The Non-Aligned Movement: A Struggle for Global Relevance

By Peter E. Davis

May 16, 2011

Professor Stephen D. Krasner, Advisor

Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies

Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)

Stanford University

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Abstract

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) forms a powerful bloc in the United Nations and associated technical agencies. The movement was created during the height of the Cold War in response to tension between the Eastern and Western blocs with the goal of buffering NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the end of the Cold War did not bring about the end of the NAM – indeed, by some measures, the movement is stronger now than it was during the Cold War. Few researchers have endeavored to explain why this is the case. This thesis examines the puzzling persistence of the NAM, first telling a narrative history of the movement from its inception to the present, then presenting data as evidentiary proof of the NAM’s maintenance of cohesion, and finally analyzing this data and this narrative using international relations theory to explain the maintenance of NAM power. This thesis argues that the Non-Aligned Movement has persisted due to a rise in counterhegemonic ideology among NAM states, combined with pressure from radical NAM hawks and increased institutionalization.

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Acknowledgements

I could not have completed this thesis without the constant guidance and support of a

number of people. First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Stephen Krasner for

his commitment to my thesis and his patience in guiding my writing and arguments in the right

direction. Second, I would like to thank the Center for International Security and Cooperation

(CISAC) and the professors and staff that continually pushed me to think critically about my

thesis and helped focus my thesis topic – including Professors Coit Blacker, Martha Crenshaw

and Lynn Eden, along with Teaching Assistant (though to honors students he has been far more

than a teaching assistant), Michael Sulmeyer. Third, my sincere thanks go out to my fellow

honors students for their friendship, encouragement, and advice. You are some of the most

intelligent and talented people I have ever met, and you continually impress me with your

commitment to and knowledge of international security.

Personally, I would like to thank the support of my girlfriend, Kate Barber, my family,

my roommate Nick Iafe, and my countless other friends for putting up with my feverish late

nights writing and researching and my moments of panic as I went through the wonderful and

stressful adventure of writing an honors thesis. Also, to Douce France for your wonderful

croissants and fast wireless internet, you are much appreciated.

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Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... vii

Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter II: The Story of the Non-Aligned .................................................................................... 19

Chapter III: Methodology and Data .............................................................................................. 45 Chapter IV: The Non-Aligned and International Relations Theory ............................................. 53

Chapter V: Conclusion and Policy Implications ........................................................................... 83 A Note on Sources ........................................................................................................................ 90

Appendix I: NAM Principles ........................................................................................................ 91 Appendix II: Data ......................................................................................................................... 92

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 123

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Chapter I: Introduction

Since 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has developed into an institution with

significant power in the United Nations and other international organizations. The brainchild of

the leaders of Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, the Non-Aligned Movement was conceived during

the height of the Cold War with the stated purpose of buffering the power of the United States

and its NATO alliance and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact.1 The question then arises:

what happened when the Cold War ended and the world was no longer forced to confront the

issues of U.S.-Soviet rivalry? One might reasonably expect that a movement founded on the

principles of non-alignment in a bipolar world would dissolve or lose relevance after the end of

this rivalry. However, this is not the case. The Non-Aligned Movement has continued to vote

based on consensus in most major international organizations, maintaining a puzzling amount of

cohesion in divisive votes across a wide spectrum of issues.2 This puzzle gives rise to several

fundamental questions this thesis aims to address. First, how have NAM voting patterns changed

over time? Second, what explains these voting patterns? And principally, why has the NAM

continued to exist after the fall of the Soviet Union? On this last question, I argue the NAM has

persisted due to a rise in counterhegemonic ideology that has united many third world countries

against the perceived hegemony of the United States.

The Non-Aligned Movement

In September 1961, 25 states met in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in the first Conference of Non-

Aligned states. Organized by Presidents Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, and Sukarno of

Indonesia along with Prime Minister Nehru of India, this conference discussed anti-colonialism

1 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance (London: Pinter, 1978) 1-5. 2 See data in Chapter III

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and self-determination, sovereignty and non-interference, an end to discrimination and apartheid,

general and complete disarmament, the importance of the United Nations, and the promotion of

economic development.3 The 1961 Belgrade Conference resulted out of six years of diplomacy

between the primary non-aligned founders – Tito and Nasser. Many theorists cite the Afro-

Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955, the first conference of Third World states, as the

precursor to the Belgrade Conference.4 However, the events that transpired between Bandung

and Belgrade played the most important role in forming the NAM – most notably, the Suez

Crisis and the Hungarian crisis and the increasing coordination among Nehru, Nasser and Tito

these crises produced.5 The Suez and Hungarian Crises also increased Third World solidarity,

helping unite states around the issues of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

The Non-Aligned Movement that resulted from this Belgrade Conference has grown and

spread in the 49 years since Belgrade, expanding to 118 members. The movement has also

adapted significantly since its creation, shifting its focus to economic issues throughout the

1970s and slowly moving its power base towards more left-leaning countries.6 During the

1970s, the NAM began to exercise its power and influence by negotiating consensus among

NAM states prior to votes in the United Nations, thus going against its original goal of avoiding

bloc politics.7 In the period following, the NAM adapted to stay relevant through its focus on the

New International Economic Order (NIEO) and through its influence at the United Nations.8

3 Proc. of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Yugoslavia, Belgrade. (Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1961) 16. 4 See Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Westport, CT: Hill U.a., 1986. Print. 5 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance, 1978. 2-5 6 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments, 1986. 305 7 Kochan, Ran. “Changing Emphasis in the Non-Aligned Movement.” The World Today. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Vol. 28, No. 11 (Nov., 1972), pp. 501-508 8 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance, 1978. 13-23.

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With the fall of the Soviet Union, the movement once again found itself searching for

relevance. The years following further demonstrated the impressive adaptability of the

movement and its priorities, as the NAM managed to maintain relevance in an age far different

from the one in which it was conceived. Several events such as the Uruguay Round of the World

Trade Organization and the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon),

along with the increasing perception of U.S. hegemony further united the movement in Third

World solidarity. Currently, the Non-Aligned maintains significant power in the United Nations,

running coordinating bureaus in each major U.N. city and meeting prior to most major

international conferences and votes.9

Explaining Consensus and Defection

The Non-Aligned Movement has maintained voting cohesion in the United Nations and

associated technical agencies following the end of the Cold War. The period following the end

of the Cold War sees a slight decline in voting cohesion due to the struggle for purpose within

the NAM, while the subsequent 10 years see an increase in voting cohesion.10

I hypothesize that the Non-Aligned shifted its ideology in response to changing

circumstances after the Cold War and increasing perception of American hegemony, becoming a

counterhegemonic bloc, working to buffer U.S. power in a now unipolar world.11 There are a

number of alternative hypotheses that will be discussed and analyzed as well. One such

alternative that could explain NAM cohesion relates to domestic politics and public opinion:

Non-aligned leaders may have maintained voting cohesion due to shifting levels of anti-

9 Strydom, Hennie. “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations.” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law. Volume 11, 2007. Koninklijke Brill N.V. Pgs. 1-3 10 See Chapter III 11 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 197-198 and Huntington, Samuel. “The Lonely Superpower.” Foreign Affairs 78.2 (1999) 45

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Americanism and anti-Western sentiment (given that after the end of the Cold War the NAM has

voted less often with the United States).12 A second alternative hypothesis deals with material

interests. This hypothesis would argue that though the Non-Aligned has remained cohesive,

those states that do defect from the NAM consensus do so due to either levels of U.S. aid or

levels of trade with the United States.13

Several other factors deserve consideration in explaining the maintenance of NAM

cohesion. These factors are not viable hypotheses that could individually explain the pattern of

persisting NAM defection nor are they requisites for the NAM’s maintenance of cohesion

(neither necessary nor sufficient). However, they play an important role in the story of the

NAM’s persistence. The first is the role of institutionalization and organizational maintenance.14

The second is the role of what will be termed the Non-Aligned Hawks and their increase in

power in the Modern NAM (Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Libya). These factors have

influenced the evolution of the NAM and the maintenance of NAM cohesion and will be

discussed extensively in Chapters II and IV, though they are not hypotheses.

Review of Academic Literature

The Non-Aligned Movement has been the subject of a number of articles, books and

manuscripts since its creation in 1961, though few works have touched on the NAM since the

end of the Cold War. Works have analyzed the NAM’s voting patterns, the concept of non-

alignment, and the role played by individual nations in the NAM; most of these works were

12 See data presented in Chapters III and IV 13 These hypotheses will be tested quantitatively (using regressions) and qualitatively in chapter IV. 14 North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 1-10 and Wilson, James Q. Political Organizations. Princeton UP: New Haven, 1973 and Iida, Keisuke. "Third World Solidarity: the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly." International Organization 42.02 (1988): 386-387

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written between 1975 and 1990. Few works have analyzed the NAM’s persistence after the Cold

War and into the 21st century and even fewer works posited hypotheses or explanations for this

persistence. The topic of UN voting blocs more broadly has been a popular one in political

science writing. Most of this work, though, has been descriptive rather than analytical,

pinpointing the existence of voting blocs over time rather than propounding theories specific to

their maintenance or formation. What follows is a chronological review first of the literature on

the NAM (of which there is little), second of the literature on UN voting blocs and the

methodology employed in analyzing them, and lastly a discussion of literature related to the

hypotheses posited at the start of this chapter.

Non-Aligned Literature

Peter Willetts’ book The Non-Aligned Movement (1978) served as the first major study

on the NAM. It remains the most cited and respected work on the NAM’s formation and

development from 1961 to 1978. Willetts reviews the history of the NAM, identifies its major

concerns and undertakes a quantitative analysis of NAM votes and cohesion in the United

Nations. Despite the exhaustiveness of Willetts’ account, his account is outdated and does not

analyze critically the formation, development or persistence of the NAM.15

In 1986, A.W. Singham and Shirley Hune followed Willetts’ study with an arguably

more exhaustive study of the origins of non-alignment, titled Non-Alignment in an Age of

Alignments. Singham and Hune present the NAM in a positive light, decrying the lack of focus

in academia on the NAM’s importance during the intense period of East-West conflict that

defined the Cold War. For Singham and Hune, the NAM fulfills the definition of a “social

movement” united by “common principles for changing the existing unjust and unequal world

15 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance, 1978.

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order.”16 Singham and Hune continue by explaining the NAM’s defining principles, the

structure and organization, the genesis of the movement, and 25 years of NAM history. Despite

the exhaustiveness of this study, it confronts the NAM from a left-leaning and positive outlook,

skewing its analysis toward the positive.

Academics, political scientists, and politicians of the Third World have authored another

branch of literature on the Non-Aligned. These works tend to portray the NAM favorably and

often include as their stated goals the advancement of NAM principles or the revitalization of the

NAM. Thus, these works deviate from the more objective analytical academic writing

characterizing the previous two books. Nevertheless, the studies provide another important

perspective both historical and future-oriented on the NAM.17

There have been several other articles written on the Non-Aligned Movement, though

few of these articles were published in major journals. In a 1972 article, Ran Kochan argued the

NAM has become more relevant due to its institutionalization while also arguing that the states

within the NAM all see its purposes differently. For example, Middle Eastern states see the

NAM as a way to help solve conflict in the Middle East while pushing Israel out of territories

they believe belong to Palestine; Latin American states like Cuba and Chile see belonging to the

NAM as an act of defiance against U.S. control in Latin America. His arguments have certain

saliency despite being written almost forty years prior, and play into the narrative in Chapter II.18

Former Russian foreign ministry official Alexander Orlov authored an article titled “The Non-

Aligned Movement: 40 Years After” in 2002 that provides some narrative history of the NAM

16 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments, 1986. 2-3 17 See Jaipal, Rikhi. Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. (New Delhi: Allied, 1983) and Mills, Greg. South Africa and the Future of the Non-aligned Movement (Braamfontein, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs – SAIIA, 1998) and Singh, Jai Nandan Prasad. Redefining Roles of Non-aligned Movement in Unipolar World. (Delhi: Academic Excellence, 2006) 18 Kochan, Ran. “Changing Emphasis in the Non-Aligned Movement.” The World Today. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Vol. 28, No. 11 (Nov., 1972), pp. 501-508

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from its creation to the present.19 Orlov specifically argues that, “A sign of the Non-Aligned

Movement’s viability and efficiency is the fact that its members, or more than half of the world

countries, manage to find mutually acceptable decisions and coordinate common positions on

most major international problems.”20 Orlov provides some insights on the movement, but does

not endeavor to explain the continued relevance and viability of the movement beyond the fall of

the Soviet Union.

In her article in 2004 in Global Governance, Sally Morphet discusses the NAM in the

context of the Global South, arguing that Western governments should take it seriously in

international organizations. Morphet also reviews the differences between the NAM and the G-

77, discusses the NAM’s positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and discusses the role of

China in Third World international relations. Most importantly, Morphet argues, like this thesis,

that the Non-Aligned Movement is a cohesive body that coordinates its actions to maximize its

effect in the United Nations. However, she does not endeavor to explain or elaborate on this

maintenance of cohesion.21

In 2007, Hennie Strydom from the University of Johannesberg authored a section of Max

Planck’s Yearbook of United Nations Law focusing on the Non-Aligned Movement. Strydom

argues that the movement has maintained relevance, reviewing some of its history and stances on

the issues of disarmament and United Nations reform, but eschewing critical or theoretical

analysis of the NAM.22

19 Orlov, Alexander. “The Non-Aligned Movement: 40 Years After.” International Affairs. 2002. 49-56. < http://www.janeliunas.lt/files/OrlovTheNonAlignedMovement40YearsAfter.pdf> 20 Ibid 54. 21 Morphet, Sally. “Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What is the Global South Doing and Where is it Going?” Global Governance. 10 (2004), 517-537 22 Strydom, Hennie. “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations.” 2007

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As one can observe based on the brevity of this section, there is a dearth of articles or

books written on the Non-Aligned Movement, especially the NAM after the end of the Cold

War. This thesis hopes to help fill this gap.

The Third World as a UN Voting Bloc

The literature on UN voting blocs is larger and more expansive than that on the NAM.

Much has been written in the previous half century and many analytical techniques have been

employed to analyze voting blocs in the United Nations (UN). This section focuses on what has

been written about the Third World and the NAM specifically as a voting bloc. Most commonly,

the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement have been mentioned as little more than

footnotes or afterthoughts in the discussion of voting blocs in the United Nations. During much

of the Cold War, academic literature focused on the East-West divide or the relationship between

foreign aid and UN votes. Afterward, much of the attention focused on regional voting blocs and

their rise to prominence after the fall of the Soviet Union.

However, some works do shine light on the Third World and their presence in the United

Nations. The works mentioned in the section prior, specifically those by Willetts and Singham

and Hune go into depth studying the NAM as a UN voting bloc. In addition, Keisuke Iida

examines solidarity in the Third World in a prescient article published in 1988 entitled “Third

World solidarity: the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).” Iida studies the G-77

and unity in the Third World, presenting hypotheses and explanations for Third World unity with

regard to economic matters. His hypotheses are well formed and researched and play a role in

influencing the hypotheses posited in this thesis. However, his article is out of date, limits its

focus to economic matters, and overlooks the importance of the non-aligned in Third World

solidarity. With regard to its economic focus, Iida states as almost an afterthought, “Indeed, on

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such political issues as security and human rights, they [the Third World] are miserably

divided.”23 However, as demonstrated in Chapter III, the Third World is not as divided with

regard to political issues as Iida claims.

In addition to Iida, Steven Holloway reviews the importance of the Third World in his

1990 study “Forty Years of General Assembly Voting,” pinpointing the rise of the Third World

as a voting bloc and the rise in cohesion of the NAM specifically through the late 1970s and

1980s.24 Holloway also co-authored an article with Rodney Tomlinson titled “The New World

Order and the General Assembly: Bloc Realignment at the UN in the Post-Cold War World,”

expanding on his earlier analysis, by examining UN General Assembly (UNGA) votes in 1985,

1990, 1991 and 1992 to look for changes in voting blocs after the Cold War. Holloway and

Tomlinson determined that the NAM bloc did not change significantly during the period during

the fall of the Soviet Union (1990-1992), maintaining markedly similar levels of cohesion during

this period. Their analysis though ends at 1992, failing to take into account the period following

the dissolution of the Soviet Union where levels of NAM cohesion seem likely to vary more. In

addition, Holloway and Tomlinson make no effort to explain changes in voting patterns of the

Third World over this period of time.25

Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett’s 1996 article “The new politics of voting alignments

in the United Nations General Assembly” recognizes the new prominence of the Third World as

a voting bloc in the United Nations. They argue, “The North-South split now characterizes

voting positions as much as the East-West split once did.”26 However, their analysis focuses on

23 Iida, Keisuke. "Third World Solidarity: the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly." International Organization 42.02 (1988): 383. 24 Holloway, Steven. "Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting." Canadian Journal of Political Science 23.2 (1990): 279-96. 25 Holloway, Steven, and Rodney Tomlinson. "The New World Order and the General Assembly: Bloc Realignment at the UN in the Post-Cold War World." Canadian Journal of Political Science 28.2 (1995): 227-54. 26 Kim, Soo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United

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the UNGA from 1991 to 1993 and does not endeavor to explain or elaborate on the rise in the

North-South divide or maintenance of NAM cohesion.

Miguel Marín-Bosch produced an important book in 1996 titled Votes in the UN General

Assembly that reviews in passing the Non-Aligned Movement in the United Nations. Bosch, like

Kim and Russett and Holloway, emphasizes the rise of the NAM during the late 1970s and 1980s

and its maintenance of cohesion during the early 1990s.27 However, Bosch also argues that some

of the NAM’s cohesion has decreased due to the loss of any need for non-alignment after the fall

of the Soviet Union and divergent interests on issues like human rights and disarmament. “It is

still too early to tell which way the [Non-Aligned] Movement will go,” Bosch states on page

159. Bosch’s review of the NAM is cursory at best and is outdated given his book’s publication

in 1996. Since 1996, NAM cohesion has risen, giving rise to a new set of questions on the

explanation for such a rise.

Erik Voeten’s 2000 article titled “Clashes in the Assembly” provides perhaps the most

recent and comprehensive analysis of UN General Assembly votes. Voeten compiles a set of

data from 1946 to 1996, analyzing voting blocs and patterns and running multivariate regressions

to test hypotheses for these patterns’ and blocs’ formation and development.28 Like Holloway,

Voeten argues that the data shows increasing NAM cohesion during the 1970s and 1980s,

maintaining some of this cohesion through 1991-1993 and losing some of this cohesion from

1994-1996.29 He disagrees with Russett’s and Kim’s assertion that the North-South divide after

the Cold War has superseded the East-West divide during the Cold War.30 Voeten also presents

Nations General Assembly." International Organization 50.04 (1996): 645-651

27 Marín, Bosch Miguel. Votes in the UN General Assembly. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) 152-155 28 This thesis uses Voeten’s dataset to conduct its analysis of NAM cohesion. Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 201-206. 29 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 201-206. 30 Ibid. 211

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several hypotheses that could explain the voting blocs he observes, though these hypotheses

ignore some of the factors unique to the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World. His data

also fails to take into account the most recent period of U.N. votes (1996-present).

Methodology in the Literature

This thesis endeavors to use both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques with

regard to the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite the difficulties associated with analyzing states’

votes quantitatively, the nature of the subject offers no alternative. One cannot demonstrate or

effectively analyze the changes in voting blocs without showing how these blocs developed or

changed over time through quantitative methods. In this case, the dependent variable that will be

measured and analyzed is cohesion (measured through defection rate), specifically cohesion of

the NAM as a voting bloc over time. This quantitative analysis will be buttressed with

qualitative narrative and theoretical explanations, especially with regard to explaining the data in

question.

Analyzing cohesion gives rise to a set of questions with regard to specific methodologies.

This thesis focuses its quantitative analysis on votes in the UN General Assembly, rather than

expanding this analysis to other agencies. The reasons for this are threefold. First, data on

UNGA roll-call votes is more broadly available than data from other organizations or agencies.

