the nuclear age at 75 years · 2020. 7. 25. · arms control today july/august 2020 1 the source on...

Volume 50 | Number 6JULY/AUGUST 2020

INSIDE | No Progress Toward Extending New START

A Publication of the Arms Control Association

www.armscontrol.org

U.S. $7.00 Canada $8.00

The Nuclear Age At 75 Years

By Carol Giacomo

Getting Back on Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons

By Vincent Intondi

Reflections on Injustice, Racism, And the Bomb

The Hiroshima And Nagasaki Bombings and

The Nuclear Danger Today

Setsuko Thurlow Remembers The

Hiroshima Bombing

Freeing the World Of Nuclear Weapons:An interview with Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui

Plan A: How a Nuclear War

Could Progress

http://www.armscontrol.org

The projected cost of the proposed U.S. nuclear spending spree is staggering and it is growing. The United States currently plans to spend nearly $500 billion, after including the effects of inflation, to maintain and replace its nuclear arsenal over the next decade.

USNuclearExcess.org highlights the costs, risks, and alternatives.

S p o n s o r e d b y t h e A r m s C o n t r o l A s s o c i a t i o n

Can the United States afford the growing costs of its nuclear arsenal?

Find out more at:

USNuclearExcess.org

https://www.usnuclearexcess.org/

https://www.usnuclearexcess.org/

1ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2020

THE SOURCE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Arms ControlTODAY

Volume 50 • Number 6 • July/August 2020

Cover photo: The first U.S. atomic bomb explodes above the New Mexico desert on July 16, 1945. This is the only color photograph (color motion pictures were also shot) of the test. (Photo: Jack Aeby/Science History Images/Alamy Stock Photo)

16

12

12

Features 6 Getting Back on Track to Zero

Nuclear Weapons By Carol Giacomo

The next president can take concrete steps to renew momentum for nuclear disarmament.

12 Reflections on Injustice, Racism, and the Bomb

By Vincent Intondi

Social movements to improve civil rights, fight climate change, and seek nuclear disarmament have been entwined since the start of the nuclear age.

16 Freeing the World of Nuclear Weapons Arms Control Today interviews Hiroshima Mayor

Kazumi Matsui

With the declining number of atomic bomb survivors, Hiroshima is leading efforts to share their experience for generations to come.

20 Setsuko Thurlow Remembers the Hiroshima Bombing

By Setsuko Thurlow

Seventy-one years afterward, a survivor recalls helping the wounded on August 6, 1945.

23 Plan A: How a Nuclear War Could Progress Princeton University researchers have simulated how

a European conflict could escalate into a U.S.-Russian nuclear war.

27 The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings and the Nuclear Danger Today

By Daryl G. Kimball Seventy-five years on, the effects of the bombings haunt the

survivors and inform the global debate about nuclear weapons and the ongoing pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

3 Focus

Nuclear Testing, Never Again By Daryl G. Kimball

4 In Brief Notable Quotable

By the Numbers

On the Calendar

15 Years Ago

48 Reports of Note

https://www.armscontrol.org/about/Daryl_Kimball

2 ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2020

Arms Control TODAY

Arms Control Today (ISSN 0196-125X) is published monthly, except for two bimonthly issues appearing in January/February and July/August. Membership in the Arms Control Association includes a one-year subscription to Arms Control Today at the following rates: $25 Basic Membership (digital access only), $70 Regular Membership (print and digital). A Domestic Professional (U.S.) subscription to the journal (print and digital) is $95 and the International Professional subscription rate is $115. Digital-only subscriptions are also available. Please contact the Arms Control Association for more details. Letters to the Editor are welcome and can be sent via e-mail or postal mail. Letters should be under 600 words and may be edited for space. Interpretations, opinions, or conclusions in Arms Control Today should be understood to be solely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the association, its board of directors, officers, or other staff members, or to organizations and individuals that support the Arms Control Association. Arms Control Today encourages reprint of its articles, but permission must be granted by the editor. Advertising inquiries may be made to [email protected]. Postmaster: Send address changes to Arms Control Today, 1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1175, Washington, D.C., 20036. Periodicals postage paid at Washington D.C., Suburban, MD and Merrifield, VA. © July 2020, Arms Control Association.

The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding and support for effective arms control policies. Through its media and public education programs and its magazine Arms Control Today, ACA provides policymakers, journalists, educators, and the interested public with authoritative information and analyses on arms control, proliferation, and global security issues.

Volume 50, Number 6 July/August 2020

A Publication of the Arms Control Association

1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1175 Washington, DC 20036

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WEBSITEwww.armscontrol.org

Board of Directors

Thomas Countryman Chairman

Michael T. Klare Secretary

Paul Walker Vice-Chairman

Christine Wing Treasurer

Lilly AdamsMatthew BunnSusan BurkLeland CoglianiWilliam R. “Russ” ColvinPhilip CoyleDeborah FikesDeborah C. GordonBonnie Jenkins

Angela Kane Laura KennedyMaryann Cusimano Love Zia MianRandy RydellRachel StohlGreg ThielmannAndrew Weber

Publisher and Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball

Editor Greg Webb

Design andProduction EditorAllen Harris

Director for Nonproliferation Policy Kelsey Davenport

Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy Kingston Reif

Research Assistant Shannon Bugos

Research Assistant Julia Masterson

Communications Director Tony Fleming

Chief Operations Officer

Kathy Crandall Robinson

Senior Fellow on Conventional Arms Control and Transfers Jeff Abramson

Visiting Senior Fellow Michael T. Klare

Finance Officer Merle Newkirk

Development Associate Elana Simon

Intern Mackenzie Knight

31 No Progress Toward Extending New STARTProspects remain dim for extending New START or engaging China in nuclear arms control efforts.

33 U.S. Testing Interest Triggers Backlash

U.S. lawmakers and international officials have criticized the Trump administration’s consideration of restarting nuclear testing.

34 IAEA Board Presses Iran The IAEA Board of Governors

approved a resolution calling on Iran to provide more information about its past nuclear activities.

35 Iran Continues to Stockpile Uranium Tehran has enriched and stored more reactor-grade uranium while allowing the IAEA to monitor its nuclear activities.

37 North Korea Pledges to Boost DeterrentThe breakdown in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy worsens.

38 Tensions on Korean Peninsula Rise North Korea has demolished a liaison office used to communicate with the South.

39 Critics Question U.S. Open Skies ComplaintsTrump administration justifications for withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty are being challenged from many sides.

41 Russia Releases Nuclear Deterrence PolicyRussia publicly releases its nuclear deterrence policy for the first time.

43 U.S., Russia Boost Shows of ForceThe nuclear adversaries have recently increased flights of strategic bombers near each other’s borders.

44 U.S. Aims to Expand Drone SalesThe Trump administration hopes to expand sales by reinterpreting the Missile Technology Control Regime.

45 U.S. Sets Global Partnership PrioritiesHolding the rotating chair of the 30-nation group, the United States plans to focus on chemical weapons.

News and Analysis

47 News In Brief

China Deploys New Missile Submarines Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore DeploymentUpgraded Nuclear Weapon Passes F-15 Test

mailto:[email protected]


http://www.armscontrol.org


FOCUS By Daryl G. Kimball Executive Director

Seventy-five years ago, on July 16, the United States

detonated the world’s first nuclear weapons test explosion

in the New Mexican desert. Just three weeks later, U.S. Air

Force B-29 bombers executed surprise atomic bomb attacks on

the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing at least 214,000

people by the end of 1945, and injuring untold thousands more

who died in the years afterward.

Since then, the world has suffered from a costly and deadly

nuclear arms race fueled by more than 2,056 nuclear test

explosions by at least eight states, more than half of which

(1,030) were conducted by the United States.

But now, as a result of years of sustained citizen pressure

and campaigning, congressional leadership, and scientific and

diplomatic breakthroughs, nuclear testing is taboo.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992,

when a bipartisan congressional majority mandated a nine-

month testing moratorium. In 1996 the United States was the

first to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which

verifiably prohibits all nuclear test explosions of any yield. Today,

the CTBT has 184 signatories and almost

universal support. But it has not formally

entered into force due to the failure of

the United States, China, and six other

holdout states to ratify the pact.

As a result, the door to nuclear testing

remains ajar, and now some White House

officials and members of the Senate’s Dr.

Strangelove Caucus are threatening to blow it wide open.

According to a May 22 article in The Washington Post,

senior national security officials discussed the option of a

demonstration nuclear blast at a May 15 interagency meeting.

A senior official told the Post that a “rapid test” by the United

States could prove useful from a negotiating standpoint as the

Trump administration tries to pressure Russia and China to

engage in talks on a new arms control agreement.

Making matters worse, in a party-line vote last month, the

Senate Armed Services Committee approved an amendment by

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) to authorize $10 million specifically for

a nuclear test if so ordered by President Donald Trump. Such a

test could be conducted underground in just a few months at the

former Nevada Test Site outside Las Vegas.

The idea of such a demonstration nuclear test blast is beyond

reckless. In reality, the first U.S. nuclear test explosion in 28

years would do nothing to rein in Russian and Chinese nuclear

arsenals or improve the environment for negotiations. Rather, it

would raise tensions and probably trigger an outbreak of nuclear

testing by other nuclear actors, leading to an all-out global arms

race in which everyone would come out a loser.

Other nuclear-armed countries, such as Russia, China, India,

Pakistan, and North Korea would have far more to gain from

nuclear testing than would the United States. Over the course

of the past 25 years, the U.S. nuclear weapons labs have spent

billions to maintain the U.S. arsenal without nuclear explosive

testing. Other nuclear powers would undoubtedly seize the

opportunity provided by a U.S. nuclear blast to engage in

multiple explosive tests of their own, which could help them

perfect new and more dangerous types of warheads.

Moves by the United States to prepare for or to resume nuclear

testing would shred its already tattered reputation as a leader on

nonproliferation and make a mockery of the State Department’s

initiative for a multilateral dialogue to create a better

environment for progress on nuclear disarmament. The United

States would join North Korea, which is the only country to have

conducted nuclear tests in this century, as a nuclear rogue state.

As Dr. Lassina Zerbo, executive secretary of the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty Organization, said on May 28, “[A]ctions or

activities by any country that violate the international norm

against nuclear testing, as underpinned

by the CTBT, would constitute a grave

challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation

and disarmament regime, as well as to

global peace and security more broadly.”

Talk of renewing U.S. nuclear testing

would dishonor the victims of the nuclear

age. These include the millions of people

who have died and suffered from illnesses directly related to the

radioactive fallout from tests conducted in the United States,

the islands of the Pacific, Australia, China, North Africa, Russia,

and Kazakhstan, where the Soviet Union conducted 468 of

its 715 nuclear tests. Tragically, the downwinders affected by

the first U.S. nuclear test, code-named “Trinity,” are still not

even included in the U.S. Radiation Effects Compensation Act

program, which is due to expire in 2022.

Congress must step in and slam the door shut on the idea of

resuming nuclear testing, especially if its purpose is to threaten

other countries. As Congress finalizes the annual defense

authorization and energy appropriations bills, it can and must

enact a prohibition on the use of funds for nuclear testing and

enact safeguards that require affirmative House and Senate votes

on any proposal for testing in the future. Eventually, the Senate

can and must also reconsider and ratify the CTBT itself. As a

signatory, the United States is legally bound to comply with

CTBT’s prohibition on testing, but has denied itself the benefits

that will come with ratification and entry into force of the treaty.

Nuclear weapons test explosions are a dangerous vestige of a

bygone era. We must not go back. ACT

Nuclear Testing, Never Again

Congress must step

in and slam the

door shut on the

idea of resuming

nuclear testing.



1945 20201950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

200

150

100

50

Limited Test Ban Treaty1963

Threshold Test Ban Treaty1974

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty1996

InBRIEFJuly/August 2020

Notable Quotable“We should not end up in a situation where we have no agreement whatsoever regulating the number of nuclear weapons in the world. And with the demise of the [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)] Treaty that happened last year, because of the Russian violation of the INF Treaty,...we cannot risk losing the New START agreement without having something else...to replace the New [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty].”

—NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, speaking at the Brussels Forum, June 23.

Fran

cois

Wal

sch

aert

s/A

FP v

ia G

etty

Imag

es

Total Nuclear Tests 1945–2020 NUMBERSBY

TH

E

The United States conducted the first test of a nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945 in the New Mexico desert. Since then, at least seven more nations have conducted their own tests. In total, more than 2,000 tests have been conducted, more than half of which by the United States.

United States .......1,030USSR/Russia .......... 715France....................... 210United Kingdom ........ 45China ........................... 45North Korea ................ 6 India .............................. 3Pakistan ....................... 2

Total nuclear tests

2,056


CALENDARON

TH

E

15 Years Ago in ACTA Readiness to Harm: The Health Effects of Nuclear Weapons Complexes

“It is a remarkable fact of nuclear weapons history and radiation risk that every nuclear-weapon state has first of all harmed its own people in the name of national security. For the most part, they have done so without informed consent.”

—Arjun Makhijani, July/August 2005

July 1–31 94th meeting of the Executive Council for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague

July 4 U.S. Independence Day

July 6 Meeting of states-parties to the Open Skies Treaty, Vienna

July 16 75th anniversary of the Trinity test

Aug. 6 75th anniversary of the first combat use of the atomic bomb, Hiroshima

Aug. 9 75th anniversary of the second combat use of the atomic bomb, Nagasaki

Aug. 10–14 Meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons group of experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems, Geneva

Aug. 17–21 Sixth Conference of States-Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty

Aug. 25–Sept. 3 Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention

Aug. 29 International Day Against Nuclear Tests and the 71st anniversary of Russia’s first nuclear test

Sept. 4 Second Preparatory Meeting of the Second Review Conference of States-Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Sept. 14–18 Meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, Vienna

Sept. 17–30 75th session of the UN General Assembly, New York (reduced attendance)

Sept. 21 International Day of Peace

Sept. 26 International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Sept. 28 Meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, Vienna

Oct. 1–31 95th meeting of the Executive Council for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague

Oct. 5–8 55th meeting of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Advisory Group, Vienna

Oct. 5–Nov. 5 Meeting of the UN General Assembly First Committee, New York

Nov. 1–30 25th Conference of the States-Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

Nov. 10 World Science Day for Peace and Development

Nov. 16–20 2nd session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York

Nov. 16–20 18th meeting of states-parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Geneva


By Carol Giacomo

If there ever has been a fantastical national

security goal, ridding the world of all

nuclear weapons would be near the top

of the list. At the height of the Cold War, the

United States and Russia possessed a combined

total of 68,000 of these most deadly armaments

and although there have been significant

reductions over the years, the two countries

still account for an estimated 91 percent of the

world’s nuclear weapons, which total more than

13,000 warheads.1

Getting Back on Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons

Even now, both are continuing to pour

billions of dollars into new systems and

supporting bureaucracies and industrial

bases to produce, manage, and operate

their arsenals. They still assign the

weapons a primary role in their national

defense doctrines. Both adhere to nuclear

doctrines that call for the use of nuclear

weapons against certain non-nuclear

threats, and they maintain Cold War-era

nuclear “launch under attack” policies

that exacerbate the risk of catastrophic

miscalculation. Meanwhile, a few other

countries, notably North Korea, India,

and Pakistan, are relentlessly advancing

their own nuclear capabilities, proving

that possessing the bomb and the means

to deliver it against an enemy still has a

darkly powerful appeal.

There are practical and political

reasons to doubt that the nuclear genie

can ever be completely returned to its

bottle. Will any government follow South

Africa’s example in the 1990s and really

run the political risk of giving up their

country’s entire nuclear weapons arsenal?

Given the deeply rooted rationale that

has justified the possession of nuclear

weapons for three-quarters of a century

and the growing tensions and rivalries

between nations, how would that make

the country safer? After all, the supposed

magic of nuclear weapons is that they are

capable of such catastrophic damage that

no adversary would ever use one against

another nuclear-armed state because

it would invite certain retaliation and

annihilation—mutual assured destruction.

Americans were told, incorrectly, that

they won the Cold War by outbuilding

and outspending the Soviet Union, and

many still believe that is a winning

formula with Russia and China.

Even if all nuclear hardware and

computer codes could be verifiably

destroyed, how do you erase the

knowledge locked in a scientist’s

brain? Even if those questions can be

convincingly answered, reducing and

eliminating the threats posed by nuclear

weapons no longer captivate the national

psyche and animate national security

agendas the way they once did. There

is little sense of urgency in part because

Carol Giacomo was a member of The New York Times editorial board from 2007 to 2020, writing about all major foreign and defense issues, including nuclear weapons, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Before that, she was diplomatic correspondent for Reuters in Washington, covering foreign policy for more than two decades and traveling to more than 100 countries with eight secretaries of state.

1945 20201950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015


1945 20201950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Of the estimated 13,410 warheads held by nuclear powers in early 2020, approximately 91 percent are owned by Russia and the United States. Nearly 9,320 are in the military stockpiles (the rest are awaiting dismantlement), of which some 3,720 warheads are deployed with operational forces, of which about 1,800 US, Russian, British and French warheads are on high alert, ready for use on short notice.

the task is so daunting, the challenges so

complex, the goal seemingly distant.

Yet, the goal of global zero is as

necessary and compelling as ever, maybe

even more so. The Science and Security

Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

this year moved its Doomsday Clock

to 100 seconds before midnight, the

symbolic threshold for nuclear calamity.

In 1991, when the United States and

Soviet Union were negotiating steep

reductions in their arsenals, the clock

stood at a far more comfortable 17

minutes to midnight.

Decades of popular pressure and

hard-won diplomatic efforts have led to

initiatives, treaties, and national policies

that have curbed nuclear competition,

nuclear proliferation, and many nuclear

risks. Beginning in the late 1960s, the

stockpile trajectory kept going down,

and the United States and Russia were in

regular dialogue on ways to mitigate the

threats posed by nuclear weapons to both

countries and to the world.

In 1970 the nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT) entered into force and

established a binding commitment that

all non-nuclear-weapon states forswear

nuclear weapons and committed the

nuclear-armed states-parties “to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective

measures relating to cessation of the

nuclear arms race at an early date and to

nuclear disarmament.”

The NPT was indefinitely extended in

1995 as part of a package of decisions that

also committed the nuclear-armed states

to a number of specific steps to help fulfill

their disarmament commitments, one

of which was to halt nuclear testing. In

1996, negotiations on the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were concluded.

