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The New German eID Card: Concepts, Technologies and Opportunities

Ulrich WaldmannFraunhofer Institute SIT

DESY Computing Seminar17 January 2011, Hamburg

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Agenda

Fraunhofer-Institute SIT

Basics of the new eID Card

Application Scenarios

Security Concepts

Special Requirements

Challenges

Summary and Outlook

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Who is Fraunhofer?

Munich

Darmstadt

Birlinghoven(near Bonn)

Joseph von Fraunhofer (1787-1826), inventor & entrepreneur

Fraunhofer Society in Germany

Largest application-oriented research organization

59 institutes, 17,000 staff

€ 1.6 billion annual research budget

€ 1.3 billion of this through contract research

Fraunhofer SIT: Institute for Secure Information Technology

Leading expert for IT Security

Competence Center new eID Card

Cooperation with public authorities

Consulting about eID Card integration

Security Testing

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Basics of the new eID Card

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Who else receives my personal data?

Typical Questions on the Internet

Citizen

Service providers usually do not identify themselves

Is the service trustworthy?

Service Provider of eBusiness or eGovernment

What is my password?

What is the correct zip code?

Where can I complain?

What do they need my date of birth for?

Have I registered before?

How can I verify address & zip code?

Is this person really over 18?

Is the name spelling correct? Is this customer already in my CRM system?

What is my account name?

German Answer since November 1st, 2010: new eID Card

Does the requesting person really exist?

Citizens must identify themselves, usually giving away their data privacy

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Physical Card

Polycarbonate in cash card format (ID-1)

Outer security features, e.g. guilloche, holograms, laser engraving

Integrated contactless microprocessor chip

Obligatory for citizens from age of 16

Validity: 10 years

Card Access Number (CAN)

Serial Number

Personal Data

Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) - Doc-Type, Serial Number- Date of Birth- Date of Expiry- Name, Given Name

Date of Expiry

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Why use a contactless Chip?

Durable, user-friendly, cost-efficient, flexible

Card reader compatible to contactless passport

Reliable technology

ISO 14443 interface (Type A and B) at 13,56 MHz

Energy transfer by inductive coupling

Data transfer by load modulation up to 847 kBit/s

Operating range at max. 3-5 cm

eID CardCard Reader

Power Supply

Transponder

Load Modulator

Magnetic Field

Source: http://RFID-handbook.com

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What Data are in the Chip?

ePass Application for Inspection Systems (offline)

- Face Image

- 2 Fingerprint Images (optional)

- MRZ data (Name, Given Name, Date of birth etc.)

eID Application for eGovernment / eBusiness (offline / online)

- Family Name, Given Name

- Religious / Artistic Name

- Doctoral Degree

- Date of Birth

- Place of Birth

- Address

- Community ID

- Issuing State, Date of Expiry

- Verification of Age

- Verification of Community

- Restricted Identification (Pseudonym)

- Revocation Feature

eSign Application for eGovernment / eBusiness (offline / online)

- Signature key

- Signature certificate (X.509)

For qualified electronic signature according to the German Signature Law

Mandatory Opt-out / opt-in Optional download

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Data Protection Functions 1

Verification of Age

For age-dependent access restrictions

- avoids disclosure of date of birth

Verification of a given date

If date of birth stored in the chip is before or equal: OK

Verification of Community

For regional services, e.g. restricted to a certain city

- avoids disclosure of address

Verification of a given community ID

If community stored in the chip is identical: OK

Yes, I am older than 18!

