The Nigerian Judiciary: Impacting Elections Through Court Decisions.

Judedavid Mbamalu

February 22, 2012

This paper had earlier been presented to Walden University, as part of the

requirements for the award of PHD in public policy and law.

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ABSTRACT

“And, I beseech you,

wrest once the law to your authority:

To do a great right, do a little wrong”

-Merchant of Venice Act 3, Scene 1

This paper deals with the issue of election outcomes in Nigeria as declared or decided

whether by the electoral body- Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), or by the

Judiciary in exercise of its adjudicatory powers under the Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria. The paper mentions violence exemplified by military coup and rioting

by the electorate as the initial reaction to electoral frauds in Nigeria. Democratic principles

and organs have since been opted for in dealing with the election issues. The paper chronicles

progressive impact of judicial decisions on this issue, which impact, along with new

leadership trait of the current president of Nigeria has changed the election terrain. The paper

concludes by saying that effective leadership drives national ethics.

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Introduction

Nigeria is a democracy, with constitution fashioned after the United States Constitution: It

operates the presidential system of government which stands on the tripod of the executive, the

legislature and the judiciary, all three delineated by the doctrine of separation of powers. (The

constitution 1999, chapters V, VI & VII)

Like the United States, Nigeria’s Constitutional democracy recognises the separateness and

independence of each government, within the country. Elections are held by popular vote into the

executive and legislative arms: Whilst the president and the governors can be elected into their

offices for a four year tenure, with eligibility for further election into the same offices, limited to a

further term of four years and no more, individuals can be elected and re-elected limitlessly into

the legislature for a four year tenure, at a time.

Elections into the executive and legislative arm are sought by the candidates on the platform of

recognized and registered political parties. The constitution did not sanction independent

candidacy.(Tht Constitution 1999.s.221). The Nigerian Constitution established the Independent

National Electoral Commission (INEC) with the power to supervise and organize all elections to

the political offices. (Constitution, 1999, S. 153(1) &[2] ).

The Electoral Act, 2010, further empowers INEC to (a) “conduct voter and civic education (b)

promote knowledge of sound democratic election process” (S. 2(a) & (b)) and also to announce,

“the result and declare the winner of the election” (S. 27(2)).

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The judiciary is one of legs of the tripod on which Nigeria’s presidential system of government

rests. Unlike the executive and legislative arms, the judiciary is an unelected body, with

constitutionally enshrined adjudicatory powers as between persons or between government and its

agencies, or between persons and government or its agencies, to determine any question relating

to a person’s civil rights and obligations. (The Constitution 1999)S. 6(6)(a) & [b])

Election as policy issue

The policy issue engaged in this paper is the exercise by INEC of its statutory powers provided by

the Nigerian Constitution and Electoral Act, highlighted above, and the interventionist act of the

judiciary into INEC’s specious style of exercising the statutory power. Judiciary as deployed in

this paper includes not only the judges but other officers (attorneys) in the temple of justice,

whose participation, involvement, and activities, in and outside the court room, complements and

authenticate judicial intervention in the affairs of INEC.

The Supreme Court recognizing the symbiosis between the judges and the lawyers, stated:

“The Bench and the Bar owe the society in the development of our nascent democracy and as

the custodian of the laws, a duty to interpret them particularly on the subject-matter of

…election suits” Dingadi vs. INEC (2010).

Aside INEC and the judiciary, the political parties, and the electorate come in between to

form a quadripartite; a ”mosaic of groups” Truman (cited in Jodan 1990) which created the

vagaries that influenced and impacted electoral issues in Nigeria. Existing political parties in

Nigeria were not formed with any distinct ideological hue, other than “maximizing votes,

seeking office, and influencing policy”(Maedo and Nishikawa, 2006) by any means including

stealth or graft: The military which held sway in governance in Nigeria, as part of its effort to

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bequeath democracy, in its wisdom registered some political party and thereafter, by

constitutional provision, left the power to register political parties to INEC (The Constitution,

1999, S. 222; Electoral Act 2010. S. 78)

The constitution (s.222) did not include propagation of any ideological bias, as requirement

for registering any political party.

Illiteracy level in Nigeria is substantial, thus requiring that political parties shall have distinct

party symbol, which symbol, INEC shall emboss alongside the acronym of the political

parties on the ballot papers (Electoral Act, 2010. S. 44): These symbols assist the illiterate in

voting the candidate of her/his choice in an election.