Second, though many votes in the UNGA are largely seen as symbolic, “It is the only forum in

which a large number of states meet and vote on a regular basis on issues concerning the

international community.”31 In addition, the symbolic nature of votes does not diminish how well

these votes represent states’ views in the international system. Third, there is little precedent for

including other agencies or organizations in quantitative studies of voting blocs, in turn

providing little indication how one might integrate other agencies’ votes in a quantitative 31 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 186

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analysis of voting blocs. However, the NAM and the Third World does exercise power in

organizations other then the UNGA, though the considerations above limit the ability of this

thesis to analyze quantitatively the NAM’s cohesion and influence in other organizations.

With regard to the dates to be analyzed, this thesis will analyze votes in 1965, 1970,

1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005; special emphasis will be placed on the period

from 1990-2005 however given the lack of completed analysis on this period in the literature and

the focus of this thesis on the period following the end of the Cold War. Iida analyzes UNGA

Second Committee resolutions from 1971 to 1985.32 Holloway first analyzes UNGA votes in

1946, 1955, 1965, 1975, and 1985.33 Then, working with Tomlinson, he analyzes UNGA votes

in 1985, 1990, 1991 and 1992 to examine changes after the Cold War.34 Kim and Russett

examine UNGA sessions from 1991 to 1993.35 Voeten examines data from 1946 to 1988 and

from 1991 to 1996, leaving out the period of transition as the Cold War ended.36 None of these

authors examines data during the expansive period of time undertaken in this analysis.

Academics have employed a variety of statistical methods and techniques to analyze

voting blocs and measure cohesion. Alker, Willetts, Russett and Kim and Bosch use factor

analysis, a method that aims to “uncover principal dimensions of conflict underlying [UNGA]

votes.”37 Voeten provides an excellent critique of factor analysis based on problems in coding

32 Iida, Keisuke. "Third World Solidarity: the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly." International Organization (1988): 377. 33 Holloway, Steven. "Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting." Canadian Journal of Political Science (1990): 284 34 Holloway, Steven, and Rodney Tomlinson. "The New World Order and the General Assembly: Bloc Realignment at the UN in the Post-Cold War World." Canadian Journal of Political Science (1995): 229. 35 Kim, Soo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly." International Organization (1996): 629 36 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 192 37 Alker, Hayward R. "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly." American Political Science Review (1964): 643-644

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for abstentions and absences and aberrantly high correlation coefficients.38 Some of these

theorists also use cluster analysis to display countries’ votes and the gaps between voting blocs

visually on a plane.39 Holloway uses a combination of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) and

Hierarchical Cluster analysis to achieve similar purposes.40 Erik Voeten uses a method called

NOMINATE, combining several of the previous techniques to analyze voting blocs. While these

analyses are valuable, they tend to provide information more useful in aiming to pinpoint voting

blocs, rather than aiming to analyze the development of one specific bloc.41 This thesis will

undertake an analysis of cohesion similar to that of Iida – based on defection rates of NAM

countries. The defection rate will be calculated using the following formula: DR = [Dx/c] * 100

with DR as the Defection rate on resolution x, Dx as the number of minority votes42 cast, and c

as the total number of votes cast.43 Iida’s defection rate provides a good measure of cohesion for

this analysis due to the importance of defection from NAM consensus or norm position. Next,

this thesis will undertake an analysis of these cohesion numbers over time, conducting

38 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 193 39 Kim, Soo Yeon, and Bruce Russett. "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly." International Organization (1996): 638-645 40 Holloway, Steven. "Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly Voting." Canadian Journal of Political Science (1990): 284-285. 41 Related to this, the broader question of how to measure cohesion and how to analyze role call votes is also essential to this discussion. Many theorists use factor analysis to analyze voting blocs, usually coding abstain as 0, yes as 1, and no as -1 (see Alker, Willetts, Russett and Kim, and Bosch). Voeten disagrees with coding for abstain as 0 and no as -1, stating “this procedure assumes that a state that abstains from voting is indifferent between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ alternatives.” Voeten instead codes for abstentions as a slightly lighter form of a no vote (Voeten 193). Iida measures cohesion using a “defection rate,” coding for abstain votes the same as no votes In this analysis, abstain votes will be coded as no votes using the defection rate Iida used, as discussed below (Iida 375-8). Iida’s defection rate is chosen due to this thesis’ goal in explaining why states might defect from NAM consensus with overall goal of determining why NAM states maintain such high levels of voting cohesion. Given the volatility of coding changes for abstain votes, this thesis takes into account quantitative approaches that place abstain votes on a sliding scale, as completed in the study by Hosli, et al (Hosli et al., “Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly). 42 The term minority votes refers to the vote choices of the minority of NAM countries. For example, if 65 NAM countries voted yes, 35 NAM countries voted no, and 18 abstained, the minority votes would be the number of no votes plus the number of abstain votes. 43 Iida, Keisuke. "Third World Solidarity: the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly." International Organization (1988): 376-378.

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regressions where necessary to test both the alternative hypotheses. Issues of methodology will

be discussed in depth in Chapter III.

Hypotheses in the Literature

Theorists have put forward a number of hypotheses explaining the formation of voting

blocs and general voting patterns of states in international organizations like the United Nations.

These include realist theories of structuralism, stability and counterhegemony, along with liberal

hypotheses of democracy and civilization, hypotheses related to organizational maintenance and

institutions, and social hypotheses related to constructivism. I hypothesize that a rise in

counterhegemonic ideology best explains the maintenance of NAM cohesion. Counterhegemonic

Theory argues that the Third World came together after the Cold War to buffer the power of the

new perceived global hegemon: the United States. Several alternative hypotheses also might

affect this lingering NAM cohesion. The first is a domestic politics or public opinion hypothesis.

Theories of domestic politics would argue that Non-Aligned leaders maintained voting cohesion

in the United Nations due to rising levels of anti-Americanism in the hopes of maintaining power

domestically.44 The second alternative is a material interests hypothesis.45 Material interests like

foreign aid or trade with the United States might explain the defection of states from the NAM

consensus.

The Counterhegemonic Model states that countries of the Third World will become more

cohesive as a voting bloc to counter the rise of a global hegemon – in this case, the United

States.46 The principal proponent for the possibility of the Counterhegemony Model is Samuel

44 Fearon, James D. “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, And Theories of International Relations.” American Review of Political Science. 1 (June 1998): 289-313 45 See Rai, Kul. “Foreign Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967-1976. Journal of Peace Research. 3.17 (1980): 269-277 and Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, The Foreign Policies of the Global South. Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2003 46 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 189

15

Huntington, who argued in 1999, “Over time the response to American hegemony may escalate

from resentment and dissent to opposition and collective counteraction.”47 An important aspect

of the Counterhegemony Model is the role of perceived hegemony (rather than perhaps

observable hegemonic economic dominance) in increasing solidarity of the Third World.48 In

testing this hypothesis, this thesis will focus on ideology, looking for a shift in NAM attitudes

from non-alignment during the Cold War to counterhegemonic and anti-U.S. after the Cold War

through examination of summit documents and NAM meeting records. In addition, this thesis

will look for NAM states to move closer towards the position of Russia and away from the

United States after the end of the Cold War in their voting patterns in the General Assembly.

Theories of domestic politics could also affect the persistence of the NAM and

maintenance of NAM voting cohesion. James Fearon explains theories of domestic politics well

in his 1998 article, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,”

contrasting such theories with structural or systemic realist theories. For Fearon, domestic

politics theories can be divided into two types: those that account for unit-level attributes of

states and those that do not. In both cases, states are depicted as non-unitary actors that base

their foreign policies in part on domestic political considerations, sometimes resulting in

suboptimal outcomes.49 States may have maintained voting cohesion in the NAM, despite

seemingly divergent interests on both political and economic issues, due to domestic political

considerations. These considerations seem likely to hinge on anti-U.S. and anti-hegemonic

47 Huntington, Samuel. “The Lonely Superpower.” Foreign Affairs 78.2 (1999) 45 48 Singham and Hune envision the NAM as a movement against hegemony prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. They picture the movement as social in its origins in trying to counter a world order stacked against the Third World. Their analysis, again, is skewed toward the positive and left-leaning and thus does not play prominently in the composition of this theory of counterhegemonic ideology, but should be noted nonetheless. Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments, 1986. 2-3 49 Fearon, James D. “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, And Theories of International Relations.” American Review of Political Science. 1 (June 1998): 289-313

16

sentiment that spread throughout the 1990s and increased further in the 2000s (as the NAM

increased its voting cohesion). This alternative hypothesis will be tested in Chapter IV using

Pew Global Attitudes Survey Data.

Theories of material interests could also work to explain defection from the consensus

position of the NAM. Herrmann and Shannon discuss such interests in theory and their role in

decision-making in international relations in their 2001 article, “Defending International Norms:

The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making.”50 The interests

analyzed in this thesis are trade with the United States and economic aid given by the United

States. Kegley and Hook analyzed U.S. foreign aid and votes in the United Nations in 1991 in

an article titled, “U.S. Foreign Aid and U.N. Voting.” They found no evidence of a linkage

between foreign aid and votes in the United Nations.51 In 1972, Kul Rai analyzed the relationship

between a number of indicators, aid and trade included, and U.N. votes in his article, “Foreign

Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly.” Rai found that U.S. economic aid and trade

had little correlation with votes in the United Nations.52

Utility of UN General Assembly Votes

Much of this thesis relies on the use of UN General Assembly votes between 1965 and

2005. Implicit in using such data is the assumption that such data provides an accurate and

useful picture of both bloc cohesion and bloc power. Some academics critique the reliance on

UNGA voting patterns and the attempt to apply theory and draw conclusions from these patterns.

50 Herrmann, Richard and Vaughn Shannon. “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making.” International Organization Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 621-654. The MIT Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078659> 51 Kegley, Charles and Steven Hook. “U.S. Foreign Aid and U.N. Votes: Did Reagan’s Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or Defiance?” International Studies Quarterly (1991) 35, 295-312. 52 Rai, Kul. “Foreign Policy and Voting in the UN General Assembly.” International Organization. University of Wisconsin Press. Vol 26, No. 3, Summer 1972. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706133?seq=5

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These are realistic concerns that should be addressed. This thesis relies on UNGA resolution

voting patterns first and foremost because the NAM exercises its power primarily through the

United Nations General Assembly. They explicitly attempt to control issues in the General

Assembly by negotiating resolutions prior to major meetings and coordinating voting positions.

As a bloc, they meet regularly to discuss important issues, but the primary venue in which they

exercise their power is the United Nations.53 Second, there is little alternative mechanism with

which to analyze empirically the Non-Aligned Movement and its cohesion. UNGA voting

patterns give the best picture of the Non-Aligned and its change and development. UNGA

Resolutions often remain the same between years and even decades as the assembly undertakes a

number of relatively symbolic votes on issues like the nuclear disarmament, Israel-Palestine

conflict, and others. Despite the symbolic nature of some of these votes, they still represent

nations’ views on these issues. The Third World takes the United Nations quite seriously as both

a vehicle for international social change and a vehicle to increase prestige. UNGA votes are a

good way of tracking country’s positions on issues and, by extension, the cohesion of a

movement like the NAM.54

Conclusion

The Non-Aligned Movement has maintained voting cohesion in a puzzling manner, given

the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West divide. This thesis endeavors to fill a

gap in the literature in explaining this cohesion and explaining the puzzling persistence of the

Non-Aligned Movement after the fall of the Soviet Union. It argues that the NAM maintained

cohesion due to a rise in counterhegemonic ideology, as the world appeared increasingly

53 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. London: Pinter u.a., 1978. Print. 3-7 and Hennie Strydom. “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations.” 2007 54 Voeten, Erik. "Clashes in the Assembly." International Organizations 54.2 (2000): 185-186

18

unipolar in the 1990s and 2000s. The second chapter will provide a narrative history of the Non-

Aligned Movement, a history essential to understanding how the movement has developed and

changed into its current form. The third chapter will examine the data with regard to cohesion

and defection of countries from the NAM consensus. The fourth chapter will review the

theoretical explanations for the NAM’s persistence, analyzing the NAM qualitatively and

conducting regressions and statistical analyses where necessary to test the hypotheses presented

in this chapter. The fifth chapter will review the policy implications of this thesis’ findings.

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Chapter II: The Story of the Non-Aligned

Understanding the story of the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is essential to

understanding the reasons for the NAM’s persistence into modern international politics. A

cursory glance at the literature on the NAM reveals few satisfactory historical accounts of the

movement.55 This chapter aims to fill this gap and answer three main questions, each with

implications for this thesis’ arguments and conclusions. First, why was the NAM started?

Second, what led to the NAM’s development into a UN voting bloc? And third, how did the

NAM stay relevant after the end of the Cold War? The picture that emerges shows a powerful

yet adaptable movement uniquely designed to draw on a variety of states’ interests and

ideologies – primarily ideologies. At times, anti-colonialist sentiment rose above all other

concerns to dominate the NAM’s work. Later, concerns regarding economic development were

prioritized. A Non-Aligned Movement was far from a certainty in the late 1950s. Most future

non-aligned states had little conception of what it might mean to be non-aligned. What follows

is the story of how these states came together to form this lasting movement, and what became of

this movement in the decades following.

The Origins of the Non-Aligned Movement

On Halloween in 1956, British and French troops invaded Egypt, beginning the five

months long Suez Crisis. Egypt’s President Gamal Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal

several months earlier in response to perceived Western aggression. The unfolding events would

play a vital role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Facing perhaps one of

55 Willetts gives us some account of the NAM’s founding, but does not extend this NAM history beyond 1970. Singham and Hune give an account of the first seven NAM summits, but from a biased pro-Third World perspective. Jaipal also gives an account of the first several summits, but acknowledges his work as that of a NAM insider. Few works look at the NAM post-1990.

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Egypt’s gravest threats in decades, President Nasser reacted tellingly to the existential crisis – he

called two leaders he had recently met: President Josip Tito and Prime Minister Jawaharlal

Nehru, the leaders of Yugoslavia and India. Tito and Nehru then went to the United Nations.

Using his role as a member of the Security Council, Tito proposed a “Uniting for Peace”

resolution taking the issue of Suez directly to the United Nations General Assembly.56 Yugoslav

and Indian pressure in the United Nations demonstrated to Nasser the commitment of his Third

World allies, helping forge a lasting bond between the three leaders. Prime Minister Nehru

further put pressure on Great Britain and France to pull out of the Suez.57 Despite this pressure

in the United Nations, Eisenhower’s decision not to back his French, British and Israeli allies

was most critical in forcing Britain and France to pull out of the Suez – but this decision was in

part based on pressure from Third World leaders.58 The resolution of the Suez Crisis gave Egypt

a major victory for the Third World and made Nasser a hero of the South.

During the same period, Yugoslavia under Tito faced a perceived threat from the Soviet

invasion of Hungary. Nasser and Nehru responded by strongly supporting Tito and Yugoslavia’s

independence and freedom from Soviet influence. These events, regardless of their power as

lightning rods for anti-colonialist movements, created a lasting bond between Tito, Nasser and

Nehru, a bond that was crucial to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement.59

Many academics and theorists trace the NAM’s origins back to the Bandung Conference,

also known as the Afro-Asian Conference, of 1955.60 Bandung’s role has in many ways been

overemphasized. While significant in marking the first meeting of mostly Third World nations,

56 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. London: Pinter u.a., 1978. Print. 3-4 57 Ibid. 3-4 58 “Suez Crisis/Sinai War/Tripartite Invasion/1956 War.” GlobalSecurity.org. Last modified February 22, 2011. 59 Ibid. 4-5 60 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Westport, CT: Hill U.a., 1986. Print. 65-66

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Bandung was not the precursor of the Non-Aligned Movement. The attendees included

communist nations like China and North Vietnam along with Western-backed nations like the

Philippines and South Vietnam. The Conference did address some of the issues central to the

NAM like colonialism and self-determination, but non-alignment was never brought up as an

issue. In addition, the conference elevated Indonesian President Sukarno’s prestige in hosting

such a meeting while giving African and Asian leaders a chance to meet and discuss issues of

importance to the South. But it did not foretell the creation of a Non-Aligned Movement.61

Considerable scholarship has been undertaken on the subject of why the Non-Aligned

Movement was created. While answering this question is not a goal of this thesis, some

discussion of NAM origins is necessary to gain an understanding of how the NAM has changed

and adapted to maintain relevance in 21st century. This thesis presents seven major factors and

issues playing into the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Principally, I argue, the non-

aligned came together due to a shared solidarity of ideology united against colonialism and

imperialism. However, personal leadership and economic cooperation factors also played into

the genesis of the movement.

First, Nasser, Nehru and Tito’s relationship was quite important. The three leaders met

and talked constantly from the Suez Crisis until the 1961 Belgrade Conference creating the

NAM. Their coordination administratively and ideologically provided the basis for the first

conferences and the creation of the movement.62

Second, fierce nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiment was crucial to the NAM’s

founding. Nationalist independence movements dominated the period from 1955 to 1961, as

many African countries gained independence from European powers. Intense anti-colonialist

61 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. London: Pinter u.a., 1978. Print. 3-4 62 Ibid. 10-11

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sentiment accompanied these strong nationalist movements. Together, these ideologies united

much of the Third World in solidarity against the great powers. This thesis argues these factors

were most essential in creating the Non-Aligned Movement. While states did have other

interests in uniting as a bloc, the shared bond of nationalism and anti-colonialism from the recent

independence movements of most NAM states was the primary impetus for the creation of the

movement.63

Third, prestige played an important role to the NAM’s founding. Leaders like Sukarno

and Nehru saw the NAM as a platform by which they could further their own prestige both

domestically and internationally. Sukarno fought the push for a Belgrade Conference in 1961 in

favor of a second Afro-Asian conference, hoping to further expand his reach and name. Nehru

as well used the NAM to define India’s foreign policy and his status as a world leader. Simply

belonging to an organization such as the NAM would bring prestige both domestically and

internationally for many leaders of newly independent states as well.64

Fourth, basic international security concerns, both psychological and real, played a role in

bringing the non-aligned together. The lessons from Suez and Hungary led many states to

conclude they had not fully escaped the yoke of imperialism from Europe and the great powers.

Former non-aligned diplomat Rikhi Jaipal writes, “The psychological security ensuing from

belonging to a larger entity commended the idea of a non-aligned movement to most countries

…” Joining the Non-Aligned gave those not under Soviet or Western influence a sense of

security from colonialist power grabs.65

63 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. Pgs. 17-19 and Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 63-66 64 Ibid. Pgs. 14-15 65 Jaipal, Rikhi. Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. New Delhi: Allied, 1983. Print. Pgs. 36-37

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Fifth, internal security concerns caused some leaders to attempt to consolidate their

power through joining the NAM, thus blaming domestic issues on the Soviet Union or the United

States. Newly installed revolutionary dictators ruled many of the newly non-aligned states, often

ruling over diverse countries with numerous ethnic groups. These states used the NAM to unite

both their own country and gather international support for arguments against colonialist

influences. Yugoslavia’s Tito had to deal with conflicts between the Serbs and Croats. Sukarno

had to deal with countless ethnic identities while trying to maintain his power. Non-Aligned

prestige helped deflect these internal concerns, at least temporarily.66

Sixth, plans for economic cooperation among the South helped define early plans for the

NAM. While the need for extensive Third World economic cooperation would not become

apparent to the NAM until the 1970s, some conception on the need for South-South economic

cooperation against the West and the Soviet Union played a role in forming the NAM.67

Seventh, Third World ideology based on non-alignment played a role in creating the

NAM. Many states in the Third World, most importantly India and Yugoslavia, truly believed in

the concept of non-alignment. Their efforts prior to the Belgrade Conference helped spread the

ideology of non-alignment, using newfound Third World solidarity due to independence

movements to spread this non-alignment throughout the world. These efforts had a lasting effect

on countries of the Third World, causing many to permanently affiliate their foreign policy with

the conception of non-alignment, thus playing an important role in creating and sustaining the

NAM.68

66 Jaipal, Rikhi. Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. New Delhi: Allied, 1983. Print. Pgs. 38, 42, 47, 67 Willets, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. Pgs. 27-28 68 Ibid. Pgs. 14-15

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These factors and issues do not make a complete list of the reasons for the NAM’s

formation. Indeed, one could easily devote a whole thesis to this subject. However, each of

these issues played a role, however small, in the formation of the NAM. Fundamentally, the

NAM could not have been created without the widespread nationalist anti-colonialist sentiment

in much of the Third World during this period. This sentiment more than anything else played

an essential role in the NAM’s founding. As will be discussed later, the NAM would soon find

itself searching for a new uniting ideology once colonialism no longer posed a threat and once

other factors related to internal security, external security and economic cooperation failed to

unite the movement.