Yes, I live in Darmstadt, Germany

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Data Protection Functions 2

With you my name is 0x312D7582F871

With you my revocation feature is 0x49A77F285D52

Pseudonym

For pseudonymous access and recognition

- avoids disclosure of personal data

Card- and service-specific identifier

calculated from service identifier and card’s secret

Unchainable

Revocation Feature

For check of card- and service-specific revocation lists

- avoids disclosure of pseudonyms

Computed like pseudonym, but from other card’s secret

Just as unique per card and service provider

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Application Scenarios

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Use Cases of the eID Function

Citizen

Service provider identifies himself by means of authorization certificate

Citizen identifies herself by means of the eID Card

Citizen and service provider can rely on the identity of the opposite party

This is really the service I trust and want to communicate with

Service Provider

May replace account name / password

May replace appearance in person

Yields person-related data of high quality

The requesting person really exists

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eID Function vs. eSign Function

eSign Function

"This I have signed"

Legally binding statement of intention

Optional download from accredited certification

authority (additional costs)

Display of document / email to-be-signed

Entry of eSign-PIN to sign document

Transmission of signed document

Example: Signing of contracts or

transactions

eID Function

"This I am"

Snapshot without enduring evidence

Included at card issuance,

opt-in at registry office

Display of service provider's identity

and requested data fields

Entry of eID-PIN to release eID data

Transmission of eID data

Examples: Registration as a customer,

opening of a bank account

Document

......

......name, address, …

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Pseudonymous Access Age Verification Public Services

eKiosk

/ Information Desk Electronic Signature

Barrier-free Internet ServicesAccess ControlsOnline Registration

Automatic Form Completion

Use Case Examples

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Use Case Example: eID card for VoIP

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Security Concepts

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The "Extended Access Control" (EAC)

eID ServerCard Reader / PC

PIN inside

eID Card Chip

I don't get it! eID Server (= Terminal)Card Reader / PC

Card security based on Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic Curves and AES

PACE, Password-Authenticated Connection Establishment

Chip verifies Authentication Certificate of the Service Provider

Terminal Authentication (TA) + Chip Authentication (CA)

Result: Secure Channel between card reader and eID Card

Result: Secure Channel between eID Card and eID Server

eID-PIN

eID Card Chip

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How does the eID Card enforce EAC?

Internal access rules of eID data with security condition

1. PACE with entry of a password

2. TA with Authorization Certificate

3. CA

Example 1: Updating the address by a registry office

Condition: PACE with CAN

+ TA with authorization "CAN allowed" + "Update Address"

+ CA Secure Channel

Example 2: Reading the address by a service provider

Condition: PACE with eID-PIN

+ TA with authorization "Read Address"

+ CA Secure Channel

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PACETA

CA

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Who can get access to the eID Data?

ePass Application for Inspection Systems (offline)

- Face Image

- 2 Fingerprint Images (optional)

- MRZ data (Name, Given Name, Data of birth etc.)

eID Application for eGovernment / eBusiness (offline / online)

- Family Name, Given Name- Religious / Artistic Name- Academic Title- Date of Birth- Place of Birth- Address-Community ID- Issuing State, Date of Expiry

- Verification of Age- Verification of Community- Pseudonym- Revocation Feature

eSign Application for eGovernment / eBusiness (offline / online)

- Signature key

- Signature certificate (X.509)

For qualified electronic signature according to the German Signature Law

CardSecurity

Signed info about public chip authentication key Readable after PACE, TAVerifiable by Passive Authentication

Card Access Number (CAN)

eID-PIN

MRZ Password

Personal Unblocking Key (PUK)

Accessible after PACE, TA, CA

Private Key for Chip Auth.

Private Key for Restricted Ident.

Public Root Key (Trust anchor)

Accessible after PACE, TA, CA

Private Key for Revocation

Accessible after PACE, TA

- Read by Inspection System after PACE with CAN or MRZ, TA, CA

- Verified by Passive Authentication (signed data)

- Read by Authentication Terminal of service provider after PACE with eID-PIN, TA, CA

- Read by Inspection System after PACE with CAN or MRZ, TA , CA

- Updated (address, community ID) by terminal of registry office after PACE with CAN, TA, CA

- Downloaded from Authentication Terminal of Certification Authority after PACE with eID-PIN, TA, CA