Although the treaty has not yet entered into

force, 184 countries have signed. There is

now a global taboo against nuclear testing.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference,

states-parties underscored the end goal

and agreed, by consensus, to further

measures and called for an “unequivocal

undertaking” to accomplish the total

elimination of nuclear weapons.2

In recent years, however, momentum

has slowed, and the destructive threat

of the weapons themselves has been

compounded by a precipitous erosion in

the arms control regimes that for decades

have helped keep nuclear arsenals in

check. There has been a weakening of the

democracies that have been central to

managing the post-Cold War peace, and

an explosion in campaign contributions

from defense contractors keeps the

pressure on members of Congress to

ensure the nuclear doomsday machine

remains intact.

The growing nuclear capabilities of the

newest nuclear actors—India, Pakistan,

and North Korea—continue to complicate

the nuclear disarmament enterprise

and pose potential nuclear flash points.

Meanwhile, tensions between the

United States and Russia are increasing,

as are those between the United States

and China, the rising nuclear-armed

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2020

Source: Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matt Korda, Federation of American Scientists, June 2020

NPTJuly 1968

SALT IIJune 1979

INFDec. 1987

START IJuly 1991

START IIJan. 1993

SORTMay 2002

NEW STARTApril 2010

SALT IMay 1972


superpower. Nonstate actors continue to

foment instability, and climate change,

cyberwarfare, and space weapons pose

new and worsening challenges.

Nothing in recent years, however, has

done more to undermine arms control

and nonproliferation efforts than U.S.

President Donald Trump. He has not

spoken at length about his nuclear

weapons philosophy, but his comments

during the 2016 campaign questioning

why the United States possesses such

weapons if it does not use them suggests

a leader with no real understanding of

their destructive power. Just days before

Christmas in 2016, the president-elect

tweeted that the United States “must

greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear

capability.” He later told MSNBC, “Let it

be an arms race. We will outmatch them

at every pass and outlast them all.”

Trump’s expansive interpretation

of presidential power, willingness to

act unilaterally, impulsive nature, and

disregard for expertise have raised

profound concerns about how he would

handle a nuclear crisis. Along with a

majority in Congress, he has embraced a

nuclear modernization program launched

by the Obama administration that will

cost a budget-busting $1.5 trillion over the

next 30 years, and he has issued a nuclear

policy document that includes a new low-

yield nuclear weapon that could make the

use of such armaments more tempting.

Trump has surrounded himself with

advisers, including at one time National

Security Advisor John Bolton, who have

a history of antipathy toward arms

control, believing treaties and agreements

are unacceptable legal restraints on

what should be the United States’ total

freedom to exercise power in whatever

way it sees fit.

Trump has thrown roadblocks in the

way of extending the 2010 New Strategic

Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that

is set to expire in February after achieving

verifiable reductions in Russian and U.S.

deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

He withdrew the United States from the

landmark 2015 deal that put serious curbs

on Iran’s nuclear program. He withdrew

from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear

Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated an

entire class of missiles in Europe after

perfunctory attempts to resolve a dispute

over Russian noncompliance with the

treaty. Over the objections of U.S. allies,

he has announced plans to withdraw

from the Open Skies Treaty, which allows

the United States and its allies to fly

over Russia and keep tabs on its military

facilities. Furthermore, Trump officials

assert that commitments made by the

United States and others through the NPT

review conferences no longer apply.

Now, his administration is considering

whether to conduct the first U.S. nuclear

test since 1992, for the purpose of sending

political signals to Russia and China.3

In short, Trump has made it his mission

to tear down rather than strengthen the

diplomatic arms control architecture that

has forced the United States and Russia to

shrink their arsenals and helped prevent

most other countries from becoming

nuclear powers. It puts the president at

odds with his predecessors from Dwight

Eisenhower onward, who sought and

negotiated or signed one or more nuclear

arms control agreements while they were

in office.

As illusory a goal as a world without

nuclear arms might seem in today’s

tumultuous political context, plenty of

smart, sober-minded people believe it is

still worthwhile. Few expect it to happen

soon or perhaps ever. At a minimum,

proponents are committed to zero as

an aspirational target that can motivate

international leaders and the public into

taking decisions that propel the world on

a path to fewer nuclear weapons instead

of more and a diminished reliance on the

ones that remain. The basic logic is this:

If, as many senior officials and experts

and former President Ronald Reagan and

former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev

have argued, “a nuclear war cannot

be won and must never be fought,”

then why keep investing in expensive,

civilization-destroying weapons when

there are other needs to fund?

It is worth remembering that Reagan,

a conservative Republican, was the first

U.S. president to seriously contemplate

eliminating nuclear weapons when he

discussed a proposal with Gorbachev at

their 1986 Reykjavik summit. Their vision

ultimately faltered over Reagan’s refusal

to forsake his dream of a costly and

elaborate missile defense program, but the

experience showed that it was possible

for a defense hawk such as Reagan to

transform into a nuclear peacemaker

President-elect Donald Trump speaks to the media at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, on Dec. 21, 2016. Two days later he seemed to relish the prospect of renewed nuclear rivalries: “Let it be an arms race. We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.” (Photo: Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images)


determined to end the balance of terror.

The pair eventually negotiated the first

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that,

for the first time, mandated an actual

reduction in the two nations’ long-range

nuclear weapons arsenals.

Decades later, the man who had been

Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz,

is still committed to that ambitious

vision. In a seminal commentary in

The Wall Street Journal in 2007, Shultz

and three other tough-minded national

security titans—Henry Kissinger, the

former secretary of state; Sam Nunn,

the former Democratic senator from

Georgia; and William Perry, the former

defense secretary—gave new intellectual

impetus to the cause by calling on the

United States to lead a global campaign to

devalue and eventually rid the world of

nuclear weapons.4

“Nuclear weapons were essential to

maintaining international security during

the Cold War because they were a means

of deterrence,” the four wrote. But they

stressed, “It is far from certain that we

can successfully replicate the old Soviet-

American ‘mutually assured destruction’

with an increasing number of potential

nuclear enemies worldwide without

dramatically increasing the risk that

nuclear weapons will be used.”

President Barack Obama picked up the

theme in his 2009 Prague speech by giving

assurances that the United States would

seek a world without nuclear weapons.

“The existence of thousands of nuclear

weapons is the most dangerous legacy of

the Cold War,” Obama said. “So today, I

state clearly and with conviction America’s

commitment to seek the peace and security

of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m

not naive. This goal will not be reached

quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It

will take patience and persistence. But now

we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us

that the world cannot change. We have to

insist, ‘Yes, we can.’”5

Obama made a valiant stab at fulfilling

his promise by negotiating New START

with the Russians and the landmark

nuclear deal with Iran and spearheading

a global effort to better secure stockpiles

of nuclear material. Yet, growing conflict

over Russia’s annexation of Crimea in

2014 and interference in the 2016 U.S.

election stymied further progress on

nuclear disarmament.

In 2016, when Obama became the

first U.S. president to visit Hiroshima,

he seemed to express disappointment

at the pace of nuclear disarmament, but

still underscored the necessity of striving

toward global zero. From the Hiroshima

Peace Park, he said, “[W]e must have

the courage to escape the logic of fear

and pursue a world without them. We

may not realize this goal in my lifetime,

but persistent effort can roll back the

possibility of catastrophe. We can chart

a course that leads to the destruction of

these stockpiles.”

Since then, Shultz and Perry, now in

their 90s, have continued to try and

shake a distracted world out of its torpor.

Perry established a project dedicated

to educating the public about nuclear

threats and has published yet another

book on the subject. “The likelihood of a

nuclear catastrophe is greater today than

during the Cold War, and the public is

completely unaware of the danger,” he

tells anyone who will listen.

The organization Global Zero, founded

in 2008 by Bruce Blair, a nuclear expert

and research professor at Princeton

University, and others, has been a major

driver internationally, as well as in the

United States, behind eliminating nuclear

weapons, with emphasis on laying out

detailed blueprints for practical action

toward the global zero goal. “I don’t

believe in arms control for its own sake,”

Blair told Arms Control Today. “It has to

solve security problems and reduce the

risk of deliberate or unintended use of

nuclear weapons. In the long run, that

means to eliminate them all.”

Other organizations and some

governments have also sought to

hold the world’s nuclear-armed states

to their earlier nuclear disarmament

commitments in the context of the NPT

and to put us back on the path to a world

without nuclear weapons.

Against considerable odds, a group

of non-nuclear-weapon states backed

by the International Campaign to

Abolish Nuclear Weapons, has worked

to harness such concerns. After years of

campaigning, they secured the backing

of 122 non-nuclear-weapon states to

negotiate and open for signature the

2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of

Nuclear Weapons.6 Although the United

States and other nuclear-weapon states

boycotted the process, advocates hope

the treaty will help to delegitimize

nuclear weapons and persuade the outlier

nations, among them the United States,

to eventually join.

Still, there is no underestimating the

obstacles to escaping Trump’s dystopic

world in which the arms control guard

rails have been ripped off and the nuclear

dangers threaten to overwhelm us.

If Trump is reelected, the problem may

be insurmountable. One of his top arms

control advisers, Marshall Billingslea, in

a recent speech reaffirmed Trump’s past

threat of a new arms race. “We know how

to win these races, and we know how

to spend the adversary into oblivion,”

Billinsglea told the Hudson Institute, a

Washington think tank. “If we have to do

it, we will. But we would like to avoid it.”7

As Shultz told the Commonwealth

Club in Los Angeles in May, when it

comes to arms control, “it all starts at

the top with the president. You can’t do

it from down below.”8 His hope is that

someone with influence, a friend of the

president or perhaps a bipartisan Senate

working group, can make a convincing

As illusory a goal as a world without nuclear arms might seem in today’s tumultuous political context, plenty of smart, sober-minded people believe it is still worthwhile.


case to Trump and his advisers to reverse

course and take arms control seriously. It

is a long shot, but presidents often look

to seal their legacy with second-term

accomplishments; and right now, Trump

has no foreign policy wins in his column.

If former Vice President Joe Biden,

the putative Democratic presidential

candidate, wins in November, there

is little doubt he will adopt a serious

mainstream arms control agenda, given

his long record of governmental service

and published positions. Just how much

of a priority Biden would assign to this

agenda and whether he would adopt a

transformational strategy with global zero

as a broad goal or a more incremental

approach is unclear. With the coronavirus

pandemic, the collapse of the economy,

and the turmoil over systemic racism

facing the country, the next president’s

plate will be full. Yet, progressive

Democrats and others are urging Biden to

think big on this and other matters in this

moment of national crisis.

So, what could be a new president’s

strategy for getting back on track to a

world with fewer and eventually no

nuclear weapons? There are many ideas

for moving forward, but the following

appear to have growing support.

Preserve and strengthen existing nuclear

guardrails. The president should make

clear in the first week in office that the

United States is committed to work with

Russia once again to lead international

arms control efforts, which in the past

have contributed significantly to stability.

He must act quickly on the things a

president can do on his own to stop

the damage from Trump’s decisions:

Tell Russia the United States is prepared

to extend New START, which requires

each side to have no more than 1,550

deployed strategic warheads and comply

with a strict verification regime, for five

more years. Tell Iran that if it goes back

into compliance, the United States will

immediately rejoin the 2015 nuclear

deal under which Tehran observed strict

curbs on its nuclear program in return for

a lifting of sanctions. Recommit to the

nuclear testing moratorium, the pursuit of

entry into force of the CTBT, and a return

to the Open Skies Treaty.

Declare the U.S. intent to adopt a no-

first-use policy and to take land-based

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

off launch-ready alert. The result would

be to forswear the first use of nuclear

weapons in a conflict, thus making clear

the sole purpose of the U.S. arsenal is

to deter a nuclear attack by others, not

initiate one. The change would also give

presidents more time to decide whether

to launch a nuclear weapon, thus easing

the pressure to strike preemptively and

reducing the risk of launching based on a

false warning. According to Global Zero,

there is no more important or pragmatic

step that could be achieved in the near

term to reduce nuclear risks and advance

the cause of disarmament than securing

unequivocal statements of support by

nuclear-armed states for a no-first-use

policy. The president should consult with

NATO on the impact of these changes on

the alliance and urge Russia to follow the

U.S. example.

Ensure no one person has control of the

nuclear button. With a no-first-use posture

and a move away from launch under

attack, the president can and should

work with Congress on legislation that

would end the president’s sole authority

to launch a nuclear weapon by requiring

that such a decision can only be taken

with the concurrence of the vice president

and the secretaries of state and defense,

and Congress.

Avoid a new European missile race. Test

whether Russia is willing to agree on a

mutual moratorium on the deployment

of intermediate-range nuclear forces

in Europe, thus halting the return of a

destabilizing class of weapons that had

been eliminated from the continent. The

United States withdrew from the INF

Treaty in 2019 after Russia violated the

pact by deploying a banned new system,

and now both sides are preparing to

deploy these missile systems.

Rethink the current plan to replace and

upgrade the U.S. arsenal. To create space

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas addresses the UN Security Council at a Feb. 26 meeting on the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ahead of its now-postponed 2020 review conference. The meeting, chaired by Germany, illustrated efforts of non-nuclear-armed nations to hold nuclear-weapon states to their disarmament commitments. (Photo: Loey Felipe/United Nations)


for new nuclear weapons policies, pause

defense budget expenditures allocated

for nuclear modernization until an

administration review of the program

is completed and decisions are made.

The pandemic, which has cost the

government trillions of dollars, has

caused Americans to think anew about

what constitutes national security, like

jobs and health care. In the context of

today’s undeniable needs, it makes even

less sense to squander resources on an

excess of weapons that will never be used.

Build on New START. Begin talks with

Russia on a follow-on agreement to New

START that would aim to reduce each

side’s arsenal even further and pave the

way for countries with smaller nuclear

arsenals, especially China, which has

roughly 300 nuclear weapons and has

resisted arms talks, to eventually join

the discussion. Under the Global Zero

plan, the new treaty would cover more

types of systems (tactical and strategic)

than the original version, leaving

Russia and the United States with no

more than 650 deployed warheads and

450 reserve weapons,9 compared to an

estimated 1,550 deployed strategic and

150 nonstrategic nuclear warheads and

2,050 reserve warheads now.10 That would

mean eliminating land-based ICBMs,

which are considered vulnerable to attack,

and scaling back the number of strategic

nuclear-armed submarines and B-21

strategic bombers.

Sustain strategic stability talks with

Russia and engage in separate talks with

China. A trilateral Russian-Chinese-U.S.

discussion could help all three explore

not just views on nuclear weapons but

other strategic topics such as missile

defense, advanced conventional weapons,

emerging Russian and Chinese anti-

satellite weapons, confidence-building

measures such as an early-warning center,

and the impact of cyberwarfare on

nuclear command and control, which is a

growing U.S. concern.

Make nuclear disarmament a global

enterprise. The United States has the

power to convene a multilateral forum

with nuclear-armed and non-nuclear

states to discuss nuclear risks and other

topics in preparation for a multilateral

negotiation that results in the complete

dismantlement of all nuclear weapons.

This would be no easy task. China

has resisted U.S. pressure to discuss

restrictions on its 300-weapon arsenal,

as have France and the United Kingdom,

at least until U.S. and Russian levels are

reduced far lower than current levels.

India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan

have also refused to subject their nuclear

weapons to external restraints. How

can they be engaged? One idea is to

begin with a series of biennial summits

at which states would make voluntary

commitments to advance disarmament.

Another would have the five recognized

nuclear-weapon states (China, France,

Russia, the UK, and the United States)

jointly pursue some preliminary measures

to foster nuclear stability among

themselves, such as unilaterally pledging

not to increase the size of their arsenals.

Restock the government’s cadre of arms

control experts. Given all the experienced

arms control experts and diplomats

who left government during the Trump

administration, there will be a need to

woo back a new generation of diplomats

and scientists to join the mission to

mitigate nuclear dangers. Alexandra

Bell, senior policy director at the Center

for Arms Control and Nonproliferation,

says younger people like herself are not

burdened by “old grudges” between

Russia and United States and can think

more creatively about problem-solving.

Rebuild a coalition in support of nuclear

risk reduction. It would help to build

a constituency in Congress, among

Americans, in foreign countries, and

the expert and business communities

in support of these steps and a world

without nuclear weapons. In theory,

there is sympathy in the United States

for the global zero vision. Americans

consider the spread of nuclear weapons

among the top threats to the nation’s

well-being, after coronavirus disease and

terrorism, according to a March 2020 poll

by the Pew Research Center. Yet, public

support alone does not motivate elected

officials in Congress to act. “I don’t think

they know what nuclear weapons can

do,” activist Jerry Brown, the former

Democratic governor of California said

recently. “If you go to Congress, there is

very little interest in nuclear weapons.”

The outcome of the U.S. election and

the actions taken in the next few years

by the United States, Congress, and

the American people, as well as other

concerned leaders and citizens around

the globe, will determine whether we

continue to live under what President

John Kennedy called “the nuclear sword

of Damocles” for another 75 years

or whether we find a way to remove

ourselves from the dangers posed by

nuclear weapons.

ENDNOTES

1. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda,

“Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation

of American Scientists, April 2020,

https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/

status-world-nuclear-forces/.

2. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons, “Final Document,” NPT/

CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), 2000, p. 14.

3. John Hudson and Paul Sonne, “Trump

Administration Discussed Conducting First U.S.

Nuclear Test in Decades,” The Washington Post,

May 22, 2020.

4. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry

A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free

of Nuclear Weapons," The Wall Street Journal,

January 4, 2007.

5. Office of the Press Secretary, The White

House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama—

Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,”

April 5, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.

archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-

barack-obama-prague-delivered.

6. For the current status, see International

Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,

“Signature and Ratification Status,” n.d., https://

www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_

status (accessed June 24, 2020).

7. Hudson Institute, “Special Presidential Envoy

Marshall Billingslea on the Future of Arms

Control: Transcript,” May 21, 2020, https://

www.hudson.org/research/16062-transcript-

special-presidential-envoy-marshall-billingslea-

on-the-future-of-nuclear-arms-control.

8. Commonwealth Club, “Reducing Nuclear

Weapons: Stopping the War That No One

Wants,” podcast, May 20, 2020, https://www.

commonwealthclub.org/events/archive/

podcast/reducing-nuclear-weapons-stopping-

war-no-one-wants.

9. To learn more, see Global Zero, “We Have

a Plan,” n.d., https://www.globalzero.org/

reaching-zero/ (accessed June 24, 2020).