So soon after independence in 1960, the issue of election presented a platform for intra-ethnic

violence, in the Western part of Nigeria, which erupted in 1965 as a result of massive

electoral fraud that upturned the choice of the people. (Nwabueze, 1982. P.27). Nwabueze,

stated that the 1964 federal elections, created contention between the president and the prime

minister and eventually heralded the first military coup in 1966.

Sub-Groups reaction

Violence exercised by the cheated electorates, was the first form of reaction to election

issues: The military through coup de tat, joined the fray, sacked the existing government and

installed themselves into governance up to 1979, and after a stint by a civil government

between 1979 and 1983, they staged a comeback remaining in the saddle until 1999.

Lawlessness of both the military and the irked electorate, having given way to democratic

practices of pursuing grievances through democratic channels, the court of law, became the

focal avenue for dealing with election issues in Nigeria.

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The election into the office of the president based on which the military handed over power to

civilian government, in 1979 created a test case for the judiciary. The electoral body,

conducted the election, and declared Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the winner, having scored: the

highest number of votes cast in the election, at least 25% of the total votes cast in each of

twelve of the then existing nineteen States structure, and 19.94% of the votes cast in the

whole of the thirteenth state. The then Electoral Law had provided inter alia, that the winning

candidate shall have, “not less than one quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at

least two – third of all the States in the Federation (S. 34(A)1(c)[ii]) .

The aggrieved candidate and his political party challenged the declaration of Shehu Shagari

as the winner of the presidential election, arguing that he did not satisfy S. 34 of the Electoral

Law to warrant being declared the winner in that election. Awolowo vs. Shagari & ors

(1979).

The real issue was whether by the principles of Interpretation, two-third of 19 States was 13,

which would fault the electoral body’s declaration of Shagari as the winner of the election, or

12 2/3 States which would render the presidential election as inconclusive, necessitating

determining the winner through the process of electoral college.

The Supreme Court affirmed the election result as declared by the electoral body holding that

the figure 12 2/3 rather than 13 was the intention of the legislature; that though Shagari’s

19.94% of the vote scored in the 13th sate was short by 5.0% to comply with the provisions of

the electoral Law, the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the law.

This decision may fell short of expectations from the judiciary, but the exigencies of the time

commended it as an input by the judiciary toward establishing democracy in Nigeria. The

decision was rendered at the twilight of military rule and the necessity to gently herd them

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back to the barracks, made it expedient, that the non-emergence of a clear winner did not

justify their further stay in power. The then chief Justice, Fatayi-Williams, in a post-

judgment remark, stated that the judgment should not be cited as a precedent (personal

communication, October 10, 1979).

As a decision by the apex court in Nigeria, the justification behind it had a domino effect on

the lower courts and gave the Electoral body a cushioning ground to continue manipulation of

election results with impunity in the belief that with the patronage of the government in

power and a docile, lame-duck judiciary, any election issue as devised by it was a fait

accompli: The electorate suffered state tyranny, for voting a minority party candidate in the

governorship election in Kano State; This candidate won the election but had a hostile

legislature majority of who belonged to a rival party. In less than three months in office, the

governor was impeached and removed from office by the legislature, and the court declined

to intervene on the ground that S. 170(5) of the Nigerian Constitution (1979) ousted its

jurisdiction to entertain such matter. Musa vs. Hamza (1982).

Political parties, benefited equally from judicial non-interventionism: Individuals who won

party primary elections were brazenly substituted with persons who lost or did not contest

the election and the court will not entertain any plea for redress on the ground that, “the issue

of primaries, selection, and nomination of candidates to contest an election at any given time

is the exclusive preserve of political parties. It is a domestic issue and non-justifiable…”

Jang vs. INEC (2004); Onuoha vs. Okafor (1982).

The state of affairs, as relayed above gave elasticity to the resilience of: the electoral body in

announcing fake or doctored election results (even when voting was still in progress) and

declaring its anointed candidates as winners; the political parties (notably the ruling party) in

flagrantly trampling on the democratic rights of party members by trading their

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democratically secured, candidacies; the executives and legislature alike, in formulating

public policy issues and implementing them in the most unaccountable manner. The military

had gone, not willingly, but because of the audacity of internal civil liberty organizations, to

confront them and of course because of external pressure from the West. With the exit of the

military the ruling political party (Peoples Democratic Party [PDP] ) became a behemoth,

employing every imaginable tactics to remain in power and create a dynasty.