- Used by Signature Terminal after PACE with CAN, TA, CA and entry of eSign-PIN

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Structure of Authorization Certificate

Card Verfiable Certificate

Certificate Body

Certificate Profile Identifier

Certification Authority Reference

Public Key

Certificate Holder Reference

Certificate Holder Authorization Template

(Flags for roles, permissions to write, read, use special functions)

Certificate Effective Date

Certificate Expiration Date

Certificate Extensions

Hash of Certificate Description

(issuerName, issuerURL, subjectName, subjectURL,

termsOfUsage, redirectURL, commCertificates)

Hash of Terminal Sector

(service identifier)

Signature

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PKI of Authorization Certificates

3-level authorization PKI

Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)

German Root of authorization PKI

Authorizes Document Verifying CAs

Document Verifying Certification Authority (DVCA)

Issuer of authorization certificates

Terminals

Holder of authorization certificates

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Types of Authorization Certificates

Authorization certificates are CVCs of service providers

Used during Terminal Authentication

Special authorizations towards eID card according to terminal type

Certificates of inspection systems

Access to ePass + eID application for police + border control (offline)

Certificates of authentication terminals

Access to eID application for eGovernment / eBusiness (remote, online)

Certificates of signature terminals

Access to eSign application for eID cardholder (local, offline)

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Card-Verifiable Certificate (CVC)

Card verifies the certificate signature (≠ X.509)

Chip with public Root key as trust anchor

Card evaluates certificate attributes (≠ X.509)

Imports certified public key

Imports authorizations of certificate owner

CVCs interoperable + flexible

Compact + self-descriptive (ASN.1 Tag-Length-Value)

Any length of certificate chains

Cross- and link-certificates

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CVC-based Authentication

Card verifies certificate chain

Chip verifies first CVC with Root key

Verification of subsequent certificate with each imported public key

Last certificate belongs to entity, which wants to authenticate

Authentication of opposite entity

Card verifies that entity is correct certificate holder

Card grants access according to authorizations

Mutual authentication with establishment of a secure channel

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Verification of Certificate Validity

Card without battery and clock

Storage of approximated current date

Update with Certificate Effective Date of certificates

Rejection, if Certificate Expiration Date < current date

Official time update service

Online update by means of special certificates

Certificates without any authorizations

No subsequent authentication

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Certificate Life

Entity Application Validity

CVCA Sign / verify DVCA certificates 3 years (useful life) + 1 month (overlap time)

DVCA Sign / verify terminal certificates 3 months + 14 days

Inspection system with distributed terminal

Read ePass + eID data 1 month + 2 days

Inspection systemwith integrated terminal

Read ePass + eID data 1 day + 1 day

Official authentication terminal, with distributed terminal

Read ePass + eID data, update service 1 month + 2 days

Official authentication terminal with integrated terminal

Read ePass + eID data, update service 1 day + 1 day

Non-official auth. terminal with integrated terminal

Read eID data, update service, restricted identification

1 day + 1 day

Non-official auth. terminalwith integrated terminal

verification of age and community ID, download service QES

1 month + 2 days

Non-official auth. terminal with distributed or integrated t.

Special regulation for vending machines, verification of age

1 month + 7 days

Signature terminal (integrated) Create electronic signatures (QES) 3 years + 1 month

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The 10 Steps of Online Identification

Web Server

eID Server

Citizen

Web Browser

eID Client

Call of Website: HTTP GET

5 Plug-In starts eID Client

6 User interaction,finally entry of eID-PIN

TLS with PAOS binding

CVC

X.509X.509

X.509X.509

X.509

X.509X.509

X.509X.509

TLS SAML

TLS SAMLAuthorizationCertificate

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Forwarding of SAML Response in HTTP POST9SAML Request in GET of HTTP Redirect2

Response: Welcome to Service!10

eID function: EAC, transmission of eID data via eCard API

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SAML Response in POST of HTTP Redirect

8HTML with special MIME type + parameters, PSK

4Forwarding of SAML Request: HTTP GET

3TLS with HTTPS

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What does it look like?

