidential elections. Only in Venezuela, Ecuador and Peruhave botched coup attempts bestowed the kind of name recognition invaluable for apolitical career.Many factors help explain this recent Andean phenomenon among them, the region's

extreme poverty, distrust of the corrupt traditional political parties and therelatively good reputation of the countries' militaries. Perhaps more important isthat the racial and indigenous groups that traditionally have been excluded frompolitics are increasingly reshaping these societies. In Ecuador and Peru,indigenous Indians make up nearly half the population. Venezuela, Ecuador and Peruall have mestizo majorities.The story of populism in Venezuela centres on one movement and to a certain extenton one man, Rmulo Betancourt, founding member and lifelong head of the partycalled Accin Democrtica (AD, Democratic Action). The party's precursororganisations began among exiled students during the dictatorial regime of JuanVicente Gmez in the 1930s. At first heavily Marxist in orientation, they shiftedtheir public stands after Gmez's death in 1935 and de-emphasized ideologicalformulations. Nevertheless, many of Betancourt's followers expected that when AD

eventually came into office, it would reveal the extent of its socialist leanings.Yet by the time it finally did accede to power in 1945 by means of a coup d'tat,the AD had evolved into a populist party like so many others in post-war LatinAmerica. Following the coup, Betancourt and the AD swept into power in thecountry's first direct, secret, and honest elections ever. These peak years ofVenezuelan populism have become known as the Trienio, a heroic period of far-reaching reforms and organisational inroads for workers, peasants, and students.Before completing their term, however, the AD leaders were overthrown by themilitary in 1948. Betancourt and his followers returned to power in 1958, andsince then Venezuela has enjoyed a long succession of elected governments. TheAD's principal rival, the Partido Social Cristano Copey (Christian DemocraticParty), managed to win several presidential elections, thus establishing aperiodic alternation between the two parties. Political observers generally

admired Venezuela as one of the most democratic nations in the region in the 1970sand 1980s. Thus the legacy of populism was generally seen as positive, althoughmore recently it has come under attack.

POPULISM AND NEOLIBERALISM

Although many works have argued persuasively that populism is a recurringphenomenon, rather than a period-specific historical anomaly, there is still atendency to associate it with etatist and redistributive policies that areantithetical to neoliberalism. As such, the spectre of populism in contemporaryLatin America is usually equated with a lower-class backlash against the


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austerity, inequalities, and market insecurities attendant on neoliberalism.Likewise, presidents and finance ministers who implement IMF-approvedstabilisation plans routinely pledge to resist the "populist temptation"--that is,the politically expedient but fiscally "irresponsible" increase of governmentspending to ameliorate the social costs of market reforms. The possibility thatpopulist tendencies could arise within--rather than against--a neoliberal projecthas yet to be fully explored.Four principal perspectives on populism can be identified in the Latin Americanliterature: (1) the historical/sociological perspective, which emphasizes themulti-class socio-political coalitions that typically arise during the earlystages of industrialisation in Latin America; (2) the economic perspective, whichreduces populism to fiscal indiscipline and a set of expansionist orredistributive policies adopted in response to pressures of mass consumption; (3)the ideological perspective, which associates populism with an ideologicaldiscourse that articulates a contradiction between "the people" and a "powerbloc"; and (4) the political perspective, which equates populism with a pattern oftop-down mobilisation by personalist leaders that bypasses or subordinatesinstitutional forms of political mediation.During the 1970s and 1980s, Latin American countries had to adapt their populiststrategies to the IMF-approved stabilisation programmes. Alan Garca in Peru(1985-1990) tried to continue the old import-substitution strategy and income-

redistribution programmes. Other post-dictatorship presidents, like Ral Alfonsn(1983-1989) in Argentina or Jos Sarney (1985-1990) in Brazil, refused to solvethe economic crisis by imposing costs on the productive sector. However, in bothcases high inflation and economic decline were their fate. It was the period thatLatin Americas economic policy shifted to a neoliberal development strategy as aconsequence of the exhaustion of its import-substituting industrialisationstrategy financing unsustainable social programmes. Excessive lending combinedwith high interest rates had caused in 1982 the Mexican debt crisis spreading overthe whole continent.However, the collapse of import-substitution industrialisation and the onset ofthe neoliberal era do not require a "requiem for populism," as some anticipated.Instead, the new era may be associated with the transformation and revival ofpopulism under a new guise, one that is shaped by the breakdown of more

institutionalised forms of political representation and the fiscal constraintsthat inhere in a context of public indebtedness and a diminished state apparatus.More "liberal" variants of populism not only represent a different economicproject than traditional, "etatist" populism, but also rest upon new social bases(that is, informal sectors rather than organized labour) and a new articulation ofthe contradiction between "the people" and the "power bloc."Like classical populism, this new form of neoliberal populism is likely tomanifest contradictions and limitations. The collapse of the neoliberal economicorder in Latin America and the downfall of Fujimori in Peru and Menem in Argentinahave discredited monetarist and other neoliberal experiments. Does it mean backto normalcy and populism as usual?What went wrong with neoliberal populism in the 1990s? Once the initial politicaldividends of inflation control have worn off, the long-term capacity of targeted

social programmes to provide political cover for an economic model that generatesgrowth without employment is subject to doubt, especially when social programmesrely on one-shot infusions of financial resources. The more enduring classicalpopulists built party or labour organisations to complement their personal appealand integrate followers into the political system, something the new generation ofliberal populists has shown little inclination to do. Although the inclusivenessof classical populism was always selective, it was far deeper than that of liberalpopulism, which spawns little organisation, no political role for citizens beyondthat of voting, and a more limited and exclusive set of economic rewards.Finally, the "politics of antipolitics" is a weak substitute for the cross-classnationalist appeal of classical populism, and it is likely to be self-limiting as


