the naval review 1932

VOL. XX. NO. 4.

T H E

NAVAL REVIEW

For Private Circulation.

(Founded in 1912.)

NOVEMBER, 1932.

Copyrighted under Act of 191 I .

CONTENTS.

9. WHEN IS A SE~MAN NOT 2 SEAMAN ? - - - - - I 10. DISCIPLINE AND THE YON-EXECUTIVE OFFICER - - -

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE S.O.S. - - - - -

AVIATION-ITS CAP~BILITIES T O - D A ~ AND 7'0-SIORROW FOR

PEACE AND WAR - - - - - - - THE FAIREYS FLY OVER THE OCEAN - - - - - DUAL CONTROL - - - - - - - - THE SERVICE OR MARRIAGE. I., 11. AND 111. - - - THE OFFICERS' ADVISORY SOCIETY - - - - - ORGANISED SPORT - - - - - - - - TRINITY HOUSE - - - - - - - -

THE ST. LAWRENCE WATEIZWAY SCHEME - - - -

" TIGRIS GUNBOATS." By Vice-Admiral Wilfrid Nunn -

" THE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE." By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart -

" THE NELSON COLLECTION AT LLOYD'S " -

PAGE

635

643

650 662

f359

677

67 7 680

685

690

693

698

" THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN." \iolume 11. By Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall- Oglander - - 803

" HELL'S ANGELS OF THE DEEP." By William Guy Carr - 807 " 40, O.B." Or how the War was Won. By Hugh Cleland

Hoy - - 813 '' IN GREAT WATERS.'' By Captain S. G. S. 1,IcNeil - - 816

24- CORRESPONDENCE - - - - - - - - 8 2 j Naval Organisation and Two Replies. Promotions.

HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.

Articles, Reviews of Books and Correspondence intended for

the February issue of THE NAVAL REVIEW should reach me not later than the last week of the year.

It is regretted that the next instalment of " Notes by an old

First Lieutenant and Commander " is unavoidably held over

until the February number, owing to pressure of space.

As announced in the August number, an Index of the whole

series of THE NAVAL REVIEW from its commencement in 1913 up to and including the present (1932) volume is now being compiled and will be ready for issue next month.

No charge will be made for this Index ; but, for reasons of

economy, copies will only be sent to those members who

signify their wish to have one. Members are requested to use the attached postcard when possible for this purpose.

It is thought that some members may like to have inter-

lea-ved copies, so as to enable them to enter up fresh articles

as they appear in subsequent numbers, and so keep their

Index up-to-date. Applicants for the Index should, therefore,

state definitely whether or not they are to be supplied with

interleaved copies. RICHARD WEBB,

Hon. Editor. Elbridge,

Windlesham, Surrey.

i,Te,i. : Bagshot 85). 8th November, 1932.

THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

W i t h yegard to the corres$ondence on pages 825-835 of this number o n the subject of naval organization i t i s thought that members m a y like to have the opportunity of studying the composition and duties of the Board of Admiralty as laid down in October, 1923.

i t must, however, be remembered that certain changes in the constitution of the Board have been made since that t ime, the principal one resulting in the A.C.N.S. ceasing to be a member of the Board.

Also, the Trade Division i s noze, incorporated in the Plans Division of the Naval Staff , the Gunnery and Tor$edo Divisions have beem amal- gamated with the Training and Staff Duties and Tactical Division respectively, and the Naval A i r Division has been established under the superintendence of the A.C.N.S.

DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS.

FIRST LORD.-General direction of all business. FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF Operations of war and DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF - -

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF - all Staff business.

SECOND SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL P ~ ~ s o ~ ~ ~ ~ . - P e r s o n n e l . THIRD SEA LORD AND C O N T R O L L E R . - M ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . FOURTH SEA 1-ORD AND CHIEF OF SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT.-S~~~~S

and Transport. CIVIL Lo~D.-Works and Labour. PARLIAMENTARY AND FINANCIAL S E C R E T A R Y . - F ~ ~ ~ ~ C ~ . PERMANENT s ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . - A d m i r a l t y business and control of expenditure.

General direction and supervision of all business relating to the Navy. Political and Board questions.

Scheme of Admiralty organisation and distribution of work. Promotions and removals from the Service of Naval and Marine

officers. Honours and rewards. Royal yacht, including appointment of all officers.

636 THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

Appointment of Flag Officers and Officers in Command, including Engineer Vice- and Rear-Admirals, Surgeon Vice- and Rear-Admirals, Paymaster Rear-Admiral, and Staff appointments of Royal Marines.

Chaplain of the Fleet, appointment of, and entry of Naval Chaplains and Instructors.

Appointments of Naval and Marine Officers to Admiralty Depart- ments (of and above rank of Captain, R.N., or to posts of Assistant Director and above).

Civil appointments and promotions (higher posts). Naval Cadetships and nominations to Paymaster Cadetships, R.N.

All large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare. Organisa- tion and distribution, and fighting and sea-going efficiency of the Fleet.

Advice as to, and general direction of, operations of war. Internal organisation and ,general direction of the work of the Naval

Staff, and the co-operation of the Naval Staff with the MatCriel side of the Admiralty.

/To be by$ jdf~~rned of d l / !p~~tc~f l t mc2tters $ the LXXS. and A.C.N.S.)

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF.

Naval Intelligence-its collection and utilisation for naval operations. All operations and movements of H.M. Ships and co-operating aircraft,

including auxiliary craft. Consideration of strategic policy and plans relating to such operations. Distribution of the Fleet as affecting operations and movements. Dates of refits and repairs in conjunction with Controller. Strategic aspects of Land and Wireless Telegraphy. Policy in relation to Sea-borne Trade and Maritime Transport. Maritime International Law. Superintendence of Hydrographic Department, and of Naval Intelli-

gence, Operations, Plans, and Trade Divisions of Naval Staff.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF.

Methods of fighting at sea generally. Tactical investigation. Principles of Training of the Navy in combatant and Staff duties. Requirements of design of vessels and matCriel in relation to policy

and tactics. Signalling in connection with tactics and weapons. Fleet practices, co-ordination and standardisation of methods. Staff questions dealing with Research and Experiment.

THE BOARD O F ADMIRALTY. 637

Air development in relation to Naval Warfare. Superintendence of Training and Staff Duties, Gunnery and Torpedo

Divisions of Naval Staff. NOTES.-(I) Under Order in Council of the 31st October, 1921, the

First Sea Lord as Chief of Naval Staff is responsible to the First Lord for the issue of orders to the Fleet affecting war operations and the movement of ships, which orders may be issued in his own name in his capacity of Chief of Naval Staff.

The responsibility for these orders is not Board responsibility unless the question at issue is referred to the Board, as unless operation orders result from Board decision, the responsibility of issuing them remains, under Order in Council, on the shoulders of the C.N.S. and of the First Lord. The procedure detailed on pages 4 and 5 is, however, designed to ensure that important operational matters shall be brought before the full Board whenever the circumstances admit of this.

The D.C.N.S. will, in the name of the C.N.S. and on his responsibility, issue operation orders, but only in accordance with the responsibility delegated or the instructions given to him from time to time by the C.N.S., and subject always to the reference of important matters to him.

In the absence of the C.N.S., the responsibility for operations falls automatically on the D.C.N.S., who is necessarily in close and constant communication with the C.N.S. Should, however, a question arise which, in the opinion of the D.C.N.S., is of such gravity as to require consultation with other Members of the Board, he should, in the absence of the C.N.S., consult the First Lord and the Second Sea Lord.

As the First Lord is ultimately responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, it is necessary that he should be kept fully in touch with operational matters by the C.N.S. or any officer acting for the latter in his absence.

( 2 ) The superintendence of the several Divisions of the Staff is assigned to D.C.N.S. and A.C.N.S. in the sense that each Director is responsible to one of them for the work of his Division as a whole ; but matters dealt with in any Division will be submitted to D.C.N.S. and A.C.N.S. according to the Distribution of Business here set forth.

SECOND SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL. Manning1 of the Fleet ; Training of the Fleet, in accordance with

principles approved by the C.N.S. ; administrative arrangements connected with barracks, training, and educational establishments.

Complements.

Manning means the provision of personnel for the Fleet.


Mobilisation and other regulations for the personnel ; and superintendence of Mobilisation Department.

Service and appointments of offlcers of all branches (except as reserved to First Lord).

Royal Marines. Reserve Forces. Hospitals. Discipline. NOTES.-(I) The Chief of Naval Staff will be consulted by the Second

Sea Lord in regard to appointments to the Admiralty Naval Staff Divisions and War Staff appointments afloat and ashore.

( 2 ) The proceedings of courts-martial will come specially under the review of the Second Sea Lord, and will be marked to other members of the Board as necessary.

Provision (so as to meet the requirements of C.N.S.) of matCriel for the Fleet, including ships and their machinery, armour, guns and gun- mountings, torpedoes, mines, etc., and their respective appliances and stores, also docking facilities.

Design, manufacture, inspection, repair and maintenance of, and alterations and additions to, such matQiel.

Order of priority of work upon ships and matkriel for Naval Service, including both new construction and repairs and alterations, on general lines laid down by C.N.S.

Selection of vessels for service as Armed Merchant Cruisers or for Fleet purposes, in accordance with the requirements of C.N. S. Alteration and preparation of vessels for such service, and their subsequent maintenance and reconditioning.

Inventions relating to ships and other mat6rie1, as above ; questions as to their suitability and applicability to the Naval Service.

Supervision of general arrangements in regard to organisation of Scientific Research.

Fleet Issues of Ordnance, Torpedo, Mining, etc., Stores. Administration of the Dockyards, including provision of Dockyard

plant (except as dealt with by the Civil Lord). Superintendence of Departments of Director of Naval Construction,

Engineer-in-Chief, Director of Dockyards, Director of Naval Ordnance, Director of Torpedoes and Mining, Director of Naval Equipment, Director of Signal Department, Director of Electrical Engineering, Director of Scientific Research, and Director of Compass Department.

THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY. 639

FOURTH SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT. Superintendence of Naval Store, Fleet Coaling, Medical Store and

Victualling Services. Transport service, including hired auxiliary vessels for the supply

services. Passages. Full and half pay ; allowances and compensations, including table

money, prize questions, pilotage and surveying pay, and all extra pay- ments. Debts of officers and men. Naval and marine pensions, Green- wich Hospital pensions (see Note). Widows' pensions. Character, conduct, and badge questions. Naval Savings Banks.

Medals. Uniform regulations. Naval Detention Quarters. Rewards for apprehension of Deserters ;

removals of " R." General salvage money questions, and money demands for salvage

of naval stores. Collisions between H.M. Ships and private vessels, etc. NOTE.-Naval and Greenwich Hospital Pensions (Officers') are to

be marked to the First Lord as well as to the Fourth Sea Lord.

CIVIL LORD. Superintendence of all Works Services. Staff of civil establishments (except as reserved to First Lord),

including classification, appointment, promotion, pay, allowances, and pension.

General labour questions. Greenwich Hospital business, including appointments (except Naval

Chaplains to livings, Superintendent of the Royal Hospital School, Curator of the Painted Hall, and appointments to Greenwich Hospital Pensions).

Charitable Fund, Compassionate allowances, subscriptions, etc., and allowances to ministers of religion and grants in aid of churches and schools.

Marine and Dockyard Schools. Special questions affecting Retirement and Pay of Naval and Marine

Officers and Men, when discretionary power is specifically provided for by Order in Council.

NOTES.-(I) The Civil Lord, when a member of the House of Lords, will answer in that House for all Naval and Admiralty matters, and is accordingly to be kept in touch with questions of general policy or of importance.


(2) Works questions of an important character, or if likely to affect questions dealt with by the Parliamentary Secretary, will be marked to the latter also.

(3) The Civil Lord will keep in close touch with the Parliamentary Secretary in regard to the Parliamentary aspect of Labour questions.

All questions relating to Finance, Expenditure, Estimates, and Accounts, of sufficient importance to require his decision ; and all important financial questions requiring reference to the Treasury. (See Note.)

Acts as Chairman of the Finance Committee. NOTE.-Proposals involving expenditure will normally be dealt with

by the Permanent Secretary and the Superintending Lord, whose approval will be sufficient authority for incurring expenditure. Where the matter is of sufficient importance, or where the Superintending Lord so desires, reference to the Parliamentary Secretary will be arranged by the Per- manent Secretary.

In dealing with Admiralty Contract business the Parliamentary Secretary or the Permanent Secretary will keep in close touch with the Controller on all important Contract matters affecting production of material for which the Controller is responsible.

PERMANENT SECRETARY.

Financial control subject to the final responsibility of the Parlia- mentary and Financial Secretary, the First Lord, and the Board.

Accounting Officer for Navy Votes and is responsible for Navy Appropriation Account.

General control of all the Civilian Departments and staff of the Admiralty, including their organisation, economical methods, and discipline.

Admiralty procedure. Recommendations for appointments and promotions in the Admiralty

Office. Correspondence. Communications with foreign Naval Attaches. Communications with ministers of religion (other than Church of

England). NOTE.-Routine papers, as defined below, will be disposed of by the

Permanent Secretary :- (a) Such as require intermediate action or reference to render

them sufficiently complete for decision by the Board.

THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY. 641

(b) Such as do not involve some new principle, establish a precedent, or occasion expense not provided for under existing regulations.

(c) Such as do not involve any point of discipline, or affect the movements of or orders to a ship. It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the

First Sea Lord is always to be consulted by the other Lords and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries ; but each Lord and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries will communicate direct with the First Lord.

BOARD BUSINESS. The First Lord will decide what business shall come before the Board

as a whole, and if a Member of the Board desires to have any matter brought forward he will refer it to the First Lord for entry, subject to his approval, on the Agenda.

The object of the weekly Board Meetings is to ensure as far as possible that not only all large questions of Admiralty policy, but also all matters of general interest, especially those having an important bearing on the traditions, privileges, and well-being of the Naval Service, come before the Board as a whole. Members of the Board shall therefore regard it as a matter of duty to propose all such questions for entry on the Agenda, such duty resting primarily on the Member within whose sphere the question comes ; but, in case of his omission to do so, on any Member of the Board after giving notice to the former of his intention.

It is not intended, however, that questions (except in special circumstances to be judged by the First Lord) should be brought before the Board until they have been circulated to and reported upon by the proper financial and administrative officers, and have been considered and minuted by the Members of the Board concerned. A Member of the Board dealing with any subject which he thinks to be a proper one to come before the Board as a whole should not divert the papers from their ordinary course, but should add the suggestion to his minute thereon, and the First Lord, when the papers reach him, will, if he concurs, arrange for the subject to be placed upon the Board Agenda.

The First Lord desires that any question involving financial considerations shall be considered by the Admiralty Finance Committee before it comes to the Board as a whole, and that the report of the Finance Committee shall be circulated for the assistance of the Board in dealing with the question.

To assist Members of the Board in keeping in touch with the work of the Admiralty generally, a weekly list of the more important questions initiated within the Department, or from the Fleet or from other Depart- ments, and a weekly summary of matters of naval interest, will be cir-


culated. A list of the more important day-to-day decisions given by Members of the Board will also be circulated weekly, and will be brought up at the weekly meeting of the Board.

In accordance with standing orders, the following matters are always to be brought before the Board :-

Navy Estimates. Shipbuilding programmes. Designs for new ships and alterations in weights of ships. Alterations in the general regulations and all important orders

of a legislative character. Captains, R.N. : selections for Acting Flag rank. Captains, R.N., Engineer Captains, R.N., and Surgeon Captains,

R.N. : questions of compulsory retirement on promotion to Rear- Admiral, Engineer Rear-Admiral, and Surgeon Rear-Admiral.

All Naval Officers : dismissals or discharges ; retirement when unfit for or unworthy of further employment ; resignations ; restora- tions and refusal of restoration ; decision as to non-employment ; alterations in record of dates of birth.

OCTOBER, 1923.

THE DISCUSSION ON NAVAL TRAINING.

THE NAVAL REVIEW, May, 1932 . . The First Lord's Statement.

THE NAVAL REVIEW, August, 1932 " Training in Sail." '

" The Training of Seamen." " Sail or Steam 1 "

THE NATIONAL REVIEW, September, I932 . . . . . . . . " Training in Sail ." By Admiral

Sir H. Richmond. THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, June,

July and August, 1932 . . . . " Naval Training " (3 articles). By Admiral Sir H. Richmond.

THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE GAZETTE, July to September, I932 . . . . . . . . " Entry of Officers for the Navy "

(3 articles). " What is a Seaman ? " " Seamanship Training. "

THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTI- TUTION (see R.U.S.I. Journal for February, 1933) . . . . . . " Sail Training for the Navy."

(Lecture by Comdr. G. C. Steele, V.C., R.N., on 5th October, 1932.)

Correspondence and short articles in The Times, Morning Post, &c.

THE above list gives, in brief, a summary of the public discussion that has arisen out of the First Lord's remark, in his speech on 7th March last introducing the Navy Estimates, that " The balance between training men to work machinery and training men to become seamen, and all that that implies, has been upset." I t is not in chronological order, for many of the letters, articles, etc. comprised under the last heading preceded the longer articles mentioned separately above ; nor can it be complete, for there have been, no doubt, several more in other publications which have not come to the writer's notice. I t should be, however, fairly representative.

644 THE DISCUSSION ON NAVAL TRAINING.

I t is interesting to compare this public discussion with that on very much the same subject which took place in 1899 and 1900, summarised in the article " Training in Sail," in the last number of this Review. The first thing that strikes anyone making such a comparison is the much smaller volume of discussion to-day than 30 years ago. To take The Times alone, there have been since the First Lord's Statement some eight letters and one article on " Naval Training " ; in 1899-1900 it published four articles (three of them leading articles) and no -less than 33 letters from correspondents, some of them of portentous length extending to a column or more, in about the same period. The discussion elsewhere than in The Times exhibits the same feature. Even allowing for the diminution in journalistic loquacity of to-day as compared with thirty years ago, this seems to indicate two things-a diminution of the public interest in the affairs of the Navy, and a decreased tendency amongst naval officers, serving and retired, to write to the newspapers. The silence of the Navy is of course proverbial ; but it certainly seems to be more pronounced now than it was at the end of the last century ; while as for the decrease in public interest in the Navy, that is unfortunately only too obvious nowadays. I t is not a new phenomenon, for it has happened before that the country has suddenly woken up to the fact that it has starved the Navy through neglect for so many years that something drastic has to be done to bring it up to adequate strength again ; and it will probably happen again. In 1900 public interest in the Navy, of the periodical reawakening in which the Naval Defence Act of 1889 had been a symptom, was at its height, and it was maintained right up to the outbreak of the war. In 1932, public interest centres principally in public economy, and so far as it is concerned with the Navy at all, it is from the point of view of reduction and disarmament.

The two discussions under review, besides their points of dissimilarity, have one singular resemblance, and that is the tendency of each participant to concentrate on the one point of the complex problem on which he happens to hold strong views, to the exclusion of others of equal importance. This perhaps is inevitable, for nobody in the short space of a letter to The Times, or even in an article in one of the Reviews, can deal with more than one aspect of this very complex question. But the result is in some degree unfortunate, for contributors to the discussion subsequent to the first are inclined to confine themselves to the particular subject first introduced, either supporting or refuting the points made by their predecessor; and the whole discussion tends to peter out over side issues without being dealt with as a whole. The age of entry, of both officers and men ; Dartmouth versus public schools entry ; whether

THE DISCUSSION ON NAVAL TRAINING. 645

youths and young officers should be trained in ships of the seagoing fleet or in special training ships commissioned for the purpose ; whether that training should be in steam ships or sailing ships ; all these are subjects of great interest and importance, but it should not be forgotten that they are all parts of one whole, and that they should all be co-related before any decision is taken.

The extent of the public discussion is not, of course, an index of the total amount of discussion that has taken place. I t is common knowledge in the fleet, and indeed it was mentioned by the First Lord in his speech, that several committees were set up in the Admiralty last autumn, though the precise matters referred to them are not so widely known. But in addition to official discussions, wherever two or three naval officers have been gathered together during the last six months, since the First Lord's speech, that is, i t is fairly safe to say that their conversation has gravitated sooner or later towards the subject of training and the changes therein that are about to be introduced. Curiously enough, i t was the matter mentioned by the First Lord as a pious hope rather than as an eventuality shortly to be forthcoming-the possibility of the reintro- duction of training in sailing ships-that has excited more argument than all the other points a t issue.

I t is a great pity that there has not been more publicity about this discussion; for without i t , it is exceedingly difficult for anyone to gauge what the real weight of opinion in the Service is. None of us can talk to more than a few of our brother officers, and nothing is more dangerous than generalizing from insufficient data. In the discussion that followed Commander Steele's lecture a t the R.U.S.I. on 5th October, none of the numerous junior officers present took part, the youngest officer to speak being the Fourth Sea Lord. Members of the Board have of course facilities for ascertaining the general opinion of the Service that nobody else possesses, but in the theatre of the R.U.S.I. it is usual for members to express their own opinions rather than to make official pronouncements. All that is possible here, therefore, is to summarize the views to which public expression has been given.

Of these. the most important without doubt are those of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, who, in the " Fortnightly Review," has given us a masterly analysis of the whole question of the entry and training of officers. Mentioning that " I t is difficult to avoid a feeling of uneasiness that the process of patchwork has been so long a t work that the time to look at the structure as a whole has come," he then shows, by a review of the tinkering that has been the rule in this matter a t intervals for the last hundred years, what a patchwork the structure really is. He surveys the work and reports of the numerous Admiralty committees

646 THE DISCUSSION ON NAVAL TRAINING.

that have sat on the matter at intervals varying from five to ten years since 1861, and points out how their recommendations were almost invariably ignored. He finally disposes of the fiction that it is necessary to send a boy to sea young (i.e., before he has finished his genera1 education) in order to teach him to become a seaman by showing, not only that some of the most distinguished seamen went to sea at the age of 18 or later, but that during the eighteenth century even, when early entry was common though not universal, it was not for that reason that it obtained. It was because at that time life at sea for subordinate ranks was so hard that most men would not stick it unless they were inured to it from early youth-a condition that no longer obtains even if we sent our young officers to sea on entry instead of keeping them in a college on shore for four years. He is insistent on the necessity of education for officers-a matter on which the numerous committees have also been unanimous-and questions whether either we are getting it from the Dartmouth system, or that it is necessary to incur the vast expense of that establishment for the purpose. He expresses the grave doubt that many have felt " whether it is, in reality, possible to make a correct decision as to whether one small boy of 13 will make a good naval officer, after ten minutes talk with him, or to say that another will not." His final conclusion is that :-

" From whatever angle the question of age and method of entry is approached, the evidence in favour of entry a t the age of about eighteen is overwhelming. The objections to it, when analysed, are found to be based upon an incorrect interpretation of tradition and a want of acquaintance with the reasons for past custom on which the tradition was founded, upon prejudice and on unsubstantiated assertions of impossibility. I t gives the boy longer to know what he really wants. It gives the schoolmaster longer to find out which promise best and to express a well-founded opinion. I t spreads the choice of candidates. It widens the scope of secondary knowledge. I t diversifies the type. I t gives the Navy the benefit of the education which the schools of the country furnish. I t surmounts the difficulty of entry from the secondary schools. I t prevents favouritism and political or social jobbery. The examination system can be eased of its rigours by the system, used in the Army, of recommendation by head masters.

" Finally, in an age when economy is a great national need, it eases the burden on the State ; and a t the same time provides a system which, in time of stress, admits of rapid expansion-the precise opposite of the present system."

In the three articles on " The Entry of Officers to the Navy," by " Captain R.N." in the Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette, which treat of the subject on very much the same lines though far more superficially and less from the historical point of view (few naval \officers share Sir Herbert Richmond's wide knowledge of naval history), the same conclusion is reached. These articles contain no argument that is not


included in those of Admiral Richmond, but they are of interest as showing that the conclusions reached by him are shared by at least one of a younger naval generation. Except for a recent announcement in the Daily Telegra@z that Dartmouth College is shortly to be closed, followed by a denial of the report from the Admiralty, there the matter of entry of officers for the present rests.

The rest of the public discussion is concerned with the proposal to reintroduce training in sailing ships for officers and men. Readers of THE NAVAL REVIEW will be familiar with the two articles, one " pro " and one " anti," which appeared in the August number, and it is therefore unnecessary to recapitulate them. Sir Herbert Richmond in " The National Review " for September is lukewarm on this subject, and is nothing like so convincing as he is on the entry and training of officers. He admits, somewhat grudgingly, that " sail training developed the habit of vigilance, quickness of eye, foresight ; the capabilities of resourcefulness and readiness to act in emergency, promptitude and decision in taking an action " ; but doubts whether the short time that it would be possible to devote to sail training in the early service of an officer or man would be sufficient to inculcate those qualities in any degree commensurate with the expense involved. But he does not pronounce definitely against sail-training, merely urging that the question must be very fully considered in all its aspects, and not decided in a rush of enthusiasm which merely brushes aside dissenting opinions.

Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle seems to have constituted himself the chief champion of the anti-sail party, by a letter to The Times on 14th July last and the opening speech in the discussion which followed Commander Steele's lecture a t the R.U.S.I. He bases his opposition chiefly on the difficulty of acquiring the recondite art of handling a ship under sail, and the view (expressed by his father in the discussion of 1900) that to resuscitate sail would be flogging a dead horse, a process which would hardly create the atmosphere of useful service which is necessary to instil enthusiasm for his profession in the recruit. Like Admiral Richmond, he contrasts the six months or so that a young officer or man can spend in a sailing training ship with the four y e a r e 7 5 per cent. of which was probably spent actually at sea-that his predecessor of roo years ago of necessity underwent immediately on his entry into the Service ; and again, like Admiral Richmond, he extols the results of service in destroyers, both during and since the war, in producing the type of officer that the Navy wants.

In the newspaper discussion, the only opponent of any weight who has appeared is the Duke of Montrose, who served under sail both in

648 T H E DISCUSSION ON NAVAL TRAINING.

the old Training Squadron and in the Mercantile Marine. His chief point was that " There is nothing like a ship under sail to give the ' sea sense ' ; the throb of steam or the ' chug-chug ' of a motor cannot do it " ; while the allegation that the art of sailing is so difficult that officers and men of to-day cannot acquire it was effectively disposed of by Captain J. F. Somerville in the discussion at the R.U.S.I.

The two last named articles in the Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette are devoted to the argument that " seamanship " can only be learnt at sea in small craft, and a plea for the abolition of shore training establishments. The writer, who is apparently an officer who entered the Navy through the Britannia, appears to favour sailing training ships rather than steam, but insists that plenty of sea-time is the first necessity, and, provided it is passed in " a craft in which wind and wave are at all times appreciable," destroyers or sloops will be almost as good. He makes the point, not given very much weight elsewhere, that the necessity for constant sea-time does not lapse with the close of the preliminary training of officers or men ; it is just as necessary for officers and men of all ranks if they are to maintain their standard of seamanship.

Commander Steele's lecture on 5th October was an appeal for " training in sailing ships " as distinct from " training in sail " ; that is, he would train new entries in sailing ships not primarily to fit them to work ships under sail, but because service in a sailing ship is the finest way of inculcating the " sea-sense " and the cheapest way of keeping them actually at sea. The discussion was disappointing. Very few officers took part in it, and none of them under the rank of captain ; moreover most of the opponents of sail approached the question entirely from the point of view of the needs of the officer, ignoring those of the rating. The oft-reiterated argument of destroyer service doing all that can be expected of training in sailing ships was brought out once more, while nobody mentioned the need of the rating for something that shall do for him what the handling of a destroyer at high speed admittedly does for the officer. An interesting feature of the very brief discussion was that all the opponents of sail training who spoke were either very senior officers or officers actually retired, while the two supporters were the Fourth Sea Lord and one senior captain, both of whom have undoubtedly been more recently in contact with the rating of to-day than their opponents, and may therefore be expected to have a more vivid appreciation of the respects in which he is lacking.

To quote from a private letter recently received from a comparatively junior serving officer :-

" What the man-of-war sailor so conspicuously lacks is that which no one who has elected to live and work in a ship can do without, and that is


seamanship and all that that word implies, including self-reliance, initiative, self-confidence, individuality and an underlying affection for the sea for its own sake. The sailor of to-day, be he warrant officer, petty officer or boy is little better than a machine and seldom a satisfactory one a t that. . . . Now, no less if not more than before, it is essential to start naval training a t sea, as it is only a t sea in all its moods that the sailor-boy can become a seaman. The sailing ship is the obvious means to that end ; not to teach a dead language and technique of the bygone days of sail, but those qualities which are lacking and cannot be taught in any other way." So far as the writer is able to judge, these views appear to be fairly

widely held amongst officers of middle rank, i.e., the large majority of serving officers of sufficient experience for their opinions to carry weight. I t is to be hoped that subscribers to THE NAVAL REVIEW will communicate their views in sufficient numbers to confirm or refute this concl~sion.~

1 Short articles on this subject will be welcomed.-HON. EDITOR.

BATTLE TACTICS. (A LECTURE.)

IT was my original intention, if time permitted, to give you two lectures on Tactics. The first was to be labelled " orthodox," the second " unorthodox " tactics. The first was to be a resume of tactical ideas as they may be derived to-day from the Tactical School and the Battle Instructions. But these you are widely acquainted with and you will encounter them in other lectures. I wish, therefore, to pass on to Unorthodox Tactics, and I want to address myself specially to the young officers present. What I have to explain is not easy. You may fail to follow me, but if you will think about the subject for ten or twenty years I believe you will understand, and agree. Personally, I have studied tactics for some thirty years and I am frankly astonished at the small amount I know about them. Also, it is rather unfortunate that the things I am most sure about are those in which, possibly, the smallest number of people would at present agree with me. From this you will realise, I hope, that modern tactics is a rather difficult science. I would not like you to think that my unorthodox tactics are in any way contrary to the orthodox procedure laid down in the Printed Instructions. On the contrary, they merely represent a logical step forward, or, to be more accurate, a step back to the principles which helped to achieve our greatest victories in the past.

TACTICS ONLY A PART OF THE PROBLEM OF BATTLE. In the first place, I want to point out that tactics are only a part of

the problem of battle, and the whole is greater than the part. To get a clear idea of tactics we must fix our eyes always on battle, which has three parts. First, there is Geometry, that is, the geometric movements of the weapon-carriers ; next, there is the science of using the weapons ; these two sections belong strictly to tactics. Last, we have those imponderable factors which affect the personnel, i.e., Morale, the Will to Conquer, and the Offensive Spirit. These factors are much more complex, and therefore are not studied by many of us ; but we must realise that in the words of Foch, " Battle is a spiritual, not a material, contest." Colonel Henderson wrote : " Wellington knew that the issue of battles lies in the hearts of men, and in the heart of the Com-

Written and first delivered in 1929.

BATTLE TACTICS. 651

mander even more than in that of the soldiers." Certainly, if other things are equal, superior tactics may win the day. But other things never are equal. I t was not tactics that won the Battle of Salamis, or Tsushima, or even Lissa. Nelson's tactics at Trafalgar were unique, but they were a subordinate factor in deciding the issue of the day. Some critics have even asserted that his tactics, though brilliant in conception, were not so in execution. I t cannot be denied that, due to the very light wind, they certainly involved heavy risks, though I venture to suggest they were none the worse for that. All this goes to show, however, that tactics are a means to an end ; not an end in themselves, as was so often thought in the days when the fleet was governed by precise tactical rules which had to be obeyed.

The great question I believe we ought to ask ourselves to-day is this- " Have we developed the offensive spirit to the fullest degree that is possible, and have we studied all the considerations that arise therefrom ? " Have we, in fact, developed that attitude of mind which would enable us to echo those immortal words of Marshal Foch when he said : " My centre yields, my right is being driven back. Situation excellent. I will attack " ? We have had no teaching on this subject similar to that of the British Army. I well remember how, for ten years before the War, the cult of the offensive was reiterated at the Camberley Staff College until some wag remarked : " there will be no need to prepare orders for the next campaign, they will be simply these-'At dawn to-morrow the British Army will attack along the whole front.' " He meant his remark as an adverse criticism, but that was the spirit that won the war.

LESSONS OF THE PAST. I am not trying to suggest to you anything new. All I ask is that

you will look at the question as the British Army looked a t it in 1914, with results that astonished the world, and as our greatest admirals have all looked at it during the last four centuries. Let us consider for a moment their views. Foch, you may remember, in one of his books, quotes the following from Von der Goltz : " Whoever writes on strategy or on tactics ought to confine himself to teaching national strategy and tactics only, for no other can be profitable to the nation he is addressing." Suppose we look into the past to see what we can discover about national tactics. Surely the blindest of us must see there are certain great principles that were never abandoned. At any rate they served us with amazing success during that period of 240 years from Drake to Nelson, which was the greatest period of our naval history. Since Trafalgar

652 BATTLE TACTICS.

more than 120 years have elapsed, more than half that period of our greatest achievements, with no very striking demonstration of our national tactics. I t may be that the long years of peace slightly obscured the great lessons of the past, but they are still there, waiting for us to apply them. Looking back, we find that all our greatest admirals, when battle was joined, adopted a fierce and impetuous offensive. You may not like the word " impetuous," but it applies to Nelson almost more than to the others. There was nothing foolhardy about Nelson either in strategy or tactics, for he was a master of both those arts, but he applied with surpassing boldness the national principles of battle that had been evolved by his predecessors. Their ideal was close action, and when they got there, they overwhelmed the enemy by rapidity of fire, based on good discipline, good gun-drill and high morale. Drake pushed in till he was so close that the Spanish galleons could only fire over his decks. Nelson pushed in till he was so close that he could grapple and board. Coupled with close action and rapid fire was the vital principle that they were not afraid of taking heavy risks. Nelson wrote : " If I had been censured every time I have run my ship, or fleets under my command, into great danger, I should long ago have been out of the Service and never in the House of Peers."

On that subject, Clausewitz wrote : " There was never a great general who was wanting in boldness."

Napoleon bitterly remarked : " My admirals have somewhere learnt that they can make war without taking risks."

This subject is one of the most difficult things in war, and unless we study it deeply, we shall get an utterly wrong conception of what risks may or may not be justifiable. In the past, brilliant successes were often preceded by taking desperate risks. But it took a Drake to enter the fortified port of Cadiz and destroy the Spanish fleet there. Few men would have dared, as Hawke did, to continue the action at Quiberon Bay by running his fleet through uncharted waters, in gathering darkness on to a lee shore. Neither night action, nor a lee shore, nor the danger of entering an enemy's harbour had terrors for men of that stamp. There are two common classes of men that we all meet : those who are good at excuses and those who produce results. The former can always prove to you that times have changed and you cannot do now what used to be done in the past. They can prove to you that modern weapons entirely prevent you from applying the principles of history. I beg of you not to believe them. There are men still with us-they can be picked out even from the retired list-who can produce results if you will let them try, but do remember that too much preaching of " safety first " may be a desperate danger to the State. This remark

BATTLE TACTICS. 653

may sound foolish : but life is full of subtle paradoxes, and this is one of them. We do not require that officers should be reckless, but we do require that they should be so fearless that they are not to be scared by those modern bogies which scientists and others are constantly presenting to us. One can see endless examples in the past of the endeavour to avoid risks. Hyde Parker, ordering the fleet to withdraw, was for safety first. Nelson, with the telescope at his blind eye, was for taking those risks which alone will lead us to decisive victory. If you young officers will cultivate the spirit of those great fighters in our past history, there is nothing to prevent you from achieving in our next war as good results as they did.

APPLICATION TO MODERN TACTICS.

You will now ask : how does all this apply to modern tactics ? The normal gun-range has certainly become very much greater, but in view of the rapidity with which a ship may fire away her whole outfit of ammunition, I suggest there is no change in the great principle of close action. In fact, there is added importance in getting to a range where one can obtain decisive results without excessive expenditure of ammunition.

CLOSE ACTION. Every great victory in our naval history has been achieved at close

action ranges, where we overwhelmed the enemy by a higher rate of fire, better drill and discipline, and superior morale. Since the introduction of steam, we have seen these principles applied only in foreign navies, vide the battles of Lissa and Tsushima. British officers to-day are apt to argue " how can you get to close range when you start fighting at 20,000 yards ? " Yet strangely enough in every battle of the late war we could have got to close action range, and remained there, had we wished to do it. At Heligoland and Jutland, short visibility precluded long range fighting. At the Falkland Islands, and on 17th November, 1917, we had ample superior speed to close the enemy as much as we desired : but long range action was deliberately chosen. Certainly at the Dogger Bank the enemy made a running fight at extreme range; but after some two hours of fighting, the British forces had crippled and reduced the speed not only of the Blucher, but also of the Seydlitz. A determination to close and fight for decisive results would almost certainly have destroyed both ships. As the teaching of history does not seem to have changed, I suggest it is extremely desirable to impress the fact on the naval officers now being trained in our fleets.

In commenting thus on close action I have no wish to decry the value of hits at long range if they can be obtained without undue expen-

654 BATTLE TACTICS

cliture of ammunition. But we must entirely get away from the false idea of trying to sink the enemy before he can hurt us. At long range, that theory is likely to lead to bitter disappointment. The ideal, if we can attain it, is to gain some advantage at long range, and then close without delay to achieve annihilation at short range.

To illustrate how much times have changed, let me tell you an item of history that perhaps is new to you. At the Dogger Bank action, at that rather critical moment when the Lion was heavily hit and reduced in speed, it was suggested to Admiral Beatty that the best way to clear up the situation and make everyone realise what was wanted, would be to hoist Nelson's signal " engage the enemy more closely." The admiral at once agreed, and ordered the flag-lieutenant to hoist it. He, after some delay, said : " I am sorry, sir, that signal has been removed from the books." There was a miserable modern substitute for it which read : " Steer closer to the enemy bearing as indicated." This, with its attendant compass signal, was duly hoisted, and was completely misunderstood. That is just one of the ways in which the 20th Century has endeavoured to improve on Nelson. There are others, but we cannot go into that now.

Let us pass to another point which seems to me of great tactical importance. I wish to put forward the suggestion (which I feel no reason to doubt) that short visibility may be not a hindrance, but a great help to a British fleet in war. I t gives one the immense advantage of being able, with adequate skill, to inflict sudden surprise on the enemy fleet.

In various other ways it seems likely that remarkable assistance may be derived by the tactician from short visibility. If, for example, the maximum visibility is ~z,ooo yards, an enemy fleet can be brought under really heavy and effective fire within a few minutes of sighting it. Readi- ness and rapidity are, of course, essential, as in night action, but one hopes that a British fleet would never be inferior in these qualities. I t may be remarked that the most decisive victory since the end of the sailing era (Tsushima) was achieved in very short visibility.

If it should happen that we have to fight in waters where mist and fog are prevalent, it follows that the requirements of close action must receive special consideration. One of the foremost requirements is a high rate of fire. I t is therefore suggested that our warship design should always give special consideration to this factor.

BATTLE TACTICS. 655

I come next to the important subject of Indirect Fire. In order to be brief, my suggestions on this subject may be summarised thus : in short visibility with aircraft spotting it should sometimes be feasible for ships to open fire, and possibly commence hitting, before the opposing fleets sight one another. The moral effect of this would be incalculable. Other nations have practised indirect fire, but so far we have done very little. I t is suggested that practice should commence at an early date and that short visibility conditions should be specially considered. Indirect fire at extreme ranges in clear weather (which has been contem- plated and talked about) would very likely lead to waste of ammunition and a regrettable lack of enthusiasm for close action. However, there is no doubt that we cannot afford to fall behind other nations in the study of these problems.

We come next to night action, a subject on whica I have ventured to express strong views on various occasions during the past five years. I regret to say I feel that a large body of Service opinion on night action is definitely wrong, and is not in accordance with the best traditions of our Service. I t may be remembered that, after the Battle of the Nile, Nelson wrote a sentence ending " . . . therefore, night was to my advantage." The context, which most officers will recollect, makes his remark of universal application. What he actually wrote was " I had the happiness to command a band of brothers ; therefore, night was to my advantage." In those two short sentences there is food for a world of thought.

I admit there is one good reason for avoiding night action, and that is if the enemy is definitely more efficient at night fighting than we are. Many officers considered that these conditions existed in the late war, but surely we do not intend to let them continue ?

Our present attitude of mind, however, makes it very difficult for us to take serious interest in, or achieve high efficiency at, night fighting. Observe, for example, our text books and standing orders. A certain " Review of Fighting Methods had a whole section under the heading " Battle Tactics by Night, Including Night Destroyer Attacks." I t covered three years, 1926 to 1928 inclusive, and comprised eleven closely printed foolscap pages, yet in all those pages there is not one word about battle tactics in a general action at night ! Still more strange, the subject is not mentioned during those three years in the section headed

Now no doubt obsolete.

656 BATTLE TACTICS.

" List of Problems Requiring Investigation." Surely this is playing ostrich to a rather dangerous extent. I should like to put forward two propositions : (I) Negatively, it is fundamentally wrong that officers should be afraid of, or be taught to avoid, night action. Surely they ought to be glad to engage the enemy on any occasion when the conditions are apparently equal, but may be turned decisively to our advantage by superior skill.

(2) Positively, can we not more easily inflict surprise and confusion on the enemy by adopting a form of attack that is generally supposed to be difficult and hazardous ?

NIGHT FLYING. In connection with night fighting it must be noted that night flying

may be of great value. Not only would it perhaps tell one the location of the enemy fleet, thereby obviating the use of recognition signals, but also it is possible that night shadowing by aircraft might be quite efficient and impossible to shake off. I t is not unlikely that night attack by aircraft with bomb or machine gun would be extremely disconcerting.

SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL. On the subject of night action, one constantly hears reference to the

suggested process of " breaking off the action at nightfall." This, however, is one of those fortunate cases where night action could be commenced without having to establish identity by recognition signals, and without any fear of mistaking friend and foe. If the British fleet is capable (as we hope) of gaining advantage in a day action, why should it not be equally capable of gaining the same or greater advantage after dark ? If we desist from pressing tke enemy at nightfall, w e axe surely doing what he most desires ; unless you would consider it right to assert that Von Spee ought to have broken off the action at Coronel as soon as the sun set ? Hawke, on a lee shore, was content to drive his fleet through gathering darkness into uncharted waters, on an enemy coast studded with shoals and rocks. If he could (and quite rightly did) take those risks in order to maintain touch w'th the enemy, we surely could not easily justify breaking off an action on a clear night in the open sea ? If we deliberately did so, and thereby allowed an enemy fleet to escape us, we might well expose the Navy to scathing criticism that could never be adequately answered.

PERSONALITY OF THE LEADER. You must not think I am arguing generally that night action is suited

to every case or to every leader. Tactics in its highest form must always

BATTLE TACTICS. 657

be an expression of the personality of a particular leader. It is therefore obviously impossible to lay down a sealed pattern plan of battle, either by day or night. If the leader of any force has a dislike for close action or a firm disbelief in night action, there is no more to be said. Those methods are not for him, and may well bring disaster to his command if he attempts them. But I would say emphatically that the right man has nothing to fear from any form of battle which promises decisive results to the bold and skilful leader. There is, however, one essential condition. If any leader wishes to achieve really decisive results he must work for it unceasingly by indoctrinating his subordinates and by training his fleet so that they are ready to grasp the golden opportunity when it comes their way. The opportunities will certainly come, but in the smoke of battle they are not easily recognised in time ; they pass in a moment, and, once gone, they are gone for ever. So important is this little point, that any officer who aspires to high command may well spend ten or twenty years endeavouring to develop initiative, and the power to make sound and rapid decisions on data that are often scanty or conflicting. I t is well worth remembering that in battle, if you wait for all the desired data to be laid before you, the decision you finally make, though perhaps good, will almost certainly be too late.

Let me pass on to a form of battle which appears difficult and hazardous and which, perhaps for that reason, has been little practised since the days of Nelson. I refer to the attack on enemy fleets in harbour. In these days, a long war means financial ruin for all participants. A short and successful war may be achieved by destroying the enemy's fleet, but if we wait to destroy it on the high seas we may have to wait for years. There seems no reason why modern science, combined with bold and resolute leadership, should not enable us to do it in harbour. In the late war we entered the harbour at Zeebrugge, we sank a Russian battleship at Kronstadt, and the Italians twice entered the fortified port of Pola. On the first occasion they sank an Austrian dreadnought there : the second time there was nothing there to sink. In the early days of the war, German submarines could easily have entered Cromarty, and any type of warship could have entered Scapa at any hour of the day or night. Twenty destroyers entering at early dawn, or even cruisers attacking with gun, torpedo and ram, might have accounted for enough battleships to change the history of the world. Consider what would have happened to Admiral Sturdee's command if Von Spee, on arriving off Port Stanley, had entered the harbour at full speed and attacked with ram and boarders ! It is not improbable that our two battle cruisers

693 BATTLE TACTICS.

might have been captured or sunk ! As no two cases are similar, it is quite impossible to lay down rules for what one may call " harbour tactics." The importance of secrecy and celerity is obvious, particularly in regard to attacking during the first few days of war when local defences are likely to be unready or inefficient. What I want chiefly to emphasise is the supreme importance of studying carefully this new method of winning a war. I say " new " because in these days of submarines, poison gas, C.M.B.'s, and aircraft discharging torpedoes, gas, or heavy bombs, we should be able to feel that an enemy's fleet in harbour need never again be looked on as inaccessible to us. The whole strategy of a campaign may be altered by this fact, and the man who can plan successfully the execution of such an attack will be worth very much more than his weight in gold.