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What does it look like?

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What does it look like?

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What does it look like?

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What does it look like?

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Special Requirements

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What does the Citizen need?

eID Card with activated eID function

Knowledge of 6-digit eID-PIN

PC with Internet access

Certified Hard- and software

Contactless card reader

Basic: without PIN Pad

Standard: with PIN Pad

Comfort: with PIN Pad, display, Authorization Certificate for eSign

eID Client software ("AusweisApp")

Communication with eID Card + eID Server

Available for Windows, Linux, Mac OS X

Later also as Open Source Software

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What does the Service Provider need?

Integration of eID application

Connection to an eID Server

Application for authorization

Application with Federal Administration Office (BVA)

Extract from Commercial Register

Description of service

Terms of usage

Justification for requested eID data

Responsible data protection authority

Authorization certificate

Short-living certificates (2 days valid)

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What is different from other Cards?

Client-Server Authentication

with eID Card

Server has "Authorization Certificate", i.e.

a Card Verifiable Certificate (CVC)

eID Card imports CVC

including access rights to eID data

Client has eID Card with private key that is the

same on many cards

Access to eID Card via eCard API

eID Card + server establish

Secure Channel (End-to-End)

Server reads data from the eID Card

Client-Server Authentication

with standard smart card

Server has X.509 certificate

- not verified by the card

Client has card with X.509 certificate and

individual private key

Access to card via PKCS#11

Client software + server establish

TLS channel

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Essential: eCard API Framework

Use of various eCards (e.g. eID Card) for different applications

Web service-oriented access to eCards

Basis of eID Client, eID Server, eID function

Citizen with eID Client

eID function: EAC, transmission of eID data

eID Server

eCard Convenience User Interface

Mgmt. InterfaceeCard Interface

ISO 24727-3 Interface,Generic Card Services,Cryptographic Primitives

Card Reader Interface,eCard Communication

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Challenges

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Challenges of Introducing an eID Card

New processes, e.g. in registration offices

New organizational units,

e.g. registration authority

Technical specifications

Development, test & certification

Technical infrastructure

Right of informational self-determination

New Identity Card Law & regulations

Change of Signature Law etc.

Technical

Legal

Organizational

User Acceptance ??

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Challenge of Infrastructure

Certification AuthoritieseID cardseID clientSupport, e.g. deactivation

Apply for eID cardsRevoke and

withdraw revocation Authorization certificates,

Revocation lists

Certificates

Forward revocation /withdrawal

Notify authorizationRevocation lists

Contract

Apply for authorization certificates

Technical guidelines,Certification of components

Chip cards

eID cards

Web Server of Service Provider

eID function

Use of the web service

eID data

Citizen

eID Server

Holder of eID Card, card reader, eID client

Federal Office of Administration (BVA)

Registration authorityFederal Ministry of the Interior (BMI)

Local Registry Offices, Citizen Service Center

Responsible for eID card

Bundesdruckerei, D-Trust

eID card issuer, certification authorityTechnical support, training, testing, information

certificatesCompetence Center eID Card

Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)

Root Certification Authority (PKI)

Component Manufacturers

Chip cards, card readers, eID client + eID server software

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ISO 14443: Contactless Interface

Challenge of Technical Specification

Chip Functionality

ISO 7816: Card Security Architecture + Commands

BSI TR-03110: Security Protocols (EAC)