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a populist formula for legitimising an incumbent government. However potent it maybe for political outsiders and protest movements, it becomes self-negating oncethe outsiders displace the traditional political class, turn into incumbents, andconstruct a new political establishment.The viability of liberal populism during periods of institutional crisis andsocial transformation is relatively short (Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia,Brazil). As such, it has profound implications for opponents as well as supportersof neoliberalism. For opponents, it warns against the comforting assumption thatneoliberalism is incapable of generating a broad base of political support, andthus will inevitably produce a popular backlash in favour of progressivealternatives. Indeed, it provides compelling evidence that neoliberalism is both aconsequence and a cause of the weakening and fragmentation of the popularcollective actors who are essential to any progressive alternative.For those who share in the "Washington consensus" favouring neoliberal reforms,the Peruvian case is a sobering reminder that economic restructuring may come withunexpected political ramifications. Proponents of neoliberalism may find itunsettling to contemplate whether they are presiding over the transformation andrevival of populism, rather than its burial. More important, the emergence ofliberal populism casts a large shadow over facile assumptions that free marketsand representative democracy are kindred phenomena. The historical development ofrepresentative democracy in the West was heavily influenced by the efforts of

subaltern groups to organize collectively to exert political control over marketinsecurities; in order to eliminate such controls, modern neoliberal technocratshave routinely suppressed or circumvented the mechanisms of accountability thatinhere in democratic organisation.Although personality may be an effective force for political aggregation andlegitimation in tumultuous times, the shifting sands of public infatuation and thewhims of autocratic rulers are hardly desirable long-term foundations for theneoliberal edifice, as the Russian case amply demonstrates. As such, thepredilection for autocracy--for the political power to implement economic reformsunencumbered by institutionalised mechanisms of representation andaccountability--is likely to clash with both the political need to establishinstitutional roots in civil society and the popular tendency to rely ondemocratic organisation as a counterweight to individual market insecurities.

These tensions can be expected to shape the evolutionary dynamics of liberalpopulism in the years to come; more fundamentally, they will be decisive indetermining whether the denouement of the neoliberal era will be democratic orauthoritarian.

THE FUTURE OF THE LULA EXPERIMENT IN BRAZIL

In 2002 Luiz Incio Lula da Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Party ofthe Workers) defeated in the second round Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira(PSDB, Party of Brazilian Social Democracy) candidate Jos Serra for thepresidency. Lulas election meant the end of the neoliberal decade in Brazil whichwas marked by Fernando Henrique Cardosos two presidential terms (1994-2002).Lulas victory was the result of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the

break-up of the governments class base. Meanwhile Lula was attracting PSDBsvotes. Nevertheless, there were indications that important changes had taken placethat would limit his possibilities. He distanced himself from the landless workersmovement MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) and the unions.Lula and the PT still criticized the ideology of neoliberalism, but they conformedto the limits it had set. Lulas Zero Hunger programme must be viewed as anintegral part of analogous neoliberal anti-hunger campaigns in the world, not asan extension of the welfare state and its universal provisions. In neoliberalthinking social resources should be channelled to the poorest, a policy alsoadvocated by the World Bank.Since his election in 2002, Lula has emerged unscathed from several affairs,


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especially the political crisis of corruption his government suffered in 2005.With his popularity on the rise, it is likely he will be re-elected for anotherfour years in October 2006.The polls released in January 2006 leave no room for doubt: Lula has recovered agood portion of the popularity he lost in 2005 and is in good condition for avictory in the upcoming election in October 2006, or at the latest, November 2006when the count is finalized. The nature of Lula's social support has beenchanging over the past tenure in office. The traditional foundations of support onwhich the PT rested came from industrial labourers and a certain sector of theurban middle class with university education. Today, however, the profile haschanged, to the point where the sole explanation for Lula's rise lies in theassistance programme Bolsa Familia, (family welfare) created in October of 2003.The two positions, that of those who criticize Lula because he has done little andthat of those who defend him because he has made some changes, are based on realfacts. It is certain that the poor are leading somewhat better lives, just as itis true that the country continues to sink into the fundamental tendencies ofneoliberalism. In the middle, the process now taking place is what Pochman callsan impoverishment (dbourgeoisement) of the middle class. This is a powerfultrend in the neoliberal model that facilitates the unity of action between thepoorest and middle-class sectors, as was the case in Argentina. But in the shortterm, it appears Brazil's middle class is supporting Lula while the poorwho have

always supported conservativeshave become devout Lulistas.These tendencies present two problems. The support from the poor all butguarantees Lula a victory in the campaign for a second term. But unlike in the1970s and 1980s when industrial workers identified with the PT out of politicalmotivations, the party now draws its votes based on the State aid given out underthe Bolsa Familia project This tends to reproduce the pattern of clientelism thatalready exists in the region. Second, there are no deep-seated changes takingplace in the trends: between 1930 and 1980, Brazil underwent a process ofindustrialisation. Since 1980, it has experienced a cycle of State-sponsoredfinancialisation and a decline in industry. Under Lula, this trend is onlydeepening. Bolsa Familia benefits nearly 9 million poor families, or more than 30million people in a country of 180 million inhabitants. It is estimated that theprogramme reaches 77 percent of poor families with incomes under US$45 a week,

totalling 11 million, 49 percent of whom live in the Northeast portion of thecountry. This regionuntil recently, dominated by right-wing leadersis where Lulanow receives his highest level of support: 55 percent compared to 29 percent inthe Southeast, the region where the PT was born and where Lula had the strongesthold during the 2002 elections. Corruption scandals have affected public opinionamong the middle class and union workers, but to the poorest part of thepopulation, they seem to have little relevance.What is occurring in Brazil is an enormous transfer of the national income intothe financial sector, which is increasingly cartelised but no more efficient.What is interesting is that the earnings by the banks cannot be accounted for byincreased efficiency. Rather, they are being generated by an abuse of economicpower and a fragile institutionality, explains economist Reinaldo Gonalves,professor of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Approximately 35 percent of

public debt ownership, which represents more than half of the GDP, is in the handsof banks. Since the government pays very high interest rates, it benefits theinvestors to invest more in debt than in building factories, for example.Economist Ceci Vieira Juru of Attac-Brasil says the banks, insurance companies,and transnationals have increased their capital worth in Brazil while the middleclass, local businesses, and public finances have suffered. This has been caused,in her opinion, by a process of reconcentration of income in favour of investmentcapital and against worker output, and greater debt incurred by the federalgovernment, which is reflected in the third factor, the de-industrialisation andde-nationalisation of the local system of production.According to another economist, Marcio Pochman of the University of Campinas, the