While addressing you on the subject of unorthodox tactics I would like to say a word about the policy of laying down printed instructions as to tactics in battle. What I feel about them is this: as a guide book to officers who have just joined the fleet, or as a text book of modern tactics, they are invaluable. But there lies in them a definite danger which can never be clearly tested until the next war. I feel that they ought really to be called Battle Orders-which are rather dangerous things-because I believe that in actual fact the majority of officers treat them as such. In battle, when faced by a sudden and difficult situation, an officer can do one of two things. He may say : " If the commander-in-chief were here now and could see all the details of this situation, what would he wish me to do ? " That is right. The alternative is to say : " This is very bewildering, what do the Battle Instruc- tions lay down about it ? " Now, that may be right, but it is quite likely to be entirely wrong, because the situation may well be one that could not possibly have been foreseen. I am seriously doubtful if detailed Battle Instructions are any more appropriate for the actual conduct of a battle at sea than similar instruction would have been for the conduct of a battle by Haig's armies on the western front. Nelson at Trafalgar had to take into action many more ships of the line than ever you will, but his Battle Instructions were very brief. He supplemented them by talking over his plans with his flag officers and captains until it was clear to all of them that they perfectly understood him. On the same lines, it might be quite a good thing, when the next war starts, for every officer to read carefully through the Battle Instructions once, and then never look at them again. Some, I think, would feel entirely happy under these conditions, some perhaps would not, but with the right kind

BATTLE TACTICS. 659

of officers under him the commander-in-chief could do the rest. These officers, however, must be trained along certain simple lines. First, they must be indoctrinated : that is, they must understand clearly the commander-in-chief's general wishes and intentions. Second, they must have developed in time of peace a quick and fearless initiative, whereby they may intelligently anticipate the commander-in-chief's wishes immediately any new or difficult situation occurs. Third, and most important of all, they must have a healthy offensive spirit and a firm determination to fight for decisive results. To paraphrase Nelson, one might say " no ship can be far wrong if she is closely engaged with an enemy ship of adequate size." On the whole, I feel that we do not greatly need to alter the Battle Instructions, but we should use them differently. Above all, so far as the commander-in-chief is concerned, it should be made perfectly clear that they are always his servant and never his master. For all other officers, I believe that more initiative, and less reliance on the printed instructions, would produce results that would be of infinite value to the fleet in battle.

REMARKS ON CRITICISM.

I am near the end, but let me say one word now about criticism. I have just criticised the Battle Instructions, and I know well that criticism is a difficult and a dangerous thing. But criticism of the right sort is a thing that we must have. If anyone wishes to state a case for reform or progress he must give us a constructive suggestion, and that suggestion must be logically supported by destructive criticism of whatever it is desired to replace. Suppose a man's car is very old and constantly breaking down, until at last his wife says to him " This car can no longer do the work; why don't you get a new one." He does not reply by saying : " The car is doing its best and it was made by a jolly good firm ; I think it is most unfair of you to criticise it." Anyway, I wouldn't say that to my wife. Now, I hate criticising an individual, but I rather feel that printed instructions left behind by our predecessors are, within limits, things that we may criticise when we consider that the interests of the Service demand it. Printed orders are rather similar to the Limited Company, of which the man said : " it had no soul to be damned nor bottom to be kicked." In other words, it has the advantage of being entirely impersonal. I feel that less criticism of individuals and more criticism of institutions might do the Service a lot of good. Without intelligent criticism you can have no progress ; but in our Service, having sometimes had criticism of the wrong sort, all criticism is looked on with suspicion. I know young officers who would tell you to-day that in their opinion certain things are wrong and ought to be put right, but

660 BATTLE TACTICS.

they dare not say so officially because they believe their careers would be finished if they did so. I am not able to believe that their fears are justified, but it is regrettable that they should think so. Personally, I never embark on a constructive suggestion without saying to myself " if it is necessary for me to criticise, how can I sufficiently gild the pill to make it acceptable " : and I find it a difficult question.

THE FUTURE. Another point to remember is, that the less we encourage discussion

and criticism within the Service, the more violent is likely to be the criticism directed at the Service from without. However, let us pass to another subject. I have just spoken of the urgent need, financially, for making our next war a short one. This is only one of many good reasons for starting the war with a vigorous offensive. Another is the fact that the Navy has been subjected to some bitter criticism since 1914, some of it perhaps justified, some certainly not. The idea is now widely held on shore that the Navy can no longer achieve so much as it used to achieve a hundred years ago. Our shares, in fact, have definitely slumped. The public feel, quite wrongly, that the idea of making the enemy's coastline our maritime frontier is now no longer feasible. I t is very desirable to show to them, and to our enemies, that the same spirit and the same possibilities exist to-day as in the days when Nelson's fleets so well exemplified that fine old maxim " the trident of Neptune is the sceptre of the world." We all recollect how, according to the poet, " The Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold." In just the same manner one would like to see the British Fleets and Squadrons going out to war when the call comes. This is all the more desirable because it would be very fitting to have a really fine finish to the great days of our naval history.

The last war was intended by many to be a "war to end war." It may or may not have succeeded. But if it should have failed, it is not unlikely that one more great struggle on land or sea is the last that we shall be involved in for at least a century. Mr. Bernard Shaw, during the late war, wrote an article on " The Last Spring of the Old Lion." If in the next war we will only dare to do all that we might do ; if we can rise worthily to the heights of the greatness that is inherent in the British race, there should be something in the last spring of the old lion that will not quickly be forgotten.

I think you will have gathered that a large part of my remarks is devoted to a plea for the cultivation of the offensive spirit. I wish it had been more eloquent. There may be some who think my suggestions revolutionary or dangerous. Let them set their minds at rest : such is

BATTLE TACTICS. 661

the innate conservatism of the naval officer that there is no conceivable danger of the Service being stampeded too rapidly into new or untried schemes. Consider for a moment the immense wall of passive opposition which years ago held up the adoption of the steel ship, steam propulsion, the screw propeller, and a dozen other more recent improvements.

There may be wise and useful reasons for it, but without doubt the Service will never take a definite step forward until there is a strong body of public opinion in favour of doing so. I t is my urgent hope that public opinion may rally in support of some of the views that I have put forward to-day. I do not ask necessarily for the support of stripes and heavy guns : youth and enthusiasm may be even better, but I would like both. If one midshipman would get up and say " I am with you all the way " I should feel that I had gained at least one ally of very real value. Let us always remember that we must either progress or stagnate. There is no middle course. If we try to content ourselves by reading the Battle Instructions and then, as Kipling says : " fold our hands and think well of it," we shall be cultivating a dangerous complacency. Very largely it is a new attitude of mind that is wanted in these matters. If, therefore, you will seriously cultivate the faith and courage and the offensive spirit that are inseparably connected with the finest traditions of our Service, you will most assuredly astonish the pessimists, and possibly the world as well.

THOUGHTS ON FUTURE POLICY.

IF recent articles in THE NAVAL REVIEW are taken as a guide, it would seem that the Navy is passing through a period of profound introspection. A number of articles could be cited, obviously written by experienced officers, which reveal something almost akin to disquiet. I believe this is due to a tardy realization that we are in for a long period of peace. At last we are facing the fact that a continued state of readiness for battle is not the best way to prepare for a war whose date and nature are unknown.

So much is common ground, but in the flood of proposals and reforms now being made there is danger of losing sight of the wood for the trees. In the article which follows I shall touch on what seem to me to be a few of the major problems. No attempt will be made either to arrange them in order of importance or to treat them exhaustively.

SHIPBUILDING POLICY. From a material point of view the outstanding fact is that after

eighty years of rapid development we are entering on a period of stability. Prophecy is dangerous, but there are grounds for believing that the epoch of physical discoveries is at an end. Engineers have already applied most of them, and it lies with us to make the best use of their work. The significance of the position however is that ships can now be built which will not become obsolete while yet new. There is no reason why they should not last as long as the old wooden walls.

The prospect of having such ships removes the greatest obstacle to a return to our traditional policy of laying up the bulk of the fleet during peace time. In the 18th century something like 75 per cent. of the ships of the line were laid up. The great advantage of that policy was that it combined economy with having the fleet at very short notice for expansion in the event of war. By no other means could fleets of the requisite size have been constructed. So it is to-day. Assuming that the treaties of limitation are allowed to lapse in 1936, it is conceivable that we could afford to construct an adequate fleet over a period of, say, 50 years ; but it would be quite impossible if at the same time we attempted to keep such a fleet in continuous commission.

I hesitate to suggest what constitutes an " adequate " battle fleet, but would merely urge that the last war was no criterion. The theatre

THOUGHTS ON FUTURE POLICY. 663

of operations was then so exceptionally restricted that only one battle- fleet had to be maintained. Conditions similar to those between 1793 and 1815 are more probable in the future ; and since battleships still carry much the same crew, and cost roughly the same in proportion to national revenues, it seems fair to suppose that their numbers will be comparable as well.

Another modern objection to keeping a large fleet in reserve has been the difficulty of finding men qualified to man it. Here also the root of the difficulty lay in the rate of development, which caused naval and mercantile engineering practice to differ. With more stable conditions it may be expected that the warship of the future will correspond in essentials to the large cargo steamer or liner, as was the case in the sailing era.

Closely related to numbers of battleships is the question of their size. Ever since the Dreadnought was built it has been British policy to have the largest and most powerfully armed ships. When the Washington Treaty limited size, we automatically accepted the maxima allowed as our minima. Yet this is a complete reversal of our historic policy, which was always to build smaller ships than our enemies but have more of them. Obviously the strategic needs of an Empire like ours are better met by twenty-one ships of 25,000 tons (or twenty-eight of 20,000 tons), than by fifteen of 35,000 tons. Unfortunately there is a doubt as to whether it is technically possible to design a ship, on the smaller dis- placement, which will not be hopelessly outclassed by the 35,000 tons giant. Experts have pretty well taken it for granted that the largest size is essential ; but nevertheless the advisability of building future battleships to a smaller size than those of foreign powers is a matter demanding more serious consideration than any other technical problem at the present moment.

TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT. The fact that the rate of technical development has slowed down does

not make it any the less important that we should keep abreast of it. Naval weapons may only improve in points of detail, but these details count for a great deal when the hour of battle is at hand. Great attention should, therefore, be paid to experimental work during long periods of peace, because it is at such times that the danger of falling behind other powers is greatest.

Technical development involves two things : the best brains must father it, and the higher command must follow it. At present the position is not wholly satisfactory : the cost is great, and the results disappointing. Chief among the reasons for this is the over-staffing

664 THOUGHTS ON FUTURE POLICY.

of most experimental departments. They were enormously expanded during the war, and have never been properly reduced since. Bureau- cratic methods, over-lapping, petty jealousies, and a general failure to " get on with the job," have been the inevitable results.

Neither is the present system, whereby " staff requirements " control development, entirely sound. Fundamentally, technical knowledge and invention dictate and govern all material development. Obviously, for the staff to try and do so is an inversion of the actual process, and merely has a delaying effect. The function of the staff is to watch, and sometimes divert, the course of development ; in exceptional circumstances they may postulate some entirely new requirement. But it would be equally wrong for scientists or designers to initiate policy, since they cannot have practical knowledge of what is required, any more than the staff have the scientific training to judge what is obtainable. " Experimental " officers, working with the design departments, and trying out their products, are the proper people to direct policy, subject of course to Admiralty approval. They combine fair scientific knowledge with sufficient sea experience to estimate both the technical possibilities and the tactical value of new designs. They should be taken from the cream of the younger officers, and therefore be likely one day to command the fleet for whose development they were responsible in their younger days.

I t is far from easy to give effect to this principle. Possibly the best plan would be to place the legal responsibility for experimental work in the hands of a number of executive committees. Each committee would have the director of the appropriate Admiralty department as its chairman, and " experimental " officers from the " school " concerned as its members. Representatives of the staff, the designers, and the supply departments would attend in an advisory capacity. Superimposed on this scheme there would have to be machinery for co-operation between the various committees. At present the D.S.R. appears to be the only link between different branches of experimental work, and in consequence there must be a good deal of duplication.

The whole subject is very complicated, and requires far more thorough discussion than I have given to it. Whatever methods are adopted, however, the fundamental need is to get quicker results at less cost.

OFFICERS : CONDITIONS OF SERVICE. Passing from material to personnel, we enter ground which has been

more carefully explored. Taking officers first ; it is generally agreed that the most pressing need is to reduce the lists to a point where good jobs, and a reasonable prospect of promotion, are open to all. Let us


leave it at that, and turn to other matters, nearly as important but less widely discussed.

Of these the relation between age and rank comes first. Peace conditions lead inevitably to slower promotion, because ruthless pruning is undesirable. Yet it has been held that the commander-in-chief of a fleet in war should not be over 50, which is the age of a senior captain under present conditions. This means that if we allow a reasonable period of command, we require a man of about 46 on promotion to full admiral. If again we assume a minimum period of eight years in the junior flag ranks (say six at sea and two at the Admiralty) the same officer must not be more than 38 on promotion to rear-admiral. Making a similar allowance for service in post rank, we find that he must become a captain at 30. This, after all, is a perfectly reasonable age for a cruiser captain, since it is absurd to suggest that a man of that age is not old enough for command.

The question is how to get a proportion of officers promoted specially early under peace conditions. In the old days favouritism provided the solution-though not a particularly satisfactory one. With the modern love of uniformity in all things, the difficulty is very great.

Side by side with this, there is the demand for a better chance of promotion, at least as far as commander, for the average officer. At first sight the two things seem incompatible : younger selections among the few would seem still further to restrict the prospects of the many. I suggest though that there is a possible way out, which is at least worth consideration. I t amounts to a complete reform of the system of officers' promotion up to the rank of captain, of which the following is an outline :-

From sub-lieutenant onwards, promotion to each rank would be by seniority, subject to qualification and recommendation. Pure seniority and pure selection would alike be discontinued. The new system would be analogous to the rating of leading hands or petty officers : qualification by examination and service would render an officer eligible to be placed on a promotion roster. Actually to get on it, and to keep on it, he would require the recommendation of his captain. Thus, every officer of average ability, who remained keen, could look forward to eventual promotion : certain to commander, and probable to captain.

Over and above this there would be a system of accelerated promotion, covering about 25 per cent. of the total promotions, which would be rather similar to the new process of making sub-lieutenants from the lower deck. Severe conditions for qualification, coupled with special recommendation by the captain, would be the first stage : interview, selection, and recommendation by the commander-in-chief would be the next ; final selection by the Admiralty would be the last. Presumably some

666 THOUGHTS ON FUTURE POLICY.

of the officers obtaining early promotion in one rank would continue to do so in the others, and by this means a few would become captains at the early age postulated.

Pay and pensions form another important aspect of the conditions under which an officer serves. No one would complain that officers of commander's rank and below are underpaid, but captains and flag officers ought to receive more when financial conditions permit. The really contentious point is, however, the old question of marriage allowance. Probably the bulk of service opinion is against any allowance, both because it is felt that pay should be based on what a man does, and also because the Navy itself derives no benefit from the fact of a young officer being married. Against this is cited the self-evident fact that many young officers are married, and find difficulty in supporting their wives ; added to which it is claimed to be in the national interest for men of the officer class to marry.

Usually these arguments leave out of account some highly relevant facts. First of all, a married officer does receive an allowance indirectly, in so far as his widow is entitled to a non-contributory pension. Secondly the national interest is not affected by an officer's marriage, but by his having issue. I therefore suggest that a children's education allowance, on a generous scale, should be paid to married officers. Since it is unthinkable that this should be chargeable on the Treasury, I propose that it should be found by a reduction in the flat rate of all serving and pensioned officers. Indirectly, an allowance on these lines would benefit the Navy itself by making it more attractive as a career for gentlemen without private means.

MEN : CONDITIONS OF SERVICE. The recent Admiralty order reviving short service engagements for

ratings is of special interest. There is a threefold importance in the period of engagement : it affects training and efficiency : it closely con- cerns the individual : it regulates the size of the reserve. Unlike the Army, naval policy need not be influenced to any great extent by this last consideration. An adequate reserve can be built up without great difficulty, for it is material which limits the rate of expansion. But the attraction which the Service offers. to potential recruits, and their subsequent training, are two intimately connected and very vital matters.

In recent months there has been a good deal of criticism of the present 12- and 22-year periods. Some of this has been directed at the casual way in which indifferent men are allowed to re-engage for their second period. This, however, is not a question of regulations, but of their lax enforcement by commanding officers. Apart from this, there are many who hold that the 12-year period is too long, and should be reduced


lo about eight. They argue that senior able seamen, without ability or ambition for higher rating, are a nuisance, and should be eliminated. Since the average man who becomes a leading hand does so after roughly seven or eight years' service, an eight-year engagement would enable captains to weed out those who were still able seamen.

Personally I am prepared to agree that the two-badge able seaman is a man who wants watching. Particularly is this so with men who started with ambition but who failed through some trait in their character, or through some unfortunate " slip-up," to get advancement. On the other hand, for skilled work the experienced able seaman is quite essential. How, for instance, could the torpedo party function if every senior hand was a leading seaman or petty officer ? (The position incidentally is bad enough already !) There are innumerable jobs in a ship which require skill, experience and steadiness, but not command. There are also many men who are able and contented to supply these qualities, but who are wholly unwilling and unsuited for higher rating. I t has been said that the three-badge able seaman was once the backbone of the service : he still would be if proper care was exercised over making up the watch bill.

Short engagements have another disadvantage in their effect on recruiting. Any Army officer will say that he envies the Navy their 12-year period, because it attracts a far better type of man. At present the military authorities are much exercised at the low standard of their recruits. One reason for this, and a big reason, is the hopeless position of a man thrown on the labour market in his middle twenties, which is what the short-service man must look forward to. My own opinion is that we should retain the 12-year period as the normal engagement, but offer an avenue of escape to dissatisfied men after about seven years' service. This could be achieved by giving commanding officers the power to grant a free discharge to any man of between seven and nine years' service at the end of the commission. If it is objected that this would make drafting impossible, I reply that in that case we must be running the fleet with too fine a margin of ratings in the dep8ts.

There is also the question as to whether the period of service for pension could not be extended to a greater age. At present we discharge men in the prime of life, at an age which was fixed when conditions of service made a man old at 40. Modern conditions would certainly allow of a man serving till 45, and in many cases till 50. Such an extension would benefit both the Service and the individual. My proposal is that two further periods, of five years each, should be allowed in certain cases. To qualify, a man would have to hold high substantive or non-substantive rating, be of superior ability, and be perfectly fit medically.

668 THOUGHTS ON FUTURE POLICY

Lastly, there are a few lesser matters worthy of attention. Despite all that has been written to the contrary, there still seems to be a case for granting to captains the power of advancement up to, say, 20 per cent. of the total available. This would be an encouragement to men who

" specially distinguish themselves by hard work and ability ; it would also enhance the prestige of the captain. In the same connection there is much to be said for making a small addition to, or subtraction from, the flat rate paid to men whose ability is " superior " or " moderate " respectively. Finally, I wish to challenge the present policy of entering signalmen and wireless ratings. The principle of trying to appropriate the best of the seaman boys, at Shotley and the St. Vincent, cannot be sound. I t is not fair on the Service as a whole, which is presumably left to make the best of those rejected by the signal department. If signal duties require men of a higher standard or longer training than seamen, then there should be a separate entry ; if this is not conceded, then the signal department should take its chance in the same way as other specialist branches.

CONCLUSION.

This short article has covered a very wide range of subjects, some relatively novel, and some well worn. The suggestions which have been advanced are not intended as precise proposals, ready for instant adoption, but rather as a kind of thinking aloud, which it is hoped may provoke thought among other members of THE NAVAL REVIEW.

HERE AND THERE.

SCAPA Flow has been defined as " miles and miles of water surrounded by-nothing at all." Designed by the Almighty for the confusion of the Germans in war, no more convenient arena can be imagined for regatta purposes in peace, and it is here, in the frenzy of thrusting oars, swinging crews, bobbing coxswains, and the cheering of partisans, that the Home Fleet summer cruise reaches crisis. Then, exhausted, the fleet disperses for a period of secluded convalescence. For those 'denied the joys of Scandinavia and the Bahic this takes the form of a gradual fleet to the southward, maybe through the delightful Sounds of Mull and Islay and down the Irish Sea to Cardiff.

Now Cardiff is a much maligned city. Associated in the mind with grime and coal dust, it comes as a revelation when calling upon the Lord Mayor to enter the central area of beautiful municipal buildings in their sylvan site. But though coal may not be in evidence in the streets of Cardiff it obsesses the minds of her citizens, so that in some respects the arrival of a man-of-war without an ounce of coal on board is about as welcome as the total abstainer in a pul;lic house. And they make no bones about it. The local press ask for an interview on the " Back to Coal " movement, and draws blank. The local chairman of that movement bids one to lunch with the governing body- presumably to eat nuts. He draws blank. Until one begins to shy at the mere mention of coal. T o cap it all, at the Lord Mayoral luncheon to honour H.M. naval officers the gentleman put up to propose the health of the Lord Mayor seizes the opportunity to read the admiral a lecture on " Back to Coal." Old Icing Coal may once have been a merry old soul; one hopes that he will be again; but at present he is a crashing old bore. However, when thme outfall of a great industry becomes choked,. murmurs from the banks, in two senses, may be expected. For the rest, Cardiff is a hospitable city rightly noted for the beauty of her women and the size of her policemen. Avoiding the latter you may spend an enjoyable week in Cardiff.

By contrast the next stop, prosperous Penzance, whose hinterland- devoted to new potatoes, broccoli and flowers-is reaping the full benefit of recent legislation. No complaints. And here a word of warning to would-be speakers in this rail-end town. Do not waste time trying to connect up with Gilbert and Sullivan. The attempt has been made

670 HERE AND THERE.

before. But you may praise the beauties of St. Michael's Mount with confidence, for everyone here is proud of it, as you will appreciate after a visit to that amazing medieval stronghold and modern residence.

St . Ives, which is, in fact, monogamous; The Lizard, whose cliffs are covered with the sub-tropical Ice Plant (or Misembryanthaneum if you like that better) ; Lands End, covered with trippers ; all these lend interest to a stay in Penzance Bay which finally concludes with a Mayoral Dance, when in the promiscuity of " Paul Jones " the more senior naval officers appear to be regarded by some of the young women as prizes to be secured at all costs. As the band stops, a yelp " I've got him at last " may disconcert the most hardened.

Falmouth-and the Cutty Sark . " Clewgarnets and buntlines, main- sail haul, fore tack, head braces. . . . ." Some 3,000 miles in 12 days was her record and there she lies at rest : her towering spars, sky- scraper, and l~ean lines of much interest to those who anticipate the return of masts and yards in the Royal Navy. As witness that she is not wholly a relic of the past a succession of Finnish fourmasters puts into Falmouth during the week; wire running rigging, double topsails and top-gallantsails, donkey engine substitute for lusty limbs, clatter of winch the only chanty. Putting to sea again with but half a dozen hands aloft, slowly evolving their cloud of canvas, these ships are the focus of all eyes.in m e of His Majesty's oil burning, turbine driven, high tensile, ships of war.

Torbay, haven of blockading fleets in the French wars. Torquay, beautiful but enervating, racked by controversy over a " beauty " parade which, though characterised as a cattle show, is attended nevertheless e n masse. Here the ship of war is so familiar as but to be deemed alternative bait for visitors.

And thmen W'eymouth, full to the tiles, so that exercise were better taken on the quarter deck : His Majesty bringing King's weather to a fleet palpitating with delight. The fleet sailing regatta, crowded fore and aft rig brought to contrast with the model Victory appropriately manned by officers of the Nelson : searchlight display unique in execution and dramatic effect.

Finally to sea, when the squadrons are put through their paces before the senior Admiral of the Fleet. A comprehensive programme concludes with the Royal Yacht steaming down between close-drawn lines manned and ch~eering, Father Neptune adding the finishing touch with his Dance of the Dolphins about her bows.

And so to the Home Port and-joy of joys-Navy Week !

THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM.

THE author of a letter about the Divisional System1 flogs a horse long since dead. Instructions to captains as regards the organisation of ship's company in battleships, battle-cruisers and cruisers (K.R. & A.I. Art. 1072) and the instructions to lieutenant- commanders and lieutenants as officers of division (K.R. & A.I. Art. 1153) admit of only one interpretati~n.~ " He will have charge of the men in his division and supervise their work, and be responsible for their discipline, training and welfare including the encouragement and supervision of games, sports and other forms of recreation." . . . . . "He is to assume such responsibility as may be directed by the captain for the cleanliness and upkeep of that part of the ship, including mess decks,3 allocated to his division." What could be more explicit ?

The underlying principle is simply this. The officer is to be responsible for the quality of his men. The form of organisation ordered gives men an officer who is not only responsible for their kit and Sunday appearance. I t gives them one who knows where they sleep, wash and eat ; where and how they work ; how they play. He it is who will hand out the " bouquets " and the " cans." He it is who must not be let down. His is the familiar face to whom to go in time of trouble.

It is true to say that the average divisional officer hasmuch to learn. If, however, he is helped, if much is expected of him, and if he has to deal directly with the commander in matters affecting the weather decks, and directly with the first lieutenant between-decks, he will more than rise to the occasion. In so doing he will gain experience which will be invaluable when, later on, he becomes a commander. On a reduced scale he is concerned with the whole life of the ship ; not merely with the set of activities which prevail on one deck level only.

These two counts form the essence of the business and, weighed in the scale against the extra work it gives the executive officer and the possibility of-not necessity for-a lower standard in " finish," they most certainly topple the balance.

THE NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 3, Vo1. XX., August, 1932, p. 483.

This article was written before the September amendments to the K.R. and A.I. were issued.

The italics are the author's.

672 THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM.

I t is probable that, through no fault of their own, many take on as executive officer with but a slight knowledge of the trade. Most of the instances given by the one-time commander of the Durham and his chief boatswain's mate bear witness to this fact. For example : Orders as to dress should be laid down by the commander and observed. Leave- breakers should be taken before the officer of the watch ; not before divisional officers. Privileges should, and can easily, be standardised. Divisional officers can be taught, and are eager to learn, the best methods of keeping their parts of ship clean. They are responsible to the first lieutenant as between decks. The latter can and should go to the commander if he finds that mess-decks and flats are not being given their fair share of attention. The statement that the system must be held partly responsible for the present low standard shown by petty officers will not hold water. I t is not the system which is at fault, but faulty application. This again rests with the executive officer. If he insists on the use of the chain of command, admonishing officers when he finds them doing petty officers' work, and if he sets a premium on initiative, then officers and petty officers will soon be in right relation.

We are concerned with the present and with the future. We need and shall need commanders who know the trade before they step into their ship ; not such as learn by painful experience after the damage has been done. The organisation laid down in the King's Regulations rightly used provides a training ground for future commanders. We need and shall need an organisation which enables men to be known by and know their officers. We have it.

A LETTER TO " GEORGE " FROM HIS " NEW CAPTAIN "

(v ide p . 484, line 3).

Dear George,-You were quite right to send on your letter from Rupert before deciding how you will organise the Lincolnshire. As you say, I have had a very unusually long experience as executive officer -two full commissions, one in a battle cruiser, one in a cruiser, and in many small ships before the War-and I have run ships both ways.

The only way a commander can get the best out of his officers and men is by team work, and to get the best team work everyone must pull his pound.

The divisional system is easi,est to run in a big ship, b,ecause there are so many officers available, and it is far better that thmey should have definite r,esponsibilities. They can get a larger amount of, and more

THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM. 673

definite responsibilities by the use of the divisional system, and it is undoubtedly very good training for the officers. Rupert says it is bad for the petty officers; but it shouldn't be if the divisional system is properly run. After all, the marines when on board ship run the divisional system to all intents and purposes, and their sergeants run the show well enough.

P~ejudice against the divisional system was started by overmuch enthusiasm for it in one of our battle squadrons about ten years ago. It was carried too far. Leave was given by divisions, and, for example, the quarterdeckmen were expected to scrub the focsle, and not steal their brooms or scamp their work ! It was too much for any collection of sailors and therefore became a failure.

T o run a divisional system properly, you must have your ship organised on a watch or part-of-watch principle, so far as leave and drills are concerned, and combine this with your quarter-bill. It is not very difficult if you have experience. The next thing-having decided how many divisions you will have-is to consider the best way of getting team work among your officers. You don't want to be bothered over the co-ordination between the divisions; it's much better to have someone else t a do that, and I suggest in a big ship that you use your two or three senior lieut'enant-commanders (depending on numbers) as " mates " respectively of upper deck and boats, mess decks and flats throughout, and storerooms. It is the job of these two or three to see that the divisional officers work on the same lines horizontally, if I may use Rupert's expression.

It is better to have the senior lieutenants as divisional officers and the junior lieutenants, sub-lieutenants or senior midshipmen as 2nd divisional officers, available a s substitutes in case of absence, and to look after the division at assemblies, when the senior may be inspecting his divisional quarters and decks.

S o much for the details of organisation ; now for your way of running it. You'll have to be very much alive to start with, constantly talking to your divisional officers and getting them to work together. It can only be a success by team work. If you are capable of getting that, you'll make a success of it, and, a few months after commissioning, you will be surprised to find how much work is taken off your hands ; your dtefaulters will become less, and you will find things being done without your initiative being needed.

Now for a few words of criticism on Rupert's letter :- ( a ) A good commander will soon get co-ordination. It's his

job, and all such things as divisional punishments and leave privileges should be known to a good command'er on the day on which

THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM.

they are given. Methods of cleaning ship may be different t o start with, but a good commander will have the best method worlring in all divisions very soon.

(b) I t should not be necessary for so important an officer a s the commander t o have intimate contact with his petty officers. H e can deal with them through their own officers, and, in the divisional system, a good divisional officer can get more help from, and give more power to, his petty officers than by the " horizontal " method. Fewer people should reach the commander's report (for instance) a s the officer of the division and his captains of tops will have better ways of dealing with the " dud."

( c ) is a statement I don't agree with. I don't agree that the standard should be lower, or that it is lower. T h e commander (under the divisional system) gets a far better knowledge of his officers' capabilities, and the officers get a better kno~iledge of their petty officers' capabilities. Rupert produces training for three or four officers in his par. (c). T h e divisional system can give responsibilities to a dozen or more.

(d) is wrapped up in (c). I don't agree that it is worse for the men, or that the standard should be lower.

(e) I do not agree that a turret officer has to spend all his time in his turret. Early in the commission in a newly built 8-in. cruiser-yes, perhaps; but early in the commission n e all have to work overtime, and 8-in. cruisers, when new, are different to any ordinary ship. T h e navigating officer can still be of great use a s a " mate " of upper deck, even with a properly working divisional system.

(f) is up to the commander-I am afraid I don't g o much on Rupert 's predecessor.

(g) I feel sure your brain and common-sense can reach higher and different levels to Rupert 's ! But it isn't fair to be rude to him-this paragraph does ask for it though !

(h) I s certainly true if the system is organised on the narrow lines that appear to have been Rupert 's experience. My suggestions further back give broader lines on which to work, when every officer and petty officer in the team is pulling his weight.

(i) Any system badly run on narrow lines will give the chief boatswain's mate and all the petty officers any amount of room to grouse. T h e views of the chief boatswain's mate at the end show that the divisional system in the Durham was run without any supervision or understanding. T h e commander has to keep in intimate touch the whole time, and, even if he is on leave, who-

THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM. 675

ever takes his place has to be trained to run on the same lines. 1 agree that the more illiterate petty officers do not care to do the regulating to start with; but after a bit they find it gives them more power over their own men, and they can give the suitable man his suitable job, and hand out all sorts of horrid things to the don't-care-a-damn ord. or A.B. I think the last two paragraphs of the chief boatswain's mate's remarks-namely, the boats and the different dress worn by parts of ship-shows how terribly bad the supervision must have been. I shouldn't have kept that commander long in my own ship.

( j ) The commander has got a great deal more to do early in the commission ; but, when he has got the system running on the right lines, he has much less work, and much more leisure to think of higher things. H e doesn't arise with the sun daily : he makes his divisional officers do that. Now and again he shows his face, and then he makes sure that everybody knows it. The rest of this paragraph is already dealt with.

( I t ) Yes, but times have changed. In those days ships were mostly at sea for long periods, and the officers who were divisional officers were handling the ship, her sails and her men daily from the bridge. The officer of the watch was a real workman with real responsibilities at sea, and had a good deal of masts and yards to do in harbour in one way or another. The idea of the divisional system is to produce a few extra responsibilities and interests for officers, as well as to give more scope for team work between officers and men. W h y is it that, on the average, destroyers' ships companies are cleaner, better dressed, smarter in their work and better disciplined than those of the big ships? Because their officers and men are in closer touch and working together more.

That is the reason for the divisional system, and that is why, when run on sound lines and thoroughly supervised, it is better than any other system, B U T you must have enough officers with time to give to it, and a big enough show to run. For that reason I think it is suitable only to %in. cruisers and above. It can be used in a modified form in smaller ships.

Rupert, I know, is a friend of yours, and I hope he will forgive anything that may seem a bit down on him in this. I hope he will forgive it enough, perhaps, to say a little more about it. Has he ever been a commander of a big ship in modern days when the lieutenant- commanders are as thick as peas in a drum, and there are midshipmen round ev,erp corner longing for responsibilities and work?

676 THE DIVISIONAL SYSTEM.

Finally, remember, the good ship is run by a team who should have as common an understanding and a s much ginger as any international Rugge r team, and it is their form of cheery, courageous co-operation you should aim at.

Th i s is written rather hastily, but it will give you something to think of, a different point of view.

Yours, YOUR NEW CAPTAIN.

ADVANCEMENT O F RATINGS.

I N THE NAVAL REVIEW of November, 1928, and throughout 1929, a series of short articles and lmetters appeared on the subject of " Advance- ment of Ratings "-indeed I wrote one myself. As the correspondence progressed I noticed that one particular point was never discussed at any length-in fact many writers did not mention it-and as it was a point which I have always regardted as being vitally important to the whole question I was somewhat surprised.

As, however, I felt I was rather ignorant on the subject, and was expecting to go to a capital ship very shortly (after sorrle timme in smaller ships), I thought I would bide my time and see holw the scheme worked out in practice. Before being appointed to my ship I was fortunate enough to hear a l'ecture on the subject of the advancement of ratings given by the drafting commander of one of the hom,e depots. This cleared up a great many points, but still left my original point open to question ; and as, after two years in a capital ship, I still consider the present scheme is wrong in this respect, I am again intruding in the hope that some other reader may provide satisfactory reasons why it has never been embodied.

The main trend of the drafting commander's lecture was that it is fully realised that no advancement system by roster can be perfect, but the existing scheme has the advantage of being a workable system which, taking it bye and large, is fair to all concerned. Now, considering only the seaman branch, I suggest that the present scheme is excellent in the positive sense, but is definitely unfair in the negative sense. By this I mean that all men recommended for advancement are shuffled and sorted out into their correct relative order, but no penalty is attached to a failure to get a recommend-fully qualified men only considered. Surely this is most unfair to the men who are recommended steadily without a break.

The previous correspondence has stated, perhaps not in so many words, that men who are not recommended fall into two main groups :-

(a ) Those who miss one or more recommends, but come on to the roster in time to pick up their turn for rating.

(b) Men who have never been recommended-and are never likely to be unless some soft-hearted and inefficient officer does

678 ADVANCEMENT OF RATINGS.

so (which has been known to happen at just the critical moment to get them rated).

The fact that no penalty is attached to the failure to get a recommend results in group (a ) being on precisely the same terms as men with unbroken recommends-provided, of course, that they do not fail in their recommend at the critical moment when they reach the top of the roster. This is most disheartening to many, and, since the majority fully realise it, there is a feeling of discont'ent among those in possession of continuous recommends.

Group (b) apparently has no effect on the position of men on the roster, since they themselves are not on i t ; but they are a potential menace to the efficient men, since at any moment any member of the group may, owing to some carelessly considered recommend, get on the roster to the disadvantage of names already on it but of later basic dates. I know of one case where a man, when his name went on to the roster for the first time, was just a year senior in basic date to the man who was then at the top of the roster.

My solution is in agreem'ent with the idea expressed in the letter on page 832 of Vol. XVII of THE NAVAL REVIEW, i.e., that failure to get a recommend should entail " lost time "; but I don't think the author is drastic enough. I would suggest, for the P.O.'s and L.S.'s rosters, that any man whose name is on the back of form S.507 should lose three months' seniority, i.e., half the time-interval between recommends, apart from his name coming off the roster. This would, incidentally, make it far less likely for men to move backwards on the roster. T o cope with group (b), and to reduce thte number of men who have to be considered when each form S.507 is made out-which in itself will tend towards the remainder being given more careful consideration- I would suggest that any man whose name appears on the back of form S.507 five times in succession should be considered ineligible for any future recommends without the commander-in-chief's authority-only to be granted in exceptional cases.

My reason for selecting five times is in order to avoid the whole series being from the same ship and under the jurisdiction of the same officers, i.e., to avoid any possible question of prejudice. It need scarcely be added that the lack of a recommend from barracks or other shore establishments, where the recommend is merely a repeat of the previous sea-going one, should not count as part of the series of five.

Reverting to my original complaint-why is such a scheme not employed? Surely it is most desirable from the service point of view, and from the point of view of the men whose names feature on the front

ADVANCEMENT O F RATINGS. 679

of form S.507, that the inefficients and unsuitables should be impeded from being rated so long as they are considered unsuitable to hold the next higher rating. Are the inefficients kept hanging on in a spirit of pity or kindness-because that is no way to fill the non-commissioned ranks of a disciplined force ?

RAMBLING REFLECTIONS ON DISCIPLINE.

I FEEL this article ought really to be three distinct ones ; but owing to :- (a) The three parts having a remote bearing on one another, and (b) Each part being so short that it is not worth printing by

itself, 1 have grouped them together under a title which gives little indication of what they are about. The actual subject matter in each part is, I fear, also somewhat disconnected-but then that suits the title of the article.

LENGTH OF SERVICE OF RATINGS.

Large changes are foreshadowed by the First Lord's speech on the subject of training of officers and men. Many of these changes were obvious requirements, and call for no comment, but the major change of all was the proposal to introduce training under sail.

Now these very humble remarks are far from intended in a critical spirit, but I must confess that, after hearing a considerable amount of discussion on the subject in various messes, I am still rather hazy as to what definite advantages are to accrue from sail training. The most generally expressed point is that officers and men will be taught to be more self-reliant, more active, more seamanlike, in fact they will be taught to be MEN-of the type who used to go down to the sea in ships a hundred years ago. If that object was achieved sail training would be justified on that alone, but I fear that the trend of modern education is terribly against any swing back towards the old shell-back type.

The other idea that has gradually fixed itself in my mind out of the fog of discussion is that sail-training will teach ship-handling. To this I would reply : " To teach a man to drive a car, would you suggest his learning to drive a horse and carriage first 1 " No, no, that won't do. True, you will teach him handling a sailing ship, but your object is to teach how to handle a modern, high-powered, steam-driven man-of-war. To do this I suggest you would do much better to commission a flotilla of reserve destroyers and use them as a training flotilla-then you will certainly be achieving that object if no other.

But at the bottom of my heart I cannot help feeling that the underlying reason behind all this desire for training under sail is an unexpressed feeling that discipline in the Navy is not quite what it ought to be, and

RAMBLING REFLECTIONS ON DISCIPLINE. 681

that sail training is a remedy for stiffening it up. Now I suggest that it isn't. Thirty-perhaps even twenty-years ago it probably was, but, as I have said before, modern education has defeated the application of discipline of that type.

If discipline is not up to scratch in the Navy, which I am prepared to admit is a statement which can be made with some justification, I would suggest that the remedy is not to try and stiffen up the existing system, but to see how this system requires modification. Whether we like to admit it or not it is a fact that the discipline of our sister services stood the test of recent pay cuts. Consequently it is no good standing aloof and saying that our conditions are not like the Army's, and therefore we don't want to follow them, because we ought to sink our pride and examine the Army and Air Force systems to see if we can take a leaf out of their books in any way.

Such an examination to my mind brings out one salient point, and that is the only main reform I would suggest our adopting (I am not considering minor details). This point is the much superior disciplinary sway that the average Army or Air Force N.C.O. has over his privates or airmen. Most people will say that this is due to the greater care taken in his selection and training, and in the fact that a great point is made of his always working with the same men. These reasons, even if true, don't really make any appreciable difference ; and, man for man, I consider the average petty officer every bit as good as an Army or Air Force sergeant. Where the difference lies is in the material he has to handle.

If you put, say, zoo seamen under the charge of ten P.O.'s some of the P.O.'s will appear to be below average, and to be not very desirable as such. If, on the other hand, you put the same P.O.'s in charge of 200 young seamen (under 5 years' service) and boys you will probably have no complaint against any of them-and that is the case in the Army. The vast majority of privates are short service men, who are young and consequently far more amenable to discipline. Should we not copy our sister service in this respect ? I know that short service means that the men are not so efficient at their technical jobs, and I know we do not want a reserve built up as our sister service does ; but these are unimportant factors compared to the need for a well- disciplined service.

I would suggest eight years' service for seamen, as this would appear to be about the right time for a man to have definitely become a leading seaman or not. The only men allowed to sign on for further periods would then be P.O.'s and L.S.'s and a very small proportion of A.B.'s- say 5 per cent. The difficulty of higher technical ratings could easily

682 RAMBLING REFLECTIONS ON DISCIPLINE.

be got over by restricting the men who could hold these to P.O.'s and L.S.'s and a very small number of A.B.'s--i.e., the ones who are likely to be in the 5 per cent. who are permitted to sign on.

I have heard it talked of as a possible coming reform that men should be allowed a free discharge after seven years' service if they want it ; but the whole crux of my suggestion is that only the P.O.'s, L.S.'s and a very small proportion of the A.B.'s should be allowed to sign on after their original period. I t is no use nibbling at a question like this, or you will find that all the better men go and you are left with the rubbish- it is one of the cases that defies the proverb " Half a loaf is better than no bread."

INCOMPETENT RATINGS. The next reflection I want to voice is the question of the undesirable

and incompetent rating. If short service is introduced the remedy for this evil will automatically applv itself, and, in addition, incompetent P.O.'s and L.S.'s should die out. Consequently the following remarks apply in detail to the existing state of affairs, but only in principle to any future regime brought about by revised periods of service, etc.

Who has not seen letters of this type : "Able Seaman John Smith is to be exchanged with a similar rating in H.M.S. Nonsuch and is to be reported on by that ship in three months' time." The average divisional officer, when he reads official letters like this, does so with disgust and annoyance. One knows them so well-they are only too often the reply to a letter requesting approval to discharge the said John Smith as S.N.L.R.

Is this policy of giving a man another chance fair either to the Service or to the divisional officer who has reported adversely on the man ? I submit that it is not, and not only so, but it also indicates a lack of trust in the divisional officer concerned.

Most divisional officers are either lieutenant-commanders or senior lieutenants nowadays, and, unless they themselves are in the S.N.L.R. category-in which case their captain should have taken action-are presumably trustworthy and reliable enough to be responsible to their captains for the welfare of the men put under their charge. When they come across a man who is not worth his pay in the Service they naturally watch him for a period of time, and, in due course, when they are convinced that their views are correct, they report the matter to the captain. The captain and executive officer, having carefully investigated the case with the divisional officer, may apply for the man to be discharged S.N.L.R. Nowadays, what with welfare committees and questions in Parliament, this type of case is investigated a great deal more thoroughly

RAMBLING REFLECTIONS ON DISCIPLINE. 683

than it used to be, so that there is little doubt that when a recommendation for discharge is made it is well merited. And yet, in many cases, the only result is a letter of the nature of the one quoted above, which virtually is an expression of distrust in the captain's and executive officer's judgment, and a reflection on the capabilities of the divisional officer concerned. If these officers' judgments cannot be trusted why are they employed ?

I am prepared to admit that there is another factor bearing on the case, and that is the reluctance on the part of many officers, both senior and junior, to punish and find fault where it is due. If officers as a whole always took the prescribed action with incompetent and inefficient ratings, this distrust of individual divisional officers would largely vanish. You must be cruel to be kind, and it is no good overlooking incompetence, or, what is even worse, recommending men for higher rating when you know in your heart of hearts that they are not suitable to fill them. The policy of " I shan't be shipmates with him then " is terribly dangerous because it is often forgotten that other disciples of the creed are saying it about other men who will be shipmates with you in the higher rating.

This leads on to the question of petty officers and leading seamen. Officers frequently rant and rail about the incompetence of these ratings, but the relevant observations which any officer should make to himself in these cases are :-

( a ) I should run this man in with a view to recommending him for reversion for unsuitability.

(b) I must make sure that I never recommend a man who might turn out like this one.