10. Kristensen and Korda, “Status of World

Nuclear Forces.”

https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/


https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered



https://www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status



https://www.hudson.org/research/16062-transcript-special-presidential-envoy-marshall-billingslea-on-the-future-of-nuclear-arms-control




https://www.commonwealthclub.org/events/archive/podcast/reducing-nuclear-weapons-stopping-war-no-one-wants




https://www.globalzero.org/reaching-zero/

https://www.globalzero.org/reaching-zero/


The moment in August 2005 is seared into

my memory. The train pulled up to the

Hiroshima station from Kyoto. I stepped

out with my mind full of images from 60 years

ago, when the United States dropped the first

atomic bomb on this pristine city of 340,000

people. (Hiroshima had been one of the few

cities that escaped the fire-bombing campaign of

Japan’s major cities led by U.S. Air Force General

Curtis LeMay.) Initially, I was taken aback by

what I saw: a modern city, filled with restaurants,

hotels, shops, and lots of people, much like any

other in the industrialized world.

Suddenly, everything changed. Clearly,

I was not ready; and before I could

prepare myself, I was standing in front

of the iconic Atomic Bomb Dome—one

of the few structures still standing in

its original form near the hypocenter.

Throughout my life, I had seen photos of

the dome standing alone amid the total

destruction wrought by the 15-kiloton

atomic blast. But it was different being

there in person. I could feel myself

starting to change.

The next two days were filled with

conversations with atomic bomb survivors

(hibakusha), museum visits, and retracing

the places about which John Hersey wrote

in his historic work, Hiroshima. On the

night of August 6, I saw thousands of

Japanese citizens gathered at the Motoyasu

River. People reflected on those who lost

their lives, making paper floating lanterns

and putting them in the water.

That night, with a few of my new

Japanese friends (I was a student at the

time at American University, which

partnered with Ritsumeikan University),

I put our lantern into the water. I still

remember what I wrote on our lantern: “I

will dedicate my life to making sure this

never happens again.” As it floated away,

I began to look around and think that

60 years ago, everyone here was dead. I

thought of the human suffering that had

taken place, and all of my anger, guilt,

and sorrow boiled over as tears rolled

down my face. At that moment, Koko

Tanimoto Kondo, a hibakusha with whom

I had grown close, immediately came over

to console me.

When I returned to the United States,

friends, family, and colleagues began

hearing me talk about abolishing nuclear

weapons. Many were perplexed. I had

been known as an activist who fought for

Reflections on Injustice, Racism, and the Bomb

By Vincent Intondi

Vincent Intondi is a professor of history and director of the Institute for Race, Justice, and Civic Engagement at Montgomery College in Takoma Park, Maryland. His research focuses on the intersection of race and nuclear weapons. He is the author of African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement (2015).


civil rights. I had become conscious when

the phrase “Free Mumia” was dominant. I

had spent my time protesting the murder

of Amadou Diallo and the police assault

on Abner Louima. “Who cares about

nuclear weapons?” I heard. “Nukes will

always be there…no one is crazy enough

to use them,” and “That’s an issue for old,

white dudes.”

But I could not forget what I learned,

who I met, or how I felt in Hiroshima.

Regardless if I was fighting for civil

rights; against the inequities perpetuated

by the World Trade Organization and

International Monetary Fund; for justice

for the indigenous people of Chiapas,

Mexico; or to stop the U.S. war in Iraq, I

kept coming back to one thought: What

does any of this matter if we were all dead

from nuclear war?

To me, it was simple. These were not

separate issues. Jobs, racial equality,

climate change, war, class, gender, and

nuclear weapons were all connected and

part of the same fight: universal human

rights, with the most important human

right being the freedom to live…live free

from the fear of nuclear war.

Of course, this thinking is not new.

Contrary to the narrative that nuclear

disarmament has been and remains a

“white” issue, since 1945, the anti-nuclear

movement has included diverse voices

who saw the value in connecting all

of these issues. Moreover, the nuclear

disarmament movement has been most

successful when it left room for diverse

voices and combined the nuclear issue

with social justice.

The movement to abolish nuclear

weapons began even before the first

bomb was dropped. Among the earliest

critics of nuclear weapons were the

atomic scientists, members of the

Roman Catholic Church, the Women’s

International League for Peace and

Freedom, and many in the Black

community. Specifically, regarding African

Americans, for some, nuclear weapons

were directly linked to racism.

Many African Americans agreed

with Langston Hughes’ assertion that

racism was at the heart of President

Harry Truman’s decision to use nuclear

weapons in Japan. Why did the United

States not drop atomic bombs on Italy

or Germany, Hughes asked. The Black

community’s fear that race played a role

in the decision to use nuclear weapons

only increased when the U.S. leaders

threatened to use nuclear weapons

in Korea in the 1950s1 and Vietnam a

decade later. For others, the nuclear issue

was connected to colonialism. From

the United States obtaining uranium

from Belgian-controlled Congo to the

French testing a nuclear weapon in the

Sahara, activists saw a direct link between

those who possessed nuclear weapons

and those who colonized the nonwhite

world. For many ordinary citizens, Black

and white, however, fighting for nuclear

disarmament simply meant escaping

the fear of mutually assured nuclear

destruction and moving toward a more

peaceful world.

Today, many people love to quote

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., especially

his “I Have a Dream” speech, while also

ignoring the full title and focus of the

march: “Jobs and Freedom.” Throughout

his life, King made the connections

of what he called the “triple evils” of

capitalism, racism, and militarism.

About one million people attended the historic rally to “Halt the Arms Race and Fund Human Needs," in New York on June 12, 1982. (Photo: Andy Levin/Science Source)


King was not alone among civil rights

activists in making these connections.

To put it in today’s context, to singer,

actor, and activist Paul Robeson, “Black

Lives Matter” meant not only speaking

out about racism in the United States but

also highlighting where the United States

obtained its material to build nuclear

weapons. To W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Lives

Matter meant not only forming the

NAACP or writing Souls of Black Folk, but

also getting millions to sign the “Ban the

Bomb” pledge to stop another Hiroshima

in Korea. To civil rights leader Bayard

Rustin, Black Lives Matter meant not only

organizing the March on Washington but

also traveling to Ghana to stop France

from testing its first nuclear weapon in

Africa. To Lorraine Hansberry, Black Lives

Matter meant not only A Raisin in the

Sun, but Les Blancs, her last play, about

nuclear abolition. To Representative

Ronald Dellums (D-Calif.), Black Lives

Matter meant not only bringing jobs and

education to Oakland, California, but also

making sure President Ronald Reagan did

not build the MX missile.

The prominent Black writer James

Baldwin put it best on April 1, 1961,

when he addressed a large group of

peace activists at Judiciary Square in

Washington. Baldwin was one of the

headlining speakers for the rally, titled

“Security Through World Disarmament.”

When asked why he chose to speak

at such an event, Baldwin responded,

“What am I doing here? Only those

who would fail to see the relationship

between the fight for civil rights and

the struggle for world peace would be

surprised to see me. Both fights are the

same. It is just as difficult for the white

American to think of peace as it is of no

color.… Confrontation of both dilemmas

demands inner courage.” Baldwin

considered both problems in the same

breath because “racial hatred and the

atom bomb both threaten the destruction

of man as created free by God.”

The power of diversity in the nuclear

disarmament movement was perhaps

most evident in the 1980s. With Reagan’s

rhetoric of a “winnable nuclear war”

and massive budget increases for nuclear

weapons while cutting social programs

that hurt the most vulnerable, the anti-

nuclear movement grew exponentially.

The nuclear freeze movement emerged.

New groups such as the Women’s

Actions for Nuclear Disarmament,

Feminists Insist on a Safe Tomorrow,

Performers and Artists for Nuclear

Disarmament, Dancers for Disarmament,

and Athletes United for Peace formed.

Established organizations such as

Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy,

the Union for Concerned Scientists, and

Physicians for Social Responsibility all saw

their membership skyrocket.2

For some, ending the nuclear arms race

was and still is linked to their religious

faith. Others saw a direct link between

the amount of money being spent on

nuclear weapons and eliminating badly

needed social programs that benefited the

poor. Many viewed and still view nuclear

weapons as part of the overall military

industrial complex, which included U.S.

intervention in Central America and the

Middle East, while for others, there was

a genuine fear that the United States and

Soviet Union would start a nuclear war.

This new sense of awareness, fear, and

action culminated in the June 12, 1982,

demonstration in New York’s Central Park,

in which 1 million people of different

races, genders, class, and religions marched

and rallied for nuclear disarmament. As

Randall Forsberg, one of the principal

authors of the proposal for a nuclear

weapons freeze, said in her speech to the

throngs that day, “Until the arms race

stops, until we have a world with peace

and justice, we will not go home and be

quiet. We will go home and organize.”

The rally, combined with other actions

of the 1980s, contributed to the Reagan

administration changing course on nuclear

weapons, effectively showed the power

of grassroots organizing, challenged the

idea that the movement was not diverse,

and paved the way for a new generation

of activists committed to saving the world

from nuclear annihilation.

The questions that we must ask

ourselves today are how have we avoided

nuclear war for the last 75 years and

how can we sustain the popular support

and awareness that is necessary to move

policymakers to take the steps necessary to

reduce and eliminate nuclear dangers. The

answers: good luck and good organizing.

There is nothing we can do about luck,

except hope it is on our side. But by

learning from the past, it is clear that

there is much we can do as organizers,

advocates, lobbyists, artists, writers,

teachers, and just concerned citizens.

We need to make connections. Our

power is in our diversity. The anti-nuclear

movement needs to continue to reach out

to marginalized communities and show

the links between that amount of money

spent on nuclear weapons and how those

funds could be used for food, health care,

jobs, housing, and education. Whether

it is connecting with the religious,

immigrant, LGBTQ, or Black communities,

half the battle is showing up.

We need education. Far too many

students go through their entire

education, including college, without ever

learning about the history of the atomic

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

or the greater nuclear threat that has

The questions that we must ask ourselves today

are how have we avoided nuclear war for the last

75 years and how can we sustain the popular

support and awareness that is necessary to

move policymakers to take the steps necessary

to reduce and eliminate nuclear dangers.


persisted since 1945. We must demand

that curriculums across the country

dedicate more time to the nuclear arms

race and the movement to stop nuclear

war. This means being involved on school

boards and curriculum committees

and creating the materials that we can

distribute and incorporate into the

various school systems.

We need artists. Part of the reason

the nuclear issue resonated in the 1980s

was because performers such as Jackson

Browne, Rita Marley, James Taylor, Bruce

Springsteen, Gil Scott-Heron, Harry

Belafonte, and Linda Ronstadt, as well as

various Hollywood and Broadway stars,

performed, raised money, and lent their

voices to the cause. We saw the power of

this action when President Barack Obama

was pushing the Iran nuclear deal.

We need filmmakers. One of the most

successful strategies of the anti-nuclear

movement in the 1980s was to create

“The Day After.” Viewed by millions,

this film, along with Helen Caldicott’s

relentless pursuit of making sure the

world knew the human effects of nuclear

weapons, shook ordinary citizens to their

core. We can and must replicate these

actions to drive home the uncomfortable

fact that nuclear weapons are a threat to

everyone, everywhere.

We need to hold politicians accountable.

Currently, we have a president who has

threatened repeatedly to use nuclear

weapons, has no problem spending

billions on the nuclear arsenal, and may

even want to resume nuclear testing.

Moreover, we have local, state, and federal

politicians who support the president’s

decisions and are complicit in the march to

nuclear competition and the perpetuation

of the oppression imposed by the threat

of nuclear weapons use. Whenever we

have an opportunity to back a politician

who fights for nuclear disarmament, we

need to do so. We need to demand from

our elected officials that they work toward

the goal of nuclear abolition and indeed

have some of our organizers within the

movement run for office themselves. Of

course, we need to vote.

We need to support the anti-nuclear

movement and help it evolve. Much

like new organizations that emerged

in the 1980s, over the last decade we

have seen groups such as Global Zero,

Beyond the Bomb, and Don’t Bank

on the Bomb and global disarmament

networks such as the International

Civil rights leader Bayard Rustin, shown here in 1964, combined domestic activism with international, including a trip to protest French nuclear testing in Africa. (Photo: Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

ENDNOTES

1. Vincent J. Intondi, African Americans Against

the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and

the Black Freedom Movement (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 2015), pp. 29–31.

2. Paul Rubinson, Rethinking the American

Antinuclear Movement (New York: Routledge,

2018), pp. 121–124.

Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

emerge. From the start, these groups have

promoted intersectionality and made

the connections among race, climate,

feminism, and poverty in the fight to

abolish nuclear weapons, not just in the

United States but worldwide. In many

cases, dynamic women have led this new

movement. They are younger, with fresh

ideas; savvy; and motivated. Whether

one is in favor of working toward a no-

first-use policy or a formal ban on nuclear

weapons through negotiations at the

United Nations, these organizers need our

support, money, time, and respect.

With all this said, I cannot lie. I am

saddened as I write this. Every five years

on the anniversary of the first atomic

bombings, the demand for my work

seems to increase. Although I am thankful

that I have the opportunity to write and

speak about racism and nuclear weapons,

this also means both are still with us.

Part of the problem is that we cannot

wait until an anniversary of the atomic

bombing or the release of another video

of an unarmed person of color being

murdered by police forces to talk about

these issues.

Yet, I also remain hopeful. I find hope

in the work of long-established groups

such as the Arms Control Association,

Ploughshares Fund, the Union of

Concerned Scientists, and others. I find

hope in younger anti-nuclear activists

and the movement around the world to

formally ban the bomb. I find hope in

seeing so many in the streets demanding

racial justice and refusing to remain silent

in the face of hate, racism, and bigotry.

But mostly, I remain hopeful that there

will come a time, perhaps on another

anniversary of Hiroshima, when I will

be asked to write about the past when

nuclear weapons and institutional racism

once existed and were finally dismantled.

Until that day, the fight continues, and

we march on.


As the site of the first atomic bomb attack,

Hiroshima has served as a vital center

for education about nuclear weapons and

their effects. The people of the city, along with

those of Nagasaki, have been steadfast in their

advocacy for abolishing nuclear weapons. The

survivors of the U.S. atomic bombings on Japan,

the hibakusha, have worked to communicate their

experience to global citizens and leaders. Kazumi

Matsui, Hiroshima’s mayor since 2011, has played

a major role in that effort. He serves as president

of Mayors for Peace, an assembly of thousands of

cities worldwide devoted to protecting cities from

the scourge of war and mass destruction.

Freeing the World of Nuclear WeaponsArms Control Today interviews Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui

In response to the coronavirus

pandemic, Hiroshima is planning to scale

back large gatherings and instead hold

virtual events marking 75 years since the

August 6, 1945, bombing. Matsui spoke

with Arms Control Today on June 23.

Arms Control Today: Seventy-five years

after the first nuclear test explosion and

the atomic bombings that destroyed your

city and Nagasaki, what message do you,

as the president of Mayors for Peace, and

the people of Hiroshima, including the

hibakusha, have for others around the

world about living under the dark shadow

of nuclear weapons?

Mayor Kazumi Matsui: In August 1945,

two single atomic bombs dropped on the

cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki instantly

reduced them to rubble, taking more than

210,000 precious lives. With almost 75

years since the bombings, the hibakusha,

those who barely survived, still suffer

from the harmful aftereffects of radiation.

While their minds and bodies are in pain,

they, together with other members of the

public, continue to make their appeal that

“no one else should suffer as we have.”

However, today, the nuclear-armed

states possess about 13,000 nuclear

warheads. The destructive power of every

one of them is far above the atomic

bombs dropped on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. These weapons could be used

by accident or for terrorism. The current

situation is far from what the citizens of

Hiroshima, including the hibakusha, have

been seeking for so long.

This is because the nuclear-armed

states and their allies consider nuclear

deterrence as essential for their security

assurance, prioritizing the pursuit of only

their own misguided national interest.

However, this poses a grave threat to the

survival of us all, the whole of humanity.

The current global coronavirus

pandemic is a transboundary crisis that

touches us all. We are experiencing

firsthand that we can confront and defeat

common threats through solidarity and

cooperation. Based on what we have

learned from this experience, we must

build a robust global coalition of citizens

everywhere to address and solve global

security challenges, especially nuclear

Defining U.S. Goals for the NPTArms Control Today Interviews U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey

Eberhardt


In a 2016 ceremony, Hiroshima Mayor Kazumi Matsui (right) offers new names to add to the list of the atomic bomb deaths that is kept at the Memorial Cenotaph in Hiroshima. More than 290,000 names have been inscribed inside the memorial's stone vault. (Photo: AFP/Getty Images)

weapons. We must not take action based

on self-centered nationalism.

I sincerely hope that everyone in

the world will share in the hibakusha’s

message and join us in realizing a peaceful

world free of nuclear weapons.

ACT: There are now fewer and fewer

hibakusha and fewer people who have

witnessed the devastation of the atomic

bombings. What can be done over the

next 75 years to remind current and

future generations of the experiences

and the messages of the survivors of the

Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and

the health impacts of the use of nuclear

weapons? Are we at risk of forgetting?

Matsui: The average age of the hibakusha

has exceeded 82. With their unshakable

conviction that “no one else should suffer

as we have,” they have conveyed their

experiences and their desire for peace to

younger generations. However, if we leave

this important task of passing down to the

future generations to the hibakusha alone,

then unfortunately, sooner or later, there

will no longer be anyone able to do so.

In order to ensure that the hibakusha’s

messages will be faithfully inherited and

shared with future generations, the City

of Hiroshima conducts various initiatives.

The Hiroshima Peace Memorial

Museum exhibits belongings and photos

of victims along with the words of

their bereaved family members. Each

item conveys to visitors the memories,

sentiments, and the pain and sorrow of

the victims and the bereaved. In addition,

displays on the harm caused by the

radiation tell the world of the inhumane

nature of nuclear weapons. We encourage

all world leaders and their fellow citizens

to visit this museum to see the long-

term catastrophic effects of the atomic

bombings for themselves.

We also have a project to train A-bomb

Legacy Successors, volunteers who pass

down hibakusha experiences and their

desire for peace on their behalf. Today,

131 successors are engaged in such

activities.

We also make videos of hibakusha

testimonies and collect memoirs in

collaboration with the government. We

are translating these into many languages

so that all can understand their tragic

experiences.

