the norwegian experience with a tfc-like system (structural quota system) fish for the future...
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The Norwegian experience with a TFC-like system
(Structural Quota System)
Fish for the Future
Transferable fishing Concessions - the solution to overfishing or a
problem in itself?
Brussels, 6. December 2011
Per Sandberg
The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries
Subsidies to Norwegian Fisheries (1962-2010)
Source: Norwegian Seafood Export Council
Vessels scrapped during the period 1960 - 2002
1960-1968 1969-1978 1979-1988 1990-1993 1998-20020
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Coastal vesselOcean-going vessels
Norwegian catch, fishermen and their efficiency during the period 1945 - 2010
* Preliminary figures
Marine life– our common responsibility
Objectives and target fleets for TFC-like instruments
• Objectives
- A fleet size more in balance with sustainable yields from fish stocks- A diversified fleet, being able to harvest in various parts of the ocean- A fleet that provides activity along the various municipalities along the coast
• Target fleets
- Multiple fleets of ocean-going vessels holding a license to fish- Coastal vessels holding annual license to fish
• Non-target fleets
- Small-scale, coastal vessels
Instruments and safeguards
• Instruments
- Stability in quota allocation- Duration of TFC in adequate period
• Safeguards
1. Avoid concentration of quotas in geographical areas2. Avoid concentration of quotas on fleets3. Avoid concentration of quotas on individual owners
Current Instruments
* 1. December 2011
** Individual Vessel Quotas
***Structural Quota System
1231
963
259
Number of vessels*
(Finished)XXCoastal vessels; 0-11m
XXXCoastal vessels; 11-28m
XXXOcean-going vessels
SQS***(TFC-like system)
Buy-back programsIVQ**
Licences/Annual permits
Denomination
OutputInput
Management instruments to adjust harvest capacity
Management instruments to regulate the fisheries
Quota
+
100%
Structural Quota System – Offshore Fleet• Structural quota; 20 years duration• Only for vessels holding a valid license• One vessel must be scrapped
Have the TFC-like instruments had the desired effects with respect to:
• Profitability ?• Fleet capacity ?• To avoid concentration of fleet in geographical areas ?• To avoid concentration of fleet in specific segments ?
ProfitabilityAverage operating margin, vessels above 8 metres
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Average operating margin, 1980-2010
Operating margin Trend driftsmargin (lineær*)
Perc
ent
*Minste kvadraters metode
Fleet capacityStructural Quotas as share of total quota in various fleet segments (30. Dec. 2010)
Fleet Quota Species SQ as share of Total Quota
Ocean-going vessels
Purse seinersLong-line, netsCod trawlers
Coastal vesselsCoastal purse seinersCoastal vessels
MackerelCodCod
NSSH (Herring)Cod
18%57%58%
42%24%
Distribution of fishermen in various counties in 2000 and 2010
County (from North to South) 2000 2010
Finnmark 10% 9%
Troms 15% 13%
Nordland 24% 24%
Nord-Trøndelag 2% 2%
Sør-Trøndelag 3% 4%
Møre og Romsdal 24% 22%
Sogn og Fjordane 6% 6%
Hordaland 7% 9%
Rogaland 4% 4%
Others 5% 6%
Total 100% 100%
Value of Norwegian catch on various fleet segments (% of total)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
Above 28 metresBetween 11 and 28 metresBelow 11 metres
Value of catch, as registered on vessels from Northern and Southern Norway
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
Value of catch, as registrered on vessels from Northern and Southern Norway
Value of Catch-North NorwayValue of Catch-South Norway
The Norwegian capacity reduction programme: Some concluding remarks• Reduction in numbers of fishermen and vessels has been inevitable
• For TFC-like system in Norway to work;
- Stability in allocation of quota between fleet segments as well as between vessels in a fleet- Duration of programme for a certain number of years
• Safeguards
- Delimitation of markets with regard to fleet groups and geographical areas- Ceiling on licenses on individual vessels
• Consequences
- Increased profitability for remaining fleet- Still a diversified structure, both with regard to fleet and geographical areas- Increased barrier to enter fishery, increased investment costs
Thank you for your attention
Marine life – our common responsibility