Does the average officer act on these lines ? A few do, but a large number don't, and hence springs up the " Give him another chance" attitude.

If this attitude can be killed life will be much easier for petty officers and leading seamen, and greater all-round efficiency is consequently to be expected.

SURPLUS OFFICERS. From many throats the cry goes up that there are too many officers

in ships. That may be true, but it must be remembered that :- (a ) The officer complement of a ship is based on her action-

station requirements. (b) War time expansion and casualties necessitate a surplus of

officers in peace time-more particularly now the fleet is so small.

I would suggest the best remedy for an admittedly unfortunate state of affairs in many ships is for the captain to select some of his officers

684 RAMBLING REFLECTIONS ON DISCIPbINE.

and say : " I'm very sorry but there is no work for you, other than paper work, which won't involve your usurping the work of petty officers and leading seamen ; therefore you must be found employment off the upper deck and mess decks, except for action stations and divisional drills."

The question of what to give these officers to do is not so easy ; but I feel that private study of staff and technical subjects would not come amiss with many officers at any rate. There are other odd jobs that could be done, such as a liaison officer between central stores and the several departments and divisions. An officer suited to the job would, I feel, save an enormous amount on central store expenditure.

Of course the main argument against this idea is the said officers won't get experience in their primary function of handling men. True, but do they now in the average over-officered ship ? And in any case you can change them round at intervals. A secondary argument is that if fewer officers work " part of the ship " it will still further tend to destroy the divisional system, which I, for one, consider functions contrary to the best interests of service discipline.

WHEN IS A SEAMAN NOT A SEAMAN ?

Zntroduclory.

THE following article was written before I had read that entitled " Brightwork and Efficiency " in the May, 1932, number of THE NAVAL REVIEW (page 299). The similarity of idceas in the two articles, if not the actual details, struck me so forcibly that my first tendency was to destroy my own article as redundant. Second thoughts, however, led me to forward it as it stood, as further evidence of a feeling that I believe is gathering force among many officers. The point at issue is far more important than casual articles in the pages of THE NAVAL REVIEW can possibly indicate, and my hope is that far-seeing officers will endeavour to counteract the " Brightwork " tendency.

The vital point that is missed by so many officers-and which I am quite aware that I have omitted from the following articlte-is that excessive housemaiding breeds slackness and discontent among the " housemaids," whose modern standards of education demand a greater purpose in life than continually wielding a deck-scrubber or a brightwork rag. Incidentally the author of " The Low Tide of the Royal Navy " makes precisely this point in the second paragraph on page 291 of the May, 1932, NAVAL REVIEW-a point, also, about which modern Economists are very exercised in civilian industries, and which is alluded to by them as " the evil of specialisation of labour."

If you asked a civilian who knew little of the Navy what he thought a seaman did during his working time he would probably say that he imagined he cleaned the ship for a certain period of the day, and that the remainder of the day was spent in working the ship if at sea (he wouldn't use this expression) and in being trained to fight her against th'e necessity arising. If you pressed him further he would probably think of landing parties and one or two other activities of that nature.

Now in point of fact thme time spent in drills-under which heading I band together all forms of drills, evolutions, gunn,ery drills, torpedo drills, firings, exercises at sea, anti-gas drills, etc.-is to my mind showing a great tendency to be reduced below the minimum consistent with efficiency. In their place grows ship upk'eep, which is assuming more and more importance.

686 WHEN IS A SEAMAN NOT A SEAMAN ?

I am only too willing to admit that cleanliness is next to godliness, and that a dirty ship cannot be an efticient one ; but there are degrees of ship-upkeep, and I am reaching the conclusion that we are already overdoing it in some ships. Now that we are having to face reduced ships' companies and economy measures in stores, is it fair to the nation that we are taking our economies out of the " war training " side of the Service instead of out of the ship upkeep side ?

I think everyone agrees that with the present economy measures a lower standard must be accepted somewhere, and I suggest that this lower standard must be accepted as regards ship upkeep. After all, we have a Navy in order to show the flag, and if occasion arises, to fight. In peace time seamanlike tasks such as salvage and towage may fall to our lot. If we don't spend adequate time and thought on drills, and adequate stores on the upkeep of material, we shall fall short of our requirements when the test is applied. This question is further affected by the reduced sea-time we do nowadays owing to economy in fuel, and the smaller number of firings owing to economy in ammunition. Since this is the case, we ought to do all the more harbour drills so as to be as efficient as we can be when we do go to sea, and not waste any of the reduced time at our disposal.

When I say that we must accept a lower standard as regards ship- upkeep I don't visualise a ship in which the corners of the mess decks and flats want cleaning, and in which odd socks are to be found behind ventilation trunks-that sort of upkeep is never excusable or acceptable. I consider stores and man-hours' work (which is even more important) should be saved by reducing the amount of bright~tork-polishing it is terribly unproductive labour-and by not spending so much time on such items as preparation of paint surfaces, etc. Few people either know or appreciate whether an enamel surface has been pumice-stoned before and after the flattening was put on, or only before, and those people who think they can tell would, to my mind, be better employed on jobs outside the Navy more suitable to their peculiar talents.

I have amused myself by trying to analyse the percentage of time spent by a seaman on the various jobs he does. I nearly gave it up as hopeless, but have persevered and produced a very inaccurate table, working, more or less, on a capital ship basis. It is no use critics rising in their wrath and confounding me because my figures are very arbitrary and are merely intended as a rough guide; I shall merely have ro agree with what my critics say. Incidentally, when working out this table I was rather reminded of Mr. Punch's marine who, when struggling into his tunic rather late for divisions, said to his pal : " First I'm a blooming housemaid, then a blooming valet, then a

WHEN IS A SEAMAN NOT A SEAMAN ? 687

blooming waiter and now they'll want to know why I 'm late for bteing a blooming soldier ! !"

Before giving my table of percentages I must state my arguments, as the mathematicians have it. Firstly, I a m considering, for con- venience, a man in a Home Fleet ship who is employed on the upper deck. A mess deck sweeper, or any other seaman rating (not a torpedo- man), would produce exalctly the same answer a s regards time spent on drills, but his other occupations would be different. Secondly, I would like to emphasise that I am only considering working hours, i.e., 0600- 1545, less meal hours, on a working day. A n y duties carried out outside these hours will not materially affect these percentages. Thirdly, I have calculated it out on a whole year's work, and have not taken into consideration Sundays, holidays (other than long leave), extra make-and-mends, etc., which again will not materially affect the results.

Now a man's working day is :- 0600-0700 Say in round numbers 7 hours, allowing 0800-1 1 4 j

for stand easy's." 1315-1545

Therefore in one week, omitting Sunday, he will work 4 days a t 7 hours a day and 2 half days of 44 hours each=37 hours.

In a year a man has 48 working weeks (6 weeks leave) so that his yearly hours worked= 1776 hours.

Now part of these 1776 hours are spent a s follows :- (a) Scrubbing decks-0600-0700 daily = 288 hours. (b) Saturday routine-3 hours weekly, i.e., 0800-1145 1,ess

quarters clean guns= 144 hours. (c) Cltearing up decks for divisions, cEeaning brightwork, etc.

(not Saturdays)= 120 hours. (d) Cl'eaning guns-& hour daily = 144 hours. (e) Divisions and P.T. or doubling round (not Saturdays)= IOO

hours (approx .) . (1) General drill-I 2 times a year= 18 hours (approx.). (g) Tricks at sea, part-of-the-watch evolutions, boat-sailing or

pulling and seamanship drills-I hour per week per man (a generous estimate)=@ hours (approx.).

(h) General quarters-12 times a year= 18 hours (approx.). (i) Divisional drills, control drills, firings, etc.-on the average

every man goes for I hour per week throughout the work- i ng year = 48 hours (approx.).

( j ) Landing parties-8 forenoons a year = 24 hours (approx.). NOTE.--Anti-gas drills have been omitted a s they are

nearly always carried out concurrently with some other drill.

688 WHEN IS A SEAMAN NOT A SEAMAN 2

Making out an abstract from these figures we get :-

Ship-up k e e p .

... Scrubbing decks ... 288 hours.

... Saturday routines ... 144 hours.

... Clearing up d,ecks ... 120 hours.

... Cleaning guns ... 144 hours. Total 696 hours.

Divisions and P.T. Total IOO hours.

Drills. ... General drill ... ... 18 hours.

General quarters ... ... ~8 hours. ... Divisional drills, etc. ... 48 hours. ... Tricks a t sea, ,etc. ... 48 hours. ... Landing parties ... 24 hours.

Total 156 hours.

Grand Total 952 hours.

This leaves 824 hours unaccounted for which are spent in varied ways according to the man's job, e.g., painting or refitting work on the upper deck, as sweeper of a gun, flat or mess deck; but which, at any rate, except in the particular case of the few men in training classes (which have been omitted for clarity), are not spent in drills.

Thus the percentage table comes out as follows :- ... ... Ship upkeep ... 39'1% } Total 85.64;

Refitting and miscellaneous ... 46.5% ... Divisions and P.T. ... ... 5.6% ... Drills ... ... ... 8.8%

This looks so startling that many readers (if they exist) will doubtless look for the flaw in the arguments. N o doubt there are many, but none which will, a s far as I can see, vary these percentages by very much.

Of course an argument that many officers will raise against me is that in war-time you would increase the time spent on drills. True, but you cannot train men satisfactorily in a rush-you must teach them slowly and surely throughout their service careers and consequently this argument is fallacious.

A particular case in a category by itself is that of landing parties. These are usually looked upon as the executive officer's curse, since he loses the services of most of his hands for the forenoon, and consequently they get badly neglected. On the other hand I would hazard a guess

WHEN IS A SEAMAN NOT A SEAMAN ? 689

that many of our war plans include the use of landing parties in one way or another, and there is no doubt that, under the present routine, the average landing party would be woefully inefficient (as several writers have recently pointed out in THE NAVAL REVIEW) if it became necessary to employ it against a well-armed enemy. In this particular case it is no use raising the war-time training argument at all, because one or two polishing-up drills would be quite futile; the knowledge gained by years of practice is what is required.

W e may well ask ourselves therefore : is this right? Are we doing our duty by the taxpayer? I have little doubt that our friend the civilian would be shocked if he realised how the sailors he was helping to pay for spent their time.

Surely in these days of economy-economy of effort a s well as of expenditure-it's time we tried to increase our efficiency at the expense, if need be, of our present high standards of ship-upkeep. I think many officers-particularly officers who went to sea during the war- and I should like to hear their views-hold the view that a ship should not be judged by the amount of brightwork she displays and the perfection of her paint surfaces, but by her efficiency in evolutions, firings, preparations for war and general battle efficiency, coupled with the highest degree of cleanliness obtainable, and a reasonable standard of external appearance.

In fact, to put the matter in a nutshell, we must increase the time occupied in drills at the expense, if need be, of time spent on ship- upkeep, or at any rate when it is necessary for us to pull in our horns owing to reduced complements, the time spent on drills must not suffer.

A man-of-war is built to fight, and her men are enlisted to be as efficient as possible in their war-like duties; that is what the taxpayer thinks he is paying for, not for a pseudo yacht, which, when war-service does come, may well be found wanting due to lack of peace-time training of her ship's company. Let us see that we do not fail the people who pay for us so ungrudgingly.

DISCIPLINE AND T H E NON-EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

THE discipline and morale of any service are dependent on everyone in that service, and are the particular charge of the officers. The proper maintenance of discipline and esprit de corps rests on the example and authority of all officers, and their mutual respect one to another. The latter point is very important in a sea service, where the officers of different branches are in close contact and the sharp sub-divisions of regiments and corps are neither desirable nor possible. I t is of little use prolonging the post-mortem on our recent troubles ; the immediate cause is well known, but the form they took is evidence that all is not well. Let us therefore look to the future and enlist the co-operation of all in the maintenance of the discipline of the Fleet which is our care.

One sometimes still finds the attitude that the incorporation of " military " titles in the descriptions of rank of the officers of the non- executive branches is bad for discipline because, those officers not having the authority thereby implied, the titles have become cheapened in consequence.1 I t is suggested, however, that, tenaciously as some may cling to this opinion, the trouble lies rather the other way. Should it not be recognised that times have changed, and more authority be granted to non-executive officers in the control of their departments ?

The present procedure for dealing with defaulters is the legacy of the days of masts and yards. With the exception of the small staffs of the purser (or paymaster) and the surgeon, the entire ship's company were then under the direct control, as well as the command, of the executive officers. The introduction of steam has placed a gradually increasing proportion under the control of the Engineer Officer; and more recently the extension of the responsibilities of the Accountant Officer has multiplied the numbers included in his department. This natural development has brought a large percentage of the ship's company under the control of officers with no inherent disciplinary power.

I t would be mischievous to suggest that any officers other than the executive should possess " military command " ; nevertheless there seems a strong case for a captain to be authorised to delegate to the heads of the engineering and accountant departments certain powers of punish-

There are, of course, two sides to that question ; there have always been many who can call themselves "Captain" but very few, for example, Paymasters-in-Chief.

DISCIPLINE AND THE NON-EXECUTIVE OFFICER. 691

ment over their subordinates in connection with the performance of their duty. This principle is perhaps grudgingly recognised in the powers of minor punishment delegated to the senior engineer, bct these powers, being vested in a junior, and not in the head of the department, so far from being a contribution to discipline may almost be regarded as detrimental thereto. To those unconnected with the Service it must appear inconsistent that the Royal Marine officer can award punishments to those under his command whereas the engineer officer is powerless as regards those under his control.

The powers suggested in the preceding paragraph need not exceed the award of stoppage of leave and extra work for stipulated periods ; but to be of practical use they should extend to petty officers, as so many of the ratings concerned, particularly engine-room ratings, are of that grade. They should be, perhaps, slightly less in degree as well as in scope as compared with those delegated to the second-in-command, whose position must be supported.

I t is felt that it would be for the better government of the Service to enhance in this manner the prestige of the position of officers whose influence and responsibilities are otherwise quite equal to those of Army officers of corresponding rank and employment, and whose contributions to fighting efficiency are in many ways more direct. But, this latter consideration apart, the procedure for minor offences would be simpler and quicker; probably more mild delinquencies would be dealt with, and the Executive Officer's time would not be taken up with other people's petty troubles. I t should also be borne in mind that petty officers of the non-executive branches would be far more inclined to bring the laggards before their own departmental officers ; nowadays if they want a man punished they can either take the man before the officer of the watch themselves-and so cut out their immediate superior officer, which they do not like doing-or they can represent the case to the head of the department, who must confine himself to a verbal lecture or have the offender taken before the officer of the watch as his subordinate petty officer could have done in the first place. The latter procedure must seem to the petty officer a waste of time, and it is a patent reminder to ratings of non-executive branches of the lack of authority and the invidious position of those commissioned officers who control their duties.

But whatever may be done to facilitate the control of the non-executive departments by their own officers it must be realised that the tone of a ship always depends primarily on the officers of the executive branch. By their example is the ship governed, if only because there are more of them. The writer of " The Low Tide of the Royal Navy " in t h

692 DISCIPLINE AND THE NON-EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

May number of THE NAVAL REVIEW mentioned ill considered talk in the wardroom. At the beginning of this article mutual respect of officers one to another was mentioned ; junior executive officers are apt to adopt a very different tone in addressing a non-executive officer of commander's rank to that they employ to a commander. There is far more inclination to familiarity in the presence of wardroom attendants and messengers ; even in fact when they are engaged with their own departmental subordinates. The prestige of all officers must be guarded, and undue public familiarity with elders-even if they are not technically " superiors "- is bad for it.

IN DEFENCE O F MECHANICAL TRAINING.

ALTHOUGH the main part of this article is based upon personal experience, nevertheless the writer believes that it covers the general case. This belief is founded upon numerous discussions carried out with other junior officers, as well as observation, under cond;tions which give complete freedom of expression.

The writer of " Gaps in the Study of Strategy (11) 'I1 would seem to consider that the training of junior officers errs on the side of too much material and too little of the broader aspects of sea warfare. He would wish to curtail engineering and science instruction and increase the time devoted to history and strategy. Surely it must be admitted that the duties of a junior officer in action are mainly concerned \<ith the efficient fighting of material and the handling of his men at their action station. Only by a really intimate technical knowledge can he hope to be able to deal with any breakdown, and it is hoped to show later that it is by this knowledge that he can most readily obtain the respect and get the most out of his men.

It cannot be said at the present time that the technical knowledge of the average O.O.Q. is any better than it ought to be. In fact the maintenance of the material of, for example, the average turret seems to be taken as far as possible out of the hands of the O.O.Q. It is assumed, presumably, that he is incapable of dealing with it himself. The average rating, while rightly resenting interference during the ordinary performance of his duties, is only too eager to turn to his officer in emergency. Whether the officer has the knowledge to deal with the situation depends largely upon his technical training.

The study of strategy, however, can be carried out in the officer's own time, history makes interesting reading, and organised study is unnecessary. Unfortunately at Dartmouth-or this was the case a few years ago-the system is one that does not teach the cadet to work in his own time. Th's crying out for more instruction devoted to strategy is a corollary of the Dartmouth system. At a public school the boy is given so much preparation to do, and has to get it done by next day ; when or how he does it is his own business-he has to produce the results. At Dartmouth he has to work for definite periods, and is debarred from

1 THE NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 2, Vo1. XX., May, 1932. p. 222.

694 I N D E F E N C E O F MECHANICAL TRAINING.

completing his work in his own time. The result is plainly visible when one gets public school and Dartmouth entries working side by side, and more especially those public school entries who were originally axed from Dartmouth. The public school entry selects books to read for his particular subject, and works hard and keenly. The Dartmouth entry at most mugs up the class-books selected for his instruction, but, more probably, regards work out of hours as an admission of mental incapacity, and retains his self-respect by working only in instructional periods. Certainly the executive naval officer, as a class, is definitely mentally lazy. Overcome this attitude, and, with interest aroused by the excellent grounding given by the Junior Officers' War Course, the keen officer will have obtained from lectures, discussions, war games, reading and the study of fleet exercises, with perhaps a Staff Course thrown in, a sufficient knowledge of the higher art of war when his time comes.

Knowledge of material and the practical side of his profession cannot wait ; it is required from the moment the sub-lieutenant receives his commission. All who had the advantage of a training cruiser are unanimous that it provided invaluable training.

To repair this missing link in his educational chain the sea-going cadet and midshipman should have as much practical training as possible, and a considerable amount of time should be devoted to engineering. I t is submitted that this will be of great value to him if he specialises or gains his own command.

Navigation should be within the capabilities of every officer ; yet, except in submarines and to a lesser extent in destroyers, you find few officers who can fix the ship at a moment's notice.

The value of practical and technical training at this period cannot be overstressed. I t is easy enough later on to study the theoretical subjects, but with his commission the young officer must maintain his position and detail his ratings for the practical work. While the skilled or semi-skilled rating expects his officer to understand the job in hand he does not expect him to have the craftsmanship to execute it. Never- theless the officer should have an idea upon how the job should be executed and how long it should take. Engineering training is invaluable here, and, with a good grounding, it is comparatively easy to grasp the working of any kind of machinery. This is especially valuable to an officer in command if he is not to be entirely at the mercy of his engineer officer or other technical enthusiasts.

In " Gaps in the Study of Strategy (11) " we read : " fascinated by the glamour of elaborate machinery . . . we avoid the simplest means that will meet our need." This is only too true, but it is submitted that unless the senior executive officer is mechanically-minded he will not

(I

I N DEFENCE O F MECHANICAL TRAINING. 695

be able to differentiate between the elaborate gadget of the fertile specialist mind and the appliance of solid worth.

Although at Greenwich science is taught which few will need again, the course does provide a polish to the education of the Dartmouth entry, and certainly tunes up the brain for the more practical courses to follow. Unfortunately this tuning is frequently completely wasted. The writer well remembers his disgust at finding that he was expected to learn " Director " from an otherwise excellent rating, who had, however, never received the mathematical education to understand it.

I t is agreed that an attempt is made in the sub-lieutenants' G course, at a time when the theoretical side of his brain is in the majority of cases at its highest pitch, to teach him as if he were an A.B. A little more teaching on armaments and the tactics of the gun would be very desirable at this period. Many find i.t extremely difficult to focus their mind upon a gunner's mate, except for field training and gun drill. Nevertheless some of their teaching, if absorbed, would be of great value later on.

Let us assume that the officer comes to sea with all the technical knowledge he can conveniently hold. Even if he is the " super plumber " it cannot be of any disadvantage to him, and is usually of the greatest advantage in the handling of the ratings with whom he comes in contact.

Admittedly the basis of the present writer's argument is founded upon experience as first-lieutenant of a very small submarine, when in some twenty months he had to deal with only about thirty ratings. However, their small number and close contact (daily conversations were unavoidably overheard) enabled him to make a very intimate study of their point of view. Also, as there was no engineer officer, direct contact was made with the engine-room ratings. Subsequent experience in a battleship and larger submarines has shown that these observations cover the general case as regards the staid ratings.

As regards engine-room ratings, it is interesting to note that in the Lucia affair seamen only were involved ; while at Invergordon it is said- lower deck rumour, it is true-that the stokers were very near to turning to after the seamen had refused duty. The stoker, usually, has a more developed sense of duty and is a quicker worker than his opposite number on the upper deck. He is also usually extremely easy to handle. This is because the branch is inclined to intellectual snobbery. The stoker fancies his capabilities as an E.R.A. and, treated as an intelligent being, will work splendidly.

This is not said in any cynical spirit, because intellectual snobbery is very prevalent ashore in what may be called the " secondary school " class, who would seem to have considerable social influence. As the attitude spreads to the Service there is no reason to suppose that it will

696 I N DEFENCE OF MECHANICAL TRAINING.

result in impaired efficiency : the opposite will occur if suitably handled. Examples of this outlook are often found in Q.O.'s, S.T.'s and L.T.O.'s, and unless the officer has a certain amount of technical understanding he will lose respect. However, his lot is made easier by the willingness, even desire, of these and higher ratings, including artificers, to credit him with greater knowledge than he possesses. But a hypothetical knowledge is not alone sufficient : for while the higher ratings realise their capabilities and limitations, the lower ones are often inclined to assume a know-all attitude, and their statements must be checked.

I t is freely admitted that there are officers who get the utmost out of their men with no technical knowledge, but by sheer charm and personality. I t is considered, however, that these would be even more successful if they could back up their personality with material knowledge ; and, as education increases, their lot becomes more difficult. Incidentally it is amazing to note to what a degree the seaman's mind is educated. The discussions overheard in the mess at sea reach a standard which could only be attained by a very ardent pursuit after knowledge. And even if the arguments and conclusions reached may sometimes be a little staggering in their naivete, nevertheless they frequently reach quite an intellectual level.

As regards the less specialised ratings, the writer of " Brightwork and Efficiency " has undoubtedly hit the nail on the head. The seaman on the whole is a very slow worker, and the reason is that he has so little to do. Any submarine first-lieutenant will agree that it is far easier to keep a boat clean when she is running regularly three times a week than when she spends most of her time in harbour. In the former the crew are constantly exercised at their action stations and every moment available for cleaning is seized upon, frequent voluntary dog-watch work being done to bring the compartment up to " standard." With too much time available for clean ship slackness creeps in ; and, as the same brightwork is aimlessly cleaned, lack of interest develops. The " standard " inevitably drops, games assume a very magnified value, and leave in working hours to play them is even looked upon as a natural prerogative !

The writer is convinced that the sailor enjoys general drill, provided It is competitive. Furthermore, against his principles, he thoroughly enjoys landing for field training. Ghain Tuffeia is certainly immensely popular. And there, as a big-ship officer, one establishes far closer relationship with one's men than otherwise seems possible, and discipline reaches a higher standard. If all the seamen were routed out once a week to land, there would be a great deal of tooth-sucking-at first. There always is when unaccustomed drills are instituted. After once

IN DEFENCE O F MECHANICAL TRAINING. 697

or twice, amazingly soon, the innovation is regarded as a routine. Similarly, divisional drill is popular, at any rate upon power-worked mountings. There must frequently be times in the middle of the week when " clean ship " achieves no object. If these occasions can be cut out, far better give a make-and-mend, so that when the sailor has to work at his cleaning station he does so at full pressure ; he will cease to be the slowest working wage-earner on record, while continuing to possess all those qualities which make him the thoroughly good fellow that he is.

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE S.O.S.

WHAT is the S.O.S. ? What happens there and why do naval officers attend the School? These questions, which may have occurred to somme people, I will try and answer.

The S.O.S. is the Senior Army Officers' School at Sheerness, and its functions are briefly-

I . T o teach officers how to administer a unit. 2 . Exchange of ideas between officers of different branches of

th,e Army. 3. 7'0 teach officers how to teach. 4. T o inculcate sound tactical principles.

S o much for the W a r Office ideas as to the functions of the School. Some of the officers who attend are inclined, rightly or wrongly, to hold other views. They are of opinion that it is for the purpose of weeding out those to whom in due course a bowler hat will be presented instead of the brass hat of the colonel. I hardly feel competent to express an opinion on this view. .\t the conclusion of the course, confidential reports on the officers are sent to the W a r Office, and I should think that it is very rare for an officer unfavourably reported on at the S.O.S. to be promoted. On the other hand, a good report may just tip the scale in doubtful cases.

So much for the function. Now for the personnel. The Officers consist of 34 Majors, 2 Royal Marine Officers, 2 Royal Air Force Officers, and 2 Captains R.N. These are the " students " and the staff are ' I instructors "-not " demonstrators."

The students have to work-with a capital W-for most of the ten weeks' course. All live in the S.O.S. Mess, and I cannot wish a naval officer a pleasanter ten weeks than living and working with these 38 fellow students.

Of course the naval officers are really interested spectators. But they should derive great benefit from three sources from attending the School :-

From the majority of the lectures and visits. From the discussion with the military officers of subjects of

mutual interest. From learning to speak a " Common Language."

SOME IMPRESSIONS O F T H E S.O.S. 699

I t is optional for the naval officers to live in the mess. Although to do so means forfeiting all allowances, I advise them to d o so if they want to get th,e full benefits of the course.

THE VVORK. T h e main features of the work are :-

LECTURES.

LECTURES BY STUDENTS.

VISITS TO OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS.

TACTICAL EXERCISES.

I will give a description of some of these.

I should like to single out a f e ~ ~ for special mention :- Unit Administration. O n this subject there were a lot of lectures,

such a s " Discipline," " Messing," " Regimental Funds," " Double- entry book-keeping." Every detail of the internal administration of a unit was dealt with. Some of the tasks with which a Commanding Officer in the -1rmy is saddled are rather surprising to a naval officer accustomed to the co-operation of an efficient accountant staff. It would appear that in addition to the qualities of a Marlborough, he must possess those of a Joseph Lyons and a Plender.

It is worth mentioning here that the majority of the officers in the course had already commanded units a t one time or another, many of them during the difficult war years. In spite of this, there was general agreement a s to the great value of these lectures and there was little crit~cism that well-known country was being traversed.

Personally thmese lectures appealed to me strongly, a s I think that we in the Navy could do with something on the same lines. Take the case of a commander appointed a s executive officer of a b ig ship. I t is long odds against his having previously carried out such 7. orl:, and even longer odds against his getting a second such job. Thermefore his administration must be to a large extent experimental. Again with so many staff and specialist jobs (the latter very much " full time "), many officers have been out of touch with such work for years. I suggest that the article, " 1,etter on the Divisional System," in the August number of THE N ~ v ~ L REVIEW, is a proof of the necessity for something on these lines.

Therefore I should like to see the experience of many executive officers pooled and codified, and handed out in the form of lectures followed by discussions. I don't think manuals are any good in this case, because discussions after the lectures are essential. M y idea would be for all officers on promotion to commander to undergo a

70° SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE S.O.S.

course which would includ'e parts of the present tactical and technical courses with the addition of the lectures above mentioned.

Courts iVIartia1. Procedure and Hints. These lectures \\ere given by the Judge Advocate and were full of good meat. H'ere again is a subject on which lectures would be of value to an officer when he first enters the zone from which members of a court martial are usually drawn. Ptersonally, before the first court on which I sat, I feverishly read the Manual of Court Martial Procedur'e and did not find it very invigorating.

Lecture by the Military Secretary. I hope 1 am not asking too much from the credulity of my readers when I state that tlhis officer travelled down from London, gave a detailed description of the way his department deals with promotions, appointments and honours, invited (and answered) questions on any subject connected with his department, anld gave a cordial invitation to come and see him at the W a r Office.

,\s regards his department, the Military Secretary deals with all officers irrespective of rank except those in certain technical branches. These latter are dealt with by the heads of their branches in much the same way as " G " and " T " Officers are dealt with in Excellent and Vernon.

Combined Operatio~zs. Lectures and Exercises. These, which vere dealt with from the military point of view, were very interesting. As, in the future, every operation in which the Army takes part mill be a " Combined operation," I should like to have had more of them.

I must say that military understanding of the possibilities and limitations of naval support has advanced a long way since those Gallipoli days when naval flat-trajectory guns were asked to shoot down wells and into the bottoms of deep holes. Military understanding has advanced in another direction, too. It now considers that, for an opposed landing, open ships' boats should never even be thought of for landing troops. The Army looks to the Admiralty to produce some type of landing craft more suitable for landing troops in these days of wlell-concealed machine guns.

I should like to stress one more point before leaving this subject. Those military officers who had taken part in recent years in even very minor combined operations seem to have benefited very much from the naval point of view. Therefore let us take (or make) every opportunity for carrying out such exercises, even on the smallest scale. Just embark a battalion, or a company, or a platoon for 24 hours. Even that will teach both Services a lot.

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE S.O.S. 701

LECTURES BY STUDENTS. These were obligatory, and most of them were well worth attending.

There was a time limit of half an hour for reach lecture. Among the subjects dealt with were :--" Soldiering in Burma," " Getting water in the Syrian Desert," " The Chinese Language," " How a Regimental Depot is run," " Tank Tactics." This shows the width of interest catered for. These student lecturmes were given to the group to which the student belonged (there were thr,ee groups). The naval officers, on the other hand, are invited to give a lecture to the whole school. The military officers are intensely interested in naval affairs, and a very appreciative audience can be counted on. I need hardly say that under these circumstances the naval officer should produce the very best he possibly can.

VISITS TO OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS.

These visits have to be limited to places within easy realch of Sheerness, as the visit and return have to be done in one day. We visited R . E . Headquarters at Chatham, the R .A .F. Establishment at Eastchurch, the Small Arm School at Hythe, and the Tank Establish- ment near Romney ; also thme School of Education near Hythe. We embarked on this last-named visit with some misgiving, fearing boredom, but it turned out to be very interesting. I was struck most with the fact that, in this school, officers are taught how to deliver a lecture. I am afrai'd that with us the fact that an officer may, or may not, be a capable lecturer is not always considered. W e have all had the painful experience of sitting through an hour listening to an expert who knew so much but had so little power of passing his knowledge on to others.

There were about a dozen young officers undergoing a two months' course at this School-learning to teach in fact. They leave the school well qualified to supervise the educational activities in their units.

It must be remembered that the Army has far fewer " Certified Teachers " than we have, by which I mean officers corresponding to our instructor officers and schoolmasters.

While on this subject of visits, there is one visit which it is up to the naval officers to arrange, namely, a visit to a man-of-war. This is not always easy, as at certain times of the year there are no ships in Sheerness or Chatham worth visiting. But if it can possibly be arranged it will be extremely popular, and (this will need much tact !) if it can be hinted to the commanding officer of the ship what extremely good arrangements some of the establishments make when visited, it

702 SOME IMPRESSIONS O F THE S.O.S.

will be all to the good. As regards these arrangements, I hand the prize to the Sappers. When we visited them, on the typed programme issued to each student occurred this item :-11.15 " Light lunch." And at I I .IS, after )having been shown some bridging work, we found, in a hut nearby, a pleasant array of sherry and cakes. Good organisation ! !

I gathered that these were among the most valuable parts of the Course. It being summer, they were certainly the pleasantest.

Here is a specimen day so spent . . . . At ogoo hours we embark in cars, four to a car, each of us armed with maps and sheets of typescript giving us particulars of the exercise. Let us assume that we in our car are part of a divisional staff of a " Redland " Army retiring from Canterbury to Chatham. W e are pursued by a " Rlueland " Army and we must fight a delaying action in the neighbourhood of, say, Ilarrietsham. Our expedition is to settle where we will make this stand. All the other car loads are doing the same, and send in independent solutions. Wse wander about the lovely Kentish countryside discussing machine-gun posts, tank approaches and divisional H.Q.'s. I am not quite correct here, though. Practically no discussion is required as regards the location of divisional H.Q.'s. This is always in an Inn, so all that has to be done is to select the Inn. This is settled about lunch time. If there is any obvious feature in our terrain, you find everyone there, little hills black with students masquerading as divisional staffs and discussing, all together, the points of the exercise.

I have mentioned these tasks very briefly, but as a matter of fact they have to be gonme into in great detail. Of course the naval officer is only a looker-on to a large ,extent. But one thing particularly impressed me: when the Staff solution of the problem is given out, the reasons for their decision on the many details seemed so very obvious. 'I'his would se'em to indicate that the one 'essential for the commander of a small unit is the possession of Common Sense. Possessing that, and using it, it seemed he could not go far wrong. But perhaps in my ignorance I underrate his difficulties.

Having explored thoroughly the terrain (this is a military expression I picked up! It can't be translated, but everyone knows what it means), we return to Sheerness, leaving with great regret (in the case of one o~f us at leasit) the lovely meadows an'd hedgero\vs. W e return, but much still remains to be done. Each officer of the group of four now has a separate order, or orders, to draft. Here are four specimen jobs undertaken by the four members of eaclh group :-

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE S.O.S. 7O3

( a ) Orders by the C.O. of the brigade acting as Dear guard. (b) Orders by the O.C. Divisional R .E . as regards delaying the

pursuit by destruction of bridges, etc. (c) Orders for special anti-tank measures to be adopted. (d) Orders for the two batterimes of 18 pdrs. and two batteries of

light howitzers which are supporting the troops occupying a certain position.

Each of these tasks means several hours' work, and delving into various little handbooks.

That is a Tactical Exercise.

I have mentioned that, at the S.O.S., naval and military officers learn to speak a Common Language. This really means that the naval officer tries to grapple with a language composed almost entirely of full stops and capital letters. Abbreviations arme food, drink and fodder to the Soldier. As an example tak~e these short paragraphs which a military friend tells me are quite sense and possible orders :--

T o I.R.W.F. from 8 1nf.Bde. Pl'ease arrange for O.C. I.R.W.F. to report at X roads

L371812 at 1030 to meet D.-I.D.V.S., D..Z.D.O.S. and ,I .D.M.S. aaa. B.M. and R.M.G.O. will accompany him and will decide site for M.V.S. S.A.A. reserve A.D.S. and R .A.P. aaa.

D.A.G., D.A.P.M., and D.J.A.G. will attend G.C.M. on I .O.M. travelling bv I .W .T. aaa. G.O.C. requires full report for C.I.G.S. by D.R.L.S. at once.

What does this all mean ? Readers of this article (if there are any) may try and translate it for themselves. Perhaps the Editor will present a Prize for the first correct solution sent in.'

VISIT OF THE C.I.G.S.

At the conclusion of each course thse Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself makes a point of visiting thme School and addressing the students. In the course which I attended a lecture was in progress when he arrived. W e all stood up as he 'entered, and the lecturer then proceeded, with his audience augmented by the presenoe of a very distinguished expert. At the conclusion of the l,ecture, the C.I.G.S. took the field, or rather, thre platform. I was told that he usually takes this opportunity of giving the students his ideas on current military

1 Certainly: a Field Service Pocket Book 1932 will, I think, make an appropriate prize to the first naval solver of the riddle.-How. EDITOR.

7O4 SOME IMPRESSIONS O F THE S.O.S.

matters of interest. On this occasion, commencing with the somewhat disturbing statement that on principle he disapproved of the School (on the ground that it should be thme function of senior officers and not schools to teach officers general military subjects), he went on to discuss questions of training.

His visit and address gave me the in~pression of a close personal touch between the head of the Army and his officers. Accessibility, in fact.

I am not goling tto discuss the comfort of the armchairs or the menu for lunch, but to mention a custom new to me. In the S.O.S., and I am informled throughout the Army, there is no " treating " or " cutting for drinks," among members of the mess.

Opinions may vary as to the desirability of an order to this effect; perhaps it should be left to the members of a mess to decide. But there can be no doubt as to one result. Much reduced wine bills.

Sociability does not seem to suffer, either, nor hospitality, as of course it only. affects the members of the mess. I should like to see the scheme tried at the naval barracks and afloat.

l 've tried to give an idea of the activities of the S.O.S. My brief remarks niust not be taken as a description of " Life in the Army." I wish I had an opportunity of sampling that also. But I see little chance of it. And more's the pity.

In these times more than ever before should the Navy and Army know as much as possible about each other. When, or if, the next war comes we shall fight together, so the more we get to know each other in peace time the bett'er.

Only to-day, in reading a book on the W a r of L4merican Independ- ence, I find on a single page two refe~ences to the embarkation of troops in men-of-war as part complement to fill shortage in seamen and marines. Real Combined Operations ! !

In peace, couldn't we do anything on the same lin,es? S o a final word to those who may be in a position to act on it . . . . Learn to know the Army.

AVIATION-ITS CAPABILITIES TO-DAY AND

TO-MORROW FOR PEACE AND WAR.

A PAPER read at the Royal Naval War College during the Winter Session, 1931-32, under this heading was published in the August number of THE NAVAL REVIEW. The paper deals with both civil and service flying, and seeks to show that in neither branch is there scope for much further development. So far as the civil side is concerned such views do no particular harm, since the evidence of progress which can be seen on every hand is sufficient to discount the pseudo-scientific theories which the lecturer puts forward. On the service side, however, the lecturer endeavours to show that the work which the Air Force can do has been much exaggerated. He considers " war in the air as popularly conceived to be a phantom of the imagination," air superiority in combined operations to be unnecessary, air control of semi-civilised countries to be of doubtful value, and suggests that the futuristic outlook of the Air Staff " is throwing a veil of obscurity and uncertainty over the whole subject of modern warfare." He refers to the existence of the Air Force as " a vexed question," and suggests that it is time that a full enquiry was held to determine the validity of Air Force pretensions.

The lecturer so obviously holds extreme views that his opinions would be received with reserve by any prudent listener. There may nevertheless be many officers with no first-hand knowledge of the problems involved who may be inclined to accept the views which he puts forward, and to assume that the arguments of a lecturer at the War College would be based on ascertained and well-substantiated facts.

The lecturer appears, however, to be most imperfectly informed on practically every aspect of the subject, yet he sets out to show that the Air Force is holding up progress and that its claims will not stand critical examination. There is nothing to be said against honest differences of opinion and honest attempts to get at the facts of any problem, but an ill-informed attack such as this, which bristles with inaccuracies, with false premises and false deductions, may do great and entirely unnecessary harm to the relations between the services. I t would be impossible in the space of one article to point out all the inaccuracies and fallacies in the lecture ; the lecturer covers every phase of air operations, in every

706 AVIATION-ITS CAPABILITIES TO-DAY

case reaches conclusions which would only be justified if full evidence from every source had been examined, yet produces no such evidence in support of his opinions.

In order to answer the lecturer's main contention that the activities of the Air Force should be enquired into, it would be sufficient to prove that the enquiry for which he asks has in fact taken place ; but to limit the reply to this would be to leave unanswered all the other suggestions which the lecturer makes, which can easily be shown to be either false or based on a complete misapprehension of the real facts. I propose, therefore, first to suggest answers to a few of the points which he raises, and then to outline the facts regarding the status of the Air Force.

WAR IN THE AIR. The lecturer opens the section of his lecture dealing with service

aviation by asking his audience to believe that, since no further major improvements in the performance of aircraft are to be expected, " war in the air as popularly conceived becomes a phantom of the imagination." In replying to this statement one is met by the difficulty of deciding what is meant by the words " as popularly conceived." Does he refer to sensational newspaper articles which foretell the material destruction of entire cities in a single night, which every thinking person knows to be impossible, or does he refer to the views of the Air Staff as set out in the Royal Air Force War Manual ? This latter must surely be his intention, since he is discussing the Air Force as a separate service ; but he brings no evidence to show that the Air Staff view of what may happen in a " war in the air" is exaggerated.

The lecturer's further argument is difficult to follow because, having stated that there is no such thing as " war in the air," he then says that " the effect within the radius of operation will be largely a matter of the number of machines which can be built and the number of pilots who can be trained to take them into the air." Exactly-it is entirely a question of numbers and radius of operation ; and, unfortunately for us, London and many other important centres in this country and the Empire are within the radius of action of aircraft operating from possible enemy bases.

The lecturer asks us to believe that attacks by these aircraft are not of sufficient importance to affect the conduct of a war. Let us examine a few facts. In the last war Germany regarded the attack on London as a divzrsion which would force us to detach considerable air forces from France, where the fight for " air superiority " was being waged. The number of aircraft which the Germans set aside for the attack on this country never exceeded 41, and for the greater part of the time the

AND TO-MORROW FOR PEACE AND WAR. 7O7

squadrons were much below strength. Yet these aircraft, although their efforts were never concentrated against any one objective, were able to cause serious alarm in this country. During the whole of the war only 452 loads of bombs were carried across our coast, amounting in all to 74.7 tons. These killed 857 and injured 2,050 people.

That was the position 14 years ago. Should we ever unfortunately find ourselves a t war with any great Power within air range of this country there can be no doubt that the great majority of his aircraft would be used against us, not in tens but in hundreds. Suppose such force was given the aim of paralysing our war effort, could anyone view the possible effect with equanimity ? What would be the position of our southern dockyard ports, of Woolwich Arsenal and of the munitions industry in the Midlands ? Again in the Mediterranean could we maintain our trade in face of a combined attack by aircraft and surface vessels ? But these are only the lesser contingencies to be feared ; what of London ? If we attempt to bring naval-economic pressure to bear on an enemy people, can anyone doubt that they would reply, and be perfectly justified in doing so, by bringing air-economic pressure to bear on us by attempting to interfere with the working of the London Docks, and other public services vital to the maintenance of London's population.

Far from war in the air being a " phantom of the imagination " no reasonable person can doubt that air forces exist to-day-our own is fifth in the world-which unless countered are capable of exerting a direct and in some instances a preponderating influence in war. If this is not so I would ask the lecturer why the resolution which marked the end of the first session of the Disarmament Conference devoted so much attention to the problem of limiting the effects of bombardment from the air.

There is no doubt that the ability to attack objects from the air is extremely inconvenient to many nations, and at first sight to none more than ourselves. But it is no cure to hide our heads in the sand and say that the menace does not exist, any more than it is to comfort ourselves with the thought that it will be all right because anti-aircraft guns will shoot the aircraft down ; unfortunately neither theory nor practice give any real foundation for this belief, as I endeavour to show in the next section.

The lecturer asks this question and proceeds to answer it as follows : " I believe the difficulties of defence against air by the air are enormous, and that such success as is achieved is mostly of the nature of inter- cepting bombers on their way home after their attack has been completed."


He then proceeds to suggest that the anti-aircraft gun is the real counter. I will return later to the arguments which he uses in support of this contention, but first I would like to suggest that the counter to large- scale bombing attack is not, and is unlikely ever to be, provided by purely defensive measures. I t will be apparent to anyone who has studied war that a defensive attitude which attempts to parry blows as they are struck can never be successful, if only for the reason that the morale of the defenders will not withstand this sort of war for long. The only certain defence in the air is to strike back, to attack: the enemy so hard that he cannot spare the forces necessary for a large scale offensive ; this is not theory but the practical outcome of four years gruelling experience in France.

Perhaps a description of what actually happened during the war would help to explain this point. When the war broke out there was little except theory to go upon, and attempts were made to obtain security by means of patrols of fighter aircraft. I t was soon found, however, that these were ineffective: firstly, because a defensive system such as this handed over the initiative to the enemy, who could deliver his attacks at the time and place and in the strength which suited him best ; secondly, because with the short endurance of fighters it was impossible to maintain more than a small proportion of the defensive force in the air throughout the day, while the speed with which attacks took place prevented reinforcements from being sent up in time ; and thirdly, because the attackers were frequently able to conceal their approach by clouds or by great height. The next stage was to send fighters over the enemy country on " offensive patrols" to attack all enemy machines seen either in the air or on the ground. But this method, although an improvement, was not sufficient to prevent the enemy from continuing to take offensive action. His machines were generally able to avoid our patrols, and it was soon found that fighting only took place by mutual consent. I t was therefore necessary to find some means of forcing the enemy to fight under conditions advantageous to ourselves, and this was done by bombing objectives of such importance that the enemy was compelled to defend them. In France during 1918 such objectives were important railway junctions or the munitions industry in the Rhine Valley. The effects of such attacks were two-fold : firstly, they forced the enemy to build more fighters, and therefore reduced the number of bombers at his disposal; secondly, they made him divert his bombing offensive on to our aerodromes-an unprofitable method when war production was at its height.