We intend to continue our efforts to

enrich and expand these and make them


available physically and online to share

the messages of the hibakusha with the

younger generation, who are the future of

our society.

ACT: You and others have noted that

"vital nuclear arms control agreements

are being abandoned, budgets for

development and production of new

nuclear weapons are growing, and the

potential for nuclear weapons use is too

dangerous to tolerate. We are badly off

course in efforts to honor the plea of the

hibakusha and end the nuclear threat.”

On an international level, how can and

should the world get back on track toward

nuclear disarmament?

Matsui: We see unilateralism is rising

in the international community,

and exclusivity and confrontational

approaches have increased tensions

between nations. Now, the international

situation surrounding nuclear weapons

is very unstable and uncertain. But why

is that? Fundamentally, policymakers

should tackle issues, even if they are

rooted in local contexts, from a global

perspective. However, they are more likely

to jump to a short-term compromise,

which results in the current international

situation.

In order to break the status quo of

dependence on nuclear deterrence

and get back on track toward nuclear

disarmament, it is essential to mobilize

civil society’s shared values and create a

supportive environment to give world

leaders the courage to shift their policies.

Those shared values and desires of civil

society aim at securing every citizen’s

safety and welfare. As a nonpartisan

organization made up of the very heads

of local governments responsible for

realizing that goal, Mayors for Peace

implements a number of relevant

initiatives.

Specifically, by utilizing its network

of more than 7,900 member cities in

164 countries and regions, Mayors for

Peace conveys the realities of the atomic

bombings and works to increase the

number of people who share in the

hibakusha’s message. In this way, we

can build a consensus among global

civil society that the elimination of

nuclear weapons is key to the peaceful

future we need. This consensus will serve

as the foundation for a collaborative

international environment in which

policymakers around the world can take

decisive steps forward toward the total

elimination of nuclear weapons.

I sincerely hope that all states,

including the nuclear-armed ones, will

engage in good-faith dialogue led by

world leaders who wholeheartedly accept

the earnest wish of the hibakusha, that

is, the realization of nuclear weapons

abolition as soon as possible. Through

this, they will surely share wisdom

and come up with an approach to

make substantial progress in nuclear

disarmament and nonproliferation.

ACT: What more can be done at the

local level, especially by the younger

generations, wherever they may live,

to support global efforts for nuclear

nonproliferation and disarmament?

Matsui: As I understand it, what civil

society is sincerely seeking is to secure

the public’s safety and welfare. But when

it comes to big global challenges to the

peaceful existence of humanity as a

whole, such as the abolition of nuclear

weapons, we should not limit our

solutions to the framework of nation-

states. Solutions should also be based on

that sincere desire of civil society at the

grass-roots level across the world. I believe

that we should spread awareness of this

throughout civil society.

My hope for younger generations, the

future of our society, is that they will start

thinking about the preciousness of their

daily lives, which are supported by rules

based on mutual trust. Hopefully, they

will then understand that this is exactly

what peace is and think what they can do

to preserve it and take action.

In civil society, which is based on

democracy, if every person develops

such concepts of peace and takes action

accordingly, it follows that policymakers

will be elected who can realize our

common wish. It is also not a dream for

them to become policymakers themselves.

If more people come to envisage a

future different from the past and work

to realize it, they will become the drive to

change the world.

Mayors for Peace puts emphasis

on peace education aimed at raising

awareness among younger generations

as part of its intensified efforts. Through

our various programs, we nurture young

leaders who engage in peace activities

proactively.

ACT: What more can Japan’s national

leadership do to move us closer to the

peace and security of a world without

nuclear weapons?

Matsui: As the only country to have

experienced the devastation caused by

nuclear attacks, Japan has a responsibility

to share the hibakusha’s sincere desire to

abolish nuclear weapons with the world

and take the lead on various initiatives to

make that a reality.

Japan has a role in international society

as a “bridge” between the nuclear-armed

states and the states-parties of the Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

to foster and promote dialogue and

cooperation. To realize abolition as soon

as possible, Japan can and should do even

more to fulfil this role. I hope this will

happen from the bottom of my heart.

If more people come to

envisage a future different

from the past and work to

realize it, they will become

the drive to change the

world.


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By Setsuko Thurlow

I use the word “miracle” lightly, but really,

71 years ago I did experience a miracle, and

here I am in your company today.

I would like to share my personal

experience with you. I know many of

you are experts, arms control specialists;

and I’m sure you’re quite well informed

and knowledgeable of all kinds of human

conditions, including the humanitarian

consequences of nuclear weapons. But I

thought I would offer my personal and

first-hand experience.

In 1945 I was a 13-year-old eighth grade

student in the girls’ school, and on that

very day, I was at the army headquarters.

A group of about 30 girls had been

recruited and trained to do the recording

work of the top-secret information.

Can you imagine, a 13-year-old girl

doing such important work? That shows

how desperate Japan was.

I met the girls in front of the station

before 8 o’clock; and at 8 o’clock, we were

at the military headquarters, which was

1.8 kilometers from ground zero. I was

on the second floor and started with a big

assembly, and an officer gave us a pep talk.

This is the way you start proving your

patriotism for emperor, that kind of thing.

We said, “Yes sir, we will do our best.”

When we said that, I saw the blaze of

white flash in the window, and then I had

the sensation of smoking up in the air.

When I regained consciousness in the

total silence, I was trying to move my

body. I couldn’t move it at all. I knew I

was faced with death.

Then I started hearing whispering

voices of the girls around me: “God, help

me, mother help me. I’m here.” So, I

knew I was surrounded by them, although

I couldn’t see anybody in the darkness.

Then, suddenly, a strong male voice

said, “Don’t give up. I’m trying to free

you.” He kept shaking my left shoulder

from behind and pushed me. We kept

kicking, pushing; and you see, we’re

finally coming to the door opening, get

out that way, crawl, as quickly as possible.

By the time I came out of the building,

it was on fire. That meant about 30 other

girls who were with me in that same place

were burning to death. But two other

girls managed to come out, so three of us

looked around.

Although that happened in the

morning, it was very dark, dark as

twilight, and I started seeing some

moving black object approaching to

me. They happened to be the streams of

human beings slowly shuffling from the

center part of the city to where I was.

They didn’t look like human beings.

Their hair was standing straight up. Burned,

blackness, swelling, bleeding. Parts of the

bodies were missing. The skin and flesh

were hanging from the bones. Some were

carrying their own eyeballs, you know,

they’re hanging from the eye socket.

They collapsed onto the ground, their

stomach burst open with their intestines

sticking out. The soldier said, “Well you

girls, join that procession, escape to the

nearby field.”

That’s what we did by carefully stepping

over the dead bodies, injured bodies. It was

a strange situation. Nobody was running

and screaming for help. They just didn’t

have that kind of strength left.

They were simply whispering, “Water

please, water please.” Everybody was

asking for water.

Adapted from remarks delivered to the Arms Control Association on June 6, 2016, shortly after U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Hiroshima. At the age of 13, Setsuko Thurlow survived the atomic bombing in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. She has since worked to tell the story of the survivors, the hibakusha. She was the Arms Control Association’s 2015 Arms Control Person of the Year, a leading champion within the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for the negotiation of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and for that was a co-recipient of the 2017 Nobel Prize for Peace.

Setsuko Thurlow Remembers The Hiroshima Bombing


Setsuko Thurlow, speaks for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons at a conference in Madrid on February 24. She has spent decades describing her experience as a survivor of the 1945 atomic bombing of Hiroshima. (Photo: David Benito/Getty Images)

We girls were relatively lightly injured.

So, by the time we got to the hillside, we

went to a nearby stream and washed off

the blood and dirt, and we took off our

blouses and soaked them in the stream

and dashed back to hold them over the

mouths of the dying people.

You see, the place we escaped to was

the military training ground, a huge

place, about the size of two football fields.

The place was packed with the dead and

dying people.

I wanted to help, but everyone wanted

water, but there were no cups and no

buckets to carry the water. That’s why we

resorted to that rather primitive way of

so-called rescue operation. That was all we

could do.

I looked around to see if there were

any doctors around us, but I saw none

of them in that huge place. That meant,

tens of thousands of people in that

place without medication, no medical

attention, ointment.

Nothing was provided for them. Just a

few drops of water from a wet cloth. That

was the level of support, rescue operation

you could offer.

We kept ourselves busy all day doing

that. Of course, doctors and nurses were

killed too. Just a small percentage of the

medical professionals survived, but they

were serving people somewhere else, not

where I was.

So, we were three girls, together with

hundreds of other people who escaped to

the place. We just sat on the hillside and

all night, we watched the Empire City

burn, to see the moon from the massive

scale of death and suffering we had

witnessed.

I was mad, strongly, appropriately,

emotionally. Something happened to my

psyche. When we close off our psychic

memory, in an ultimate situation like

that, the cessation of the emotions takes

place automatically. I’m glad of that

because if we responded emotionally to

every graphic sight I witnessed, I couldn’t

have survived.

The day ended. Other people can tell

about being near the rivers, full of floating

dead bodies, and so on. But I didn’t see

that then.

But I’ll tell you about the few people in

my family, my friends, how they lost their

lives. That will show you just how the

bomb affected human beings.

I mentioned about 30 girls who were

with me, but the rest of the students were

at the city center. The city was trying to

establish the facilities to be prepared for

the air raid.

So, the seventh-grade and eighth-grade

students from all the high schools were

recruited, went to the center of the city.

We were providing the minor labor.

Now, they were in the center right below

the detonation of the bomb. So they are

the ones who simply vaporized, melted,

and carbonized. My sister-in-law was

there with a student. She was one of the

teachers supervising the students. We tried

to locate her corpse, but we have never

done so. On paper, she’s still missing,

together with thousands of other students.

I understand there were several

thousand students, 8,000 or so. They


simply disappeared from the face of earth.

The temperature of the blast, I understand,

was about 4,000 degrees Celsius.

Another story I can tell is about my

sister and her four-year-old child, who

came back to the city the night before to

visit us. Early in the morning, they were

walking over the bridge to the medical

clinic, and both of them were burned

beyond recognition.

By the time I saw them the next day,

their bodies were swollen two or three

times larger than normal, and they too

kept begging for water. When they died,

the soldiers dug a hole and threw in the

bodies, poured gasoline, and threw a

lighted match.

With a bamboo stick, they kept turning

the bodies. There I was, a 13-year-old girl,

and I was standing emotionlessly just

watching it.

That memory troubled me for many

years. What kind of human being am I?

My dear sister being treated like animal or

an insect or whatever.

There was no human dignity associated

with that kind of cremation. The fact that

I didn’t really shed tears troubled me for

many years. I felt guilt.

I could forgive myself after learning

how our psyche automatically functions

in situations like that. But, you know, it’s

the image of this four-year-old child that

is burned to my retina. It’s always there.

That image just guided me, and it’s the

driving force for my activism. Because

that child came to represent all the

innocent children of the world without

understanding what was happening to

them. They agonized.

So that child is a special being, a special

memory. If he were alive, he would be 75.

It’s a sobering thought, but regardless of

passage of time, he’s still a four-year-old

child guiding me.

It was interesting, [President Barack]

Obama made a lot of references about

innocent children, how we need to

protect each one of them, and I was

weeping. I couldn’t help it.

Now, let me tell you another example

of how the atomic bomb affected the

human beings. We rejoiced to hear my

favorite uncle and aunt survived. They

were okay. They didn’t have any visible

sign of injury.

Then several days later, we started

hearing a different story. They got sick,

very sick. So after my sister and my

nephew died, my parents went over to my

uncle’s place, started looking after them.

Their body started showing purple

spots all over the body, and according

to my mother, who cared for them until

their death, their internal organs seemed

to be rotting, dissolving, coming out as a

thick black liquid until death.

Now, radiation works in many mysterious

and random ways. Some people are killed

immediately, some weeks later or months

later, a year later. The horrible thing is, 71

years later, people are still dying from the

effects of the radiation.

The hibakusha, the survivors, struggled

to explain in the aftermath. It’s surviving

in the unprecedented catastrophic aura

and the unprecedented social, political

chaos due to Japan’s defeat and the

occupational forces’ strict control over us.

I finished university in Japan, and

upon my graduation, I was offered a

scholarship, so I came to your country. I

came to Virginia, very close to this city.

That was 1954. The United States

tested the biggest hydrogen bomb at the

Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific that time,

creating the kind of situation similar to

the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experience.

All of Japan was up in arms with fury.

It was not only Hiroshima, not only

Nagasaki, now the Bikini Atoll. Well, the

United States continued with the testing

and actually using them.

That’s when all of Japan became fully

aware of the nature of nuclear weapons

development. Anyway, at that time, I

left Japan, arrived in Virginia, and I was

interviewed by the press.

I gave my honest opinion. I was fresh

out of college and naive and believed in

honesty. I told them what I thought: The

United States nuclear policy was bad. It

has to stop. Look at all the killings and

damage to the environment in the Pacific.

That has to stop, and all these kinds of

thing I said.

The next day, I started receiving

hate letters. “How dare you? Do you

realize where you are? Who is giving

the scholarship? Go home. Go back to

Japan.” Just a few days after my arrival, I

encountered this kind of situation, and

I was horrified. It was quite a traumatic

experience.

What am I going to do? I can’t go back,

I just arrived. I can’t put a zipper over

my mouth and pretend I never knew

anything about Hiroshima bombing.

Would I be able to survive in North

America? Well, I spent a week without

going to the classroom. I just had to be

alone and do my soul-searching.

It was a painful and lonely time in a

new country. I hardly knew anybody, and

I had to deal with this issue. I’m happy

to say that I came out of that traumatic

experience with more determination and

a stronger conviction.

If I don’t speak out, who will? I actually

experienced it. I saw it. It’s my moral

responsibility. So, I have my experience to

warn the world. We’ve seen this is just the

beginning of the nuclear arms race. I just

have to warn the world.

A victim of the Hiroshima atomic bomb is treated at a makeshift hospital in September 1945. Immediately after the bombing, Setsuko Thurlow sought to provide aid and comfort to wounded survivors. (Photo: Wayne Miller/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)


Plan A: How a Nuclear War Could ProgressSeventy-five years ago, the United States

tested the first nuclear weapon in New Mexico and then used one to destroy

Hiroshima and another to destroy Nagasaki. As devastating as they were, those atomic bombs were small by today’s standards, each exploding with just a tenth of the explosive yield of typical warheads now deployed on missiles, submarines, and planes by a handful of countries. Fortunately, no nuclear weapons have been used in combat since the bombings in Japan, but the risk of nuclear war ebbed and flowed throughout the Cold War. It has been increasing in the past three years. The United States and Russia have abandoned long-standing nuclear arms control treaties, started to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons, and expanded the circumstances in which they might use nuclear weapons. However a nuclear exchange might start, it could quickly escalate from a local disaster into a global catastrophe. To illustrate how this could happen, Princeton University’s Program on Science & Global Security (SGS) developed a simulation that shows a plausible step-by-step escalation of nuclear war between the United States and Russia that starts in Europe. The images that follow are moments taken from the simulation’s four-minute video. SGS researchers used independent assessments of current U.S. and Russian force postures, nuclear

war plans, and nuclear weapons targets. The simulation was also supported by extensive data sets of the nuclear weapons currently deployed, weapon yields, and possible targets for particular weapons, as well as the order of battle estimating which weapons go to which targets in which order in which phase of the war to show the evolution of the nuclear conflict from tactical, to strategic by city-targeting phases. It is estimated that there would be more than 90 million people dead and injured within the first few hours of the conflict. The immediate fatalities and casualties that would occur in each phase of the conflict are determined using data from NUKEMAP, an online tool to estimate casualties that was developed by Alex Wellerstein at the Stevens Institute of Technology. The actual fatalities would be significantly increased by deaths occurring from the collapse of medical systems, as well as nuclear fallout and other long-term effects, including a possible global-scale nuclear winter. The simulation was developed by SGS researchers Tamara Patton, Moritz Kütt, and Alex Glaser, together with Bruce Blair, Zia Mian, Pavel Podvig, and Sharon Weiner, with sound by Jeff Snyder and graphics by Alex Wellerstein. It was originally prepared as part of the “Shadows and Ashes” exhibition at Princeton University’s Bernstein Gallery curated by Mary Hamill, the gallery director.


The simulation begins in the context of a conventional conflict. In hopes of halting a U.S.-NATO advance, Russia launches a nuclear warning shot from a base near the city of Kaliningrad. NATO retaliates with a single tactical nuclear air strike.

nuclear warning shots

Russia launches nuclear warning shot NATO retaliates


With Europe destroyed, NATO launches a strategic nuclear strike of 600 warheads from U.S. land and submarine-based missiles aimed at Russian nuclear forces. Before losing its weapon systems, Russia launches on warning, responding with missiles launched from silos, road-mobile vehicles and submarines.

Immediate casualties | 3.4 million | over 45 minutes

the counterforce plan

As the nuclear threshold is crossed, fighting escalates to a tactical nuclear war in Europe. Russia sends 300 nuclear warheads via aircraft and short-range missiles to hit NATO bases and advancing troops. NATO responds with approximately 180 nuclear warheads via aircraft.

Immediate casualties | 2.6 million | over 3 hours

the tactical plan


With the aim of inhibiting the other side's recovery, Russia and NATO each target the other's 30 most populated cities and economic centers, using 5–10 warheads on each city depending on population size.

Immediate casualties | 85.3 million | over 45 minutes

the countervalue plan

91.5 million Number of immediate casualties, including fatalities (34.1 million) and injuries (57.4 million), resulting from the series of nuclear exchanges.

Deaths from nuclear fallout and other long-term effects would significantly increase this estimate.

Watch the four-minute video: https://youtu.be/2jy3JU-ORpo

https://youtu.be/2jy3JU-ORpo


The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings and the Nuclear Danger Today

The U.S. atomic bomb attack on the people of Hiroshima

at 8:15 a.m. on August 6, 1945, and the second attack on

the city of Nagasaki at 11:02 a.m. on August 9 killed and

wounded hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting men, women, and

children in a horrible blast of fire and radiation, followed by deadly

fallout. In years that followed, those who survived—the hibakusha—

suffered from the trauma of the experience and from the long-term

effects of their exposure to radiation from the weapons.