The Road to Belgrade

Six years after Bandung and five years after the Suez Crisis, Yugoslavia hosted the first

conference of the non-aligned in Belgrade. Known afterwards as the Belgrade Conference of

1961, this conference saw the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The years

following the Suez Crisis saw significant maneuvering on the parts of Tito, Nehru and Nasser to

hold this conference. A movement or even conference of non-aligned nations was far from a

certainty. Non-alignment as an ideology was relatively new and yet to be embraced by the Third

World.69 Only because of the hard work of the three main founders could this conference even

occur.

In September of 1960, Tito called what has been termed the first meeting of the non-

aligned. After an angry speech from Krushchev at the United Nations General Assembly’s 15th

Session and heightened Cold War tensions generally, the Yugoslav Mission to the United

69 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. London: Pinter u.a., 1978. Print. 3, 28-31

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Nations in New York called a meeting of Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah (of Ghana), Nehru and

Soekarno. These five have often been termed the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement – in

reality Tito, Nasser and Nehru played the central role. Divisions among the group rose

immediately. Nkrumah cared mostly for Pan-African politics while Soekarno wanted the

prestige associated with a second Bandung. Yugoslavia was of course opposed to being cut out

of an Afro-Asian Conference. Despite these disagreements, these leaders discussed a Summit of

Third World leaders. In April, Nasser and Tito invited some 17 states to what would be a

preparatory conference in Cairo in June 1961. Cairo also saw serious divisions, both over the

exclusiveness of their new group and over the role anti-colonialism should play in any non-

aligned conference – Nehru opposed elevating anti-colonialism, stating “the era of classic

colonialism is gone and dead.”70 However, Cairo attendees, according to the Official

Communiqué on Preparations for the Belgrade Conference had, “unanimous agreement … on the

necessity of holding such a [Non-Aligned] conference.”71 The proposed agenda included self-

determination/anti-colonialism, territorial sovereignty, racial discrimination and apartheid,

nuclear disarmament and foreign bases, peaceful co-existence, and the United Nations.72

Belgrade: The First Conference of the Non-Aligned

In September 1961, 25 states from 4 continents gathered in Belgrade in the first

conference of non-aligned states. The conference began tellingly with President Tito calling for

a, “minute of silence in tribute to all those who gave their lives so that people might be free and

70 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. Pg. 13 71 Proc. of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Yugoslavia, Belgrade. Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1961. Print. Pg. 15 72 Ibid. Pg. 16

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independent.”73 This minute of silence set the stage for a weeklong conference focused on

radical nationalist movements and fierce anti-colonialist sentiment. Over the course of the

conference, the leaders of each of the 25 attending nations spoke, covering topics from nuclear

holocaust to self-determination to the East-West split.74 A predictable split emerged among

conference attendees. Tito and Nehru eschewed anti-colonialism as the NAM’s main priority,

instead focusing on positive goals like promoting international peace, furthering nuclear

disarmament and lessening East-West tensions. Other leaders like Nasser, Soekarno and other

African and Middle Eastern leaders focused their statements almost entirely on colonialism and

imperialism, seeing the NAM as a vehicle for similarly mistreated states to criticize the major

powers’ past colonialist actions.75

The resulting conference document incorporated all of these ideas in a hodgepodge

manner, throwing in disarmament, ending racism, self-determination, anti-colonialism, and peace

under the umbrella of non-alignment. In essence, this was the NAM’s first step toward creating

an organization that could cater to individual states’ concerns. Attendees saw the conference in

the ways they wanted to see it. Some saw it as fundamentally anti-colonialist, others promoting

peace and democracy, others opposing nuclear weapons. This adaptability would later play a

major role in sustaining the NAM through periods of tension in the Third World and even

through the 1990s. One issue of import, the conference of non-aligned states actively disavowed

the notion that they were forming a new bloc, stating in their final declaration, “The non-aligned

countries represented at this Conference do not wish to from [sic] a new bloc and cannot be a

73 Proc. of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Yugoslavia, Belgrade. Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1961. Pg. 13 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid.

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bloc.”76 This aversion to forming a bloc, stemming from Third World distaste for the East-West

blocs, would slowly diminish as the NAM began to realize the power it could exercise as a

voting bloc in the United Nations.

The Belgrade Conference played a clearly important role as the first non-aligned

conference, but it did not on its own solidify the creation of a lasting non-aligned movement.

The work undertaken between Belgrade in 1961 and Cairo in 1964 would be essential in making

permanent the movement that would become the NAM.

From Belgrade to Lusaka: The Formative Years

The second non-aligned conference in Cairo in 1964 saw the expansion of the NAM from

25 to 47 countries and confirmed the principles enshrined in the Belgrade Summit declaration

three years prior. The Cairo Conference also saw a shift away from rhetoric relating to the East-

West divide due to the recent thaw in U.S.-Soviet tensions.77 Instead, conference attendees

focused on ending racism and discrimination and anti-imperialism. Attendees also began to

focus on issues related to economic development, a rising concern among many Third World

states. Also of significance, the Cairo Conference saw one of the first proposals to set up zones

free of nuclear weapons (later referred to as Nuclear Weapons Free Zones – NWFZs), a concept

that would later be implemented in much of the Third World.78

The five years following the 1964 Cairo Conference saw little activity from the non-

aligned states. A number of international factors caused this five-year hiatus in NAM activity.

First, the elder generation of NAM statesmen was slowly being replaced by a new generation of

76 Proc. of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Yugoslavia, Belgrade. Belgrade: Jugoslavia, 1961. Pg. 256 (Manuscript originally had “from a new bloc” – presumably the authors meant “form a new bloc” 77 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pg. 89. 78 Jaipal, Rikhi. Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. Pgs. 85-86

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leaders. Prime Minister Nehru had died on the eve of the Cairo Conference while Nkrumah and

Soekarno were ejected in coups that propped up more Western-leaning leaders.79 Also during

this period, Egypt suffered an embarrassing defeat to Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967, China

tested a nuclear weapon, and the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. These events resulted in

several years with little focus on the movement created in Belgrade and Cairo in 1961 and 1964.

Non-aligned concerns in the late 1960s remained focused on anti-colonialism, but also

turned further to the issue of economic development. The so-called Group of 77 held their first

major meeting in Algiers in 1967, hoping to influence international economic issues through

their involvement at the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and later the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and even the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

The Algiers Meeting of the G-77 brought about increased Third World solidarity, but produced

few noticeable gains at the UNCTAD meeting that year. Singham and Hune argue that this

turned many Third World states back toward the NAM and away from the G-77.80

President Tito turned attention back to the NAM in calling one of its most formative

meetings in July 1969. Often overlooked by scholars of the NAM, this meeting played an

essential role in sustaining the NAM and adapting it into its modern form. Tito was concerned

about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and he wanted to reaffirm the support of Third

World countries for non-alignment.81 In this meeting, these states confirmed non-aligned

opposition to all forms of imperialism, sending a message not only to Western powers but to the

Soviet Union as well that imperialist ventures against non-aligned states would not be accepted.

This meeting also saw significant agreement on increasing the NAM’s role at the United Nations

in New York, including agreement on holding a ministerial meeting in September to discuss the

79 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 95-96 80 Ibid. Pg. 97 81 Jaipal, Rikhi. Non-Alignment: Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. Pgs. 90

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possibility of a third non-aligned conference; these ministerial meetings prior to UNGA meetings

would soon become a permanent aspect of non-aligned membership.82 The importance of the

1969 Belgrade meeting cannot be overstated. Many thought non-alignment had died in the

period between 1964 and 1969. In this meeting, non-alignment was reaffirmed (and legitimized

due to proximity of the meeting to Soviet invasion) and the NAM role at the United Nations was

expanded, one of the first steps towards the coalescence of the modern Non-Aligned

Movement.83

Lusaka and Beyond: Institutionalization and the New International Economic Order

The Lusaka Conference in 1970 and the Dar-Es-Salaam Preparatory Conference that

preceded it saw increased emphasis on economic issues and increased institutionalization of the

NAM. In Lusaka, non-aligned states agreed that heads of state summits would be held every

three years and that the country that hosted the summit would act as the Chairman of the NAM

until the next summit three years later. In 1970, non-aligned states also appointed an official

spokesman and created a permanent executive committee known as the Coordinating Bureau that

would be tasked with preparing for the next summit. As Willetts puts it, “The existence of the

Bureau has made it possible for routine collaboration to take place among the Non-Aligned.”84

Over the course of the 1970s, the NAM became a United Nations caucus group, releasing

joint statements and meeting prior to votes at the United Nations General Assembly. The

Colombo Summit in 1976 decided that a Ministerial Coordinating Bureau (of 25 states) should

meet once a year while the United Nations Coordinating Bureau (same 25 states, presumably at

Ambassadorial level) should meet at least once a month in New York to discuss negotiating

82 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 98 83 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. Pgs. 31-33 84 Ibid. Pg. 38

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tactics and strategies and coordinate voting positions.85 To some extent these meetings were

already occurring, but the summit formally institutionalized them, solidifying the grouping of

non-aligned states as the Non-Aligned Movement. Up until this point, many non-aligned states

rejected labels of being a movement or a bloc. These institutional measures created the modern

NAM, helping them better coordinate votes and policies in the United Nations General

Assembly, the main forum by which they would express their influence and power. Such

institutional increases had a measurable effect on the cohesion of the movement, as can be seen

in the data presented in Chapter III. This period saw in many ways the height of NAM cohesion.

At the same time that the NAM was institutionalizing, it also began to turn its focus

further toward economic issues. Economic issues had slowly taken over from anti-colonialism

as the major concern for NAM countries during the 1970s. As the Vietnam War drew to a close

and Europe had almost fully extricated itself from African and Asian affairs, the NAM found

itself no longer able to legitimately decry colonialist influences. At the Algiers Summit in 1973,

Non-Aligned states famously called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in its

Economic Declaration.86 At the same time, they expanded their membership to include

developing countries in Latin America, making their membership closer to that of the G-77

(though still not allowing a number of aligned Asian and European powers to join). The New

International Economic Order was effectively a coordinated strategy to “restructure market-

oriented international regimes … to limit the market power of the North by enhancing the

sovereign prerogatives of the South.”87 The Non-Aligned, along with the G-77, played a central

85 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. Pgs. 39-40 86 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 158-160 87 Krasner, Stephen D. Structural Conflict: the Third World against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California, 1985. Print. Pg. 7

31

role in promoting the NIEO, passing, with the help of the Coordinating Bureau, a Declaration on

the Establishment of the NIEO at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly.88

While efforts to actually establish a NIEO would fail due to clear opposition from

capitalist states in the West, the NIEO functioned as the new lightning rod bringing the NAM

together, providing them purpose in a transition period for global political and economic

relations. Their ability to use the Coordinating Bureau to harness Third World support for the

NIEO demonstrates well the NAM’s adaptability over time; it made clear that the Third World’s

anti-colonialist movement could just as easily be the Third World’s movement for economic

justice.89 This NAM would further demonstrate this adaptability in the decades that followed.

Some might argue this adaptability and lack of consistent core principles would hurt the long-

term viability of a movement like the NAM. But indeed, in a world of shifting national and

domestic priorities and varied interests and ideologies, the NAM could only stay relevant by

adapting and shifting its message and goals for the time and for the state.

Membership Issues and the NAM vs. the G-77

The ten years following the first Summit of non-aligned countries saw significant

expansion in membership. The process for becoming a member of the NAM was loose during

the first years of the NAM’s existence. One must first note that NAM decisions were undertaken

using consensus. Consensus means that every state must agree to any decision, though states can

list reservations to such decisions. The NAM dealt with membership issues the same way, via

consensus. Thus, issues regarding membership became some of the most divisive in the early

years of the NAM, especially with regard to regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam and because of

88 Krasner, Stephen D. Structural Conflict: the Third World against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California, 1985. Print. 86-87 89 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 131-132

32

India’s opposition to Pakistani entrance into the NAM.90 The process for entrance into the NAM

first required states to apply for membership, loosely agreeing to support the principles set forth

in the Belgrade Conference in 1961: 1) Independent policy based on non-alignment; 2) Support

for movements of national independence; 3) non-membership in military alliance with a Great

Power; 4) In case of bilateral military agreement with Great Power, the agreement should not be

concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; 5) Military bases should not be leased in

context of Great Power conflict.91 Next, non-aligned foreign ministers would discuss those

countries that applied in the annual NAM ministerial meeting, recommending for membership

those that gathered consensus support and writing detailed reports on those that did not. This

ministerial meeting also might decide to allow states’ attendance regardless of whether the

Summit had approved them yet, though still subject to consensus of the foreign ministers. Then,

a state would become a member of the NAM if they gathered consensus support at a NAM

summit. The 1969 Belgrade Consultative Meeting produced a vague formula, which suggested

“… that those interested countries that proclaim their adherence to the policy of non-alignment

and particularly those who had won heir independence after the Cairo Conference and all

members of the OAU” should attend NAM conferences.92

A basic question arises from these criteria: how could countries like Cuba and Vietnam

become members of the NAM given their military and economic ties to the Soviet Union? The

NAM summits and ministerial meetings had significant latitude in allowing states to join the

movement. Often, NAM conferences would overlook some states’ ties to the Soviet Union or

90 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. 102-103, 112-115 91 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. Pgs. 18-19. The full text of this is included in the appendix. A number of states did allow military bases on their soil, regardless of the nature of these bases relative to great power conflicts. Examples include Panama, the Philippines, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Turkey. 92 Ibid. Pg. 17

33

the United States, stating that this state could not avoid these ties or connections given their

security environment. The general feeling among many NAM states was that the movement

should be as large and expansive as possible, thus the rapid growth of the movement and the

overlooking of many of these original requirements. These membership issues explain to some

extent why a number of non-aligned countries actually were aligned.93

The NAM membership, despite these relatively lax membership requirements, differs

significantly from the membership of the G-77. Though the NAM and G-77 share the vast

majority of member states (every NAM state is in the G-77 and the G-77 has 13 members not in

the NAM). However, these 13 countries are quite significant, especially in terms of modern

economic output. Today, they include: China, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and several

smaller countries. Also, countries like Mexico, South Korea and Romania used to be a part of

the G-77 before leaving the group and Pakistan used to only belong to the G-77 before

eventually joining the NAM.94 This list demonstrates that these countries were not united by the

same radical nationalism and anti-colonialism that united many of the NAM countries, and some

of them were aligned with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Data analysis of

cohesion of the G-77 and cohesion of the NAM indicates that the NAM has remained much more

cohesive following the end of the Cold War than the NAM. This stems from both reasons of

membership and several other reasons cited below.95

Developing states first created the G-77 to negotiate Third World positions at the United

Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Under the leadership of the NAM,

the G-77 and the Third World united around the issue of the New International Economic Order

93 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 100-115. 94 Websites of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77: http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html and http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm 95 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. 97, 110-11, 168

34

(NIEO), which were discussed prior. The G-77 lacked the institutional frameworks the NAM

had in place at the UNGA during this period, thus the NAM became the dominant force in

coordinating policy on these issues during the 1970s. However, the G-77 soon worked to

institutionalize at the UNCTAD, IMF and at the United Nations. However, these institutional

measures would generally trail those already implemented by the NAM. The fundamental

difference between the NAM and the G-77 is that the NAM deals with both political and

economic issues while the G-77 deals solely with economic issues. While the NAM did focus its

agenda on economics during the 1970s and 1980s, it also united its membership around the

important political issues of anti-colonialism, nuclear nonproliferation and more radical

ideology. For these reasons, the NAM has been the primary vehicle for the South to express its

opinions in the United Nations with regard to political and economic issues.96

Dissension Within the Ranks: Splits in the NAM

At the same time that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was expanding its membership

by capitalizing on economic issues, it also began to fracture along regional and ideological lines.

Indeed, the period from Colombo in 1976 through the 1979 Havana Conference and into the

1980s saw the serious possibility of a split within the NAM. This split followed predictable

lines, generally pitting those under Soviet influence against those closer to the United States.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan exacerbated this split, pitting socialist nations supported by

the Soviet Union like Cuba and newly joined Vietnam against Middle Eastern states that played

a prominent role in the movement.97 The invasion of Afghanistan also meant that the 1979

NAM Summit could not be held in Kabul as planned. Cuba immediately volunteered to host in

96 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 168-170 97 Ibid. Pgs. 163-165

35

Havana, but this drew concerns from true non-aligned states about Cuba’s growing influence in

the movement. In addition to this, U.S.-backed states like Singapore and Malaysia dissented on

many of the economic issues presented in the NIEO. Anti-Western sentiment among non-

aligned countries also appeared to be on the rise given the entrance of Iran and Nicaragua and the

radicalization of a number of other NAM regimes; this radicalization and increase in anti-

Americanism was quite apparent at the Havana Conference in 1979. 98 This further split some of

the NAM membership, especially isolating Yugoslavia. These splits threatened to consume the

movement throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

NAM Political Issues in the 1970s and 1980s

Given these potential splits, the movement began searching for issues with which to

reunite the somewhat fractured membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. The two political

issues that dominated the NAM’s time and work and helped reunited the movement through the

1970s and 1980s were apartheid in South Africa and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Economic

issues and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) maintained their prominence through

much of this period, but political issues surrounding apartheid and anti-Zionism also remained

essential. Apartheid rule in South Africa and Namibia, along with persisting Portuguese

colonialism, remained one of the only salient reminders of Western colonialism. Elevating the

importance of these events strategically made sense for NAM countries, as it recalled early

uniting conceptions of anti-colonialism. In addition, non-aligned countries ideologically

opposed racism and discrimination, as stated in their original Conference documents.99 The

98 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pg. 190, 214-215 99 Ibid. Pgs. 156-157, 171

36

issue of apartheid in South Africa would remain a lightning rod for the NAM, bringing together

the movement in a time when parts of the movement began to splinter.

Anti-Zionism played a similar role in uniting the NAM during this period.100 While the

NAM had always been explicitly anti-Zionist, stating in its Declaration in Belgrade, “the

Conference condemn[s] the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their

support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine,”101 the movement

had deprioritized anti-Zionism in an effort to attract broader membership. After the wars of 1967

and 1973, anti-Zionism became a uniting issue for the NAM. In the Colombo Conference in

1976 specifically, non-aligned states used harsh language in criticizing Israel, even opening up

the possibility of “depriving it [Israel] of membership of these institutions [United Nations].”102

The strong anti-Zionist movement within the NAM was only slightly threatened by the Camp

David talks at which Egypt participated. The issue of anti-Zionism still retained resonance

among non-aligned states. These political issues, along with the major economic issues

mentioned prior, sustained the NAM as a voting bloc and as a movement through a period in

which it might have split irreparably.

A New Non-Aligned Movement

By 1982, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had grown to 101 members, up from 25

members 21 years prior. Since that point, the movement had undergone remarkable change.

First a vehicle for opposing colonialism and easing East-West tensions, the NAM expanded into

economic issues and ventured into controversial issues like the Israel-Palestine conflict. None of

100 Today, anti-Zionism divides the NAM more than almost any other issue. U.S. pressure on NAM countries has splintered consensus on issues relating to Israel-Palestine in recent years. 101 Proc. of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 1961. Pg. 259 102 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. Pgs. 156

37

the original non-aligned leaders were still in power, and consequently, internal workings of the

movement had markedly changed. As Singham and Hune put it well, “A new generation of

leaders and countries had emerged and established themselves [in the NAM]. Indira Gandhi,

Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe, Maurice Bishop, Daniel Ortega, and a host of other leaders …”103

Despite the liberal ideology of Singham and Hune’s NAM study, their study pinpoints exactly

the leadership and membership changes that influenced NAM development during this period.