Nothing which has happened since the war has altered in any way the principle that the best defence against air attack is a vigorous counter-

AND TO-MORROW FOR PEACE AND WAR. 709

offensive which will paralyse the enemy's power for the offensive. A proportion of defensive aircraft will be required, but the number provided should be the minimum necessary to prevent those bombing aircraft which the enemy can muster from delivering their attacks unopposed. This form of offensive strategy must surely appeal to naval officers, for was it not Drake who, faced with the problem of stopping the Spanish Armada, urged that " with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own [the Spanish] coast than a great many more will do here at home " ? If the lecturer will turn to the current Air Force List he will see that the present composition of the Home Defence Air Force is 28 bomber and only 13 fighter squadrons, yet he omits all mention of the bombers.

To turn now to the question of anti-aircraft gunnery, the lecturer says : " . . . The problem for the anti-aircraft gunner is constant- the aeroplane cannot armour itself, and the selection of the target limits the height of attack-small increases of speed do not affect the problem. Anti-aircraft gunnery has much improved of recent years, and every improvement in the future will be a net gain to the defence which it will not be possible for the aircraft to counter." The lecturer evidently believes that anti-aircraft guns are even now the best counter to large- scale bombing attack, and that in time they will be able to prevent such attack ; but before accepting this as proved, the average person would probably like to examine the evidence rather more closely and to see how much this conclusion is based on known facts and how much on supposition. Firstly, what is known ? By 1918 the Germans had massed great numbers of anti-aircraft guns along the Western Front, and particularly on the Belgian coast, where they had installed several batteries of high-velocity naval guns in permanent works. The shooting of these guns was extremely accurate, but they did not prevent our aircraft from operating over Belgium, nor were the great concentrations of anti- aircraft guns at other points on the front any more successful. The concentration of fire was often such that it would have been a legitimate conclusion that no aircraft could pass through such a zone of fire, had it not been for the fact that aircraft frequently did pass through. I t was also a commonplace for aircraft to land having been pierced by several shell fragments without having received any vital damage. Pilots soon found that, by making judicious alterations of course, height or speed, they could avoid the worst effects of the fire.

The position in 1918 was that under the best weather conditions anti- aircraft fire was generally unpleasant, occasionally dangerous, but never a real bar to operations of war. What has happened since then to alter this position ? There have been two major changes, on the one side the

71° AVIATION-ITS CAPABILITIES TO-DAY

introduction of better fire control instruments and on the other the increased performance of aircraft. The lecturer dismisses the latter as of no importance and assumes the former to have revolutionised the whole science of anti-aircraft gunnery. In order to see whether this is true it is necessary to obtain some idea of the elements of the problem. This is in essence one of interception : that is to say the gunner has to burst the shell at the point which he thinks the aeroplane will have reached after making allowance for the time of flight of the shell. In order to decide whether this problem is easy or difficult a few figures are necessary. A modern aeroplane will cruise at I jo m.p.h., or 220 feet per second, and present a vulnerable area (to anything except a direct hit) of about 50 square feet. A modern anti-aircraft shell of the largest type likely to be used on land will certainly not have a danger zone extending more than 70 feet in front of the point of burst and about half this distance on either side : and it will throw no fragments backwards, so that all shell which burst over are lost. The time of flight of the shell to a target at I 5,000 feet will be not less than 40 seconds at extreme range and about 10 seconds when the aircraft is in the most favourable position. These figures mean that at extreme range the aircraft will travel 8,800 feet while the shell is in the air and will have to avoid a danger zone only 70 feet across. Even under favourable conditions of range the aircraft will travel some 2,200 feet while the shell is in the air. I t must be obvious that quite small alterations of course, height or speed, or a combination of all three, will take the aircraft to a point other than that at which the shell will burst, and the pilot is free to make such alterations except during the last half minute of his approach to the target. Even this time has been reduced by half in the latest pattern bomb sights.

Now what is the extent of the two major changes which have taken place since the War ? For the gun, the production of a highly ingenious control system has done no more than predict where the gun should shoot on what should almost invariably be the false assumption that the aircraft will maintain a constant course, height and speed while the shell is in the air. For the aircraft there has been a great increase in performance, not just " small increases of speed " which the lecturer says do not affect the problem, but an increase in the nature of jo per cent.

Summing up these two post-war developments I think that an impartial judge would be struck by the fact that the " improvements " in anti-aircraft gunnery have done nothing to reduce the time of flight of the shell, which is the crux of the whole problem. Until this is solved the increasing performance of aircraft is making the anti-aircraft gunners' problem more and more difficult. Unfortunately, the real nature of the problem is seldom apparent during target practices because for reasons

AND TO-MORROW FOR PEACE AND WAR. 711

of safety the target must be towed on an almost constant course, while the speed range obtainable and the rate of climb are very much less than those of modern aircraft. But even under these extremely artificial conditions hits are never very frequent.

Before leaving this point I would like to touch on one other aspect of the problem. I t is this-that there are a great many days in the year- in this country perhaps the majority-during which aircraft can conceal their approach from the ground by flying in or above clouds. Assuming, however, perfect conditions of visibility, there is still the question of the number of guns necessary to defend a large number of points, all of which can be attacked from any direction. I wonder if the lecturer has worked out what this purely passive defence would cost in men and money, and, having distributed his fixed defences so as to obtain some protection everywhere, how he would fare if the enemy elected to concentrate his entire force on one or two objectives at a time.

To sum up. The lecturer appears to pin his faith on the power of the anti-aircraft gun, to doubt the ability of the fighter, and to neglect altogether the bombing counter-offensive. Yet if he were given command of an Air Force in a campaign, I have not the slightest doubt that contact with realities would convince him, as it has convinced all those who have been faced with the problem in the past, that the only counter to large- scale bombing attack is a vigorous counter offensive.

Some measures of passive defence are necessary, and these must include anti-aircraft guns; but practical experience not only of air war, but of all forms of war, gives no indication that these can be sufficient in themselves.

The lecturer, having discussed the scale on which he considers bombing operations are feasible, goes on to say that we should now " . . . be able to clarify our views considerably as to the extent of the participation of Air Forces in wars overseas and the degree to which they would be able to take themselves to the scene of o$erations, and there maintain themselves and $reserve their own secarity." (My italics.)

But why should the Air Force be expected to maintain itself and preserve its own security '2 The Navy has long since learnt to rely on the Army for the security of its bases, and the Army on the Navy for its communications. Similarly an Air Force overseas will require land forces for its protection, and will rely on naval forces to keep open the routes by which it will be maintained.

In the past we have been most successful in our wars overseas when the Navy and Army worked together as the " blade and hilt of one


weapon." Now we have three components to the weapon ; but while the new one has increased its reach and given it much additional penetration, it is still necessary that all three should play their parts.

" CONTROL WITHOUT OCCUPATION." The views expressed by the lecturer under this head show that he

has unfortunately failed to grasp the principles underlying the use of aircraft in the control of semi-civilised countries. The lecturer dismisses the whole problem in two short paragraphs. In the first he remarks that the extent to which the policy of " control without occupation " such as that exercised in Iraq and Aden can be carried out " seems to be largely dependent on the attitude of those controlled." In the second paragraph he shows even more clearly how little he realises the true situation, and I will quote it in full. He says : " In normal times the population of this country is controlled admirably by the police ; but if a revolution occurred, some more positive control by armed forces, capable of defending themselves as well as controlling the situation, would be found essential. The provision of the necessary armed forces to support the Air Force may, in certain circumstances, prove extremely difficult, especially as revolts are peculiarly apt to occur when armed forces are tied up elsewhere. . . . ,,

The first point to notice is that the problem with which we are faced is not the control of the population of this country or of any other civilised country in which the population is concentrated in large towns connected by roads and railways. It is the control of " wild men in wild places " in countries where there are no communications and where fighting is a recognised pastime. The control of these tribes has been one of the great problems which this country has had to face during the last 50 years ; it is the problem of the Pax Britannica. Before the war the only method of quelling a disturbance was to send a column of troops into the rebel area. Such expeditions were in those days dignified by the name of campaigns and cost several millions of pounds and a large number of casualties, but there was no alternative and the cost had to be faced.

Since the War the problem has become very much more difficult. On the North-West Frontier, not only are the tribes now armed with modern rifles, but Congress agitation is acting as a ferment which runs from end to end of the Frontier and provides a link connecting all the disaffected elements. At Aden we now have the problem of defending a land frontier some 250 miles long against an independent and powerful Arab chief. Finally in Iraq and Transjordan we have two entirely new commitments, the former entailing control of the mountain tribes

AND TO-MORROW FOR PEACE AND WAR. 7I3

of Kurdistan as well as the protection of the Southern Frontiers against raids from the desert. Yet in spite of all these factors there have been no large military punitive campaigns during the last 10 years, and the reason, which is clear to anyone who will study the history of these years, is that air-force control has rendered such campaigns unnecessary. In order to appreciate the truth of this we must see how this system of control works. Under normal conditions control is exercised by the political authorities by means of armed police who are capable of dealing with minor disturbances and acts of brigandage. In the East, however, troubles break out with little warning, and some military force is necessary to back up the political authorities. The problem is-what form shall it take ? If it is to consist mainly of infantry it must either be scattered in small detachments throughout the country, when each is liable to be cut off, or if it is centralised it may take weeks to reach the scene of action, by which time the trouble will almost certainly have increased out of all proportion to its small beginnings. If the revolt takes place in summer it may even be necessary to delay action until the cooler weather. Quite apart from these difficulties it was found, first in Iraq and Transjordan and later in Aden, that the cost of military garrisons of the necessary size made this form of control impracticable.

Aircraft, on the other hand, give the political authorities a weapon with which they can strike instantly at any disaffected area and clear up the trouble before it has had time to spread ; they have a weapon which is economical to use and to which the tribesmen have no reply. An obvious corollary to this form of control is that the bases from which aircraft operate shall be adequately guarded, and for this purpose ground forces are necessary and are provided as part of every scheme of air control.

These secure bases are as necessary for aircraft as they are for a fleet, but they only call for a small proportion of the forces which would be necessary if the political authorities had to rely on slow-moving infantry to strike at the tribes. I t is therefore difficult to understand what the lecturer can have had in mind when he says : " The provision of the necessary armed forces to support the Air Force may in certain circumstances prove extremely difficult, especially as revolts are peculiarly apt to occur when armed forces are tied up elsewhere."

Another great advantage of aircraft is that they do not become committed in any particular operation, but can concentrate in a few hours against a new trouble. Aircraft that quelled a rising in Northern Kurdistan in 1923 were tackling a revolt in the Euphrates a few days later, while during the 1930 troubles on the North-West Frontier aircraft were switched from one disturbed area to another as the occasion demanded.


The fears which the lecturer expresses might have been legitimate 10 years ago, but to state such views to-day shows a real ignorance of the facts. For those who would like these facts a great deal of information will be found in Chapter VII of Captain Liddell Hart's recent book " The British Way in Warfare,'jl in which he has marshalled the published facts and shown in the clearest possible way the reasons for the success of " control without occupation." I would particularly ask the lecturer to read this chapter and to tell us whether he considers it a fair presenta- tion of the case, or whether we must assume that, because Captain Liddell Hart's researches have made him an enthusiastic advocate of "Air Control," he must therefore be considered one of those " Technical Journalists " whose views are biased.

" TROOP CARRYING."

The lecturer suggests that as aircraft become simpler to operate and maintain they may come to be recognised in the same light as other forms of transport and be capable of operation by the personnel under the direction of the service concerned. He instances the conveyance of troops from Egypt to Cyprus, and says that the aircraft used " were essentially a form of military transport for which, if a necessity exists, the military organisation should allow in their transport plans." The suggestion is therefore that in order to avoid what the lecturer earlier described as an overlapping of functions, troop-carrying aircraft should be taken away from the Air Force and handed over to the Army. At first this may seem a reasonable suggestion, but let us examine the facts.

The first point to note is that the movement of troops by air is not a frequent occurrence ; it has taken place on perhaps half-a-dozen occasions in the last 10 years, secondly troop-carrying aircraft are very expensive and cannot therefore be provided in large numbers in peace time. Look- ing at the situation as it exists to-day we find that troop carrying is only one of a number of duties undertaken by the Air Force bomber transport squadrons. These squadrons are provided primarily to maintain Air Force units which are operating away from a base, and for conveying the personnel and special stores for squadrons which are being moved as reinforcements along the Empire air routes, as for example between Iraq, India and Singapore. They are also of great value as heavy bombers and particularly for bombing at night.

I t will be seen, therefore, that the greater part of the duties of these squadrons is in connection with purely Air Force work, and by way of example it may be mentioned that the squadron which flew the troops to Cyprus was within a few months of that date engaged in supplying

lReviewed on pages 794-800 of this issue.


an Air Force detachment in the Western Sudan, and in taking part in an air exercise in the Aden Protectorate.

The recent move of a battalion from Egypt to Iraq by air is however an even better illustration of what the lecturer's suggestion would mean. This move required the entire resources in bomber transport aircraft of the Middle East and Iraq Commands ; so that to put the policy he advocates into force it would have been necessary to duplicate these squadrons, and we should then have seen the Army conveying a battalion in Army aircraft, while the Air Force, who at that moment had no operations on hand, would have had no employment for their squadrons, which it should be noted could not be reduced in numbers even if the troop- carrying commitments were withdrawn.

The lecturer suggests that such a system would avoid " overlapping," but to the ordinary person it must surely look like an uneconomical over-provision of forces which would only be justified if there was no such thing as co-operation between the services. Since this is a con- tingency which need not be seriously considered, the present system by which these very expensive aircraft are available to undertake several duties is surely the best.

The lecturer's views on this subject are sufficiently interesting to be worth quoting in full (p. 5 2 2 ) . He says : " The mobility of aircraft, judged by speed, is certainly very great ; but when the transport of fuel, stores, munitions and ratings is concerned, the ultimate mobility does not appear to much exceed that of the corresponding land or sea transport unless uneconomical [my italics] concentrations of the necessary material are made in advance at all places where concentrations of force are thought to be necessary."

It is difficult to understand why concentrations of air force material should be considered uneconomical when concentrations of naval material -oil fuel reserves, dockyard facilities, etc.-are universally recognised as essential to mobility. In actual practice the value of the air force stores which must be kept in order to ensure the mobility of squadrons is not great, and in many instances the requirements can be met out of the ordinary working stocks of a command, supplemented by such personnel and equipment as can be carried in bomber transport aircraft. The air routes which now run from Cairo through Iraq and India to Singapore, and from Cairo to South and West Africa, enable squadrons to be moved rapidly to a scene of trouble. Much remains to be done in organising these routes, and in linking them up with this country, but the establishment of depots on the small scale required by air forces


is an exceedingly cheap method of securing the mobility without which real economy of force is impossible.

The lecturer twice states that he has " purposely refrained from discussing the vexed question of the separate Air Ministry and Air Force . . ." . But it is clear from the whole tenor of his lecture that he doubts whether there are adequate reasons for a separate Air Force, and considers that the time has come when the present organisation should be enquired into. I want to show beyond any doubt that far from its being a " vexed question " which is due for an enquiry, the fullest enquiry has already taken place, and that the present organisation of three services represents the settled policy of successive governments.

To do this I must trace something of the history of the Air Force. As a start it may be noted that the-original l?lyink Corps of pre-war days consisted of a single Royal Aircraft Factory and a Central Flying School with a Naval and a Military Wing. At that time, however, there was no fighting in the air and no bombing; and the two Wings, concentrating solely on their own specialised forms of reconnaissance, gradually drifted apart until they finally broke off and were formed into the R.F.C. and R.N.A.S.

This organisation lasted until 1st April, 1918, when the pressure of events led to the introduction of a single air service. I t is important, I think, to note that this change took place in the middle of a war, and the Official History makes it perfectly clear that it was only formed after every other alternative had been tried and found wanting. No country willingly undertakes the reorganisation of a fighting service when it is engaged in a war, and this fact alone should make it clear that there were the strongest +racticaL reasons for the formation of a unified Air Force.

Some of these reasons were stated by the Lord Privy Seal in November, 1917, when introducing the Government's bill for a separate Air Force. He said :-

. . . "Aircraft can no longer be regarded as a sub-department of the Admiralty or of the War Office. The air is one. I t is a unity far more than the sea is, and a hundred times more than the land i s ; and the conditions of fighting in the air are similar even though the airman be attached to the naval or to the military side of the Air Service. A man may be trained to fly over the land and to alight in a field, or he may be trained to fly in a seaplane and to rest upon the waters of the sea, but the element is identical and his problems of observation, or scouting, or bombing, or of photography and so forth are in themselves essentially similar. That is the great reason why the amalgamation of the training and control has at this stage become so advisable. . . ."


After the War this organisation was assailed by both the other Services, who, concentrating on their own air requirements, would have liked to see them part and parcel of their own Services. There was, however, the question of the air defence of Great Britain, which by I923 was causing the Government a good deal of concern. There were two questions to be answered-(I) did the danger of air attack exist ? and if it did, (2) how were we to organise the necessary air forces to meet it and at the same time provide for the requirements of the Navy, the Army and the control of Overseas territories ? Should there be one Air Force responsible for providing all the air requirements of the Empire, or should there be three, one for defence against air attack and one for each of the other services ?

The Government remitted the whole question to a very strong committee, which sat throughout the summer of 1923 and took the most exhaustive evidence on every aspect of the problem. Their report, which has been published as Cmd. 2029, was approved by the Government, and the findings announced in the House of Commons in the following terms :-

" These are the conclusions a t which we have arrived- In the first place, that the Air Force must be autonomous in matters of

administration and education. Second, that in the case of defence against air raids the Army and Navy

must play a secondary r61e. Third, that in the case of military operations on land, or naval operations '

by sea, the Air Force must be in strict subordination to the general or admiral in supreme command.

Fourth, that in other cases, such as the protection of commerce and attacks on enemy harbours and inland towns, the relations between the Air Force and the other services should be regarded rather as a matter of co-operation, than of the strict subordination which is necessary when aeroplanes are acting merely as auxiliaries to other arms. . . ." This very clear pronouncement of policy did not, however, end the

agitation for separate military and naval air services, which reached such a pitch that in February, 1926, Mr. Baldwin, who was then Prime Minister, was constrained to make the following statement in the House of Commons :-

" I think i t essential to announce that, in accordance with the policy of successive Administrations, the Government have no intention of re-opening the question of a separate Air Arm and Air Ministry. We intend to pursue the organisation of Imperial Defence on the existing basis of three co-equal services. It is in the interests of the Fighting Services that controversy upon this subject should now cease. We are convinced that the way to secure the higher co-ordination in our Defence machinery, indispensable to full efficiency and, indeed, to economy, lies not in the abolition of any one of the three established arms of His Majesty's Forces, but in combined action between all three through the machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the agency of the recently instituted Committee of Chiefs of Staff.


We are sure that we can rely upon all concerned to devote themselves loyally and whole-heartedly to this end."

Again in November, 1930, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in reply to a request that a public enquiry should be held into the whole question of the Air Force and its military and civil associations, said :-

" The answer is in the negative. His Majesty's Government have no intention of departing from the policy of successive Governments with regard to a separate air arm and Air Ministry, or as regards the control of civil aviation. . . ." The lecturer goes to some lengths to suggest that the present policy

is " obscure " and that this is due to the ability of the aircraft industry, the professional aviators, technical journalists, etc., to influence the Government's air policy. He says (p. 516) : " One thing the present day public and politicians are determined not to be is ' old fashioned,' they are, therefore, highly impressed with the future possibilities of the air, and the policy remains obscure."

Who are these men who can thus be persuaded by the wish not to appear " old fashioned " into giving a decision against the evidence ? The 1923 Committee on which subsequent Government policy has been based consisted of :-

Lord Salisbury, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Lord Curzon, The Duke of Devonshire, Lord Derby, Lord Peel, Sir Samuel Hoare, Mr. Amery, Lord Balfour, Lord Weir.

The lecturer apparently believes that all these able men and successive Governments who have endorsed their views are wrong, that " war in the air is a phantom of the imagination," that the 52 squadrons which they recommended for home defence are the result of futuristic outlook, and that the status of the Air Force is still a vexed question.

I have dealt with this point at some length because all readers of THE NAVAL REVIEW may not be aware of the past history or of the thoroughness with which the whole question has been threshed out.

The lecturer states that co-operation between the services is hindered because in " air matters . . . we are asked to take on trust, not things


as they are to-day and which have been proved, but things as it is hoped they will turn out in the future."

He brings no single piece of evidence to show that this sweeping statement is true ; and in view of the evidence outlined above, it would appear more correct to say that the blame for any lack of co-operation rests with people such as the lecturer who approach these very difficult and complex problems without any real knowledge of the facts.

He used as the text of his lecture a quotation from Francis Bacon : " I t is good that the novelty, though it be not rejected, yet be held for a Suspect ". I would like to complete this quotation-" and as the Scripture saith, that we stand in the ancient way, and then look about us and discover what is the straight and right way and so to walk in it."

Here I think the lecturer and I are on common ground : we both want to find the straight and right way ; but I am convinced that this can only be done by a rigorous examination of all the evidence, and that superficial judgments oiily confuse the issue and stir up feelings of distrust which are entirely unwarranted by the facts.

" NOGRA."

T H E FAIREYS FLY OVER T H E OCEAN.

DCRING the great floods in the Yangtse valley in August, 1931, the writer's ship found herself at Hankow shortly after the zenith had been passed. 'The native city was still deeply flooded, and there was still three or four feet of water on the Bund in S.A.D.3; but the general opinion on board was that the more spectacular part of the disaster was over.

Ships which had preceded us, and many officers in the past, had seen more than we of the huge scale on which the Malthusian Doctrine is vindicated in a simple agricultural society, where no roads or railways exist for the relief of famine, even should the will to do so be evinced by a race which has accepted it with the utmost philosophy from time immemorial, and of which the Emperor Kien Lung observed simply " . . . . there are too many Chinese."

Some of us, however, were able t o see its effects from a new angle- an aerial survey of the flooded areas from Hankow nearly up to Shasi. and downstream nearly to Kiukiang-while the manner in which this came about was illuminating to those who took an interest in the chaotic political state of the country.

Although the ship's aircraft had been placed a t thme disposal of the Nanking Government, it was clear from the outset that this alone would not ensure their use. T h e National Flood Relief Commission, organised by Nanking, was a departure from the previous system under which the relief funds were administered by a committee of foreign missionaries, and was formed on this occasion partly a s a gesture to foreign opinion, a s well a s for less praiseworthy motives, by the Minister of Finance, Mr. 7'. V. Soong. In addition to this source of relief, the American hospital in Pekin had sent an expert, with funds, to Hanliow, and the representative of the League of Nations was also in attendance.

Jealousies between these factions caused a considerable delay in the proceedings, since each faction possessed separate avenues of approach to the official ear in Nanking ; while the Government there was unm illing, amidst the distractions of the struggle with Canton and the ambitions of the Japanese, to become embroiled in any further commitments. It was also reluctant to allow foreign airmen to establish a precedent for flying over Chinese territory, and fearful lest, if they guaranteed the

THE FAIREYS FLY OVER T H E OCEAN. 721

safety of our aircraft crews, a forced landing might demonstrate their lack of control over the bandit-infested province of Hupeh, and be the cause of a protest by the British Government.

Here the matter might have remained indefinitely but for the arrival of Colonel Lindbergh, who had volunteered to assist the Flood Relief Commission by surveying the flooded areas in his seaplane. During his stay at Nanking he carried out a considerable amount of flying, mainly with the representative of the League of Nations, the latter taking many photographs which he sold to the press and in which pursuit his chief interest, when not employed in thwarting the work of the doctor from Pekin, was centred. After a short stay a t Nanking, Colonel Lindbergh announced his intention of proceeding to Hankow, where he arrived (uninvited), landed astern of thme ship, and was hoisted in.

Although there is certainly no affinity between the gallant colonel and the song-writers of his native land, his arrival inspired on all sides the spirit of sunny optimism which the latter so indefatigably prescribe. It seemed that the clouds of our difficulties had all " rolled away," and that the sun had come " smiling thru." Two of our machines were already fitted with float undercarriages, and Chinese inscriptions had been painted on their sides proclaiming that their occupants were " the friends of the starving people "; Lewis guns were fitted in case the starving people were unable to read, and plans were made for a combined survey next day. Colonel Lindbergh was to take the western sector north of the river, one of our aircraft the sector next to his, while another would make a photographic survey of the neighbourhood of the Wuhan cities to find out what areas were suitable for the formation of relief camps.

Colonel Lindbergh's aircraft, a Lockheed " Sirius," was not fitted with any slings of its own, a deficiency which was to prove its undoing, but improvised ones were produced by the boatswain.

All machines got safely away next morning, and the work required was satisfac~torily carried out, exlcept that Lindberg flew over the wrong area-that to the southward of the river. This, however, was not important, a s his notes did not contain much useful information. The ship's aircraft made further flights in the afternoon, one of them taking an official of the Flood Relief Commission.

For the following day, a further expedition was planned, with the object of pushing on beyond the limits of the areas hitherto covered; and, since the distance flown from the ship would be greater than on previous flights, it was arranged that our two aircraft should fly in

722 THE FAIREYS FLY OVER THE OCEAN.

company, so that in the event of a forced landing by one the other would be able to render assistance or summon help.

Although fitted with float undercarriages, a landing on the flooded areas nould be far from pleasant; for, while on the northern limit of the valley there was little current, and, the sediment being undisturbed, a deeper shade of blue shoned plainly the areas of sufficient depth, to the southward and along the centre of the valley a strong current was flowing over the country, transforming it into a vast yellow sea. Nothing \<as visible in this desolate scene except the tops of trees and houses, although to the north, where the flood waters reached the hills, occasional patches of bare fields nere to be seen. It was impossible to tell from the air whether there was six inches of water or the 2 or 3 feet necessary for a seaplane. In addition to this we were at times over 40 miles from the river, access to which (and so down to Hankow) would have been very difficult by any means.

In due course the ship's aircraft were ho~sted out and took off. T o the " casual observer " it might seem that the surface of a deep river, in spite of a four to five knot tide, might reasonably be assumed to be flat. 'This theory proved incorrect, a s the writer's pilot had discovered. The prevailing wind being across the river, thme length of run available for taking off was not unlimited, and the existence of a large mound of water into which we flew just a s the pilot had lifted her off, came a s a most unwelcome surprise. How~ever, the second attempt was more successful, and we climbed up to join the other machine.

T h e absence of landmarks, the lack of accurate maps, and the merg- i ng of the river ~ n t o the surrounding country, made it necessary to use the methods of navigation employed over the open sea. Our companion lllachille had found the wind, and we set off on a compass course a t three thousand feet, to increase our choice of landing grounds in the event of an engine failure, and to avoid offering armed bandits tempta- tions greater than they could bear.

I n a few minutes the Wuhan cities were lost to view, and nothing remained but a n (expanse of muddy waters reaching to the horizon in all directions. A few villages were partly dry, the tree-lined banks of a few small rivers could be seen winding their way south beneath the surface, and here and there a patch of slightly bluish tinge showed the position of a lake. Forty miles later we were approaching the northern limits of the flood. Here the waters were deep and still, standing crops could be seen with their ears awash, and further off dry land was dimly visible in the haze.

'There was, however, little opportunity for sight seeing. The observer in the leading machine was fully employed in plotting, check-

THE EAIREYS FLY OVER THE OCEAN. 723

ing the wind, keeping in W/T touch with the ship, and making what notes he could, while the writer was making a detailed description of the country, taking bearings, distances and times of villages ar,d landmarks, whether flooded, recently flooded, or dry, signs of inhabitants or refugees, numbers of junks and sampans, and occasional photographs with notes of camera orientation and time. By fitting these on to the navigational plot kept by the leading aircraft, the final survey was prepared on our return on board, and proved more accuratte than the maps supplied to us.

By now we had rteached the northern limits of the floods and turned on to a south-westerly course to pick up the limits of the area examined on the previous day, and after a run of some twenty minutes we reached the town of Alien Yang, isolated in the floods, and covered up to the tops of the houses. In what condition the people were it was impossible to say, but of their sanitary state the less said the better, as the whole area within th'e walls was a bright emerald green, the smell of which could almost be imagined.

From Mien Yang we turned on to a north-westerly course, and from here until we reached the river-some thirty miles distant-the conditions became steadily worse. The writer's notes at this time record the country here as 95 per cent. flooded, the remaining five per cent. being house tops and the upper branches of trees. I'his was the area in which refugees were first observed, their straw shelters on house roofs being clearly visiblre, and in increasing numbers. The plight of the people for the next twenty miles was unenviable in the extreme. Too far from any source of relief (Hankow by this time was about a hundred miles to the south-east), their houses and crops destroyed, nothing remained to them but the stoicism ingrained in the Chinese character, under n hich the peasant will mix leaves and earth with his food, tighten his belt, and lie down to avoid lowering his strength by exertion. In this area there were no boats, every available one having long since gone in the hope of reaching some source of food.

The last few miles to the river revealed fewer and fewer traces of life. 'The floods here mere very deep, and a strong current, shown in places by the swirl caused by submerged trees and houses, flowed downstream. As far as we could see northwards the conditions were similar, making the existence of refugees there very unl~ikely; antd we turned our noses homeward some twenty miles short of Shasi, setting a course which took us parallel with the river and fifteen miles north of it.

Throughout this stage of the flight the floods continued deep and swift until almost within sight of Hankow. Houses were rare, and the limits of the river on our starboard hand could only be traced inter-

724 THE FAIREYS FLY OVER THE OCEAN.

mittently. By this time the combination of cold and writer's cramp- caused by describing country which we covered at the rate of a mile and a half every minute-had resulted in a gradual decrease of interest, accompanied by speculation on the accuracy of the leader's navigation. T h e deep purr of the Napier " Lion " a few feet in front of us seemed more satisfactory every time we looked over the side at the unbroken desolation below us, an operation which we repeated with increasing frequency until Hankow appeared in sight right ahead.

O n our return to the ship we found that we had missed a superb spectacle-no less a one, indeed, than the capsizing of Colonel and Mrs. Lindbergh a s they were b'eing hoisted out. T h e Pratt and Whitney " Hornet " motor, with which thmeir seaplane was fitted, could not be throttled back to a low rate of revolutions, with the result that on touching the water he went ahead too fast for our crane to veer sufficient slack for his temporary slings to be unhooked. When some way ahead, in response to the frenzied shouts of those on board who had seen this sort of thing happen to other seaplanes, he switched off his engine and drifted back. H i s head fell away, and when the purchase again took the strain he was no longer head to stream. The machine heeled over until the port wing dipped, and, the current taking it, the machine capsized. An officer attmending the operation from a motor sampan, being with regrettable cynicism in very close attendance, the crew were retrieved after only thirty seconds' immersion, but the machine was somewhat damaged. T h e photographs of this disaster were afterwards found to have a commercial value of four thousand dollars gold.

That afternoon the writer flew with a Chinese of the Flood Relief Commission over the area north-east, east and south-east of Hankow, reaching a point within twenty miles of Kiukiang. This gentleman was unfamiliar with the country and made no notes, his only action consisting of politely raising his (eyebrows whenever the writer pointed out a town to him and then show'ed it to him on the map. On our return to land, however, he showed intense interest; and when the pilot flew low over the river for a " looksee " before his landing, he turned an ashy white and sprang out of the cockpit on to the gunring, where his legs were seized by the writer. After we had landed it transpired that he had only flown previously with Chinese pilots, who invariably land immediately on arrival at their destination, and to whom a second circuit, or a second attempt at a landing, is a serious " loss of face."

T h e authorities expressing thems~elves satisfied with the results of our various flights, no more flying was done a t Hankow, and the

THE FAIREYS F L Y OVER THE OCEAN. 725

next day we sailed for Shanghai, whmere we learnt that the National Government had presented Colonel Lindbergh with a medal nearly four inches in diameter-a piece of news which was received with ill-ccmcealed envy by certain of the writer's shipmates.

W e had covered eight thousand square miles of territory, and had been fortunate in an experience doubly rare for naval officers-that of flying over a most interesting part of China, and of seeing from an. unusual viewpoint one of the greatest flood disasters in its history.

W. T. C.

DUAL CONTROL.

Two Winged Strangers are flying slowly round Weymouth Bay. I t is evident that one of them, owing to his recent residence on earth, is unfamiliar with this form of progress. The other stranger is more expert, and gives his companion advice on recovering from the spins into which he is thrown by the bumpiness of the air in the neighbourhood of two large flat-topped vessels, anchored further from the shore than the rest of the fleet. The name of the former stranger is " Q," and that of the latter " A."

Q. That is an odd looking vessel ; what is its purpose ? A. I t is an aircraft carrier, which carries aircraft with the fleet. Q. Then it is manned by airmen ? A. I t is manned by seamen ; but there are airmen to fly the aero-

planes and look after them. Q. Who flies in these aeroplanes ? A. Some are naval officers, some are Air Force officers. Q. Then are the naval officers airmen or seamen ? A. On that point there is some doubt ; some declare that they are

both, while others assert that they are neither.

Q. What is the nature of the work which these aeroplanes perform ? A. They are employed for naval operations. Q. Who is responsible for these operations when the aeroplanes

are in the air ? A. I t is all amicably arranged. Some direct the operations, while

others hold the baby. Q. Then it conforms with the usual customs of the Service ? A. No. In the Service, operations are conducted by those with

the greatest experience of them. Q. Then is not the captain's senior adviser in a carrier the one most

experienced in naval air requirements '2 A. Not as a rule. Q. Of what then does his experience consist ? A. I t is obtained in Inland area, the North-west Frontier, and in

armoured cars in Iraq. Q. Then he approaches the subject with an open mind ? A. Entirely.

DUAL CONTROL.

Q. What are those aeroplanes drawn up on the flying deck ? A. They are the newest fighter aircraft.

Q. Are they good aeroplanes ? A. They are superb machines for the air defence of Great Britain,

and they can climb to twenty thousand feet in ten minutes.

Q. Are naval air operations then conducted at twenty thousand feet ?

A. No.

Q. Then these aeroplanes are not designed primarily for naval air work ?

A. They are superb machines for the air defence of Great Britain.

Q. What are those aeroplanes on the cruisers ? A. They are seaplanes, which can be fired off from a catapult. Q. And when their fuel is expended ? A. They return to harbour. Q. But if they are seaplanes, can they not be landed alongside their

ships, and hoisted in ? A. Sometimes the sea is rough. Q. But are not seaplanes tested for seaworthiness after they are

made ? A. Yes. They are tested by the Royal Air Force at Felixstowe.

Q. Is it not sometimes rough at Felixstowe ? A. Sometimes it is very rough. Often the waves are over a foot

high. Q. And if the seaplane lands on the sea when it is too rough ? A. It sinks because it is made of metal.

Q. Then why are not these aeroplanes made of wood, and capable of landing when the sea is rough ?

A. Because then they would no longer be superb machines for the air defence of Great Britain.

Q. What were those aeroplanes which we saw yesterday, flying round and round the carrier while she was at sea ?

A. They were spotter-reconnaisance aeroplanes, waiting to land on.

Q. Then they had been away practising spotting and reconnaissance ? A. No. They had been practising for an aerial display.

Q.. But what other functions have they ? A. They are used for bombing. Q. But did you not mention yesterday some other aeroplanes called

torpedo-bombers ? A. Yes, but they do not drop bombs.

728 DUAL CONTROL.

Q. Why do not the reconnaissance aeroplanes practise reconnaissance ?

A. Because then they would get a long way from the carrier. Q. But surely they are equipped with wireless, by means of which

they can remain in communication ? A. Yes, but their wireless sets were designed in 1916. Q. Who provides wireless sets for naval aircraft 1 A. The Royal Air Force. Q. It is all very puzzling. I think we had better return, or we shall

be late for harping practice. A. I agree. Gabriel has detailed me for slow landings on a thunder

cloud this afternoon, and I must get some more camber on my wing tips before then.

The Winged Strangers then pull down their goggles and climb slowly up towards the sun.

FOUGUEUX.

THE SERVICE OR MARRIAGE.l

To reliseve A. R. F.'s mind I will say at once that I am a happily married officer of some years' (married) standing; but, unlike what he expects of me, I prefer being at sea to shore jobs, and I have no objection to being sent abroad for as long or as often as Their Lordships desire. I also am not well off, so that I am not open to the imputation that I can transport my family where and wlhen I fancy, even if I should so fancy. Having now set th'e stage I can proceed with a clear conscience.

I think that A. R . F.'s views are nearer the truth than most people are prepared to admit, but I think he overstates the case. H e states that, broadly speaking, marriage and the Service are incompatible, w~hich statement requires, to my mind, some qualification before it is generally acceptable.

The question really turns on the married man's attitude to marriage, not on the prime fact that he is married. If he puts his home life before the Service then I am with A. R. F., but only if he does this. Therefore I would say that a truer statement is that home or family life-in its fullest sense-and marriage are incompatible.

Luckily for the Service a large number of married officers do put the Service first-if this was not the case things would indeed have come to a prettty pass. Those officers who do put home life before the Service should, to my mind, be considered as unsuitable for advancement, as that type is not required-particularly as senior offilcers who, ips0 facto, juniors look to as an example.

The difficulty arises witlh the lower deck. Wi th them the Service is an employment, not a profession, anld it is only the very exceptional man who puts the Service before his home-and this I regret to say applies in general to warrant officers as well. The depth of this feeling is brought out in Sidney Knock's book " Clcear Lower Deck " (reviewed on pages 368-371 of the May NAVAL REVIEW) and it is perhaps a pity that many 'officers fail to realise the extraordinary intensity of most men's views on the subject of their family life.

Vide NAVAL REVIEW, NO. 3, Vo1. XX., August, 1932, p. 537.

73O THE SERVICE OR MARRIAGE.

This I believe, in common with A. R. F., is one of the great troubles we have to contend with in the Service to-day. It is true that the lower rates of pay may possibly tend to raise the average age of marriage in the Service, but we must always expect to have the majority of men in their second periods married.

I think A. R. F. is wrong when he infers that Invmergordon was due to the married men because they were married; it was because their fninily life was likely to be jeopardised by an unexpectedly heavy pay cut (which is possibly a quibble, but I think not).

I can offer no immediate suggestions, and I see no definite remedies, but when men to whom home life means everything and the Service comparatively little consider that the even tenor of this home life is being threatened, then discontent is certain to be rife.

Possibly short service is the only innovation which has any prospect of seriously influencing the question, but ought we not to try and lessen thme evil by the inculcation of ideas on the importance of putting the Service before everything ?

11.

A REPLY.

THE writer of " The Service or Marriage " in the August number of THE NAVAL REVIEW appears to have very definite views on matrimony in the Service, nearly all of which are shared by the writer of the " Low Tide of the Royal Navy " in the May number.

That the present increase in marriage in the Service is a very serious difficulty in the Navy to-day few will deny, but it is not going to be remedied by saying " when officers realise this and model themselves accordingly an improvement may be expected." To whatever extent this increase in marriage is bad for the Service, i t is a factor we must accept ; but, having got this state of affairs, i t is our business to get the maximum possible entliusiasm and efficiency out of our officers and men.

Thirty years ago, or even when "A.R.F." began his foreign service, the sailor, provided he was fed well and was comfortable on board, asked only for a monthly " bust ", and for the rest of the time remained on board. Now he wants more than this-the monthly " drunk " is a thing of the past. His contemporaries are getting much more in the way of luxuries and home comforts, and the sailor is not prepared to smile a t and enjoy what he did thirty years ago.

We are a very conservative race in the Navy. About the year 1866 a large number of admirals signed a petition to the Admiralty saying that, if the introduction of steam into the Navy were persisted in, the

THE SERVICE OR MARRIAGE. 7 3 I

Service would be ruined. Let us be careful that we make some attempt to move with the times.

There can be no question but that, if the Navy as a whole could be persuaded to postpone the present average age of marriage by some six or eight years, it would be a very good thing. This event is not likely ; we shall do well therefore to cut our cloth accordingly. The Army do so ; why not the Navy ?

The proposed " change round " scheme of commissions had four objects :-

(I) To do away with the sitting round the Home ports for two years in the case of the Home Fleet ships,

( 2 ) To give captains increased independence and opportunities for command and initiative,

(3) To give officers and sailors more variety and experience, (4) To return men to their homes in something under eighteen months.

"A.R.F." objects to this scheme for various reasons. He does not think that the admiral on any station will get to know his officers in one year. Taking into consideration the present change round of oficers and commanders-in-chief this is no worse than the average of the present day.

Then again he refers to the better opportunities for training on a foreign station, and the resulting improvement in a ship's company ; this being so, it would strengthen the case for all ships to go abroad during their commissions. Do not let us get carried away by memories of paying-off pendants of prodigious length and bands playing " Rolling Home " as the ship passes the Barracca for the last time in her commission. If the drafting question is gone into, it will be found that in some cases all that means is one month's leave and then " Back to the Straits."

All those of us who have been fortunate enough to be executive officers on foreign stations know full well the merits of commissions abroad, and the great majority of us officers enjoy those commissions to the full ; but there is the other side to the picture, and in our enjoyment and enthusiasm don't let us forget it.

IN his short and spirited article " The Service or Marriage," A.R.F. has endeavoured to show that " the blight of marriage " is " the forts et origo of most of our troubles." Quite a fair case for the converse proposition might be made ; and he has stated, rather than proved, his theory ; but he must have caused some of our married members to

732 THE SERVICE OR MARRIAGE.

examine their own position and view point. The following remarks, which are confined to officers only, are entirely attributable to the stimulus he has kindly provided. They are forwarded only in case no better lawyer for the defence is available.

To begin with, I think we may dismiss at once the visionary scheme of ships not doing more than fourteen months abroad. It is not really a practical proposition, and A.R.F. is wasting his ammunition on a target unworthy of his heavy armament.

Twenty-five or thirty years ago people may have been prepared to accept less in the way of personal comfort, as A.R.F. remarks ; but has the increase of comfort in the Service done more than keep pace with facilities ashore ? And if it had failed to do so, would the Service not have suffered in other ways ?

At what stage does A.R.F. consider that marriage is permissible ? I agree with him that, as a rule, it is probably an error in the early years, but suggest that after an officer has, say, six years in as a lieutenant, it is entirely his own affair. I t is impossible to generalize about its effect on his work. A may have divided and conflicting loyalties, and the Service may lose ; B may be stimulated to " dig out " as he would not otherwise have done, because getting on is of more importance since it affects his wife. In view of the superfluity of officers of intermediate ranks on the list, is the presence of some As very serious ? They can soon be identified and treated accordingly.

Where perhaps A.R.F. makes an unjustifiable assumption is in supposing that the time which married officers devote to their wives would otherwise be given to the Service. It might equally well be devoted to the bottle or to reading " Tit Bits " in destroyers' " charity mail." We still have, fortunately, a number of single-minded enthusiasts-they are in many ways to be envied-but some of us average performers work very much better for a fairly frequent change of atmosphere and relaxation, which marriage provides in the highest and most unselfish form. I t can, of course, be overdone. I t sometimes is, but it should not be forgotten that on any station more than half the year is spent away from the home ports, which admits of good long periods of concentrated effort.

The conditions of service nowadays are also very different from those of " before the war." When it comes to shore jobs, or U.T., both now so regrettably frequent, then it is a great advantage to be married. The sight of some of these happy bachelors sitting round the fire in a shore establishment at gin-time, with a dull or unprofitable evening ahead, is not an inspiring one. It might be further suggested that many bachelors are so by reason of their devotion not so much to the Service as to their creature comforts-but let us avoid personalities.

THE SERVICE OR MARRIAGE. 733

I t is true that foreign service on a distant station loses a good deal of its appeal for those who cannot afford to transport their family ; but one hears bachelors clamouring for foreign service, and there should be no great difficulty in filling all such situations several times over. More- over, very few married men should object to the Mediterranean, which, one hears, is not a very popular station with the single.

Among the ships which I happen to know well at the moment I would defy A.R.F. to pick out the ones whose officers are happy bachelors. The latter ships are by no means happier, cleaner or more efficient. I t may be purely fortuitous, but the balance is actually the other way.

The wife of a distinguished admiral once remarked that the only way for a naval couple to be happy was for them both to put the Service first. While I cannot answer for more than one wife, I honestly think that the married officers for whom I have any respect (and they are the vast majority) do put their jobs first, and that their performance would be no better, and might be worse, if they were not married.

In any case, faced with an fait accompJi, what does A.R.F. suggest doing about it ?

AUTRE TEMPS, AUTRES M ~ U R S .

THE OFFICERS' ADVISORY SOCIETY.

APART from his duties in the Service, an officer has also to attend to his own personal affairs, and is sometimes faced with a knotty problem. This is where the Officers' Advisory Society can prove useful, as it was specially designed to assist officers with reliable and qualified advice whenever necessary. The Society was formed two years ago under the auspices of a Council including Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob for the Army, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond for the Navy, and Air Vice-Marshal Longcroft for the Air Force. The work which it has done since then has more than justified its inauguration, but there are difficulties in getting it better known throughout the Services.

