the new silk road impact to the united states · 10/9/2018 · background: building the belt and...

The New Silk Road Impact To The United States

John Hood – Team Leader

Jay Shay – XO

Jordan McDonald

Candice Carter

Randall Mai

Approved by: Prof Randall Nichols

Team Dragon

Agenda

Background: Building the Belt and Road

Overland Silk Route Risk Assessment

Maritime Silk Route Risk Assessment

Chinese Military Buildup to Support New Silk Road

UAS/UAV Involvement in the New Silk Road

US Involvement in the New Silk Road

Risk Assessments, Countermeasures and Challenges Facing the US

Conclusions

References

BACKGROUND: BUILDING THE

BELT AND ROAD


New Silk Road (NSR) China government coined the project ”The Belt and Road” (B&R)

President Xi Jinping’s “Project of the Century” estimated $1.3 trillion by 2027

B&R is at the core of China’s foreign policy strategy and was even added to the

Communist Party constitution in 2017

Source: Rand 2018


On March 17, 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution

2344, calling on the international community to strengthen regional economic

cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative

China has signed agreements for B&R with

❑ United Nations Development Program

❑ United Nations Economic

❑ Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

❑ World Health Organization

Background: Belt and Road Framework

1. OVERLAND ROUTE

Traditional Route used for centuries

Connects Europe through the Mediterranean to Burma and China

2. MARITIME SEA LANES

Extend from Chinese Eastern coast through the Spratley Islands, around

Horn of Africa into the Mediterranean

COMBINED THESE ROUTES FORM A NEW ECONOMIC SPHERE

OF INFLUENCE FOR CHINA

Background - The Belt and Road

B&R is two primary trade corridors/physical routes

❑ Land - China to Southern Europe

❑ Sea - Port of Shanghai to land-based route in Venice

B&R will connect China with Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South

America, Central America, and Europe

The growing web of trade routes extends into at least 76 countries

China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) oversees

development of B&R

Figure 1: 2013 Proposed Belt and Road

Belt and Road Economic Corridor Creation

Creation of six economic corridors:

New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor

China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor

Central Asia-China-West Asia Economic Corridor

China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor


Source: OBOReurope 2018

Central Asia-China-West Asia Economic Corridor



Source: Financial Times 2016

Belt and Road Framework

Creation of six means of

communication:

Rail

Highways

Seagoing Transport

Cyberspace

Pipelines

Aerospace Source: World Economic Forum 2017

Silk Road International Exposition

Annual Expo hosted by China to share products across several

industries (Housewares, Medical Care, Education, Agriculture,

Fishery)

In 2017 - 600,000 attended with over 1500 exhibitors

Representatives of the official agencies of the embassies and

consulates of China from 27 countries including Argentina,

Cambodia, the Netherlands, Russia, and the United Kingdom

UAS is a large focus of the Expo even though it is is not listed as

a industry on the site description

2018 Silk Road International Exposition

The products, services, and technologies of the countries along the “Belt and

Road” continue to enter China

❑ “Made in China”

❑ “China Construction”

❑ “China Service”

China’s Ministry of Commerce stated “the aerospace industry is also the most

promising industry”

OVERLAND NEW SILK ROAD

ROUTES


Developing rail transportation between China and Europe through Kazakhstan,

Russia, and Belarus

Freight trains link Chongqing to Duisburg, Chengdu to Lodz, Yiwu to Madrid,

Wuhan to Hamburg, and Wuhan to Lyon

Connects China directly to major metropolitan centers in Europe

New Eurasian Land Bridge Routes

China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor

Main area of the new Silk Road

Connects Chinese province of Xinjiang to the Mediterranean Sea, through

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey

Follows old Silk Road

Better connect all the regional economies to China but also to Europe

❑ New intercontinental communication network will open up Central Asian

states

China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor

Source: CGTN.com


Transport development

❑ Motorways

❑ Railways

❑ Air connections

Support trade between China and ASEAN members that are already bound by a

free trade agreement since 2010

Important to China provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi

China and Korea have begun construction of the Sino-Laos railway and the Sino-

Thai railway

Source: Hong Kong Means Business



Connects Kashgar in the Chinese province of Xinjiang to the port of Gwadar in

Pakistan

❑ Railways

❑ Highways

❑ Optical fiber networks

❑ Creation of an international airport and additional deep-water terminals in

Gwadar


April 2015 beginning of Construction has started on KKH Phase-II (Thakot to

Havellian Section)

❑ Friendship Highway

❑ Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (the largest highway infrastructure project

under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor)

❑ Construction of the Gwadar Free Zone has been accelerated

❑ Energy and power projects have been quickly launched along the corridor


Connect China with the various economic centers of the Gulf of Bengal, and to

increase interregional trade by reducing non-tariff barriers

Link Kunming to Kolkata (Calcutta) via Mandalay and Dhaka

The BMIC has seen many setbacks due to strained diplomatic relations between

China and India

❑ This relationship recently calmed during a meeting between Indian Prime

Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping

❑ Meeting was necessary due to a recent military standoff in the Doklam

region

Source: Flickr/ MEAphotogallery


China – India Border Dispute

Relations between China & India

were at a low point because of the

dispute near three-way border

between India, Bhutan, and China

Mid June 2017 Bhutan observed

Chinese builders extending an

unpaved road into disputed area

❑ Bhutan alerted India

❑ India sent troops to halt the

activity


India does not claim the land but says it is acting on its ally Bhutan’s behalf

China has been active in trying to build roads and infrastructure in this strip of

disputed territory

The standoff intensified as each side had as many as 3K troops in the area

❑ Exact numbers are undocumented

Each side carried out repeated military exercises in the region

Both sides have disengaged from the site but have not withdrawn

Chinese road construction continues but not into areas India has drawn a red line

around


Source: Business Insider online magazine

Deployments and activity at Chinese and Indian airbases around the Doklam Plateau

increased in late 2017 and early 2018


China’s National Development and Reform Commission establishing cooperation plans with

countries impacted by B&R

China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor signed with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Czech

Republic

Goal: To become a Eurasian transport-logistic hub and a continental bridge as well as a crucial

transit corridor connecting Asia and Europe, telecommunication and energy networks to make

Mongolia a hub


In October 2014, the Parliament of Mongolia authorized new vertical tracks built to the broad

gauge or 1520 mm

Mongolia has agreed to establish the following initiatives:

❑ General Agreement to Establish Joint Transportation

❑ Logistic Company of Three Countries

❑ Trilateral Agreement on Road Transit Transportation

❑ General Agreement on Transit Transportation

Source: National Security Council of Mongolia 2016


Mongolia has the following strengths:

❑ Close to giant markets of China-Russia

❑ Unique geographical location bridging Asia and Europe and the shortest

transportation route

❑ Relatively peaceful and secure country

❑ Abundant resources of energy, minerals which are vital for the transportation

and economic corridor

❑ Pure and organic agricultural products

Three roads to be built through

Mongolian connecting China to

Russia

Further enhances trade with one of

the largest economic powerhouse

and near-peer rivals in the region


Source National Security Council of Mongolia 2016


China-Mongolia-Russia Himalayan roads

MARITIME SILK ROAD

SEA LANES

China’s “String of Pearls” Strategy

“The larger strategic challenge posed by China in this region is not yet a military

one. It is an economic one, and a new approach may be required to compete

effectively against China’s coordinated efforts in the Americas. Some of the most

critical elements needed in this effort are not ones that [SOUTHCOM] can bring to

bear,”

Kurt Tidd

US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

Stated to Senate Armed Services Committee February 2018


China’s construction of

seaports, railroads and

highways in littoral states

Island-building in the distant

waters of the South China

Sea

China has a massive

submarine-building program,

boasting more submarines

than the US

Source: National Interest 2018


US refers to 21st Century Maritime Silk Road as China’s “String of Pearls”

Strategy

Beijing’s continues to expand in regions of SE Asia and Indian Ocean, solidifying

deep water ports leases along with the creation of new infrastructure to support

naval logistics

China continues to strengthen its naval presence along the route in order to set the

stage for larger volumes of commercial traffic


Chinese trade and investment initiatives that seek to advance regional economic

integration and promote greater economic reliance on China

B&R built to Chinese standards—which could further lock in preferences for

Chinese exports in the region

Trade agreements - Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

(RCEP) involving the ASEAN + 6 countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India,

Australia, New Zealand)

One important purpose is to be less reliant on sea lanes through the Malacca

Strait, which has a heavy US naval presence

21st-Century Maritime Silk Road

21st-Century Maritime Silk Road relies on over-land and sea routes:

❑ Northwest China and Northeast China to Europe and the Baltic Sea via

Central Asia and Russia

❑ Northwest China to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, passing

through Central Asia and West Asia

❑ Southwest China through the Indochina Peninsula to the Indian Ocean

Source: Spiegel Online



The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road has two major routes:

❑ Starting from coastal ports of China, crosses the South China Sea, passes

through the Malacca Strait, and reaches the Indian Ocean, extending to

Europe

❑ Starting from coastal ports of China, crosses the South China Sea, and

extends to the South Pacific

Maritime Silk Road will help build a community that represents the common

concerns, interests and expectations of all all trade partners

This community is expected to guide and support a peaceful and stable Asia

Pacific landscape


Bring together the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” the “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

Economic Corridor” and the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” that together connect

Europe and Asia

Enhance China’s ability to develop economically while limiting external risks

Enhance cooperation in non-traditional security areas while maintaining maritime security

China will focus on upgrading the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and extending it to the

coastal regions of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden


Source: Richard A. Brooks/AFP/Getty Images

21st-Century Maritime Silk Road Risk

Diplomatic goals of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road

❑ Need to improve law enforcement abilities

❑ Provide public goods of marine security

❑ Guarantee the security of marine pathways

❑ China needs to support the construction of ports, wharves, and information

networks to ensure the open flow of goods and information

❑ Enhanced communication on marine cooperation policies to facilitate marine

investment and trade


The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently possesses:

❑ 5 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN)

❑ 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)

❑ 54 diesel-powered attack submarines (SSK)