As a quick glance at this list of leaders demonstrates, the Non-Aligned Movement of Tito died

with Tito. The new generation of NAM leaders eschewed entirely Tito’s conception of

equidistance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, many embracing socialism and anti-

Americanism. More radical states won over in the NAM in the next three years, choosing

Zimbabwe strongman Robert Mugabe as the next chairman and host in 1986. While still

emphasizing apartheid in South African and in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the NAM also began

to focus on the dual issues of development and disarmament, uniting NAM states behind Third

World economic development and the lingering hope of a NIEO and the hope for nuclear

disarmament.104

The Fall of the Soviet Union

On December 26, 1991, the Soviet Union officially dissolved. Its dissolution set off a

period of struggle and conflict within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The 1989 Belgrade

Summit prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union highlighted the opportunities détente presented

to the international community – namely, the chance of increased focus on helping Third World

nations climb out of global poverty and the possibility that the United States and the Soviet

103 Singham, Arch W., and Shirley Hune. Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments. 305 104 Ibid. 305-315

38

Union would completely disarm their nuclear capabilities. The Belgrade Declaration was

moderate, reflecting Yugoslavia’s persisting influence in the NAM, and dealt as much with the

United States as with the Soviet Union.105 The 1992 Jakarta Summit saw non-aligned states

struggling to justify the continuing existence of the NAM after the Soviet Union’s fall, arguing

for the continuing relevance of a movement born in a bipolar age.106 Non-aligned states at

Jakarta continued emphasizing issues of economic development and nuclear disarmament. Their

statements in many ways reflect what appears to be hope that the Soviet Union’s collapse will

lead to more equitable distributions of wealth in the Third World and complete nuclear

disarmament. The Jakarta Declaration states, “The collapse of the bipolar structure of the world

presents unprecedented possibilities as well as challenges for cooperation among nations.”107

The final Jakarta declaration also called for the strengthening of coordination among non-aligned

states at the United Nations in New York through the NAM Coordinating Bureau. The NAM

struggled to find its vision after the fall of the Soviet Union. It responded by focusing on the

issues it had focused on prior: disarmament and development. These two issues would become

the staples of non-aligned politics through the next decade.

Expectations Shattered

Two events in the mid-1990s worked to shatter the expectations of the non-aligned

following the end of the Cold War with regard to these two major issues (development and

disarmament) and helped changed the NAM permanently. The effects of the Uruguay Round

105 Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Belgrade, 1989. Online: http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx 106 “Non-Aligned and Nowhere to Go?” BBC News. 27, December 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/574242.stm 107 Proceedings of the Tenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Jakarta. 1992 Online: http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx Pg. 10

39

shattered hope for North-South economic cooperation for development, and the 1995 NPT

Review Conference shattered the Non-Aligned hope for movement toward nuclear disarmament.

In the midst of the tumult within the NAM at the collapse of the Soviet Union, nations

were negotiating the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).

Agreed by most scholars and practitioners of international trade to be the most important trade

agreement since the signing of the GATT, the Uruguay Round would have profound implications

for the structure and rules defining international trade. While developing nations to some extent

acted in concert through the NAM and G-77, they were forced to accept numerous concessions

from the Western powers that dominated the GATT (and now WTO) negotiations. According to

economist Michael Finger, these concessions in the short term left the Third World worse off. 108

The 1995 Cartagena Conference reflected the hope of developing countries that Uruguay would

prove beneficial to development. The final conference document stated, “The Heads of State or

Government welcomed the signing in Marrakesh, Morocco of the Uruguay Round agreements.

They [non-aligned states] emphasized that the new commitments and procedures … should be

translated into a greater market access, an expansion of world trade, and an increase in income

and employment opportunities throughout the world, particularly in developing countries.”109

The following three years saw economic crises in a number of non-aligned countries and a rise in

opposition in the developing world to the changes made in the Uruguay Round. Thus, the notion

of Uruguay’s benefits disappeared in the 1998 Durbin Conference Declaration, replaced instead

by strong anti-Western language:

108 Finger, J. Michael. “Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements: Problems for Developing Countries.” (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Web. <http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/Implementing_Uruguay_Round_Finger.pdf> Pgs. 1098-1099 109 Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cartagena, Colombia. 1995. Online: http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx 59

40

The Heads of State or Government particularly emphasized that the high social cost of the structural adjustment and opening up of the economies of the countries of the Movement should not be borne by developing countries alone, especially the poorest sectors of their population. It was developed countries that have derived the greatest benefits from this change in the world economy, while the alarming concentration of wealth in a few hands, a consequence of the unbridled market economy, heralded social instability. Therefore they found it unacceptable that rich and powerful nations continued to establish unilateral conditionalities on open trade, a concept which they themselves promoted … They [Non-Aligned states] declared that to demand from the countries of the Movement the opening up of their economies while imposing restrictions and tariff obstructions on their products is a [sic] morally reprehensible conduct110

NAM States’ populaces began to oppose the economic volatility and structural adjustment that

came with open markets and lower trade barriers. This caused most NAM states to take a strong

stance against “rich and powerful nations,” referring generally to the United States and Europe,

and some of their trade policies.

The 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) also helped

shatter the NAM’s hopes for the peaceful multipolar world they had envisioned. Like their hope

with regard to economic development, many non-aligned states believed the end of the Cold War

would signal a move by the U.S and the other powers towards complete nuclear disarmament. In

Jakarta in 1992, the non-aligned declared, “We are heartened by the progress being made in

limiting nuclear and conventional armaments. But the disarmament agenda is still unfinished …

A nuclear weapons free world has always been the vision of our Movement.”111 The Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, provides that the five

recognized nuclear powers eventually disarm their nuclear weapons. Those that ratified the

treaty review it and update it every five years. The 1995 NPT RevCon was especially important

given that states would not only review the treaty, but decide on whether or how to extend it.

110 Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Durban, South Africa. 1998 Online: http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx 16 111 Proceedings of the Tenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Jakarta. 1992. Pg. 7

41

Non-aligned states failed to negotiate a consensus position on what strategy or policy to review

prior to the May conference. Nuclear Weapons States, led by U.S. Vice President Al Gore,

would capitalize on this failure, successfully convincing the body to extend the treaty indefinitely

and successfully avoiding agreeing to concrete timetables for complete disarmament. For the

United States, this was a major victory. For the Non-Aligned Movement, it was a catastrophic

failure, and one it would not repeat. The result of the 1995 NPT RevCon shattered the NAM’s

hopes that Nuclear Weapons states would pursue disarmament, and their failure to negotiate

prior demonstrated in their minds the need for increased consultations on issues of nuclear

disarmament. This galvanized the movement and helped keep them motivated and cohesive.112

The Non-Aligned Movement’s Cartagena Summit reflected this change:

Even when the specter of a nuclear holocaust seems more remote than in the recent past and several countries have resolved to reduce their military budgets … great powers continue to endanger the future of humankind through the unjustified stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons … continues to put in jeopardy the security and stability of vast regions of the world.113

These two events demonstrate the way in which the Non-Aligned Movement’s unrealistic

expectations were shattered. The West and the United States did not intentionally harm North-

South or U.S.-Non-Aligned relations through their actions in these instances. However, these

events would have a lasting effect in both creating the perception of U.S. hegemony in the NAM

and in building up the NAM as a movement in opposition to this hegemony.114

Anti-Americanism and the Rise of the NAM Hawks

112 Epstein, William. “The Revolt of the Non-Aligned” in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. March 1996. Vol. 52 No. 2 Pgs. 39-40 113 Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cartagena, Colombia. 1995. Pg. 15 114 In trying to explain the cohesion of the NAM maintained beyond 1991, this thesis will use content analysis and other methods to test this counterhegemonic hypothesis (see Chapter IV)

42

As explained previously, the membership and leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement

(NAM) changed substantially as the old guard passed control to the new guard. Tito’s brand of

non-alignment was replaced by a version more similar to that of Castro, Ortega and Mugabe. As

a result, the internal politics of the movement changed significantly. As the 1990s progressed

into the 2000s, these changes became more entrenched as European states like Yugoslavia (and

then Bosnia and Serbia) were refused reentry into the NAM based on NAM consensus and others

like Malta and Cyprus left willingly to join the European Union. Other states like Mexico left

the movement and joined the OECD, further reducing the number of American allies within the

NAM. The NAM more and more began to pit itself against the United States, the European

Union, and the OECD more broadly.115 The NAM hawks played a major role in bringing about

these changes. NAM hawks refers to radical members of the Non-Aligned Movement that are

anti-American. Examples include Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Libya, and Zimbabwe. These states

slowly began to gather more power within the NAM, often working in concert to further each

other’s objectives. Cuba played a major role in guiding the NAM through the 21st century,

acting as NAM Chairman from 2006 to 2009. Iran will take over as Chairman from Egypt in

2012.116

During the Durbin Summit in 1998, Cuba and other NAM hawks pushed further

institutionalization of the NAM by proposing and getting approved the creation of a NAM

Troika, a group of the current NAM Chairman, the past NAM Chairman and the future NAM

Chairman.117 The troika would have power in helping the Coordinating Bureau fulfill its

115 Hearing, Roger. “Doing business at Non-aligned Summit.” BBC News. 16 September, 2006. Web. < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5351914.stm> 116 Ibid. This will be expanded in Chapter IV. 117 Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Durban, South Africa. 1998 Pg. 16; and Morphet, Sally. “Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What is the Global South Doing and Where is it Going?” Global Governance. 2004 Pgs. 19-20.

43

functions and in managing the NAM’s affairs between summits. Given Egypt’s internal chaos,

the troika is currently controlled almost completely by Cuba and Iran.118 These NAM hawks

have gathered control over the direction and message of the movement, a change reflected in the

slowly more anti-American and anti-Western conference declarations. Nowhere is this better

illustrated than in the NAM’s actions in the last decade with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, in

many cases providing it diplomatic in the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran’s

increasing control over the NAM further signals the important and powerful role the NAM will

play in multilateral fora related to Iran’s nuclear program.119 In addition, Iran’s power is just one

example of the power of the hawks within the NAM in controlling the voting and direction of the

movement.

The NAM Against Global Liberalism

The Non-Aligned has united its membership, especially in the last 15 years, against the

perception of neo-colonialism coming from the United States. The last five Non-Aligned

Summits have elevated concerns of a group of states that appear threatened by actions of the

United States and European powers. Examples include Libya, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Syria, Cuba

and Iraq. In the case of Libya, the 12th Summit of the Non-Aligned stated in 1998, on the issue

of Western response to Lockerbie:

The Heads of State or Government reiterated their shock at the immense harmful effects both human and economic sanctions imposed upon Libya … the Heads of State or Government decided that the sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya must be suspended120

118 Hearing, Roger. “Doing business at Non-aligned Summit.” BBC News. 16 September, 2006. Web. < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5351914.stm> 119 Hibbs, Mark. “Ten Lessons from September’s IAEA Diplomacy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 7 October, 2010. Web. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41682> 120 These sanctions were placed on Libya due to its involvement in the Lockerbie bombing incident Proc. of the Twelfth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, South Africa. 1998. Web.

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In the case of Iraq in 2003, the Summit of Non-Aligned countries stated, “The Heads of State or

Government examined threats of aggression against some Arab States, especially Iraq. They

affirmed their categorical rejection of assaulting Iraq as well as of any threats made to the

security and safety of Iraq.”121 In part, the inclusion of this language may hinge on security

concerns of those states that feel threatened by the sanctions or potential military actions of the

West. In general, the statements of this sort – those decrying sanctions or intervention in the

internal affairs of Third World countries – deal with the most harshly autocratic regimes of the

Third World, including those of Saddam Hussein, Robert Mugabe, among many others. The

implications of the rise of neo-colonialism relating to security concerns, at least among some

members of the Non-Aligned, will be dealt with in Chapter IV. However, recent actions by

states of the Third World during the democratic revolutions in the spring of 2011 seem to go

against these past actions of the NAM in protection of sovereignty of human rights’ abusers.

The Arab League’s approval of a no-fly zone in Libya marks the beginning of such a change. If

the modern Libya example serves as a guide, Third World protection of autocratic brothers

through institutions like the NAM may be coming to an end.122

<http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> This section will be expanded significantly in Chapter V 121 Proc. of the Thirteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, South Africa. 1998. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> For more, see Chapter IV 122 Issues related to the recent democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa will be discussed more in depth in Chapter V, dealing with the future of the NAM.

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Chapter III: Methodology and Data123

The quantitative analysis endeavors to examine the changes in voting patterns in the Non-

Aligned after the Cold War and into the 21st century. Academics have analyzed voting blocs up

to 1995, but few have researched developments in the Third World after 2000. These

quantitative results establish what has occurred as far as NAM voting cohesion through the

decades, paving the way for the explanations that will follow. NAM cohesion is measured

principally using Keisuke Iida’s defection rate, which explains how often NAM states break

from consensus votes. This defection rate is calculated using Iida’s formula: DR = [Dx/c] * 100

with DR as the Defection rate on resolution x, Dx as the number of minority votes cast on

resolution x, and c as the total number of votes cast on resolution x.124

Defection rates will be graphed by year using a line graph to visually display the

differences in defection rates based on resolutions. In addition, average defection rates are

analyzed over time graphically to examine how the NAM’s cohesion and consensus changed

over time.

123 Collecting and analyzing cohesion data on the Non-Aligned Movement is essential in both establishing the puzzle (puzzling amount of cohesion) and in preparing for the statistical tests used in Chapter IV in analyzing primary and alternative hypotheses. Working with data on U.N. Roll Call votes presents a number of significant challenges. The nature of the data requires significant manual inputs and changes. For this reason and others, this thesis does not undertake an analysis of every single year of data on NAM cohesion, choosing rather intervals of 5 years. The methodology and data follow. 124 Iida, Keisuke. "Third World Solidarity: the Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly." International Organization (1988): 376-378. This thesis also analyzed a small subset of votes to research the sensitivity of this cohesion measure to changes in coding for abstentions – this did not change the data.

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Data125

Mean Defection Rates Over Time

Year Defection Rate

1965 7.82% 1970 12.02% 1975 3.38% 1980 5.8% 1985 7.94% 1990 3.03% 1995 5.97% 2000 3.32% 2005 4.48%

The chart above reflects the average defection rates from 1965 to 2005, obtained by

calculating the average of the defection rates for each individual vote within each year. The

125 Dataset used was compiled by Erik Voeten and Merdzanovic and obtained via dataverse: Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data", http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379 UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzzvXF9m66yLTg== V1 [Version]. There are several errors or missing values in early parts of the dataset. I did my best to rectify these when possible. However, in general, the dataset is accurate, credible and incredibly useful.

47

results seem appropriate given the narrative in Chapter II. In 1965, there were only 47 countries

in the NAM, but these countries had not begun to coordinate votes in the U.N. General Assembly

and many did not attend the majority of the votes. Thus, one finds a moderately high defection

rate of 7.82%. By 1970, the movement had grown further and the non-aligned states did attend

the majority of UNGA votes. However, the NAM had not yet begun to coordinate votes prior to

UNGA meetings. Thus the large membership with little coordination resulted in a high defection

rate of 12.02%. The period between 1970 and 1975 saw major increases in coordination of

voting activities and institutionalization in New York, thus the extremely low defection rate of

3.38%. The promise of a New International Economic Order kept the defection relatively low

through 1980. The beginnings of a split in the movement resulted in the higher defection rate of

8.28% in 1985, but increased coordination and a strong meeting in Belgrade in 1989 once again

brought the defection rate down, to 3.03%. Tumult in the movement after the fall of the Soviet

Union resulted in slightly higher defection in 1995 at 5.97% while increased coordination within

the movement (due to a number of reasons discussed in Chapter IV) brought the defection rates

down to 3.32% in 2000 and 4.48% in 2005.

48

Defection Rates By Resolution By Year

I have included charts of defection rates by year with individual data points as the

defection rate on a given resolution.126

1965

1970

1975

126 The charts with the data are included in the Appendix.

49

1980

1985

50

1990

1995

2000

51

2005

52

53

Chapter IV: The Non-Aligned and International Relations Theory

The Non-Aligned Movement has maintained cohesion and power in the United Nations

despite the fall of the Soviet Union and thus the elimination of its ostensible purpose for existing.

Few researchers have examined this phenomenon and even fewer have applied international

relations theory to the NAM, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. At first glance, such

persisting cohesion through the NAM as an institution defies many of the major theories of

international relations. Neorealism would suggest that diverging interests as far as both power

and economic growth would pull these states apart rather than bring them together.

Institutionalism seems promising in its ability to explain the NAM, except that the NAM has

little incentive structure, no power of punishment and few real institutional constraints.

Neoliberalism would suggest that states would focus on their strict economic interests at the

behest of participation in international institutions like the NAM. Theories of material interests

and domestic politics also fail in explaining the persistence of NAM cohesion.127 If these

theories cannot explain the NAM’s persistence, what can? This thesis argues that a rise in

counterhegemonic ideology best explains the persistence of the NAM in the last two decades. In

setting out to provide evidence for this assertion, this thesis will analyze the changing language

in NAM summits due to a growing perception of a hegemonic United States and the rise of

counterhegemonic ideas in response to several major events during the 1990s and 2000s. Next,

it will review the major alternatives – material interests, domestic politics and neorealism.

127 Evidence provided at close of this chapter.

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Counterhegemony

What is Counterhegemony? Samuel Huntington stated in 1999, “Over time the response

to American hegemony may escalate from resentment and dissent to opposition and collective

counteraction.” Huntington does not elaborate on this concept, failing to elucidate main tenets or

the motivations for the formation of such a counterhegemonic bloc – except that it would occur

in response to American hegemony. He states that such a counterhegemonic bloc has not yet

formed, arguing that other major powers like China and Russia would work with Third World

states in countering perceived U.S. hegemony.128 In his analysis of bloc orientation and balance

of power politics, he overlooks the development of such a bloc solely in the Third World through

the institutional auspices of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).129

Few theorists have elaborated specifics of what makes up a counterhegemonic bloc. In

an interview with Al-Jazeera on the eve of the 15th Summit, British scholar Timothy Lynch put

forward the notion that the only thing uniting the NAM is its opposition to the United States.

However, he did not articulate how or why this is the case, or the role that counterhegemony

plays in this story.130 This thesis argues that NAM states remained united due to a rise in

counterhegemonic ideology in response to perceived hegemonic actions from the United States –

such actions include sanctions, nuclear weapons negotiations, and interventions. This ideology

grew out of illiberal ideologies of many Third World states even prior to the fall of the Soviet

Union, including their record of Marxist affiliation, nationalist autocracy and neocolonialist

rhetoric. Second, this thesis argues that NAM hawks, motivated by a combination of the same

128 Huntington, Samuel. “The Lonely Superpower.” Foreign Affairs. 1999. 129 Huntington’s view of counterhegemony focuses on a bloc that could counter American economic and military power in the sense of a traditional balance of power analysis. This thesis does not claim that the Non-Aligned Movement has become a close-knit alliance counter to U.S. policy or actions in the international scene. Rather, this thesis claims that the NAM has formed such a bloc in the UN. 130 “The Non-Aligned Movement.” Al Jazeera Special: Inside Report. July 15, 2009. Interview with Timothy Lynch. http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2009/07/2009715134854305945.html

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ideology as well as security concerns and domestic politics, utilized this rise in

counterhegemonic ideology to further shift the movement against U.S. priorities, taking on

leadership positions within the movement and encouraging institutional mechanisms to promote

voting cohesion. The distinction in motivations between most NAM states and the NAM hawks

– counterhegemonic ideology for most states and security and domestic issues for hawks – is

quite significant and will play itself out in each of the events cited as evidence for rising

counterhegemony, as NAM hawks seek to use the movement to shelter themselves from threats

to their security both internationally and domestically. Lastly, one must note that this

counterhegemonic ideology stems not only out of ideological opposition to the United States but

also necessarily out of ideological opposition to the perception of a hegemon. This means that

the rise of a bloc counter to the United States could not have occurred without the perception of

the U.S. as a hegemon.131 This chapter will first review evidence for this rise in

counterhegemonic ideas, then elaborating on the role the NAM hawks played in the story of the

modern NAM, and finishing with a discussion of alternative hypotheses.