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US$120 billion paid by the State each year to debt security holders (some 20,000families) makes up 7-8 percent of the GDP. This is the percentage of Brazil'swealth that is transferred to the rich every year. Pochman's assessment of thecountry's evolution over the last decade of neoliberalism insists thatprivatisation and financial deregulation have given the powerful even more power.The economy today is managed in accordance with the interests of the 20,000families who account for ownership of 80 percent of the total amount of publicdebt. This segment is so powerful it is capable of controlling the country'seconomic policies. If interest rates fall, they will simply take their money, stopfinancing the debt, and leave. The Brazilian economy has been organized more andmore to protect those interests.One of the hardest facts the Lula government has had to deal with is that economicgrowth in 2005 was much lower than expectedonly 2.3 percent, the lowest in LatinAmerica after Haiti. In the years of Lula's government, economic growth has beenmediocre, averaging 2.6 percent, lower than the first three years of HenriqueCardoso's government, which saw a rate of 3.4 percent. The spectacle of growthLula promised upon election is not occurring, in spite of the fact that exportshave doubled during this same time period.For a good portion of analysts, the poor growth, which takes place at a time whenemerging economies (among them China) are growing at an average rate of 8-9percent, can be explained by the financial sector, the one most benefited by state

politics. In effect, investments and industry are growing at a slow rate due tothe high interest rates being paid by the State, the highest in the world, at 16.5percent annually. This explains how during a time of economic stagnation, bankshave registered the highest profits in their history. The earnings of Bradesco,the country's largest bank, were 80 percent higher than in 2004 and the highest inthe Latin American open-capital bank's history. The second bank, Ita, hadearnings that exceeded 2004's by 39 percent. The banks that follow on the list(Banco do Brazil, Caixa Econmica Federal, and Unibanco) also registered thelargest profits in their history. According to available information, in 2005 thegovernment spent US$63.2 billion (139 billion reales) on debt servicing to dealwith the internal and external debt (85 percent and 15 percent, respectively).This figure represents no less than 23 percent of Brazil's total budget: nearlyone out of every four dollars the government spends goes toward paying

amortizations and interest on the debt. This would be a noose around the neck forany country, but in Brazil's case, the government is the one that has tied thenoose itself, by opting for the highest interests rates in the world in order tobring in capital and thus pay off its debt.According to the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB, ConfernciaNacional dos Bispos do Brasil) the country has become a financial paradise. TheCNBB is a long-time ally of Lula and the PT, supporting them since the beginning,and it played an important role in opposing the military dictatorship that came topower in 1964. Bishop Odilio Scherer, Secretary General of the CNBB, directlyaccused Lula of having turned the country into a financial haven, and Archbishopof Salvador da Bahia, Geraldo Majella Agnelo, was harsher still when pointing out:There has never been a leader so submissive to the banks.

BOLIVIAS REALIGNMENT UNDER MORALES

Regaining the autonomy that was taken away by the privatisation of naturalresources under the previous government of Gonzlo Snchez de Losada was a promiseMorales made during his presidential campaign. Evo Morales read the decree inwhich the nationalisation of the natural gas industry was announced with theconsideration that in historical struggles, the people have conquered and paidwith their blood, the right to return our natural resources and our wealth innatural gas to the hands of the nation and to be utilized to the benefit of the


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country. What will be the next step? Is this a prelude to the revolution?Morales did not reveal a scenario for his revolution. However, Bronfenbrennerformulated already in the 1950s a workable scenario for Morales revolution:Comes the revolution. It may indeed be a social revolution, with or withoutsubstantial violence. It may be a capital levy at rates close to 100 percent. Itmay be nationalisation, with compensation wiped out by rapid inflation.Evo Morales and his Moviemento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement for Socialism) tookpower in January 2006 with a clear popular mandate. Social uprisings starting in2000 demanded that the state nationalize the countrys natural gas and petroleumso the lucrative profits of these industries could be used to help lift SouthAmericas poorest country out of poverty. Three presidents resigned or were forcedout of office by these popular protests.Evo Morales, the countrys first Indian president, is dramatically reshaping hiscountrys destiny. His democratic project is different from that of the Bolivianpopulist and nationalist political parties having ruled the country since the1950s. The Morales movement is the product of grass-roots movements, not of atechnocratic elite or professional politicians competing for power and spoils.MAS is not a normal populist party making deals with financial oligarchs,foreign capital or state technocrats. Officially founded in 1998, MAS spearheadedthe movement against water privatisation in Cochabamba. As Vice-President AlvaroGarca Linares has noted, the goal of MAS is to achieve hegemony, and the

Constituent Assembly is central to this process. Bolivia has been unstable foryears because of poverty, military revolts, and the conniving of the countryspolitical elites as they loot the public treasury. As in Venezuela prior to HugoChvezs election, the traditional parties are viewed as bankrupt. Evo Moralesand MAS want to breath new life into the countrys political and socialinstitutions, to give voice to the countrys indigenous poor. Indeed, in thefootsteps of Karl Polnyi, one may assume that if globalisation is the ultimateenclosure of the commons our water, our biodiversity, our food, our culture,our health, our education then reclaiming the commons is the political,economic, and ecological agenda for our times.The ethnic character of this poverty fed the massive discontent that led to thetriumph of Evo Morales as the countrys first Indian president. Many landlesspeasants, predominantly of Quechua and Aymara origins, have migrated out of the