BSI TR-03111: Elliptic Curves

BSI TR-02102: Algorithms, Key Lengths

BSI TR-03116-2: Cryptographic Requirements

European Specifications of Card Applications

CEN EN 14980: European Signature Card

CEN TS 15480: European Citizen Card

BSI TR-03117: Contactless Signature Cards

BSI TR-03127: eID Card Architecture

Specification of Card Operating System

ICAO Doc 9303: Data Structures + Security ProtocolsMiddleware

BSI TR-03112 eCard API

CEN TS 15480: European Citizen Card, Part 3: App. Interface

ISO 24727: Integrated Circuit Card Programming Interfaces

BSI TR-03119: Card Readers

BSI TR-03130: eID Server

Evaluation and Certification

BSI PP SSCD

BSI PP eID

German Signature Law/ Signature Act

ISO 15408: Common Criteria V3.1

BSI TR-03105-3.3 and 5.2: Conformity tests, eID, readers

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Summary and Outlook

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Summary

eID Card enforces mutual proof of identity

Secure and data protective authentication

Benefit for citizens and service providers

eID Card demands rethinking

Card Verifiable Certificates

eCard API implementations

Authorization of services

eID Card allows for more trust on the Internet

Sovereign rollout + Root PKI

New business models and customers?

Optimization of processes?

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Outlook

Implementation period

Specification work since 2006

Setup and testing > 2 years

Integration into a service > 3 months

20 services ready at end of 2010

Rollout of German eID Cards

ca. 12 million citizens with eID Cards at end of 2011

European perspective

National solutions incompatible

EU project STORK for eID interoperability

Specification of European Citizen Card

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Going Life since 1 November 2010

Application for new eID card possible since 1 November 2010

Delivery period: ~2-4 weeks

Available eID Server / eID Service provider

bremen online services GmbH & Co. KG

Bundesdruckerei GmbH

Deutsche Post GmbH, business area: SignTrust

]Init[ AG

media transfer AG

OpenLimit SignCubes GmbH

Current list of all eID Service providers:

www.Personalausweisportal.de Partner werden

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Available Services in 2011

Application test participant Test scenario

Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG Fluggastabfertigung

Allianz Deutschland AG Kundenserviceprozesse im Versicherungsportal

Anstalt für Kommunale Datenverarbeitung in Bayern (AKDB) KFZ-Zulassungsverfahren OK.VORFAHRT u.a.

ARGE eKfz Teilprojekte eKFZ u.a.

Bayerisches Landesamt für Steuern, Bereich IUK, Verfahrens- Management ELSTER (BLSt-ELSTER)

Registrierungsverfahren für die Teilnahme am ELSTER-Verfahren über das Elster-Online-Portal (elektronische Steuererklärung)

CosmosDirekt Versicherungen Authentisierte Willenserklärungen / Mitteilungen

Datenzentrale Baden-Württemberg (DZB) Online Gewerbeanzeige des Kommunalen Gewerbemanagements (KoGeMa)

Deutsche Kreditbank (DKB) Direktbank

Deutsche Rentenversicherung (DRV) eService der Deutschen Rentenversicherung

d-hosting die rackspace & Connectivity GmbH im Auftrag der Selbsthilfeverbände von Menschen mit Behinderungen

Verfahren für Menschen mit Behinderung oder chronischen Erkrankungen

FRITZ & MACZIOL GmbH Elektronisches Abfallnachweisverfahren (eANV)

Fujitsu Technology Solutions GmbH "Fujitsu Online Shop Deutschland"

Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG Antragstellung

Hagener E-Government Konsortium (Stadt Hagen, HABIT, Fernuniversität Hagen, SAP, u.a.)