The Evidence for Counterhegemony

What evidence exists that the NAM has become a counterhegemonic bloc working to

buffer U.S. power? First, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has shifted consensus voting

patterns since the fall of the Soviet Union, voting more often against the United States than prior

to the fall of the Soviet Union.132 Second, the language at Non-Aligned summits and speeches of

131 Thus, if the perception of the U.S. as a hegemon decreases, one might expect counterhegemonic ideology to decrease, despite lingering anti-U.S. sentiment. 132 This thesis aimed originally to analyze exhaustively the change in voting patterns relative to U.S. votes. However, the dataset used (Erik Voeten) does not include U.S. votes in 1995, making such an analysis difficult. In addition, such an analysis tells us little about the nature of the votes being taken. Indeed, most of the votes the NAM opposes the United States on seem inconsequential or procedural. However, the trend of the NAM voting against

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the Non-Aligned at international meetings has shifted against the United States over the course

of the last two decades, evidenced through quantitative content analysis and qualitative

observation. Third, studies of specific NAM votes over the last two decades reveal the rise in the

NAM of counterhegemonic ideas on issues from the NPT Review Conference to issues of

perceived neo-colonialism through Western sanctions or intervention in the Third World.

Perception of Hegemony

This thesis has several times referred to an increasing perception of U.S. hegemony as

playing a major role in the rise of counterhegemonic ideas. Some elaboration on this concept is

needed to clarify this issue. While the NAM’s rise as a counterhegemonic bloc stems from ideas

rather than interests or domestic politics, real perceptions of a hegemonic United States played

an important role in inspiring these ideas. In some ways, this logic seems self-explanatory. For

counterhegemonic ideology to rise, states need to perceive that the world is dominated by a

hegemon. But the necessity of this perception cannot be overemphasized. The following

sections review the evidence for the NAM’s perception of a hegemonic United States and the

rise in counterhegemonic ideas that accompanied this perception. The events reviewed below

include Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, U.S. sanctions, and U.S. intervention in

the Third World. These events, and the perceptions of hegemony they inspired, were essential in

causing the rise in counterhegemonic ideas that united the NAM.

Summits

Analysis of summit documents leads one to conclude the NAM has shifted to form a

counterhegemonic bloc. The Non-Aligned Movement meets in summits of heads of state or

the U.S. more often should be noted. In 1990, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) voted against the United States 73% of the time. In 2000, 82% and 2005, 80%.

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government every three years.133 Each summit releases a final document drafted during the

summit that contains the NAM’s positions on major world issues. This thesis undertook a

content analysis of the final documents from the summits of the last 20 years. The observable

variable is instances of anti-U.S. language in summit documents over time.134 The instances

increase significantly over the course of the 1990s and into the 2000s. While these documents do

not provide conclusive evidence of the NAM as an anti-U.S. bloc, they support the assertion that

the NAM moved towards more anti-Western and specifically anti-U.S. positions in their major

meetings.

Summit

Instances of anti-U.S. or counterhegemonic language

1995 Cartagena Summit 4 1998 Durban Summit 7 2003 Kuala Lumpur Summit 14 2006 Havana Summit 22 2009 Cairo Summit 17

Shift in Summit Language

Qualitative analysis of these documents also shows that the movement became

significantly more anti-American in the last two decades. After the fall of the Soviet Union,

NAM Summit documents took a different perspective from those prior to the end of the Cold

War. While statements once warned of the dangers of a bipolar world and pessimistically

criticized the Great Powers’ treatment of the Third World, new statements looked forward with

133 Occasionally every 4 years. 134 Content analysis was conducted using the process outlined by Cleveland State University in its Content Analysis Guidebook. <http://academic.csuohio.edu/kneuendorf/content/>. Instances of anti-U.S. or counterhegemonic language were measured by examining the clauses in each summit final document devoted to criticizing the United States. The clauses that did so, whether explicitly or implicitly (but only when very clear who is being referred), were counted as the instances. A more exhaustive content analysis could certainly be undertaken in looking at NAM speeches and summit docs, but such an analysis lies outside the range of this thesis.

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hope that development could now proceed without competing with East-West concerns and

nuclear weapons could be disarmed. The 1992 Jakarta Summit stated:

The collapse of the bipolar system, while not in itself ensuring just and durable peace for the peoples of the world, should nonetheless open up opportunities for building a new international order based on peace, justice, full respect for the principles and norms of international law, cooperation and common prosperity. Prominent among these opportunities is the cessation of East-West confrontation, which has greatly improved prospects for [nuclear] disarmament.135

Such language was common in the 1992 Summit documents as hope pervaded the Non-Aligned

perception of the end of the bipolar world order.

These hopeful expressions soon shifted over the course of the 1990s. The 1995

Cartagena Summit stated:

The Heads of State or Government were of the view that the collapse of the bipolar system, while raising hopes for ensuring a universal, just and durable peace that are yet to be fulfilled, could result in a worrisome and damaging unipolarity that would be conducive to further inequality and injustice.136

The NAM begins to express fears of unipolarity in the 1995 Cartagena Summit, in part because

of unmet expectations on the nuclear front as a result of the 1995 NPT RevCon and in part

because of the persistence of extreme poverty among the poorest nations in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The disheartening result, from the NAM perspective, of the Uruguay Round also contributed to

the more pessimistic views of the NAM and the increasing perception of the world as unipolar

with the United States as the sole hegemonic power. The XIII Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2003

increased the anti-U.S. and anti-hegemonic rhetoric to a level not seen in the history of the Non-

Aligned Movement. In a statement clearly directed at the United States, the NAM decries U.S.

135 Proc. of the Tenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Jakarta, Indonesia. 1992. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> Pg. 20 136 Proc. of the Eleventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Cartagena, Colombia. 1995. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> Pg. 17

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unilateral actions in the Third World, with veiled references to the Bush administration’s policies

in Iraq.

The Heads of State or Government underscored the inherent dangers in the emerging trends towards a unipolar world, where unilateral and hegemonic policies could violate the basic principles of the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations Charter. They strongly condemned any labelling of countries as good or evil and repressive based on unilateral and unjustified criteria and reiterated their firm condemnation of all unilateral military actions or threat of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any State.137

The Havana Summit in 2006 and Cairo Summit in 2009 continued referencing U.S. unilateralism

and hegemony. The Havana Summit especially highlighted this shift toward anti-U.S. policies,

as highlighted in one Al-Jazeera article titled, “Non-Aligned States line up against U.S,”138 as the

summit criticized U.S. support for Israel and U.S. actions with regard to Iran’s nuclear program.

The following statement from the 2006 Summit summarizes this rise in radical

counterhegemony:

They [the Non-Aligned countries] further totally reject the use of the term “axis of evil” by a certain State to target other States under the pretext of combating terrorism, as well as the unilateral preparation of lists accusing States of allegedly supporting terrorism, which are inconsistent with international law and constitute on their part a form of psychological and political terrorism and in this context, underscoring the need to exercise solidarity with the Non-Aligned Countries that are affected by such actions and measures139

These summit documents reveal a shift in Non-Aligned thinking over the course of the

1990s and 2000s. Many NAM states believed that the end of the Cold War would cause a

restructuring of the international system in favor of the Third World. When this did not occur,

coupled with U.S. action in the Third World, NAM states began uniting in opposition to the

United States. A movement that once blamed economic development issues and colonialist

137 Proc. of the Thirteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia 2003, Pg. 10. 138 "Non-Aligned States line up against U.S." Al Jazeera English 17 Sept. 2006. <http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2006/09/20084914278496139.html>. 139 Proc. of the Fourteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba 2006, <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> Pg. 37 Emphasis added

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interventions on a bipolar world and East-West divide, shifted to the only visible adversary – the

United States. The movement, in many ways lost and searching for a cause in the 1990s, found

one that united its membership and maintained the movement’s relevance. However, this is not

the entire story. The NAM hawks played an integral role in making this shift occur, capitalizing

on shattered Third World expectations to move the movement against the United States, as will

be discussed later in this chapter.

The NAM and Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences

Nuclear disarmament and the promotion of nuclear energy programs generally have been

prioritized by the NAM since its creation. Through its four-decade existence, the movement has

consistently pushed for nuclear disarmament, both in Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

negotiations as well as in its work in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its

push to establish the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD). In recent years, the

NAM has played an essential role in the NPT Review Conferences, held every five years. A

2010 report from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute stated,

“Unlike other bodies such as the UN Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

where the United States (and the other NPT nuclear-weapon states) hold great sway, NPT review

conferences tend to be dominated by the single largest political grouping of countries, the 116

non-nuclear-weapon states of the NAM.”140 Given the NAM’s size and the need for consensus

in the review conferences, the NAM could theoretically dictate the result of the conference, if it

negotiates consensus positions prior. Studying the NAM and its role in these NPT review

conferences reveals more however than a body working to further its priorities in the nuclear

140 Potter, William, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, and Miles Pomper. "The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus." Monterrey Institute - Center for Nuclear Security (2010). <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/100617_npt_2010_summary.pdf>. Pg. 4; 116 because the count does not include Pakistan or India.

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policy arena. It reveals a NAM increasingly disenchanted with Nuclear Weapons States’ (NWS)

and U.S. actions in the nuclear arena, engendering a perception of American hegemony that

would inspire anti-U.S. and counterhegemonic statements from foreign ministers and leaders of

numerous NAM states. These statements provide further evidence for the rise of

counterhegemonic ideas within the NAM in response to perceived U.S. hegemony.

The 1995 NPT Review Conference saw a major victory for nuclear weapons states

(NWS) and the United States specifically; in many ways the NAM experienced a major loss.

The conference extended the NPT indefinitely with no timetables for disarmament and few

binding mechanisms on NWS’s. In April prior to the conference, NAM states met in Bandung in

attempts to negotiate positions on major NPT issues – the most important being the decision on if

or how to extend the treaty. Due to a combination of intense U.S. lobbying and general disarray

in the Non-Aligned after the end of the Cold War, the NAM failed to agree on such a position.

NWS’s capitalized on this failure, gathering allies behind an indefinite extension with few

disarmament provisions (only principles).141

The result seriously angered a number of NAM countries hoping for a different

conclusion.142 In response to a question on the NAM’s role in an interview with the Monterrey

Institute’s Susan Welsh, Venezuelan Ambassador Taylhardat lamented the pressure applied on

NAM countries by the United States: “In Bandung sovereign countries … were being subject to

pressures [that] obstructed a consensus around the 25-year rolling extension.” The concept of a

25-year rolling extension was one propounded by NAM countries from Pakistan to Venezuela.

In Susan Welsh’s interviews on behalf of the Monterrey Institute, NAM countries expressed

141 "Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference." Interview by Susan Welsh. Center for Nonproliferation Studies - Monterrey Instititue. 1995. <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/welsh23.pdf>. 142 Ibid. Pgs. 7-10

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anger at the result while Western states like Canada and the United States seemed satisfied. In

response to Welch’s question on the future of the NAM, Taylhardat stated, the NAM:

Has been fractured.... External factors have fractured the non-aligned.... The non-aligned died at Bandung because one of the few issues where there was some cohesion of the non-aligned was in disarmament and nonproliferation. This does not exist anymore, so it means the death of the non-aligned.143 However, the NAM did not die at the 1995 NPT RevCon. Indeed, the result of the 1995

NPT Review Conference inspired NAM states to coordinate better prior to future review

conferences. The final document from NAM Summit in Cartagena in 1995 stated, “The Heads of

State or Government to the NPT strongly deplored that the Nuclear Weapon States have not

fulfilled up to now the obligations contained in Article VI of the NPT and reiterated the urgent

need to achieve the total elimination of all existing nuclear weapons.”144 As William Epstein

puts it in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “It became clear [in the 1995 NAM summit] that the

movement had been revitalized – so much so that some Western diplomats privately described

them as being in revolt.”145 Indeed, this revitalization came in part from anger at perceived U.S.

hegemony and in part from a rise in counterhegemonic ideas. While developing nations blamed

all NWS’s for the dissatisfactory conclusion, the United States bore the brunt of these complaints

– mostly regarding “U.S. pressure” on non-aligned states. Foreign ministry statements after the

conference’s completion saw more anti-U.S. rhetoric and significant determination, as evidenced

prior, to not allow this to happen again.146

2000 saw significant pessimism from both Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-

Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) that an agreement could be reached on reviewing the treaty. 143 "Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference." Interview by Susan Welsh. 1995. Pgs. 8-9 144 Proc. of the Eleventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Cartagena, Colombia. 1995. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> 145 Epstein, William. “The Revolt of the Non-Aligned” in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. March 1996. Vol. 52 No. 2 Pgs. 39-40 146 Ibid. Pgs. 38-39

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Contrary to these dismal expectations, such an agreement was reached based on consensus. This

occurred in part because of the NAM’s coordination prior. Learning from the lessons of failed

coordination of the NAM at Bandung in April 1995, NAM discussions of the 2000 NPT RevCon

began earlier, with the hope they could preempt U.S. pressure on major issues. An early start

helped the NAM reach consensus on major issues, giving them significantly more negotiating

power in the conference itself. While the treaty did not see the hard deadlines for disarmament

some NAM hawks wanted, the 2000 NPT RevCon incorporated many significant concerns of

NAM countries, including 13 concrete steps toward disarmament.147

The NAM’s influence was only slightly diminished by a new set of countries allied prior

to the conference – the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) made up of Mexico, Brazil, Egypt,

Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand and Sweden. These states played a major role in bridging

consensus, in part diminishing the role played by the NAM. However, the 2000 NPT RevCon

saw significant institutional learning for the NAM, as NAM states began to better coordinate

their positions, in many cases in direct opposition to U.S. policies.148 Still, some NAM states

were dissatisfied with NAM coordination and wished the NAM could play an even greater role

in setting the decisions for the conference.149

The 2005 NPT Review Conference saw a vastly different result from the 1995 and 2000

review conferences – states could not reach consensus on updating the treaty. This occurred in

large part due to NAM opposition motivated by the rise of anti-American and counterhegemonic

147 Wulf, Norman. "Observations From the 2000 NPT Review Conference | Arms Control Association." Arms Control Association. <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/wulf>. 148 Specifically, this was seen with the NAM’s push for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East targeted at Israel. The unity of ideology between 1995 and 2000 helped keep the NAM united in pushing for disarmament principles and for a Middle East NWFZ, a unity of ideology based in large part on anti-U.S. sentiment. 149 Wulf, Norman. "Observations From the 2000 NPT Review Conference | Arms Control Association." Arms Control Association. <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_11/wulf>.

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ideology.150 According to Simpson and Nielsen in their 2005 article in the Nonproliferation

Review (NPR), U.S. refusal to recognize the language from the 1995 and 2000 RevCons angered

the NAM immensely and prevented agreement even on an agenda for the 2005 Review

Conference. These disagreements, combined with Third World anger at many Bush

administration policies like the war in Iraq, set the stage for the main event.151 Many NAM

states seemed determine to block a successful conference due to this anger at the United

States.152 The United States could not split the NAM using diplomatic pressure, as they did in

1995, as the NAM remained more cohesive in the face of perceived U.S. hegemony, and refused

to retreat from their strong demands with regard to disarmament and a Middle East NWFZ.153

The 2005 NPT RevCon demonstrates the power that a counterhegemonic NAM could

demonstrate in the face of U.S policy priorities.

The NAM in many ways reached the height of its coordination prior to the 2010 NPT

Review Conference, proposing numerous amendments at the start of the conference, and

functioning as the major negotiating power for NNWS’s.154 The promise of the Obama

administration brought new hope to the prospect of a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference.

150 Some theorists argue the United States and the Bush administration deserve all the blame for the failed conference (Granoff, Jonathan. "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its 2005 Review Conference: A Legal and Political Analysis." Global Security Institute Publication (2007)). This is not a fair characterization. The NAM played a major role in derailing conference negotiations. 151 Simpson, John and Nielsen, Jenny 'THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE', The Nonproliferation Review, 12:2, 271-274. Accessed thanks to SULAIR. 152 “Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran to the Seventh NPT Review Conference” May 3, 2005, New York. <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/proliferation/iran/2005-review-conference-kharrazi-kamal-statement.pdf> 153 Simpson, John and Nielsen, Jenny 'THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE', 271-275 Theorist Rebecca Johnson argues the NAM was actually very split in the 2005 Review Conference. While divisions arose on certain issues, the NAM agreed on major issues prior to the conference, strengthening their negotiating hand relative to the United States. 154 “Unlike the 2000 conference, the bridge-building transcontinental group known as the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) was not a driving force and yielded to the NAM states.” Dhanapala, Jayantha. “Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference.” Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace. October 2010. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR258%20-%20Evaluating%20the%202010%20NPT%20Review%20Conference.pdf>

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Obama’s support for a new START treaty as well as ratification of the CTBT satisfied many

developing nations’ demands that the United States move toward disarmament.155 Fault lines

between the United States and the NAM at the 2010 NPT Review Conference emerged though

on familiar territory, with the United States arguing for stronger nonproliferation measures and

the NAM pushing more disarmament provisions and peaceful nuclear energy programs.156 The

NAM’s lead negotiator, Egypt, soon realized that no significant progress could be made on this

split, instead focusing his energy on pleasing his NAM constituency by pushing for a Middle

East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) targeted at the Israeli nuclear program.157 The United

States and the EU opposed naming Israel in the final document, especially given the NAM’s

refusal to name proliferators like Syria or Iran. The United States eventually compromised in

negotiations with NAM chair Egypt, allowing language on a NWFZ in the Middle East – in part,

the United States delegation realized Egypt could not maintain NAM support for the result

without the inclusion of the provision on Israel and the Middle East.158 Without the NAM’s

agreement and negotiations prior, and the leadership of Egypt as the NAM’s chair, the 2010 NPT

Review Conference might have met the same fate as the 2005 RevCon. The reluctant agreement

by the Obama administration allowing the language on a Middle East NWFZ reflects the strong

negotiating power exercised by the NAM in the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Examining in detail the progression of the NPT Review Conferences from 1995 to the

present illustrates the rise in coordination and power of the NAM as well as a rise in

155 Choubey, Deepti. "Understanding the 2010 NPT Review Conference." Carnegie Endowment Publications. 3 June 2010. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=40910>. 156 Müller, Harald. "A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama's Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review Conference." The Nonproliferation Review 18 (2011): 219-35. 157 “Statement by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad before the 2010 NPT Review Conference.” May 3, 2010. Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/iran/statement-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-before-2010-npt-review-conference/p22041> 158 Choubey, Deepti. "Understanding the 2010 NPT Review Conference." Carnegie Endowment Publications. 3 June 2010.

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counterhegemonic ideas after the 1995 conference. Notably, the NAM began coordinating their

positions more closely after their failure in 1995, negotiating consensus positions to better block

U.S. policy goals. The NAM’s rhetoric also became increasingly anti-U.S. with regard to

nuclear issues. This increased negotiating power and anti-U.S. rhetoric reflected itself in

different ways. In 2000, this power succeeded in securing 13 principles toward disarmament

(significant principles that NWS’s had not agreed upon prior). In 2005, this power was reflected

in the NAM’s stubbornness to agree to the unsatisfactory deal proposed by the Bush

administration, thus the conference’s failure. In 2010, the NAM’s negotiating power saw major

victory in the inclusion of the provision on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East

with a proposed 2012 conference to discuss the issue. These years saw increased coordination

counter to U.S. priorities in reaction to an increasing perception of hegemony derived originally

from the 1995 Review Conference.

What motivates this NAM focus on nuclear issues? This section has argued that the

NAM became united in counterhegemonic ideology in response to and through nuclear

negotiations. Most NAM states saw nuclear affairs, especially disarmament and nuclear energy

rights, as integral to security priorities. But what motivated their cohesion, especially in the 2005

case and even the 2010 case with the Middle East NWFZ, were not these security priorities but

instead their counterhegemonic ideology. In 2005, NAM states gained little from refusing to

compromise with the United States and NWS’s. The act was symbolic in its repudiation of U.S.

policy and priority and telling of the NAM’s shift in views against the United States. In 2010,

many NAM states like India, Thailand, Vietnam, and Chile gained little from pushing to name

Israel in the final document while refusing to name Iran, but they remained united in their push

against Israel despite U.S. pressure. These actions are not easily explained by interest-based

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hypotheses, and instead are explained by a rise in counterhegemonic and anti-U.S. ideology after

the 1995 NPT RevCon.159

U.S. Action in the Third World: Sanctions and Intervention

The rising perception of U.S. hegemony among NAM countries during the 1990s and

2000s, and the rise of counterhegemonic ideology that accompanied it, occurred in part because

of U.S. action in the Gulf War, sanctions in Libya, Sudan and Zimbabwe, and the Iraq War. The

Gulf War caused a rift among NAM members because it took place between two non-aligned

countries; indeed, NAM states could not even agree to oppose U.S. intervention due to the desire

of states like Saudi Arabia to see U.S. action in the Middle East. But the Gulf War furthered

Third World perception of American hegemony. U.S. sanctions on states like Libya, Sudan and

Zimbabwe inspired significant outrage from the NAM, which decried such actions as unfair and

in violation of international law (even though many of these sanctions were passed by the

UNSC). The War in Iraq saw almost unanimous opposition from NAM states. These

interventions helped solidify and unite the NAM as a bloc against U.S. policy in the United

Nations.