Historians now largely agree that the United States need not

have dropped bombs to avoid an invasion of Japan and bring an

end to World War II. President Harry Truman and his advisers

were aware of the alternatives, but Truman chose to authorize the

use of the atomic bombs in part to further the U.S. government’s

postwar geostrategic aims.1

The bombings helped to launch the dangerous, decades-long

U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race; and they ignited a debate about

the dangers of nuclear weapons, their role in foreign and military

policy, their regulation and control, and the morality and legality

of their possession and use that continues to this day.

Although nuclear weapons have not been used in a military

attack since 1945, they have left a trail of devastation, including

cancer from atmospheric nuclear test fallout, toxic waste and

environmental contamination, and workers and residents

exposed to radiation and hazardous chemicals from nuclear

weapons production plants, uranium mines, and research labs.2

All too often, indigenous and disempowered communities have

found themselves downwind and downstream.

Beginning with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki, when U.S. authorities sought to censor information

about nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons establishments

have tried to hide and stifle debate about the health and

environmental effects of nuclear war and nuclear weapons

development, testing, and production.

In 1956, however, the Japanese survivors of the atomic

bombings came together and pledged to work to “save humanity

from its crisis through the lessons learned from our experiences”

and issued their first formal appeal to the world that “there

should never be another [h]ibakusha.”

The voices, testimony, and outreach of the hibakusha have

been central to the decades-long struggle to put in place

meaningful, verifiable, legally binding restraints on nuclear

weapons; to realize a global treaty prohibiting their possession

and use; and to advance the steps necessary to achieve the peace

and security of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Through the decades, persistent citizen pressure and hard-

nosed disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy have

produced agreements and treaties that have successfully curbed

the spread of nuclear weapons, slowed the arms race, and

reduced the danger of nuclear war. These initiatives slashed the

staggering size of the Cold War-era U.S. and Russian arsenals,

prohibited nuclear test explosions, and strengthened the taboo

against nuclear weapons possession and use.

Yet, far too many of these weapons still exist. Combined, the

U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals total some 12,170 nuclear

weapons, more than 90 percent of the global total, which is

estimated to be 13,400.3 In addition to the United States and

Russia, there are now seven more nuclear-armed nations, with

smaller but still very deadly arsenals: the United Kingdom,

France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

In addition, many of the dangerous policies developed over the

years to justify the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons

persist. For instance, the United States, Russia, France, and the UK

maintain significant numbers of their nuclear weapons on prompt-

launch status, ready to retaliate in response to a nuclear attack.

The United States and Russia also cling to the option to use

nuclear weapons first and against significant non-nuclear threats.

The cloud generated by “Little Boy,” the uranium-based atomic bomb dropped by the United States on Hiroshima, rises above the city with a wartime population of approximately 320,000 on the morning of August 6, 1945. The blast packed a destructive force equivalent to about 15 kilotons of TNT. In minutes, approximately half of the city vanished. (Photo: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum)

the countervalue plan


Making matters worse, the dialogue on disarmament has

stalled. Tensions between many of the world’s nuclear-armed

states are rising, and the risk of nuclear use is growing. The

Trump administration has severely undermined U.S. credibility

and capability to provide effective global leadership on

nonproliferation and disarmament.

The world’s nine nuclear actors are squandering tens of billions

of dollars each year to maintain and upgrade nuclear arsenals,

monies that could be redirected to address real human needs.

The United States and Russia have discarded or disrespected key

agreements that have kept their nuclear competition in check,

and other agreements are in jeopardy. Other nuclear-armed

states, for the most part, still remain outside the nuclear risk

reduction and disarmament enterprise. We are once again on the

verge of a new, global nuclear arms race.

Our nuclear anxieties persist, and humanity’s efforts to contain

and eliminate the nuclear weapons danger continue.

The historic 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons, which has won the support of the vast majority of

the world’s non-nuclear states, is a step forward, but the current

environment necessitates even bolder action from civil society and

governments everywhere. We must reduce nuclear risks, and we

must freeze, reverse, and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

The survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings bear

witness to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of

nuclear weapons. As the authors of a new 2020 appeal from a

consortium of hibakusha leaders and organizations write, “The

average age of the [h]ibakusha now exceeds 80. It is our strong

desire to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world in our lifetime, so

that succeeding generations of people will not see hell on earth

ever again.”

Arms Control Today presents the following annotated photo

essay to honor their call to action.—DARYL G. KIMBALL

Three days later, the city of Nagasaki burns following the decision by U.S. leaders to drop “Fat Man,” a plutonium-based bomb with an explosive yield estimated at 21 kilotons, on the city of approximately 260,000 at the time of the attack. (Photo: UN/Nagasaki International Cultural Hall)

ENDNOTES

1. J. Samuel Walker, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical

Update,” in Hiroshima in History and Memory, ed. Michael J. Hogan

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

2. Arjun Makhijani, “A Readiness to Harm: The Health Effects of Nuclear

Weapons Complexes,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2005. See Arjun

Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih, eds., Nuclear Wastelands: A

Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental

Effects (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

3. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,”

Federation of American Scientists, April 2020, https://fas.org/issues/

nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.





The Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall stands alone in the rubble. The explosion produced a supersonic shock wave followed by extreme winds that remained above hurricane force more than three kilometers from the hypocenter. A secondary and equally devastating reverse wind ensued, flattening and severely damaging homes and buildings several kilometers further away. Only remnants of a few reinforced structures remained. (Photo: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum)

A burned body in the ruins 500 meters from the hypocenter; and the pattern of a woman’s kimono burned into her skin. The intense heat rays of the Hiroshima bomb reached several million degrees Celsius at the hypocenter and incinerated everything within approximately two kilometers. The heat scorched flesh and ignited trees and other flammable materials as far as 3.5 kilometers from ground zero. Flash burns from the primary heatwave caused most of the deaths at Hiroshima. By the end of 1945, an estimated 140,000 were killed by the blast, heat, and radiation effects of the nuclear attack. (Photo: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum)


The remains of a religious temple in Nagasaki on September 24, 1945, six weeks after the bombing. Many of those who survived the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks would die in radiation-induced illnesses years later. The number of survivors contracting leukemia increased noticeably five to six years after the bombing. Ten years after the bombing, the survivors began contracting thyroid, breast, lung, and other cancers at higher than normal rates. These hibakusha and their descendants helped form the nucleus of the Japanese and global nuclear disarmament movement. (Photo: Galerie Bilderwelt/Getty Images)

The ruins of Nagasaki on August 10, 1945, at about 700 meters from the hypocenter. The nuclear attack on Nagasaki killed an estimated 74,000 by the end of 1945 and

injured approximately another 75,000. The attack occurred two days earlier than

planned, 10 hours after the Soviets entered the war against Japan, and as Japanese

leaders were contemplating surrender. (Photo: UN/Yosuke Yamahata)

The city of Hiroshima on fire on August 6, as seen from four kilometers away. A firestorm ravaged the city of Hiroshima for hours after the explosion, peaking around midday. Firestorms leveled neighborhoods where the blast had inflicted only partial damage and killed victims trapped under fallen debris. Within 20 minutes, the explosion also produced black rain laden with radioactive soot and dust that contaminated areas as far away as 29 kilometers from ground zero. (Photo: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum)


NEWS &analysis

Your source on developments related to the world’s most dangerous weapons.‘ ‘

July/August 2020

No Progress Toward Extending New START

The United States and Russia concluded the latest round

of their strategic security dialogue on June 22 without

agreeing to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty (New START), the last remaining arms control agreement

limiting their nuclear arsenals.

The United States is “leaving all options available” on the

future of the treaty, said Marshall Billingslea, U.S. special envoy

for arms control, who led the U.S. delegation at the talks in

Vienna, during a June 24 briefing in Brussels.

“We are willing to contemplate an extension of that agreement

but only under select circumstances,” he said. Those circumstances

include making progress toward a new trilateral arms control

agreement that has strong verification measures, covers all nuclear

warheads, and involves China, according to Billingslea.

New START will expire in February 2021 unless U.S. President

Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin agree to

extend it by up to five years. Russia has repeatedly stated that

it is ready to extend the treaty without any preconditions

and warned that there is not enough time to negotiate a new

agreement to replace it before next February. U.S. allies have also

urged the Trump administration to extend the treaty.

Trump administration officials, however, have argued that

New START is outdated and are instead prioritizing the pursuit of

a broader agreement. (See ACT, May 2019.)

Billingslea characterized the talks with Russia in Vienna as

“positive” and said the two sides had agreed to form technical

working groups to discuss key issues.

The special envoy said he was hopeful that the working groups

would make “sufficient progress” to allow for a second round of

talks “at the end of July or maybe beginning of August,” when

“China again will be called upon to attend.”

The Wall Street Journal on June 23 quoted an unnamed U.S.

official who said that the topics for the working groups would

be nuclear warheads, especially Russia’s unconstrained stockpile

U.S. arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea speaks to the media in Vienna on June 23 after holding talks the day before with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. (Photo: Thomas Kronsteiner/Getty Images)

https://www.armscontrol.org/aca/1059


of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and doctrine; verification; and

space systems. But a June 24 report in Kommersant cited Russian

officials saying Moscow did not necessarily agree to discuss

nuclear warheads.

Asked about the discrepancy, Billingslea replied that he would

have “to circle back” on this issue with Deputy Foreign Minister

Sergey Ryabkov, who had led the Russia delegation in Vienna.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said at the conclusion of the

talks that “the delegations continued discussing the future of

arms control, including extending [New START] and maintaining

stability and predictability in the context of the termination

of the [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, as well as

a comprehensive dialogue on resolving international security

problems.”

Prior to the start of the June 22 talks, Billingslea tweeted a

picture of the table, with some empty seats reserved with Chinese

flags. “Vienna talks about to start,” Billingslea said. “China is a

no-show…We will proceed with Russia, notwithstanding.”

Fu Cong, director-general of the Department of Arms Control

in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, replied, “What an odd scene…

Good luck on the extension of the New START! Wonder how

LOW you can go?” The United States and Russia are currently

believed to possess about 6,000 total nuclear weapons apiece,

while China has roughly 300.

Following the Vienna talks, Chinese Foreign Ministry

spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on June 23 that the U.S. placement

of Chinese flags at empty seats “is unserious, unprofessional, and

unappealing for the U.S. to try getting people’s eyes in this way.”

He also noted the incorrect design of the flags that the United

States set on the table. “We hope certain people in the U.S. can

do their homework and improve their general knowledge to

avoid becoming a laughing stock,” he said.

The Trump administration claims that China is engaged in

a secret, crash program to build up its nuclear forces and that

future arms control efforts must include Beijing.

China has repeatedly refused to join trilateral talks with the

United States and Russia and bilateral talks with the United

States. (See ACT, January/February 2020.)

Billingslea on June 8 invited Beijing to join the talks in Vienna,

but the following day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson

Hua Chunying declined the invitation. “China has repeatedly

reiterated that it has no intention of participating in the so-called

trilateral arms control negotiations with the United States and

Russia,” she said. “This position is very clear.”

Billingslea urged China to reconsider. “Achieving Great Power

status requires behaving with Great Power responsibility,” he

tweeted on June 9. “No more Great Wall of Secrecy on its nuclear

build-up.”

Russia has refused to pressure China to change its position and

join the talks. “China should itself decide whether these talks

are beneficial for the country,” said Anatoly Antonov, Russian

ambassador to the United States, on June 20. “We will not force

our Chinese friends.”

Antonov also repeated a longtime Russian stance that if China

joins arms control talks, then U.S. allies France and the United

Kingdom should as well.

Billingslea acknowledged that the U.S. “definition of

multilateral might be different, but the principle remains the

same.” He claimed that China’s nuclear buildup poses a much

greater threat than the French and UK nuclear arsenals.

The Trump administration has yet to put forward a concrete

proposal for what it wants arms control with China to achieve or

detail what the United States would be willing to put forward as

concessions in trilateral talks with Russia and China.

Prior to and following the talks in Vienna, Billingslea touted

the support of U.S. allies for the Trump administration’s

approach to arms control.

Allies have praised the administration for resuming talks with

Russia and seeking to bring China into the arms control process,

but they also continue to urge the Trump administration to

extend New START by five years.

During the Brussels Forum on June 23, NATO Secretary-

General Jens Stoltenberg said that he welcomes “Russia and the

United States sitting down and talking to each other on arms

control” and agrees “that China should be involved.”

Still, he added, “in the absence of any agreement that includes

China, I think the right thing will be to extend the existing New

START agreement.”

“We should not end up in a situation where we have no

agreement whatsoever regulating the number of nuclear weapons

in the world,” he said.

New START caps U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals at

1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed missiles and heavy

bombers each.

Under its monitoring and verification regime, the treaty allows

for short notice, on-site inspections.

As the Trump administration continues to assess whether

to extend New START, inspections under the accord have been

suspended since March due to the coronavirus pandemic. It

is not clear when such inspections might resume.

—KINGSTON REIF and SHANNON BUGOS

Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control Marshall Billingslea tweeted this photo of empty seats designated for China at nuclear talks on June 22 in Vienna. Earlier in the month, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said, “China has repeatedly reiterated that it has no intention of participating in the so-called trilateral arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia.” (Photo: @USArmsControl/Twitter)


https://www.armscontrol.org/about/Kingston_Reif

https://www.armscontrol.org/about/Shannon_Bugos


The Trump administration faces

widespread opposition, including

from members of Congress

and nuclear weapons scientists, to the

potential restarting of U.S. nuclear

weapons testing.

The Washington Post reported on

May 22 that the Trump administration

weighed whether to conduct a nuclear

test explosion during a May 15 meeting

with national security agencies. (See ACT,

May 2020.) The administration reportedly

believes that a nuclear test would help

prod Russia and China into negotiating a

new trilateral arms control deal.

During a June 24 press briefing in

Brussels, Marshall Billingslea, U.S. special

envoy for arms control, said, “[W]e

maintain and will maintain the ability to

conduct nuclear tests if we see reason to

do so,” but that he is “not aware of any

reason to test at this stage.” Nevertheless,

“I won’t shut the door on it because why

would we?”

The United States conducted a total of

1,030 nuclear tests, with more than 900

of them performed at the Nevada Nuclear

Test Site, now known as the Nevada

National Security Site, until President

George H.W. Bush declared a moratorium

on U.S. nuclear testing in 1992. According

to U.S. nuclear test readiness guidelines, a

“simple test” with limited instrumentation

could be conducted at the former site

within six to 10 months if the president

decides to resume nuclear testing.

“With no stated justification to

resume testing, we unequivocally oppose

any administration’s efforts to resume

explosive nuclear testing in Nevada,”

said Nevada Democratic Sens. Catherine

Cortez Masto and Jacky Rosen on June

12. They were joined by the state’s

Democratic Reps. Dina Titus, Steven

Horsford, and Susie Lee.

Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) introduced

an amendment to the fiscal year 2021

National Defense Authorization Act

(NDAA) calling for $10 million for the

administration to execute a nuclear

weapons test “if necessary.” The Senate

Armed Services Committee passed the

amendment June 10 along a party-line

vote, but whether it will be included in

the final bill remains unclear.

On the other side of the aisle, Sen.

Ed Markey (D-Mass.) joined the Nevada

delegation in criticizing any resumption of

nuclear testing and introduced legislation

that would deny the administration any

funds to conduct a nuclear test.

“A return to U.S. nuclear testing would

dishonor the lessons from the Cold War

and expose a whole new generation of

Americans to the horrors of radiation

sickness,” said Markey when introducing

the Preserving Leadership Against Nuclear

Explosives Testing (PLANET) Act on

June 4. Senate Minority Leader Chuck

Schumer (D-N.Y.) and 13 other senators

co-sponsored the legislation.

Titus and Horsford introduced a

companion bill to the PLANET Act in the

House on June 8.

“Resuming nuclear testing would open

a door to allow other nations to openly

conduct nuclear test explosions while

imposing immense financial and health

costs on the American people,” said Horsford.

On July 1, Cortez Masto introduced

legislation and an NDAA amendment,

along with five other senators, to require

a joint resolution of approval for the

United States to conduct an explosive

nuclear weapons test. The passage of

the joint resolution would need a two-

thirds affirmative vote in the Senate.

“The decision to conduct an explosive

nuclear test should not be made without

congressional approval, and should never

be made by a president hoping to gain

political points,” said Cortez Masto.

Condemnations also came from House

Armed Services Committee Chairman

Adam Smith (D-Wash.) and House

Appropriations Committee Chairwoman

Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.). “It is unfathomable

U.S. Testing Interest Triggers Backlash

Lassina Zerbo, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, visited the Nevada Test Site in 2015, where structures remain from a planned, but never conducted nuclear test, in 1992. In May, Zerbo urged all countries to refrain from restarting any nuclear testing. (Photo: Lassina Zerbo Twitter)




that the administration is considering

something so short-sighted and

dangerous,” they wrote in a June 8 letter

to Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette and

Defense Secretary Mark Esper.

Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Rep. Bill

Foster (D-Ill.) spearheaded a bicameral letter

of 80 members of Congress to President

Donald Trump warning against the

resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing.

“A return to nuclear testing is not only

scientifically and technically unnecessary

but also dangerously provocative.... It

would needlessly antagonize important

allies, cause other countries to develop

or acquire nuclear weapons, and prompt

adversaries to respond in kind—risking

a new nuclear arms race and further

undermining the global nonproliferation

regime,” they wrote on June 8.

Meanwhile, a group of 12 former

scientists with nuclear weapons expertise

signed a June 16 letter to Senate Majority

Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), saying,

“We strongly oppose the resumption of

explosive testing of U.S. nuclear weapons.

There is no technical need for a nuclear test.”

The Trump administration has faced

international condemnation as well,

with Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Organization Executive Secretary Lassina

Zerbo saying on May 28 that “any

actions or activities by any country that

violate the international norm against

nuclear testing would constitute a grave

challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation

and disarmament regime, as well as to

global peace and security more broadly.”

The Russian and Chinese foreign

ministries also condemned the Trump

administration for contemplating a

resumption of nuclear testing.

“This bombshell,” said a Russian

statement, demonstrates “a U.S.

campaign against international law.”

Russia ratified the Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2000.

—SHANNON BUGOS

IAEA Board Presses Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board

of Governors urged Iran in June to cooperate with the

agency’s investigation into possible undeclared nuclear

materials and sites in the country. The board resolution

prompted Iranian lawmakers to call for Tehran to suspend a

voluntary monitoring arrangement with the agency that gives

inspectors greater access to information and locations in Iran.