Source: Chinese PLAN handout


The PLAN has budgeted for the purchase and construction of the following by

2030:

❑ 12 SSNs

❑ 12 SSBNs

❑ 75 SSKs

The US Navy is projected to have 53 submarines in 2030

❑ 11 SSBNs

❑ 42 SSNs

China-Central Asia-West Asia Maritime Route

Connecting Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, the

Mediterranean, Central Asia, West Asia, and Africa

Source: Xinhua News Agency

China-Indochina Peninsula Maritime Silk Road

Connects China with countries on the Indochina Peninsula, thus serving as an

important channel for wider and higher-level cooperation between China and

ASEAN

China and Korea have begun renovation of the Lancang-Mekong River channel

Established the Mohan/Boten Economic Cooperation Zone between China and

Laos in exploring new models for integrated development of the border economy

China-Indochina Peninsula Maritime Silk Road

China signed agreements with Laos (a land-locked nation), Cambodia, and other

countries, launching preparation of bilateral cooperation plans for the maritime

route

Source Hong Kong Means Business

China-Pakistan Maritime Silk Road

Develop a 3,000-kilometer, $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC) connecting its restive Xinjiang province to the Baluch port city of

Gwadar on the Arabian Sea

Source Rand 2018


Foreign Ports with Major Chinese Interests/Influence

Sri Lankan Deep Water Ports

GeminiToursTravel.com

Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka


Located on the southern coast of Sri Lanka with the best geographic access to the

surrounding shipping lanes

Considered one of the main and most strategically located deep water ports in the

Indian Ocean

In July 2017 Sri Lanka and a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) Chinese

Merchant Group signed a 99-year lease for the Hambantota Port

The 99-year lease resulted from the local Sri Lankan contractors and

government’s inability to repay loans from Chinese banks

China will have a more economic influence in Sri Lanka

PLAN will use this port as a fuel and resupply point


6

4

Japanese Concern over Hambantota Port

Japan has become increasingly concerned the Chinese intend to operate military

vessels out of this strategic location

Sri Lanka’s government stated if a military vessel calls in to port for fuel and

water it is not for ‘military purposes’, but a ‘good will visit’

This has prompted Japan to begin to negotiate for rights in Sri Lanka’s other deep

water ports

China vs Japan in Indo-Pacific Deep Water Ports

Bloomberg.com

Major Shipping Lanes near Sri Lanka

Piraeus Port, Greece

Greater Port of Piraeus, Greece

Source: Clingendael Institute


In August 2016, the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), a Chinese SOE,

acquired 51% of ownership shares in the Piraeus Port in Athens Greece

COSCO nickname for the port translates to “Dragon Head”

Motto of the port is “Bridging East and West”

COSCO

COSCO paid $323.8 million for its majority share in the port

❑ There is an option for COSCO to purchase another 16% of the port’s

ownership over a period of 5 years for an additional $102 million

COSCO has a plan to invest another $620 million in upgraded crane system &

added a container ship dry dock

Investments have increased numbers of containers moved in 2017 to 3.7 million

❑ Up 6.7% from 2016

❑ Expected to top 5 million containers in 2019

Piraeus is one of the largest ports in Europe

19 million passengers makes it the third largest worldwide in of passenger

transportation

Piraeus Port Authority ended 2017 with a net income of $14 million

A 69% increase from 2016’s $8.3 million

Chinese Navy will have a new deployment point in the Mediterranean


7

2


“Piraeus, the fastest growing port in the world, will be the largest port in the

Mediterranean by 2019, displacing Hamburg from third place in Europe”, per the

German newspaper Die Zeit in early 2018

Chinese SOE Huawei constructed a railway to connect Piraeus to western and

central Europe


16-18 freight trains leave Piraeus each week loaded with Chinese goods

Has reduced shipping time by a week compared to container transport from

Europe’s other 3 major ports

❑ Hamburg

❑ Rotterdam

❑ Antwerp

Kyaukpyu Port, Myanmar (Burma)

Source: South China Morning Post


Myanmar is currently reviewing the deep-water Kyaukpyu Port in Southern

Myanmar

This is critical to Beijing’s strategy of securing supply routes other then the

through the Strait of Malacca

Myanmar Government understands that the debt it will owe from the project could

put Beijing in a position to gain the strategic port

PLAN will have a new deployment and resupply point

7

6


The port can not currently support the amount of economic traffic the 21st-Century

Maritime Silk Road will bring it

The deep-water port is the culmination of seven years of negotiation (2009-2016)

which also created the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ)

Originally plans for the deep-water port and a railway were planned to be

completed in 2014

❑ Opposition to Chinese construction projects in Myanmar are largely due to

the Myanmar government’s policy of seizing lands from private citizens to

sell to the Chinese companies to build and develop the projects

Kyaukpyu Port, Myanmar (Burma) cont’d

Due to concerns by the Myanmar government about the costs, the project has

recently been scaled back from its original $7.3 billion effort to a more debtor

friendly $1.3 billion project

❑ This was largely supported by Myanmar citizens after watching Sri Lanka &

Pakistan struggle with BRI project debt

❑ This will take the port from the planned 10 deep-water berths to 2

Darwin Port, Australia


In October 2015, The Landbridge Group, a Chinese SOE, signed a 99-year lease

giving it 100% operational control and 80% ownership of Darwin Port in northern

Australia

❑ Landbridge Group paid $506 million to Australia’s Northern Territory

government for the lease

❑ Australia did not tell US about the agreement until 2 days after it was signed

❑ US and Australia have a force posture agreement until 2040 for 1500

Marines to be based in Darwin


The value of bilateral trade between China and Australia reached $138.23 billion

last year

❑ A 29.1% year-on-year increase

Despite the increase in trade, Landbridge’s Australian branch reported a $31

million loss in 2017

The deal between the Northern Territory government and Landbridge caused

enough controversy that Australia’s federal government passed legislation giving

it more control over deals involving critical infrastructure

Gwadar Port, Pakistan

Chinadialogue.net


Source: Dispatch News Desk


Pakistan leased its Gwadar Port to a Chinese SOE in April 2017

The lease was awarded to the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC)

for a period of 40 years

COPHC agreed to improve and develop the port and has been working on the

port’s infrastructure since 2013

8

6


In exchange for the continued development of the port:

❑ COPHC gets $0.91 share of revenue collected from terminal operations

❑ COPHC also gets $0.85 of gross revenue from free zone operation

❑ Still under construction using Chinese workers

Recent attacks by Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has brought the

deployment of Chinese soldiers to building sites


This give Beijing an advantageous position near the strategic Strait of Hormuz

Gwadar is also within a days voyage for a modern warship

PLAN will now have a new deployment point

Due to the unrest in the area, PLAN has already deployed warships to the port for

‘security’

8

8


The end of the line of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) railway

Also known as one of China’s “String of Pearls” in the Maritime Silk Road

India has deep concerns about the PLAN & Pakistani Navy’s partnership here

❑ Pakistan’s Navy claims to have “forced” an Indian submarine out of

international waters off the Pakistani coast in November 2016

❑ Incident was a few days before Pakistani-Chinese naval exercises in the

Arabian Sea

❑ Pakistan alleged the sub was attempting to spy on Gwadar activity

Malaysia

The previous Malaysian government backed China’s east coast Rail Link project,

the building of artificial islands called Melaka Gateway, and a deep-water port

large enough to host an aircraft carrier

The newly elected Malaysian government halted the projects due to concerns

with the debt Malaysia would incur

Beijing needs this project to go through to help ease its reliance on the Strait by

Malacca

A natural choke point with a heavy US presence

The projects, come with a $22 billion price tag

9

0

Nacala Port, Mozambique

China has has undertaken development projects of a value of US$1.4 billion

❑ Upgrading of the Nacala Port forms a significant part

❑ The port is seen as an important key to the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road

as it allows access to the interior land-locked countries in central Africa

In 2012, large natural gas reserves were discovered in Mozambique, revenues

which have the potential to dramatically change the economy

❑ China’s SOE the China National Petroleum Corporation has invested more

than $5 billion

9

1

13 priority areas in a memorandum of understanding was signed in 2017 including

industrial parks, highways, railways, agriculture assistance, exploration of natural

energy resources, and ports

PLAN used this port in Nov 2017 for the deployment of it Peace Ark naval

hospital ship

Maputo Port, Mozambique

9

2

Ghana

Earlier this month, China and Ghana signed agreements totaling $66 million to

support the Jamestown fishing port complex as well as implement other projects

China is providing $50 million specifically for the construction of the port

❑ Construction on the port complex is expected to start this year

❑ PLAN used this port deployment point

9

3

Bagamoyo Port, Tanzania

At the end of 2015, China obtained $10 billion project aiming at the development

of the Bagamoyo port in Tanzania

Contracts to begin port construction were signed in October 2015 and was set to

complete phase I of the construction project in 2017

In 2018, the project got the go ahead and work started on about June/July

❑ It will be built by the SOE China Merchants Port and will include a special

economic zone

PLAN will use this port as a resupply/deployment point

9

4

CHINESE MILITARY BUILD UP

TO SUPPORT THE NEW SILK

ROAD

Chinese Military Build Up

China continues to seek ways to cover and monitor the vast B&R Initiative

A build up of traditional PLA & PLAN units and equipment has been joined by

two other unique sources of security:

❑ SOE Contractors

❑ Drones

❑ It seeks the use of advanced drone technology in order to fill the gaps

and cut down on the cost of maritime patrols and fixed wing sorties

9

6

China’s Defense Spending

Chinese defense spending has more than doubled in the last 10 years

China’s Military

Beijing has the world’s largest military in terms of active members

❑ 2,285,000 active-duty members (US has 1,429,995)

China’s total active duty, reserve, and paramilitary (law enforcement) members

❑ 4,585,000 members (US has 2,206,000)

China currently has 330 ships and 66 submarines for a total of 396

❑ US currently has 211 ships and 72 submarines for a total of 283

❑ China’s PLAN has budgeted to have 450 surface vessels and 99 submarines

by 2030

❑ These numbers do not include surface or subsurface drones

China’s ‘Private Army’