U.S. action in the Gulf War inspired the usual outrage from the usual suspects. However,

given the support of many Arab states, as well as UN Security Council backing, the NAM could

find little consensus on a response.160 In the past, the NAM championed sovereignty and self-

determination, and Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait violated these principles. But the NAM also

159 Foreign ministry statements specifically stating counterhegemonic intentions are limited. Conversations with NAM officials in my time in Vienna and while researching suggest such a conclusion, as do the other pieces of evidence cited in this thesis. 160 In the Security Council, the vote was 12-1 with Cuba opposed and two abstentions – Ecuador and Yemen, both NAM states. In their speeches in the debate, these states – Cuba especially – noted the trend toward unipolarity and the inappropriateness of Western action in the Third World. “UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq and Kuwait.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 3, 1991 <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/un-security-council-resolution-687-iraq-kuwait/p19037 >and “UN Security Council Resolution 687,” April 3, 1991 <http://looklex.com/textarchive/modern/un687.htm>

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strongly opposed Western action within NAM states. A Non-Aligned delegation offered to

negotiate a peace to the crisis – but that was the extent of the NAM’s involvement. The Gulf

War’s importance lies in increasing Third World perception of the world as unipolar, with the

United States able to intervene militarily whenever it chooses. The rising perception among

NAM states that the United States was acting unilaterally in a hegemonic manner also furthered

the idea of the NAM as a movement working to counter these actions.161

Over the next decade, the United States would impose sanctions on a number of NAM

states for a number of reasons. Instances include the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe, for

human rights violations, Libya, for its involvement in Lockerbie and its nuclear program, and

Sudan, for its involvement with Islamic terrorist groups and human rights violations. In the case

of Libya, the Security Council voted 10-0 with 5 abstentions in favor of sanctions after Libya’s

involvement in Lockerbie – all NAM states on the Security Council abstained (India, Cape

Verde, Morocco, and Zimbabwe). In this case, as with many of these other cases, India and the

other NAM states abstained despite little apparent national interest in doing so. In the case of

Zimbabwe, George W. Bush imposed sanctions in 2003 due to human rights violations. The

2003 NAM summit stated, in response, “The Heads of State or Government condemned the

unilateral imposition of targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe by the United States.”162 In the case of

Sudan in the 1990s, the United States could not achieve momentum in the UNSC for sanctions,

despite Sudanese ties to Islamic terrorist groups and al Qaeda, thus the U.S imposed unilateral

161 Proc. of the Tenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Jakarta, Indonesia. 1992. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> 162 Proc. of the Thirteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia 2003. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx>

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sanctions in 1997 through Executive Order 13067.163 On the issue of U.S. sanctions, the NAM

summit of 1998 stated:

The Heads of State or Government condemned the continued unilateral application, by certain powers, of coercive economic and other measures, including the enactment of extra-territorial laws, against a number of developing countries, with a view to preventing these countries from exercising their right to decide, by their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems. They called on all countries not to recognise the unilateral extra-territorial laws enacted by certain countries, which impose sanctions on other States and foreign companies and individuals.164

The NAM came out strongly against U.S. and E.U. sanctions, despite the fact that these sanctions

were mostly imposed due to human rights violations, which the NAM purports to protect, and

connections to terrorism, which the NAM purports to fight.165

In a debate in the General Assembly in 2008 on the issue of sanctions, the Algerian

ambassador argued, “it was important that they [sanctions] should come into play only when a

credible threat to peace had been detected, as means of last resort. Unilateralism was prejudicial

to collective action of the United Nations, and he disapproved of unilateral sanctions conducted

outside the Organization.” In this session of the General Assembly, such statements were

common as all NAM members affiliated themselves with Cuba’s statement on behalf of the

NAM, targeting their comments in opposition to U.S. sanctions imposed on the Third World.

U.S. sanctions, as stated above, helped create a perception of American hegemony and inspired

counterhegemonic ideas among NAM states.166

Of the multitude of U.S. actions in the Third World over the last two decades, the War in

Iraq certainly inspired the most opposition within the NAM. Like the issues discussed above,

163 Executive Order 13067, signed November 3, 1997 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 62 F.R. 59989). Regulations, issued by the Department of the Treasury. 164 Proc. of the Twelfth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, South Africa. 1998. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> 165 See summit documents from 10th-14th NAM summits 166 “Criteria for Implementation of Sanctions, Legal Aspects of United Nations Reform.” Meeting of United Nations General Assembly. L/3124. Committee on Charter and United Nations Role 253. 2008.

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much of the discussions in the lead up to the war took place in the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC). The UNSC had passed a number of resolutions in 2002 with regard to the

situation in Iraq. In 2003, the United States, along with Great Britain, proposed another

resolution – this one authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein. This resolution never

came up for a vote. While most observers assumed this was due to Russian or Chinese veto

threats (along with a possible veto from France), journalist Ronan Bennett of The Observer

reveals that more was going on. His account demonstrates that NAM states on the Security

Council – Chile, Guinea, Angola, Cameroon and Pakistan – were all prepared to vote against the

resolution, making it nearly impossible for the U.S. to reach the 9 votes needed regardless of the

veto situation.167 One should note that Chile and Angola held out despite the fact that Chile was

negotiating a free-trade package with the United States and Angola was attempting to receive an

increased aid package from the United States.168

NAM states continued to oppose U.S. action in Iraq throughout the invasion and into the

post-war period. In the 2003 Summit in Kuala Lumpur, the NAM stated, “The Heads of State or

Government demanded respect for the independence, sovereignty, security, territorial integrity

and non-interference into the internal affairs of Iraq.” Many NAM states made statements

regarding the trend of U.S. hegemony because of the potential for a U.S. war in Iraq.169 South

African President Mbeki made statements to this effect:

"Unipolarity" and "unilateralism" mean that one power, with a little help from its friends, takes decisions about what happens in the world, including our countries, without our

167 Bennett, Ronan. "Ten Days to War." The Guardian 8 Mar. 2008. Guardian News and Media. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/08/iraq.unitednations>. 168 Issues of trade and aid discussed further on pages 79-81. In addition, Angola biggest trading partner is the United States. 169 Lesotho: “The Right Honourable the Prime Minister, delivered a statement at the Non-Aligned Movement, and unequivocally put Lesotho’s position before the 115 Member States gathered at the Summit. ‘we call on all Governments, particularly those of the United States and Great Britain to refrain forthwith, from their intentions and preparations to unilaterally declare war on Iraq.’” Government of Lesotho. Statement on Position on War in Iraq. MOFA Lesotho. http://www.gov.ls/articles/2003/Statement%20-%20Min%20Foreign%20-War%20Iraq.htm

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participation. This represents an undemocratic "new" world order that turns us, once more, into "the invisible people of the world", living in fear of the consequences of responding to our consciences, because of our dependence on the wealthy and developed world.

South African fears of a unipolar world were shared by many NAM states at the NAM summit in

Malaysia in 2003. President Mbeki continued several minutes later, “The processes relating to

the question of Iraq confirm the disturbing reality that unilateralism, rather than multilateralism,

has become the dominant tendency in world politics.”170

Case studies of humanitarian intervention by the U.S. and Western states provide a

convincing picture of a Non-Aligned Movement concerned with countering U.S. actions. As one

can see through votes in the Security Council and statements in NAM summits, the NAM has

united against U.S. sanctions and interventions in Third World countries, working to block U.S.

actions and priorities – perceived U.S. hegemony and unilateralism – in the United Nations

Security Council and other bodies. This unity occurred due to a rise in counterhegemonic ideas

as evidenced in NAM summits and NAM statements.

The Development of Counterhegemonic Ideology

The previous sections elaborated on some of the major events that inspired a Third World

perception of American hegemony and gave evidence for NAM coordination as a

counterhegemonic bloc. This section elaborates on how such counterhegemonic ideology rose

and came to dominate the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), focusing on the transition from Cold

War ideologies along with the role the NAM hawks and institutionalization play in this story. In

some ways, the emergence of the Third World as a voting bloc against perceived U.S. hegemony

could have been predicted. Before the end of the Cold War, the movement became increasingly 170 “President Mbeki Statement Thirteenth NAM Summit,” Kuala Lumpur. 2003. http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/view_press_release.php?release=4737284

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more anti-U.S. and elevated to power autocrats like Castro that clearly aligned themselves with

the Soviets. With the end of the Cold War, many of these more radical states (NAM hawks) saw

an opportunity to make the NAM what they had always envisioned it – a bloc against the United

States.

Transition to Counterhegemony

The NAM comes from a history of opposing hegemony and intervention in the Third

World, whether U.S. or Soviet, due to the revolutionary anti-colonialist nature of its creation. As

mentioned in Chapter II, nationalist and anti-colonialist ideology was key to the creation of the

movement. Nationalist anti-colonialist movements in much of the Third World provided

developing nations with common histories and themes that further inspired non-aligned

solidarity. As the movement developed, this shared history slowly became less significant as

colonialism was left behind and states began to develop as sovereign entities. Thus, other issues

came to the forefront like the New International Economic Order (NIEO) of the 1970s and early

1980s. Other motivations for the foundation of the NAM no longer play significantly into the

persistence of the movement. Issues related to prestige or international security or internal

security have little relevance in a Third World not dominated by recently independent regimes or

facing East-West issues.171 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the NAM shifted its ideology from

one of non-alignment and anti-colonialism, opposed to the East-West divide, to one opposed to

hegemony of the West. As NAM hawks elevated neo-colonialist concerns and the Third World

increasingly saw the United States as a hegemon, the movement’s ideology shifted to one of

counterhegemony, united against U.S. policies.172

171 NAM states face vastly different security threats and challenges and there seems little evidence that the NAM protects states’ from internal security threats (motivations for NAM hawks are slightly different, as mentioned below). 172 Proc. of the Fourteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba. 2006. Web.

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The NAM Hawks

This thesis has cited the Non-Aligned Hawks numerous times for the role they have

played in guiding the movement into its modern iteration. Some elaboration of these states and

their motivations is needed in analyzing their role in the movement and its shift to

counterhegemony. First, some criteria must be established to define the hawks. Most

importantly, to be a NAM hawk they must have been in conflict with the United States. Second,

they must be actively involved in the NAM. For the first issue, this thesis will define conflict as

any country that has been sanctioned by the United States, had relations cut off, or has verbally

threatened the United States in the last two decades. For the second issue, heads of state or

government or Ministers of Foreign Affairs (rather than Ambassadors or Deputies), must have

attended each of the last four summits of the Non-Aligned Movement.173 By these criteria,

NAM hawks include Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. These states

oppose U.S. policy in many areas. In addition, most of these states exercise disproportionate

power in the NAM, relative to their power in the international system. Zimbabwe was the NAM

chair in 1986, Cuba in 2006, and Iran will be the chair in 2012.

The discussion in the previous section regarding motivations for counterhegemony differs

slightly for the NAM hawks. While counterhegemonic ideas certainly have played an essential

role in these states’ participation in the movement, NAM hawks are also motivated by security

interests and occasionally domestic politics. These states see the movement not only in positive

ideological terms, but also as a shield to potential sanctions or intervention by the United States

<http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> The NAM “Oppose[s] … the actions by a certain group of States to unilaterally reinterpret, redefine or redraft the provisions of these instruments to conform with their own views and interests.” 173 These criteria were chosen in order to pinpoint states that a) are clearly/fundamentally anti-American and b) committed to the NAM. The distinction is naturally manufactured, but is useful in distinguishing between a set of NAM states less opposed to the U.S. and a set of NAM states less active in the organization or both.

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as well as a legitimation domestically of their international policies. Given the NAM’s potential

in providing diplomatic cover and legitimating policies domestically, NAM hawks have taken

leadership roles in the organization and helped push a movement tending toward

counterhegemonic ideology toward a cohesive counterhegemonic bloc.

As referenced in the section on Western intervention, the NAM has condemned U.S.

sanctions against Libya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. They have also opposed sanctions on Iran and

the Iranian nuclear program and support Iran’s right to enrich uranium174 and consistently

condemn the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. In addition, the NAM stated its 1998 summit that the

United States remove its No-Fly Zone over Kurdish portions of Iraq, despite the fact that the No-

Fly Zone probably saved thousands of Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s brutal actions.175 The

hawks have pushed for such condemnations of U.S. sanctions and policies not just because they

oppose the United States ideologically, but also because they hope to protect their own security.

By gathering the 118 member movement in opposition to U.S. policies like sanctions in Iran and

intervention in Iraq, NAM hawks hope to provide cover for their actions, protect their own

security, and dissuade the international community from implementing further sanctions or tough

measures. Tangibly, this can be seen throughout each of the major events mentioned in the

previous sections. The NAM prevents the NPT Review Conferences from naming potential

proliferators like Iran and Syria while the NAM also worked for more than a year to prevent the

IAEA Board of Governors from referring Iran to the United Nations Security Council. 176 These

174 "Non-aligned States to back Iran." Al Jazeera English 13 June 2006. <http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2006/06/200849135031756606.html> 175 Proc. of the Twelfth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Durban, South Africa. 1998. Web. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/RelevantDocuments/Pages/default.aspx> 176 "Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference." Interview by Susan Welsh. 1995. Pgs. 8-9

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events demonstrate that the motivations of the NAM hawks stem not just from ideas, but also

from interests in protecting their own security.

In addition, many of the NAM hawks work through the movement against the United

States to provide cover domestically. States like Iran and Zimbabwe especially capitalize on

histories of colonialism and pit the NAM as a movement opposed to modern American

imperialism. Iranian leaders in part work to legitimate their nuclear program by citing the

NAM’s support for enrichment activities, as can be seen in the Iranian state newspapers’

constant reports on the subject.177 Levels of anti-Americanism are likely high in these states,

though good poll numbers are generally unavailable, further supporting the assertion that

domestic politics play a small role in NAM hawks’ motivations as far as the NAM as a

counterhegemonic bloc.

NAM hawks, motivated by the security and domestic concerns mentioned above,

emphasize neo-colonialist issues with regard to intervention and sanctions, convincing fellow

NAM members of the modern threat of colonialism from the United States and further

encouraging counterhegemonic ideology within the movement. In effect, these actions by NAM

hawks, coupled with their insertion of more radical language into summit documents, have

pushed this movement toward a counterhegemonic bloc. This brings up an important question –

how exactly have the NAM hawks won over the movement? Evidence presented above shows

that the movement has been in many ways influenced and radicalized by these hawks, but not

how these hawks managed to succeed in doing so. One major way they do this is through their

push for increasing institutionalization and in their leadership roles in these institutions (as

177 See the following articles: “UN sanctions against Iran illegal,” PressTV, <http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/174476.html> and “Iran Hails NAM’s invaluable support,” PressTV, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/169220.html and “NAM: Respect Iran’s Nuclear Rights,” PressTV, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/169110.html All of these articles were written in the past two months by PressTV, affiliate of the Iranian state news agency.

76

discussed below). In addition, the NAM was not a priority for many moderate Third World

states after the fall of the Soviet Union. The hawks used this period to consolidate control over

the movement and push some of the institutional measures and more radical language that helped

radicalize the movement. When counterhegemonic ideology began to rise among NAM states

after perceptions of U.S. hegemony increased, NAM hawks had the institutions and rhetoric in

place to exert control and direction over the movement, as seen in their positions as Chairs (Cuba

and Iran) and the positions espoused in Summits in 2003, 2006 and 2009.178 The hawks were

crucial in the NAM’s shift to counterhegemonic ideology.

Institutionalization

As mentioned above, the NAM hawks have pushed to institutionalize the NAM to help it

better coordinate its positions in international organizations, while taking leadership roles in the

movement. These institutional measures have further helped unite the movement against U.S.

priorities, in a practical way allowing states to better negotiate their votes. The NAM has

enhanced the power of coordinating bureaus in United Nations cities, including Vienna, Geneva

and New York, establishing the practice of NAM countries meeting before each major

international vote or conference.179 For example, they opened a coordinating office in Vienna in

2003.180 Much of the staff from these offices comes from the current chair of the movement,

thus the chairmanships of Cuba and Iran have a significant effect on the coordinating offices and

the movement’s policies at large.

178 Proceedings of the Thirteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 2003; Proceedings of the Fourteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Havana, Cuba. 2006; Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cairo, Egypt. 2009 179 Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Durban, South Africa. 1998 16 and Morphet, Sally. “Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What is the Global South Doing and Where is it Going?” Global Governance. 2004 Pgs. 19-20. 180 Gerami, N. The International Atomic Energy Agency: An Organizational Perspective. GCST Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Series, (1). Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST). February 2011 <http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/198_Non-Proliferation_Series_1_-_The_International_Atomic_Energy_Agency.pdf>

77

In addition, the NAM established the Troika, a group of three countries that directs

coordinating bureaus and sets agendas for the summits. The Troika is made up of the past chair,

current chair, and proximate chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. This idea was first voiced by

Iran’s representative to the 1995 NPT Review Conference in his frustration at Iran’s failure to

control NAM positions: “I think we [the NAM] would have been able to have a common

position if we had had better coordination, I mean collective coordination by a group of key non-

aligned countries that should have played an active role.”181 This tentative idea turned into the

NAM Troika, a body that has grown in power and influence in the NAM. Currently, the troika is

made up of Iran, Egypt and Cuba. However, given internal turmoil in Egypt, it seems to be

dominated by Iran and Cuba. These institutional measures have played an important role in

increasing NAM cohesion and in allowing the NAM hawks to consolidate control and further

move the body against U.S. policy positions.

Alternative Hypotheses

In examining the Non-Aligned Movement’s maintenance of cohesion, this thesis

considered a number of alternative hypotheses, including hypotheses of domestic politics and

material interests. While the evidence provided in this chapter thus far presents a full picture of

the NAM as a counterhegemonic movement based on ideas, such an argument could not be

complete without analyzing more basic hypotheses related to the interests and domestic politics

that tend to dominate states’ foreign policies.

Domestic Politics

181 Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference." Interview by Susan Welsh. 1995. Pgs. 10-12

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A theory of domestic politics would predict that the NAM was driven together due to

public opinion or the desire of leaders to remain in power. This thesis measures the role anti-

Americanism plays in predicting countries’ defection rates over time.182 With the NAM

emerging as a bloc counter to the West, leaders could choose to actively participate in the

movement due to rising anti-Americanism in the last decade, perhaps in attempts to woo anti-

American populaces. Utilizing data from the Pew Center’s Project on Global Attitudes, this

thesis conducted statistical regressions between defection and anti-Americanism in 2000 and

2005.

The data demonstrate little correlation between anti-Americanism and cohesion levels

both in each year and over time. The regression table is included below. R-squared values are

negligible of .009, showing little correlation in these instances. Qualitatively, some evidence

might suggest that NAM leaders harness domestic anti-Americanism in the NAM in cases like

Libya and Zimbabwe with extreme anti-Western leaders.183 In the data (included in the

appendix), states with high levels of anti-Americanism like Jordan tend to vote most often with

the NAM – in 2005, Jordan had a defection rate of 0 and approval rating of U.S. of 21%.

However, states with high approval levels of the U.S. like India also have low defection rates –

in 2005, India had a defection rate of 0 and approval rating of U.S. of 71%. This inconsistent

evidence suggests that domestic politics and anti-Americanism do not explain well the NAM’s

persistence, though it could at times play into NAM hawks’ motivation in pushing the movement

toward counterhegemony and in some states acceptance of anti-U.S. positions as part of the

NAM.

182 Anti-Americanism is measured in part in order to explain the rise in anti-U.S. and counterhegemonic rhetoric and in due to the shift in NAM voting patterns away from the United States. 183 Motivations of NAM hawks differ slightly from NAM moderates, as domestic and security concerns play more of a role.