I t is difficult, in view of the variety of subjects with which it deals, to give a short and precise account of its objects, but briefly it offers to supply all commissioned officers of the Regular Forces, whether serving or retired, with information concerning civilian matters, and, when necessary, to arrange for the assistance of reliable experts whose charges are moderate. The interests of officers are often prejudiced when dealing with civilian transactions because the officers do not realise the possible- and usually probable-" snags " which are to be met with ; consequently they are unprepared, and before they realise it difficulties arise and money is wasted. I t would be easy enough to suggest that, in order to be on the safe side, one should always seek advice, but such advice coming from any reliable quarter must be paid for-gratuitous advice is seldom worth listening to-and such a procedure would become expensive. Besides which, there is always the chance that one may manage without any advice, so the money spent on expelt's fees is entirely wasted. The other extreme, however, of always plunging into a business deal without due care and forethought can produce very unpleasant results. The Society endeavours to leave a middle channel between these two alter- natives whereby an officer, before tackling a proposition about which he does not know very much, can have the facts put to him for consideration. This gives him the chance of obtaining a general appreciation of the situation, and thereby making his dispositions accordingly.

Such work obviously cannot be carried on without funds, so officers are asked to subscribe seven shillings and sixpence a year towards the maintenance of this organisation, which entitles them at any time to

place their case before an expert for preliminary advice. I t is no exaggeration to say that this preliminary advice has already saved officers some hundreds of pounds. In one case a civilian firm was claiming £268 from an officer in respect of the purchase of a motor-car : as he had to leave for the Far East he left the matter in the care of the Society, who got his money back at the total cost of two penny-halfpenny stamps.

Certain officers have their own advisors and they ask what assistance the Society could be to them. If they are satisfied that they can always get all the advice they want on any particular matter without always having to pay for it, the answer is obvious--they would be merely wasting their money in subscribing to the Society, as it is not intended to be a charitable organisation but rather a mutual co-operative society for civilian advice purposes.

Here are a few of the subjects with which the Society deals. All legal matters, that is such matters as require the attention of a solicitor ; all matters concerning property, i.e., the renting and purchase of civilian accommodation-a subject with which the average married officer is being continually troubled and which offers numerous opportunities of losing money : income-tax questions, the correct returns for assessments and any claims for rebates. The Society are very fortunate in having retained the services of a very expert chartered accountant on this subject, and several very useful rulings have been obtained. It would not be politic to broadcast these as it may be remembered that a few years ago the Inland Revenue Authorities squashed the idea of tax-payers taking out single premium insurances to evade paying extra income-tax.

I t is far better to deal with each individual case on its merits and apply any useful rulings which one may have in hand. It may be mentioned for the information of readers of this article, however, that there is a very useful ruling with regard to the position of officers who are taxed on letting their houses furnished-an expedient which many in the Service have to adopt when ordered on foreign service.

Insurance.

Another matter on which the Society can offer its unbiased advice is Insurance-a subject with which everyone in the Services is familiar, if only on account of the numerous circulars which are received from various companies. It is no wonder that the average officer who decides to take out a policy is somewhat bewildered as to which is really the best company out of all those who present their case so attractively. In such cases, if the officer sends all the literature to the Society he will be given a report as to which policy it is suggested he should adopt. There is one axiom about insurance worth remembering, and that is that the

words in the smallest type are often the most important, and usually contain the exceptions under which the policy becomes absolutely useless.

Investments.

Those who are fortunate enough in these times to have any money to invest can receive advice on this so that they can receive a fair return by way of income with a reasonable chance of capital appreciation. Some of the cases submitted where the officer has followed the advice of some outside bucket-shop are almost pitiful.

The Society exists for its members, and any suggestions as to how it might become more useful are always welcome. The question of employment is one on which it is being continually consulted, but there are not sufficient funds available to maintain the organisation necessary to carry out such work satisfactorily. However, Naval and Marine Officers are fortunate in having an organisation to assist them in this direction, namely, the R.N. and R.M. Officers' Civil Employment Com- mittee. The address is Queen Anne's Chambers, Dean Farrar Street, London, S.W.I.

All that the Society can do in helping retired officers is to make suggestions as to what form of employment they might take up when once on the beach, having regard to the work which they have been doing in the Service. This can be done by virtue of the Society's extensive liaison with civilian business men, who will gladly interview retired officers and give them some first-hand information on their particular job.

Incidentally, several naval officers are finding the running of hotels both a pleasant and a profitable form of occupation, but a course of instruction is advised before one takes on sole responsibility ; in all business there are wrinkles which have to be learnt before one can be sure of one's footing.

It is hoped that some idea of the Society's work has been gained from these few notes ; any officer who cares to ask for further information will be supplied with full details on making application to the Secretary. The address is The Officers' Advisory Society, c/o The Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1, the subscription is 716 a year, and its work is to offer pilotage to those who may not be too certain of their soundings in civilian waters.

ORGANISED SPORT.

THERE has been a rather more pronounced undercurrent of disculssion on the subject of " organised sport " in naval circl'es during the last few months than has b~een t'he case during the last decade. This has probably arisen from the general desire apparent in many officers-both senior and junior-tot point out and to assist to rectify the features that to th,em are wrong, or incorrectly organised, in the Service at present.

Unfortunately it does not strik'e most of these reformers that these features have existed flor som'e years, and that if morale is being under- mined the process has been going on for a considerable period. They have only found it necessary to point out the mote in the eyes of " those responsible " aftmer an upheaval has occurreld-and, as the proverb says, " It is easy to be wise after the event." A further criticism of their arguments is that praise of any meritorious feature of the existing regime is seldom forthcoming.

BF that as it may, this article is in thme nature of a defence of that most criticised question " Organised Sport," together with a series of comments on methods of organising sport in a ship. ,A few suggestions to improve the status of sport in the Service are also very tentatively put forward.

The first and all-essential points that must be made are that :- ( a ) Sport must be treated as such, and as a means to an end. I t

must never be allowed to become the end itself. (b) Sport must never be allowed to interfere with Service require-

ments, and should not be allowed to encroach on Service time. (It is fully realised that at present it does so.)

Provided these two maxims are rigidly adhered to no possible harm can result from sports generally.

A great deal of the present outcry on the part of some officers against sport is owing to individual ships, and in some cases squadrons, infringing the above maxims, and I am the first to admit that, once these are infringed, ill feeling between ships is bound to arise wi~th all its consequent ill-effects. If those in authority would ensure that infringements of these maxims in spirit, as well as in actual practice, were severely dealt with, I venture to believe that many opponents of organised sport would become ardent supporters of it.

738 ORGANISED SPORT.

Advantages of Spor t .

The main argument in favour of sport is that it tends to build up and strengthen esprit de corps. The actual number of men that are taking part in any contest may be small, but the mere fact that they are struggling for the ship and that the remainder of the ship's company are keenly interestmed in their progress binds the men together and gives them a healthy outlook which spreads throughout all their work. X very good example, which I venture to think none of the opponents of organised sport will disagree with, is the Service " sport " of general drill. Admitted general drill's main object is to make men think and move like lightning, but u,nderlying it is the desire on everybody's part to perform each evolution most quickly and thus beat their neighbours. Everybody knows many of the evolutions are valueless from a practical point of view-but then frolm a practical point of view what value is a game of football or (nowadays) a sabre combat? Hence the outlook produced by general drill is in many ways similar to the effect of sport.

Another argument in favour o~f sport is that if the large number of men who watch, say, a football match were not doing so they would quite likely be drinking beer to excess or would remain on board- neither of which occupations is so good for their health. Similarly the fact that a portion of the ship's company is kept thoroughly fit must be cou~nted in favour of sport generally.

*%nother factor is ithat, whenever a ship goes to any port at home or abroad, challenges to all sorts of sports are promptly forthcoming. If sport were not encouraged the number of skilled performers in the Service woluld rapidly drop off, and the reputation of the Service would, willy-nilly, suffer among the communities which know the Navy throughout the world-and these are very numerous and very varied in their nationalities. The most critical opponents of sport must admit that a successful team does assist in " showing the flag," which is one of the Navy's main duties in times of peace.

-Again, a sporting outlook, which can only be engendered by constant dealing with and thinking about sport, is a great asset in war. Men who have this outlook are prepared to put up with greater dis- comforts and hardships to gain their ultimate ends ehani men who must depend entirely on discipline to keep them striving for their goal.

Advantages o f Orgcznised S9or t .

However, these remarks are all arguments in favour of " sport " as opposed to " organised sport." Having argued that sport is desirable the next question that arises is how to make the sporting spirit per-

ORGANISED SPORT. 739

meate the whole Sfervice so that all gain benefit by it. Tahe answer is purely and simply (and obviously) " organised sport," so that all ships and as many men as possible are brought into its ramifications and encouraged in every possible way to take part. Actually it is not a peculiarity of the Service (or the fighting services) to organise sport so extensively. Big civilian firms and works organise it just as extensively, but necessarily in a way that does not make it quite so obvious to external observers owing to :-

(a) The fact that few if any civilian undertakings are of a size comparable with the Service.

(b) A fair proportion of the average firm's employees being much older than even the oldest ratings in the Service, and therefore somewhat outside the scope of the organisation.

(c) The much greater " class " distinctions between the various grades in the average firm.

( d ) The fact that the family life of the employees of a big firm enters very largely into the question, whereas once a ship is away from her home port family life enters into the question very little.

Further, it may be argued that many civilian firms are not so concerned in building up the morale of their employees as the Navy is.

In the Navy, gunnery practices, fleet exercises and other activities of that nature are naturally carefully organised-so why not sport ? When all's said and done it is the man who counts in any form of warfare; and if sport is going to improve his capabilities of furthering the Service's warlike preparations and activities why not organise i t ?

The alternative is ridiculous. Imagine no organisation to exist, and you would be faced by the chaos produced by ships doing what they felt like in the way of sport, quite irrespective of whether other ships were capable of, or even trying to produce, suitable teams for them to compete against. The competitive spirit, which is the basis of all sport, would droop at once, and the number of men in the Service who were any good at the various games would fall off in a very short time-and incidefltally so would the number of recruits for the Navy.

No, there is little doubt that organised sport is a definite asset to the Navy.

Attitude to Sport in Ships. Before going on to discuss organisation of sport in a ship I would

like to comment on one or two points in sport organis&ion which affect the Navy as a whole.

74O ORGANISED SPORT.

The first of these is a factor which undoubtedly does cause a good deal of ill-fteeling between ships, and that is the very different attitude as regards sport which is adopt,ed in different ships. Sport can be overdone, and it can be neglected, and ships whose attitude falls in either of these categories are a menace to the remainder of the fleet. The former type of ship causes ill-feeling in other ships' companies arising from jealousy, and the latter causes discontent among her own ship's company arising from a feeling that officers are not interesting themselves as they should do in the welfare of the lower deck.

" Moderation in all things " is a good saying, and holds good as regards sport just as much as regards anything else ; and there is little doubt that if by general opinion, or rules, all ships could be induced, or forcted, to adopt exactly the same attitude as regards sport the lower- deck as a whole would be far more contented, and a greater increase in morale would be engendered.

A subsidiary factor to this is my second point-that of preferential treatment. Preferential treatment of teams in a ship can, and usually does, have two adverse effects. In the ship itself the men not in the teams are very apt to resent the " perks " which are given to the teams, as they fully realise that it iis more in the nature of an inducement to the players to perform than any real assistance to their training and skill. This, howev'er, does not usually cause anything like the discontent that occurs in other ships where similar teams cannot be, for Service reasons, or are not, allowed the same privileges.

The solution, of course, is to ensure, by careful orders, which will require obeying in the spirit as well as the letter, that all similar teams in every ship are given exactly the same privil~eges-or better still none at all.

T o ensure equality of treatment and to prevent sport interfering with Service requirements I would suggest-with my tongue in my cheek-that the best rules that could be introduce'd would be the following : -

( I ) No sport of any sort to take place-either training or competing-from reveille till 1200. (To apply all the year.)

(2) No training for any sport-as opposed to bona fide competitions-to take place till 1600. This condition of bona fide oompetitions would requir,e obeying in the spirit as well as in practice. (To apply all the year.)

(3 ) Close seasons for sports and training for them to be introduced, i.e., no regatta training before, say, two months before the regatta.

ORGANISED SPORT. 74I

There is little doubt that such rules would be intensely unpopular among a large section of the Navy, and would temporarily lead to a very large falling off of sport in the Navy generally; but I venture to suggest that in the long run the S.ervice would gain enor~mously by the removal of so many causes s f inter-ship discontent, and probably in the end the standard of sport in the Navy would b'e raised by more than most peopl'e are prepared to admit. How$ever, to introduce such rules would require very strong and courageouis handling of the situation, and great care would be needed to ensure that officers in unsuccessful ships were not victimised as a result of their ship's company's apathetic attitude.

Drafti~zg of Ratings : its effect on sport.

Having rather wandered from the point I want to' mention one more factor which has a strong bearing on sport in the Navy, and that is the question of drafting of ratings to ships.

There is no doubt, despite any printed or unofficial regulations to the contrary, that a certain amount of deliberate drafting of " experts " in various sports to certain ships does go on. I fully admit that in many cases the drafting officers concerned are unaware that they have been a party to it, as unless th,ey have been personally approached on the matter, or unless they take a deep interest in sport themselves, many of the names are merely names to th'em, and it is a matter of indifference which of several ships the ratings in question go to.

Tihis in itself is not a bad thing, because it tends to keep the " experts " together to thme advantage of the Service in the particular line of sport in question, and also because the mere fact of a man having been " wangled " by a certain ship means that he will be given a better chance of practising his partioular line of sport than if he went to some other ship that was not interested in him. But-and it is a big BUT-this is another source of potential discontent among the ships' companies of the non-favoured ships, who rather naturally, and with some truth, feel that they are competing in the sports concerned at a disadvantage. W h o has noL heard the oomments of the spectators when some ship starts winning one form of sport after another?

Actually, however, I would not advocate complete impartiality in drafting, as I think it is very desirable be keep the " experts " from getting into out-of-the-way ships and stations where their prowess is of no value to themselves or the Service; but I do considrer that it can be sadly abused and overdone, and that it is a question which wants very careful watching.


Sports Organization on. board Ship. I now want to turn to the question of sports organisation in a ship.

I have been fortunate (or unfortunate) in having been sports officer or otherwise interested in the subject in several ships, and from my own and other peoples' experience I have formed very definite conclusilons as to how the best results can be obtained.

The first requirement is a " Central Sports Officer," who should be pretky senior in the wardroom. Most junior officers fail in this job because they cannot bring pressure to bear (when necessary) on the officers running the various sports. His job, which need not necessarily include running any sport himself, is to run the central sports fund (separate funds Eor each individual sport are a great mistake) and to keep all officers running sports up to the mark. H e can also do an amazing amount of good in preventing and overcoming friction between the various sporting activities, S e r v i ~ e requirements and heads of departments' requirements. A further very definite duty is to ensure that no infringement of fleet rules as to training, etc., takes place.

Under this officer come the various officers running the individual sports. The ideal is, undoubtedly : one officer one sport, but this obviously becomes less and less possible the smaller the ship. The essential feature is to have oiiicers who will take a keen interest in their sport, and not necessarily officers who are experts in rhe sport themselves (a mistake often made in many ships). Of course there is no doubt that the very best results are obtained by having an officer running each sport who, by virture of his own prowess, earns a place in the first team-but this is not always possible. Officers should never take their place in a team by virtue of being an officer.

Many officers running sports do not obtain the best results because they do not think ahead enough. There are two main troubles which arise from this-firstly not getting the best teams and individuals settled and formed early enough to be well trained by the time some particular competiition takes place, and secondly not organising competitions and matches so that they will not clash with one another or with Service requirements (the Central Sports Officer can assist in this connection a great deal as has been stated abovej.

lmportu~zce of Propaganda.

The next point is dissemination of information to the ships' company. The importance of this side of the qu,estion is seldom appreciated, but I can vouch for its being all-important. Future fixtures should be displayed on all notiice-boards as soon as they are arranged, and repeated weekly until they take place-and the past week's results should also

ORGANISED SPORT. 743

be put up. A meekly " sports bulletin " is a very sound way of doing this, arranged to cover both paints. If this is not done many ratings do not keep in touch with what is going on, and, apart from potential spectators being lost, the sporting spirit which is so desirable flags on the lower deck fnom sheer lack of propaganda. A great deal more can be done with suitable notices than is generally realised, chiefly because of their propaganda effect on a large body of men living in close contact with one another.

Finance.

The last point I want to touch on is finance. To run the sports of a capital ship or large cruiser successfully a large expenditure of money is essential-and the more successful the ship is the more calls will there be on the sports fund. I have found from experience that LIOO a year is a low estimate of the average capital ship's requirements. This, of course, covers all sports gear, entrance fees, ground subscriptions, prizes, travelling expenses, etc. The sum is relatively so large that it is most desirable to have a separate sports fund which, although possibly created and maintained by a fixed income from the canteen fund, should be administered entirely separately. Nothing is more annoying to the Central Sports Officer than to have to go continually to the Canteen Committee for money; and if money is not forthcoming the sports of the ship suffer correspondingly.

Suggestions. Redzccfion of Cups : Abolition of Tote. T o complete this article I should like to suggest two reforms which

would, in my opinion, improve the status of Service sport generally, but which have little bearing on the previously discussed questions of inter-ship feeling and morale generally.

Firstly, I would suggest the abolition of a very large number of the existing competitive cups, which are far too numerous at present. Fur- ther, I woul'd like to see a large curtailment in the number of mcedals and prizes awarded to indivlduais and members of teams. These are all really inducements to the man to compete, and savour of professionalism. I5'11at is to b'e aimed at is for teams and individuals to compete, not for the sale of the reward, but for the sak'e of the sport itself.

This would no doubt cause a temporary falling off of sport in the Service (as would other of my suggestions) and might not prove practical in the long run; consequently it would be as well to introduce this reform for a limited period in the first place, only making it permanent i f justified by the results.


Secondly, to end with a n anti-climax, the tote at pulling regattas should be abolished at once. Nothing is more opposed to the true sporting spirit, with the shlp as the unit, than to give ships' companies en masse the opportunity of laying against their own crews should they desire to do so. I venture to suggest that the tote does infinitely more harm to the Service at regattas than the regatta itself does good. If ships' cornpanices are not sufficiently interested in regattas to make them worth while wiihout a tote, then pulling regattas should be abolished.

TRINITY HOUSE.

T h e following are extracts from a n address g iven last year b y the Deputy Master of Trini ty House (Vice--4dmiral S i r Robert Mansell, K.C. 17.0.) C.B .E.), and now reproduced b y his kind permission.

Further information o n the history and functions of Trini ty House will be found i n a small book entitled " T h e Trini ty House, London, Past and Present," b y TYalter H . Mayo, published b y S m i t h , Elder €F Co. in 1905. T h e frontispiece shows " Frigates commanded b y Elder Brethren of Triwity House defending the R iver Thames , October, 1803-Octo ber, I 805 ."

I H ~ V E been asked to speak to you of the work of Trinity House, the ancient title of which is " Guild or fraternity of &he most glorious and blessed Trinity and Saint Clement in the parish church of Deptford Stronde lin our County of Kent."

These words are quoted from the Charter granted by Henry VIII. in 1514, but the words of the Charter clearly show that it was a royal recognition and a development of an existing organisation. The fact that the fraternity existed as a Guild of seamen, possibly of a semi- religious character with benevolent object, is shown by the fact rthat a hall and almshouses were in existence at Deptford at the time of incorporation. These were probably erected a century before as the headquarters of the Society of Mariners which the Chanter incorporated. Unfortunately any documentary evidence perished in the Great Fire of London, 1666, and in a second fire which destroyed another Trinity H'ouse in 1714, SO there is no proof of the legend that the Fraternity existed in rthe reign of King Alfred or that it was founded by Stephen 1,angton in the reign of King John.

Be that as it may, the work of Trinity House has ever been to protect and further the interests of the Mariners in all ways possible, both at sea and in old age. In the reign of Elizabeth an A d of Parlia- ment granted authority to the Corporation of Trinity House to " erect beacons, marks and signs for the sea for the better navigation of the Coasts of England."

I will first give an outline of our present work, and will then refer to some of our former activities.

746 TRINITY HOUSE.

The Board ~ons i s t s of 10 Elder Brethren, one of whom acts as Deputy Master; these are elected as vacancies occur (which they do at age 70 or previous death). The positions are filled from the ranks of the Younger Brethren, who number about 300 and who are officers with certain qualifications from the Royal and Merchant Navies. H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught is the present Master of the Corpora- tion, and there are 10 Honorary Elder Brethren consisting of princes, statesmen and other persons of eminence.

Our work can be divided into four pants :- (I) As a lighthouse authority we have the duty of lighting,

beaconage and buoyage and marking and removing wrecks. (2) As a pilotage authority. (3) Administration of charitable funds. (4) Acting as assessors in the Admiralty Court, the House of Lords,

the High Court of Scotland, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Trinity House is the general lighthouse authority for England an'd Wales, and thme Channel Islands, and the adjacent seas and islands, and a t Gibraltar. Scotland and Ireland have their own Commissioners, but any additions or alterations in lighting or marking which they propose require the approval of Trinity H0use.l All the bodies- Trinity House included-are under the financial control of the Board of Trade.

The income for the upkeep of the service-lighthouses, light vessels, steam vessels, buoys and beacons, is derived from light dues which are levied on vessels on a tonnage scale, and are collected at the ports by the Customs Officers. The scale of light dues is adjusted from time [to time, to cover the estimated expenditure for the year.

The average yearly expenditure for the three general lighthouse authorirties, v,iz. Trinity House, Scotland and Ireland, is approximately jt'750,ooo to jt'800,ooo.

I should make it clear that the responsibilities of the general lighthouse authorities are concerned with general navigation, that !is marking dangers and channels on or near the tracks round the coast, and not with harbours or rivers, which are dealt with by the local authority, though in the course of time many exceptions have arisen.

The Trinity House service is administered from Trinity House, London, by the Elder Brethren. It is the headquarters of the clerical and technical staff, at the head of which are the secretary, the engineer- in-chief and the surveyor of shipping.

lThis applies to Northern Ireland but not to the Irish Free State.

TRINITY HOUSE. 747

T h e coasts and waters for which Trinity House is responsible are dlivided into seven districts, each in charge of a superintendent who is a former master of a lighthouse tender, of which there are nine. Each diistrict has a dep8t where stores are kept, including spare buoys, moorings and so on, while a t Blackwall, our principal depBt, there are also extensive engineering shops where many of the lighthouse fittings are made an'd repairs carried out.

W e have 96 lighthouses, of which 62 are manned, whlile the remainder are semi-watched or unwatched, that is, they require no attention during the n ight ; in some of them the lights are lighted and extinguished by an attendant, others exhibit and extinguish the light by means of a sun valve, or a clock which performs this office by means of a cam at sunset and sunrise. T h e manned lighthouses, which are all the most important ones, are in equal numbers on the coast line or on outlying rocks and islands such a s the Eddystone, Smalls and Slterries. T h e former we call shore and the labter rock lighthouses.

The shore lighthouses have cottages attached for the keepers and their families; there are two keepers to each lighthouse except where there is also a fog signal at the station when there are usually three keepers. T h e complement of a rock lighthouse is four keepers, of whom three are always at the rock and one ashore, the relief being effected monthly. Each keeper has two months on duty at the rock, and then one month ashore, during which he does duty at the dep8t. -4 super- numerary assistant keeper goes to the rock once every three months to keep the reliefs regular. T h e lighthouse keepers enter a s super- numeraries between the ages of 19 and 28, preference being given to artisans. Throughout the service the employees find their own food, reserve tinned provisions being provided tin case the relief cannot be carried out punctually owing to weather.

The lights are exhibited from I j minutes before sunset to sunrise, except in foggy weather when they are lighted one hour before sunset and kept burning till one hour after sunrise. T h e usual form of illuminant in a lighthouse is petroleum vapor with a mantle-the oil being vaporised on the spot. There are four electric lighthouses and one more being converted to electric light. T h e unwatched lights are in many cases acetylene.

The lens, though weighing in some cases 4 tons, can, owing to its perfect balance and to its floating in a mercury bath, be revolved by one's little finger. T h e actual method of revolving it is by means of

748 TRINITY HOUSE.

clockwork actuated by a weight. The keeper on watch winds it up every hour or s o ; this map seem primitive, but it helps to keep the keeper, who is alone in a warm lantern, awake. It is of course unnecessary for me to mention that the object of revolving the lens is to produce the flashes of light which give the "character " to the light by which one can be distinguished from another. For this purpose single, double or triple flashes or more are produlced; for instance, Hantland Point shows six flashes every 15 seconds. An additional advantage which the flashing light has over the fixed one is that it increases the power of the light, by concentrating it into the various panels of the lens ~inst'ead of diffusing it right round the horizon. Coloured lights are not used for important lights owing to the loss of intensity ; a red shade reduces the power 60 per cent. and a green one 75 per cent. ; these colours are, however, sometimes used for subsidiary beams to show over isolated rocks or shoals.

FOG SIGN~LS. The more important lighthouses have fog signals, the shore ones

being reeds, sirens or diaphones with a distinctive character, and the rock statlions usually an explosive signal consisting of a charge of tonite discharged from a gallows over the lantern at regular intervals. The reeds, sirens and diaphones are sounded by compressed air, the com- pression being effected by oil engines. Although the engines take about fifteen minutes to get under way, sounding can be commenced immediately it is necessary, as compressed air is kept available which will last for that time. The fog sirens and diaphones are quite formid- able in size and noise; the largest in our service is at Trevose Head and is 36 feet long and has an oval mouth, the maximum dfiameter of which is 18 feet.

Owing to the vagaries of sound, we always impress on seamen that a fog signal shoul'd be looked on as a warning signal and not one to be approached nearer than necessary by a vessel. Experiments we have carried out showed that a powerful signal could be heard at a distance of 12 miles, not heard at 8, heard again from 4 to 2 miles, and not heard at 3 mile. The sound seems to strike air of different densities and to be diverted upwards or downwards in curves.

WIRELESS DIRECTION FINDING. It is pantly owing to the uncertainty of these aerial signals that wire-

less beacons have been established round our coasts; Tninity House has ncrw eight of them in operation, and, a s they have a range of 70 miles or so, they cover a great part of the tracks round England and

TRINITY HOUSE. 749

Wales. They are called beacons, but really consist of an aerial through wh~ich during fog, and at intervals during clear weather, a wireless signal is emitted, the character of which denotes the place from which it is transmitted. A vessel wishing to obtain a bearing of the beacon is enabled to d o so with extreme accuracy by means of a direction-finding compass.

This device iis the greatest godsend the mariner has been presented with since lighthouses were established, since fog perhaps is his greatest enemy.

The sets we have installed necessitate no addition to the staff of a lighthouse, as they are almost entirely automatic. The wireless emissions take place at set intervals controlled by. a clock, a cam regulating the long and short dashes and dots; storage batteries are used which are automatically recharged, when the capacity falls, by a dynamo driven by a small Crossby oil engine--except where electric supply is available. All the keeper has to do is to keep rhe engine and so on oiled, and switch on the signal when necessary.

Owing principally to the extensive shoals on the East Coast we have a large number of llight vessels-43 on station and 7 to relieve them when they come in for overhaul. The early ones were of wood and are wonderful old vessels ; some of them have been on service since Queen Victoria came to the throne 94 years ago and are expected to last another ten years. Unfortunattely, owing to the difficulty of getting wooden vessels constructed nowadays due to lack of seasoned wood and skilled woodworkers, we can no longer build them, though we are con- structing same composite vessels.

W e also have iron and stteel vessels-they have to be brought in every three years for docking and overhaul, whereas wooden vessels remain on station for seven years. Most of the vessels are approximately 80 to IOO feet long, our later ones being 350 tons.

The older vessels have oil a s an illuminant, the lamps being placed in the focus of a silvered parabolic reflector, the grouping of these governing the character of the light, the clusters being revolved in the lantern by means of clockwork. The newer light vessels are electric incandescent in a lens with an intensity of half-million candle-power.

The dog signals range from manual horns in inshore ships to powerful diaphones. Many of the vessels have submarine bells or oscillators

75O TRINITY HOUSE.

which send the sound through the water, which vessels pick up by means of special fittings below the water line.

The crew of a light vessel consists of a master and six men; the former has a month aboard and one ashore, and the latter two months aboard and one ashore. They enter the service as seamen and must have four years service a t sea before entry. I may mention here that all our employees, ligh~thouse keepers, light vessel men and steam vesseI officers and men are penslionable.

Life in a light vessel or a rock lighthouse is very much less monotonous now than it formerly was, owing to the provision of listeningain-sets; this was due to the initiative of the Daily News which got up a publlic subscription for the purpose; the sets are maintained by Ithe good ofices of the Missions to Seamen.

Eleven light vessels are fitted with wireless telephones for life-saving purposes-they report to shore stations, vessels ashore or otherwise in distress.

BUOYS. Trinity House maintains over 600 navigational buoys round the

coasts, of which 141 are llighted. The estuary of the Thames, wi~th its sandbanks, shoals an'd many channels, accounts for a large number of these.

The buoys are of three main shapes: can, spherical and conical; they are of steel construction and are painted in charactertistic colours. Some of them are very large; for instance, an oil-gas lighted whistle buoy has a diameter of 10 feet, the light is 15 feet above the water level and a tulbe extends 23 feet below the buoy; the air, pumping through thlis tube as the buoy lifts and falls with the motion of the sea, actuates the whistle. This buoy weighs approximately g+ tons. You can imagine that buoys of this size are somewhat formi,dable objects for our steam tenders to deal with, especially if there is any lop on.

The illuminant in the buoys is oil-gas or acetylene in bottles; with bhe latter th,e gas lasts nearly 12 months before a new supply of bottles is required ; the change can be efl'ected on the spot. With oil-gas there are no bottles, the bu,oy itself being the container; and the gas is just pumped in to the buoy-the gas being renewed about every three months.

The positions of the buoys are constantly checked by our steam vessels, and also by the Elder Brethren during their annual inspection of lighthouses and light vessels.

TRINITY HOUSE. 7 s

STEAM VESSELS.

The other duties of our steam vessels consist in carrying reliefs to the light vessels and ro'ck lighthous,es, buoy-shifting, surveying, carrying stores and searching for and marking wrecks.

When a wreck occurs outside local jurisdliction dangerous to navigation or lifeboats, we mark it by a buoy, and, if the owners d o not undertake salvage, we disperse it either ourselves or by contract. W e had a very busy time during and for some years after the war carrying out this duty, a s you will appreciate. In one year we dealt with I 18.

THE Irene .

Many of us remember tlhe Irene, which was such a picturesque figure at all Spithead reviews for many years.

She was used ordinarily a s a lighthouse tender, her work being the routine work of lighthouse and light vessel reliefs, attending to buoys, dispersion of wrecks, etc. In summer, however, she was used on the inspection cruises when the Elder Brethren visit'ed all the lighthouses and light vessels, checked the positions of all light vessels and buoys, and performed their statutory obligation of inspecting local lighthouses, etc.

T h e Corporation have for many years enjoyed the privilege of acting a s escort to, and preceding the vessel carrying the Sovereign when afloat ,in home waters, a t Naval Reviews, etc. T h e Irene was sunk by a mine in November, 1915, and the steamer we now use for the purpose is the steam vessel Patricia.

PILOTAGE. Trinity I-Iouse is the principal pilotage authority of the United

Kingdom and, a s such, the Corporation examines, licenses and controls the pilotage service for the River Thames and its estuaries and approaches from Orfordness to Selsea Bill, an'd also for certain outport disttricts dotted about the coasts, including the Isle of W i g h t with Southampton, Plymouth, Falmouth and many others.

Altogether we have nearly 600 licensed pilots and 11 pilotage steamers and motor cutters.

CHARITABLE FUNDS.

Apart from what one may call tits public duties, which I have dealt with up to now, Trinity House a s a private corporation administers charitable funds amounting to about ,424,000 a year, specially dedi- cated to the relief of aged and distressed mariners and their dependants,

7 9 TRINITY HOUSE.

whilst at Wile End we have 66 almshouses for masters and their widows and spinster daughters. These almshouses are attributed to Christopher Wren. The income for the pensions, the land and almshouse buildings are mostly due to the benefactions of former Elder Brethren of Trinity House.

'THE TRINITY HOUSE FLAG. The origin of the Corporation's flag cannot be traced, but is

assumed to be cont,emporaneous with the grant of Arms. The grant of Arms was made by Queen Elizabeth and was issued on 27th January, 1573, by Gilbert Dethicke, Garter King at Arms.

The earliest pictorial representation of the flag is shown in the picture of " The Trinity Yacht off the Caskets " by Whi~tcombe in 1795. This picture is in the possession of Trinity House.

An Elder Brother of Trinity House is entitled, when afloat, to fly the Trinity jack a t the masthead of the vessel he is on board when he is on official duty in the service of the State or of the Corporation of Trinity House.

The Master's flag is the same as the Tsinity House jack except that it bears the Corporation's coat of arms in the centre. Coloured pictures of this and also of the Trinity House ensign, burgee and jack are to bc found in the Admiralty publication " Flags of all Nations," published by the Stationery Office.

Permission for the Corporation's steam and sailing vessels to fly the white ensign at the masthead on all oc~asi~ons upon which the shlips are dressed, and while escorting the Sovereign in company with royal yachts and ships of war was granted by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the 21st June, 1894.

I,IGHTHOUSES IN GENERAL. I have now, I think, given you an oultline of the activities of Tninity

House. Here are now a few remarks on lighthouses in general that may be of interest.

The earlicest ones of which there are records were in Egypt; beacon fires were maintained in them by priests. There is mention of one in Greece in 660 B.C., whilst the famous Pharos of Alexandria was built in the reign of Ptolemy in the 3rd century B.C.; it was one of the wonders of the world, and is said to have been Goo feet high. I t was destroyed by an earthquake in the 13th century.

On the Castle Hill a t Dover the ruins still exist of a tower constructed by the Romans on which a fire was burnt in a brazier to help the Roman galleys.

TRINITY HOUSE. 753

In the early days such lights a s were shown round our coasts to help the mariner were wood fires, kept going by monks of the seashore monasteries. Coal fires on special tolwers succeeded these, the last coal fire having been at S t . Bees until 1822; candles succeeded these fires a s an illuminant.

Lighlthouses were formerly built and maintained to a large extent by private enterprise under patent from the Crown, and the owners levied dues on passing vessels. These lighthouses in England and Wales were transferred to Trinity House by Act of Parliament in 1836. We had to purchase them in some cases for very large sums; for instance we paid for the Skerries L ~ ~ ~ , o o o , it having produced for its owner an annual profit of L I Z , j 2 j.

There was great opposition in some localities to the building of lighthouses, a s th'e dwellers on the seashore relied to a great extent on wreckage for fuel and stores. In 1619 great difficulty was experienced in getting labour to build the lighthouse at the Lizard. S i r John Killigrew wrote in regard to this :-

"The inhabitants nearby think they suffer by this erection. They affirm I take away God's Grace from them. Their English meaning is that now they shall receive no more benefit by shipwreck for this will prevent it. They have been so long used to reap profit by the calamities of the ruin of shipping that they claim it hereditary and heavily complain on me."

In Cornwall, notices of wrecks if occurring during divine service were at once given out in church b y the parson, and all left for the shore. On one occasion the parson, feeling he had a n unfair disadvantage, instead of giving out the notice in the customary way, proceeded to the west doorway and, having divested himself of his robes, said : " There is a wreck on the beach, and this time we'll all start fair." On another occasion a guileless curate visiting the Scilly Isles found the body of a man washed up on the beach and asked one of the islanders with a view to saving life " W h a t do you d o when you find a man nearly drowned ? " T h e reply was " Search his pockets."

These instances will show that Trinity H~ouse has not always been popular in its efforts to help the mariner.

The designers and construators of lighthouses were of most unlikely professions in former times.

Take the Eddystone, for example. The first lighthouse was bu~ilt in 1697 by Winstanley-an artist and engraver. H e and his men were carried off to France dur ing the wars by a French ship but were released after a short time. T h e lighthouse was of wood, polygonal in form, and with its verandahs and other excrescences was like a pagoda. It was washed away after six years with its architect and keepers.

754 TRINITY HOUSE.

T h e next Eddystone, also of wood but of modern form, was built by Rudyerd, a mercer; it lasted 47 years when it was destroyed by fire. There were three keepers at the time and one of them, aged 94, was throwing water over the flames in the lantern when the leaden roof melted an'd some of the molten lead went down his throat. H e sur- vived for twelve days, dying in Plymouth Hospital, and the piece of lead weighing 7 ounces was then extracted from his stomach. It is now in the Edinburgh Museum.

T h e next Eddystone lighthouse was designed and built by Smeaton -a clockmaker. This one was bulilt of granite blocks and the illuminant mas 26 candles, subsequently replaced by 24 oil lamps with re- fleators, and later on by a lens with a single lamp in the centre. This lighthouse stood for 120 years, and, as the rock on which it was built showed cracks, the present lighthouse was built on another rock in 1878 . Smeaton's lighthouse was re-erected on the Hoe at Plymouth.

G. R . M.

Now the lodesden of K ing Harry, or the Pilots of their day Lacked the rudiments of sea craft and were apt to lose their way, S o a charter was presented, 'neath the Royal seal and hand, T o the Guild of Holy Trinity and Clement, Deptford Strand.

Which in time from many galleons and from ships of later build Drew the mightiest of mariners a s brethren of the guild, W h o would sift the seas for secrets, and pronouncing what was good, Hand it on to their successors as an elder brother should.

By and by, their children's children, a s the ships delight to tell, Builded temples, where the spirits of their ancestors might dwell, In the tower on the headland, or the reef that lies off shore, Men may only sight a lighthouse, but the ships sight something

more !

For a s regular a s nightfall, up and down the English coast, Certain Ancients blink and waken where the traffic throngs the most; Then beware, K i n g George's lodesmen, what ye tell your ships to do, For the Eldest of the Brethren have their flashing eyes on you !

TRINITY HOUSE. 755

Would ye steer to grim disaster, where the breakers sob ahead ? 'Ware the anger of a Brother whom ye goad to seeing red ! Spin your wheels and clear t,he sector, till his wrath shall calm and

cease And his eyes be all untroubled a s he bi'ds you g o in peace.

Hear the chorus off the Lizard, how they gossip heart to heart : " Drake's tu *home again in Longships," " Hawkins hailed me off

the Start," " Sperrt'll mind ye by St . Cath'rines," so they clatter up and down, From the Bishop to the Forelands and the gates of London Town.

Rolls a fog bank up from seaward ? There is not a ship shall dare Make her landfall till the Brethren give their husky " WHOO-

goes tlhere ? " Men may prate forsooth of foghorns to expla~in the call they send, But the dripping tramp knows better, that is why she answers

" Friend."

Wherefore, when they sight a lighthouse, or a beacon or a buoy, O r the House Flag from a lightship waves its genial " Ship ahoy," ,411 the pilgrims of the Empire, be w,hate'er their size or build, Rend,er homage to K i n g Harry and the Brethren of the Guild.

THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY SCHEME.'

I t i s now generally recognised that no scheme of protection for our ocean-borne supplies is complete without a consideration of the economic factors governing those supplies. T h e importance to u s of supplies of foodstufis and war material from the North American continent, especially in the event of war wi th a European power, needs n o emphasis, and any plans for the facilitation of shipment of those supplies cull for close study.

There seems little doubt that the S t . Lawrence Waterway Scheme alill come to the fore sooner or later, and readers of THE NAVAL REVIEW %ill then have at hand a comprehensive and valuable survey of the whole situation. Meanwhile the paper affords an interesting study of one phase of Canadian-American relations. HON. EDITOR.

THE St. Lawrence Waterway Scheme is a project for the improvement of the St. Lawrence River above Montreal, to enable ocean-going vessels to ~ roceed to the ports of the Great Lakes of North America and, at the same time, to develop the hydro resources of the river. The greatest part of the work envisaged in the scheme requires to be done in the

l N o ~ ~ . - ' r h i s essay, written in November, 1931, is subject to some modification consequent upon recent developments. The Canadian Federal and Ontario provincial governments have agreed upon the hydro-electric development and the division between the two governments of the cost involved in the International Division as between power and navigation interests.

Agreement, which has been embodied in a treaty signed in July, 1932, has also been reached between the Canadian and American governments for the carrying out of the Waterway project, a s outlined in this paper. This is still subject to ratification, and is expected to come before the representative houses of government in each country late in 1932 or early in 1933. AS, however, a settlement, similar to that between the federal government and Ontario in Canada, has not yet been made between the American Federal and New York State authorities, there is still some uncertainty attaching to the finality of the Treaty. The Treaty provides for the work to be completed in from seven to ten years, the total cost, including National and International sections, to be divided equally between the two countries, Canada being given credit for work already done. Provision is also made for the adoption of the Canadian proposal for two dams in the International Division.

Since the signing of the Treaty i t has been announced that the Beauharnois development in tne Soulanges Section is to pass into the control of the Canadian Federal Govern- ment, being administered as a government canal.

The Welland Canal was opened officially during the visit to Canada of the delegates to the Imperial Conference in the summer of 1932.

September, 1932.

ST. LAWRENCE R\vER F R O M LAKE ONTARIO TO MONTREAL.

I-THOU~AND ISLANDS S E C ~ I O N - - 67 MILE^ ~ J T E R N T I ~ I ALAKE IT FRANCIS Fouih~~EsL LACHINE 1 SECTION - - 48 MILES SECTION- - 25 MILES SECTION , SECTION , I ~ M I L E S 26 MILES

92 F' D R O P 183FT. DROP ] 4 8 FT. D R O P

1 I

I --PROVINCE OF ONTARIO- . ' ~ I F L C ~ I ulr

- PROVIINCE OF ]QUEBEC -

4 C ~ U W A L L - . -. 1 \

- -STATE O F NEW YORl<----

THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY SCHEME. 757

183-mile stretch of the river, between its commencement at the outled of Lake Ontario and Montreal, through which occurs a drop of 226

feet. It is proposed to provide, initially, 27-foot channels with permanent structures, such as locks of 30-foo~t (depth, to allow of subsequent deepening of the whole. The scheme in its entirety includes the provision of adequate connecting channels between the lakes, but the existing works are such that their enlargement woul~d be a small undertaking in comparison with the development of the St . Lawrence above Montreal. A plan of this 183-mile section is appended.

The scheme has attracted a great deal of attention in Cana~da and the United States dur~ing the last twelve years, and from time to time notice has been taken of it in the English press. The object of this essay is to make clear to the average English reader what lies behind the scheme and the vast possibilities which are attached to it. No attempt has been made to reproduce all the arguments ' for ' and ' against ' which have been advanced, nor have all the different proposals for accomplishing the undertaking been examlined. An attempt has been malde, however, to emphasise the chief points sufficiently to enable anyone who reads this to follow current developments.

Properly to grasp the significance of the project it is necessary to review briefly the geographical arrangement of the North American continent and the economic development of those parts of Canada and the U.S.A. occupying the St. Lawrence Basin.

I I .-GEOGRAPHICAL. A reference to the map of North America shows three great bodies

of water lying approximately in the middle of the continent, in more or less the same degree of longitude : in the nonth, Hudson's Bay; in the centr'e, the Great Lakes system, draining to the east and north through the St . Lawrence River; an~d in the south, the Gulf of Mexico, in~to which drains the Mississippi River system from as far north as the region of the Great Lakes. These are the natural means of approach to the interior of the continent; for, lying along the Atlantic seaboard are two highland systems-the Laurentian, north of the St . Lawrence River, and the Appalachian, rising on the southern shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and extending almost to Florida in the south. There are three passages through the Appalachian system, the most northerly of which is that afforded by the Hudson River and its tributary, the Mohawk. The former rises in the vicinity of Lake Champlain in the St. Lawrence watershed and flows south into the Atlantic, where now is the city of New York. The Mohawk enters the Hudson from the

758 THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY SCHEME.

west, having its source in proximity to waters flowing into Lake Ontario. A map of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrenoe River is shown opposite.

The drainage basin of the St. Lawrence, which is approximately one third the area of Europe, extends westward to the Mississippi and Hudson's Bay watersheds. Situated in this area are the five bodies of tresh water comprising the Great Lakes, wcith a total area rather larger than that of England, Scotland and Wales combined.

The largest and m'ost westerly of these lakes, Lake Superior, the area of which approximates to that of Scotland, extends almost to the centre of the continent. It is drained by the St . Mary's River, 63 miles in length, flowing from its eastern end into Lakes Michigan and Huron. There is a drop of 16 feet in the course of the river, the greater part of which is at Sault Ste Marie. The river has been canalised and locks installed at the " Sault," one on the Canadian shore and four on the American, the two most recently completed of which each have a depth of 24+ feet.

Lake Michigan, which is the second of the lakes in point of size is wholly American. I t is connected with Lake Huron, the next in size, by the Straits of Mackinac. The surface level of Lakes Michigan and Huron is the same.

T h e drainage from all three of what are known as the " Upper Lakes " is from the southern extremity of Lake Huron through the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River,, round the south- west end of the Ontario Peninsula, into Lake Erie, a total distance of IOO miles. The difference in level between Lakes Huron and Erie is 8 to g feet, which is taken up in the flow of the rivers. These have been dredged to a depth of 20 feet to accommdate shipping. The outlet of Lake Erie is at its eastern end by way of the Niagara River and Falls, through which occurs a drop of 325 feet [to Lake Ontario.