One of the most relevant issues for Chinese leadership is how to provide security

for the Chinese personnel, contractors, their equipment, and infrastructure along

the New Silk Road

❑ At the heart of this issue is a fundamental change in Beijing’s decades-old

policy of noninterference

❑ This change does not typically apply to nation-state actors, but more to

‘security adversaries’ brought about by recent incidents

❑ The killing of 3 China Railway officers in Bamako, Mali by terrorists

❑ The beheading of 2 Chinese teachers in Quetta, Pakistan by ISIL


These security concerns and others surrounding the B&R have given rise to a

fairly new industry in China, the private security company (PSC) sector

PSCs were legalized by Beijing in September of 2009

❑ In 2013, there were 4,000 PSCs who employed 4.3 million

❑ By 2017, more than 5,000 PSCs in mainland China

❑ Together they employ almost 5 million security officers

❑ Loyalty to China by the officers in the PSC is all but guaranteed by the heavy

recruitment of young people exiting the PLA and looking for work abroad


Current Chinese policies and law insist these PSCs are not some sort of French

Foreign Legion that can be called upon by the PLA when required

❑ Operatives are officially barred under China’s legal system, and in many of

the countries they work in, from carrying or using weapons

❑ However, armed Chinese PSC members helped the Sudanese army rescue

personnel in Al-Abbasiya village in 2012

There is concern in the Chinese government that these PSCs not become a

diplomatic and public relations liability, such the American Blackwater PSC

Known Drones On The New Silk Road

In 2016, Pakistan deployed a small fleet of Falco surveillance drones to PAF

Mushaf

❑ It co-developed these drones with Italian defense firm Leonardo

Pakistan has operated an indigenous mid-sized surveillance drone, the GIDS

Shahpar since 2013


In late 2017, satellite images captured what appears to be a Chinese made CH-4 at

PAF M.M. Alam

❑ Although China has not admitted exporting the CH-4 to Pakistan, the later

has expressed interest in acquiring more capable combat and surveillance

drones


Dronecenter.bard.edu


Source: https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/shahpar-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav/


Source: iTours of China maps, 2018


Satellite imagery confirms the basing and testing of CH-4 Rainbow medium-range

surveillance and strike drones in the northern Chinese city of Zhongwei, near the

border with Mongolia


Source: Drone Center, 2018


Chinese island of Hainan


Several satellite images confirm BZK-005 long-range surveillance drones at the

Lingshui AB on the Chinese island of Hainan

These drones have been sighted at Lingshui since 2013

Although the BZK-005 has also been spotted in images of Woody island in the

Spratly chain, the lack of support structures for the drones suggest they are

primarily based at Lingshui

Chinese Military Drills on the Region

Naval vessels from three theater commands of the People’s Liberation Army

Navy (PLAN) have conducted air defense and anti-missile live-fire exercises in

the East China Sea

Export-driven economy that heavily depends on raw material and fuel imports

seeks to buttress its supposed lordship over regional sea lines of communication

(SLOCs)

❑ Critical to the survival of other Asia-Pacific states

UAS/UAV INVOLVEMENT IN THE

NEW SILK ROAD

Current View: UAS/UAV China

The UAV industry in China is expected to rise 40 percent / year on average to 60

billion yuan (about $9.1 billion) by 2020

China is expected to be the largest growing domestic aviation market for at least

the next 20 years

April 2018 the Trump administration decided to release for export armed

Guardian drones very similar to a MQ-9 to India

❑ First time US sells a large armed drone to a country outside the NATO

Chinese Drone Proliferation

Chinese drones pose a ”backdoor” threat to both China’s own drone users and

opponents

Flight and other usage data from exported Wing Longs, Rainbows, and Wing

Fangs has been found to be getting back to Chinese manufacturers, originally

unbeknownst to the users of the equipment

Even under these circumstances, the relative inexpensiveness of the UAS systems

is very attractive to economically constrained countries

In an early 2018 press release, CASC revealed more than 30 CH-4 drones have

been exported to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and “other countries”

UAS on the Maritime Silk Road

January 2018, satellite photos captured Chinese and US manufactured drones on

the same flightline for the first time

❑ The CH-4s are known assets of Saudi Arabia

❑ The General Atomics Predator XP is a known asset of the UAE

❑ It is believed the drones are being used primarily for operations against the

Houthis in Yemen

❑ However, their proximity and range make them valuable eyes in the

southern Red Sea and Bab-el-Madeb Strait

UAS on the Maritime Silk Road

Warsintheworld.com

Jizan, Saudi Arabia


EU-China Aviation Partnership Project (EU-China APP)

EU-China AAP established 2015, next five years (2020) EU will fund 10 million

Euros

❑ European aviation industry supports 5.1 million jobs (2.4% of the European

GDP)

Build off of 2014 completed EU-China Civil Aviation Cooperation Project (EUCCAP)

Expansion of the European aviation industry in China

❑ EU manufactured aircrafts and components into China

❑ Increase of flight frequencies between Europe and China


EU-China APP focus:

Regulatory dialogue on safety,

General aviation,

ATM/ANS and airports,

Airworthiness,

Environmental protection, and

Economic policy and regulation

Aviation Safety and Security

Legislation and law enforcement

Source: UAS Vision 2018


Members:

The European Union Chamber of Commerce - local European project

partner for the involvement of the European aviation industry

Member States Aviation Authorities

Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST)

Air Traffic Management Bureau of Civil Aviation Administration of

China (ATMB)


Second annual EU-China APP drone workshop took place on 6-7 June 2018 in

Shenzhen, China

❑ Notable attendees that have partnerships with US:

❑ Airbus Aerial (Singapore)

❑ Airbus Helicopters (Singapore)

❑ Thales (France)

❑ DFS Aviation Services (Germany)

Attendees shared their respective countries UAS development/ regulation roadmaps

Visited DJI and Huawei facilities

CASC CH-3 Rainbow

❑ The CASC CH-3 is just one in a series of UAVs found under the Rainbow name

produced by Chinese industry.

❑ Status: Active, In-Service from 2012

❑ Manufacturer: China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) -

China. Production: 500+

❑ Operators: Algeria; Iraq; Nigeria; Pakistan

1

2

5

http://errymath.blogspot.com/2014/09/ch-4-uav-undergoing-flight-tests.html#.W7t-J6eZPaY

CASC CH-3 Rainbow

1

2

6

CASC CH-4 Rainbow

❑ The CASC CH-4 Rainbow UCAV borrows heavily from the American MQ-9

Reaper UCAV drone series. ORIGIN: China YEAR: 2014 and Status: Active, In-

Service

❑ Manufacturer (S): China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

– China

❑ Production:500+

❑ Operators: China; Egypt; Iraq; Saudi Arabia

1

2

7

https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1843

CASC CH-4 Rainbow

1

2

8

CASC CH-5 Rainbow

❑The CASC CH-5 Rainbow is a newer, more potent, attack addition to the existing

Rainbow UAV line to emerge from China. YEAR: 2017, Status: Active, In-

Service

❑Manufacturer (S): China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)

– China

❑Production: 50+

❑Operators: China; Saudi Arabia

1

2

9

https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1843

CASC CH-5 Rainbow

1

3

0

Chengdu (AVIC) Soar Dragon (Soar Eagle)

❑ The Chengdu-Guizhou Soar Dragon HALE UAV will begin service as an

unmanned drone before being developed into an armed variant.

❑ Status: In-Development YEAR: 2020

❑ Manufacturer (S): Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation (GAIC) / Chengdu /

Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) – China

❑ Production: 1 and Operators: China

1

3

1

Chengdu (AVIC) Soar Dragon (Soar Eagle)

www.militaryfactory.com

1

3

2

Chengdu (AVIC) Wing-Loong (Pterodactyl)

❑ The Chengdu Wing Loong UAV drone serves double-duty for several global

customers beyond China as it can be modified to undertake various over-

battlefield roles including attack. Medium-Altitude, Long-Endurance (MALE)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Status: Active, In-Service from 2014

❑ Manufacturer (S): Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group / Aviation Industry

Corporation of China (AVIC) - China. Production: 250

❑ Operators: China; Egypt; Kazakhstan; Nigeria; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; United

Arab Emirates; Uzbekistan

1

3

3

Chengdu (AVIC) Wing-Loong (Pterodactyl)


1

3

4

NORINCO Sharp Eye III

❑ The Sharp Eye III is an in-development helicopter drone presented by NORINCO

of China geared towards unarmed and armed reconnaissance and strike roles.