Andean west to the low lands in the east. There they often work in conditions ofabject servitude on the large estates of non-indigenous owners, many of whom claimde facto possession of large tracts of idle or underutilised lands that theyrefuse to sell or distribute to the landless Indians.Outlining a series of sweeping proposals for changes in the countrys agrarianreform laws, the Morales government is taking on the countrys elite economicinterests located in the eastern region of the country. This is where most of thelarge land ed estates are located, many of them acquired through politicalcorruption and land speculation over the last three decades. According to MiguelUrioste, the director of the Land Foundation, an independent research centre in LaPaz, Bolivia has a dual land system, the minifundias and subsistence agriculturalplots in the west, and the capitalist enterprises tied to the latifundias in theeast. The prosperous estates produce soybeans, cattle and other agricultural

export commodities that have enriched a bourgeoisie based in Santa Cruz, Boliviasthird largest city.In the 1980s Bolivia was on the cutting edge of the trend toward privatisation,adhering to an IMF-recommended structural adjustment programmes. The pro-corporatereforms proved profitable for the multinational energy companies involved, butthey utterly failed to benefit the Bolivian people. Today 64 percent of thepopulation lives in poverty, with a majority of people scraping by on less thanUS$2 per day. A March 2006 report by the Center for Economic and Policy Researchshows that, according to the IMF's own data, real per-capita gross domesticproduct (GDP) in Bolivia is lower now than it was 27 years ago.The devastating poverty that afflicts South Americas poorest country Bolivia is


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bound up with this dysfunctional land system. Out of Bolivias 9 millioninhabitants, 3.5 million people live in the countryside with about 80 percentsubsisting at the poverty level. Garca Linares noted in his address on agrarianreform that 40 percent of the countrys peasants and inhabitants of the indigenousagricultural communities live in conditions of extreme poverty, earning less thanUS$600 a year.The Bolivian landless movement in recent years has occupied some of these idlelands, meeting violent resistance from the large landowners. As Miguel Urioste ofthe Fundacin Tierra (Land Foundation) notes, a climate of violence andconfrontation over access to land has led to the injury and death of manypeasants. The Morales government will implement many of the changes it proposesin the agrarian reform law by executive decree and through legislation inCongress. But if it meets with sustained opposition it will use the ConstituentAssembly that will be elected in early July to restructure the countrys agrarianpolicies as well as its political institutions, said Urioste. A few leadersexpress reservations. Felipe Quispe, the former head of the Confederacin SindicalUnica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUCTB, Union Confederation of RuralWorkers of Bolivia) who has often challenged Morales from the left, said: Thegovernment is committing an error because it is offering to discuss the agrarianreform plan with the large landowners who have historically exploited thepeasants.

Sectors of the landed bourgeoisie in Santa Cruz have already proclaimed theirstaunch opposition to the proposed changes in the agrarian reform laws, eventhough the government has offered to discuss the legislation with them. Virtuallyall the business and entrepreneurial associations in Santa Cruz under theleadership of Branko Marinkovic of the Federacin de Empresarios de Santa Cruz(Federation of Private Businesses) issued a proclamation expressing their deepconcern with the measures of agrarian reform that are coming from theadministration of Evo Morales.Militant indigenous movements are already intending to take over large estates.President Manuel Dosapei of the Coordinador de los Pueblos tnicos de Santa Cruz(CPESC - Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz) announced its determination to seize 14,000hectares owned by Branko Marinkovic. This land will automatically be taken becauseit is ours, declared a representative of the ethnic groups. An official of the

business coalition shot back: this is an abusive assault and we are going todefend our private property with determination.With the governments expropriation decree, fifteen corporations have beennationalized, with foreign capital from a wide variety of nations, including theUnited States, Spain, Great Britain, Brazil, France and the Netherlands. Seizingcontrol of these enterprises goes to hand in hand with Bolivias audacious stepsin the trade arena. MAS and Morales view neoliberalism, US trade agreements, andcorporate-driven globalisation as major obstacles to the countrys development.Adriano Pires, director of the Brazilian Centre for Infrastructure Studies, whosaid: Governments in the region see energy as a commodity they can use to pushpopulist agendasFrom a political point of view, its a powerful issue tomanipulate, but from an industrial point of view, it can do real harm. Theindustrial sector and the government of industrial countries are not considering

the possibility that the nationalisation of Bolivias huge natural gas reserves -in 2005, estimated natural gas reserves were 26.7 trillion cubic feet (TCF) -could be a way to fight poverty. Regaining the autonomy that was taken away by theprivatisation of natural resources under the government of Gonzlo Snchez deLosada may not be going back to the national populism of the 1970s in LatinAmerica, but moving forward to a new way of doing politics and economy (the de-colonial way, as it is being conceptualised in Bolivia).The trade agreement and the nationalisation of Bolivias natural resources mark adramatic shift in hemispheric affairs. Morales is serving notice on Washingtonthat he is becoming part of a radical bloc of nations in Latin America that are nolonger subservient to the United States.


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This discontent with the Andean community led to the signing of the Peoples TradeAgreement between Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia on April 29, 2006. The accord isparticularly favourable to Bolivia as to Cuba and Venezuela have agreed to takeall of Bolivias soy production as well as other agricultural commodities atmarket prices or better. Venezuela will also ship oil to Bolivia to meet domesticshortfalls in production while Cuba will send doctors to Bolivia. Peru has alsojust signed a trade agreement with the United States that will have an adverseimpact on Bolivian exports to Peru. These accords have ruptured the thirty-sevenyear old Andean Community of Nations, a trade pact that included Venezuela andEcuador as well as Bolivia. Hugo Chvez announced in April 2006 that Venezuela iswithdrawing from the pact because the United States has fatally wounded thecommunity. Morales also stated that Bolivia is reconsidering its membership.At the same time Morales is moving to reshape the countrys commercial relations,particularly with Venezuela. Hugo Chvez flew to Bolivia declaring we are goingto concretise the Peoples Trade Treaty, an accord that was recently signedbetween Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. It is openly pitched as an alternative to theUS-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a trade zone based on neoliberalprinciples that facilitates the expansion of multinational corporations. Boliviaand Venezuela have signed eight different accords dealing with 200 differentprojects concerning energy, mining, education, sports and cultural exchanges. Mostimportantly Venezuela has agreed to invest over US$1 billion to help industrialize