The Welland Canal has bleen cut across the Niagara Peninsula, on the Canadian side of the boundary, for the passage of ships. The recent supersession of the original 14-foot canal by a new work 25 miles in length, with 25-foot channels and 30-foot locks, designed to allow of subsequent d'eepening of the whole when necessary, now makes the 20-foot channels between Lakes Huron and Enie the limiting depth for vessels plying between ports on the three Upper Lakes and Lake Ontario. On thfe ,4merican side of Lake Erie, just above Niagara River, is the entrance to the Erie Canal, which provides a 12-foot channel to New York by way of the Mohawk and Hudson River valleys, upon which are operated specially designed barges up to as large as 2,000 tons.


The Niagara River discharges into the western end of Lake Ontario, the smallest of the five lakes, the area of which is approximately the same as that of Wales. The St. Lawrence River commences at the eastern end of the lake.

ST. LAWRENCE RIVER. From Lake Ontario the St. Lawrence flows in a north-easterly

direotion 183 miles to Montreal, where it is joined by the Ottawa River from the north-west. There is a drop of 226 feet in this 183 miles, anld it is here that the greatest part of the work requires to be done before the " lakes to the sea deep waterway " is complete. This also is the site of the projected power development. The details of this section which are set out in the accompanying map are described in a subsequent paragraph and it is only necessary to note here that six canals have been constructed on the Canadian side of the river for the passage of ships round those stretches which are not navigable. The minimum depth of these existing works is 14 feet, which allows vessels of some 2,500 tons to proceed from the lakes to Montreal. Montreal is the present head of ocean navigation. From here to Quebec, a distance of 160 miles, the river has been dredged, where necessary, to provide a channel 30 feet deep; the work of increasing the minimum depth throughout to 35 feet is now in hand. From Quebcx the river continues a further 180 miles to Father Point, where it opens into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The channel from Quebec to Father Point is 35 feet deep, whilst for the 600 odd miles through the Gulf to the ocean it is of sufficient depth to accommodate any vessel afloat.

Having outlined the St . Lawrence system it is necessary to point out its relation to the Canadian-American boundary. Approaching from the east the boundary strikes the river at Cornwall, 68 miles above Montreal and 115 miles downstream from Lake Ontario. From Cornwall, it follows the centre of the river upstream, and then through the centre of Lakes Ontario, Erie, St . Clair, Huron and Superior and their connecting rivers. From Lake Superior, it goes west-by-north a short distance to the Lake of the Woods, whence it follows the 49th parallel of Latitude to the Pacific Coast.

The St. Lawrence River, for the greater part of its course between Lake Ontario and Montreal, flows in a wide, deep channel, broken at intervals by sharp descents characterised by rapids and swift currents. This portion falls into two pol~itical divisions : the " International," from Lake Ontario to Cornwall ; and the " Canadian," the remainder of the dis~tance to Montreal. These are again divisible into sections, five in all, according to the physical features of particular stretches of the river. These are the " Thousand Islands " and " International


Rapids " sections in the International division and the " Lake St. Francis," " Soulanges " or " Beauharnois," and " Lachine " sections in the Canadian division, occurring in the order named, downstream from Lake Ontario.

The Thousand Islands section begins w~ith the river at its out- flow from Lake Ontario, just below Kingston on the Canadian shore, and extends downstream 67 miles to a short way below Prescott on the Canaldian bank. The rimer here is wide and deep, which, comibined with a drop in level of about one foot only, results in a slow steady current. As the name implies, however, there are numerous islands, and the provision of a big-ship channel will necessitate a considerable amount of cutting through rock and the removal of granite reefs.

The International Rapids section begins some three miles below Prescoctt. Here the river drops 92 feet in the course of 48 miles through a series of four rapids. The Galop Rapids and the Rapid Plat, above Morrisburg, aocount for one third of the descent lin the first 18 miles; ther'e is a further drop in the Farran Point Rapids, some 10 miles below Morrisburg; whilst 8 miles further down is the commencement of the Long Sault Rapids, which continue to the end of the sectlion, where the river opens into Lake St. Francis and the International boundary leaves the river.

At the foot of the Long Sault Rapids the river widens out to form Lake St. Francis, the width varying from 3 to 6 miles. The current here is sluggish, and, though deep water is found for the greater part of the 25 miles length of the lake, dredging of shoals will be necessary to provide a 27 foot channel.

The Soulanges section begins at the foot of Lake St. Francis. The river here drops 83 feet in a distance of 17 miles to Lake St. Louis.

Lake St. Louis forms the upper pontion of the last, or Lach~ine, section. From its head to Montreal is a distance of 26 miles. The lake itself is 15 miles long, and for the most part is deep except at the lower end, where it shoals. From the foot of the lake the river drops g feet in a distance of 4 miles to the Lachine Rapids, where there is a sharp drop of 24 feet in one mile. -4t the foot of the rapids the river widens out into La Prairie Basin, a five-mile stretch of shoal water where there is a further drop, making a total for the section of about 48 feet.

The following is a summary of the proposals for the development of the St . Lawrence between Lake Ontario and Montreal.

(a) Thousand Islands Section. Clearing and deepening the river channel. No power.

(b) International Rapids Section. By means of one or two dams, to raise the water level sufficiently to enable ships to pass into


the section above through a free channel. Hydro-Electric power plant of approximately 2,000,ooo H.P . to be installed at the dams, where also would be installed locks for the passage of ships.

(c) Lake St. Francis Section. Dleepening of the channel as necessary.

(d) Soulanges Section. A canal 15 miles long and 27 feet deep, from the foot of Lake St. Francis to the head of Lake St. Louis, is now nearing completion. This work has been undertaken by the Beauharnolis Light, Heat and Power Co., which has obtained the right to divert sufficient flow of water to develop 500,coo H.P. in return for royalties on the power produced and the construction of a canal suitable for the passage of ships. The power plant will be at the lower end of the canal, where also will be installed locks for the passage of ships when the need arises. The total power capable of being developed in this section is estimated to be in the neighibourhoold of 2,000,000 H.P .

(e) Lachine Section. T o raise the level of Lake St. Louis 4 feet for navigation purposes, by the erection of a dam in the Lachine Rapids, and to construct a canal g miles long, with three locks, from the foot of the lake to Montreal Harbour. There is estimated to be about ~,ooo,ooo H.P. capable of development in this section, but the initial cost is considered to be too great to make it economically practicable at present. It is proposed to leave it in abeyance therefore until the demand for electric power justifies the undertaking.

Until the advent of the railway towards the middle of the last century the lakes and rivers provided the only means of transporting goods in any quantities, both in Canada and in the United States. The Erie Canal, between Lake Erie and the Hudson River, mas completed in 1825 and was followed shortly by the first Welland Canal, ibuilt to carry shipping round Niagara. The latter was taken over by the Canadian government a few years later and incorporated in a comprehensive waterway system designed to make Canada, as it then existed, one economic unit. This undertaking was completed in 1848 when an all Canadian waterway g feet deep was placed in operation between Montreal and Lake Erie. The rapid settlement of the American West and the consequent growth of the Lake trade, led to the improvement of the rivers between Lakes Huron and Erie by the American Govern-


ment, which, in 1855, also unldentook the construction of the first lock a t Sault Ste Marie for the passage of vessels into and out of Lake Superior. All these canals have been enlarged and improved to meet the requirements of the times, and are now maintained by the Govern- ments in whose territory they lie, by whom also they are operated free of tolls.

The pioneers were attracted to the Great Lakes country by the fertile lands and water transport. As manufacturing increased, however, the discovery of iron and copper and of anthracite coal converted this agricultural country into what is probably one of the world's largest industrial areas. Particularly. is this the case in the United States. The four chief industrial states in the Union, with a combined population in excess of 30 millions, all have lake coastlines. Practically the whole output of American anthracite coal is from the south shore of Lake Erie, whilst 60 per cent of the country's iron ore comes from the Lake Superior country. Adjoining the ' Lake States ', and nearer to the Great Lakes than to either the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico, are some of the more important agricultural areas of the country. Altogether, it is safe to say that the population of the American area contiguous to the Great Lakes is more than 40 millions.

On the Canadian side of the boundary a not dissimilar situation exists, though of course on a much smaller scale. The Province of Ontario, which awns the whole of the Canadian coastline on the Lakes, contains a third of the population and produces more than 50 per cent. af the manufactures-by value of gross output-of the entire Dominion. The productive areas for the most part are concentrated in the peninsula lying between Lake Huron on the one side and Lakes ErBe and Ontario on th'e other. The older Province of Quebec, the more thickly settled areas of which are in the St. Lawrence Valley between Monhreal and Quebec city, contains 27 per cent. of the population and produces 28 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. In each of these Provinces the proportion of manufactures to agriculture, on the basis of gross output, is approximately two to one. In order that the extent of the manufacturing industry may be gauged, it is observed that less than half of the Canadian export trade-which ranks fifth among the countries of the world-now consists of raw material. The fact remains, however, that bath Provinces are still in the early stages of development and may reasonably be expected eventually to support a population many times as great as at present. While coal is not found in either Province, both are rich in practically all of the ~ t h e r important commercial minerals except tin, and both possess very great water power resources.


In fact with no coal supply indigenous to the chief manufacturing areas, industry has been built upon electrical energy developed from water-power ; and it may be said that what coal was to England in the 19th century, wat~erpower is to Canada to-day. Some 95 per cent. of the electrical energy produced is derived from water-power.

The rate of development of water-power in Canada has been rapid; the installed horse power increased nearly 600 per cent. between 1910 and 1928, and at the end of the latter year amounted to 54 million H.P. The projected de~~elopment of the St. Lawrence, as we have seen from the outline of the scheme, would make possible the eventual installation of a further 4 million H.P. for the Canadian market, the half of 2 millions in the International Division of the river and a further 3 m~illions in the purely Canadian Division. Whilst there is no doubt that the Canadian demand for electrical energy will continue to increase, it is feared in some quarters that, if the scheme is undertaken as a whole, power would be developed in excess of th'e absonbent capacity of the Canadian market, resulting in the export of the surplus to lthe United States. In explanation of this attitude it is observed that the United States have developed the greater (part of the watmer-power that can be obtained economically within a reasonable distance of the Eastern industrial area and are now taking some 1 1 per cent. of the output of Canalda. The Canadian market is increasing steadily, and lit is possible t o foresee a time when it will require all the power available. When this time arrives it will not be possible to discontinue the export to the United States, for t o d o so woul'd ruin the ~inldustries which have grown up in that country dependent upon this power, throw thousands out of employment, and so 1,ead to serious international complications. More- over, if power will not go to industry the latter must come to power ; and public opinion, not unnaturally, is averse t o the disposal of the natural resources of the country for the benefit of foreign taxpayers.

Ownership of water-power resources in Canada is vested in the Crown, represented by the Provinces in which the sites are situated. Public ownership is favoured in Ontario, where development and distribution are largely in the hands of a semi-official body k n w r as the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. A somewhat different policy is followed in Quebec, where the various power sites are developed by private interests under licence from the provincial government, to whom is paid an annual rental and royalties on the power produced. The export of power is now controlled by the Dominion government, new permits being generally restnicted to the disposal of temporary surplus production such as occurs at seasonal periods of high water.


The foregoing may seem rather a digression from the subject in hand; but its importance cannot be stressed too strongly, for it is felt by many people that the power aspect of the St . Lawrence Waterway Scheme is of equal, if not greater, importance than the question of opening the ports of the Great Lakes to ocean shipping.

The growth of the tindustrial areas round the Great Lakes and the development of the grain growing areas to the westward of them gives employment to a considerable volume of shipping on the Lakes themselves. The entire Lake Fleet in 1927, both Canadian and American, consisted of 765 vessels with a gross register tonnage of about 3 million tons; that is, some 4 per cent. of the registered shipping of the world. Many of these vessels average from 13,000 to 15,000 tons, whilst the largest is 16,500. These craft for the most part are designed to handle particular bulk cargoes only, special machinery being installed at the terminal points for rapid loading and unloading, and are operated to the fullest extent throughout the &month season of navigation, the time in port being reduced to a minimum. For instance, the record for handling iron ore is 164 minutes to load 12,508 tons and 3 hours j

minutes to discharge the same cargo.2 The heaviest traffic is that handled at Sault Ste Marie, at the outlet of Lake Superior, where, during 1928, an average of IOO ships a day were locked through. This is acknowledged to be the greatest ship highway in the world ; and it is even claimed that the traffic passing through it during the eight-month season of navigation is greater than that through the Suez, Panama, K~iel, and Manchester Ship Canals combined, in a year. Of the cargo passing through the canal in 1926, 80 per cent. consisted of grain (105 million tons) and iron ore (579 million tons) down-bound and I j per cent. of coal on the return journey. Half the grain and a small percentage of the ather cargoes were carried in Canaldian ships to the ex~tent altogether of rather less than one tenth of the whole. Another inldication of the importance of the lake commerce is to be found in the fact that Buffalo, at the lake end of the Erie Canal, is the fourth largest port of the United States. On the Canadian side of the boundary, the annual departures from Port Arthur and Fort William-the wheat ports on Lake Superior-amount to approximately half the number of vessels and a thiird of the tonnage passing through the Suez Canal in a year.

As we have seen, the bulk of the Canadian cargoes on the Great Lakes are made up of grain of one kind or another. Wheat is the chief od these to the extent of some 70 per cent. of the whole. It is worth noting the extent of this trade; for, notwithstanding the importance of the manufacturing industry in the Eastern Provinces, wheat is Canada's

Encyl. Brit. 14th Edition Vol. 10, p. 731.

THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY SCHEME. 7%

chief individual product, and normally constitutes one third of the country's exports in value. Most of the annual crop comes from the Prairie Provinces to the west of Lake Superior, from which some 8+ million tons were exported in 1927. One seventh of this was shipped through Pacific Coast ports; of the remainder, a small proportion went direct by rail to Montreal, while the balance, some 80 per cent. of the whole, went by rail to Lake Superior and thence by lake vessels, half to Canadian and half to American ports. The bulk of the ship- ments to Canadian ports were transhipped at Niagara (Port Colborne) to smaller vessels for the passage through the Welland and St. Lawrence Canals to Montreal. The 'early opening of the Welland Ship Canal will obviate the necessity for transhipment at Niagara, and the larger lake vessels will soon be able to proceed as far as Kingston a t the lower end of Lake Ontario. The deepening of the channel in the Thousand Islands seation of the St . Lawrence to a depth of 23 feet is now in hand to enable these vessels to reach Prescott, from whence the cost of transporting grain to Montreal by rail will be comparatively light. I t is anticipated these improvements will benefit the Canadian growers by reducing the cost of transporting the grain to foreign markets, and will, at the same timle, secure a greater proportion of the trade for Canadian ponts.

Normally there is little fluctuation of the water level of the lakes during the season of navigation, and ships are designed to operate at the maximum draught that will allow of their passage through the various improved channels. Of recent years, however, the lake levels have been lowered an appreciable amount by the diversion of water from Lake Michigan through th'e Chi'cago Sanitary and Ship Canal into the Mississippi Basin. This has imposed a considerable burden on lake shipping interests generally, for lit necessitattes vessels' operating at a reduced draught with a consequent loss of cargo-carrying capacity.

The other Lake States are agitating for the diversion to be reduced, though it is recognised it cannot be stopped altogether as the Chicago Canal now forms the last link in a g-foot waterway connecting Lake Michigan with the Gulf of Mexico by way of the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers.

1V.-NEGOTIATIONS.-THE FORMULATION OF THE PROJECT.

The Great Lakes anld the St . Lawrence havie been the subject of numerous treaties between England and Canada on the one side and the United States on the other, but it is only necessary to mention the two more important ones. The Treaty of Washlington tin 1871 gave to the .4mericans freedom of navigation throughout the St. Lawrence.


The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 extended the freedom of navigation for citizens of both countries in boundary waters to include Lake Michigan, which u'p to that time hald been an American preserve, and to all canals connecting boundary waters. Provision was made at the same time for the setting up of a representative official b,ody, known as the Joint International Commission, to exercise jurisdiction and to advise both governments in all matters pertaining to bounldary waters.

The question of opening the Great Lakes to ocean shipping has engaged the atten~tion of individuals for upwards of a hundred years. The earliest advocates of the plan had the St. Lawrence in mind as the entrance; though serious consideration was given later to the route followed by the early fur traders from Georgian Bay, the eastern section of Lake Huron, by way of Lake Nipissing and the Ottawa River to its junction with the St. Lawrence at Montreal. An official survey of the Georgian Bay route was made tin 1904, when it was reported that a waterway 440 miles in length, with 27 locks capable of ac~commodating ships 600 feet long by 60 feet beam and drawing 20 feet, could be completed in ten years a t an estimated cost of ~20,000,000.

Nothing further was done in regard to the matter, butt it is of importance as providing a potential all-Canadian route for large ships, which could be developed when the need arose should the Canadian and American governments not be able to agree upon a working arrangement in regard to the St. Lawrence Scheme. When comparing the cost of the Georgian Bay route with that of the projected St. Lawrence development it should be borne in mind that the estimate was made at a time when lalbour costs were comparatively low, and that it only allowed for a 22-

foot, as opposed to a 27-foot, channel. Other disadvantages attaching to it in comparison with the St. Lawrence are that it would not directly serve the industrial areas, there would be a greater distance of restricted channels, and the power development would be neglligible in comparison.

The possi~bility of the St. Lawrence Scheme dimd not take concrete form until 1913, when the U.S. Government askmed that the matter might be referred to the Joint International Commission, set up after the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, for report. The war of 1914-18 inter- vened and nothing was done. During the war several proposals were put forward to develop part of the power in the International Rapids Seotion of thme St. Lawrence, but approval was withheld, as it was felt that nothing should be undertaken which might be prejudicial to any scheme formulated later for the development of all the resources of the river calculated to give the greatest benefit both to transportation and to indus~try in the form of power.


Whilst, prior to 1914, the products of the inland American States had been handicapped in foreign markets by the delay. and expense incidental to the long railway journey to the coast-in many cases u p wards of a thousand m~iles-the situation was very much accentuated by the war. The manufacturing industry, stimulated by home and foreign demand at a time when other sources of supply were cut off, increased to such an extent that the railways anld ocean terminal points could not cope efficiently with the traffic they were called upon to handle. The resultant congestion, delay and expense attracted more and more attention to the possibbilities of opening the Great Lakes to ocean shipping. In Canada manufacturing had increased, proportionally, to an even greater exten~t; but the transportation situation was not at all critical, Canadian railway facilities being far in advance of population. Ontario was attracted to the scheme by the possibility of acquiring ocean ports, and \by the development of the vast amount of power running to waste in the St . Lawrence. The proponents of the scheme also claimed that it would facilitate the export of the Western wheat crop. The Power aspect of the case undou~btedly influenced American opinion too, though possibly not to the same extent as did the necessity for an outlet to the sea.

As soon as the war was over lthe Canadian Deep Waterways and Pow,er Association, composed for the most part of Ontario (interests, and the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Tidewater Association in the United States, were formed for the purpose of promoting the Lakes to the Sea Dceep Waterway. Th'e two governments were induced to take action and, in 1920, the whole question was referred to the Joint International Commission for investigation.

Opposition to the scheme was soon raised by the Atlantic seaboard interests, who saw in it a threat to their position in the economic life of both countries. Antagonism was particularly strong in New York, where, while the necessity for a big-ship canal to the Great Lakes was not conceded, it was maintained that, if any action was taken, con- sideratlion shoulld only be given to an all-American route, enlargement of the Erie Canal being advocated. The strongest Canadian opposition was in the Province of Quebec, though the objections raised were more " National " in character than was the case in the States. It was maintained, primarily, that ocean ships would not use the river above Montreal even if the work was completed. Further abjections were :- firstly-Dovelopmenr of the St. Lawrence hitherto had been entirely in Canadian hands, and the scheme would jeopardise sovereign rights therein ; secondly-Interference with the flow of the St. Lawrence would be prejudicial to Montreal and other Cana~dian ports on the river;


thirdly-The amount of power lo be produlced would be greater than the Canadian market could albsorb, with the result that large quantities would be exported; and finally, the finances of the country, already burdened with the debts arising out of the war and the National Rail- ways, were not in a state to warrant the cost of the undertaking, var~iously estimated as being from L2o to A200 million sterling ! Official opinion in Manitoba held that the completion of the Hudson's Bay railway was the most important need of the West, whilst the other Prairie Provinces looked more towards an outlet on the Pacific Coast. Nottwithstanding these objections the International Joint Commission submitted to the Canadian and American governments a unanimous report in favour of the project. I t was acknowledged, however, that the benefits to be derived would accrue, at first, in much larger measure to the United States than to Canada.

The report was adopted by the -4merican government despite the opposition of official representatives of the State of Yew York. The Canadian government, however, in reply to an American note, declined to proceed any further with the matter until after further consideration. Publicity continued to be given to the question, and it was kept alive both by newspaper campaigns and debates in the representative houses of government in each country.

The Board of Engineers, attached to the Joint International Com- mission, was enlarged in 1924 for the purpose of reviewing all the engineering problems of the scheme. Official bodies were formed in each country at the same time to examine the purely national aspects of the matter; these were the National Advisory. Committee in Canada and the St . Lawrence Commission in the United States, the latter being un'der the chairmanship of Mr. Hoover, the present President of the U.S.A.

The Joint Engineering Board submitted irs report during the latter part of 1926. The plan put forward was generally as already outlined. It entailed the provision of 25 miles of canal, in which there would be not more than g locks, and provided for an initial development of 3 million horse-power. Provision was made for locks of the same dimensions as those in the Welland Ship Canal, namely 829 feet long, 80 !feet wide with a depth oif 30 feet, and for 25-foot channels in the first place, to be deepened to 30 feet as and when required. It was agreed, subsequently, that the channels should be 27 feet deep instead of 25 feet. It was estimated that the work could be completed in from eight to ten years from the date of commencement, while the cost was computed to be in the neighbourhood of one hundred million pounds Sterling.


The American and Canadian members of the Board were divided in their opinion as to the best method of carrying out the work in the International Rapids section. The former preferred a single stage development, with one dam only, to be situated at Barnhart Island near the foot of the sect'ion. The Canaldian engineers recommended a Two Stage development with two dams, one at Ogden Island, just albove Morrisburg, and the other at Cornwall Island at the foot of the section. The final cost in each case, including the ins~tallation of 2,0o0,000 H.P., was estimated to ble more than 50 million sterling.

Two plans were put forward for carrying out the work in the Soulanges section, both of which entailed the construction of dams in the river. The first allowed for the gradual development of the 2,000,000

H.P. available. The initial work for navigation purposes and the installation of 500,ooo H.P. to cost ~21,000,000; the final cost, after the remainder of the power had been developed, to be ~41,000,ooo. The alternative plan entailed the development of the whole of the power in the initial stage a t a cost of jt;3g,ooo,ooo. Neither plan is now necessary for any purely navigational project, for the canal being constructed by the Beauharnois Light, Heat and Power Co., in connection with their power development (see page 761), has been designed to accommodate the largest vessels. It is estimated that when the canal iis finished, additional work to enable ships to pass through could be carried out at a cost of approximately ,&4,00o,ooo.

The Lachine section was estimated to require an outlay of approximately ~xo,50o,ooo to develop lit for navigattion alone. The plan proposed allowed for the subsequent installation of ~,ooo,ooo H.P., the cost of the first half million to be ,&16,ooo,ooo and the remainder ~g,ooo,ooo.

The " all-American " St. Lawrence Commission made its report to the United States government during the latter part of 1926. This dealt with the question of transport in relation to the inland States, in all its aspects, and made the following points :-The construction of a ship- way from the Lakes to the Ocean was imperative for the relief and future development of the interior. The St. Lawrence route was the most suitable, provided arrangements could be made with Canada. I t was stated that to enlarge the Erie Canal would cost about three rimes as much as the St. Lawrence development, whilst olperatsion costs would be from four to five times as great. This report was adopted by the American government.

The report of the Canadian National Advisory Committee was submitted to Ottawa early in 1927. Though generally favourable towards the scheme, the view expressed by the Joint International Commission,

7 7 O THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY SCHEME.

that the United States woulsd receive the greatest benefits, was again put forward together with a recommendation that no aation should be taken if it was proposed that Canada should assume half the financial obli- gations involved. I t was suggested that as Canada already had spent some ~4o,ooo,ooo in the St . Lawrence and in the Welland Canals, whilst a further ~40,000,000 was required for the development of the wholly Canadian division of the river, it would not be unreasonable to expect the United States to undertake the entire work, both for navigation and power, in the International division, togekher with the deepening of the Upper Lake Channels, at a total estimated cost of ~68,000,ooo. I t was further recommended that the work should be carried out under the technical supervision of an International Com- mission which, on completion of the work, shoulfd be charged with full authority to direct maintenance an'd operation and to regulate the use of water at the power plants in the International Division, in order that such use might be prevented from creating conditions harmful to navigation in any part of the St . Lawrence. Attention was drawn to an alternative two-stage plan for the development of the Inter- national Rapids section, with the upper dam at Chrysler Island below, instead of at Ogden Island above, Morrisburg, designed to afford better control of the flow and to provide a power development more acceptable to American requirements.

The committee stated it was opposed to the export of power and recommended that the purely $Canadian division of the river should be developed before work was undertaken in the International Division. It w~ent on to express the opinion that

"if a reasonable time were permitted in which to enable the resultant power to be economically absorbed the development of this national section would be undertaken by private agencies willing and able to finance the entire work, including the necessary canalisation, in return for the right to develop the power."

This actually has been done in the Lachine section, the Beauharnois Company, as we have seen, having undertaken to provide a ship canal in return for the right to develop only a quarter of the power available there. In regard to somereign rights it was stated that " in the event of a new treaty being negotiated the United States should not be given any greater rights than obtain under existing treaties." I t is of interest to note in this respect that, whereas by the Washington Treaty of 1871 American citizens obtained the right of free navigation in the St. Lawrence in perpetuity, this does not extend to the unconditional use of the Canadian canals, though it is in fact allowed.

These reports formed the basis of correspondence between the Canadian and American governments during 1927 and 1928, in which

THE ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY SCHEME. 77I

the latter accepted the Canadian views generally, particularly in regard to the expont of power and division of the cost, thfough exception was taken to consicderation being given to the cost of works, to be super- seded by the scheme, in the Canadian estimate, and tit was maintained that work should be undertaken in all sections at the same time. The matter was then dropped pending agreement being reached as to the best means of developing the International Rapids section, and also agreement between the Proviinces of Ontario and Quebec on the one hand and the Dominion government on the other in regard to power rights. As already mentioned, ownership of power is vested in the Provinlces; but its development is subordinate to navigation, which comes exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Dominiion government. Thus the development of power in connection with navigational works threakened to bring the local and federal governments into conflict, and it was necessary to come to some working arrangement.

Negot~iations tbetween the Canadian and American governments have recently been resumed, so that agreement on these points has pr,esumably been reached, and all that now remains is the final drafting of a treaty that will satisfy the requirements of each country. It cannot definitely be said, however, that the end is in sight; for, though Canadian public opinion generally appears to be more favourably disposed towards the scheme than formerly, opposition is still being voiced by the Quebec provincial government on the grounds that the finances of Canada are in no condition to assume the great financial burden involved. I t is not likely that any Canadian federal government would risk offending the large Quebec electorate. In these circumstances it would appear that the Americans must be prepared to make considerable concessions if they want the scheme undertaken as a whole now. On the other hand there is still a considerable btody of opinion in the United States that holds that the scheme is not worth the expenditure if Canada fonbids the export of power. It has, however, a strong fr'iend a t court in no less a person than the President of the United States who, before assuming that office, was chairman of the American St. Lawrence Commission. It was expected that on his assumling office endeavour would be made to hasten the undertaking, and it seems reasonable to anticipate that as his term is drawing to a close every effort will be made to place the matter on a satisfactory footing.

From the facts set out lit seems inevitable that the Great Lakes, in effect an inland sea, will be opened to ocean shipping sooner or later, and it is safe to say that if the whole route was in American territory the work would already have been carried out. On the ather hand,


if it was a wholly Canadian concern, it prabably would not be considered seriously for some time to come, and then would be accomplished gradually, the power development being made to carry the cost of the navigational works. Any arrangements that are made must, therefore, be a compromise between the requirements of the two countries; that is to say, if the Americans want the development now they must be prepared bo assume the greater share of the cost. It must not be lost. sight of in this connection that whereas the population of the United States is more than 120 millions that of Canada is little more than 10 millions. It also puts into Canadian hands a bargaining power with whilch to force an equ~itable settlement of such outstanding questions as the Chicago Diversion.

It may appear that inherent defects in the scheme are that the St. Lawrence is closed for from 4 to j months each year and that ocean- going ships will not proceed so far from their proper element. Re- flection thab Montreal, some 1,000 miles from the ocean, is the second port on the continent and that 20,000-ton shiips, of 18 knots speed, sail from it regularly, shoul~d be sufficient to refute these views, though possibly a great deal of transhipment will continue to be carried out a t Montreal.

The scheme will enable go per cent. of the shipping now calling at North American ports to have free access to a manufacturing area, which, (despite the handicap of uneconomical transport, has been able to make a place for its goods in the markets of the world. This, combined with the large quantities of power which will be made available, may be exlpected to have far-reaching effects upon the prosperity of both countries.

An aspect of the matter which, though it has received attention in the Press, has not appeared in any official correspondence, is that of the attitude to be adopted by each country in the event of either being at war when the other is neutral. This will be the first treaty of real imporitance negotiated by any of the Dominlions, and the result may be awaited with interest.

List of Authorities. The St. Lawrence Waterway Project by G. W. Stephens.

(Carrier-Toronto.) Canada Year Book-1928. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th Edition. The St. Lawrence Waterway Project-Canadian Parliamentary

White Paper-Correspondence between Canadian and American Governments.

Various articles in the Press.

PAGES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS.

Continued from the August number, 1932.

DURING the Zulu war a constant correspondence passed between Adm~iral Sir William Mends, the Director of Transports at the Admiralty, and Commodore Richards. An extract from one of the last of these may illustrate some of the difficulties of the position.

29th September, 1879. My dear Richards,-Many thanks for yours of the 2nd instant. I am

well pleased with all that has been done, especially with that of turning the City of T7enice to account. It is always necessary to have a ship as headquarters ship and depot, hut to be used as circumstances render necessary . . . Our official letters will give full details respecting the removal of all the troops intended to be embarked from the Cape Colony. I conclude the military authorities keep you informed of all such detail, as well as of the telegraphic comm~lnications on such matters addressed by the General officer commanding the Forces to the War Office: a long telegram has recently been received from Sir Garnet on these matters which it is essentially necessary you should be aware of-and if I find you have not been com- municated with on the subject I shall point out the danger likely to befall the public interest by one-sided actions, iniiolving considerable expenditure. I know the tact necessary to a position such as yours, as well as the ability to combat quickly and readily the various plausible arguments held-but I have such perfect faith in your judgment and skill that I have no misgiving

1st October, 1879.

Your letter of the 8th September is just come in. Orontes is leaving St. Vincent to-day. I am glad City of Venice is coming u p with a regiment . . . . our object is to get all away that are to come, before the end of the financial year. The Major-General when with me had not the scope for *the vagaries he is now displaying. The only way is to keep perfectly cool and firmly hold to what is right, not on any point yielding up the control of the shipping to any soldier living . . .

Yours most truly, R. MENDS.

From October, 1879, to the end of the year Richards had one of the rare pauses that came to him in the course of this most active command : anld the signal log for this brief period reveals only the usual Iiife of

774 PAGES AND PAPERS FROM THE LIFE OF ADMIRAL

attenttion to th,e ordinary current affairs of men-of-war on foreign sltations, together wi.th a wi,de hospitality to the officers on the station.

THE BRASS RIVER. At the end of the year the scene shifts to the West Coast of A4frimca

where new activitiaes awaited him beginning with a letter from t,he Foreign Office to the A,dmiralty.

17th December, 1879.

Sir,-I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to transmit to you the accompanying papers relating to the British schooner Cyfiriot which would appear to have been attacked and plundered by the natives in the Brass River : and I am to request that in laying these papers before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty you will move their Lordships to give directions that they may be commun,icated to the Senior Naval Officer on the West Coast of Africa with instructions to inquire into and report upon this affair, and particularly with reference to the conduct of some of the white traders who are alleged to have encouraged the natives in plundering this vessel by purchasing some of the oil taken out of her.

I am, etc., JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

The papers spoken 'of in this Foreign Office letter contained a letter from the Committee of Lloyd's enclosing a protest and captain's letter connected with the schooner Cypriot and saying " It appears that the vessel was abandoned perforce by the captain and crew, on account of an attack by natives in the Brass River, and it would seem that rhe hull of the vessel iis still intact in that niver."

Commodore Richards went to the scene, and the following extracts from the official correspondence relate the sequel.

l1 Report of an inquiry held on board H.M.S. Forester in the Brass River cn 25th, 26th and 27th February, 1880, into the case of the alleged plunder of the British schooner Cyfiriot by natives and others."

'( Roadicea off the Bonny, 29th February, 1860.

Sir,-In compliance with the directions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty conveyed in your letter of 26th December last, I anchored off the Brass River in H.M. ship bearing my broad pennant on Monday ~ 3 r d instant where I found the Firebrand and the Forester, the vessels I had appointed to meet me there.

" 2. Mr. S. F. Easton, Her Majesty's acting Consul for the Bights, was conveyed in the Firebrand from Fernando Po.

" 3. The following day at noon, having obtained as pilot the mate of the West African Trading Company's steamer Sydenham, I proceeded with the two gunboats over the bar, anchoring off the factories at 3 p.m.

" 4. On the arrival on board of the agents of the different mercantile firms, who also are members of the ' Court of Equity,' I informed these gentlemen

OF THE FLEET SIR FREDERICK RICHARDS. 775

of the reason of my appearance in the river and fixed noon on the 25th as the time of commencing the enquiry. Circular letters were at once sent to the chiefs of the different towns on the river summoning their attendance.

" j. At the time named the agents of the factoI.les presented themselves, and also the chiefs of Twa and Fish-town, but the chiefs of the upper Brass did not appear, the reason assigned being that the time was too short.

" 6. The enquiry was then proceeded with by my examining each of the agents of the factories on oath administ~red by Her Majesty's acting consul, and afterwards the native chiefs present : after which the enquiry was adjourned until noon of the 26th and a fresh summons sent up to Brass.

" 7. On the morning of the 25th I despatched Sub-Lieutenant Herbert Taylor, of the Firehra~zd, with the cutter of that vessel towed by the steam pinnace of the Roadicea to Akassa on the River Nunn, with a letter to Captain McIntosh, agent of the T!nited African Company, and with instructions to recover the hull of the Cyfiriot from that gentleman or his representative at Akassa, and to bring her back to Brass.

" 8. He returned the following morning with the vessel in tow of one of the African Trading Company's steamers; Mr. Forcker, the agent a t Akassa for the time being, arrived with her.

" 9. The examination of Mr. Forcker was proceeded with at noon that day, and, the Brass chiefs not having arrived, the enquiry was adjourned until the 27th.

" 10. About midnight on the 26th the Brass men arrived with considerable noise and tom-tom-ing, and on the 27th all the principal parties in the late piracy were assembled on board.

" 11. The Chairman of the Court of Equity, Mr. Veitch, of ,the firm of Stewart and Douglas, and Mr. Sohncke, representing the firm of Harrison and Company, having been called upon to identify King Ebeefah of Bessumbra and his chiefs, and the chiefs of Brass Town, and having certified that they were the principal chiefs of the River and the proper and responsible Headmen, pending the electing of a king in the place of Okiah deceased.

"12. Several questions were then put to these chiefs concerning the plunder of the CyPriot and the quantity of oil taken, which, having elicited unsatisfac- tory and prevaricating answers, I first addressed them in the terms of enclosure No. 4, and then the agents of the European firms, and spoke to them as stated in enclosure No. 5 ; and I request you will inform their Lordships that I consider it not too much to say that this enquiry has revealed a state of things which is in the highest degree scandalous, and that as regards the cargo of the CyPriot I do not consider that any insurance effected upon it should be paid.

" 13. I am of opinion that it was a well-understood thing before the Cypriot left her anchorage that she would be run aground, that after she was aground the European agents neither collectively as members of a Court of Equity, nor individually as representatives of important mercantile Rouscs who had ample means had they chosen of rendering the vessel assistance, afforded her the s l~ghtes t ; unless taking oil from her on ruinous terms with an apparently half-witted captain can be regarded as such. On such terms )hey did commence to take out oil, the understanding being that they would get all they removed if the vessel did not get off, and I have no doubt that on these terms they would have removed the whole cargo, had not the natives, coming last and keen for their share of the plunder, driven them away.


" 14. The cargo removed by the natives was then taken and openly bought on the beaches of the respective factories, and at (as I believe) a rate considerably below the market price a? the time.

" I;. On ,this point the agents al l affirm that they paid the regular trade bar, but the evidence does not seem to me to bear out the statement, and according to the sworn depositions of Assetta, chief of Fish Town, Spiff and Cameroons, they were paid at the rate of 40 cases of gin (5s. a case) per puncheon, the trade bar a t the time being 56 cases of gin.

" 16. Her Majesty's Acting Consul, Mr. Easton, is quite in accord with me that the oil was purchased at a reduced rate.

" 17. I desire to draw their Lordships' attention to the evidence of Mr. Veitch, Agent for Messrs. Stewart and Douglas, the consignee of the Cypriot, as also that of Mr. Sohncke, Agent for Harrison and Co., which I regard as being of considerable interest to underwriters.

" IS. Another gentleman whom I forbear to name, as he was in nowise concerned i n the Cypriot case, having only arrived on the river on the previous day, put the case in a very practical form.

" 19. Having arrived LO take charge of the interests of a company, I thought it right to give him a n opportunity of making any observations he wished : he was not sworn.

" 20. He had had three years' previous experience of the Brass River, and on my asking him if any case of wreck had occurred in his time he replied in an easy jaunty manner accompanied by a wink, ' No, no such luck.' On my asking the meaning of the observation, he replied ( he had had no pickings,' and referred to the case of the Bertha, a French brig which grounded on entering the Brass in December, 1874, which vessel, according 'to the reports in the Records, from Lieutenant Wallcer, of the Foam, to Commodore Sir William Hewett, dated 6th February, 1875, duplicate of which was forwarded to their Lordships direct, was ' indiscr~minately looted by the white merchants and natives.'

" 21. I have caused the oil recovered by Messrs. Sohncke, Scott and Bleasley to be returned to the schooner, and the natives have restored what sails were cut u p ; the vessel I have ballasted and removed from the river, and the Firebrand has taken her down to Fernando Po where she will remain until I have finished my round of the other rivers, when I propose that the Firebrand, on her way North, shall drop her a t Lagos where she will be handed over to the proper authorities.

" 22. The vessel is a very handsome iron schooner, go tons register, of three masts, quite new, and her hull is in perfect order.

" 23. As regards her puichase for fifty pounds by the United African Company, I have to say that in accordance with the request of the Secretary of Lloyd's enclosed in your letter, I have removed her from the river for the purpose of sending her to a port of safety, as there is nothing to show me that any bona-fide sale has taken place, the ship having been towed off the bank, surveyed, condemned, and put up to auction by the same interested parties, and finally knocked down by themselves to themselves, no other bidders being present.

" 24. Having thus brought the history of this affair to a conclusion, I have but to submit for the consideration of their Lordships that I have not overstated the case in informing the agents of the mercantile houses t ading


in the Brass River that their conduct had been discreditable to the British F lag and to the character of British commerce.

l 1 25. As regards my decision that the natives must pay back the oil pillaged from the Cypriot, I a m of opinion that it will be most neressary to enforce this decree, and I propose that from the 27th of next September, when the rains will have about ceased, should their Lordships approve, the river shall be blockaded and the factories closed unless the fine is paid.

" 26. I t h ~ n k it is also probable that it will be necessary to punish the natives of the Upper Brass Town, who are a very bad set, and who doubtless were the instigators, if nor the actors, in the outrages which Sir William Hewett had to deal with in 1875.

" 27. I t would be very desirable if the Brass River were finally closed to trade, a t least so far as withholding al l protection to traders who choose to establish themselves here. I t would be a salutary lesson to others besides the natives, and should tend towards the pacification of the Delta of the Niger, as the Records of this command clearly show that most of the troubles of late years have arisen from the Brass men, who formerly acted as middle men in the Delta and are very jealous of the direct Niger trade now carried on in steamers from the Nunn, having been instigated by it to attack and plunder the steamers in their passage up and down the river.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient wrvant ,

F. W. RICHARDS. To the Secretary of the Admiralty."

E n c l o s u r e No. 4 gives the C o m m o d o r e ' s addr'ess to the n a t i v e s . It is as follows :-

" King and Chiefs of Brass,-I am pleased to see your attendance here to-day in such numbers, as I want you and al l your people to understand what I have got to say t o you. This is not a Trade Palaver at all, it is a Queen's Palaver, and ordered in consequence of your having contrary to your treaties with the great Queen of England, your friend, robbed and pillaged one of her peaceful trading vessels when one of your own pilots put her on shore in leaving your river.

l 1 instead of helping and assisting to get the vessel off, you send your armed Boys, and rob her of her cargo, cutting and hacking the vessel and th~ea ten ing her crew with death. Now, I tell you, that oil has to be returned to the Queen, it was not yours, you stole it, and you must give it back again. I know that you cannot get together so large a quantity as you will have to pay, i n a short time. I give you seven months to make the payment and you will have to return 300 puncheons of oil by the 27th September next, paying roo puncheons by the 4th May, another roo by the 14th June, and the remainder by the 27th September. If a t that time the 300 puncheons of stolen oil have not been returned to the beach of Messrs. Ftewart and Douglas, your river will be closed and al l trade stopped.

" I have my hand on a letter written by your late King Okiah, you men of Brass, in which he says that if his trade is stopped his people will starve, or become labourers in steamers-so look to it. What I tell you now will certainly be done if you do not restore the oil you have plundered, and the trade of your viver will be stopped altogether. The quantity of oil t o be restored is from Brass Town roo puncheons, from Ebeefah and Chiefs of


Bessembra 60 puncheons, from Fish Town 50 puncheons, from Twa go puncheons.

" You will understand that in only making you now restore what you have stolen, I am dealing mercifully with you, but any such acts of piracy committed by you in future wili end in your destruction."

The Commodore's address to the agents and representatives of commercial establishments in Brass River-the enclosure Xo. 5 4 s of the same forceful character.

L( Gentllemen,-In order that there may be no doubt as to the nature of the observations which in the furtherance of my duty I considered it necessary to make to you to-day at the conclusion of my address to the representative Chiefs of Brass Kiver, I desire to repeat to you in substance here the opinion I then expressed viz. : .that from the evidence adduced in.the enquiry into the circumstances connected with the plunder of the Cypriot the course adopted by the representatives of the important mercantile houses trading in the Brass, on the occasion was discreditable to the British flag and to the prestige of English traders.

" That to receive upon your Beaches and to purchase from piratical natives red-handed from the plunder of a vessel just despatched from one of your factories, her pilfered cargo, was discreditable in the highest degree; and that whether it was purchased at the fair trade bar (which the evidence a s I judge does not show to have been the case) or not, the facts are not materially altered. And that I shall give it as my most decided opinion that the insurance on the Cypriot's cargo should not be paid and that the Com- mittee a t Lloyds be warned that they will run an undue and unfair risk in insuring any vessel, and especially a chartered vessel, trading with Brass whi1.e the present standard of commercial morality prevails in the river.

Your obedient servant, F. W. RICHARDS."

Draft notice (preliminary).

Blockade of Brass River , Delta of the Niger, W e s t Coast o f Africa.

" I hereby declare that on and after the 27th day of September, 1880, the Brass River will be placed in a state of Blockade and that such Blockade will be maintained by a competent force of Her Br~itannic Majesty's ships. All measures therefore which are authorised by the law of nations will be enforced on behalf of Her Majesty's Govern- ment against all vessels whatsoever that may attempt to violate such blockade either by entry from the sea, or by any of the inland creeks communicating with the sea.

" Given under my hand on board H.h4.'s ship Boadicea in Simon's Bay this 26th day of May, A.D., one thousand eight hundred and eighty.

FREDK. W. RICHARDS."


Draft for the zise of the Senior Saval Oficer in the Rights.] '( To the Chairman of the Court of Equity and the respective Agents in the Brass River.

" Gentlemen,-The Commodore Commanding the Cape of Good Hope and West African Station having on the 27th February last directed that the Natives of the Brass River shou!d by the 27th September next pay a t the Beach of Messrs. Stewart and Douglas goo puncheons of Palm oil, as indemnity for the plunder of the cargo of the British schooner C'ypriot, of Whitehaven, in October, 1879, and declared his intention of blockading the river and stopping all trade therein in the event of such indemnity not being paid by the date specified, I have to acquaint you that the terms of the Commodore's Ultimatum win be strictly carried into effect and a blockade will be established on and after that date if the demand is not complied with."