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Anti-Americanism Regression Table Model

R R Square Adjusted R

Square Std. Error of the

Estimate

d

i

m

e

n

s

i

o

n

0

1 .094a .009 -.090 3.48138

Alternate theories of domestic politics could argue that NAM countries have remained

cohesive not because of anti-Americanism but because of Third World solidarity generally or

because of the prestige associated with voting with the NAM in international bodies. This thesis

finds little evidence to support such assertions. Testing these quantitatively is near impossible,

and potential causal links in modern states between NAM prestige or Third World solidarity and

U.N. votes through domestic politics seem implausible. Internal political vulnerability and

personal security concerns, and leaders’ goals in projecting these vulnerabilities outwards

through the NAM, may play some slight role in the story of the NAM’s persistence, as

mentioned above. But these issues land squarely in neorealism rather than domestic politics.184

Material Interests

A second set of alternative hypotheses deal with material interests. Despite the Third

World’s general move away from the United States in voting patterns through the NAM, it

184 Krasner, Stephen D. Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California, 1985

80

stands to reason that those states that still defected might do so due to trade ties with the United

States or foreign aid from the United States. Responding to a question about U.S. pressure on

NAM countries prior to the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Venezuelan Ambassador Taylhardat

stated:

There are many ways of exerting pressure, especially when countries are going through difficult times, and most of the developing countries are going through difficult times, including my own. So it is very easy [to exert pressure] by [using a] simple phrase saying basically, “You better think of what we do for you.185

Studies have been undertaken with regard to the latter question, as issues of foreign aid in the

early 1990s played into discussions of the makeup of the Security Council. The logic supporting

these hypotheses says that NAM states more closely tied either trade or aid-wise to the United

States will be those most likely to defect from the NAM consensus votes (higher defection rates).

The data shows that this is not the case. This thesis analyzed trade using dyadic dataset from the

Correlates of War (COW), aggregating trade per year per NAM country with the U.S. and

dividing it by total national trade, thus providing a measure of trade dependence on the United

States. There is a small correlation between trade and defection rate analyzed both over time and

in each specific year, with an R-squared of .044 and a correlation coefficient of slightly higher at

.210. Qualitatively, there also seems little correlation between trade and defection. As

mentioned prior, Angola was one of several states to oppose the U.S. proposal on Iraq in the

United Nations Security Council while also having major aid and trade connections to the United

States. “US oil imports from Angola of just over half if its 900,000 barrel a day production mean

that it is Angola's biggest trading partner. And with investments by US oil companies Chevron

185 Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference." Interview by Susan Welsh. 1995. Pgs. 8-9

81

and ExxonMobil, the US is also the biggest foreign investor in Angola.” Despite this, Angola has

a defection rate of 0 in 2000 and 2005, meaning it never defected from the NAM consensus. 186

Trade Regression Table Model

R R Square Adjusted R

Square Std. Error of the

Estimate dimension0

1 .210a .044 .042 .067119

With regard to aid, this thesis obtained values from Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Commission (DAC) dataset to

test the aid hypothesis. There also appears to be little correlation between foreign aid and

defection rate, with an R-squared of .003 and correlation coefficient of .053. Examining some

instances of states with high trade or aid with the United States further demonstrates the lack of

correlation between such votes and these material interests. For example, Egypt and Pakistan

receive a significant portion of U.S. aid, but both states vote with the NAM the vast majority of

the time (Egypt and Pakistan both have defection rates of 0 for 2000 and 2005).

186 “Caught in the Crossfire.” Africa Confidential, March 2003. <http://www.africa-confidential.com/special-report/id/1/Caught-in-the-crossfire->

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Aid Regression Table Model

R R Square Adjusted R

Square Std. Error of the

Estimate dimension0

1 .053a .003 .000 .060189

Conclusion

This chapter has made several claims regarding the nature of the modern Non-Aligned

Movement. First, that it has united in opposition to U.S. policies due to a rise in

counterhegemonic ideology. Second, that NAM hawks and institutional mechanisms helped

further this shift. The evidence for these claims stems from both the quantitative and the

qualitative. Quantitatively, the NAM has voted less often with the United States and condemned

the United States more often in its Summits. Qualitatively, case studies of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty Review Conferences, U.S. interventions and sanctions, and NAM summits and statements

in response to these events show a movement uniting against U.S. policies and actions of the

course of the last two decades. As a counterhegemonic bloc, the NAM is not an alliance that

always agrees in fighting U.S. actions and policies. Instead, it works closely in international

organizations to fight U.S. priorities diplomatically, be they nuclear or human rights, and provide

cover for its members in the face of U.S. pressure, sanctions and potential intervention.

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Chapter V: Conclusion and Policy Implications

This thesis has reviewed the history of the Non-Aligned Movement, analyzed its voting

patterns since its creation, and argued that its persistence stems from a rise in counterhegemonic

ideology targeted at the United States. This chapter concludes by examining the key claims

made in this thesis, discussing the future of the NAM, the policy implications of the arguments

presented, and avenues for future research.

Key Claims

This thesis draws on counterhegemonic ideology to explain the persistence of the Non-

Aligned Movement after the fall of the Soviet Union, arguing principally that the Non-Aligned

has remained united due to a rise in counterhegemonic ideology, shifting the movement against

U.S. policy towards an anti-American bloc in the United Nations. This rise in counterhegemonic

ideology arose from perceptions of American hegemony from its actions in the Third World and

from its legacy of anti-colonialist and anti-hegemonic ideology, combined with pressure from

NAM hawks and increased institutionalization. Together, these factors helped keep the NAM

together and cohesive into the 21st century. Evidence for these claims comes quantitatively from

shifts in NAM voting patterns and summit documents. Qualitative evidence comes from close

examination of NAM policy in Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences and NAM policy

in response to U.S. sanctions and interventions. This evidence demonstrates a strong case for the

NAM’s shift after the fall of the Soviet Union from a bloc countering East-West tensions to a

bloc countering the U.S. policies through its actions in the United Nations.

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The Future of the Non-Aligned Movement

This thesis has argued that the NAM has remained cohesive due to counterhegemonic

ideas that spread in response to perceived U.S. hegemony and due to pressure from NAM hawks.

Recent developments on each front indicate that the NAM will slowly begin to lose cohesion and

relevance, unless it finds a new set of uniting ideologies.

A Hegemonic United States

A crucial part of the story of the rise of counterhegemonic ideology and the shifts in ideas

in the non-aligned has been the real perception that the United States has acted as a hegemon in

the international system. While perceptions alone do not explain counterhegemony, as explained

throughout Chapter IV, the NAM would not have formed a counterhegemonic bloc without the

perception of the United States as a hegemon. One can expect that the South’s perception of

U.S. hegemony will slowly diminish as U.S. economic dominance becomes less pronounced and

U.S. military power becomes limited, as in many ways it already has, from intervening in the

Third World. As the world becomes more globalized and connected, the United States will

control less and less of the narrative of the global system, and thus Third World perception of

U.S. hegemony seems likely to decline as U.S. power declines in the international system.

A second piece of evidence that could counter Third World perception of U.S. hegemony

is the rise of China’s influence in Africa. As the United States has retreated from influencing

internal affairs of Third World states, China’s effort to secure natural resources has led them to

become more involved in the Third World. According to one Economist Report from April

2011, African nations are beginning to tire of it: “Growing numbers of Africans are turning

against the saviours from the East. They complain that Chinese companies destroy national parks

in their hunt for resources and that they routinely disobey even rudimentary safety rules.

85

Workers are killed in almost daily accidents. Some are shot by managers.”187 The picture that

emerges is one reminiscent of European colonial days in Africa. Such actions by the Chinese

government seem likely to inspire a backlash that would diminish if not extinguish any lingering

perception of U.S. hegemony in Africa. These changes in perception could be crucial in

dispelling the notion within the Third World that the United States is a hegemon, thus shattering

the uniting ideology of counterhegemony. While anti-U.S. sentiment might surely linger,

especially in the NAM hawks, the NAM’s ideological raison d’etre would disappear, thus

fracturing the movement along the lines of the moderates (whose ideology focused on countering

hegemony) and the hawks (who also wanted to counter hegemony but cared more about security

and domestic concerns).

The NAM Hawks and Democratic Uprising

Recent events have demonstrated the increasing isolation of the NAM hawks mentioned

in Chapter IV. Iran has become more isolated in recent years due to its defiance with its nuclear

program. Indeed, according to Müller in his account of the 2010 NPT RevCon, Iran saw itself

isolated and unable to pursue many of its major priorities because of its nuclear program.188

Libya has also seen itself increasingly isolated due to human rights violations. This isolation is

personified by the Arab League’s decision to back a Western-led No-Fly Zone in Libya, an

action previously decried by most NAM states.189 This issue has split the NAM, with some

states angry at Western actions and others satisfied with the Security Council Resolution against

Libya. One should note that India abstained in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution

187 "Africa and China: Rumble in the Jungle." The Economist 20 Apr. 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/18586678>. 188 Müller, Harald. "A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama's Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review Conference." The Nonproliferation Review 18 (2011): 219-35. 189 See situation cited previously on No-Fly Zone in Kurdish zones in Iraq.

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1973, a sign of respect some argue to a fellow non-aligned state threatened by Western

intervention.190

Democratic uprising in the Middle East and worldwide further threatens the role of the

NAM hawks. The NAM arose in part from a number of autocrats’ desires to promote

international cooperation, attain prestige, maximize power, and legitimize their rule.191 It is in

part maintained and elevated in importance by some of the same types of autocrats. Those most

seized in NAM affairs, the NAM hawks especially, have tended to be autocrats hoping to

maximize their power and legitimize their rule.192 Major leaders of the NAM in the past two

decades have been Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe, Hosni Mubarak, Hugo Chavez, and Muammar

Gaddafi. Castro is no longer in power, Mugabe is sick and his power is threatened, Mubarak has

been deposed and Gaddafi is under attacked from his own rebels and from NATO. In a decade,

one could easily envision a world without these leaders. And no next generation of non-aligned

leaders has emerged. These democratic uprisings and the fall in power of NAM hawks indicate

that the hawks’ role in NAM is likely to diminish, in turn diminishing the anti-American nature

of the movement. Without the hawks maintaining their influence in the movement, keeping it

focused on counterhegemony, the counterhegemonic aspect of states’ motivations could begin to

dissolve.

The evidence on the NAM’s future is inconclusive. While the likelihood of a decreasing

perception of U.S. hegemony seems likely to decrease the prevalence of counterhegemonic

ideology, one cannot judge for certain given the nature of ideology and its persistence. One

190 This abstention again demonstrates the lingering power of the NAM. 191 “The Non-Aligned Movement.” Al Jazeera Special: Inside Report. July 15, 2009. Interview with Timothy Lynch. 192 India is the exception to this rule. India’s obsession with non-alignment stems from a long social and historical tradition that in many ways has defined their foreign policy. See Jaipal for more.

87

should not rule out the NAM and its power as a movement in adapting and shifting ideology

given changes in the international system.

Policy Implications

As argued in Chapter IV, the NAM became a counterhegemonic bloc in part due to the

perception of wrongs perpetrated by the United States and shattered expectations for a new

international system. In many ways, these perceptions still define the NAM, perceptions of

economic injustice and the specter of nuclear holocaust. The actions by the Bush administration

in substantively increasing aid to Africa have worked to help dispel these notions. The Obama

administration’s rhetoric on nuclear disarmament has similarly helped America’s image on these

major issues. However, as mentioned previously, the Third World still perceives the United

States as a hegemonic power. Without countering these underlying perceptions, the U.S. will

find it difficult to gain favor and right perceived wrongs in the eyes of NAM states. Thus, this

thesis implies that in relations with the Non-Aligned, the United States should consider

perception and the important role it plays in determining NAM actions. In some ways, such an

approach has already proved effective. The Obama administration’s work and rhetoric toward

creating a perception of U.S. nuclear disarmament proved important in creating a positive result

and consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.193

But countering perception may not be sufficient. The counterhegemonic and anti-

American ideology that has come to define the movement could persist beyond into a more

multipolar world – indeed, it has persisted to this point. The prevalence of such ideology presents

quandaries for American policy. There is little the United States can do to change ideology

193 Sagan, Scott and Jane Vaynman "Conclusion: Lessons Learned from the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review." The Nonproliferation Review 18 (2011): 237-262

88

except to encourage peaceful and friendly relations with all states among the Third World with

the hope that such diplomacy can right perceptions and work towards changing such views.

The powerful role the NAM hawks play in the Non-Aligned Movement also has

implications for U.S. policy. From a normative perspective, NAM hawks using the movement as

cover or consolidating NAM votes on important issues is detrimental to U.S. policy. Past

instances have suggested that the United States can successfully isolate the hawks from other

NAM states more allied with the U.S., thus cutting off their negotiating power and limiting their

influence. This worked successfully in the 2010 NPT RevCon as the United State negotiated

with Egypt and Iran was left isolated and without significant negotiating stature.

This research has also shown that the United States can split the NAM best not only by

dividing NAM allies from the hawks but by pressuring states’ diplomatically early. The NAM

often negotiates consensus on major votes in ministerial meetings prior to those votes. The

United States can best prevent such consensus on these major votes by sending demarches and

applying pressure early. This tactic succeeded in dividing the NAM in 1995 prior to the NPT

Review Conference as their meeting in Bandung failed to produce consensus, in large part due to

early U.S. pressure.

At a broad level, this thesis has demonstrated that the NAM continues to play an

important role in international politics, despite its seemingly anachronistic basis for existing. It

has united against U.S. policies in international organizations and it works to counter these

policies, pushed by the NAM hawks, by negotiating consensus votes in each major U.N.

organization. These conclusions have implications for U.S. policy and for international relations

theory. A movement of 118 countries has united to counter U.S. policy in international

organizations. Such a bloc cannot be ignored when examining an international system often

89

described as unipolar and controlled by the United States. By taking into account the NAM and

its concerns, while also working to divide it from NAM hawks that oppose the United States, the

U.S. can best mend relations with the South and create a new alliance for democracy, progress,

human rights, and peace.

Future Research

This thesis adds to a body of literature on voting blocs in the United Nations and third

world organizations. Given the nature of undergraduate honors work, as opposed to work on a

doctoral dissertation, there was insufficient time to conduct further data analyses and qualitative

analyses that could further buttress the arguments presented. Future research could expand on

the quantitative analysis of the NAM by looking at how NAM votes relate to Europe and Russia

or in how regional blocs play into the NAM’s voting patterns. In addition, research could

expand on the content analysis undertaken with regard to NAM summits. On the qualitative

side, more research could be done in undertaking interviews with NAM officials both past and

present, to integrate some of their views in the evidence presented regarding the persistence of

the movement into the 21st century.

90

A Note on Sources

In writing a thesis on the Non-Aligned Movement, I encountered a number of issues and

challenges, foremost among these being how to find information in reputable sources on the

NAM. As mentioned in Chapter I, very little has been published recently in reputable journals

on the NAM, leaving me few options in researching but to draw on books and articles authored

by less known scholars or scholars biased in their views. In the cases where I draw on such

authors, as in Singham and Hune’s work, I do so only when also supported by a second source

and only to cite facts and history rather than strict analysis or theory. Wherever possible, I tried

to draw on primary sources in Summit Documents and speeches.

In addition, evidence for proving ideas-based hypotheses is hard to come by, especially

related to counterhegemony. No state is going to publicly declare: we are joining the NAM

because we believe in countering hegemony, in this case the hegemony of the United States.

Interviews with those officials that would respond to calls or emails turned up little substantive

information on the movement and its development. Thus, the body of evidence is made up of

narrative from NAM statements, summit documents and third party sources. The nature of such

material provides an incomplete picture. But I did my best to build up a significant enough body

of such evidence to support my arguments and assertions.

91

Appendix I: NAM Principles

Criteria for invitations to Summits of non-aligned states:

1) An independent policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social

systems and non-alignment or a trend in favour of such policy;

2) Consistent support to movements for national independence;

3) Non-membership of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power

conflicts;

4) In case of bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or membership of a regional

defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of

Great Power conflicts; and

5) In case of lease of military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been

made in the context of Great Power conflicts194

194 Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement the Origins of a Third World Alliance. 18-19

92

Appendix II: Data

1965 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID Mean 880 0 881 0 882 0 883 0 884 36.36 885 14.29 886 8.7 887 0 888 4.17 889 12 890 0 891 4.55 892 0 893 27.78 894 26.32 895 19.05 896 0 897 0 898 8 899 8 900 0 901 0 902 9.09 903 0 904 0 905 0 906 13.64 907 13.64 908 5.88 909 36.36 910 0 911 0 912 0 913 0 914 0 915 0

93

916 0 917 0 918 42.86 919 0 920 30

Average 7.821707317

1970 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID Mean 1110 16 1111 20 1112 0 1113 0 1114 0 1115 0 1116 13.16 1117 36.36 1118 0 1119 48 1120 25 1121 50 1122 21.05 1123 2.56 1124 2.86 1125 0 1126 0 1127 2.17 1128 2.27 1129 43.48 1130 0 1131 21.05 1132 18.42 1133 28.21 1134 6.52 1135 0 1136 0 1137 0 1138 31.03 1139 29.03 1140 37.93

94

1141 40 1142 21.87 1143 17.14 1144 2.22 1145 40 1146 0 1147 0 1148 0 1149 2.38 1150 2.63 1151 2.27 1152 0 1153 23.53 1154 0 1155 0 1156 0 1157 9.76 1158 0 1159 5.41 1160 0 1161 8.7 1162 0 1163 10.87 1164 4.17 1165 0 1166 25 1167 42.86 1168 23.81 1169 33.33 1170 0 1171 19.51 1172 2.13 1173 2.17 1174 2.13 1175 6.52 1176 2.04

Average 12.02313433

1975 Defection Rate By Revolution

RCID Mean

95

1582 0 1583 6.25 1584 3.7 1585 6.67 1586 0 1587 0 1588 0 1589 32.35 1590 20.45 1591 1.69 1592 1.79 1593 1.75 1594 0 1595 0 1596 0 1597 2 1598 1.75 1599 1.69 1600 1.67 1601 3.77 1602 1.75 1603 6.25 1604 0 1605 0 1606 0 1607 0 1608 0 1609 0 1610 0 1611 0 1612 0 1613 0 1614 1.75 1615 1.72 1616 1.79 1617 3.7 1618 0 1619 1.67 1620 0 1621 0 1622 19.3

96

1623 0 1624 11.32 1625 5.88 1626 0 1627 3.39 1628 3.23 1629 1.64 1630 0 1631 0 1632 0 1633 0 1634 0 1635 1.79 1636 5 1637 0 1638 14 1639 41.46 1640 0 1641 11.36 1642 2.22 1643 0 1644 1.67 1645 1.67 1646 0 1647 1.64 1648 1.69 1649 1.61 1650 1.59 1651 1.64

Average 3.375142857

1980 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID Mean 2094 21.52 2095 20.29 2096 12.94 2097 5.49 2098 1 2099 0.99

97

2100 0.99 2101 0 2102 13.83 2103 23.66 2104 3 2105 5 2106 1.98 2107 2.02 2108 0 2109 2.06 2110 0 2111 0.99 2112 0 2113 0 2114 7.53 2115 0 2116 0.99 2117 0 2118 0 2119 4.08 2120 0 2121 0.98 2122 13.54 2123 7.06 2124 3.03 2125 31.25 2126 3.16 2127 1.03 2128 0 2129 0 2130 12.05 2131 2.06 2132 1.04 2133 0 2134 1.03 2135 4.55 2136 4.04 2137 1.02 2138 6.38 2139 2.04 2140 15.58

98

2141 13.48 2142 1.02 2143 2.15 2144 1.02 2145 10.99 2146 1.01 2147 0 2148 0 2149 0 2150 1.23 2151 1.02 2152 1.02 2153 3.09 2154 1.02 2155 2.06 2156 4.08 2157 17.5 2158 9.21 2159 0 2160 2.06 2161 0 2162 4.12 2163 0 2164 2.13 2165 22.41 2166 1.01 2167 1 2168 26.47 2169 23.17 2170 49.06 2171 31.82 2172 0 2173 3.13 2174 2 2175 0 2176 27.94 2177 11.7 2178 0 2179 2.74 2180 9.09 2181 7.35