Paradigm Shifts

The experiences of the civilian interregnum between 1979-1983, and the agitation for change,

resulted in changes in the provisions of the 1999 constitution which replaced the 1979

constitution: The 1999 constitution, (S. 188) removed the seeming omneity of the legislature,

granted it by the 1979 constitution, on impeachment matters, so that an aggrieved person can

approach the court on grounds of constitutional breach. The constitution, like any other

traditional tool for regulating human behavior, as proactive as it may be, lacks omni-

competence, which is a prognosticative element that will deal with complexities it

encounters, from convoluted contingencies.

These complicated contingencies form “policy problems (or policy subsystems)” (Blair 2001)

which by themselves constitute enough force to make or mar the regulatory tool approach to

the implementation of public policy.

The judiciary, became a confluence point for dealing with the hydra-headed challenges in

elections in Nigeria, and in staunching these electoral manipulations, it became, paternalistic

– to the relief of democracy in Nigeria and to the toast of “traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice ”Miliken vs. Meyer (1940). Thus in a gubernatorial election conducted in

April 19, 2003, INEC, inexplicably declared the wrong candidate. Dr. Chris Ngige as the

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winner, in place of Mr. Peter Obi who actually won the election: The court in nullifying the

declaration and instating Mr. Peter Obi had this to say:

INEC has not only a pivotal, but also a delicate role to play in ensuring a free

and fair election in this country, and like Caeser’s wife, it must be seen to

live above board …If it wants to be taken as seriously as it should be or is

expected to be taken, it must learn to do things properly and in accordance

with the rule of law. Ngige vs. Obi (2006)

A corollary to the above case was that the wrong, but favored candidate Dr. Chris Ngige, was

governor of the state for three years whilst the battle to secure justice raged. This may be a

blur or deficiency in democracy, but patience with the principles of democracy is a virtue in

governance and amongst humans, whose ability to perpetrate mischief is catholic.

Governor Obi was sworn in as the governor on March 17, 2006 and another legal battle

erupted, to determine the tenor of his four year tenure, since Ngige had served three years of

the four year tenure, provided for under S. 180 of the Constitution.

The court held that Governor Obi’s four year tenure began to run, reckoned from March 17,

2006, when he took the Oath of office, and will end on March 17, 2010 (Obi vs. INEC (2007)

Whilst, the above matter was pending, and in its jaundiced notion, that Governor Obi’s

tenure was subsumed under the annulled tenure of Ngige, INEC conducted a fresh election:

The Supreme Court nullified the election adding that INEC conducted an election for an

office that was not vacant. Obi vs. INEC (2007). Said the court, “[INEC]” was aware…that

the appellant was in court pursuing his legal rights. A body that has respect for rule of law,

which INEC ought to be, would have waited for the outcome of the court proceedings”. Obi

vs. INEC (2007)

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Departing from its non-interventionist policy in matters of impeachment proceedings, the

courts have since not only intervened but nullified such proceedings on constitutional

grounds: The court relied on its duty as the custodian and guardian of the constitution to

intervene in appropriate cases. Thus the judiciary nullified impeachment proceedings, which

it considered, not to have been carried out strictly in accordance with the constitution: The

court justified the intervention on the premise that S. 188(10) of the constitution which

ousted the jurisdiction of the court, on impeachment proceedings, did not deprive it

jurisdiction to ensure that the constitution itself was not violated. Ekpenyong vs. Umanna

(2010); Adeleke vs. Oyo State House of Assembly (2006);

The fact is that compromise, negotiation and attempts to foster equality of opportunity and

principles of the Federal Character produced unintended consequences of throwing up

irreconcilable tag teams: President/Vice-President, Governor/Deputy Governor, Senate

President/Deputy Senate President, and Speaker/Deputy Speaker. The resultant effect was

that once these pairs got into offices, their differences manifested, bringing about war of

attrition through impeachment proceedings by any of the pair, who possessed weighted

influence over the legislatures: Impeachment proceedings then was a tool with which to settle

political or personal differences without regard to the true tenets of governance.