❑ Status: In-Development 2019

❑ Production: 2

❑ Operators: China (possible)

1

3

5

NORINCO Sharp Eye III


1

3

6

Shenyang (AVIC) Divine Eagle

❑ The Shenyang Divine Eagle utilizes an unconventional twin-fuselage arrangement

for its design. High-Altitude, Long-Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(UAV)

❑ YEAR: 2020, Status: In-Development

❑ Production: 1

❑ Operators: China (probable)

1

3

7

Shenyang (AVIC) Divine Eagle

www.militareyfactory.com

1

3

8

Ziyan Blowfish

❑ The Ziyan Blowfish I is marketed with a multi-mission, all-weather capability that

is sure to suit many global buyer requirements

❑ Status: Active, In-Service as of 2015

❑ Manufacturer (S): Ziyan UAV - China: Production: 25

❑ Operators: China

1

3

9

Ziyan Blowfish


1

4

0

AVIC Cloud Shadow

❑ The AVIC Cloud Shadow UCAV has been designed by Chinese aero-industry for

the export market. High-Altitude, Long-Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Combat

Aerial Vehicle (UCAV)

❑ Status: In-Development and year 2019

❑ Manufacturer (S): Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) - China :

Production: 10

❑ Operators: China (possible)

1

4

1

AVIC Cloud Shadow


1

4

2

Hongdu Lijian (Sharp Sword)

❑ The Hongdu Lijian UCAV was photographed undertaking its maiden flight in

November of 2013. Stealth Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)

❑ MANUFACTURER(S): Hongdu Aircraft Industries Corporation (HAIC) /

Shenyang – China

❑ Production: 1 as of 2018

❑ Operators China (probable)

1

4

3

Hongdu Lijian (Sharp Sword)

1

4

4

Aisheng ASN-209 (Silver Eagle)

❑ The Aisheng ASN-209 was a joint-development of a MAME UAV system

between China and Egypt. Medium Altitude, Medium Endurance (MAME)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

❑ Status: Active, Limited Service as of 2012

❑ Manufacturer (S): Xian Aisheng Technology Group Company Ltd -China:

Production: 24

❑ Operators: China; Egypt

1

4

5

Aisheng ASN-209 (Silver Eagle)


1

4

6

CASIC WJ-600

❑ The CASIC WJ-600 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle is another in the growing

line of jet-powered Chinese-originated attack drones


❑ Manufacturer (S): China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) -

China: Production: 35

❑ Operators: China; Turkmenistan

1

4

7

CASIC WJ-600


1

4

8

Guizhou Sparrow Hawk II

❑ The Guizhou Sparrow Hawk II achieved first flight in 2011 and showcases an

appearance not unlike the American Predator family of UAVs

❑ Manufacturer (S): Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation (GAIC) - China

Production: 1 as of 2016


1

4

9

Guizhou Sparrow Hawk II


1

5

0

Guizhou WZ-2000 (WuZhen-2000 / WZ-9)

❑ The Guizhou WZ-2000 UCAV out of China is a multi-role, armed drone platform


❑ Manufacturer (S): Guizhou Aviation Industry Corporation (GAIC) - China:

Production: 20


1

5

1

Guizhou WZ-2000 (WuZhen-2000 / WZ-9)


1

5

2

China vs US UAV Production and Proliferation

❑ China is currently outpacing the US in UAV / UCAV production in almost all

airframe types

❑ The Chinese government is exploiting the technology gap created by the

overmatch from US Drone systems

❑ Most US systems are not permitted to be exported and China is seizing the

opportunity to influence US allies by selling UAV/UCAV technology / systems

❑ Currently, China has more UAV’s flying then the US does, not to mention China

has not fully disclosed how many UAV’s are in their fleet’s

1

5

3

China’s Drone Squad

Shenzhen Power and Electric launched

their Drone Squad February 2018

Team of laser drones to solve electrical

breakdowns

❑ Detect electrical glitches from far

away

❑ Eliminate hypothermal obstacles

Uses binocular vision system and

automatic fault detection systemSource: Peoples Daily 2018

Viga UAV

Source: China Daily 2017

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

IN THE NEW SILK ROAD

US influence on New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic

Corridor

The New Eurasian Land Bridge corridor of China’s Belt and Road is

predominately located in China and Russia

The largest portion not included in Russia or China is located in Kazakhstan

The US-Kazakhstan relationship has been strong since the break-up of the Soviet

Union awarded it independence in 1991

❑ The US was the first country to formally recognize Kazakhstan as an

independent state


Corridor

US-Kazakhstan trade totaled $1.3 billion in 2017

Kazakhstan has participated in several US funded & led military exercises:

STEPPE EAGLE, VIKING, EAGER LION, and SHANTI PRAYAS

Kazakhstan is the last stronghold of US influence in Central Asia

The US had an air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan until a change of power in that

country in 2014

Shamsi Airfield, Pakistan

Also known as Bhandari Airstrip is situated

about 200 miles southwest of Quetta & about

250 miles northwest of Gwadar

❑ Leased by the UAE 1992-2001 for royal

family falconry hunting

❑ Leased by the US 2001-2011

❑ US operated MQ-1 Predator drones

from here

❑ It is unknown who or what Pakistan is operating

out of this facility now

Source: Maps.com

1

5

9

Shamsi Airfield, Pakistan

Source: GlobalSecurity.org

1

6

0

US influence on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

❑ In August 2018, US suspended its training of Pakistani military officers

❑ 66 Pakistani officers were trained per year in the International Military

Education and Training program, by the US

❑ Pakistani officials warned the suspension would push them to China or

Russia for military leadership training

❑ They signed a training agreement with Russia in late August 2018

❑ Total the US has cut $800 million in aid to Pakistan so far in the last year

❑ Due to its Islamabad’s lack of action in fighting the Taliban

1

6

1


❑ The US has approximately 15K military members in Afghanistan

❑ The US has used Pakistani ports & land routes as part of its supply-chain for these

forces in exchange for $255 million in aid annually

❑ This aid was officially turned off in Jan 2018

1

6

2

US Drone Bases near the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

▪ In Jan 2018, the US Air Force increased its force

of MQ-9 Reapers to 3 squadrons at Kandahar AB

▪ The older MQ-1 Predators remain and are being

transitioned to support US Navy, Marine Corps,

or special operations units in the area

▪ These units also use MQ-27As with a signal

intelligence payload & RQ-20A Silent Eagle

smaller UAVs

❑ The exact location of these units is

classified

Source: Maps.com

1

6

3


❑ The deterioration of the US-Pakistani relationship has Washington solidifying its

partnership’s with New Delhi

❑ A enhanced US relationship with India will further deteriorate the US-Pakistani

relationship

❑ This has already contributed to expanded cooperation both economically and

militarily between Russia-Pakistan-China

1

6

4


❑ China has replaced US as Pakistan’s weapons (from rifles to combat aircraft to

warships) source

❑ Weapons sales to Pakistan from the US dropped by 76% since 2011

❑ China has supplied 35% of the arms bought by Pakistan since 2013

❑ In 2017, Pakistan imported its military’s new weapons from:

❑ 70% from China

❑ 12% from US

❑ 5.7% from Russia

1

6

5

Challenges Facing the US

Even before China began building military bases in the South China Sea and

taking over commercial ports in Asia, the US Navy was facing a nearly

impossible task in trying to police the Indo-Pacific region

The US Seventh Fleet headquartered in Japan and the US Fifth Fleet

headquartered in Bahrain have barely a hundred warships and a few hundred

aircraft to cover ocean areas stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Korean

Peninsula

www.forbes.com

Challenges cont’d

It seems the biggest gap in capabilities concerns intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance -- in other words, achieving the kind of situational awareness

necessary so that scarce naval assets can be deployed in the most effective fashion

across vast expanses of ocean

Intelligence gaps are currently filled by the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft

and US Air Force assets (U2, Global Hawk, National Assets)

www.forbes.com

New Silk Road Getting Closer To US

China has already pledged $500 billion in trade funds with various Latin

American countries and $250 billion in direct investment over the next decade

❑ financing and loans that appear to have ‘no strings attached’

Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi encouraged Latin American and

Caribbean states to expand their trade with the country

❑ Chile and Bolivia declared their readiness to integrate into the initiative

Current US Policies Towards The NSR

The US has shifted the entire focus of the Department of Defense towards the

Pacific in an effort to emplace forces that could counter Chinese aggression if

necessary

This is now the DOD’s top priority and can be seen with the increases in troop

strengths to South Korea along with the build up of naval power in the region to

include more frequent deployments of carrier battle groups

US Pacific Command (INDOPACOM)

May 2018 Defense Secretary Jim Mattis renamed the US Pacific Command as

INDOPACOM, or Indo-Pacific Command, in Honolulu as America’s “priority

theater”

Renaming of the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific clearly signaled the role the US

expected India to play in countering China

China’s war potential

❑ Spratly and Paracel Islands

❑ “the deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic

jammers, and more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody

Island”

RISK ASSESSMENTS, AND

CHALLENGES FACING THE US


Corridor

CARVER RISK ASSESMENT VALUE RATING SCALE

VALUE C A R V E R VALUE

5 Chinese

expansion would

halt US

operations

Geographic area

is very difficult to

gain access to

US economic &

military influence

will be extremely

difficult to

reestablish (5

years or more)

China’s military

would require

National Assets /

sophisticated

tech to defeat in

this area

Unfavorable

impact, assured

adverse impact

from global

community

Not recognized

as adversarial5

4 Chinese

expansion

would reduce

performance of

US operations

significantly

Geographic area

is difficult to gain

access to

Difficult to

reestablish 3-5

years)

China’s military

would require

SOF /

conventional

forces to defeat

No impact on

adversary,

Adverse impact

from global

community

Not recognized

by most

countries as

adversarial

4

3 Chinese

expansion would

reduce US

operation’s

performance

Geographic area

is accessible

Can be

reestablished in

relatively short

time (1-3 years)

China’s military

would require

can be struck by

UAS / hourly

surveillance

required

Favorable impact

some adverse

impact from

global

community

Recognized by

most countries

as adversarial

under specific

circumstances

3

2 Chinese

expansion may

reduce

performance of

US operations

Geographic area

is easily

accessible but

protected by

Chinese security

Easily

reestablished in

a short time (<1

year)

China’s military

would require

occasional

surveillance by

UAS (daily)

Favorable impact

some global

community

concern

Recognized by

most countries

as adversary

2

1 Chinese

expansion

would not effect

US operations at

all

Geographic area

is easily

accessible, away

from Chinese

security

Strong enough

that Chinese

influence is not a

concern

(Days)

Requires

occasional

surveillance by

UAS (weekly)

Favorable impact

from global

community if

destroyed

Chinese

influence easily

recognized by all

countries as

adversarial

1

CARVER APPLICATION

VALUE C A R V E R TOTAL

New Eurasian Land

Bridge Economic

Corridor3 2 3 2 5 3 18

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 5 5 4 1 3 22

Central Asia-China-

West Asia Economic

Corridor3 2 2 2 4 3 16

China-Indochina

Peninsula Economic

Corridor3 3 3 3 2 3 17

China-Pakistan

Economic

Corridor5 5 4 5 2 1 22

Bangladesh-China-

India-Myanmar

Economic Corridor2 1 3 2 5 3 16

Northwest & Northeast

China-Europe via Baltic Sea-

Central Asia-Russia 4 5 4 5 1 2 21Northwest China-

Persian Gulf-

Mediterranean Sea via

Central & West Asia

4 5 5 4 1 1 20Southwest China-Global

shipping lanes via South

China Sea-Indochina

Peninsula-Indian Ocean3 3 3 2 5 3 19

Jordan—The highest risk to US influence before countermeasures are applied are China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic Corridor with a score of 22. The Northwest & Northeast China-Europe via Baltic Sea-Central Asia-Russia Maritime Corridor

was second with a score of 21.