Bolivias natural gas production, including the construction of a petrochemicalcomplex.The burgeoning economic alliance between Venezuela and Bolivia also helps offsetthe difficulties that have arisen with Brazil and Argentina over Moralessdetermination to exert greater control over natural gas exports. Bothneighbouring countries have significant investments in Bolivias gas fields, andboth are importing gas for domestic use at prices well below the world market. Ata recent international gathering of Latin American and European leaders in Vienna,Austria, Morales and President Lula of Brazil exchanged harsh words over effortsto draft a new accord over natural gas. While the two leaders formally made upbefore they left Austria, there is little doubt that Chavez support providesBolivia with leverage in its negotiations with its two more powerful neighbours.Venezuela is also signing a financial accord aimed at bolstering Bolivias banking

and monetary system. According to a project of the Peoples Trade Treaty betweenBolivia, Venezuela and Cuba, enterprises from all three countries participate withthe goal of expanding commerce and sharing technical expertise.

CONCLUSIONSSurely, it is time perhaps to start questioning the idea that industrialisationand technology paves the way to democracy and that democratic projects that aredifferent from those of the private sector are authoritarian populism. The newsand official reports regularly inform that while worldwide wealth and productivityincreases the population, poverty increases as well. We, readers and audience ofpopular media, are daily invited to think that there is only one way to go: toincrease productivity, to spread technology and to allow people to vote. Democracyis at the end of this road. When people vote in a surprising majority for a

project (like that of Evo Morales, Hugo Chvez or Hamas), that is not followingthe predicted path, democracy in danger is debated and the authoritarian use offorce is considered as a measure to re-establish democracy.In Latin America, political change is related to changes in the class structureand how the ruling class alliance is exercising its hegemony over society. Theusual view is that control of the state, the major centre of political power inregard to both the allocation of societys productive resources and the coercivepower is still of crucial importance for any political or social movement. Thepursuit of political power on the basis of political parties and electoralcompetition has become the normal form of exercising political power. A competingform is the formation of social movements, which unlike political parties, are not


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organized to pursue power as such, though they are clearly engaged in the struggleover state power.The lessons to be drawn from the Brazilian and Bolivian cases are manifold. Firstof all, in opposition to classical populism organisations of self-defence (orsocial movements) have become involved in a process of social action and communitydevelopment. Secondly, these organisations of self-defence representing peasantsand Indians have become, together with the labour unions in the cities, highlypoliticised. They broke with former patterns of clientelistic behaviour vis--vispolitical power and the charismatic populist leader. As reformist organisations,they want to bring about social change and improvements in the lives of the poor,not the socialist revolution. As reformists, their leaders and militants are notseeking confrontation with the power structure or the agencies of political power,but are trying to develop new and additional resources in order to accumulatesocial capital and skills within the practices and frameworks of the neoliberalsocial and political model.This brings us to the problem of the electoral road to power and the oldLuxemburgist dilemma of reform or revolution? In other words: should we narrowthis strategic question to the problem of the so-called pitfalls of electoralism?The electoral road to power offers some social movements better possibilities forovercoming their internal contradictions and for broadening their audiences.Electoral politics can help reaching other social classes, professional strata or

regional interest groups on the base of a common platform. In Latin Americancountries, mobilisation of social movements representing the interests of ethnicminorities, a landless peasantry and slum dwellers against neoliberal reforms ispaying. In several cases they succeeded in defeating neoliberal regimes and inbringing back in power leftist parties using a neopopulist discourse.A contributing factor to their success may be a belated process of economicdevelopment that brings about sharp differentiation between the agricultural andthe urban proletariat and transforms the urban workers into a privileged class, atleast in the eyes of a dispossessed agricultural population. This populism ischaracterised by a primitive chiliasm that is adverse to dialectical thinking anddoctrinal flexibility. It stresses the subjective factor of will over and abovethe analysis of objective social and economic factors. As a social movement it isvoluntaristic by its very nature and resists bureaucratic organisation and

routinised modes of action. Finally, it has a tendency to seek solidarities interms of racial, national, cultural, and primary group identity that is stillstrong among peasants having recently migrated to the cities or being subjected tothe constraints of the international market and Washingtons war on drugs.

MANIFESTO OF THE AMERICAS

We live in a dominant economic system that for centuries has engaged in theunlimited exploitation of all ecosystems and their natural resources. This

strategy has generated economic growth and, for some countries, what has beencalled "development," and has privileged the consumption and well-being of a smallfraction of humanity. And, unfortunately, it has excluded the great majority ofhumanity from access to minimum conditions for survival.

The costs of this system of exploitation of nature and of human beings, and ofuncontrolled consumerism, has been paid with the sacrifice of millions of poorworking people, peasants, indigenous peoples, pastoralists, fisherfolk, and thepoorer people in society, who give their lives every single day. And this isaccompanied by ongoing aggression against nature, that has been and still is


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systematically devastating.

The integrity and diversity of life forms, which are the basis of biodiversity,are under threat. Nature on our planet is threatened, as is human life, whichdepends upon nature. Even the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment conducted by the UN,and released in 2005, recognizes that, "human activities are fundamentally andirreversibly changing the diversity of life on planet Earth. These changes willonly accelerate in the future." In this important recognition of the planetarycrisis, it is critical that we recognize that it is not all human activity that isso damaging, but rather, above all, those actions guided by the uncontrolled drivefor profit of transnational corporations.

Faced with this dramatic situation, we feel the need to affirm alternatives thatcan assure a hopeful future for life, for humanity, and for the Earth. We need topass from an industrial production society, consumerist and individualistic, thatsacrifices ecosystems and penalizes human beings, while destroying social andbiological diversity, to a society that sustains life. This must be a society inmotion toward a life that is socially just and ecologically sustainable, and thattakes care of the community of life and protects the physio-chemical andecological bases of support for all living systems, including that of human

beings.