99

2182 8.82 2183 1.59 2184 4.29 2185 4.35 2186 16.44 2187 1.1 2188 4.55 2189 5.62 2190 1.12 2191 1.09 2192 1.11 2193 2.2 2194 1.09 2195 0 2196 8.89

Average 5.801553398

1985 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID Mean 2791 2.25 2792 22.83 2793 24.27 2794 5.32 2795 19.42 2796 1.89 2797 2.13 2798 27.45 2799 1 2800 2.04 2801 2.02 2802 0.99 2803 26.32 2804 0 2805 3.92 2806 1.94 2807 0.97 2808 0.98 2809 0 2810 11.43 2811 11.59

100

2812 2.08 2813 3.06 2814 5.71 2815 3.81 2816 2.88 2817 1.89 2818 21.15 2819 2.83 2820 0.97 2821 1.89 2822 1.03 2823 2.11 2824 3.06 2825 5 2826 2.94 2827 2.91 2828 11.65 2829 22.77 2830 15.15 2831 2.91 2832 0.95 2833 7.62 2834 0.95 2835 2.86 2836 0.97 2837 19.35 2838 25.49 2839 27.45 2840 21.57 2841 9.09 2842 2.94 2843 1.9 2844 7.92 2845 45.54 2846 19.1 2847 15.15 2848 5.88 2849 34.62 2850 1.94 2851 0.97 2852 1.94

101

2853 17.48 2854 0.95 2855 0.94 2856 0 2857 0.94 2858 0 2859 0.95 2860 1.9 2861 2.88 2862 0 2863 2.83 2864 0.96 2865 47.87 2866 38.38 2867 47.47 2868 25.84 2869 49.49 2870 6.86 2871 1.01 2872 1.01 2873 1.96 2874 2.97 2875 7 2876 4 2877 1.98 2878 0.99 2879 2.91 2880 26.73 2881 10 2882 1.92 2883 2.88 2884 44.44 2885 10 2886 7.92 2887 1.9 2888 0.95 2889 3.81 2890 0.97 2891 3.37 2892 6.82 2893 5.32

102

2894 1.92 2895 7.77 2896 14.77 2897 5.15 2898 4.08 2899 12.24 2900 8.08 2901 8 2902 13.13 2903 3.88 2904 1.96 2905 0 2906 0 2907 1.94 2908 0.96 2909 3.85 2910 5.88 2911 8.74 2912 1.96 2913 0.96 2914 0 2915 20.79 2916 31 2917 6.93 2918 1 2919 0.98 2920 21.65 2921 0.93 2922 0 2923 2.86 2924 38.78 2925 0 2926 0 2927 0 2928 0.93 2929 1.87 2930 0 2931 2.97 2932 0.97 2933 10.31 2934 10.53

103

2935 12.5 2936 18.45 2937 0.99 2938 0 2939 0 2940 1 2941 0 2942 2 2943 1 2944 1 2945 1

Average 7.942387097

1990 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID Mean 3501 3.96 3502 0 3503 5 3504 2.02 3505 4.12 3506 2.02 3507 0.99 3508 0.99 3509 0 3510 2.94 3511 1 3512 1 3513 0.99 3514 1.03 3515 1.01 3516 1 3517 1 3518 17.17 3519 0 3520 0 3521 0 3522 0 3523 1 3524 0.96

104

3525 46.08 3526 6.73 3527 0 3528 1.92 3529 1.92 3530 0 3531 6.8 3532 0.97 3533 0.97 3534 0.96 3535 0.96 3536 0.96 3537 1.96 3538 15.84 3539 1 3540 0 3541 1.01 3542 0 3543 2.02 3544 0 3545 0 3546 0 3547 0 3548 0 3549 0 3550 0 3551 0 3552 0 3553 11.11 3554 0 3555 0 3556 0 3557 0 3558 2.02 3559 0 3560 0.99 3561 0 3562 2.06 3563 1.92 3564 0.99 3565 15.84

105

3566 26 3567 1.96 3568 0.98 3569 0 3570 0.98 3571 0.97 3572 2.94 3573 0.97 3574 4.04 3575 15.15 3576 4.85 3577 3.81 3578 1.04 3579 2.06 3580 2.04 3581 13.4 3582 0 3583 4.08 3584 1.03 3585 0 3586 1.05

Average 3.03

1995 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID 2.41 3875 2.44 3876 19.18 3877 0 3878 0 3879 6.02 3880 24.68 3881 16.92 3882 3.85 3883 0 3884 0 3885 0 3886 0 3887 3.66 3888 0 3889 22.22

106

3890 1.12 3891 2.25 3892 5.68 3893 1.08 3894 4.82 3895 1.12 3896 0 3897 0 3898 0 3899 0 3900 0 3901 0 3902 0 3903 0 3904 0 3905 0 3906 0 3907 0 3908 0 3909 1.06 3910 0 3911 1.11 3917 0 3920 0 3921 2.13 3922 1.06 3923 1.04 3924 1.11 3925 1.02 3926 4.08 3927 23.08 3928 2.41 3929 1.11 3930 1.2 3931 2.08 3932 2.33 3933 0 3934 3.12 3935 0 3936 4.17 3937 5.26

107

3938 0 3939 5.26 3940 38.36 3941 0 3942 3.57 3943 4.65 3944 3.41 3945 0 3946 0 3947 3.49 3948 13.48 3949 0 3950 0 3951 9.78 3952 17.05 3953 3.26 3954 48.08 3955 25 3956 28.57 3957 8.99 3958 40.68 3959 20 3960 33.9 3961 1.11 3962 5.968641975

Average 6.012575827

2000 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCID Mean 4238 1.16 4239 5.95 4240 1.28 4241 0.96 4242 0 4243 1.09 4244 0 4245 2.3 4246 14.81 4247 0 4248 1.06

108

4249 0 4250 0 4251 0 4252 0 4253 0 4254 1.1 4255 0 4256 0 4257 1.2 4258 0 4259 0 4260 1.06 4261 0 4262 0 4263 0 4264 2.44 4265 1.16 4266 1.15 4267 0 4268 0 4269 3.7 4270 1.01 4271 0 4272 0 4273 3.33 4274 1.06 4275 6.25 4276 4.04 4277 4.12 4278 0 4279 35.56 4280 35.09 4281 46 4282 36.54 4283 0 4284 0 4285 0 4286 0 4287 0 4288 0 4289 8.14

109

4290 0 4291 0 4292 0 4293 0 4294 0 4295 0 4296 1.12 4297 0 4298 0 4299 0 4300 0 4301 0 4302 0 4303 0 4304 0

Average 3.32358209

2005 Defection Rate By Resolution

RCIP Mean 4593 0 4594 0 4595 0 4596 4.65 4597 3.3 4598 0.99 4599 0.99 4600 3.03 4601 36.84 4602 30.23 4603 47.06 4604 30.95 4605 33.33 4606 0 4607 4 4608 2 4609 0 4610 0 4611 0.98 4612 1.98 4613 8.79

110

4614 0 4615 0 4616 3.09 4617 0 4618 0 4619 0.96 4620 1.96 4621 2.91 4622 0 4623 5.15 4624 0 4625 0.96 4626 0 4627 0 4628 1.15 4629 1.02 4630 0 4631 0 4632 2.02 4633 16.13 4634 0 4635 1.94 4636 1.96 4637 1.09 4638 2.02 4639 1.01 4640 0.99 4641 3 4642 2.04 4643 2.06 4644 13.19 4645 4.08 4646 4.12 4647 7.22 4648 4.12 4649 0 4650 0 4651 0.99 4652 0 4653 0 4654 1.01

111

4655 1.94 4656 2.08 4657 3.12 4658 7.14 4659 1.04 4660 1.03 4661 7.37 4662 8.33 4663 3.85 4664 0 4665 0 4666 0

Average 4.475810811

Defection Rate, Aid, Trade and Domestic Politics by Country by Year

The charts below contain values of defection rate by country for the period 1990-2005

along with the corresponding values for aid, trade and anti-Americanism.195 The Country Codes

are from the Correlates of War dataset. These values were used in conducting the regressions

and analyses in Chapter IV.

1990

Country Code

Defection Rate

U.S. Aid (Millions of $)

Trade Dependence (Trade with U.S./Total Trade)

31 6.98 0.43 40 9.41 0 41 2.99 50 0.95 42 9.52 25 0.93 51 5.81 104 0.51 52 0 0.49 53 3.49 -1 0.3 54 17.74 0.27

195 There is not a significant amount of data from the Pew on anti-Americanism. Data is only used for 2000 and 2005, and even though very few countries had data on anti-Americanism. The data available is included.

112

55 6.98 0.32 56 3.7 0.34 57 8.54 1 0.27 58 5.81 0.35 60 10.53 2 0.55 80 3.49 12 0.5 90 0 88 0.53 91 7.14 215 0.54 93 0 97 0.09 95 28.57 97 0.42

100 3.57 -19 0.44 101 2.33 0.53 110 2.33 -17 0.27 115 2.33 0.26 130 4.71 27 0.47 135 5.88 79 0.27 145 0 84 0.23 155 3.57 -28 0.19 345 2.33 0.05 370 4.76 402 0 5 0.09 404 0 7 0.01 420 0 12 0 432 1.16 30 0.01 433 0 57 0.04 434 0 5 0.12 435 1.18 10 0.06 436 1.2 31 0.1 437 5.95 17 0.07 438 0 0.16 439 2.35 11 451 1.16 3 0.19 452 2.33 13 0.12 461 2.35 10 0.04 471 3.57 39 0.07 475 1.16 22 0.46 481 1.16 2 0.26 482 5.81 3 0.01 483 0 18 0.04 484 2.44 3 0.26 490 2.44 32 0.16

113

500 2.38 30 0.06 501 3.9 95 0.07 510 1.16 39 0.02 516 2.38 18 0.03 517 0 13 0.09 520 1.19 72 0.02 522 0 6 0.03 530 4.65 50 0.07 540 3.95 1 541 1.25 62 0.07 551 2.5 12 0.09 552 2.33 15 0.07 553 16.67 21 0.06 565 2.35 570 3.53 14 0.04 571 3.53 15 0.01 572 1.22 14 580 2.63 22 0.06 591 1.19 8 0.02 600 1.16 57 0.04 615 2.35 0.19 616 1.18 31 0.03 620 1.18 0 625 2.41 143 0.03 630 2.33 0 640 30.59 -76 0.09 645 3.49 0.23 651 2.33 2346 0.15 652 2.38 0.05 660 0 12 0.04 663 1.19 58 0.13 670 0 0.22 678 2.38 41 690 0 0.09 692 0 0.05 694 0 0.04 696 0 0.06 698 0 4 0.08 700 3.53 56 0.02 712 1.18 0.01 750 8.24 -24 0.14

114

760 2.33 770 3.49 167 0.12 771 1.16 169 0.15 775 4.71 1 0.04 780 0 75 0.16 781 1.16 0.09 790 2.35 17 0.08 800 1.19 30 0.16 812 2.41 0.01 816 3.57 2 0 820 1.16 0.18 830 2.33 2 0.17 840 1.16 248 0.29 850 2.33 31 0.13 910 3.7 1 0.06

1995

CCODE Defection Rate

Aid from U.S.

Trade Dependence

31 20.78 1 0.32 40 20.25 0 41 5.06 382 0.74 51 10.13 28 0.52 52 6.41 0.38 53 14.67 -1 0.36 54 22 0.27 55 20.83 0.39 56 4.55 0.37 57 23.08 0.33 58 19.74 60 45.45 0.41 80 10.26 4 0.47 90 12.07 37 0.59 91 3.8 46 0.78 93 10.53 29 0.38 95 6.25 6 0.3

100 3.75 21 0.4 101 8.75 0.5 110 3.7 8 0.27 115 8.64 5 0.33

115

130 9.88 13 0.4 135 8.64 81 0.24 145 5.06 89 0.22 155 3.8 -49 0.19 370 25.93 0.01 402 7.04 6 0.03 404 15.38 6 0 411 40.63 0.15 420 50 6 0.06 432 7.69 31 0.03 433 2.63 22 0.04 434 12.5 11 0.06 435 7.04 1 0.04 436 9.21 31 0.04 437 19.23 9 0.06 438 9.09 28 0.12 439 7.69 14 450 0 12 0.01 451 13.56 8 0.17 452 11.11 54 0.09 461 12.66 3 0.09 471 13.58 3 0.03 475 14.47 5 0.32 481 15.79 2 0.45 483 8.33 12 0.05 484 17.74 7 0.21 490 22.22 0.12 500 0 49 0.03 501 0 36 0.05 510 0 18 0.04 516 0 23 0.1 517 0 101 0.13 522 0 1 0.02 530 0 70 0.12 531 0 5 540 0 31 541 0 96 0.09 551 0 21 0.03 552 0 29 0.05 553 0 58 0.06 560 0 107

116

565 0 6 570 0 11 571 0 13 572 0 12 580 0 26 0.09 591 0 0.04 600 0 -21 0.06 615 0 0.16 616 0 -14 0.03 620 0 0 625 0 8 0.04 630 0 0.02 640 0 101 0.1 651 0 626 0.19 652 0 0.04 660 0 2 0.09 663 0 107 0.07 670 0 0.19 679 0 3 690 0 0.13 692 0 0.06 694 0 0.05 696 0 0.05 698 0 1 0.06 700 0 2 0.02 701 0 0.02 704 0 1 0.01 712 0 0.04 731 0 0 750 0 16 0.15 760 0 770 0 -82 0.12 771 0 56 0.18 775 0 0.03 780 0 25 0.18 781 0 0.04 790 0 19 0.11 800 0 15 0.15 811 0 33 0.02 812 0 2 0.01 816 0 1 0.02

117

820 0 0.2 830 0 1 0.16 840 0 112 0.28 850 0 -7 0.15 910 0 1 0.02

2000

CCODE Defection Rate

Aid from U.S.

Trade Dependence

% Approve of U.S.

31 4 0.3 40 13 1.39 0 41 2 91.04 0.55 42 8 -18.8 0.67 51 6 -26.15 0.48 52 5 0.79 0.59 53 0 0.3 0.36 54 0 0.19 0.31 55 0 0.34 0.42 56 7 0.29 0.42 57 0 0.03 0.33 58 5 -0.05 60 4 -0.38 0.66 80 0 -0.52 0.5 90 10 57.96 0.61 91 7 110.29 1.06 93 9 72.77 0.43 95 2 -8.78 0.35

100 6 105.14 0.46 101 6 6.82 0.48 110 2 7.58 0.27 115 3 0.59 0.29 130 2 47.06 0.37 135 12 92.34 0.27 145 5 97.37 0.18 155 8 -19.05 0.18 345 16 0.01 370 5 0.02 402 9 2.9 0.06 403 13 0.03 411 0 0.03 0.19

118

420 10 3.24 0.02 432 5 56.44 0.03 433 6 22.88 0.03 434 6 29.72 0.04 435 9 4.15 0.01 436 0 5.27 0.02 437 4 10 0.08 438 7 25.68 0.13 439 7 9.33 451 9 7.97 0.05 452 8 63.34 0.1 461 7 1.93 0.03 471 9 2.53 0.07 475 10 32.53 0.33 46 481 0 1.34 0.44 483 10 4.11 0.07 484 23 3.51 0.21 490 32 12.75 0.14 500 0 57.92 0.05 501 0 45.88 0.05 94 510 0 24.52 0.04 516 0 0.96 0.06 517 0 22.93 0.07 522 0 1.14 0.02 530 0 129.82 0.05 531 0 39.49 540 0 37.31 541 0 115.52 0.04 551 0 46.08 0.04 552 0 13.11 0.05 553 0 59.32 0.08 560 0 105.85 0.13 565 0 9.5 570 0 1.3 571 0 0.99 572 0 0.22 580 0 31.63 0.13 600 0 14 0.06 615 0 0.12 616 0 -19.69 0.03 620 0 0

119

625 0 5.21 0.01 630 0 0.01 640 0 -61.93 0.09 52 651 0 634.82 0.16 652 0 0.04 660 0 31.83 0.08 663 0 187.76 0.09 670 0 0.19 679 0 56.59 690 0 0.15 692 0 0.07 694 0 0.05 696 0 0.05 698 0 -3 0.04 700 0 2.42 0.02 701 0 0.02 704 0 35.66 0.05 712 0 12.59 0.13 731 0 1.58 0 750 0 14.55 0.15 760 0 770 0 88.46 0.15 23 771 0 62.54 0.19 775 0 3.36 0.1 780 0 -3.86 0.2 781 0 -0.09 0.22 790 0 15.95 0.16 800 0 12.64 0.19 811 0 21.46 0.35 812 0 2.7 0.01 816 0 6.79 0.04 820 0 0.15 0.22 830 0 0.15 840 0 75.46 0.28 850 0 174.19 0.15 75 910 0 0.95 0.02

2005

CCODE Defection Rate

Aid from U.S.

Trade Dependence

% Approve of U.S.

120

31 8.7 0.23 40 15.28 9.84 0.05 41 15.15 140.6 0.59 42 13.7 18.92 0.61 51 8.11 17.77 0.38 52 5.97 0.52 0.6 53 8.11 1.46 0.34 54 0 0.2 55 15.79 7.11 0.25 56 7.14 0.22 57 0 -0.1 0.34 58 7.04 -0.17 60 14.29 -0.7 0.51 80 4.29 0.94 0.32 90 10.81 38.36 0.46 91 12.5 88.38 0.65 93 7.35 102.61 0.51 95 9.59 7.5 0.29

100 10.96 448.94 0.36 101 9.46 8.96 0.55 110 6.94 17.6 0.24 115 7.14 0.86 0.24 130 2.74 71.33 0.41 135 6.76 155.19 0.26 145 2.9 139.61 0.14 155 5.41 -0.12 0.17 345 370 17.81 1.81 0.02 402 8.82 12.15 0.03 403 0 0.14 0.14 404 4.69 1.38 0.01 411 0 0.19 0.27 420 18.52 1.99 0.05 432 6.94 56.85 0.02 433 7.25 44.73 0.03 434 7.14 24.41 0.02 435 4.11 20.02 0.04 436 7.94 29.2 0.14 437 11.11 23.77 0.11 438 6.85 43.6 0.07 439 9.72 20.11

121

450 1.92 86.35 0.03 451 0 21.85 0.06 452 8.22 66.9 0.07 461 6.76 2.98 0.01 471 30.88 13.75 0.05 475 6.76 98.96 0.4 62 481 0 1.79 0.45 482 4.08 17.47 0.07 483 0 60.85 0.7 484 0 15.07 0.26 490 12.82 143.64 0.11 500 0 228.82 0.04 501 0 153.26 0.1 510 0 93.69 0.03 516 0 54.79 0.04 517 0 57.13 0.03 520 0 36.95 0.01 522 0 7.57 0.04 530 0 608.61 0.12 531 0 141.5 540 0 67.24 541 0 85.36 0.02 551 0 110.79 0.02 552 0 41.65 0.03 553 0 56.34 0.11 560 0 116.78 0.1 565 0 28.87 570 0 2.72 571 0 17.96 572 0 1.68 580 0 80.6 0.13 591 0 0.01 0.02 600 0 -14.91 0.04 615 0 1.05 0.18 616 0 -15.14 0.02 620 0 0.13 0.05 625 0 759.04 0.01 630 0 3.79 0 640 0 -14.5 0.06 23 645 0 11227.79 0.36 651 0 401.76 0.12

122

652 0 0.36 0.02 660 0 38.3 0.05 42 663 0 353.33 0.13 21 670 0 0.17 679 0 15.86 690 0 0.13 692 0 0.04 694 0 0.04 696 0 0.06 698 0 -1.44 0.05 700 0 1318.3 0.11 701 0 0.05 704 0 34.97 0.03 712 0 18.53 0.09 731 0 7.91 0 750 0 57.13 0.12 71 760 0 770 0 323.07 0.12 23 771 0 49.15 0.14 775 0 4.11 0 780 0 59.14 0.16 781 0 1.09 0.02 790 0 52.05 0.06 800 0 20.72 0.13 811 0 70.36 0.34 812 0 7.36 0.01 816 0 28.14 0.12 820 0 1.18 0.19 830 0 0.09 840 0 96.76 0.21 850 0 155.64 0.12 38 910 0 0.03 0.02

123

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