CARVER APPLICATION


New Eurasian Land

Bridge Economic

Corridor5 5 3 4 2 4 23

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 5 5 5 3 5 27

Central Asia-China-

West Asia Economic

Corridor2 2 3 3 3 4 17

China-Indochina

Peninsula Economic

Corridor2 2 2 2 2 3 13

China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor 5 4 5 3 3 4 24Bangladesh-China-

India-Myanmar


Northwest & Northeast China-

Europe via Baltic Sea-Central

Asia-Russia 2 4 3 1 3 4 17Northwest China-Persian

Gulf-Mediterranean Sea

via Central & West Asia 1 1 2 1 3 4 12Southwest China-Global


China Sea-Indochina

Peninsula-Indian Ocean

3 2 3 2 2 1 13Jeremy—The highest risk to US influence before countermeasures are applied are is the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor with a

score of 27. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was second with a score of 24.

CARVER APPLICATION


New Eurasian

Land Bridge

Economic

Corridor

5 4 5 3 3 3 23

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 5 5 3 4 3 24

Central Asia-

China-West Asia

Economic

Corridor

5 4 5 4 3 3 24

China-Indochina

Peninsula

Economic

Corridor

5 4 4 4 3 3 23

China-Pakistan

Economic

Corridor5 4 5 4 4 4 26

Bangladesh-

China-India-

Myanmar Corridor4 5 4 3 4 4 24




Persian Gulf-


Central & West Asia



China Sea-Indochina


Candice—The highest risk to US influence before countermeasures are applied are China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with a score of 26. The

next highest are China-Mongolia-Russia, Central Asia-China-West-Asia and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridors all with a score of 24

CARVER APPLICATION


New Eurasian Land

Bridge Economic

Corridor4 4 3 4 4 3 22

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 5 5 5 3 2 24

Central Asia-China-

West Asia Economic

Corridor3 4 4 4 3 3 21

China-Indochina

Peninsula Economic

Corridor3 3 3 3 3 4 19

China-Pakistan

Economic

Corridor3 3 3 4 3 3 19

Bangladesh-China-

India-Myanmar





Persian Gulf-


Central & West Asia



China Sea-Indochina


John-Paul—The highest risk to US influence before countermeasures are applied are China-Mongolia-Russia Economic with a score of 24. The

New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor was second with a score of 22.

TEAM’s CARVER AGGREGATE

Corridor Result

New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic

Corridor 21.5

China-Mongolia-Russia Economic

Corridor 24.25

Central Asia-China-West Asia Economic

Corridor 19.5

China-Indochina Peninsula Economic

Corridor 18

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor22.75

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

Economic Corridor 18.5

Northwest & Northeast China-Europe via

Baltic Sea-Central Asia-Russia 19.75

Northwest China-Persian Gulf-

Mediterranean Sea via Central & West

Asia

18.25

Southwest China-Global shipping lanes

via South China Sea-Indochina Peninsula-

Indian Ocean

18.5

TEAM CARVER AGGREGATE

China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor is the most at risk with a score of

24.25

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the second most at risk wit a score of

22.75

China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor is the least at risk with a score of

18

CURRENT US COUNTERMEASURES

US Countermeasures

Increase US Naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region

❑ The recent activation of the 5th Fleet should ease operational stress on the 7th

Fleet

❑ The US can negotiate use of Vietnamese or Philippine islands in the

Spratly’s for ISR drone operations

❑ The US can negotiate use of Maldivian islands in the Indian Ocean for ISR

drone operations

Increase range for carrier based aircraft

New anti-shipping / anti-infrastructure cruise missiles to be deployed to theatre

Increased naval and military drills with partner nations

US Countermeasures

The US needs to use China’s playbook against them

US needs to build its own trade networks through improved trade policy and

terms with Eurasian-Central Asian-Middle Eastern-Southeast Asian-Indopacific

regional and global partners

Prevent our allies from being bought out-right through debt-book diplomacy

Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti are examples of countries whose

infrastructure project debt to China has pushed them deeper into Chinese

influence

Use the these examples with traditionally adversarial nations (i.e. Mongolia,

Vietnam, etc.) to economically and diplomatically woo these countries into

better relationships and trade deals with the US and its economic allies

1

8

1

US Countermeasures

Create a US Trade Partnership focused on Afghanistan and its neighbors

Champion US led infrastructure projects in South and Southeast Asia in which

India could/should be a vital co-leader/co-financer

A step that could potentially act as counter influence to China's ambitious

Belt and Road Initiative

US-Japan-India could create and champion their own Economic Corridor in the

Indo-Pacific region

This could undermine any leverage Russia has over India

Prevent the need for countries in the region from needing the B&R for

infrastructure and economic development

1

8

2

Increased US Naval Presence

A US aircraft carrier has arrived in Vietnam for the first time in more than 40

years in Mar 2018

Visit demonstrates the US Navy’s increasing ability to call on friendly ports as it

pursues security objectives in Southeast Asia, and the wider Asia-Pacific region

USS CARL VINSON CVN 70 visits Da Nang Bay, www.janes.com

US 7th Fleet on Guard

US 7th Fleet continues to conduct Partnership and Security patrols in the region as

it has done for the past 70 years

USNS Millinocket (T-EPF 3) departs Changi Naval Base, Singapore, May 19, 2018. Photo: US

Navy www.navaltoday.com

The Navy's P-8A Poseidon derivative of

the Boeing 737 commercial transport

Armament:

4 x Harpoon anti-ship missiles

6 x Torpedoes

Large and diverse sensor suite for

surface and subsurface warfare

Boeing P-8 Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft

www.aviationtribune.com

U2 Dragon Lady (USAF)

Extreme endurance, ultra

high altitude reconnaissance

aircraft

Advanced camera systems

Advanced sensor suite(s)

Day/night all weather capable lockheedmartin.com

US NAVY Attack Aircraft

F-35C Lightning II

FA-18 E/F/J Super Hornet

Current U.S. UAV/ UCAV’s in Service

❑ 246 Predators (USAF) most of which were retired 9 March 2018

❑ 152 MQ-1C Grey Eagles (US ARMY)

❑ 195 MQ-9 Reapers (USAF)

❑ 500+ RQ-7 Shadows (US ARMY)

❑ 68 RQ-4 Global Hawk / Triton systems (USAF /USN)

1

8

8

MQ-1C Grey Eagles

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Atomics_MQ-1C_Gray_Eagle#/media/File:OCPA-2005-08-11-080331.jpg

1

8

9

MQ-9 Reaper

https://www.military.com/equipment/mq-9-reaper

1

9

0

RQ-7 Shadows

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AAI_RQ-7_Shadow

1

9

1

UAVs in the U.S. Military Cont.

❑ Boeing RQ-21 Blackjack and 109 systems with 5 air vehicles each (USN)

❑ Boeing ScanEagle- 1,000 (USN)

❑ Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton and total of 68 aircraft to be procured as of

2018 (USN)

1

9

2

Boeing RQ-21 Blackjack (USN)

https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/11/navy-blackjack-uav.html

1

9

3

Boeing ScanEagle (USN)

en.wikipedia.org

1

9

4

Northrop Grumman RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK (USAF)

Performs similar missions as the U2

Able to survey up to 40,000 sqmi

Extended Range, can remain aloft

for several days

Large and diverse sensor suite en.wikipedia.org

Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton (USN)

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2018/04/09/future-plans-

emerge-for-navys-triton-surveillance-drones/

1

9

6

Northrop Grumman RQ-180

❑ RQ-180- In development as a UCAV (USN)

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-air-force-moves-stem-shortage-drone-pilots-

225715109.html

1

9

7

Boeing MQ-25 Stingray

The Navy has awarded Boeing with a contract for 4 MQ-25 Areal Refueling

Drones with an extension for 65 more

Boeing.com/defense/mq25

MQ-25 Areal Refueling Drone

The MQ-25 “Stingray” will be able to drastically increase the ranges of the

current US Navy Strike Aircraft, the FA-18 Super Hornet and F-35 Lightning II

This will alleviate Super Hornets from performing the areal refueling mission,

saving airframe hours and allowing them to fly more combat air patrols

Boeing.com/defense/mq25

MQ-25 Increases Strike Range

The inclusion of the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray aerial tanker into the US carrier

air wing could increase the effective strike range of the strike fighters aboard

aircraft carriers by up to 400 nautical miles (usni.com)

Boeing image of the company’s MQ-25A Stingray bid. USNI News Photo

CARVER RISK ASSESMENT VALUE RATING SCALE

VALUE C A R V E R VALUE

5 Chinese

expansion would

halt US

operations

Geographic area

is very difficult to

gain access to

US economic &

military influence

will be extremely

difficult to

reestablish (5

years or more)

China’s military

would require

National Assets /

sophisticated

tech to defeat in

this area

Unfavorable

impact, assured

adverse impact

from global

community

Not recognized

as adversarial5

4 Chinese

expansion

would reduce

performance of

US operations

significantly

Geographic area

is difficult to gain

access to

Difficult to

reestablish 3-5

years)

China’s military

would require

SOF /

conventional

forces to defeat

No impact on

adversary,

Adverse impact

from global

community

Not recognized

by most

countries as

adversarial

4

3 Chinese

expansion would

reduce US

operation’s

performance

Geographic area

is accessible

Can be

reestablished in

relatively short

time (1-3 years)

China’s military

would require

can be struck by

UAS / hourly

surveillance

required

Favorable impact

some adverse

impact from

global

community

Recognized by

most countries

as adversarial

under specific

circumstances

3

2 Chinese

expansion may

reduce

performance of

US operations

Geographic area

is easily

accessible but

protected by

Chinese security

Easily

reestablished in

a short time (<1

year)

China’s military

would require

occasional

surveillance by

UAS (daily)

Favorable impact

some global

community

concern

Recognized by

most countries

as adversary

2

1 Chinese

expansion

would not effect

US operations at

all

Geographic area

is easily

accessible, away

from Chinese

security

Strong enough

that Chinese

influence is not a

concern

(Days)

Requires

occasional

surveillance by

UAS (weekly)

Favorable impact

from global

community if

destroyed

Chinese

influence easily

recognized by all

countries as

adversarial

1

CARVER RISK ASSESSMENT WITH US COUNTERMEASURES


New Eurasian Land

Bridge Economic

Corridor2 2 2 4 2 3 15

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 5 4 4 3 5 25

Central Asia-China-

West Asia Economic

Corridor2 2 2 3 3 3 15

China-Indochina

Peninsula Economic

Corridor2 2 1 2 2 2 11

China-Pakistan

Economic

Corridor4 2 4 3 3 4 20

Bangladesh-China-

India-Myanmar





Persian Gulf-


Central & West Asia



China Sea-Indochina


Jeremy—The highest risk, after applying the countermeasures discussed is the geographically isolated China-Mongolia-Russia Economic

Corridor with a score of 25. The second highest was the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with a score of 20.