As inhabitants of the American continent, we are conscious of our universalresponsibility. Through us, also, passes the future of the Earth. The Amazonianand Andean countries, for example, like Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia,Venezuela and Brazil, are mega-diverse countries. Not just because of the presenceof very rich ecosystems, but also because of the many indigenous peoples,peasants, quilombolas and other local communities, that over centuries andmillennia have learned to co-exist with biological and cultural diversity. TheAmazon forest in our countries makes up a third of all tropical forests in theworld, and contains more than 50 percent of the biodiversity. In it there are atleast 45,000 species of plants, 1,800 species of butterflies, 150 species of bats,1,300 species of freshwater fish, 163 species of amphibians, 305 species of

reptiles, 311 species of mammals, and 1,000 species of birds.

Because of this richness, Latin America is the object of the greed of the"neoliberal global-colonizers," via the action of dozens of transnationalcorporations, principally companies from the Global North, who are shamelesslyengaged in bio-piracy. If it once was the race for gold and silver, today it isthe race to monopolize genetic and pharmacological resources and the traditionaland local knowledge that accompanies them, which have become strategic resourcesfor the future of business in the global market. And they want to impose upon uspatent laws and protections for their windfall profits.

We want to confront, decisively, this process of exploitation and destruction. Wepropose consistent policies that:

1. Conserve the biological and cultural diversity of our ecosystems, including allthe living organisms in their habitats, and protect the interdependencies amongthem, within the dynamic equilibrium that characterizes each ecological region,together with the socially and ecologically sustainable interaction with thepeoples that inhabit each region.

2. Guarantee the integrity and beauty of ecosystems, and of the peoples thatconserve and depend upon them. This implies preserving the features of ecosystemsthat assure their functioning and maintain the identity of living beings in theirterritorial, biological, social, cultural, landscape level, historic and


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monumental aspects. The preservation of biological and cultural diversity, and ofthe integrity and beauty of ecological systems, can assure the sustainability ofthe multiple environmental functions and benefits for human beings today and infuture generations. Among these are: clean water, food, medicine, wood, fibre,climate regulation, and flood and disease prevention. At the same time theyconstitute the basis of recreation, of aesthetics, and of spirituality, while atthe same time supporting the soil, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling, amongother vital functions for all of humanity.

3. We oppose, decisively, the introduction of exotic species that are non-adaptivefor our ecosystems, as has happened in many biomes with the promotion ofhomogeneous, industrial plantations of Eucalyptus, pine, etc., that destroynatural ecosystems and have severe, negative social impacts on the peoples thatinhabit these areas. What they produce is profit for a few, dollars, cellulose,carbon, polluted water, a degraded environment, and poverty.

4. We strongly oppose the liberation of transgenic organisms in the environment,whether in farms, plantations, ranching or whatever other activity in theenvironment. Beyond being unnecessary, they are essentially useless for anythingother than transnational corporate profits. They represent potential risks tohuman health, and can cause irreversible damage to Nature and ecosystems. We

emphatically oppose the introduction of transgenic trees, which represent an evengrater danger, because, among other reasons, their pollen can be disseminated overmany miles or kilometers, inevitably contaminating other forest species, includingnative species, and they can have multiple impacts on flora, insects and othercomponents of fauna, and can undercut the basis of the livelihoods of indigenouspeoples, fisherfolk, peasants, quilombolas and other local communities.

5. We pledge to combat Terminator seeds because they put life itself -- and itsreproduction -- at risk, as they are "suicide seeds" that only benefit thetransnational corporations that control our seeds, imposing a position ofdependence on farmers.

6. We oppose the attempt of the imperial government of the United States and its

transnational corporations to impose the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) onus, as well as diverse bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), treaties to protectforeign investment, and agreements adopted in totally undemocratic manners atSummits and in the WTO. These agreements put our Nature, our agriculture, ourservices, and the living conditions of our populations at greater risk, and onlyprioritize guarantees in the interest of profits.

7. We express our support for, and recognition of, the peoples and communities whoover centuries and millennia have developed our agricultural biodiversity, throughthe selection and conservation of the seeds that today are the basis of theworld's agriculture and of humanity's food supply. To maintain this basis of oursustenance, this enormous richness of agricultural and culinary diversity, we mustrecognize and affirm the rights of peasants, indigenous peoples, pastoralists,

fisherfolk, quilombolas and others, to land, territory and to natural resources,so that they can continue to carry out the essential task for humanity ofconserving diverse local seed varieties, which can only take place at the locallevel. We will fight those companies that seek control over our seeds, against thetraditions of the peoples who are the stewards of our seeds, who always understoodseeds as the source of life, which should never be turned into mere commodities.

Finally, we express our hope that these resolutions benefit our peoples andbenefit our food sovereignty -- that is, the right of each and every people toproduce their own food, in conditions of good health and social justice, and inbalance with Nature. We defend those who work in the countryside, our farmers and


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peasants. We defend their right to live as farmers, and to thusly guarantee thesustenance of our populations. This peasant mode of production contributesdecisively to the sustainability of our planet, and to integral, broad-baseddevelopment, essential for the future of humanity.

April 20, 2006Curitiba, capital of the state of Parana, Brazil, building an America free of GMOsand aggression against the environment.