The board passed the resolution June 20 by a vote of

25–2, with seven countries abstaining. France, Germany, and

the United Kingdom introduced the resolution after IAEA

Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said on June 15 that

Iran’s continued refusal to cooperate with IAEA requests for

information about certain nuclear activities and for access to

two locations over the past year was “adversely affecting the

agency’s ability” to provide “credible assurance of the absence of

undeclared nuclear material and activities.”

The resolution calls on Iran to “satisfy the agency’s requests

without further delay” and to provide “prompt access to the

locations specified.”

Grossi raised concerns with the board about Iran’s failure

to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation during its previous

quarterly meeting in March. In reports issued March 3 and June

5, he said that the IAEA first requested clarifications from Tehran

regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and activities

at three locations in Iran in January 2019. After a year of

attempting to get information from Tehran about the locations

in question, the IAEA requested access to two of the sites in

January 2020 to take environmental samples. Tehran has refused

to allow inspectors to visit the site.

The two reports indicate that the activities and materials in

question predate 2003, when the IAEA and U.S. intelligence

community assessed that Iran had an organized nuclear weapons

program. There is no indication in the report that the IAEA

has evidence that any of the activities under investigation are

currently ongoing.

Before the vote on the resolution, Iranian Foreign Minister

Javad Zarif said Iran has “nothing to hide” and that addressing

the IAEA’s investigation is possible but a resolution “will ruin it.”

After the vote, he blasted the three European countries for their

“total impotence in resisting U.S. bullying.”

Ahead of the vote, Jackie Wolcott, U.S. ambassador to the

IAEA, described the resolution as a “balanced and fair reaction

to Iran’s alarming refusal to comply with its legal obligations”

and urged states to support it. Wolcott said that “ignoring such

critical safeguards-related questions in Iran would undermine the

implementation of safeguards everywhere.”

According to the June 5 report, the IAEA is seeking information

about a uranium metal disc that Iran did not declare to the

agency; possible fuel-cycle-related activities, including uranium

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi (left), delivers his opening statement to the Board of Governors on June 15. The board convened with reduced attendance to reduce risks from the coronavirus pandemic. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)



processing and conversion; and possible storage of nuclear material

at a location where explosive testing took place in 2003.

Iran is legally obligated to declare locations where nuclear

material is present and respond to IAEA requests for information

and access under its safeguards agreement, which is required by

the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has also permitted

additional agency monitoring as part of the 2015 nuclear deal,

known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

These measures, laid out in the additional protocol to Iran’s

safeguards agreement, allow for shorter-notice inspections and

expand the use of environmental sampling. Unlike a safeguards

agreement, an additional protocol is not required by the NPT, but

136 states are currently implementing additional protocols.

According to the June 5 report, Iran told the IAEA in a June

2 letter that it is “willing to satisfy the agency’s requests” but

certain “legal ambiguities” must be addressed first.

The IAEA responded to Iran on June 4, saying that the agency’s

requests were “strictly in accordance” with Iran’s safeguards

agreement and the additional protocol.

In a statement signed by 240 of the 290 members of Iran’s

parliament, lawmakers called the resolution “excessive” and

demanded that the government “stop voluntary implementation

of additional protocol and change inspections.” The statement

urged the IAEA to act “independently and professionally, not

under the influence of political and hostile pressures of some

members” of the board.

Russia and China opposed the resolution, citing concerns

about the origin of the evidence behind the IAEA request and the

negative repercussions that it could have on the JCPOA.

Wang Qun, Chinese ambassador to the IAEA, said on June 18

that the legal basis of the IAEA request is questionable and that

the agency acted too hastily in submitting a report on Iran’s

refusal to cooperate to the IAEA board.

Wang said if a resolution were adopted, it could “be the basis

for further actions in the [UN] Security Council, leading to the

ultimate termination of the JCPOA,” and would damage the

global nonproliferation regime.

In 2006, after Iran had failed to comply with several IAEA

resolutions urging Tehran to cooperate with the agency’s

investigation into illicit nuclear activities, the board referred

Iran to the UN Security Council. This led to a series of council

resolutions requiring Tehran to halt its nuclear activities and

sanctioning Iran for failing to do so. That investigation was

resolved in 2015 as part of the JCPOA, and the Security Council

sanctions were also modified by the nuclear deal.

Wang blamed the United States, saying the root causes of the

issue “lie in the unilateral and bullying practices” of the U.S.

maximum pressure campaign.

Although Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian ambassador to the IAEA,

said on June 19 that Iran and the IAEA need to resolve the

investigation “without delay,” Moscow views the resolution as

“counterproductive.”

Brian Hook, U.S. special envoy for Iran, called the Russian and

Chinese votes against the resolution “irresponsible” and said on

a June 19 press call that “Russia and China tried to shield Iran

from scrutiny.”

Ahead of the vote, Ulyanov also raised concerns about

information provided to the IAEA from third-party states,

saying that there are “no clear rules in the agency on the use of

information received from third countries” and it is “high time”

this issue was addressed.

Ulanyov was likely referring to information stolen from

Iran by Israel and provided to the IAEA. Israeli Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu publicly pressured the IAEA on several

occasions to follow up on information contained in the

documents. (See ACT, November 2018.) The documents allegedly

provide more information about Iran’s illicit nuclear weapons

program, which the IAEA assessed was halted in 2003.

Grossi pushed back against assertions that the IAEA should not

have acted on information provided by states. He said on June

15 that the IAEA does not take any information provided “at

face value” and that the agency conducts “dogged technical and

scientific analysis of information coming from any state.”

—KELSEY DAVENPORT

Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched

uranium (LEU) continues to grow in

violation of the limits imposed by

the 2015 nuclear deal, but the country

is abiding by the monitoring and

verification mechanisms put in place

by the accord, the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) reported.

According to an IAEA report on June

5 on Iran’s implementation of the 2015

nuclear agreement, known as the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),

Iran has stockpiled 1,571 kilograms of

uranium enriched to a level of less than

5 percent uranium-235, significantly

more than the 202 kilograms of uranium

enriched to 3.67 percent (the equivalent

of 300 kilograms of uranium gas enriched

to 3.67 percent) allowed by the accord.

When the IAEA last reported on Iran’s

implementation of the JCPOA in March,

the stockpile was 1,020 kilograms.

Kazem Gharib Abadi, Iranian

ambassador to the IAEA, emphasized

in a June 16 statement to the agency’s

Board of Governors that Tehran is ready

to “reverse all remedial actions” taken

to reduce compliance with its JCPOA

obligations if the other parties to the

deal take “credible practical steps” to

implement their obligations under the

accord. He said that “words do not

ensure” that Iran benefits from the deal

and that actions are needed.

Iran first announced it would begin

taking steps to breach limits set by the

nuclear deal in May 2019, one year after

U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew

the United States from the agreement

and reimposed sanctions on Iran lifted

by the accord. (See ACT, June 2019; June

2018.) Iranian officials have continued

to reiterate that Tehran will return to

compliance with the deal if its demands

on sanctions relief are met.

Iran Continues to Stockpile Uranium


https://www.armscontrol.org/about/Kelsey_Davenport





Gharib Abadi singled out the three

European parties to the deal (France,

Germany, and the United Kingdom) and

accused them of succumbing to U.S.

bullying and urged them to take steps to

meet their obligations under the JCPOA

“before it’s too late.”

In a June 19 statement, the foreign

ministers of the three European states

said they met their obligations to lift

sanctions under the deal and “have gone

beyond the commitments required by the

agreement to support legitimate trade.”

They urged Iran “to pursue substantial

discussions and actions in coordination

with us” to preserve the deal. The

statement said the three countries will

seek a ministerial meeting to take stock

of the dispute resolution mechanism

process. In January, the three countries

triggered the process outlined in the

nuclear deal to address Iran’s breaches of

the accord.

Although Iran continues to breach

JCPOA limits, Tehran has refrained

from taking new actions that violate the

agreement, despite having announced on

Jan. 5 that it would no longer adhere to

any restrictions on its nuclear activities.

Nevertheless, the IAEA “has not observed

any changes to Iran’s implementation of its

nuclear-related commitments in connection

with” the Jan. 5 announcement, said

agency Director-General Rafael Mariano

Grossi on June 15.

The United States took no solace in

that finding. The IAEA report “makes

clear that Iran has continued to expand

its proliferation-sensitive activities

and is showing no signs of slowing its

destabilizing nuclear escalation,” said

Jackie Wolcott, U.S. ambassador to the

IAEA, on June 16. Iran’s actions are

“transparent attempts at extortion” and

are designed to “raise tensions rather than

defuse them,” she said.

Wolcott may have been referring to

the growing size of the LEU stockpile and

Iran’s expansion of enrichment activities

using advanced centrifuges.

Of the 1,571 kilograms of uranium

enriched to less than 5 percent U-235,

the IAEA noted that 483 kilograms are

enriched to about 2 percent, a level that

does not significantly affect Iran’s ability

to produce weapons-grade material for a

nuclear bomb, should Tehran make the

decision to do so.

Yet, with 1,088 kilograms of material

enriched to between 3.67 and 4.50

percent, Iran now has enough LEU that,

if enriched to weapons grade, is sufficient

for one nuclear bomb. If Iran were to

use the 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz

and the 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow

to pursue weapons-grade enrichment,

it could produce enough material for a

bomb in three to four months, according

to expert assessments. When the JCPOA

was fully implemented, that timeline was

12 months.

Such an effort would be quickly

detected, however, as the IAEA report

noted that Iran continues to cooperate

with the verification and monitoring

mechanisms put in place by the JCPOA,

including tracking of enrichment levels in

real time.

The IAEA also reported that Iran

continues to breach limitations put in

place by the JCPOA on research and

development of advanced centrifuge

machines. According to the June 5

report, Iran is withdrawing enriched

uranium from cascades of 164 IR-2 and

IR-4 centrifuges and a cascade of 135

IR-6 centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, Iran

is only permitted to test a small number

of advanced machines with uranium

and is prohibited from withdrawing any

enriched material.

The IAEA report noted that Iran has not

resumed construction on the Arak reactor

based on its original, more proliferation-

sensitive design or resumed uranium

enrichment to 20 percent.

In May, U.S. Secretary of State Mike

Pompeo terminated sanctions waivers

allowing international cooperation on

conversion of the Arak reactor and the

import of 20 percent-enriched uranium

fuel for Iran’s research reactor. (See ACT,

June 2020.) The parties to the JCPOA are

required under the deal to assist with the

conversion and the transfer of 20 percent-

enriched uranium fuel to Iran. Without

the waivers, however, any continued

cooperation could be penalized by the

United States.

Gharib Abadi said that the “unlawful

conduct” of the United States is

“endangering international cooperation

in the field of nuclear energy and

technology” and a “clear contradiction”

of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Resolution 2231 endorsed the nuclear deal.

Iranian officials have threatened to

resume work on the Arak reactor based on

the original design, which would produce

enough plutonium for about two nuclear

weapons per year, if the international

cooperative efforts to convert the reactor

were halted. Iran has also threatened

to resume enriching uranium to 20

percent, a level that poses much more

of a proliferation risk than the current

enrichment level of less than 5 percent,

if necessary to produce fuel for its

research reactor.

The IAEA report said Iran received a

shipment of 20 percent-enriched uranium

for the Tehran Research Reactor in April,

prior to Pompeo’s announcement.

—KELSEY DAVENPORT

An International Atomic Energy Agency camera monitors activity at Iran's Uranium Conversion Facilities in 2005. As Iran has violated the uranium production limits of the 2015 nuclear deal, it has not curtailed the agency's inspection efforts. (Photo: Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images)





North Korea Pledges to Boost Deterrent

North Korea slammed the United States on the two-year

anniversary of the inaugural summit between North

Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald

Trump, which was held in Singapore in 2018. “Never again will

we provide the U.S. chief executive with another package to be

used for achievements without receiving any rewards,” North

Korean Foreign Minister Ri Son Gwon warned in a statement

published June 12 by the state-run Korean Central News Agency

(KCNA). “Nothing is more hypocritical than an empty promise.”

Rather than continue to take steps to promote diplomacy with

the United States, as North Korea did in 2018 when it introduced

a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile

testing, Pyongyang is now determined to “build up a more reliable

force to cope with the long-term military threats” from the United

States, Ri said. After introducing the moratorium, Kim met with

Trump twice in 2019, in Vietnam in February and Panmunjom in

June. North Korean officials also met with a U.S. delegation for a

round of working-level talks in October. (See ACT, November 2019.)

Without discernible progress toward constructing a peace

regime or an agreement on the terms of North Korea’s

denuclearization, Pyongyang formally renounced its testing

moratorium in January 2020. (See ACT, January/February 2020.)

Since then, North Korea has not tested any long-range missiles,

but has tested a host of shorter-range systems.

According to Ri, the United States “professes to be an advocate

for improved relations” with North Korea, “but in fact, is hell-

bent on only exacerbating the situation. As a result, the Korean

peninsula has now turned into the world’s most dangerous

hotspot haunted uninterruptedly by the ghost of nuclear war.”

Further condemning the Trump administration’s approach, he

suggested that Washington’s efforts to improve bilateral relations

between the United States and North Korea are a ruse for regime

change in Pyongyang.

“Unless the 70-plus-year deep-rooted hostile policy of the U.S.

towards [North Korea] is fundamentally terminated, the U.S. will

as ever remain to be a long-term threat to our state, our system,

and our people,” he said.

Ri’s remarks in his June 12 statement are consistent with other

announcements recently broadcast through the KCNA. On May

24, the outlet reported that Kim presided over a meeting of North

Korean military officials who discussed national efforts to bolster

the country’s armed forces. The meeting concluded with a pledge

to implement “new policies for further increasing the nuclear war

deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces

on high alert.”

U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, during a May 24

interview with CBS News, said the United States was monitoring

developments related to that meeting. He remarked that the

United States would continue reaching out to North Korea

and, in reference to bouts of bilateral talks and leader summits

between the two countries, noted that “the president is engaged

in some excellent personal diplomacy” with Kim. O’Brien also

reiterated the Trump administration’s position that North Korea

must surrender its nuclear weapons program in order to “reenter

the world” and bolster its economy.

In March, Pyongyang made clear it was disinterested in further

diplomacy with Washington. (See ACT, May 2020.) Where a

diplomatic path to achieving North Korean denuclearization,

peace on the Korean peninsula, and a strengthened relationship

between the United States and North Korea once seemed

possible, the North now seems to have shifted its efforts to

defend against U.S. aggression. Kwon Jong Gun, who directs

the Department of U.S. Affairs within the North Korean Foreign

Ministry, said on June 13, “I want to make it clear that we

will continue to build up our force in order to overpower the

persistent threats from the United States.”

“It is better to stop a nonsensical thinking about

denuclearization,” Kwon warned.—JULIA MASTERSON

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un congratulates U.S. President Donald Trump after a signing ceremony at their Singapore summit on June 12, 2018. Any goodwill generated there appears to have evaporated with the latest remarks by North Korean officials on the second anniversary of the meeting. (Photo: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images)

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Tensions between North and

South Korea have escalated after

Pyongyang cut all communications

lines and later demolished the inter-

Korean liaison office in Kaesong,

North Korea, on June 16. South Korean

Unification Minister Kim Yeon-chul, who

previously oversaw relations between

South and North Korea, resigned June 19.

The liaison office was established

following the 2018 Panmunjom

Declaration, which laid out a list of

commitments shared by the two Koreas

“to boldly approach a new era of national

reconciliation, peace and prosperity, and

to improve and cultivate inter-Korean

relations in a more active manner.” The

declaration was concluded at an April

summit between South Korean President

Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim

Jong Un, following a period of newfound

bilateral cooperation.

The office was used to facilitate

diplomatic relations between the two

Koreas. Weekday inter-Korean phone calls

took place twice daily through the office

since its establishment in September

2018, until North Korea cut that and all

other communications lines with South

Korea on June 8.

Two weeks later, North Korea’s state-

run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)

revealed Pyongyang’s plan to release 12

million propaganda leaflets into South

Korea, in response to the scattering of

anti-North Korea leaflets at the countries’

border in early June. Seoul came forward

to say that move was conducted by

several South Korean nongovernmental

organizations, but Pyongyang holds South

Korean authorities near the demilitarized

zone responsible for the act. Propaganda

leaflets are a relic of the Cold War and

were common across the North-South

border in the early 1950s.

The distribution of propaganda leaflets

violates the Panmunjom Declaration,

under which both countries pledged to

cease “all hostile acts” on the Military

Demarcation Line that spans their border.

Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, said

June 4, “I would like to ask the South

Korean authorities if they are ready to take

care of the consequences of evil conduct.”

She heads the Central Committee of the

Worker’s Party of Korea, North Korea’s

highest political body. “The South Korean

authorities will be forced to pay a dear

price if they let this situation go on while

making sort of excuses,” she said.

North Korea pledged on June 17 to

ready its military for deployment near

the demilitarized zone that divides the

two Koreas, as well as to the southwestern

maritime front, but later reneged on

that threat. A KCNA statement June

24 clarified that North Korea’s military

leadership “took stock of the prevailing

situation and suspended military action

plans against the south.”

Kim Yong Chol, vice chairman of the

Central Committee of the Workers’ Party

of Korea, remarked June 24 that a détente

of inter-Korean relations could only be

achieved “by efforts and patience of both

sides based on mutual respect and trust.”

He warned, however, that “nothing will

turn out favorable when our suspension

becomes reconsideration,” adding that

South Korea must “realize that self-control

is the key to tiding over the crisis.”

Although the scattering of leaflets

across the border exacerbated tensions,

North Korea’s heightened hostility

toward South Korea appears fueled

by Seoul’s long-standing efforts to

promote U.S.-North Korean dialogue

on denuclearization amid souring inter-

Korean relations.

Kwon Jong Gun, the, director-general

of U.S. affairs in the North Korean

Foreign Ministry, noted on June 13 that

South Korean authorities had voiced

their support for a resumption of U.S.-

North Korean talks. “I still remember that

exactly one year ago, we advised them

to stop fooling around in such a nasty

manner,” Kwon said, adding that “it is

not because there is not a mediator that

the [North Korean]-U.S. dialogue has

gone away and denuclearization been

blown off.”