The concept of federal character is representative democracy. The multi-ethnic composition

of Nigeria (with over 250 ethnic groups) three of them having numerical strength over the

rest, created the necessity for “democracy as limited majority rule” (Ranney & Kendall,

1951). Federal Character was conceptualized to ensure “that there shall be no predominance

of persons from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its

agencies”. (The Constitution 1999. S. 14(3)). The component states are also enjoined to

replicate Federal Character principles, “by recognizing in the conduct of affairs of their

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agencies, the diversity of the people within its area of authority…” (The Constitution S.

14[4])

This affirmative action in the Nigerian Constitution was designed to foster unity in diversity,

but it has given preferential opportunity an ascendancy over equal opportunity: some group

consider compensatory opportunity as exclusionary, discriminatory and an affront to

efficiency and meritocracy, the opposing group view it as a tool, “to offset past

discrimination, counteract present unfairness, and achieve future equality”(Mustapha, 2007).

Mustapha, (2007) did not indicate the start off time for “present unfairness” pursued by

practice of Federal Character: Did it start from Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 1960?

; or from 1966 when the military ventured into politics, and genocide against Ibo ethnic

group happened in the Northern Nigeria?; or is it from or immediately after the civil war

between 1967 to 1970 after which the Ibo ethnic group were marginalized in the national

government, and the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group became new colonial masters over Nigeria?

These questions cascade and take on different coloration defined by ethnic diversity. The

greatest anger though is against colonialism: The British collapsed over 250 ethnic groups

into a nation without regard to non-existing cultural affinity amongst these groups.

Federal Character in its quest for equality deliberately perpetrates inequality and injustice: It

is implemented based on indegeneity; Patrilineal rather than natalitial State of origin, thus

perpetuating the institutionalization of primordial mindset over national ethic, which ought to

be the dividend of democracy in a complex set up like Nigeria. Federal Character principle

is adopted in the appointment of the justices of the apex court (Supreme Court) and

intermediate court (Court of Appeal).

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Through the decisions of the Supreme Court over the years, in electoral matters, the court

enjoys the confidence of majority of citizens that the Justices there, though appointed by

quota system, do not judge based on ethnic sentiments but on national, professional, and

democratic sense.

However, whenever there is a split decision at the Supreme Court on a policy issue which has

ethnic bent, the dissenting voice, which has affinity with the ethnic group agitating for or

against, the policy issue, is heard or listened to, with ethnic bias. This fate befell, Justice

Karibi-Whyte in the case that the federal government sought judicial, “determination of the

seaward boundary of a littoral state within Nigeria for the purpose of calculating the amount

of revenue…from any natural resources derived from that state”. Attorney General of the

Federation vs. Attorney General of Abia State & ors (2001)

All the 36 states of Nigeria were joined in the suit, to the consternation of the eight littoral

states: The majority in the Supreme Court sanctioned the joinder, on the ground that the

interest of the landlocked states will irreparably be prejudiced by excluding them.

Honourable Justice Karibi-Whyte (from a riverine state) dissented holding that the

landlocked states were improperly joined in the suit and that in any case the issue of natural

resource control was political not justiciable.

Though the learned Justice’s position may have been read as filial, it ultimately grounded the

engagement of group networks to deal with the issue: The group network, resulted in the

deference of ethnic majoritarianism to patriotic democracy which ushered in the election of

President Goodluck Jonathan-from the Ijaw minority ethnic group-as the President of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The penchant for substituting, candidates who won party primary election, with individuals

who lost or did not even participate in that election has been addressed by the Supreme

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Court. In a classical case, an individual who did not contest in the party primary election had

his name put forward for gubernatorial election, by the ruling party: He won the election and

became the governor of the State. The party derived its confidence in acting as it did, from

the notion that nomination of candidates for election was a domestic affair of the party not

open to judicial scrutiny. INEC accepted the nomination, relying on its statutory power to do

so.

The Supreme Court, intervened: It not only reversed the acts of the political party, but it also

deemed, as the party’s candidate in that election, the individual who won the party primary

election, but was substituted, and declared him the governor.

The individual, Rotimi Amaechi, did not ask the court to declare him the governor; he did not

contest the gubernatorial election. The Supreme Court relied on its inherent jurisdiction and

the need to meet the justice of the case to declare Rotimi Amaechi the Governor of Rivers

State. In so doing the Supreme Court made fair reaching pronouncements that have endeared

it to protagonists of democracy in Nigeria.