[Translated from Portuguese]

1. Hugo Chvez, President of Venezuela

2. Roberto Requio, Governor of Parana

3. Prez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Laureate, Argentina

4. Eduardo Galeano, writer. Uruguay

5. Peter Rosset, food sovereignty researcher. USA/Mexico

6. Pat Mooney, ETC-Group, specialist in the impacts of GMOs and other newtechnologies, Canada

7. Silvia Ribeiro, researcher ETC-Group, Mexico

8. Noam Chomsky, linguist, MIT, USA

9. Atilio Boron, social scientist, CLACSO, Argentina

10. Violeta Menjivar, Mayor of San Salvador, El Salvador

11. Camille Chalmers, Jubilee South, HAITI

12. Ramon Grosfoguel, Puerto Rico

13. Doris Gutierrez, Congresswomen, Honduras

14. Monica Batoldano, ex-comandante Sandinista. Nicaragua

15. Ernesto Cardenal, poet, priest and ex-minister of culture, Nicaragua

16. Gioconda Belli, poet. Nicaragua

17. Raul Suarez, Baptist pastor and congressman. Cuba

18. Miguel Altieri, professor of agroecology, Univ. California, USA/CHILE

19. Fernando Lugo, Catholic bishop. Paraguay

20. Blanca Chancoso, Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities, CONAIE - Ecuador

21. Hebe de Bonafini, Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Argentina

22. Anbal Quijano, social scientist, Peru

23. Leonardo Boff, theologian and writer, Brazil


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24. Beth Carvalho, cantautora. Brasil

25. Mons. Pedro Casaldaliga, Bishop and poet - Brazil

26. Mons. Ladislau Biernaski, Catholic bishop, Curitiba. Brasil

27. Monja Coen, Buddhist nun, Brazil

28. Joo Pedro Stedile, leader of MST-Via Campesina-Brazil

29. Temistocles Marcelos Netto. Nat. Sec'ty Environmet, CUT. Brazil

30. Leticia Sabatela, actress, Artists Human Rights Movement, Brazil

31. Nalu Faria, World March of Women, Brazil

32. Pedro Ivo Batista. Eco-socialist Network. Brasil

http://www.alainet.org/active/11215&lang=en

Declaracin Final del V Encuentro Hemisfrico de Movimientos Sociales, Redes yOrganizaciones que luchan contra el ALCA.Declaracin Final: Llevar nuestra unidad a niveles superiores

A todos los pueblos de Nuestra AmricaA la opinin pblica nacional e internacional

En abril del ao pasado, el IV Encuentro Hemisfrico de Lucha contra el ALCA quecelebramos aqu mismo en La Habana, nos convoc a los movimientos sociales de todo

el continente a unirnos en la realizacin de la III Cumbre de los Pueblos paraencarar la nueva Cumbre Presidencial de las Amricas a realizarse en Mar delPlata. All, las jornadas de resistencia popular, unidas a la voluntad poltica dealgunos gobiernos, consiguieron bloquear la agenda del Gobierno de los EstadosUnidos y el intento de revivir el rea de Libre Comercio para las Amricas (ALCA).

De esta manera, el proyecto hegemonista norteamericano sufri una nueva derrota yha quedado paralizado. La campaa continental contra el ALCA brind unsignificativo aporte en esta batalla. Hemos mostrado as la capacidad de losmovimientos sociales para hacer realidad las acciones que nos proponemos.

En este V Encuentro, las delegadas y los delegados representantes de diferentesredes y campaas continentales, al mismo tiempo que celebramos esta victoria,

reafirmamos nuestro compromiso por continuar luchando contra el libre comercio entodas sus expresiones. Esta lucha tiene hoy da un escenario decisivo en elenfrentamiento a las negociaciones y firmas de Tratados de Libre Comercio (TLCs)en varios pases del continente. Resaltan las resistencias de los pueblos deEcuador, Per y Costa Rica que han logrado trabar esas negociaciones.

Igualmente denunciamos y nos oponemos activamente a la Organizacin Mundial delComercio (OMC), institucin que generan las normativas y definen las polticas dellibre comercio en el mundo, donde se hace avanzar la agenda de las trasnacionalesen contra de los intereses de los pueblos. Por otro lado, denunciamos y combatimosel resurgimiento del neocolonialismo europeo en su tentativa de imponer tratados


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de libre comercio como parte de una agenda neoliberal en nuestra regin quefavorece exclusivamente a sus trasnacionales.

El libre comercio y la accin de las transnacionales estn homologando hacia abajolas condiciones laborales en todo el mundo, fomentando la competencia entretrabajadores y trabajadoras norte- sur y sur sur para ver quien trabaja ms pormenos. Tenemos que fortalecer la solidaridad entre los trabajadores como nicaforma de romper este chantaje.

En general estamos ante un ascenso de la resistencia popular en Amrica Latinacontra estas polticas.

Inclusive en los Estados Unidos se ha despertado una ola de movilizaciones masivasde los emigrantes que se enfrentan al intento de criminalizarlos y acentuar ladiscriminacin de que son vctimas, y por defender sus derechos civiles ylaborales, en definitiva sus derechos como seres humanos. La migracin a la que seestn viendo obligados grandes grupos de poblacin en todo el continente esconsecuencia del modelo econmico neoliberal y de libre comercio que padecemostodos. La reivindicacin de sus derechos es tambin nuestra reivindicacin, detodos y todas, por una sociedad ms justa econmica y socialmente en las Amricas.

Este ascenso de las luchas populares est permitiendo en Amrica Latina la llegadade gobiernos surgidos de plataformas polticas que tratan de oponerse a lahegemona de Estados Unidos, lo que contribuye al cambio de la correlacin defuerzas que favorece la oposicin al consenso de Washington.

Esto nos sita en un nuevo escenario donde existen mejores condiciones para, juntoa la resistencia a los planes del imperialismo, avanzar en la construccin dealternativas cada vez ms viables. Para ello, debemos estar abiertos a un dilogofructfero, en pie de igualdad y respeto, entre los movimientos sociales yaquellos gobiernos que estn verdaderamente comprometidos con los interesespopulares.

Hoy se viene desarrollando ya la Alternativa Bolivariana para las Amricas (ALBA),

promovida por Venezuela y Cuba, que se viene concretando en importantes proyectoscomo la operacin Milagro, los programas de alfabetizacin en varios pases delcontinente y acuerdos como el de Petrocaribe. As mismo ha surgido la iniciativade los Tratados de Comercio de los Pueblos (TCP) impulsados por el presidenteboliviano Evo Morales (participante de nuestros anteriores encuentros). Talesalternativas de integracin, deben contar cada vez ms con los aportes de losmovimientos sociales.