Instructions for the blockad,e were given to th,e Senlior Officer, Wes t Coast Division, in the event of the indemnity not being paid by the natives of Brass, and a copy of them sent to the Admiralty, 31st May, 1880. In these instructions the S.N.O. was given particulars of the whole story and order,ed to send a vessel to the B,rass t o ascertain whether the terms of the ultimatum hafd been complied with by the payment of the instalm,ents; and he was told

" 2. If the officer sent finds that the due portion has not been paid he will address a circular letter to the several kings and chiefs reminding them that the 26th day of September is the last date allowed for the payment of the whole quantity of 300 puncheons, and that their river will be closed on and after that date.

" A similar communication is to be sent t~ the Chairman of the Court of Equity for the further information of the agents of the factories in the Brass : also to the Chairmen of the Courts of Equity a t Akassa in the River Nunn and various other oil rivers so that no unnecessary inconvenience may be caused locally through want of knowledge of what is pending.

" A second visit is to be made to the Brass about the 1st day of September, and if payment of the indemnity is not being proceeded with al l the necessary steps for establishing a strict blockade of the Brass are to be taken and . . . you will issue a declaration accordingly and you will take al l measures authorisec! by the law of Nations to enforce such blockade."

[Copies of the official notice were to be sent to the Governors i n Chief of the West African Settlements and of the Gold Coast Colony : to Masters of all vessels fallen in with : to H.M. Consuls for the Bights of Biafra and Angola : to the respective Governors of Foreign Settlements on the Coasi : and to the commanders of a l l foreign ships of war fallen in with, etc.]

" To make the Blockade effective a vessel should be stationed in the river, as the main point of pressure upon the natives will be the absolute stoppage of all trade and communication with the factories in the Brass and their complete isolation from the Nunn River by the Akassa Creek.

" From the date of the proclamation all canoes and native craft found afloat are to be seized. Vessels that may be loading cargo are at once to clear out, as the preliminary notice to the agents of the factories is to be considered efficient.

1 At that time he was Edward Compton Domvile, captain of H.M.S. Dido.


" The officer commanding the cruiser in the Brass is to be warned not to allow small boats to be detached out of range of the guns of the ship or any inadequate force to be sent u p the river out of sight from the vessel, the war canoes of the Upper Brass men being numerous and well-armed 2nd manned. There is to be no landing for hostile purposes : a strict watch is to be kept on the factories day and night : and no trade whatsoever is to be allowed with the natives either by land or sea. The factories are to be closed.

" The vessel stationed within the river to be relieved at least once in ten days, and vessels are to anchor well off the beach within the influence of the sea-breeze. Pilots are to be obtajned from the mail companies or from other rivers before you require to take action.

" All orders to be considered cancelled should the Admiralty direct that the blockade of the Brass is not to be instituted."

On 5th -%ugust, 1880, the Admiralty wrote to the Commodore that his letters of 29th February and 31st May, 1880, had been under consideration and the Ultimatum and Report referred to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs " who concurs with Their Lordships iin ap- proving the judicious manner in which you have conducted the trans- actlion," but added that he, the Secretary of State, desired that the blockade should not be commenced until further orders and that a report should be sent as to how much oil had been paid.

The reason given by Lord Granville, (the Foreign Secretary, for countermanding the intended blockade was :-

" Lord Granville is of opinion, in view of the collusion whith is believed to have existed between Europeans and natives in relation to the abandon- ment and plunder of the vessel, that the proposed blockade should not be carried out, especially as it would have a n injurious effect on the trade of the river generally, to the great detriment of the respectable merchants carrying on business here, and might after all , as in the case of Dahomey, not be attended altogether with successful results."

This reason drew forth from Cornmodlore Richards an interesting reply, not only illustrating, as past incidents in his career had already done, his insight into the essence of his subject, but also his fearless resolution that the character of England in his hands should be above reproach.

Boadicea in Table Bay 13th September, 1880. [After acknowledging the Admiralty Letter of the 5th August and the orders not to proceed with the blockade, the Commodore reports that he has issued the necessary instructions for this to the Senior Officer of the West Coast, and also directed him tn cause the oil restored by the natives of the Brass to be shipped to the Port of Liverpool consigned to the Naval Transport Officer there, pendlng Admiralty instructions as to its disposal. H e continues :-I

" 2. Captain Domvile in a despatch dated 4th August, a duplicate of which he has forwaxded to their Lordships, reports that on his preliminary visit to Brass on 31st July, he found that up to that date 574 puncheons had been


returned, and he expected the result of his visit would be to accelerate the restitution of the remainder, which he considered had only been delayed by the ill-advice of some vf the traders who had counselled the natives that the blockade would not take place.

" 3. I trust therefore that a considerable part of the oil will have been refunded before the receipt by Captain Domvile of their Lordships' letter of the 6th August.

I' 4. I desire with leference to paragraph 4 of your letter to make a few observations with a view to making the case more clear to their ,Lordships. It mas in face of the undoubted fact that there had been collusion between the white traders and the natives that I judged the blockade of the river would be the most efficient means of punishment, and one that would ensure restitution of the cargo in a short time; the locality is specially adapted for such a purpose, as there is n o trade in the river except with the factories whose agents were al l more or less implicated; and the simple closing of these establishments would have brought al l parties to terms.

" 5. If stoppage of trade entailed (as doubtless it would) loss upon the mercantile houses in England, that should also have had the beneficial effect of making them consider the advisability of being more careful in the selection of their employees.

" 6. The Brass case therefore I judged afforded a favourable opportunity of making a n example of Natives and Europeans alike, and the Natives in this case were quite sensible of the fact that the Traders were under a cloud as well as they, a niatter important in itself as showing that the power of Her Majesty is brought to bear upon wrongdoers irrespective of their colour."

The hope empressed in para. 3 of this letter was more than fulfilled, for the whole quantity demanded was paid; the closing scenes of the drama being recorded by Captain Domvile's letters from the Dido. H e took Consul Hewett from Fernando P o to the Brass River in the Dido and went up the river with him in the Decoy on the morning of 31st July. At noon he assembled a Court of Equity, and getting a report from it that only 57+ puncheons had so far been paid he informed the chairman of the Court that under the circumstances there was nothing for him to do but issue the preliminary notice of the blockade; and, summoning a palaver of the chiefs for Monday, 2nd August, he left the river. On Monday he returned, and of the assembled palaver of K i n g and chiefs he asked why the oil had not been delivered as ordered when that goo puncheons had been (to use a river expression) hove during the past oil season and that zoo puncheons were leaving the river a t that moment in a brigantine. They had nothing to say beyond a full intention to return the oil, and handed to the chairman of the Count of Equity an agreement to heave no more oil until the whole quantity demanded had been returned. They also asked for more time. Captain Domvile, the Consul agreeing, refused to grant more time, and, telling the Chiefs that he was glad to see them now make proper arrangements, he assured them that unless every puncheon was paid up by. the 27th


September the blockade would begin; and he handed to each chief a formal notice of blockade and told them he should return again in September. H e issued the same to the Court of Equ~ity and the various agents, and then proceedeld, with the assistance of the consul, to disseminate the preliminary notice of the blockade throughout the station, a s ordained by the Commodore's original instructions. H e returned to the river on the 1st of September to find that restitution of the oil was being steadily carried out ; and on the 271th September he came again, anchoring in the Firebrand off Messrs. Stewart and Douglas' Factory at 9.20 a.m. Mr. Veitch came on board immediately and reported that the whole 300 puncheons had been paid some days ago and that he was very anxious to get rid of it as his beach was blocked up. Captain Domvile au~thorised him to ship lit a t once to Messrs. Stewart and Douglas on behalf of Lloyd's: " 2 0 0 puncheons will g o (by the next mail, and the remainder will g o as soon a s possible."

BATANGA.

Following close upon the Brass River affair came that of Batanga; and we pass in a few days from the preparation of a blockade of one part of the Coast to a n act of war in another, the same ruling sense being evident iin each that the authority and justice of England were to be unmistakable.

In July, 1879, Acting Consul Hopkins reported to the Foreign Office that the natives of Batanga, which is a town in the Bight of Biafra to the south of the Cameroons River, had forcibly taken a white man, a Bri~tish subject, out of a British ship, and were keeping him a prisoner in their town until his employer should establish a factory there. This he could not do a s there was no trade available there, and the only result of landing trade stores woulld be their theft by the natives.

Commodore Richards wrote on the 19th March, 1880, to the Admiralty to say that Consul Hopkins had told him of thiis case in the early part of the previous year, and that he was about to enquire into the matter on the spot wilthout reference to the opinions of the traders in the Cameroons.

H e accordingly went there on the 20th March, having sent the consul, Mr. Easton, on ahead of him, telling him to warn the agents that if, in consequence of his representation, any punlishmenr was in- flicted upon the natives, all the Europeans who remained a t Batanga after the deparlture of Her Majesty's ships would do so at their own risk.

O n reaching Batanga he found that the consul had not attempted to communicate with ' K i n g Jack,' so he did so himself.


" I require you to come off to me on board H.M.S. Boadicea to explain your conduct in making prisoner a n English subject last year who had committed no fault against you, your people, or your laws. If you come off I promise you full security to go to your town after you have heard what I have to say to you. Rut if you do not obey the summons you will have to take the consequences, which you will find to be very serious.

" March 21st. I have received your message that you refuse to answer to my sunimons to answer for your conduct in having dragged one of Her Majesty's subjects from his vessel last year and kept him a prisoner for many weelis until he escaped. The consequences be upon your own h e a d : as you refuse to come to me I will go to you, and I warn you to move your women and children before I come . . . . I give you now till 6 a.m. to-morrow to surrender yourself without condition : after that it will be too late."

23rd March, 1880. Off Batanga. Commanlder Romilly (the commander of the Boadicea) to Commodore Riichards.

I n execution of your orders I left H.M.S. Boadicea a t 8 a.m. with a landing party of 240 officers and men . . . . and the boats formed in line abreast on the offside of H.M.S.'s Firebrand and Forester, which vessels were shelling the bush.

2 . On your signal being made to the gunboats to cease firing the boats advanced to the beach i n line abreast following you in your galley.

3. No opposition was oflered, the enemy having been driven back by the fire of the gunboats.

4. With the assistance sf a native guide we proceeded by a narrow path through thick bush to the town of King Jack, which occupied a square mile on the left bank of the river Lorly-300 well-built houses in quadrangles, some of them of two storeys. The town was burnt, the canoes destroyed, bananas and other crops cut down. The operation was over by 1 1 a.m., when we returned to the Mission House and rested the men, the heat, go degs. in the shade, combined with that from the burning to\xTn, being very oppressive.

5. Embarkation began at 1.30 p.m., the last boat leaving the shore at 3.30 p.m. The surf having risen during the forenoon, the party were embarked in a surf boat, in detachments, lent from the European factories, and taken to the boats outside the line of breakers.

6. The enemy never showed during the day, but towards the close of the embarkation they assembled in the thick bush and commenced a dropplng fire upon the covering party, but they were quickly dislodged and did not return.

7. I regret to report the death of William Lakeman, private R.M.L.1.- shot through the heart with slugs-and of James Allen, ordinary seaman, shot in the abdomen with slugs.

FRANCIS ROMILLY.

The Commodore's report to the A4dmiralty is dated 23rd March, 1880, and details his correspondence with the consul and the receiving his report that in spite of his warning all the Europeans were of opinion that something should be done. T h e 1,etter then gives the details of the landing after the clearing of the bush, etc.

" I enclose a report from Commander Romilly of the day's operations and I cannot speak too highlv of the zeal and energy displayed by that officer


and the officers named by him during a day of great physical trial under a burning sun.

" 7. I regret to say that this service has not been effected without casualty.

" 8. The correspondence in this case will, I trust, be sufficient to show their Lordships that a n absolute necessity for punishment existed, as the Cyprus was actually boarded and the mate carried away by force.

" 9. When the Spanish Governor of Fernando Po, a t the request of the late Consul Hopkins, very kindly sent a gunboat to endeavour to procure this man's release the king met the denlands with defiance and threatened to cut the man's head off.

" 10. After the appearance of Her Majesty's ships off Batanga, and the defiant manner in which my summons was met by the king, there remained no alternative but to inflict such punishment as was possible, and that has been very severe. For a n African town the houses were very well constructed, and the position was evacuated so suddenly on the gunboats opening fire that very little property was removed from the houses,

" 1 1 . I regret very much the necessity of undertaking expeditions such as th i s : it is a n ignoble species of warfare, but is, and I regret to say will be from time to time, the natural outcome of the legitimate commerce which has succeeded the Slave Trade on the West Coast of Africa. While traders continue to push their way everywhere along the coast, outrage by the natives will but too surely be repeated. It is a matter of great difficulity to arrive a t the truth in African squabbles, but I am fully satisfied that in this case the punishment has heen well merited.

" 12. The traders having elected to remain, I have distinctly warned them that they must protect themselves i n the future.

F. W. RICHARDS.

Acting Consul Easton in reporting this affray to the Marquis of Sahisbury stated that the Eu'ropean traders were unanimous; and he describ,es the Commodore's action. H i s report closes with the sentence : " unfortunately with the loss of two men killed and himself wounded."'

There is no other official mention of the Commodore's being wounded, but the following recent letter from Admiral the Honourable Sir Stanley Colville, the present Vice-&4dmiral of the IJnited I<ingdom, who was a midshipman in the Boadicea, sheds a vivid light upon the story. Quoting from his journal he writes :-

" At about 2 o'clock (p.1n.j they began to embark i n the boats, going off to them i r ~ the surf boat. Just as the first boat was going off there was a n alarm on shore and everyone began easing off their rifles anyhow, and a great many rushed back into the water. Soon after this, Fox, the quarter- master, firing his rifle without looking, hit the Commodore, luckily, on the front button of his jacket; ~t fo l lo~red along his breast and lodged in the lining of his coat a t his shoulder, only bruising hirn : it was a wonderful escape. I17hen about two-thi~ds of the me11 had gone off, a signal was made to shell the bush, so as to cover the remainder embarking. The last boat left the shore about 3.30 : the Commodore was the last to leave the shore."


" That is my account of what took place nearly j o years a g o ; the Commodore had a marvellous escape. Just think, a Martini-Henry bullet at close range ! ! I did not actually (as far as I can remember) see the accident a s I was lying off in the steam pinnace 150 to 200 yards away.

" That evening, the Boadicea having weighed, we burield a t sea the two men who had been killed. T h e Commodore with his arm in a sling read the burial service, the deck lit by lanterns. I evidently was much impressed, and I remember every one else was : we had had a long and ttiring d a y in .the hot sun and we all thought of what the Commodore's feelings must be, thinking that it was only by a miracle he was not also lying there sewn up in a hammock."

( T o be continued.)

REVIEWS BOOKS.

" TIGRIS GUNBOATS." By VICE-ADMIRAL WILFRID NUNN, c.B., c.s.I., c.M.G., D.S.O.

(Melrose. 18s.)

THIS is a book for which many naval officers must have looked, for the account of the work of the Royal Navy on the Tigris, as given in the Official History of Naval Operations, stops with the surrender of Kut. Nothing is told of the work of the gunboats in the re-taking of Kut and the capture of Baghdad.

The story starts with the question of oil : oil from Abadan, which town is on the Persian side of the Shat-al-Arab. The boundary-line between Persia and Turkey runs down the centre of the river, and the mouth of the river is guarded by a Turkish fort. As relations with Turkey became more strained a proposal was made that a small land force be sent from India to guard this oil port of Abadan. Next came a request from the Turks that 'the Odin should leave the river ; and we hear how the Turkish officer-bearer of the request-was entertained with an Eno and soda, no sherbert being to hand, with dire results. Then Espiegle comes up the river, tucks herself into Persian territorial waters, and the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force leaves Bombay with the cheery rumour that the Shat-al-Arab is being mined, and that the Emden is coming into the Gulf. So we get Espiegle in the river, cutting communication Basra-Fao, and the M.E.F. off Fao Bar.

On 6th November, 1914, the work of the Royal Navy on the Tigris started. Odin dealt with the fort at Fao, Espiegle with the Turkish battery opposite Abadan ; the transports entered the river, and the troops were landed at a spot selected by Espiegle from inside the river.

From now the tale is one of combined operations ; step by step the Army extended its field of action : the rivers are the real highways of the land, and, where an armed craft will float, there sailor and soldier go. Once landed, and after the early fighting, it was thought necessary to move to Basra. The Turks had sunk block-ships in the fairway, but a channel was found, and Espiegle occupied the government buildings, and stopped the looting of Basra, on 21st November.

' ' TIGRIS GUNBOATS." 787

Now comes the start of trouble. We had moved from Abadan to Basra; in order that Basra might be secure we must hold Kurna-at the junction of the Euphrates and Tigris-and about forty miles above Basra. At the time the possibility of an eventual advance to Baghdad was foreseen and discussed. The length of the ensuing lines of communication, the need of rail and river transport, were fully realised ; but, as Kurna was the present limit, nothing was done. We were to pay, dearly, for this lack of preparation.

However, the task of preparing and arming such small craft as were available was pushed on. The sloops scraped their way through the mud, past sunken lighters, convoying the flotilla and engaging the enemy ; for their 4-inch guns were the heaviest available.

The troops left Basra on 3rd December and Kurna was occupied on 9th December, a deputation having come on board Espiegle to arrange terms of surrender on the night 8th-9th December. The tenderness of river craft against field-gun fire and the difficulty of moving the sloops in shallow waters were felt : but the job was done.

So here we were at Kurna, holding a lodgment at the angle formed by the two rivers, forty miles from Basra, and the surrounding territory in enemy occupation.

1915 saw the start of further extension. The Turks were gathering forces to the west on the Euphrates at Nasiriya, to the east on the Karun at Ahwuz. Both areas were such that only small craft could operate ; thus the sloops could not assist with their heavy guns, and the local Arabs-who knew each channel and creek-were ever ready to take advantage of any mishap to our forces. Various reconnaissances were made, so far as the shallow waters allowed, and the enemy were shelled. Our position at Kurna was strengthened, for the enemy forces round were growing and they had started the use of drifting mines.

Finally the attack on Basra, from the west, matured in the hard- fought battle of Shaiba, where the Turks were defeated with heavy loss ; though the ships were only able to harass the retreat where it touched the water, the enemy escaping in canoes. On the Karun there was also heavy fighting, but only small craft could assist. The enemy were defeated and driven from the area, to meet us again for a few minutes at Amara. Meanwhile we were getting more knowledge of the Hamar Lake leading to the Euphrates, and part of the Karun area cleared of the enemy.

Now, what was to be done ? The answer was that it was necessary to go to Amara to cover Ahwuz, and to Nasiriya to cover Kurna and Basra. I t seemed to run all in sequence : but it meant a line of communication of 120 miles, far beyond the navigation limits of the sloops,

" TIGRIS GUNBOATS ." 789

from Basra to Amara, and practically the same from Basra to Nasiriya, 75 miles over the shallow Hamar Lake for the latter.

The command of the military force in the advance up the Tigris was given to General Townshend, who, at the start, proclaimed himself as a devoted disciple of Napoleon. The movement was to start on 31st May with an attack on the enemy round Kurna. The Tigris was in flood, and the area mostly under water-" too much for the soldier, and not enough for the sailor." The methods employed were probably unique. The troops were in canoes which they pushed or paddled ; machine guns and ambulances were on rafts ; small guns on double canoes ; bigger guns on barges ; while moving in the actual river were sloops, launches, armed horse-boats, tugs and river-steamers. The risks to the sloops was considerable ; they were unarmoured, the enemy guns hard to locate ; the river was mined ; movement was difficult.

But the advance was made, covering fire given, and the mine field located. This last was due to the capture of the man who laid it, and who found himself in the leading mine-sweeper. Then a passage was found, the small craft sent on to pursue the now retreating enemy ; the sloops followed. By 6 p.m. on the 1st June, the small craft were near enough to open fire on the enemy river craft, and the Turks began to shed their water transport ; and at g p.m. the ships anchored above Ezra's Tomb, waiting for the moon to give enough light to move on. At 2 a.m. a move was made, and at 4.15 a.m. the sloops could go no further ; the actual limit of navigation was reached ; they were brought up.

Surely 31" 23' 30" N., 47" 27' E. is a position well worth marking on any map as " Es+iegleJs furthest : June, 1915.''

A burning Turkish gun-boat, lighters and stores were left ; the sloops moved back into deeper water, and a small " cargo of courage " took up the pursuit in the river craft. The British troops were far behind, and the naval force which was driving the retreating Turks back consisted of the Cornet, paddle yacht, Shaitan, Sumana and Lewis Pelly, tugs, a steam launch and three armed horse-boats. The total strength of the personnel-General and Staff included-was 88 officers and men; and of these 35 were native rates, stokers, etc. This force anchored at Quarlet Salih, some 50 miles from Kurna, on the night of 2nd June and moved on at 6 a.m. on the 3rd.

The general was doubtful as to what Napoleon would have done ; but it seemed that Napoleon had never been in such a situation.

So Shaitan, with a 12-pdr. gun and a crew of eight men, was sent on ahead. She reached Amara, fired two or three rounds and, besides capturing some 250 Turks, caused some 2,000 others to evacuate from

790 " TIGRIS GUNBOATS."

the town. The large number of Turks were, in part, those retreatingfrom Ahwuz in addition to those from Kurna. The rest of the flotilla came up, and the flood of surrenders started.

Now it remained to see if this force could hold on before its bluff was called-fifty white men against thousands. I t was an anxious night, a near thing, for the Arabs had grasped the situation ; but, at 10 a.m. on 4th June, the 2nd Norfolks arrived, were rushed ashore, and all was well. Singleton of Shaitan had earned his D.S.O.

So Amara was taken, Ahwuz covered, the oil pipe-line repaired, and oil again reached Abadan on 14th June. It was not again interrupted. The sloops were with difficulty got down the now falling river, and the bulk of the naval force returned to Basra to prepare for the move on Nasiriya.

I t may be mentioned that about this time the material for the first four of the sixteen Fly class gunboats left England, and the first four of the Insect class started, in tow, later in the year.

The work on the Euphrates was very different to that on the Tigris. On the latter one worked in a winding river, a single narrow channel ; and in flood time a clear view could be obtained over the banks. On the delta of the Euphrates one found a maze of creeks and channels lined with trees, and swamps cut up by ditches and walls.

The force started on 27th June, 1915, from near Kurna-at the highest point that the sloops could reach-and on over the shallow Hamar Lake, fighting as they went. I t was found that the entrance to the channel leading into the lake from the Euphrates had been closed with a dam. This had to be blown up, and the craft man-handled through.

On 4th July an advance was made, the fighting being severe, some of the craft being put out of action, as also those of the enemy. The difficulties of keeping up supplies from Basra was great, and a halt had to be made till reinforcements arrived.

On 24th July a fresh advance started ; the Navy was getting the trick of indirect fire, working in and out of creeks and seeing what was round the corner. The Turkish positions were taken bit by bit, and on 25th July a small force of fifty Gurkhas-packed into two small gunboats- occupied Nasiriya.

The flag was shown as far as Samawa, and then came the long job of getting the craft over the still falling Hamar Lake to Basra. Then followed a spell, when the crews of the sloops went south to Ceylon.

While all this was going on pressure was rising on the Tigris. We had gone to Kurna to cover Basra, to Amara to cover Kurna ; now the idea was to go to Kut, where Turkish forces were reported. The river

' TIGRIS GUNBOATS. " 7 9 I

craft had made a few trips above Amara, and had been fired on, but our success on the Euphrates had caused the Turk to fall back.

On 1st August, Ali Gharbi was occupied, but, owing to the falling water, the troops from Basra were a long time getting up, and the concentration was not complete till 11th September, at which time tempera- tures ran IIOOF. to 116°F. in the shade. The troops marched on the banks ; the shipping struggled through the shallows.

Kut was taken on the 28th-29th September, the naval craft assisting in the attack at the point where the Turkish lines reached the river. The pursuit was held up by an obstruction placed across the river, in attempting to clear which Cookson lost his life ; this cleared, Comet and Shaitalz pressed on, and nearly got into a trap.

For reasons outside this book to discuss a further advance was made up the shallow river, which was now running in a ditch. Amara was 120 miles from Basra ; Kut was 270 miles ; and the troops reached Ctesiphon, which was 425 miles, all by river.

The Battle of Ctesiphon was fought on the days following 21st September, on the left bank of the river, and far from the water. The right bank was not occupied ; and the Turkish guns placed there were free to devote all their attention to the flotilla, and held it up. The line of communication had been stretched and stretched, now it snapped ; and Townshend, unsuccessful in his advance, was compelled to retreat.

So far we have had a story of advance and success ; now we have to read as fine a one in the way the Navy dealt with the 160 miles of shoals and shallows before they regained Kut. I t must be remembered that the ships had to follow the bends of the river ; the troops marched on the chord. The tugs were few in number, and had been run to death ; grounding was constant, the sniping from the bank never ceased, and ever the knowledge that if the ammunition barges cannot be got along then our guns will be silent.

Once the Turk pressed too far in the pursuit and got bitten ; but FireJEy, the first of the Fly class, and Comet, were both disabled and had to be abandoned. The army ammunition was saved. Kut was reached on 3rd December, and was completely invested by the 7th. What was left of the water transport was sent down the river, save a tug and the naval horse-boats.

There was no idea that the siege of Kut would be a long affair ; but The Powers were stirred. Troops moved up to Ali Gharbi ; a fresh flotilla was formed ; the Fly class began to hatch out at Abadan ; more troops came from India. But it was too big a job to be done in a hurry ; that Conference at Basra in November, 1914, when all the needs

792 " TIGRIS GUNBOATS."

of railways and water transport were foreseen, had not been acted on. Now came the reckoning. The troops had to march up ; supplies took a long time. Added to all this was the supposed need of haste, and this, in its turn, led to lack of preparation and organisation.

The facts, as the author tells us, were these :- (I) Those outside thought that Townshend was out to a clinch. (2) Townshend was not out to a clinch ; the town held out for

four months, but (3) He never said so ; he did not start to conserve supplies.

Thus Aylmer's force, poorly equipped, and not fully organised, was pressing on to deal with a crisis which had not arisen.

The rest of the tale is known ; neither the gallantry of the troops on land nor of the crew of the Julna afloat could avail. Kut fell on 29th April, 1916.

But the lesson had been learned that " He who desireth shall not make haste." The naval force was growing in strength, and was learning the technique of artillery co-operation. General Maude's care and organisation started to make an Army which was to reach Baghdad, and stay there. Basra was developed into a fine port. The R.I.M., who had worked so well, making bricks without straw, and controlled by Simla, were relieved by the Inland Water Transport with the use of ample funds ; and river craft, even down to the L.C.C. Thames steamers, arrived in numbers. The War Office took over control of the campaign. The gunboats, as they were commissioned, were moved round, some on the Euphrates, some on the line of communication, some with the advanced force below Kut.

As has been said, Kut fell on 29th April, 1916, and on 12th December, 1916, the first new move was made to re-take the town, a move to capture the line of the Hai river. There was a new Army ; a new spirit : and the Army was, at last, properly equipped. Four of the Insect class, with 6-inch guns, had arrived, and nearly all the sixteen (now fifteen) Fly class were in commission. There was a close touch with the Army, and bombardments were constantly practised.

On 23rd November, 1917, General Marshall crossed the Tigris at the Shamrun Bend above Kut, and on 24th February General Cobbe stormed the last of the Turkish lines below Kut. The enemy started to retreat.

At mid-day on 24th Tarantula (S.N.O.), Mantis, Moth, Butterjy, GadJl'y and SnakeJl'y passed through the boat-bridge, and, receiving a " pat " from the commander-in-chief for having got an early move on, started up the river. That night they were off Kut, which they found

" TIGRIS GUNBOATS." 793

deserted ; they hoisted the Union Flag and anchored. Early on the 25th they passed through Marshall's bridge and took up the harassing of the retreating Turk. On the 26th they got to Bughaila, where were many stragglers, and FireJly was sighted.

Now came a critical time-a long reach, a hairpin bend, another long reach-all under close fire. The risk was great, but taken ; for the enemy rear-guard was in sight. Repeatedly hit, and with many casualties, the three big ships got past, pressed on, and by 6.15 FireJEy was again under the White Ensign.

It was a wonderful example of the value of such craft, acting in sufficient water, to work ahead of an Army and hasten a rout. The chase stopped only at Aziziya, for the line of communication was getting stretched. Heavy sandstorms prevented full co-operation in the next advance on 5th March. The Diyala River was strongly held, but the ships were then able to give effective help.

For the Turk the game was up. Baghdad was evacuated on 10th March, and on Sunday, 11th March-mark this as the perfection of timing-at 7 bells in the afternoon Tarantula came to anchor off the citadel, and General Maude came on board to tea.

With Baghdad taken, the work of the gun-boats was on the tributaries ; but the navigation above the town is difficult, and the bottom starts to get rocky. With Allenby's victories in Palestine, and Marshall's in Upper Mesopotamia, the campaign, as such, came to an end.

Captains Nunn and Wason left for England in May, the flotilla was gradually reduced, and finally passed out of existence as a fighting force- a state of things destined to give rise to bitter regrets in the Arab Rebellion of 1920.

But what a record it all is ! The daring with which Es9iegle remained in the river, ready to form one half of the nut-crackers; the passage of the block-ships below Basra, and the early occupation of that place; the steady movement to Ezra's Tomb; the dash to Amara, a decision worthy to rank with Farragut's " D-n the torpedoes, go ahead ! " Then the fighting in the swamps, and another dash to Nasiriya.

Next the ebb of the tide, the retreat, the lame ducks, and the cruel fate of FirefEy. Low water, and, at last, full flood, a well equipped flotilla, and an adequate base, and on to 7 bell tea, with the G.O.C. as guest, off Baghdad citadel.

The author won every distinction that can fall to a post captain. He never mentions one of these ; but closes a work of the most thrilling interest, and of some quiet humour, with a full and generous word of thanks to all who had given help to him and his.

794 " TI-IE BRITISH WAY IN WARFARE."

"THE BRITISH WAY I N WARFARE."

By CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART. (Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.)

ALTHOUGH Captain Liddell Hart 's work is mainly concerned with matters of land warfare-the operations, that is to say, of forces operating on, or against objectives, on land-it is one which has great value for naval officers. Much of what he says concerning the ideas that have governed recent strategical and tactical thought can be translated into naval terms, and his first chapter is entirely dominated by a naval outlook.

The theme of this chapter-which we should gladly see much expanded-is that there is a vital contrast between the r6le played by Britain in the last war and that which she played in those past wars in which the British Empire was built up. W e had a historic strategy, well understood by our statesmen, seamen and soldiers. The contribution we made to the allied causes with which we werfe, associated was our superiority at sea, our small but-in consequence of our superiority at sea-extremely mobile land forces, and our financial strength. We never put a big army into the field. Even in the Peninsular War , our greatest land effort, that effort was made with " small " forces- 40,000 men-and it was in strict accordance with the historic policy of making use of our small army in those theatres where it could produce the utmost effect. Where that theatre was, varied. It might be in an enemy colony which was a source of supply. It might be against an enemy naval base, in order to ensure our superiority at sea. It might again be, if the enemy offered us the opportunity, against some portion of his forces at a distance from the main theatre. But what it never was was a large force forming a part of an allied army : though it might be and often was a small force, and that only a portion of the whole. Even a t Waterloo the British force was but one-seventh of the whole taking part in that campaign.

From that policy we departed in the last war. " The immediate chain of causation is to be traced through Sir Henry Wilson's pre-war affiliations, Lord Kitchener's summons to arms, the General Staff's haste to reach France, and General Joffre's haste to reach Germany, to its ultimate destination in the swamps of Passchendaele." (Page 15.)

Captain Hart asks the questions: " I t was heroic, but was it necessary ? I t was magnificent, but was it war ? A supplementary yet separate question is whether it even benefited our allies in the long run . . . . W a s there adequate reason why we should have changed our traditional policy, a policy that has had a longer run on the world's

stage than any other, and a uniquely successful run?" (Page 15. ) Why did we change i t?

W e changed it, according to Captain Hart, because we adopted a set of Clausewitzian maxims without asking whether the doctrines enunciated by him were applicable to us, a Sea-Empire. Our military authorities adopted the Fr'ench interpretation of Clausewitz as preached by Foch. Clausewitz himself was an interpreter of that great war- maker of his own time, Napoleon, and his interpretation, according to our author, was incorrectly understood by the French school of thought, including Foch.

So far as we were concerned, th,e effect of our military doctrines being taken direct from this pool of thought was that war was regarded solely in the light of land operations : that the part which naval force could play, the part which it had always been made to play, was entirely negle~t~ed. W e became a land Power as wiell as a sea Power; we very nearly lost the war on our own element; and we deeply injured ourselves t'o the benefit of our previous allies, who now profit from our losses.

The chapter on " The Fallacy of French Strategy " may profitably be read and pondered upon. W e are rather inclined in the Navy to tr,eat official expositions of policy a s matters so sacrosanct, as expressions of infallible persons, that to dissent from those doctrines is a criminal form of heresy, deserving thie nautical equivalent of excommunication. Captain Hart recalls the work done by Captain Hoenig of the German Army. His " simultaneous assault on orthodox history and theory brought him under the ban of the General Staff " (page 44); but eventually his views received acceptance. In the French Army Capitains Mayer and Grouard performed the same r8le of critics of the official doctrines, and Mayer was forced to seek literary sanctuary beyond the frontier. " Hiis ' dangerous ' unorthodoxy was known to his superiors . . . . Soon afterwards his professional career abruptly finished." (Page 50.) Yet he ended by being completely justlified in his criticisms; and he made, in 1902, a forecast of a future war which was fulfilled almost to the letter in 1914. Captain Grouard, like Mayer, #dissented from the orthodox views of French strategy and policy. His criticism was based upon a profound knowledge of military history, but his works were boycotted by those responsible for the military education of officers in the French armv. Three years before the late war he published his views on the Guerre Eventuelle. " Hitherto he had been tacitly ostracissd as a blasphemer; now he was evcommunicaited as a heretic." (Page 56.) The ideas he preached were

eventually reverted to, but the means of conducting the strategy he had advocated had been dissipated. The opportunity had been lost.

The " Ifs " of history are no more than phantoms. Nothing that has been done can be alterred. It is done with. Yet it is not altogether a waste of effort to consider those " ifs," for they may set one thinking as to what can be done to prevent-so far as prevention is humanly possible-a repetition of errors of policy, of training, of misuse of authority in the establishment of the formula of official infallibility. If the critical views of Napoleonic strategy expounded by Mayer and Grouard had not been rejected, and the French plan of war had been based upon the principles of these heretics; if the British plans, instead of being wholly subservient to the French doctrinte, had been in accordance with our historic policy; what form would the opening phases of the war have taken? expeditionary corps, undoubtedly, would have gone, but whither? Historic British strategy would, beyond a shadow of doubt, have provided that the Flanders sea bases would not fall into the hands of a maritime enemy. Historic minor strategy would never have attempted the impossible task of searching for the Emden in the expanses of the Indian Ocean, nor have fiddled with the capture of totally unimportant harbours and territories like New Guinea while a squadron was at large, and its destination obvious, in the South Pacific.

Captain Liddell Hart, in his fourth chapter, " Thce Signpost that was missed," provokes these and many other thoughts. Military thought and doctrine followed, he says, a false direction. W h y ? " In training the thought of the future leaders and staff officers of the armies the accepted pract i~e was to select and concentrate on one or two campaigns, and study these intensively and exhaustively, rather than to make an extensive study of the whole of military history." One result, he considers, was that the economic element was never brought into view. The study was too partial, too much concentrated upon the actual operations in the field, to take in the more distant, the less obvious, influences of economic pressure and economic objectives. -4s an example, he askk " Would the military doctrines of 1914 have been different if the General Staffs of Europe had scientifically studied and adequately reflected upon the American Civil W a r as a wlhole, and not merely the Virginian battlefields, instead of drawing their inspirations from the 1866 and 1870 wars?" (Page 79.) The answer he gives is that there would surely have been a realisation of the fact that a quick decision in such a conflict of nations was but a bare possibility, which could only be fulfilled by some " truly subtle strategy to lure an opponent into a trap " : that Plan XVII could never have been

evolved, nor would the Russians and their allies have pinned faith on the " advance of the steam roller." The staffs would have realised that they must prepare for a long war, however much they might hope for a short one. They would have been led to study economic factors, to consider the possibilities inherent in new weapons. They would possibly have seen that it was dangerous to sacrifice " big political advantages for immediate military gains, and the danger of antagonising neutrals or of failing to enlist possible allies." Here Captain Liddell Hart, we would suggest, is too sweeping, for French Ministers fully realised those dangers. At the Council in February, 1912, they decisively rejected the military staff's proposal to move into Bselgium, realising that the political disadvantages utterly outweighed the military advantages. British Ministers saw the need for not antagonising neutrals-possibly they overestimated the dangers rather tlhan were blind to them. But the statement is sufficiently correct to act as a generalisation : a long war was ahead : to conserve one's energies was essential. The use of g economic pressure, on a great scale, was obvious. If the armies had studied war in blinkers, marked " 1866 " and " 1870," had not Ministers and the Admiralty done the same? Were not the Declaration of London and the pronouncements of Lord Raeay the result of a study of sea war on too restricted a scope? It was said that in the wars of the nineteenth century the economic influences had been n~egligible. But those wars were wars with a very limited scope. The naval effort in none, with the exception of the Civil W a r of 1861-66, embraced or needed to embrace the economic objective. In the greatest -the Russo-Japanfese-the operations at sea had a purely " military " object-military in the narrow sense-of the securing of the line of passage and supply of the Japanese army in Korea. Our own studies of sea war usually ended at Trafalgar. How much did any of us know ahaut those momentous years between 1805 and 1815 ?

The fifth chapter. " Strat'egy Reframed," deserves most careful and critical reading. The author t'ells us that it " meant hard writing : almost every sentence was gauged with extreme care." It is not a chapter to read, agree with or dissent from, on general lines. I t is one the assertions and opinions in which it is well worth while to test individually throughout by the test of 'experience, applying that test to all the " strata " of war-grand strategy, major and minor strategy, and tactics. How much of it is applicable to sea-warfare, how much to that " historic policy " to which Captain Liddell Hart wishes us to return ? Is it true that " military history to be of practical value should be a study of the psychological ~eactions of the commanders with merely a background of 'events to throw their thoughts, impressions and deci-

sions into clear relief " ? The present writer thinks it is supremely true, and that what is of real value in history is not the record of what was done, but of why it was done. The facts must obviously be correct. Vast labour must be expended by the naval or military historian to ensure that they are so. But to him who wishes to extend his knowledge of war, to broaden his understanding, what is important is to know how the commander, faced with a certain situation, proceeded to think out, and then to take, the steps required. If our training did more to develop our minds in that direction, we should hear far less of those expressions of " potted strategy " in the forms with which we are familiar, and there would be less incertitudce than there has been in the last thirty years in the direction of naval policy.

The eight chapters in Part I11 deal mainly with matters of military policy. They concern the future of tanks, aircraft, the constitution of armies, the use of cavalry, mobility and manceuvres and so forth. Their value to the naval officer is that they give a view of the sort of problems which the Army of to-day is in course of considering. They show the close relationship between training and the d'evelopment of material, a relationship that is albsent in what is called naval training. They provide a most useful stimulant to thought. The naval officer is in no position to judge between Captain Liddell Hart and those whose views he criticises; but he will do well to consider whethcer we in the Navy are working out our own problmems of training and material in as close association with each other as we should.

And yet another thought arises. How far does the progressive mechanisation of {the Army affect .that very problem of " Historic Strategy " which is the theme of the author's book ? Historic strategy requires an army which is {easy to transport by sea and to put on shore. How is the whole problem of sea transport, disembarkation and supply affected by the substitution of machines for men ? The transportation of the Japanese army to thme theatre of war in Korea, and of the British army to France, could be effected by the use of small merchant vessels : and the movements could bme spread over a respectable period. " His- toric strategy " called for the simultaneous disembarkation of a " large " force. I s this more, or less, practicable to-day? How is it affected by he size of the tank and the number of merchant vessels provided with the means of disembarking them ? What limitations does the development of flying place upon such campaigns as those involved in the " historic policy " ? Before artillery was invmented, or effective, a besieging force went alongside the walls of a city, as we see in the pictures of the capture of Constantinople by the Venetians, and boarded the city over thce lateen yards of the galleys. Then came artillery,

n hich forced the besiegers either first to reduce the defence by bombardment or make a breach (as was done at Havana) or-and this generally proved necessary-to land out of range of the guns of the fortress. The torpedo boat in its turn tended to force the landing to a still more distant spot, unless a secure harbour could be found, and defended, close by. It extended the range of the weapons of defence. Does the aircraft add another extension, and if so how does such an extension affect the possibility of making use of the mobility which superiority at sea has hitherto conferred upon this maritime country ?

The last chapter, short as it is, is one of the most thought-provoking in the book. Captain Liddell Hart there gives what he calls " the concentrated essence of war." H e suggests that the principles of war can be condensed into one word " concentrations " (page 301) ; but this word itself requires explanation, or definition as " concentration of strength against weakness." The aim is to produce weakness in the enemy; and that is done, strategically, by forcing him to disperse his forces-to be unable himself to concentrate. T o create that dispersion it is necessary to make a distribution of force that gives the appearance and partial effect of dispersion. In fact, you cannot effect concentration by merely massing your forces, you need also to disperse them. In other words, diversions are a means by which to produce the superiority which is implied in the words " concentration against weakness."

This seems to carry simplification beyond the stage to which it can legitimately be carried. One thing, and one essential thing, is left out, a thing moreover that constitutes the very essence of Captain Liddell Hart's earlier remarks : the selection of the object. The more one studies the measures adopted by our statesmen in the past, the more one is impressed with the conviction their their successes or failures depended in the first place upon the correctness of their insight into the object which they set themselves to attain, and in the second to the degree to which they kept that object in view throughout their conduct of affairs. It is after the object, and as a result, thfe objective, have been determine~d upon, that the principle of concentration upon that object, and the resultant objective, comes into play. " Concentration," however, does not seem the right word in the definition. What is it, in reality, put in plain words, that is aimed a t ? W e know what we mean to do, the result we aim at achieving: we wish to overcome the resistance which the enemy will offer to the particular effort by which n e propose to compel his surrender. T o overcome the resistance which his armed forces will make we need to be superior to them. Our aim is to produce sz~$eriority-which may be in any form, superior skill, command, numbers, material-at the point where we

intend our blow to fall. " Concentration " is not, it is suggested, a principle. The principle is, as Jomini put it, to produce superiority at the determined spot. Concentration lis one of the means by which that superiority is produced. Superiority may be produced by increasing your own force at the point of contact or by diminishing the force the enemy can bring thither, at the dtecisive moment. Captain Liddell Hart's point about the value and importance of diversionary operations comes in at this stage, and his references to Stonewall Jackson's " mystify, mislead and surprise." These are all, together with concentrations, measures bq means of which superiority at the decisive spot is produced.

In his early chapter on the " historic strategy " of Britain, Captain Liddell Hart shows a clear appreciation of combined strategy. His interpretation of " war " is the use of the fighting forces in co-operation. Rut in his " concentrated essence of war " he seems to have got out of touch with this earlier broad vision, and to have become absorbed with the problems of operations on land : of armies, not of fleets and armies : not of war, but of a part of war. H e givses us half a dozen axioms-four DO'S and two DONT's. These might properly be called the measures by which his principle of " concentration by calculated dispersion " is put into practice. But are they enough ? Do they give us all we want? Are they applicable, as principles should be, to all situations ? One can test their universality of application by applying them to instances with which we are acquainted-the test of experience. Thus to take one instance. In 1898 this counttry was on the verge of war with France- the circumstances wfe all know. If war had taken place, how would Captain Liddell Hart's principle and six axioms have shown us how to shape our strategy, where to strike, where to concentrate, where to disperse ?

Captain Liddell Hart quotes in his preface Wolsel~ey's prescription -" to read a little and think a great deal-and think of it over and over again." One may well do this with this book; and one will get much profit from doing so.

H . W. R.

"THE NELSON COLLECTION AT LLOYD'S."

Edited by WARREN R. DAWSON. (Macmillan. 10s.)

THE association between the Navy and Lloyd's is an old one. In the 18th century wars, a t any rate in the latter part of the century, news from Lloyd's, about our own shipping or about enemy movements at

sea, was welcomed at the Admiralty ; and so it has continued. In 1782 Lloyd's opened a subscription for the dependants of the men who lost their lives in the Royal George. This charitable work was repeated in the next war ; and in 1803 the Patriotic Fund was started to " animate the efforts of our defenders by sea and land."l In the words of a reviewer in The Times Literary Supplement : " The nation and its Navy owe an ancient and great debt of gratitude to John Julius Angerstein and those noble-minded and generous merchants and underwriters of Lloyd's who originated, provided, and administered the Patriotic Fund. They raised money for the wounded, they gave tokens of swords of honour, plate and medals to the commanders in lavish and princely fashion. . . . ,,

The Corporation of Lloyd's has lately formed a collection of Nelson relics and of letters and papers of historical interest, which has been deposited in a special strong room called the Nelson Room ; and in 1931 they decided to publish an account of the papers, so as to make them available to the world at large. Mr. Dawson, their honorary librarian, has undertaken the task of editor : the result is a magnificent volume, packed with interest, at the low price of ten shillings.