Kommunale Verwaltungsdienstleistungen im virtuellen Rathaus21

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Available Services in 2011

Application test participant Test scenario

HSH Soft- und Hardware Vertriebs GmbH E-Bürgerservice

HUK24 AG Online-Versicherungen

Informatikzentrum der Sparkassenorganisation GmbH (SIZ) Online-Beantragung von qualifizierten elektronischen Signaturen

]Init[ AG in Zusammenarbeit mit AG Extrapol der Polizeien des Bundes und der Länder

Länderübergreifenden Polizeizusammenarbeit auf der Plattform EXTRAPOL

InterCard AG Kundenkarte mit Zahlfunktion

Lotterie-Treuhandgesellschaft Glücksspiel

LVM-Versicherungen Authentifizierung, Portalzugang, Adressübernahme

Provinzial Rheinland AG Versicherungsbeantragung

Schufa Holding AG Verbraucherportal „meineschufa.de“ und Online- Antrag zur Eigenauskunft

Tönjes Holding AG Identitätsnachweis bei Kfz - Online - Zulassungen

T-Systems in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg

Verwaltungsdiensteportal des Landes Baden- Württemberg „mein service-bw“ und EU-DLR (Teilbereiche)

Umweltbundesamt - Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle (DEHSt)

Antrag auf Zuteilung von Emissionszertifikaten und Emissionsberichterstattung

Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Ruhr (VRR) eTicket-System

Willi Weber GmbH & Co. Kg Altersverifikation an Zigarettenautomaten

Complete list of services: www.Personalausweisportal.de Neue Möglichkeiten

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Security Flaw of the AusweisApp

Course of Events

Release of AusweisApp on 8 November 2010

Jan Schejbal (TUD, Piratenpartei) describes a security flaw on 9 November

Update function verifies certificate without verification of hostname

Spoofing attacks + infiltration of false updates possible

Update function downloads ZIP file, unzips and verifies signature

Directory traversal possible: direct unzip of any files into file system

(e.g. Trojan in Windows auto boot)

Analysis and Bug fixing

Validation of security flaw by Fraunhofer SIT

Forward of preliminary results to project management

Withdrawal of download facility

Relaunch on 3rd January 2011

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Thank you for your attention!

Ulrich Waldmann

Phone: +49 (0)6151 869 222

ulrich.waldmann@sit.fraunhofer.de

Fraunhofer Institute SIT

Rheinstr. 75

64295 Darmstadt

www.sit.fraunhofer.de/en

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Annex

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Selected Readings

BSI Website: www.bsi.bund.de -> Topics -> Electronic ID documents

-> Electronic ID Card, Security Mechanisms

BSI: Technical Guidelines, www.bsi.bund.de -> Publikationen -> Technische Richtlinien

TR-03127: Architektur elektronischer Personalausweis (English version pending)

TR-03112-7: eCard-API-Framework - Part 7: Protocols

TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents

J. Eichholz, D. Hühnlein, J. Schwenk: SAMLizing the European Citizen Card,

in: Proceedings of "BIOSIG 2009: Biometrics and Electronic Signatures", available via

www.ecsec.de/pub/SAMLizing-ECC.pdf

Walter Fumy and Manfred Paeschke (eds.):

Handbook of eID Security - Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies,

Publicis Publishing, December 15th, 2010, ISBN: 978-3-89578-3791

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Abbreviations

AES

API

BSI

CA

CAN

CEN

CRM

CVC

CVCA

DVCA

EAC

eID

EN

ICAO

ISO

MRZ

Advanced Encryption Standard

Application Programming Interface

(German) Federal Office for

Information Security

Chip Authentication

Card Access Number

Comité Européen de Normalisation

Customer Relationship Management

Card-Verifiable Certificate

Country Verifying Certification Authority

Document Verifying Certification Authority

Extended Access Control

electronic Identification

European Norm

International Civil Aviation Organization

International Organization for Standardization

Machine-Readable Zone

PACE

PAOS

PKCS

PKI

PP

PSK

SAML

SOAP

SSCD

TA

TLS

TR

TS

X.509

Password-Authenticated

Connection Establishment

Reverse SOAP

Public Key Cryptography Standards

Public Key Infrastructure

Protection Profile

Pre-Shared Key

Security Assertion Markup Language

(no acronym) A Web service protocol

Secure Signature Creation Device

Terminal Authentication

Transport Layer Security

(German) Technical Guideline

Technical Specification

A standard certificate format for PKI