As stated by the Supreme Court:

The political parties in Nigeria are the creation of the constitution. They

therefore have an important stake in flying high and loftily the banner of the

rule of law. In this case, the PDP did not live up to that standard. It did

everything possible to subvert the rule of law, frustrate Amaechi and hold the

court before the general public as supine and irrelevant. Amaechi vs. INEC

(2008. P.100)

The Supreme Court after lambasting INEC “as a spineless body whose pre-occupation is

dissemination of injustice” (Amaechi vs. INEC) (2008) further held:

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I wish to say that in all countries of the world which operate under the rule of

law, politics are always adapted to the laws of the land and not the laws to

politics. Let our political operators allow this time honoured principle to sink

well into their heads and hearts. The vicious acts of the dramatis personae in

this case…must not be allowed to repeat themselves”. Amaechi vs. INEC

(2008)

The supreme court early this year further settled election related policy by adjudicating in the

matter of fraudulent gubernatorial election results, which INEC declared to usher in some

individuals as governors respectively in five States of Nigeria. The election tribunal had

annulled the results and INEC conducted fresh elections, after which the five individuals

were declared winners again.

These individuals were then sworn in a second time as governors. To elongate their tenure,

surreptitiously they sought, court order to declare that, the period they spent as governors

before being sworn in a second time based on the fresh election, did not count in reckoning

their four year tenure as provided by the Constitution (S.180).

The court of first instance, and the appellate court obliged them, but the Supreme Court

denied them, holding that their tenure ended in May 29, 2011 reckoned from the date they

took the first oath of office: The Supreme Court held that they cannot be allowed to benefit

from their own fraud. (The Guardian, Saturday, January 28, 2012. Vol. 29 No. 12, 084).

These individuals, exploited democratic principles (right of fair hearing) to elongate their

tenure, because they remained in office whilst the legal battle raged, until final determination

on January 27, 2012. If not anything, governance and formulation of public policy gained

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from the inter play with democratic frameworks: judicial precedent has settled future public

policy issue on similar tenure elongation scheme.

The Supreme Court held in Amaechi vs. INEC (2008) that it had no jurisdiction to either

cancel an election or order fresh election; this can be done by an election tribunal. ( The

Constitution1999 ss. 285 & 246) However, this lack of jurisdiction by the regular courts,

influences the court in delivering decisions that will avert the conduct of a fresh election by

INEC, after having faltered in conducting a previous one. INEC had acquired notoriety in

conjuring election figures and court decisions which will satisfy democratic principles

without further election, are welcome.

In Ngige vs. Obi (2006) INEC had asked the appeal court for a second chance to conduct

another gubernatorial election, rather than declare Peter Obi as the winner and the court

refused saying, “How can we in clear conscience entrust INEC with another opportunity to

conduct an election in the same Anambra State, where they could not keep their own officials

in check…” (p. 157)

Also in the case of Peoples Democratic Party vs. INEC (2001) the Supreme Court had the

task of construing the provision of the constitution., where an elected governor not yet sworn

in accepted nomination as a vice presidential candidate, thus making INEC to declare both

the governor and the deputy governor’s seat vacant: the constitution provided for the deputy

governor to become governor only if the governor dies. The supreme court construed the

word ‘die’ in the most liberal sense to include ‘fizzle out’ or ‘ vanish’; synonyms which the

court held were wide enough to accommodate what the governor elect did, therefore

foreclosing the necessity for another election.

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The fact is that the court read the pulse of the polity and reflected same in their judgment

when political issues are at stake. The electorates were getting weary of the antics of the

politicians and the court obliged them. To repeat the election under the prevailing political

climate would have been a welcome opportunity for public funds to be further expended to

conduct an election which result was already pre-determined not by opinion poll, but by

audacious activities of the electoral officers backed by the government in power at the centre.

Inclusion

I will mention that the influence of globalisation also shapes democratic practice in Nigeria:

The intrusiveness of USA into the internal affairs of nations including Nigeria provides some

form of restraint to the authoritarian preferences of governance in Nigeria. Democratic

principles though in the most aberrant manner was adopted rather than sheer brute of force, to

impeach Governor Alameseigha of Bayelsa state and Governor Dariye of Plateau State, to

enable their arrest for financial crimes.