COUNTERMEASURES - CARVER APPLICATION


New Eurasian

Land Bridge

Economic

Corridor

5 4 4 3 4 3 23

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 4 4 3 4 4 23

Central Asia-

China-West Asia

Corridor 4 4 4 4 4 3 23

China-Indochina

Peninsula

Corridor3 4 3 3 4 4 21

China-Pakistan

Corridor 4 3 4 3 4 4 22Bangladesh-

China-India-

Myanmar

Corridor

3 3 4 3 3 3 19




Persian Gulf-


Central & West Asia



China Sea-Indochina


Candice – The New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia and Central Asia-China-West Asia Corridors would be the most at risk with a

score of 23 each with the China-Pakistan next at 22

CARVER RISK ASSESSMENT WITH US COUNTERMEASURES


New Eurasian Land

Bridge Economic

Corridor2 2 3 3 2 3 15

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor4 4 4 4 2 4 22

Central Asia-China-

West Asia Economic

Corridor2 2 2 3 3 3 15

China-Indochina

Peninsula Economic

Corridor2 2 2 2 2 3 13

China-Pakistan

Economic

Corridor3 2 4 3 3 4 19

Bangladesh-China-

India-Myanmar





Persian Gulf-


Central & West Asia



China Sea-Indochina


John-Paul—The highest risk, after applying the countermeasures discussed the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor with a score of 22.

The second highest was the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with a score of 19.

CARVER APPLICATION WITH US COUNTERMEASURES


New Eurasian Land

Bridge Economic

Corridor1 2 3 4 1 2 13

China-Mongolia-

Russia Economic

Corridor2 1 4 3 4 5 19

Central Asia-China-

West Asia Economic

Corridor2 3 2 3 2 2 16

China-Indochina

Peninsula Economic

Corridor4 2 2 3 3 2 16

China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor 5 1 4 5 5 5 25Bangladesh-China-

India-Myanmar


Northwest & Northeast China-Europe via Baltic Sea-Central

Asia-Russia 5 4 1 3 3 5 21Northwest China-Persian Gulf-Mediterranean Sea

via Central & West Asia 5 4 1 5 4 3 22Southwest China-Global shipping lanes via South

China Sea-Indochina Peninsula-Indian Ocean

2 3 3 5 3 3 19Jordan— China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will still be a higt risk to US influence with countermeasures are applied

TEAM’s CARVER AGGREGATE

WITH COUNTER MEASURES

Corridor Result


Corridor 16.5


Corridor 22.25


Corridor 17.25


Corridor 15.25




Northeast China-Europe via Baltic Sea-

Central Asia-Russia 15.5



Asia

14.75


via South China Sea-Indochina Peninsula-

Indian Ocean

15.5

CARVER COMPARISON

Corridor Result


Corridor 16.5


Corridor 22.25


Corridor 17.25


Corridor 15.25




Northeast China-Europe via Baltic Sea-

Central Asia-Russia 15.5



Asia

14.75


via South China Sea-Indochina


15.5

Corridor Result


Corridor 21.5


Corridor 24.25

Central Asia-China-West Asia



Corridor 18




Northwest & Northeast China-Europe

via Baltic Sea-Central Asia-Russia 19.75



Asia

18.25

Southwest China-Global shipping

lanes via South China Sea-Indochina


18.5

Without US Countermeasures With US Countermeasures

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion

To counter China’s influence is to offer them investment and trade deals on better

terms than China has offered, rather than spend hundreds of billions on a military

buildup

China would prefer to see friendly nations on its borders rather than ones that

house American forces

Australia and South Korea have expressed some concerns about their economic

relations with China

China is losing influence in Myanmar. It does command some influence over

Cambodia and Laos.

Conclusion

The two countries must jointly act to counter China’s “dominance” across the

New Silk Road

Africa is a key area that needs to be included in Indo-Pacific region for U.S.

Japan and India are two important powers in the Indo-Pacific region that plan to

partner with U.S. and Australia.

While the competitive effects of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor on the Belt and

Road should not be underestimated, China should beware they are not the only

country with power in the region

Conclusions

The geographic isolation and culturally close ties with Mongolia make this the

most difficult New Silk Road economic corridor for the US to gain influence in

China is spending and loaning billions of dollars on infrastructure improvements

largely through national banks and SOE, creating a strain on their current national

economic situation

❑ Even when these improvements are completed, the profitability of some of

these investments is unsure

❑ As seen in the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota

❑ This could make the upkeep and operation of these unsuccessful

improvements a further financial burden for the Chinese SOE

Conclusions

The growing concern of New Silk Road partner nations about the “debt-book”

diplomacy methods employed by the Chinese, opens the door for US diplomats

and industries to offer a better way forward to these nations

The uncoordinated nature of the Chinese SOE has spread the reach of the New

Silk Road at an unanticipated and possibly, unsustainable rate

❑ Recent “corruption” arrests of SOE CEOs and business owners by Chinese

authorities may have a slowing or cooling off effect on overseas acquisitions

and loans

Conclusions

The recent reset in US trade policy has also opened the door for renegotiated trade

relations with much of the global community

❑ Pairing this with the concern some countries have with the B&R program

could greatly improve our bargaining power and influence with these nations

The recent trade deals with Canada and Mexico can be an example to demonstrate

the US’s interest in creating win-win trade deals

❑ Which is something the Chinese do not always provide to their trade partners

The US needs to improve its focus on improving economic infrastructure of trade

partners in the western hemisphere before the Chinese SOE’s can gain more

influence in the region

❑ Particularly in-and-around the Panama Canal

Conclusion

As the Chinese Navy continues to build combat power in the region, mainly

focused in and around the Spratly Island chain, the US will encounter an ever

increasing Chinese UAS / UCAV presence with ever increasing stand off and

over the horizon strike capabilities

The Chinese will not have to confront a superior US warship with an emerging

Chinese warship when it can strike it with a low observable drone

Understanding when and how the Chinese will employ these UAS systems will be

crucial in the coming years to maintain open sea lanes in the region

Conclusion

The US still enjoys a technological over match in drone UAS / UCAV technology

but that gap is closing rapidly

Soon the US will encounter Chinese made drones in foreign waters and

battlefields as other countries aggressively seek to fill the technology gap with

Chinese made drones

Drone warfare will continue to expand, the potential is limitless with what drones

can do and accomplish. The US must continue to seek ways to counter this threat

at all levels and echelons both in civil applications as well as the military

Recommendations for Future US Countermeasures

❑ The US must continue to work to develop new technology to detect China’s

stealth UAV’s

❑ Another concept that could ease the cost of using manned aircraft to counter

China’s drone fleets would be to develop a new way to counter Chinese UAV

operations by using US UAV’s as a type of hunter/killer or ‘influencer’

❑ As our allied partners continue to grow their own UAV fleets, it will become

increasingly important to incorporate them into the increased naval and military

drills that the US conducts annually with our partner nations

2

1

6

Recommendations for Additional US Countermeasures

❑ Build more UAVs to regain number(s) and technological overmatch

❑ Sell non weaponized systems to our allies at lower cost (retired predators), allows

our allies to put eyes in the skies relieving some burden on IS systems

❑ Continue to bolster UAV/UCAV R&D for all types of systems to include water

borne patrol craft and sensors

❑ Ensure the latest DOD combat doctrine discusses ways to harden against, defeat

or neutralize enemy UAV’s at all echelons

2

1

7

REFERENCES

References

Ali, Idrees. "Exclusive: As Trump Cracks Down on Pakistan, U.S. Cuts Military..." Reuters, 10 Aug. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-usa-military-exclusive/exclusive-as-trump-cracks-

down-on-pakistan-u-s-cuts-military-training-programs-idUSKBN1KV166.

Aneez, Shirhar. "China's 'Silk Road' Push Stirs Resentment and Protest in Sri Lanka." Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 2 Feb. 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-china-insight/chinas-silk-road-push-

stirs-resentment-and-protest-in-sri-lanka-idUSKBN15G5UT.

Anton. "China and the 21st Century New Maritime Silk Road | Belt and Road Center." Belt and Road Center | Created by Pallas Foundations, 27 Oct. 2017, beltandroadcenter.org/2017/10/23/china-

and-the-21st-century-new-maritime-silk-road/.

Arduino, Alessandro. "China's Private Army: Protecting the New Silk Road." The Diplomat, 20 Mar. 2018, thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-private-army-protecting-the-new-silk-road/.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. "Comparing Aerial and Satellite Images of China's Spratly Outposts." Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center For Strategic International Studies,

16 Feb. 2018, amti.csis.org/comparing-aerial-satellite-images-chinas-spratly-outposts/.

Asia Times Staff. "New Series of Chinese Assault Drones Takes Flight." Asia Times | Covering Geo-political News and Current Affairs Across Asia, 7 Feb. 2018, www.atimes.com/article/new-series-

chinese-assault-drones-takes-flight/.