A KCNA commentary on June 19

relayed that North Korea was “fed up

with the disgusting acts of the South

Korean authorities who accepted the

‘South Korea-U.S. working group’ even

Tensions on Korean Peninsula Rise

Cho Myoung-gyon (left), then South Korean unification minister, and his North Korean counterpart Ri Son Gwon (center), attend the opening ceremony of the now-demolished joint liaison office on Sept. 14, 2018 in Kaesong, North Korea. (Photo: Korea Pool/Getty Images)


analysis

Critics Question U.S. Open Skies Complaints

In the wake of the Trump administration’s decision in May to

abandon the Open Skies Treaty, and amid uncertainty about

the future of the 34-nation accord, critics are disputing the

administration’s rationale for withdrawal.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a May 21

statement that “Russia’s implementation and

violation of Open Skies” has negated the “central

confidence-building function of the treaty—and

has, in fact, fueled distrust and threats to our national security—

making continued U.S. participation untenable.”

Specifically, Pompeo cited Russian restrictions on observation

flights over Russian territory and alleged that Moscow “appears”

to use treaty flights “in support of an aggressive new Russian

doctrine of targeting critical infrastructure in the United States

and Europe with precision-guided conventional munitions.”

Members of Congress, former government officials, U.S.

allies, and Russia have said that these arguments are based on

tendentious reasoning, beset by contradictions, and ignore positive

benefits the treaty continues to provide. (See ACT, May 2020.)

Meanwhile, the fate of the treaty is in limbo. Several European

treaty parties have said they plan to continue implementing the

agreement, while Russia has not specified how it plans to proceed.

To further complicate matters, flights under the treaty have

been suspended since mid-March due to the coronavirus

pandemic, and it is unclear when they will resume.

Signed in 1992, the Open Skies Treaty permits each state-party to

conduct short-notice, unarmed observation flights over the others’

entire territories to collect data on military forces and activities.

The Trump administration alleges that Russian limitations

on flights over the Kaliningrad enclave and territory bordering

Abkhazia and South Ossetia violate the treaty. Critics argue

that the breaches do not defeat the object and purpose of the

agreement and are resolvable through diplomacy.

The Kaliningrad issue focuses on Moscow’s demand to

limit Open Skies missions over the enclave to less than 500

kilometers in total flight distance. The requirement followed a

2014 overflight by Poland that, according to a May 26 Russian

Foreign Ministry paper, crossed “back and forth, thereby creating

problems for the use of the region’s limited airspace and for

the operation of the region’s only international airport” and

“entailed serious financial costs.” Russia maintains that the

500-kilometer limit was “established in line with [Open Skies

Treaty] provisions.”

In 2016, the United States responded to the sublimit by

restricting flights over the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and the missile

defense interceptor fields in Fort Greely, Alaska.

The Russian Foreign Ministry claims that whereas Western

countries can still capture “from 77 to 98 percent of the

territory” of Kaliningrad in an observation flight, Russia can

observe “just 2.7 percent in Alaska.”

In February 2020, Russia allowed a flight over Kaliningrad

by the United States, Estonia, and Lithuania that exceeded

the 500-kilometer limit. On March 2, U.S. Ambassador to the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe James

Gilmore described the flight as “very cooperative.”

Christopher Ford, assistant secretary of state for international

security and nonproliferation, acknowledged in a May 21

briefing that Russia permitted “a very slightly longer flight”

over Kaliningrad but argued that the flight “doesn’t undermine

the basic point that Russia clearly regards its Open Skies legal

obligations as something akin more to guidelines or options

for them.”

Swedish soldiers guard a Russian aircraft preparing to conduct an Open Skies Treaty observation flight over Sweden in 2000. (Photo: OSCE)

before the ink on the north-south

agreement got dry,” referring to a

body established in the fall of 2018 to

strengthen coordination between Seoul

and Washington on efforts to achieve

North Korean denuclearization. Behind the

scenes, the June 19 statement continued,

South Korea remains “engrossed in military

exercises with the foreign force” and

has “connived at the leaflet-scattering

by the human scum ten times last year

and three times this year, reneging on

the promise to halt hostile acts in

frontline areas.”

South Korea’s presidential Blue

House stated on June 17 it would “not

endure” continued condemnation from

Pyongyang and added that repeated

criticism of Seoul transmitted through the

KCNA was counterproductive to efforts to

build trust between the two Koreas.

Seoul’s chief nuclear negotiator met

with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State

Stephen Biegun on June 18 to “assess

the current situation on the Korean

peninsula and discuss responses.”

—JULIA MASTERSON




The United States additionally asserts that Moscow not only

violates a crucial clause of the treaty but also uses the clause to

make a political claim with respect to Georgia.

Under the Open Skies Treaty, states-parties must open all of their

territory to overflights, although Article VI prohibits flights within

10 kilometers of borders with countries that are not states-parties.

Russia is one of only a handful of countries that recognizes

Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent from Georgia. As a

result, Moscow has prohibited treaty flights within 10-kilometers

of its border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as they are not

states-parties to the Open Skies Treaty.

The Russian Foreign Ministry argues that “it is possible to

reliably obtain images of these zones without flying over them”

and that Georgia, a treaty party, is in violation of the accord by

prohibiting Russian flights over Georgia.

In a June 22 letter to Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark

Esper criticizing the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw

from the treaty, Senators Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), Chuck

Schumer (D-N.Y.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), and Mark Warner (D-Va.)

write that “instead of withdrawing from the treaty, the United

States should diplomatically engage Russia to resolve these issues

as it has done successfully in the past, for example when Russian

imposed limitations on flights over Chechnya.”

As for the allegation that Russia is misusing treaty flights over

the United States to collect military-relevant intelligence, Ford

said that he was “not at liberty to go into some of the details of

why we think that this is a concern.”

“[W]hile not a violation per se,” he added, “it’s clearly

something that is deeply corrosive to the cause of building

confidence and trust.”

There appears to be disagreement among military officials

about how useful Russian flights are for intelligence gathering.

Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, the former head of the Navy’s

Strategic Systems Program, told a Congressional hearing in

2016 that “the information Russia gleans from Open Skies is of

only incremental value in addition to Russia’s other means of

intelligence gathering.”

The treaty includes provisions that dictate the standards for

equipment, including cameras and planes, used during a flight.

No equipment is used that is not previously authorized by the

states-parties.

Under the treaty, states-parties seeking to conduct an overflight

must supply their flight plan at least 24 hours in advance to the

host country. The host country then reviews the plan and can

raise any concerns about safety or weather. When the flight does

take off, there are also representatives of the host country on the

plane alongside the observing states-parties to ensure all goes

according to plan. All images taken on the flight must then be

shared with the other parties to the agreement.

In addition to arguing that Russia is using the treaty to gather

intelligence, the Trump administration and other opponents

of the agreement also maintain that the treaty has outlived its

usefulness and is based on outdated technology.

“[T]echnology has passed by the world of wet film and

antiquated aircraft,” Marshall Billingslea, the president’s special

envoy for arms control said on May 21. “You can download

commercial imagery today in a matter of seconds that really meets

the original intent of confidence-building measures in Europe.”

Critics argue that the administration cannot have it both ways.

If the treaty is antiquated and replaceable by higher-resolution

commercial satellite images, how is Russia using it to capture

irreplaceable images of critical U.S. infrastructure?

Russia has responded to the U.S. allegation that it is misusing

the treaty by stating that the United States, when flying over

Russia, “film[s] not only parks and beaches.” Since the treaty

entered into force, the United States has flown over Russia about

three times more frequently than Russia has flown over the

United States.

A former senior official told Arms Control Today that the United

States and its allies have made use of treaty flights “to track

infrastructure that it’s otherwise hard to photograph in a single

satellite pass.” This includes imagery of Russian rail lines, “which

has helped us to understand more about military transport

potential, including for nuclear warheads.” The official said the

United States has also used the treaty “to help preview inspection

sites for…nuclear treaties,” such as the 2010 New Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty and to photograph Russia’s nuclear test site at

Novaya Zemlya.

The Trump administration has told allies that it is exploring

options to provide more imagery products to them to address

any gaps that might result from the U.S. withdrawal. Many treaty

members, including the Baltic states, do not have their own

aircraft with which to conduct flights.

But sharing such sensitive imagery may be easier said than

done.

Pranay Vaddi, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State

Department official, tweeted on May 28 that it takes time to

downgrade sensitive images and then coordinate with allies that

might have different domestic procedures for handling such

information.

He added that “commercial imagery will be contested as if it's

[intelligence] information” and “be called unofficial, doctored,

biased, etc.”

Pompeo noted in his May 21 statement that the administration

might reconsider the treaty withdrawal decision “if Russia

demonstrates a return to full compliance with this confidence-

building treaty.” Most observers believe, however, that there

is little hope the United States will return to the treaty given

the wide-ranging reasons the administration has given for its

decision to leave.

According to Article XV of the treaty, no more than two

months after a state-party decides to withdraw, a conference of

the states-parties must take place so as “to consider the effect

of the withdrawal on this Treaty.” Canada and Hungary, the

depositaries of the treaty, have scheduled this meeting, to be

conducted by remote communication, for July 6.

Many allies have expressed regret about the U.S. decision

and indicated that they will continue to implement the accord

as they still view it as “functioning and useful.” (See ACT,

May 2020.)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on June 23 that

“we will see the reaction of our Western colleagues during this

conference, what Europe thinks about it.”

“We don’t rule out any options of our actions,” he added.

—KINGSTON REIF and SHANNON BUGOS



https://www.armscontrol.org/about/Kingston_Reif



Russia publicly expanded on the

circumstances under which it

might employ nuclear weapons in

a policy document on nuclear deterrence

signed by President Vladimir Putin on

June 2.

The 2020 document, called “Basic

Principles of State Policy of the Russian

Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” marks

the first time Russia has consolidated and

publicly released its nuclear deterrence

policy, which previously was classified.

The document presents four scenarios

that might warrant nuclear use, two of

which did not appear in the 2014, 2010,

and 2000 versions of Russia’s military

doctrine. (See ACT, March 2010; January/

February 2000.)

As stated in the two most recent

versions of the military doctrine, two of

the scenarios in which Russia “reserves

the right to use nuclear weapons” include

when Moscow is acting “in response to

the use of nuclear and other types of

Russia Releases Nuclear Deterrence Policyweapons of mass destruction against

it and/or its allies, as well as in the

event of aggression against the Russian

Federation with the use of conventional

weapons when the very existence of

the state is in jeopardy.” The 2000

military doctrine differed slightly in its

description of the latter scenario, as it

instead allowed nuclear use in response to

conventional attacks in “situations critical

to the national security of the Russian

Federation.”

The two additional scenarios contained

in the 2020 document include an “arrival

[of] reliable data on a launch of ballistic

missiles attacking the territory of the

Russian Federation and/or its allies” or an

“attack by [an] adversary against critical

governmental or military sites of the

Russian Federation, disruption of which

would undermine nuclear forces response

actions.”

The two new scenarios had not yet

been included in formal policy, but other

documents or statements by government

officials, including Putin, have hinted at

their inclusion, said Olga Oliker, program

director for Europe and Central Asia at

International Crisis Group, in a June 4

analysis.

Divided into four sections, the

document leads with how Russia defines

its state policy on nuclear deterrence,

which it calls “defensive by nature.”

The goal of deterrence is “to prevent

aggression against the Russian Federation

and/or its allies.”

The document does not explicitly

name Russia’s allies and adversaries,

but the second section does broadly

define adversaries, stating that Russia

implements its deterrence “with regard to

individual states and military coalitions

(blocs, alliances) that consider the Russian

Federation as a potential adversary

and that possess nuclear weapons and/

or other types of weapons of mass

destruction, or significant combat

Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (left) attend a June 24 Victory Day parade in Moscow to mark the 75th anniversary of defeating Germany in World War II. Three weeks earlier, Putin signed a new document outlining Russia's nuclear deterrence policies. (Photo: Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)





potential of general purpose forces.” This

definition would include the United

States and alliances such as NATO.

The second section of the document

further defines Russia’s definition of

nuclear deterrence as signaling to

adversaries “the inevitability of retaliation

in the event of aggression against the

Russian Federation and/or its allies.” It

also describes military risks presented by

adversaries that deterrence is designed

to “neutralize,” such as the deployments

of medium- and shorter-range cruise

and ballistic missiles, hypersonic

weapons, and missile defense systems.

The document does not say how Russia

would move to neutralize any of these

risks should they elevate to “threats of

aggression.”

This section additionally details

what Moscow views as “the principles

of nuclear deterrence,” to include

compliance with arms control

agreements, unpredictability for an

adversary as to Russian employment of its

means of deterrence, and readiness of its

forces for use.

The third section covers the four

scenarios in which Russia might use

nuclear weapons.

The fourth and final section notes

the roles of the government and related

agencies, including the Security Council

and Defense Ministry, in implementing

Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy. The

document maintains that the Russian

president makes the decision to use

nuclear weapons.

The document does not explicitly

address Russia’s purported willingness

to use or threaten to use its much larger

arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons to

stave off defeat in a conventional conflict

or crisis initiated by Russia, a strategy

known as “escalate to deescalate.” (See

ACT, March 2018.) But, as Oliker points

out, “hard[-]core believers” in this strategy

may point to the document’s statement

that Moscow’s nuclear deterrence policy

“provides for the prevention of an

escalation of military actions and their

termination on conditions that are

acceptable for the Russian Federation and/

or its allies.”

Oliker instead suggests an

interpretation that Russia will not use

nuclear weapons “for simple battlefield

advantage.” But if Russia decides to use

nuclear weapons, it “will do so intending

to prevent further escalation and end the

conflict as favorably (or acceptably) as

possible for itself.”

Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation

Studies and former Russian Foreign

Ministry official, said in a June 3

analysis of the deterrence policy that

the document has a deescalation

strategy but emphasizes deterrence and

views deescalation more as a means of

preventing rather than waging war.

Following the publication of the signed

document, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry

Peskov told reporters on June 3 that

“Russia can never and will never initiate”

the use of nuclear weapons.

Marshall Billingslea, U.S. special

envoy for arms control, responded to

Peskov on June 11, tweeting, “Where is

this reflected in the new doctrine?”

—SHANNON BUGOS

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U.S., Russia Boost Shows of Force

As tensions between the United States and Russia have

intensified, both nations have engaged in airborne

“show of force” operations intended to demonstrate their

intent to resist intimidation and defend their

territories. Such operations can prove hazardous

when the aircraft of one antagonist come perilously close to

those of another, a phenomenon that has occurred on numerous

occasions over the past few years. The recent maneuvers,

however, appear to have raised the stakes, as the two rivals have

increased their use of nuclear-capable aircraft in such operations

and have staged them in militarily sensitive areas.

The pace and extent of recent air operations have exceeded

anything since the end of the Cold War. The United States

has flown a number of missions near Russia, sometimes going

places for the first time with strategic bombers. These include

(1) two missions in March and June by U.S. B-2 stealth bombers

above the Arctic Circle in exercises intended to demonstrate

NATO’s ability to attack Russian military forces located on the

Kola Peninsula in Russia’s far north; (2) a first-time U.S. B-1B

bomber flight on May 21 over the Sea of Okhotsk, a bay-like

body of water surrounded by Russia’s far eastern territory on

three sides; (3) a May 29 flight by two B-1B bombers across

Ukrainian-controlled airspace for the first time, coming close to

Russian-controlled airspace over Crimea; (4) a June 15 mission by

two U.S. B-52 bombers over the Baltic Sea in support of a NATO

exercise then under way, coming close to Russian airspace and

prompting menacing flights by Russian interceptors in the area;

and (5) a June 18 flight by two U.S. B-52 bombers over the Sea of

Okhotsk, a first appearance there by that type of aircraft, again

prompting Russia to scramble fighter aircraft to escort the U.S.

bombers away from the area.

For its part, Russia conducted a March 12 flight of two nuclear-

capable Tu-160 “Blackjack” bombers over Atlantic waters near

Scotland, Ireland, and France from their base on the Kola

Peninsula in Russia’s far north, prompting France and the United

Kingdom to scramble interceptor aircraft. In addition, nuclear-

capable Tu-95 “Bear” bombers, accompanied by Su-35 fighter

jets, flew twice in June within a few dozen miles of the Alaskan

coastline before being escorted away by U.S. fighter aircraft.

In conducting these operations, U.S. and Russian military

leaders appear to be delivering two messages to their

counterparts. First, despite any perceived reductions in military

readiness caused by the coronavirus pandemic, they are fully

prepared to conduct all-out combat operations against the

other. Second, any such engagements could include a nuclear

component at an early stage of the fighting.

“We have the capability and capacity to provide long-range

fires anywhere, anytime, and can bring overwhelming firepower,

even during the pandemic,” said Gen. Timothy Ray, commander

of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, the unit responsible

for deploying nuclear bombers on long-range missions of this

sort. Without saying as much, Russia has behaved in a similar

manner. From his post as commander of U.S. air forces in Europe,

Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian observed, “Russia has not scaled back air

operations in Europe since the start of the coronavirus pandemic,

and the number of intercepts of Russian aircraft [by NATO forces]

has remained roughly stable.”

Leaders on both sides have been more reticent when it comes

to the nuclear implications of these maneuvers, but there is no

doubt that such considerations are on their minds. Ray’s talk of

“overwhelming force” and “long-range fires” could be interpreted

as involving highly destructive conventional weapons, but when

the aircraft involved are primarily intended for delivering nuclear

weapons, it can have another meaning altogether.

Equally suggestive is Harrigian’s comment, made in

conjunction with the B-52 flights over the Baltic Sea on June

15, that “long-range strategic missions to the Baltic region are

a visible demonstration of our capability to extend deterrence

globally,” again signaling to Moscow that any NATO-Russian

engagement in the Baltic region could escalate swiftly to the

nuclear level.

Russian generals have not uttered similar statements, but the

dispatch of Tu-95 bombers to within a few dozen miles of Alaska,

which houses several major U.S. military installations, is a loud

enough message in itself.

Although receiving scant media attention in the U.S. and

international press, these maneuvers represent a dangerous

escalation of U.S.-Russian military interactions and could set the

stage for a dangerous incident involving armed combat between

aircraft of the opposing sides. This by itself could precipitate

a major crisis and possible escalation. Just as worrisome is

the strategic implications of these operations, suggesting a

commitment to the early use of nuclear weapons in future major-

power engagements.—MICHAEL KLARE

analysis

A U.S. F-22 aircraft accompanies a Russian Tu-95 "Bear" bomber during an intercept near Alaska on June 16. (Photo: North American Aerospace Defense Command)

https://www.armscontrol.org/about/Michael_Klare


The Trump administration intends

to unilaterally reinterpret how

the United States will participate

in the 34-nation Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR) in order to allow

U.S. companies to export more drones,

presumably to states that had sought

them but been denied access, according

to news reports.