The people having lost out to state tyranny, the Judiciary though an unelected body has

admirably checked and curbed this tyranny, in defense of the citizens. But for the fact that

the Judiciary is a product of democracy in governance and public policy formulation,

Nigerians, would have preferred a form of government, which I called “Judicial democracy”.

The wisdom exhibited by the Judiciary whilst dealing with election issues in Nigeria

demystified the notion amongst political groups that power to rule derived from the sitting

president of Nigeria, that once the president anointed an individual as the candidate of his

choice for any post, that individual was deemed elected. In that situation all political forces

including INEC, State agencies, and security personnel were mobilized to ensure the

actualization of the wishes of the president. This explains why the voters’ choice hardly

mattered; the election results are already prepared before the election itself.

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In Anambra State, in the election which the Supreme Court in Ngige vs. Obi (2006)

declared to have been conducted for a position that was not vacant, INEC announced the

winner of that election Dr Andy Uba, as having scored the number of votes which number

exceeded the total number of registered voters in the State.

The involvement of international observers in monitoring elections, the effect of globalization

on governance, coupled with continued pressure from the West, led the Presidency from

2007 to yield to democratic practice of free and fair election. The then president, late Musa

Yaradua, in his inaugural speech stated that the election that brought him to power was

flawed and promised to effect changes in electoral process in Nigeria.

His demise whilst in office did not deter the successor from confronting the issue of

conducting of elections in Nigeria. President Goodluck Jonathan reformed the electoral

body, by appointing new and credible officers into INEC. The loss of the presidency as the

power base for political office seekers, led to politicians, turning to the electorates for

endorsement of their ambition. Electioneering Campaign, in earnest, occupied the office

seekers who now considered that votes from the polling booths count.

INEC transformed and abandoned its old ways of announcing false results and installing

dubious individuals into offices. The elections conducted by this new INEC, in 2011 testified

to the transformation: The election was adjudged by the International Observers and Citizens

alike as most free and fair election reflecting the wishes of the majority. For the first time, in

the history of election in Nigeria, the ruling party (PDP) lost elections in as many as six

States, hitherto governed by it- Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Ekiti and Ondo States,

to the opposition party Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)

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The beauty in this triumph of democracy was that, even though PDP lost the gubernatorial

and legislative elections in these States, the electorate switched to President Goodluck

Jonathan, of the ruling party, and voted for him massively in the presidential election.

This voting behaviour pertubated the ethnic lines along which voting patterns were hitherto

structured, and it ruffled political pundits and office seekers whose main stronghold to

power is their ethnic origin.

Three leaders deserve mention in this treatise on transformation of electoral process in

Nigeria; President Goodluck Jonathan, INEC chairman, Professor Jega, and the leadership of

the Judiciary represented by the Chief Justice of Nigeria. These leaders are effective leaders.

Effective leadership thrives on “vision, mobilizing people toward change; serving, by

building emotional bonds; leading others to greatness, by developing people for future

responsibility “ Goleman (cited in Renfrow, 2007), and, on, “willingness to recognize the

limitations of [the leader’s ] own cultural norms and accept and adapt to the culture of

[others}”(Fernandez & Underwood, 2006).

Every leader exhibits different kinds of leadership style to deal with differing situations.

Leadership positively impacts implementation of public policy when the leader behavior (a

leadership trait) manifests in a utilitarian or moral manner. There is no policy without

opposition. Leadership matches its character with the public policy sought to be implemented

rather than adapt that character to fit the situation.(Hughes,Ginnet,& Curphy,2010)

President Jonathan, whilst appointing Jega as the chairman of INEC promised not to interfere

in the affairs of INEC. During the electioneering campaign the president repeatedly stated

that he would accept the results of the election if he lost. The Supreme Court as shown in this

paper has championed the cause of democracy before the administration of President

Jonathan joined the train.

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In conclusion successful democracy, and its continued impact on governance, are derivatives

of leadership. Leadership is defined by the leader, his personality traits and his ability to

bring those traits to bear on governance, in such a manner that, those traits successfully

model the vision, mission, and national ethics of the country. Authority is not leadership; it is

an aspect of leadership which if misused, misapplied, or wrongly exercised spells disaster for

the nation.

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The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999

The Guardian: website: www.ngrguardiannews.