Bahcetepe, Hilal. "China Continues to Push Global Ambitions - My Met Media." My Met Media - The Student Voice of MSU Denver, 29 Aug. 2018, www.mymetmedia.com/news/china-continues-to-

push-global-ambitions/.

Banerjee, Jyotirmoy. "India-U.S. Strategic Convergence in the Indo-Pacific Region." Center for International Maritime Security, 24 Sept. 2018, cimsec.org/india-u-s-strategic-convergence-in-the-indo-

pacific-region/37719.

Beech, Hannah. "'We Cannot Afford This?: Malaysia Pushes Back Against China's Vision." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia, 22 Sept. 2018,

www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/world/asia/china-malaysia.html. Accessed 27 Sept. 2018.

Blyenburgh & Co. "EU-China Aviation Partnership Project – Experience Exchange on UAS – 180606-08 – RPAS Regulations." RPAS Regulations – The Guide to Rules and Regulations Relative to

the Operation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), 2016, rpas-regulations.com/community-info/eu-china-aviation-partnership-project-experience-exchange-on-uas-180606-08/.

Boeing. "Boeing: MQ-25 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)." Boeing: The Boeing Company, www.boeing.com/defense/mq25/#/milestones. Accessed 29 Sept. 2018.

References

Bruce-Lockhart, Anna. "Why is China Building a New Silk Road?" World Economic Forum, 26 June 2016, www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/why-china-is-building-a-new-silk-road/.

Bureau of Public Affairs Staff. "Kazakhstan." U.S. Department of State, 19 July 2018, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm. Accessed 1 Oct. 2018.

Buyankhishig, Otgonsuren. "Mongolia-China-Russia Economic Corridor." Institute for Strategic Studies, National Security Council of Mongolia, 18 Nov. 2016,

nigscass.cssn.cn/xshy/201701/W020170303349361882465.pdf.

Byana, Abhishek G. "Why is Caspian Sea Security in China's Interest?" CGTN, 31 Aug. 2017, news.cgtn.com/news/3349544f31557a6333566d54/share_p.html.

Chaudhuri, Pramit P. "Why India Sees China's Belt Road As a Geopolitical Threat." Rhodium Group, 17 Nov. 2017, rhg.com/research/india-sees-chinas-belt-road-geopolitical-threat/.

China Power Team. "Is China Contributing to the United Nations? Mission?" ChinaPower Project, 3 Aug. 2018, chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/. Accessed 2 Oct. 2018.

---. "Where is China Targeting Its Development Finance?" ChinaPower Project, 8 Dec. 2017, chinapower.csis.org/china-development-finance/.

Davidson, Helen. "Chinese Company Secures 99-year Lease of Darwin Port in $506m Deal." The Guardian, 13 Oct. 2015, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/13/chinese-company-

secures-99-year-lease-of-darwin-port-in-506m-deal.

Dorell, Oren. "How China's Military Expansion Threatens U.S. Interests." USA TODAY, 18 May 2018, www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/05/18/how-chinas-military-expansion-

threatens-u-s-interests/621385002/.

Dorsey, James M. "Chinese Interests at Risk As Gulf Crisis Expands into the Horn of Africa." South China Morning Post, 13 Jan. 2018, www.scmp.com/week-

asia/geopolitics/article/2128064/gulf-crisis-expands-horn-africa-and-china-sits-eye-storm.

Durden, Tyler. "China To Build Military Base In Africa Next To Critical Oil Transit Choke Point." Zero Hedge, 10 May 2015, www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-10/china-open-military-base-

horn-africa-next-critical-oil-transit-choke-point.

Financial Times. "What Can the New Silk Road Do for Global Trade?" World Economic Forum, 22 Sept. 2015, www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/09/what-can-the-new-silk-road-do-for-global-

trade/.

References

FT Staff. "China Signs 99-year Lease on Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port." Financial Times, Nikkei Company, 11 Dec. 2017, www.ft.com/content/e150ef0c-de37-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c.

Gaffey, Conor. "What You Should Know About Kenya's Mega-railway, Built with Chinese Money." Newsweek, 31 May 2017, www.newsweek.com/kenya-railway-china-madaraka-express-

618357.

Graham, Euan. "Mattis Lays Out U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy at Shangri-La | RealClearDefense." RealClearDefense - Opinion, News, Analysis, Video and Polls, 4 June 2018,

www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/04/mattis_lays_out_us_indo-pacific_strategy_at_shangri-la_113504.html.

Hernandez, Marco, et al. "Belt and Road Initiative." South China Morning Post, 2017, multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/pakistan.html.

Hillman, Jonathan. "Opinion | The Hazards of China's Global Ambitions." Washington Post, 5 Feb. 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/05/obor-china-

asia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bbaf0c73c5df.

Horowitz, Jason, and Liz Alderman. "Chastised by E.U., a Resentful Greece Embraces China's Cash and Interests." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia,

26 Aug. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-tsipras.html.

Huang, Zheping. "Your Guide to OBOR, China's Plan to Build a New Silk Road." Quartz, 15 May 2017, qz.com/983460/obor-an-extremely-simple-guide-to-understanding-chinas-one-belt-one-

road-forum-for-its-new-silk-road/.

Hyatt, Daniel. "Mideast and Africa's Road to China Goes Through Gwadar - China.org.cn." China.org.cn - China News, Weather, Business, Travel & Language Courses, 29 Aug. 2018,

www.china.org.cn/opinion/2018-08/29/content_60895396.htm.

Irshad, Muhammad S., et al. "One Belt and One Road: Dose China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Benefit for Pakistan's Economy?" Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, Tianjin

University of Finance and Economics, 31 Dec. 2015, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710352.

Iwanek, Krzysztof. "The New Silk Road Is Old: Why You Should Ignore Belt and Road Initiative Maps." The Diplomat, 25 May 2018, thediplomat.com/2018/05/the-new-silk-road-is-old-why-

you-should-ignore-belt-and-road-initiative-maps/.

Jamal, Umair. "The Consequences of Shifting US-Pakistan Military Ties." The Diplomat, 18 Aug. 2018, thediplomat.com/2018/08/the-consequences-of-shifting-us-Pakistan-military-ties/.

References

Knawel, Gurmeet. "Pakistan's Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China's String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific." Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Apr. 2018,

www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-string-pearls-indo-pacific.

Keck, Zachary. "China's New Aircraft Carrier Shows All the Signs of a Killer. Here Is What We Know." The National Interest, 1 Aug. 2018, nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-new-aircraft-

carrier-shows-all-signs-killer-here-what-we-know-27467.

Kou Jie, Bianji. "“Drone Squads” Tackle Electric Breakdown in China - People's Daily Online." English--People's Daily Online, 5 Feb. 2018, en.people.cn/n3/2018/0205/c90000-9423881.html.

Kurukulasuriya, Lasanda. "Japan Eyes Sri Lanka's Deep Water Port of Trincomalee." The Diplomat, 31 Aug. 2018, thediplomat.com/2018/08/japan-eyes-sri-lankas-deep-water-port-of-

trincomalee/.

LaGrone, Sam. "MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Aerial Tanker Could Almost Double Strike Range of U.S. Carrier Air Wing." USNI News, 1 Sept. 2017, news.usni.org/2017/08/31/mq-25-stingray-

unmanned-aerial-tanker-almost-double-strike-range-u-s-carrier-air-wing.

Lintner, Bertil. "China-India Vie for a Strategic Slice of Paradise." Asia Times | Covering Geo-political News and Current Affairs Across Asia, 23 Nov. 2017, www.atimes.com/article/china-india-

vie-strategic-slice-paradise/.

Loesekrug-Pietri, André. "Why Europe Can't Afford to Ignore China's New Silk Road." World Economic Forum, 16 Nov. 2015, www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/europe-china-new-silk-road/.

Macau Hub. "China is Mozambique’s Largest Financier and Builder of Infrastructure." Macauhub, 30 Apr. 2018, macauhub.com.mo/feature/pt-china-e-o-maior-financiador-e-construtor-de-infra-

estruturas-em-mocambique/.

Majendie, Adam, et al. "China’s Empire of Money is Reshaping Lives Across New Silk Road." The Economic Times, Bloomberg, 4 Aug. 2018,

economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/chinas-empire-of-money-is-reshaping-lives-across-new-silk-road/articleshow/65262932.cms.

Majumdar, Dave. "China's Advanced Submarines Are 'Breaking Records'." The National Interest, 26 July 2018, nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-advanced-submarines-are-breaking-records-

26811.

Malik, Nukhbat. "China Outpaces US in Arms Supply to Pakistan." VOA, 14 Mar. 2018, www.voanews.com/a/china-outpaces-us-arms-supply-pakistan/4297350.html.

References

MAREX. "Pakistan and China Boost Security at Gwadar Port." The Maritime Executive, 15 Dec. 2016, www.maritime-executive.com/article/pakistan-boosts-maritime-security-at-gwadar-port.

McBride, James. "Building the New Silk Road." Council on Foreign Relations, ForeignAffairs.com, 22 May 2015, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/building-new-silk-road.

MD Staff. "New Report From SIPRI On The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road." Modern Diplomacy, 4 Sept. 2018, moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/09/04/new-report-from-sipri-on-the-21st-century-

maritime-silk-road/.

Meltzer, Joshua P. "China's One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the United States." Brookings, 28 June 2017, www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-a-view-

from-the-united-states/.

Mettletest Editoral Team. "The Verdict is out on Philippines V. China." Mettletest, 12 Apr. 2017, mettletest.com/the-verdict-is-out-on-philippines-v-china/.

Murray, Lisa. "Chinese-owned Darwin Port Struggling to Pay Back Debts." Financial Review, 17 June 2018, www.afr.com/business/infrastructure/chineseowned-darwin-port-struggling-to-pay-

back-debts-20180615-h11gcr.