En esta construccin de alternativas concretas destaca la importancia del tema dela energa como uno de los ejes de los procesos de integracin. Todos estos temassern la materia de nuestro trabajo durante la prxima Cumbre Social por laIntegracin de los Pueblos, que realizaremos en Santa Cruz, Bolivia, durante elprximo mes de septiembre.

En la bsqueda de alternativas no puede estar ausente la necesidad ineludible deacabar con el flagelo de la deuda externa que es usado por las grandes potencias einstituciones financieras internacionales como un instrumento de chantaje paradisciplinar a nuestros pases. Debe prevalecer la idea justa de que somosacreedores y no deudores.

Estos nuevos escenarios significan una nueva etapa, en la que los movimientossociales debemos pensarnos ms a la ofensiva, y que a la vez nos exige reforzar laarticulacin y cohesin de nuestras acciones. Debemos lograr no slo identificarla agenda que nos resulta comn sino adems integrar las diversas agendas


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nacionales y sectoriales como espacios reconocidos tambin de lucha de todos ytodas. La agenda del movimiento social frente a los nuevos retos y escenarios esmuy amplia y diversa.

Nuestros objetivos contemplan la lucha contra el neoliberalismo en todas susexpresiones e incluye la superacin de la cultura patriarcal y las diferentesformas de discriminacin por gnero, identidad y orientacin sexual; contramujeres, jvenes, pobres, indgenas, afrodescendientes e inmigrantes. Dentro deestos objetivos la dimensin jurdica ocupa un papel importante en la defensa delos derechos fundamentales de la humanidad.

Asimismo la defensa de la naturaleza y la biodiversidad, los recursos genticos yel conocimiento popular son parte esencial a nuestra resistencia a la destruccinneoliberal. Defender la tierra y democratizar su propiedad, impulsar la reformaagraria, as como garantizar la soberana alimentaria, constituyen componentesbsicos de nuestra agenda. En este terreno es necesario continuar impulsando ydefendiendo la economa solidaria y la produccin local sustentable.

La resistencia a la ofensiva de las corporaciones trasnacionales por privatizarlos recursos estratgicos de las naciones y mercantilizar derechos pblicosbsicos como la educacin, la salud y la seguridad social, y sobre todo hoy el

vital derecho al agua, seguir siendo un motor de nuestras acciones comunes, ascomo la defensa de las culturas e identidades de nuestras naciones.

Las luchas estudiantiles a democratizacin de las universidades y contra lamercantilizacin de la educacin, , constituyen expresiones de enorme importanciaen estos empeos. Asumimos la defensa de estas luchas que estn siendo blancos dela accin de las fuerzas represivas.

Un eje central de nuestra accin es el combate contra la militarizacin y lapoltica de seguridad del gobierno de los Estados Unidos que est asumiendoformas graves de expresin en nuestra regin. Ese gobierno impulsa una visin quemezcla argumentos de combate a la piratera, al lavado de dinero, al narcotrfico,al terrorismo internacional, al contrabando, etc. que busca en realidad someter

las polticas de seguridad de los gobiernos de nuestros pases a una orientacin ycomando definidos en Washington. Esto es lo que est en curso, por ejemplo, en elPlan Colombia y el Plan Patriota, en la Triple Frontera (Argentina, Brasil,Paraguay) y en la implementacin del TLC plus, conocido como Alianza para laseguridad y la prosperidad de Amrica del norte (ASPAN).

El guerrerismo de la administracin Bush est provocando el incremento de lasacciones intervencionistas en nuestros pases, sobre todo en aquellos donde lossectores populares comienzan a tener sus mayores xitos. Particularmenteamenazados estn hoy Cuba, Venezuela y Bolivia. Nos declaramos en alertapermanente para oponer con toda energa nuestro potencial movilizador y de combatefrente a tales acciones. Convertiremos cada agresin en un nuevo playa Girn,esto lo proclamamos en el 45 aniversario de aquella victoria frente al

imperialismo Yankee.

En el combate contra la dominacin imperialista, el colonialismo y elneoliberalismo no se nos escapa que lo fundamental es ganar la guerra por laconciencia de la gente, librar la batalla de las ideas. En esa tarea esparticularmente importante vincular el pensamiento de los intelectuales a laspropuestas de los movimientos sociales en la lucha por la emancipacin de lahumanidad. Y ganar la conciencia de la gente pasa necesariamente por construirvisiones y alternativas en los mbitos de la comunicacin, la informacin, laeducacin y la cultura que logren contrarrestar los aparatos y mecanismos queestn al servicio del pensamiento hegemnico. Frenar la imposicin de leyes que


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reducen cada vez ms los espacios democrticos de ejercicio de la comunicacin yque intentan, monopolizando el espectro radioelctrico entre otras acciones,ahogar a los medios de comunicacin alternativos, como por ejemplo est sucediendoen Mxico, es una tarea impostergable en la agenda de todo el movimiento social.

Las redes, campaas y movimientos sociales de todo el continente americano salimosde este V Encuentro con la firme decisin de que es indispensable llevar nuestraunidad de pensamiento y accin a niveles superiores que estn a la altura de lasamenazas y desafos que encaramos tanto en la resistencia como en la construcciny defensa de nuestras alternativas. La tarea de continuar abriendo nuevoshorizontes comienza desde hoy mismo.

Nos reencontraremos en La Habana, los prximos 3 a 5 de mayo de 2007, en el VIEncuentro Hemisfrico de movimientos y redes que luchan contra el ALCA y el librecomercio.

Otra Amrica es posible

La Habana, Cuba, 15 de Abril de 2006

http://www.alainet.org/active/show_text.php3?key=11150

the ongoing populist revolution in latin america andrÉ mommen university

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