The policy change could open up

sales of U.S. remotely piloted aircraft,

also known as drones, to countries in

the Middle East and Southeast Asia that

have been forbidden from buying them

under the MTCR guidelines, Reuters

reported on June 12. To date, U.S. defense

manufacturers have only been allowed to

sell large drones to Australia, France, and

the United Kingdom.

The MTCR requires that exports of

most missile systems, including cruise

missiles and unmanned aircraft that have

a range of at least 300 kilometers and

the ability to carry a payload of at least

U.S. Aims to Expand Drone Sales500 kilograms, are subject to a “strong

presumption of denial.”

The Obama administration policy

for the export of military unmanned

aerial systems, which was finalized in

2015, explicitly sought to reinforce U.S.

obligations under the MTCR.

That policy also requires that all

potential sales be considered on a

case-by-case basis and “puts in place

stringent conditions” on potential drone

sales. Recipient countries also may be

required to agree to end-use assurances

as a condition of sale or transfer or more

specific end-use monitoring, as well

as specific “principles for proper use”

included as a condition of the transfer.

The revised U.S. policy will reportedly

reinterpret how the MTCR applies to

drones that travel at speeds under 800

kilometers per hour, such as the Predator

and Reaper drones, which are made by

General Atomics, and the Global Hawk,

which is made by Northrop Grumman.

Under the proposed U.S. reinterpretation,

Reuters reported, the United States will

treat these drones as if they belong in a

lower category that falls outside MTCR

jurisdiction. Whether the new policy

alters other elements of current policy is

not yet clear.

U.S. export oversight agencies,

including the departments of Homeland

Security, Commerce, Energy, and Justice,

agreed to the change in May, Reuters

reported, and the first State Department

approval of new drones sales could come

this summer. The administration has

already notified Northrop Grumman and

General Atomics, which are the largest

U.S. drone manufacturers.

The push to relax U.S. arms export

standards, including drone sales, has been

underway for nearly a decade as sales to

U.S. defense and intelligence agencies

has flattened out and overseas interest in

advanced drone surveillance and attack

drones has grown. Since 2017, the defense

A U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone aircraft taxis at a 2016 airshow. The Trump administration is seeking to reinterpret export restrictions to enable more sales of such weapons systems. (Photo: Dennis Henry/U.S. Air Force)


industry and some members of Congress

have launched a more intensive effort to

encourage the Trump administration to

revise U.S. policy to allow manufacturers

to sidestep MTCR restrictions.

Defense industry lobbyists and

spokespersons have argued that, without

changes to the existing U.S. policy for

drone exports, the United States will fall

behind in the fast-growing, multibillion-

dollar global drone market. They fear

that some states will turn to other

suppliers, including China, to acquire

drone capabilities for their military and

intelligence agencies.

Critics in the U.S. government,

Congress, and the arms control and

human rights communities have argued

that relaxing rules for the export of

advanced remotely piloted aircraft,

particularly those capable of carrying

weapons, could result in sales to

governments that have abused human

rights, flouted international humanitarian

law, or have been involved in proxy wars

outside their borders.

In addition, they point out that if the

United States seeks to create loopholes in

the MTCR in order to expand its share of

the global market, it will likely undermine

efforts to ensure compliance with MTCR

guidelines by other missile- and drone-

producing states.—DARYL G. KIMBALL

U.S. Sets Global Partnership Priorities

The United States is prioritizing the security of chemicals

to help restore the norm against chemical weapons

use during its chair of the Global Partnership Against

the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction for 2020, a State

Department official told Arms Control Today.

Increasing biological security will also be a key area of focus for

the Global Partnership, as the coronavirus pandemic has renewed

attention on the “catastrophic impact” that a biological weapon

could have, the official said in a June 17 interview.

The Global Partnership is a multilateral initiative founded in

2002 to prevent the use and proliferation of chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear weapons.

Initially focused on disposing of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) and related facilities in former Soviet countries, the

Global Partnership expanded its geographic scope in 2008. The

initiative now implements projects worldwide to secure and

destroy WMD-related materials and support partnering countries’

efforts to adhere to international nonproliferation instruments.

Its work is guided by six core principles, which include managing

and destroying WMD materials, implementing effective border

and export controls, protecting facilities that house dual-use

materials, and implementing international treaties aimed at

preventing WMD proliferation.

The Global Partnership is now comprised of 30 member states

plus the European Union. The chair of the initiative rotates on

the same schedule as the Group of Seven. The United States

last chaired the Global Partnership in 2012. (See ACT, January/

February 2013.)

Currently, the partnership has four working groups: nuclear

and radiological security, biological security, chemical security,

and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

security. The initiative implemented more than 180 projects

valued at more than $534 million in dozens of countries in 2019.

Although there is continuity in the scope of the working

groups, the chair of the initiative can determine priorities for

each over the course of a year.

A scientist works at a laboratory of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in Rijswijk, the Netherlands. The OPCW has received support from the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction to help nations prevent their chemical industries and materials from being misused. (Photo: OPCW)





The State Department official said the United States is focused

on building capacity through donations during its chairmanship

and on strengthening dialogue between partnership states to

take into account their threat assessments and programming

priorities. The official said the United States also wants to

emphasize the importance of donor involvement and challenge

all partners in the initiative to make substantial contributions.

This includes focusing on the Global Partnership’s matchmaking

process for implementing projects across the range of WMD

threats. Such matchmaking pairs countries in need of assistance

with state donor funding and expertise. As chair, the United

States will seek to “tap into an evolving set of requirements on

one side, and the priority of funding on the other, and try to

match the two,” the State Department official explained.

The official said the United States takes seriously the full range

of WMD threats, but the repeated use of chemical weapons over

the past several years makes restoring the norm against chemical

weapons usage a key priority for the initiative, which the United

States will continue to emphasize in 2020.

The partnership’s significant efforts to strengthen chemicals

security over the past few years has strengthened the regime

and contributed to the capacity of the Organisation for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The United States plans to build on this work, and efforts

to restore the norm against chemical weapons use will be a

“centerpiece” of the Global Partnership’s work in 2020, the official

said. The official noted that the working group plans to further

develop best practices for chemicals security infrastructure and

continue to build a network of experts on which the international

community can draw.

The Global Partnership has a number of ongoing projects

that support these goals. The United States announced $7

million in funding for the OPCW’s center for chemistry and

technology and has funded a project since 2011 to assist states in

securing chemicals and assessing the evolving threat of chemical

weapons use. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia,

Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan are some of the states

that have benefited. Germany, in connection with the OPCW,

funded workshops on chemicals security from 2009 to 2020 for

professionals working in chemicals industries in Africa, Asia, and

South America.

In the biological security working group, the official said the

United States is concerned that nefarious actors are “paying

attention to the consequences of the current pandemic” and

may too become interested in biological weapons. The officials

said that the pandemic has highlighted gaps in biosecurity and

noted that some states have already requested help through the

initiative to respond to the coronavirus pandemic. Requests for

assistance have included training for using personal protective

equipment correctly.

The United States is also looking to prioritize building biological

incident response capabilities and developing sustainable practices

to minimize the risk of a future, intentional biological incident,

the official said. The official also noted important progress on

linking global health and security efforts in 2019 and said the

United States will continue that work.

Past projects funded by the partnership have focused on

capacity building to respond to biological threats. Germany

funded a project in the Sahel region of Africa from 2016 to 2018

that established a regional response network, and Japan funded

work during 2017–2019 to build capacity to diagnose infectious

tropical diseases in Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In the nuclear and radiological security working group,

the United States is focusing on a range of issues, including

enhancing operational resilience; supporting implementation

of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material, the parties to which will hold a

conference in 2021; and priorities identified in the action plan

released during the 2016 nuclear security summit.

The Global Partnership was one of five organizations tasked

with continuing the work of the nuclear security summits,

which aimed to secure and minimize weapons-usable nuclear

materials in civil programs and raise awareness of the threat of

nuclear terrorism.

The partnership’s action plan includes supporting efforts to

increase cybersecurity and insider threat mitigation and working

with the IAEA on nuclear security priorities.

The working group is scheduled to meet in July to discuss how

the partnership can build on the IAEA’s February 2020 nuclear

security conference.

The partnership has also contributed to continuing efforts

to secure nuclear and radiological materials. The United States,

for instance, is funding a 10-year effort through 2024 to secure

high-threat radioactive sources in Kazakhstan, and Canada

is working with nine Latin American countries from 2018 to

2022 to set up nuclear detection architecture to detect material

outside of regulatory control.

The CBRN working group is taking a different approach to

its mandate in 2020, the official said, noting that efforts will

focus on implementing export controls and creating consensus

recommendations on areas including addressing sanctions

evasion and countering proliferation financing. The official said

the working group will continue to advance implementation of

UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to

prevent WMD proliferation to nonstate actors and work more

closely with the World Customs Organization on its capacity-

building programs. The United States also hopes to revitalize

matchmaking on CBRN projects and make strategic trade

controls a permanent focus of the working group.

The United States is currently engaged in a multiyear program

with a number of states in the Asia Pacific and East African

regions to devise strategic trade controls and better enforce UN

Security Council sanctions targeting North Korean proliferation.

The Global Partnership’s 31 members are primarily located

in North America and Europe, but the United States has no

plans to expand the initiative’s membership at this time. The

State Department official said Washington hopes to strengthen

existing members’ participation and to implement new project

proposals through the matchmaking process.

The State Department official said that the pandemic has

created new challenges for the initiative, but noted that the

Global Partnership is taking an innovative approach to virtual

meetings that allow the initiative’s threat reduction work

to continue. Partners now facilitate virtual engagements,

remote training, and distance learning in place of their regular

activities.—KELSEY DAVENPORT and JULIA MASTERSON




A Chinese Jin-class nuclear submarine participates in a 2019 naval parade in in Shandong Province. (Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/AFP/Getty Images)

NEWS In Brief

China Deploys New Missile SubmarinesChina deployed two new submarines capable of carrying nuclear-

tipped ballistic missiles in April, expanding the sea-based leg of

the country’s nuclear triad to include six vessels categorized as

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

The two new subs shore up the third leg of China’s air-, land-,

and sea-based nuclear triad. An effective sea-based leg is likely

intended to demonstrate China’s second-strike capabilities and

to deter first-strike nuclear attacks from other states. Fielding a

robust SSBN fleet is consistent with Beijing’s nuclear doctrine,

which is believed to center on a small but effective nuclear

arsenal to be used only in self-defense. Beijing’s 2009 white paper

on its nuclear doctrine states that “China remains committed

to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursues a self-

defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear

arms race with another country.”

The two newly deployed SSBNs are variants of China’s Type

094, or Jin-class, submarine. They are outfitted with sophisticated

radars and sonars and are equipped to carry up to 16 of China’s

JL-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles. (See ACT, June 2013.)

According a 2020 report by the U.S. Congressional Research

Service, the current JL-2 missiles may soon be replaced with a

longer-range and more advanced JL-3 missile. The JL-3 is not yet

in service, but initial flight tests suggest its range nears 10,000

kilometers. (See ACT, July/August 2019.)—JULIA MASTERSON

Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore DeploymentJapan will not deploy two U.S.-made Aegis Ashore ballistic missile

defense systems designed to protect Japan against North Korean

ballistic missiles, officials announced in June, citing growing

financial costs, unresolved technical issues, and local opposition.

“Due to considerations of cost and timing, we have stopped

the process of introducing the Aegis Ashore system,” said

Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono on June 15. The cost

was too high, he said, to develop enough confidence that the

system’s rocket booster would not fall on Japanese residents

and buildings after detaching from the interceptor. Attempts to

revise the missile’s software to ensure this outcome had failed,

and costly hardware modifications will be necessary, Kono said.

Japanese officials had proposed to site the two systems at the

north and south ends of the nation’s main island, a decision met

with protests from local communities and officials.

Purchasing, operating, and maintaining the two Aegis Ashore

systems for 30 years had been estimated to cost about $4.2

billion, and Japan has already invested about $1.8 billion in the

project, according to Japanese news sources.

With the cancellation, Japan’s missile defense capabilities

will now rely solely on naval vessels armed with Aegis weapons.

Japan plans to deploy eight such destroyers, the last of which

began sea trials in June and is scheduled to be commissioned in

2021, Defense News reported.—MACKENZIE KNIGHT

Upgraded Nuclear Weapon Passes F-15 TestThe F-15E Strike Eagle became the first aircraft to be certified to

deliver the B61-12 nuclear bomb design, after two test flights at

the Nevada Tonopah Test Range in March. The tests were run at

two different altitudes, one at approximately 1,000 feet and the

other around 25,000 feet. Both tests successfully hit the target.

The B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb is the product of a

life extension program by the National Nuclear Security

Administration (NNSA) and will replace earlier variants of the

weapon. The F-15E was the first aircraft to be fitted with the

design, but the Pentagon plans to certify F-16 fighters and

B-2 bombers, as well as NATO aircraft as part of the nuclear

sharing arrangement with the United States. The NNSA, a

semiautonomous agency in the Energy Department, is also

planning to certify the B61-12 on the F-35 aircraft within the

next decade.

The B61 first entered service in 1968. The B61-12 life extension

program is one of five major NNSA modernization programs and

is projected to cost $8 billion. The NNSA is expected to produce

400 to 500 B61-12 warheads.

The first production unit of the upgraded weapons system

had been scheduled for completion in March 2020, but last year

was delayed until 2022. (See ACT, November 2019.) At a House

Armed Services Committee hearing in September 2019, Charles

Verdon, deputy administrator for NNSA defense programs,

attributed the delay to issues with off-the-shelf parts used in the

weapon. Although the system is designed to remain in service

for 20 to 30 years, stress testing raised concerns that certain

components of the design would fail before reaching a three-

decade lifespan.—MACKENZIE KNIGHT






reports of note

Rethinking Land-Based Nuclear Missiles: Sensible Risk-Reduction Practices for U.S. ICBMs

David Wright, William D. Hartung, and Lisbeth Gronlund Union of Concerned ScientistsJune 2020

The United States currently deploys 400 Minuteman III

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on high alert

in three states. The U.S. Air Force plans to replace these

missiles, which were originally developed and deployed in

the 1960s, with new ones from the Ground-Based Strategic

Deterrent program at a projected cost of $100 billion.

The Union of Concerned Scientists argues in this 38-

page report that the U.S. ICBM policy is outdated and that

the United States could launch these missiles based on an

inaccurate warning of impending attack. The group calls for

retiring the ICBMs, but acknowledges that doing so in the near

future is unlikely due to military and political concerns.

Until the U.S. ICBM force is fully retired, the report urges

the Air Force to remove its missiles from their high-alert

status, revise the process for launching ICBMs, and maintain

and upgrade existing missiles instead of purchasing new

ones.—SHANNON BUGOS

A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st CenturySamuel Charap et al.Rand CorporationApril 2020

The current regional conventional arms control regime in

Europe is outdated and must be redesigned to lower the risk of

conflict in Europe, according to this 102-page report from the

Rand Corporation.

With NATO and Russia fielding improved conventional

capabilities, a severe downturn in relations, and the near

collapse of arms control and confidence- and security-building

measures, the pathways to armed conflict are more diverse

than they were when the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe was signed in 1990.

New arms control measures could address the potential

sources of conflict between NATO and Russia. European

nations limit exercises in sensitive locations, create a special

forum to address airspace or maritime incidents, and redesign

sensitive zones around vulnerable lines of communication.

—SHANNON BUGOS

A World Free from Nuclear Weapons

is a critical companion for scholars

of modern Catholicism, moral

theology, and peace studies, as well

as policymakers working on effective

disarmament. It shows how the

Church's revised position presents

an opportunity for global leaders

to connect disarmament to larger

movements for peace, pointing toward

future action.

Available in Hardcover, Paperback, and eBook from Georgetown University Press

http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/world-free-nuclear-weapons

August 2020

Edited by Drew Christiansen, SJ, and Carole Sargent

With an Address by Pope Francis

With Contributions from Seven Nobel Peace Prize Laureates



“A comprehensive and illuminating account of America’s paralyzing infatuation with nuclear weapons. This expanded edition of Scott Ritter’s 2010 book drives home the point made in the original: The ominous threat of Doomsday persists, with U.S. policymakers unable to extricate themselves from the reckless pact with the devil made by their predecessors more than a half-century ago.”

—ANDREW BACEVICH, President Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

“Scott Ritter’s Scorpion King is an important and necessary wake-up call. Nuclear weapons, in the quantities that now exist, are a threat to our very existence. They have no rational military use, yet we still cling to them, “modernize” them, and undermine the international agreements designed to keep them under control. This book should be required reading for political leaders, media pundits, and citizens who want to leave a future to our children and grandchildren.”

—JACK J. MATLOCK, JR, author of Superpower Illusions: How Myths and False Ideologies Led America Astray

“To an ever-increasing extent, the business of America is the business of war. But although Americans live in the shadow of a war economy, few understand the full extent of its power and influence. Thanks to Christian Sorensen’s deeply researched book into the military-industrial complex that envelops our society, such ignorance can no longer be an excuse.”

—ANDREW COCKBURN, author of Kill Chain: The Rise of the High Tech Assassins.

“A devastating account of American militarism, brilliantly depicted, and exhaustively researched in an authoritative manner. Sorensen’s book is urgent, fascinating reading for anyone who wants to save the country and the world from political, economic, and ecological disaster. Its message is so convincingly delivered that it will change many open minds forever and for the better.”

—RICHARD FALK, Professor Emeritus, Princeton University

Addressing the urgent issues of our time

“A.B. Abrams tells the history of the fraught relationship between the United States and North Korea with care. His undertaking explains how the two countries, from Kim Il Sung and Harry Truman to Kim Jong Un and Donald J. Trump, have managed a difficult coexistence. To understand where the Korean Peninsula might go in the rest of the 21st century, Abrams’ telling of the story of how the two countries got to where they are today is essential.”

– Ankit Panda, senior editor, The Diplomat

“If North Korea were ever to publish its own view of the history of its relation-ship with the USA the result might well look something like this book. While controversial, Abrams is careful to support his assertions with footnotes and references, so that even those who find his conclusions unpalatable will be forced to weigh them carefully.”

– John Everard, British Ambassador to North Korea from 2006-2008. Former Co-ordinator of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts

on sanctions on North Korea.

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