Naval Today Staff. "US Navy Kicks off Southeast Asia TSC Patrol." Naval Today, 21 May 2018, navaltoday.com/2018/05/21/us-navy-kicks-off-southeast-asia-tsc-patrol/.

Nuehard, Ryan. "China's Influence Operations In The United States." Fortuna's Corner, 15 Mar. 2018, fortunascorner.com/2018/03/15/chinas-influence-operations-united-states/.

O'Connor, Tom. "U.S. Says China is on Its Way to Becoming Powerful Enough "to Beat Any Military in the World"." Newsweek, 23 Aug. 2018, www.newsweek.com/us-says-china-way-

becoming-powerful-enough-beat-any-military-world-1086473.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Annual Report to Congress - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018."

media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

Oysharja, Orpita. "BCIM: In the Shadow of Belt and Road Initiative." The Financial Express, 30 Nov. 2017, today.thefinancialexpress.com.bd/anniversary-issue-3/bcim-in-the-shadow-of-belt-

and-road-initiative-1511942258.

Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. "The United States Just Closed Its Last Base in Central Asia." The Diplomat, 10 June 2014, thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-united-states-just-closed-its-last-base-in-central-

asia/.

References

PTI. "Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Leased to Chinese Company for 40 Years." The Indian Express, 20 Apr. 2017, indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-gwadar-port-leased-to-chinese-company-for-

40-years-4621432/.

Rahmat, Ridzwan. "US Showcases Strength of Naval Relations in Southeast Asia As Carl Vinson Arrives in Vietnam | Jane's 360." Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis | Jane's 360,

5 Mar. 2018, www.janes.com/article/78360/us-showcases-strength-of-naval-relations-in-southeast-asia-as-carl-vinson-arrives-in-vietnam.

Reuters Staff. "China's 'One Belt, One Road' is Threat to US in Latin America - US Commander." RT International, 17 Feb. 2017, www.rt.com/business/419080-china-initiative-threat-us/.

Reuters. "Myanmar Scales Back Chinese-backed Port Project over Debt Fears." The Guardian, 2 Aug. 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/myanmar-scales-back-chinese-backed-port-

project-over-debt-fears.

Saeedy, Alexander. "How Greece's Busiest Port Reveals the Perils of Privatization." The Nation, 1 June 2018, www.thenation.com/article/how-greeces-busiest-port-reveals-the-perils-of-

privatization/.

Smee, Ben, and Christopher Walsh. "How the Sale of Darwin Port to the Chinese Sparked a Geopolitical Brawl." The Guardian, 13 Mar. 2018, www.theguardian.com/australia-

news/2016/dec/18/how-the-sale-of-darwin-port-to-the-chinese-sparked-a-geopolitical-brawl.

Sputnik. "US Aims to Revive Projects in Central Asia, Asia-Pacific to Counter OBOR." Sputnik International - Breaking News & Analysis - Radio, Photos, Videos, Infographics, 24 May 2017,

sputniknews.com/politics/201705241053941920-us-asia-projects-obor/.

Staff Press Release. "Ministry of Planning,Development & Reform." Ministry of Planning,Development & Reform, 17 Sept. 2018, www.pc.gov.pk/web/press/get_press/218.

Staff. "About EU-China Aviation Partnership Project (APP)." Eu-china-app, www.eu-china-app.org/about-eu-china-app.

---. "Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China's Contribution." Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, Foreign Languages Press, May 2017,

www.followingthemoney.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017_Leading-Group-for-the-BRI_Building-the-Belt-and-Road_E.pdf.

---. "One Belt." OBOReurope, 2018, www.oboreurope.com/en/beltandroad/one-belt/. Accessed 12 Sept. 2018.

StoneNews. "Piraeus, the Fastest Growing Port in the World." StoneNews.eu, 28 Aug. 2018, stonenews.eu/piraeus-fastest-growing-port-world/.

References

Stratfor. "China's Belt and Road Initiative, Five Years In." Stratfor, Worldview, 22 June 2018, worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years.

---. "Why Russia and China Are Expanding Their Roles in Afghanistan." Stratfor, 5 Sept. 2018, worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-russia-and-china-are-expanding-their-roles-afghanistan.

Tan, Wilfred, and Kwang Shean. "Challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam." The ASEAN Post, 2 May 2018, theaseanpost.com/article/challenges-belt-and-road-initiative-vietnam.

Tarabay, Jamie. "With Sri Lankan Port Acquisition, China Adds Another 'pearl' to Its 'string'." CNN, 5 Feb. 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/02/03/asia/china-sri-lanka-string-of-pearls-intl/index.html.

Thompson, Loren. "A Quick Fix For U.S. Navy Surveillance Gaps In Asia." Forbes, 10 July 2018, www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/07/10/a-quick-fix-for-u-s-navy-surveillance-gaps-in-

asia/#6c17e8d31d84.

Thrall, Lloyd. "China Is Not a Threat to U.S. National Security Interests in Africa." RAND Corporation Provides Objective Research Services and Public Policy Analysis | RAND, 2015,

www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR905.html.

Tiezzi, Shannon. "Chinese Company Wins Contract for Deep Sea Port in Myanmar." The Diplomat, 1 Jan. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinese-company-wins-contract-for-deep-sea-port-in-

myanmar/.

Trade Arabia Staff. "UAE 'will Make Changes in Law to Help Maritime Sector'." Trade Arabia | Trade Arabia Middle East & GCC Business Information Portal | Trade News Portal, 11 Sept. 2018,

www.tradearabia.com/news/IND_344969.html.

Trading Economics. "China Military Expenditure | 1989-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast." TRADING ECONOMICS | 20 Million INDICATORS FROM 196 COUNTRIES, 8 Oct. 2018,

tradingeconomics.com/china/military-expenditure.

Tweed, David. "China's New Silk Road." Bloomberg, 23 Aug. 2018, www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/china-s-silk-road.

Undercurrent News. "China Strenghtens Investments in African Ports." Undercurrent News, 23 Apr. 2018, www.undercurrentnews.com/2018/04/23/china-strenghtens-investments-in-african-

ports/.

Van Blyenburgh, Peter. "EU-CN APP Drone Workshop in Shenzhen, China – UAS VISION." UAS VISION – a Global News Service for the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Community,

14 June 2018, www.uasvision.com/2018/06/14/eu-cn-app-drone-workshop-in-shenzhen-china/.

References

Van Der Leer, Yeroen, and Joshua Yau. "China's New Silk Route - The Long and Winding Road." PwC's Growth Markets Centre, Feb. 2016, www.pwc.com/gx/en/growth-markets-

center/assets/pdf/china-new-silk-route.pdf.

Viet Nam News. "Vietnam Opposes China's Activities in Paracel Islands." The Nation, 11 Aug. 2018, www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/breakingnews/30351945.

Walt, Vivienne. "China's Next Target? A Strategic Greek Shipping Port." Fortune, 10 Apr. 2015, fortune.com/2015/04/10/china-goes-after-greek-port/.

Ward, Alex. "Why Trump Cut Millions in Military Aid to Pakistan." Vox, 4 Sept. 2018, www.vox.com/2018/9/4/17818396/pakistan-aid-military-trump-pompeo-afghanistan.

Watts, Gordon. "China’s ‘Private Army’ Prowls the ‘New Silk Road’." Asia Times | Covering Geo-political News and Current Affairs Across Asia, 20 Aug. 2018, www.atimes.com/article/chinas-

private-army-prowls-the-new-silk-road/.

Woody, Christopher. "Tensions Are Still Simmering a Year After the World's 2 Biggest Countries Almost Clashed over a Border at the Top of the World." Business Insider, 22 Aug. 2018,

www.businessinsider.com/tensions-between-china-and-india-continue-year-after-doklam-standoff-2018-8.

Woolston, Alan. "Overcoming the Legal Challenges to 'One Belt, One Road?" Global Railway Review, Fladgate LLP, 15 Jan. 2018, www.globalrailwayreview.com/article/65484/legal-challenges-

one-belt-one-road/.

www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=389.

Xinhua News Agency. "Backgrounder: Major China-Africa Infrastructure Cooperation Projects." COMTEX News Network, Inc, 25 Mar. 2017,

go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&u=ksu&id=GALE%7CA487073405&v=2.1&it=r&sid=ITOF&asid=ea28e7ad.

Xinhua. "Belt and Road Initiative Opens New Era of Global Cooperation." The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 24 Apr. 2017,

english.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2017/04/24/content_281475635407152.htm.

---. "Full Text of the Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative." The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 20 June 2017,

english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm.

---. "Xinhua Headlines: Xinjiang's Hearts, Minds Open Up to Silk Road - Xinhua | English.news.cn." Xinhua Headlines, 23 Aug. 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/23/c_137412638.htm.

2

2

6

REFRENCES

Yang, Yang. "Belt and Road Initiative Warmly Welcomed in Australia's Northern Territory - Chinadaily.com.cn." China Daily Website - Connecting China Connecting the World, 16 July 2018,

www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/16/WS5b4c0bfda310796df4df6a16_1.html.

---. "China-developed Drones at Silk Road Expo in Xi'an." China Daily, 6 June 2017, africa.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201706/06/WS59bbe7c7a310ded8ac18b7e6_8.html.

Zhan, Echo. "Video: Dazzling Display over Chinese City As More Than 1,300 Drones Take to the Sky." Guinness World Records, 4 May 2018,

www.guinnessworldrecords.com/news/commercial/2018/5/video-dazzling-display-over-chinese-city-as-more-than-1-300-drones-take-to-the-s-524413.

Zhang, Alicia. "Loaning Stability for Development: Chinese Aid and African Consequences | Harvard Political Review." Harvard Political Review, 28 Dec. 2017,

harvardpolitics.com/world/loaning-stability-for-development-chinese-aid-and-african-consequences/.

Zheng, Sarah. "China's Djibouti Military Base: Logistics Facility or Geopolitical Platform?" South China Morning Post, 15 Aug. 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-

defence/article/2113300/chinas-djibouti-military-base-logistics-facility-or.

2

2

7

the new silk road impact to the united states · 10/9/2018 · background: building the belt and...

Documents