The collection is arranged in two main series, 182 " L " letters on matters of general interest and 314 " l' " letters concerned with the distribution of the Fund after Trafalgar. There are two hitherto un- published letters from Nelson in the Mediterranean to Sir Evan Nepean, who was Secretary of the Admiralty from March, 1795 to January, 1804, and from whose papers the cream of Lloyd's collection emanates. In the first of these letters, December, 1803 (L. 6 4 , the Admiral remarks on his want of small cruisers and on the need of victory : " The French have such a number of frigates and corvettes with them that I have given up for the present the blockade of Genoa ; for in the event of a battle the French will be able to tow off their crippled ships, which I do not intend they should, for our frigates must tow us up with them, for I must not have anything like a drawn battle. . . . The watching of the French Army in the south of Italy and the care of our commerce at Malta and the Levant takes 12 sail of small ships from me, and I only hope that the Admiralty when they can spare them will give me more frigates." Again, " I look not for prize money, which although it would be most acceptable I despise compared to fighting and gaining a victory over the French fleet." In the second, January, 1804 (L. 182), he describes the poor state of his ships, their urgent need of repairs. Other papers directly concerned with Nelson are minutes of instructions for the detachment

Two articles on Lloyd's by Mr. Fayle appeared in the 192 j volume of THE NAVAL REVIEW, pp. 68 and 565.

802 " THE NELSON CO1,LECTION AT LLOYD'S."

that led to the Nile (L. 136-I~I), the revolution at Naples in 1799 (L. 24 and 25), the famous reproof by the Admiralty for his disobedience of Keith's orders (L. 162), and extracts from the logs of the frigates Euryalus and Naiad at Trafalgar (L. 75 and 85).

Apart from these, much the most interesting papers have nothing to do with Nelson. They come from Nepean's collection, and they form a valuable supplement to " The Spencer Papers" published by The Navy Records Society. L. 103 is a letter from Admiral Rainier in the East Indies, explaining his objections to an attack upon Mauritius in 1800. There are minutes of instructions to Captain Popham for the attack on Ostend in 1798 (L. 142) ; an Admiralty minute of July in the same year proposing to seize Minorca to serve as a base for the Mediter- ranean squadron, which was carried out in the autumn (L. 144) ; instructions to Admiral Mitchell for the Helder expedition of 1799 (L. 160) ; and to Keith for the expedition to Egypt (L. 168). The multifarious duties of cruisers and convoys are illustrated by L. 145, 147, 150, 151, 169 and 170. Measures taken to deal with Bruix's squadron are set forth in L. 152-159 and 164.

The first letter in the book is an outrageous-and very characteristic- one from Rodney, belabouring his admirals and captains in the Leeward Islands in 1780 : it is a letter that shows, in a way that Rodney could never understand, why things went wrong with him. There is also (L. 14) a long pamphlet by Sir John Orde describing his quarrel with St. Vincent, a dreary business with faults on both sides that nearly led to a duel between them. Of much the same sort are letters from Sir Edward Pellew (L. 180 and 181) about the division of his command in the East Indies with Sir Thomas Troubridge in 1805.

The book is capitally produced and edited, and it bristles with foot- notes that show most painstaking research-biographical notices of persons and particulars of ships, not perhaps altogether infallible, but then what notes are ! The papers are all transcribed with exact spelling, punctuation, and so on : even the limits of each sheet of notepaper used for the letters are defined. Mr. Dawson makes a great point of this ; he devotes a whole section of his preface to his methods, saying that to edit ancient documents in accordance with modern custom is to rob them of half their charm and to take unjustified liberties. For his particular purpose, which is to reproduce the papers as they might be displayed in a museum, I think he is quite right ; but there is another way to look a t it. In the books published by The Navy Records Society, for instance, the documents are modernized. This is because they are intended for professional study. A long passage in unfamiliar form, with unusual

spelling, too many capital letters and so on, is almost as tiresome to read as a foreign language. Moreover, it is not quite correct to speak of " modern custom " in this way. Mr. Dawson's transcripts are no more like normal 18th century printing than a present-day private manuscript is like a letter in The Times.

J. H. 0.

"THE OFFICIAL HISTORY O F THE GALLIPOLI

CAMPAIGN." VOLUME 11.

By BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. F. ASPINALL-OGLANDER, c.B., c.M.G., D.s.o., 9.s.c. (Heinemann 15s.)

THE Gallipoli campaign divides itself up naturally into three phases :- (a) The Naval attack. (b) The Combined Operations. (c) The Withdrawal.

This volume deals with the latter part of (b) and with (c). I t is, however, impossible to divorce these later operations from the naval attack, and one of the most interesting portions of the present volume is that in which the author discloses the efforts made by certain naval officers to be permitted to attempt the forcing of the Straits by naval means alone.

As is well known, the naval attack ended on the 18th March, with the failure to sweep the Kephez minefield in daylight under cover of the guns of the fleet ; the failure was due entirely to the presence of an unsuspected line of mines laid by the enemy in the early days of March. It was, however, established without doubt that moored mines were present in the waters in which the fleet was operating, for on the afternoon of the 18th March the British minesweepers swept up and destroyed two mines in the area between the lines of the British battleships ; floating mines were also suspected, but these did not present an unexpected obstacle.

On the 18th March, Admiral de Robeck telegraphed to the Admiralty that the squadron " was ready for immediate action except as regards ships lost and damaged, but it was necessary to reconsider the plan of attack." On the 19th March the War Council authorised " The First Lord of the Admiralty to inform Vice-Admiral de Robeck that he could continue the naval operations against the Dardanelles if he thought fit." It is therefore clear that at this date there was no intention of abandoning the naval attack. The seeds of such a decision were first sown on the

804 THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF T H E GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN." VOLUME 11.

zznd March when, at a conference of the naval and military commanders, it was decided that a combined operation on a large scale about the middle of April would be the surest method of achieving the object of the campaign.l Once the Army was established on the Peninsula the naval attack would be resumed, and this was foreshadowed in the orders issued by Admiral de Robeck for the landing of the Army on the 25th April.

On page 4 of the volume under review it will be noted that on the 10th May, Admiral de Robeck was forbidden to renew the naval attack " till the Kilid Bahr plateau had been captured by the Army" ; thus we see that, in spite of the advantage to the Navy of the presence of the Army at Helles and Anzac, opinion against the renewal of the naval attack had hardened considerably between the 19th March and the 10th May.

This astounding change of opinion is inexplicable ; the Allied forces were to be used piecemeal against the enemy-the negation of all the teachings of war. The only reason the present writer has ever heard advanced for this decision was that, in order to enable the guns of the fleet to engage the forts, it was essential to have an observation-post on shore to spot for the ships. This contention carries no weight, as by the 10th May efficient spotting by aeroplane and kite-balloon was available and had been used with effect by the fleet. This decision is the more inexplicable when it is realised that by the 10th May the arrival of German submarines off the Dardanelles was a certainty in the near future. It must, however, be assumed that Admiral de Robeck agreed with the decision not to renew the naval attack ; for in none of his telegrams to the Admiralty does he press for a reversion of the decision.

The attacks by the Army alone, supported by naval gun fire, therefore continued to the end. It is instructive to note that the naval supporting fire proved ineffective, due to the fact that training in such operations of war had been sadly neglected during peace. It became necessary for the Navy to commence this training in war, and the results are shown in the praise bestowed on the supporting squadron by the G.O.C., VIII Corps after the attack of the 156th Brigade on the 15th November (p. 425) ; it is impossible to estimate what the effect on the Army's operations would have been had this pitch of perfection been possible in the early days of the landing, but there seems little doubt that it would have been considerable and possibly decisive, as the Turks were not then experts in concealing their movements from the ships. The lesson is obvious.

Report of Dardanelles Commission, Part 11. pp. 12, 1 3 and 14.

'L THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN." VOLUME 11. 805

The fighting on land between May and August calls for no naval comment ; the squadron continued to support and supply the Army, and these duties were rendered more difficult by the advent of the enemy submarines ; the battleships were locked up in harbour, and the supporting fire was provided by " blistered " cruisers, monitors and destroyers; and so well did these vessels perform their task that the Army suffered very little by the absence of the larger ships.

General Aspinall-Oglander deals in great detail with the August attacks and the landing at Suvla. The Army's plan was, indeed, a bold one ; but to the naval staff at the time it seemed to possess two defects which mitigated against the chances of success. Briefly these were, firstly, that the night march and attack on Chunuk Bair was an operation which no troops in the world could be expected to accomplish ; that it so nearly succeeded is one of the outstanding events of the whole war. The second misgiving was the hour selected for the landing of the 11th Division at Suvla-10 p.m. ; the objectives assigned to this Division could not be seen in the black darkness, the ground was a mass of thick scrub, and no roads or paths existed ; to the naval staff it seemed that a landing in darkness, immediately before dawn, would provide the troops with the best chances of success.

The author has shown clearly that the Navy did not like the landing inside Suvla Bay ; they would have preferred to land a part of the Division on the North coast between Suvla Point and Ejelmer Bay, where the troops would have had a short climb to their northern objectives. The anticipated difficulties of the attacks on the Chocolate Hill and " W " Hills from the west were apparently the deciding factors.

On page 143 the author mentions the large Turkish reserves at Keshan ; and though this reserve subsequently turned out to be small, the steps taken by the Navy to delay their arrival are worth recording. Arrangements were made to station a destroyer in the Gulf of Xeros to prevent the passage of troops along the north side of the Bulair Isthmus, and two submarines watched the southern side, E.14 and E.II (Lieutenant-Commanders E. C. Boyle and M. E. Nasmith)-throughout daylight on the 7th August these two submarines prevented the passage of any reinforcements along the Bulair road, taking heavy toll of the enemy. It was whilst engaged on this duty on the morning of the 8th August that Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith torpedoed and sank the Turkish battleship Barbarossa hurrying down from Constantinople to support the Turkish defence.

On page 337 the author discloses the fact that on the 17th August the project of the renewal of the naval attack was being pressed by Commo-

806 " THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN." VOLUME 11.

dore Keyes. The author somewhat naturally does not discuss the project, but his extracts from telegrams, etc., leave the question in an unsatis- factory state, which should be cleared up. On page 337 it is clear that Admiral de Robeck was not in favour of such an attack, but that Admiral Wemyss shared Commodore Keyes' opinion. This is further supported on p. 216 of Admiral Wemyss' book " The Navy in the Dar- danelles Campaign " where he writes : " I never ceased advocating with all the strength in my possession the action [naval attack] which since the reverses in August I had been pondering and hoping to see carried out."

On page 366 we find Admiral de Robeck telegraphing to the Admiralty on the 21st August-" To attack Narrows now with battleships would be a grave error . . . This also opinion of other Admirals." And again, on page 412, Admiral de Robeck, replying to Mr. Balfour's telegram of the 5th November, says that " Rear-Admiral Wemyss and all senior officers agreed with his opinion that unless it could be shown that some substantial and definite object could be attained by a portion of the fleet eventually forcing their way into the Marmora, the sacrifice entailed in effecting an entry, and the consequent inability to safeguard the armies in Gallipoli and at Salonika would make the operation a grave error " ; whilst on page 429, also in November, we find Admiral Wemyss (in temporary command at the Dardanelles) telegraphing-" pointing out the grave danger of an evacuation from a naval point of view, implor- ing him to re-open the whole question, and insisting on the ability of the fleet, even at that late hour, to save the situation by forcing the Dardanelles."

These extracts may not convey a complete picture, but they do indicate that an erroneous impression might have been created at the Admiralty that naval opinion at the Dardanelles was unanimously against the renewal of the naval attack, an impression that would not have been modified until Commodore Keyes reached London at the end of October.

Whether the renewal of the naval attack in August or September- or even later-would have led to success must be a matter of opinion ; but the facts that emerge from this History show how near the Navy went to success on the 18th March and how nearly the Army succeeded in April and August. I t must always be a matter of regret that the bold policy advocated by Admiral Wemyss and Commodore Keyes was not attempted.

Why ! Oh, why ! did the Navy and Army never attack together ?

W. W. G.

" HELL'S ANGELS OF THE DEEP.'' By WILLIAM GUY CARR. Author of " By Guess and by God."

(Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.)

" HELL'S ANGELS OF THE DEEP" is the autobiography of an officer well known to those who served in submarines during the war. I do not know him personally ; but, having read this book, I made it my business to find out more about him, for the series of adventures in which he figures reads more like fiction than 20th century fact; and having now heard of his doings in submarines from those who served in the same flotillas I can well believe that his life story is no exaggeration.

For the most part the book has been written in diary form and in a style which is not always easy to read ; also I cannot but wish that he had omitted some of his outbreaks into verse ; but in spite of these small defects the book is a thoroughly good one and retains its interest to the end.

In 1910, William Guy Carr ran away to sea, but wasrecaptured before his ship sailed. In the following year he was apprenticed to the steam- ship Dacre Castle, a cargo steamer running between New York and the Far East. Having joined and discovered that life at sea for him was going to mean scraping and painting bilges on no pay and little food, he made an attempt to " skin out " and join a sailing ship.

In this adventure he found himself in a crimp's " hostel " where the remainder of the crew for the ship he proposed joining were being shang- haied. He accompanied the unconscious crew to their ship, but was identified and sent back to the Dacre Castle.

During the first round voyage Carr got mixed up in at least four serious fights. The first was with the Chinese cooks with which he and his fellow apprentice, Mickey, dealt well and truly ; but it was no child's play, and if they had been worsted they would most certainly have been killed. This happened just before reaching Singapore. At Hong Kong the next fight occurred, this time in a bar ashore. There had been bad trouble between the crews of H.M.S. Newcastle and some American warships, and while the officers of the Dacre Castle were ashore one of them, Geordie,

" got into an argument. . . . before any one could interfere, a big lanky Yankee hauled off and knocked him down. Mickey never spoke. He shot out his fist and down went the American. The fight was on. . . . He picked up a chair, smashed i t across the bar, broke off two legs and handed me one. ' Take this and make for a wall. . . . Fight your way towards a door. When you get there. beat i t and wait until we join you outside.' . . . Tables and chairs were overturned, bottles were flung here, there, and everywhere." (Page 41.)

The result of this affair was a large number of bruises and black eyes, while one of them had a bad knife wound.

Carr complains bitterly of the treatment accorded to officers of the Merchant Navy in Eastern ports :-

" If you go ashore in uniform you are about as welcome as the plague. If you go ashore in mufti i t is not much different. . . . Go to the decent places and look for innocent amusement and you can't help but feel that you are not wanted. . . . They treat your advent into the better class hotels and places of amusement as an impertinence.

" I suppose i t is for this reason that many officers off the ships gradually drift to those places where they are welcomed (for the money they have to spend) ." (Page 35.)

One cannot help sympathising with him and realising that we in H.M. ships could and should do more to welcome the officers of the Merchant Navy when we meet in foreign ports. I am inclined to think, however, that he has put the cart before the horse, and that it is because a certain number of the Merchant Navy officers are the wrong sort and frequent the low haunts by choice, that the European abroad has turned a cold shoulder. As so often happens, the misdeeds of relatively a few are sufficient to damn the whole in the eyes of a critical world.

The next episode gives one a good idea of how some captains deal with mutiny. Mr. Carr writes as follows :-

" We have had a lot of trouble with the crew. . . . There are a couple of Sea Lawyers amongst them and they have been instrumental in stirring up most of the trouble.

" They persuaded the crew to ' kick ' about the food. There was the devil to pay for several days." (Page 61.)

Just previous to this the captain had had trouble with a German seaman and, after knocking him about, had picked him up and dropped him over the top of the bridge rail. The man complained to the Hong Kong authorities and it was then that the incidents of which he writes took place. " The little German was as cocky as a game cock after its twentieth kill. . . ." The captain and mate held a consultation and the two apprentices were put on to day duty with the little German.

" The first task given us was to clean up the 'tween decks in number two hold. . . . The German was no sooner below than he found himself a comfortable seat and proceeded to light his pipe. ' Get up there, you lazy scoundrel, and get a hustle on,' Mickey ordered. . . . The German told him to go to Hell and advised him to get busy with the work himself. Mickey got busy. He bent down and picking up all the dunnage-wood within reach, threw i t into the corner where the German was sitting lighting his pipe. I followed suit and i t literally rained wood on that poor fellow for about two minutes.

" He rushed out, frothing with rage. What wasn't he going to do to us ! We lit into him and cleaned up the hold with him. As he lay there with both eyes blackened, his nose bleeding like a tap, his lips swollen and some of his

teeth missing, Mickey looked down a t him and said, ' Perhaps that will teach you to keep your place aboard a British ship and keep a civil tongue in your head' . . . Having delivered himself of this speech, Mickey handed the sailor a broom and made him get busy cleaning up the hold. . . . .

" Our position as executioners-in-chief to the captain was not allowed to pass undisputed. The crew all got riotously drunk in Muji. They knocked off work and refused to obey the bosun when he ordered them to turn to. . . . Mr. Gough sent for Mickey. He told him to take me and turn the crew to and batten down the hatches. . . . Before going into the fo'c'sle, Mickey armed himself with an iron belaying-pin and I picked up a good-sized marlin- spike. ' We've either got to clean them up or take a dog's life for the rest of the trip,' Mickey said, as he led the way below.

" ' Out of this and up on deck or I'll crack the skull of every mother's one of ye ! ' he ordered, reverting back to his native brogue.

"A big blonde giant, a Dane, rushed a t Mickey. . . . If he'd ever got hold of either of us, he would have killed us. Mickey knew it. He stretched him out stiff and cold with a blow over the head. I thought the man was dead. . . . The air became alive with flying missiles. Knives, plates, boots, bottles, all arrived from the shadows a t the far end of the crew's quarters. Back in those shadows we knew were five or six men. Five empty bottles stood on the filthy mess table. We grabbed these and threw them with all the force we could muster. I heard a splintering crash as one hit the ironwork, then a dull thud and a groan.

" We won that scrap, although both Mickey and I looked more like meat in a butcher's shop than human beings when we emerged into the light of day. But we drove four sailors up on deck ahead of us and we made them batten down the hatches." (Page 66.)

On the next voyage while passing down the Red Sea the Dacre Castle ran ashore on a soft coral reef, the officer of the watch having failed to call the captain as ordered. Anchors were laid out to steady the ship as the wind and sea were rising, but while this was being done Bedouin began to collect on the shore and dhows appeared from nowhere and hovered round. In view of previous incidents, when ships had been looted and the crews sold into slavery, the work was stopped until daylight, the boats being recalled. Hoses were connected up on board and placed ready for repelling boarders, and sentries placed all round the ship.

After sixteen days' hard work dumping cargo the ship was refloated, and after returning to Suez for repairs proceeded on her voyage.

Nemesis overtook her after leaving Shanghai. The ship was light except for water ballast, and while about a day's steaming from Kelung harbour the weather grew ominous. Stifling heat, weird unnatural sky, the sun a huge copper ball, and a rapidly falling barometer all indicated the approach of a typhoon. The Dncre Castle won the subsequent race for safety only to find Kelung harbour crowded with shipping seeking shelter, and herself, the last arrival, with the outside billet. Every

preparation was made, and the authorities announced that the centre of the typhoon was expected to pass over the Island about 7 p.m.

" The sky was like a sheet of hammered copper-the sun itself, a huge copper ball. . . .

" The wind was blowing fitfully with ever increasing force. " Suddenly a dull ominous sound registered on our ears. " ' It's coming . . . grab hold of something solid and hang on,' the mate

warned. "A wall of dark clouds rolled up. . . . The sound grew in magnitude

until i t reached the proportions of an angry roar. . . . The dark curtain of clouds was torn now by vivid stabs of fork-lightning.

" The storm hit and burst with the force of a high-explosive shell. Every- thing loose was hurled in the air and overboard.

" Just as complete darkness descended, I saw the signal station blown off its foundations and hurled down the hillside. . . . The after moorings parted as if they had been made of cotton thread." (Page 94.)

I t was only a question of minutes before she would break adrift, and if this happened she would be carried down into the crowded harbour and by morning it would have been strewn with the wreckage of sunken ships. The captain decided to throw away his own ship to save the others. He ordered the mate to slip. Carr was at the wheel. As they cleared the breakwater the seas broke over them like a Niagara ; within five minutes 1,000 tons of coal which had been stowed on the upper deck was blown overboard. Suddenly in the utter darkness and blinding rain a Japanese cruiser was sighted at anchor right ahead. The engines were put to full astern, and as the sea lifted the Dacre Castle high above the cruiser she carried away the cruiser's rail and ladder, but gathering sternway drew clear. Now the wind got her and she drifted steadily astern towards the rock?.

The anchors were let go but they failed to hold, the windlass brakes failed, and finally the windlass was torn out of the ship. The Dacre Castle was thrown up on to a ledge of rock and broke her back. Mr. Carr's description of that night is wonderfully vivid. For his services he was promoted to fourth officer on return to England. But he soon lost his promotion, as he stood up to a particularly unpleasant chief officer to the tune of knocking him out, and for this he was dipped.

The outbreak of war found him at Buenos Aires. The Cap Trafalgar was also lying in port, and after a discussion with the consul Carr decided to board her to verify the rumour that she was fitting guns. He succeeded, saw the guns, and then was caught ; however he made his escape and reported what he had seen.l Why the Cap Trajalgar was allowed to leave after this evidence had been obtained is a mystery.

1 This report never reached the Trade Division of the War Staff, and I doubt if it ever reached the Admiralty.-HON. EDITOR.

From Buenos Aires Carr returned to England in company with many others bent on joining up. He was already an R.N.R. midshipman ; and September, 1914, found him at the Devonport Barracks. From here he went to a county-class cruiser which eventually joined up with the Grand Fleet at Scapa.

His remarks on the monotony and routine of the Grand Fleet are interesting but not new. We must agree with his criticisms of the " secrecy complex " which prevented the crews of our ships from knowing anything of what they were doing ; he remarks : " I t is wonderful that the morale of the crews remains as good as it does. If it were only possible to take them into one's confidence, and tell them something of what was expected or what was planned it would make a big difference."

In 1916 Carr joined the Virg in ian , a merchant cruiser on the Northern patrol, and he tells several good yarns of his experiences when bringing in ships for examination. " I t was November and blowing big guns . . . the waves were mountains high. No seas off Cape Horn were ever bigger than those we had North of the Shetlands that night." (.)

The Virgi.nian fell in with a Norwegian sailing ship, and Carr went away in charge of the armed guard. Once on board, with the cruiser out of sight, the captain showed himself to be antagonistic. He asked that the armed guard should assist in making sail as his crew were sick. This of course they were unable to do, and Carr told the captain that they were there to see the ship navigated to Lerwick and not to sail her. He then posted sentries on the poop and told the helmsman to steer due east.

" The captain wanted to know what my intentions were. . . . I told him that if he refused to sail the ship into Lenvick I would sail her before the wind and pile her up high and dry on the rocks of Norway. I told him she would never arrive in Germany. . . .

" We drove on until we were perilously near the rocky coast of Norway. When the captain saw I was determined in my threat he weakened. ' You win,' he told me, and held out his hand. He called the crew. . . . An hour later we were headed back for Lenvick." (Pages 185-186.)

Soon after this episode Carr joined the Maidstorze for navigating duties in submarines.

Mr. Carr sums up the remainder of the book when he says : " I have already told the most interesting adventures experienced by the officers and men of the submarine service in my book ' By Guess and by God.' The only thing left to tell are some of those more intimate and personal events which occurred while I was serving in submarines." (Page 223.)

These include at least one incident which should be mentioned here, not only because of its remarkable nature, but because such experiences were not uncommon during the war, and yet one seldom sees them

recorded in serious war literature. I t happened while Carr had the middle watch one night :

" It was dark . . . dark and still . . . there was no wind except the little we made ourselves as we plodded along a t a ten-knot clip. . . . I couldn't help it. I felt uneasy. I felt as if some evil thing was about to befall me or the boat. I felt just like I did before we were wrecked in the typhoon out in China. I tried to put the feelings away from me . . . for I honestly thought I was suffering my first real attack of nerves." (Page 235.)

Suddenly out of the darkness he saw two parallel streaks of light coming towards him through the water, just as they were about to hit they turned away simultaneously-porpoises.

" But it was no use," the feeling persisted. " I was for ever turning my head and looking over my right shoulder. . . . Some unseen force seemed to be dragging my attention to that direction. I took the night glasses and gazed long and earnestly into the darkness on our starboard quarter." Nothing.

Another quarter of an hour went by. Carr summoned the signalman to the bridge, and, telling him to keep a good lookout ahead, concentrated his attention on the starboard quarter.

After a short time he thought he saw something, but it was gone again. Then it reappeared, this time he was certain. " I t looked like an enormous bird, its white wings hovering low over the water."

I t was the bow wave of a German submarine steaming on a parallel course and slowly overtaking them. In the subsequent encounter the torpedoes from Carr's boat ran deep, and although they succeeded in ramming they slid over the German doing little damage. The German, one of the big type of cruiser submarines, made off, and do what they could the British submarine could not catch up.

The building and trials of Rr2 are described at some length, and the book closes with some remarks by Mr. Carr on the submarine as the dominant factor in war at sea, and the uselessness of our Asdic installa- tions for A/S purposes.

The reader must form his own opinions as to the merit of this argument, but there is at least one important fact which Mr. Carr glosses over, and that is that however powerful a gun-armament a submarine may carry, her principal feature is her ability to dive ; lose this and she becomes a most indifferent surface ship. For this reason few submarine captains would engage an armed surface ship by gunfire if in enemy waters; for one shell in the hull of the submarine, and she becomes useless for diving and would fall an easy prey to any destroyer, or cruiser, attracted to the scene by the cries of her victim.

Just now, when there is so much controversy about training, it is good to read a book like this, for here we have practical experience demonstrating that, given the right material, training in steam can turn out just as fine a type of fighting officer as ever put to sea in sail.

G. R. W

" 40, 0.B." OR How THE WAR WAS WON.

By HUGH CLELAND HOY. (Hutchinson. 15s.)

I CANNOT honestly recommend " 40, O.B." unless the prospective reader is prepared to face a book whose contents can be guaranteed to appeal to the type of mind which relishes tit-bits in a sensational Sunday paper. My impressions of it can scarcely be described better than by quoting two lines from its last paragraph ; lines written, I admit, in a sense totdIy different from that in which I am quoting them :-

" . . . where rowtance went hand-in-hand with efficiency, and high courage with lively inventiveness. "

The italics are mine. The book derives its title from the number of the Admiralty room in

which the expert cryptographic staff, employed on the decyphering of German WIT intercepts, was housed. The activities of this staff form the background of the whole book, and while there is no doubt that the nation, and the Navy in particular, owes an enormous debt to their labours, the author, who claims to have been confidential secretary to the Director of Naval Intelligence during the war, makes their achievements appear to have been positively superhuman. Mr. Churchill, when speaking of the same subject in " The World Crisis," claims much less for the staff of 40, O.B., and is consequently more believable.

There is a grandiose sub-title-" Or how the War was Won "-which is expanded in Chapter I (page zo), as follows :-

" The great share which the Royal Navy had in winning the war is still underestimated by the general public. . . . I trust that this book will, in some small way, help to reimpress upon the minds of readers the debt that Great Britain, the Empire and especially our later Allies owe to our Navy."

I doubt if this hope will be fulfilled ; but it is only fair to say that this book does attempt to fill in the gaps in many well-known stories, which up to date have been incomplete in detail.

The range of subjects touched on is diverse in the extreme. On page 19 the following statement appears :-

" . . . I have gathered together in this volume recollections and reflections on the events and personalities with which I came in contact through my association with the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty. . . ."

Full use has been made of this premise to work in not only a large number of anecdotes connected with the Naval Intelligence Division's activities, but also-as far as one can see-many other stories connected with the Navy and the late war which the author had treasured up from time to time. For instance, in a book bearing this title it is a little surprising to find Sir Percy Scott's " Creed " set out on page 89-purporting to have emanated from the naval censorship department during the war, whereas actually, I believe, it originated many years before the war. A thumb- nail, and not very accurate, account of the defence of Verdun (pages 186-198) is also difficult to reconcile with the previously quoted object of the book.

One other bone I have to pick with the author is that he is unable to resist the temptation of making a good story better. This is a fault many of us suffer from, but in a book of this nature, which depends for its interest on sensational disclosures (frequently, I feel, straining the elasticity of the Official Secrets Act), the credibility of some of the yarns would be considerably enhanced were it not for their being rounded off by an additional dramatic happening-often of no bearing on the incident proper. An example of this is. the story, on pages 142-148, of the landing of " James O'Brien," one of Sir Roger Casement's Irish Brigade, from a submarine on the Galway coast. The story in itself is presumably correct, but I doubt if it is improved by the ending, which tells how the German submarine-which O'Brien told Captain Hall was coming to collect him in a fortnight-fared :-

" A U-boat came to the surface and approached the shore. But when she was close in, two aeroplanes promptly appeared on the scene, and bombs, I was informed, put an end to that German mission."

This type of denouement to some anecdotes tends to make one shy of the remainder, for as a matter of fact this incident never occurred.

Turning to the subject matter of the various chapters in detail :-The first three deal with the inauguration of 40, O.B. and its work. These, except for one or two points, are non-controversial. Page 30, however, contains the statement :-

" Not one of them (i.e., the German WIT intercepts) ever completely defeated the code experts ! "

and page 32 shows that German code books found their way to 40, O.B. at intervals during the war, which was smart work on the part of the Intelligence Division.

The next chapter is about the Director of Naval Intelligence-now Admiral Sir W. R. Hall, K.C.M.G., C.R., D.C.L.-whose name, more than any other, most people associate with Naval Intelligence during the war. Following this is one dealing with Lord Fisher. There is nothing to complain of in these except, perhaps, the remark about A.D.C.'s on page 58, with reference to the Hon. Henry Fielding.

Chapter VI starts by dealing with Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg and naval censorship, and then degenerates into anecdotes about the latter department. Its interest lies in the comments on the effects on the morale of the populace produced by the suppression or publication of bad news.

The next four chapters describe spy-mania in England and espionage in general, including stories of such well-known characters as Carl Lody, Trebitsch Lincoln, Sir Roger Casement, Mata Hari and several others. The last chapter of the four winds up with a story about a man called O'Connor who was a card-sharper of no mean skill, but whose connection with the book, or the Navy, is obscure.

Chapter XI deals with German activities in neutral countries, followed by a chapter dealing exclusively with the German attack on Verdun, about which comment has been made above, although there is a reason for including it, since the author claims that it was owing to the Naval Intelligence Division that the French High Command were warned of the impending attack.

U-boats and their activities next occupy a chapter which is chiefly noticeable for its lack of arrangement.

Chapters XIV and XV deal with air-raids over England and, incidentally, extol 40, O.B.'s achievements rather more than usual. Apart from the fact that there is an error which infers that the Scarborough raid on 16th December, 1914, was carried out by gunboats (page 221), these chapters are of interest for their remarks on the psychology of recruiting (chiefly on pages 217-218). Most people will agree with the comments made ; and their failure to realise that the early air-raids tended to stimulate volunteers is not the least of the mistakes made by the Germans during the war.

After page 240 the book definitely deteriorates, and the last three chapters consist of a disconnected miscellany of subjects of varied appeal, to describe which I cannot do better than to quote the " Contents " of Chapter XVI as printed in the book :-

" ' World Dominion or Downfall.' The chart at the Admiralty. ' The writing on the wall.' The recurrent strikes. Diplomatic lying. Clemenceau and strikers. Earl Jellicoe faces the facts. Rumoured revolution. Horse meat in Yorkshire. The new rich. Fur coats

and clogs. Scenes on Glasgow Green. German atrocities. British morale. ' We want more beer.' An Irish potheen millionaire. Some relaxation for the workers. The Late Empress Eugenie. Scenes at Portsmouth. George Moore and Ladies with ' flea-bags.' "

I t may also be added that the early part of this chapter is so worded that it seems probable that naval and mercantile shipping losses have been confused.

In the last chapter on page 272 is a paragraph many officers will dislike, touching on the " totally inadequate pay " our naval ratings received during the war.

The book on the whole is strangely like another by a German author, whose name and the title of whose book both escape me except that the author described himself as " The Kaiser's Master Spy." Several people I knew were unable to swallow this German book, and I very much fear that many people will also find it equally difficult to stomach " 40, O.B."

C. C. H H.

" I N GREAT WATERS." . .

By CAPTAIN S. G. S. MCNEIL. (Faber & Faber. 15s.)

" IN GREAT WATERS " is the autobiography of Captain McNeil, a Captain (retired) in the R.N.R. and a sailor of long experience in sail and steam. Having read the book I was left with the feeling that this was the story of an embittered and possibly disappointed man. I did not enjoy it ; there is too much destructive criticism and unnecessary recalling of bitter little incidents which were better forgotten. However, as Captain McNeil has commanded many ships and men, including the Mauretania, his opinions cannot be lightly set aside.

Personally I am growing tired of always being told that the modern young officer is rotten ; maybe he has not been brought up in sail, but he is quite prepared to fly an aeroplane, or to go to sea in submarines, and in neither of these pursuits is there any room for the ham-handed, weak-kneed mascot which he is so often made out to be.

Readers of THE NAVAL REVIEW have had ample opportunity for studying the relations between the Navy and the Merchant Navy, and all of us must realise that, however bad these relations may have been in the past, it is essential for the good of the Empire that they should improve. I t is the duty of every officer to do his part to promote these good relations. " In Great Waters " will certainly do nothing to improve the feeling between the two Services, but it may serve as a warning to

< < IN GIZE.4T WATERS." 817

show what can result from lack of tact on the one hand and pride and prejudice on the other.

Captain McNeil went to sea in 1884 at the age of I ~ Q . He spent his time as apprentice in sailing ships, cruising to Australia, New Zealand and South America. After ten years in sail he transferred to steam, his first ship being a small steamer in the copper ore trade which ran between Huelva and Liverpool. He remarks : " No time could be spared to batten the hatches down whilst in the security of the river ; with luck, that would be done at sea. . . . There can be no excuse for any seaman who takes his ship to sea in such a condition." (Page 97.) After this ship he served in several other cargo ships trading to the Baltic and the West Indies. In 1897 he joined the Cunard Line.

During one voyage the Eiruria, in which he was serving, lost her rudder and only propeller while in mid-Atlantic ; WIT was then in its infancy, but as luck would have it another vessel, the Will iam Cliff, sighted her distress signals, and after twelve days succeeded in towing her into Fayal, a tow of 600 miles.

In 1911 Captain McNeil was appointed captain of the Ausonia, but a year later was transferred to the Mauretania where he occupied the newly created post of staff captain. This job is analogous to that of the commander of a capital ship, since the staff captain is responsible to the captain for the organisation of the ship's company.

At the outbreak of war Captain McNeil, who was on leave, received orders to join Devonport Barracks, but his clothes being in London he preferred to join ori is mouth Barracks instead, and this he did.

" Three R.N. captains and a number of senior officers, R.N. and R.N.R., were sent to Liverpool. A s I knew the Lusitania I was one of the R.N.R. officers in the party. The lieutenant-commander R.N. came from a boys' training-ship. He had not been to sea and had hardly seen a gun for some years, but he was to be the First-Lieutenant and gunnery officer, and I presume their intention was that I would be the senior watch-keeper.

" However, I considered that my consistent R.N.R. training, and re- qualification both in gunnery and torpedoes, entitled me to a more responsible position than that of a mere senior watch-keeper ; and, as my promotion to commander was already overdue, I told the Regulating Commander that, although I would go up to the Lusitania, I would not go to sea in her, excepting in the rank that was mine by the King's Regulations. . . . (Page 151.)

" In those days, in certain spheres of sea operations, senior R.N.R. officers, especially commanders and lieutenant-commanders, were just tolerated, and this attitude continued until the end of 1917. It was the cause of so much bitterness and friction, that I shall not be able to avoid further mention of it. . . ." (Page~ga.) Commander McNeil was given command of the Reindeer, a cross-

channel steamer, and in this ship he served as fleet minesweeper in the North Sea, and later as minesweeper and ferry at the ~ardanelles. His

crew consisted of R.N.R. officers and R.F.R. men, and from this isolated position it is perhaps hardly to be wondered at that he developed a narrow outlook in which naval customs and esprit de corps had no place.

We now know a good deal about the Dardanelles campaign, of the failures, and of the reasons for these failures. Captain McNeil says of the landing of the 25th of April, 1915 :-

" That landing, in my opinion, received not one atom of help from the High Command either of the Navy or of the Army. . . . Nevertheless, the evacuation proved that, if the British Army officer is allowed to do a job without interference by people who are thousands of miles away from the scene of operations, he is capable of thinking out in detail any eventuality of a military operation." (Page 159.)

Captain McNeil is ever ready to damn the staff and High Command but he does not appear to realise that he also failed at times. The following is an instance :-Before the landing he reported on board the flagship for final instructions. Admiral Wemyss asked him how many gangways he had. He replied, " one." When told to rig four more, he replied that it was impossible as he had no long planks. As might be expected Admiral Wemyss told him to damn well get some. McNeil however asked the admiral to make a general signal asking for suitable planks. No more was heard, and moreover no more was done by Commander McNeil, and the soldiers had to move slowly down the single gangway under a heavy fire, suffering severe casualties while so doing. One may blame the staff, but a little initiative and energy on the part of the commanding officer of the Reindeer might have saved many valuable lives.

During the Dardanelles operations the Reindeer was running almost continuously between Mudros and the beaches ; taking stores, ammunition and troops ashore, and bringing back wounded. That they were over- worked is obvious, but that is no reason for holding up to contempt the officers and men of the bigger ships who were serving their country just as faithfully, and who would, had they been given the chance, have done just as well as Commander McNeil and his crew.

On one dark night Reindeer collided with a steamer when about twelve miles outside Mudros harbour. Captain McNeil remarks :-

" Running as we were, without steaming lights, to and from Anzac and Gallipoli, night after night, down a narrow lane, we Commanding Officers should have been told what ships we were likely to meet each night and we shoula have had our wireless for other emergencies. An intelligent staff would have given the north-bound ships to Gallipoli and Anzac a course that would have allowed a wide berth to the south-bound ships from there." (Page 179.1 He is of course right, but unfortunate in his mode of expression.

" IN GREAT WATERS ." 819

One chapter is devoted to " Lessons of the Naval Campaign," and the page headings will give some idea of its contents. " The Merchant Navy," " R.N. v. R.N.R.," " I put my foot down," "A collier Captain's seamanship," "A compliment from the battleship," " The Too Silent Service," " Underestimating the enemy," " Lack of war-sense," "A fine ship and finer shipmates."

Of the Too Silent Service, he says :- " We relied too much upon the haloes we had won in the days of the glorious

past. . . . We lost the Aboukir, Grecy, and Hogue in the autumn of 1914, because of this undervaluing of the enemy. The Coronel battle . . . crowned this attitude. . . . These losses should never have occurred. . . . The loss of these five cruisers did not destroy the fleet's efficiency, said the high command. A small street-boy would understand that, but even he might ask if it was necessary that so many officers and men should be thrown away.

" I t is not unnatural, therefore, that we should like the silence to be broken and to be assured that the Navy is now organised to profit by all the possibilities and probabilities of this scientific and mechanised age." (Page 205.)

As an example of lack of war-sense he refers to a certain Merchant Service captain who told him he had had three ships torpedoed, and it transpired that the ships were lost in each case due to their waiting for daylight off some prominent land mark. Captain McNeil's reply was : "Aren't you ashamed of yourself. . . . Yes, damned well ashamed of yourself . . . you ought to be damned well court-martialled." Of this sort of thing he writes :-

" I am advocating the cultivation of this ' war-sense,' which implies a constant alertness from the time one harbour is cleared until the next one is entered. I t means that one must have every faculty keyed-up and that one must a t once commence to do the right thing." (Page 208.)

Another chapter which may be of interest to naval officers is " The making of a sailor." In this he advocates training in sail.

" The reason why the only training that can make a real sailor is in sail is that the elements then become a vital part of his environment ; " (Page 310.)

In order to obtain this training he suggests state-subsidised square- rigged training ships for the Mercantile Marine.

" The Merchant Service is the greatest asset the country has ; and yet the country spends scarcely one penny in helping to train the officers and men. . . . This is in great contrast to the public money spent in educating the officers and men in the Royal Navy." (Page 308.) As regards the name Merchant Navy he writes :-

" Personally, I object to this new name ; because for centuries we have endured the hardships of our profession and have built up the Mercantile Marine with little help from the Navy and with next to none from the politicians. So that we also have a tradition." (Page 307.)

G. R. W.

SHORT NOTICES OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS.

IMPERIAL D E F E N C E AND CAPTURE AT SEA I N WAR. By ADMIRAL SIR H. W. RICHMOND. (Hutchinson. 10s. 6d.) A full review of this important work (which has just been published) will

appear in the February number.

ROYAL, YACHTS. By PAYMASTER-COMNANUER C. M. G.~vIN, R.N. (Rich & Cowan, 2 7 , Maiden Lane, Strand, London, W.C.2.) Announcement is made of the publication of this book by gracious permission

of his Majesty the King. The book is a history of vessels used in the personal service of Royalty for

a variety of purpases during many centuries. I t will contain more than r j o illustrations-sixteen in colour---of Royal Yachts of various periods. Many of them are reproductions of well-known pictures by the Van de Veldes, father and son, Dominic Serres and other marine artists.

The edition is limited to one thousand numbered copies. A review of the book will appear in the February number.

T A K I N G THE CHAIR : How to conduct a Meeting or Committee Meeting. By PAYMASTER-CAPTAIN H. P W. G. MURRAY, D.S.O., R.N. (\I-. H. Barrel], Ltd., Portsmouth. IS.) I t so frequently falls to the lot of naval officers to preside at meetings of

committees and other bodies that such a book as this one comes as a great help to those who have not had much experience in " taking the chair." The book owes ibs origin to a lecture recently given by the author to the R.N. War College when some of the officers present suggested a reproduction of the notes in the form of a pamphlet. The price is so moderate as to put the book within the reach of all, and it is one which should certainly find a place on the book- shelves of officers who may expect to be called upon to undertake the duties of chairman.

I t is not too much to say that a meeting is made or marred by the knowledge which the chairman has of his job, both as regards procedure and the more delicate task of handling his committee with tact and skill. This hook helps very greatly in giving that knowledge, and can therefore be thoroughly recommended

F I E L D SERVICE P O C K E T BOOIC, 1932. H.M. Stationery Office. 2s. A new edition of the Field Service Pocket Book has just been published

In form and size it is similar to the Royal Naval Field Service Pocket Book. although its contents are of course mainly applicable to Army organisation and procedure. There is a great deal of information which will be of value to a naval officer if he is called upon to CO-operate with the Army, or act ashore on his own, in one of the riot or revolution breaking " shows " which have occurred with such unbroken regularity since the War.

SHORT NOTICES OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS. 8 2 I

The book " is intended to be a handy and concise reference for the use of d c e r s on active service " ; and in it will be found a chapter on Army organisation ; notes on reconnaissance, air photographs and their interpretation; general instructions as regards writing orders, messages, etc. ; notes and rules for the movement of troops by road, and the movements of troops, animals and vehicles by sea and rail.

There are other chapters dealing with accommodation, weapons and equipment, field engineering, supplies and medical service, etc.

The section dealing with combined operations has been omitted in this edition presumably because the subject is now dealt with fully elsewhere.

G. R. w.

EYE WITNESS : Being personal reminiscences of certain phases of the great war, including the genesis of the tank. By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ERNEST D. SWINTON, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., R.E. (Hodder & Stoughton. 25s.) Any naval officer who gets a chance to beg or borrow this book should

certainly do so. I t is a wonderful story of a very remarkable man. I n the early days of the war, when war correspondents were severely discouraged by General Joffre, the War Office sent him out as an eye witness of what was happening, to write articles on the military operations for publication. While there, he pandered deeply over the answer to the terrific slaughter perpetrated by the German machine guns. H e found it in the Tank, and this book tells the story simply, clearly and convincingly. Having at last got the Tank accepted and its value proved to the hilt, he was quietly unshipped and sent back to the War Cabinet Secretariat whence he had come. But he knew his work wals sound. " As I walked down the passage of the War Office, bereft of my child, con- isolation came with the thought that the child was waxing strong. ' The dog? hark, but the caravan passes on,' runs the Persian proverb. I n this instance the caravan moved on caterpillar tracks. "

And a further consolation came later. In the Epilogue the author repro- duces the facsimile of a telegram from Brigadier-General Elles, commanding the Tank Corps in the attack at the Battle of Cambrai on 20th November, 1917, in reply to his of congratulation :--" All ranks thank you. Your show. Elles."

RALEIGH'S LAST VOYAGE. By V. T. HARLOW. (Argonaut Press. 30s.) Thiis book is a valuable addition to the literature concerning the life and

deeds of one of the greatest of Englishmen. I t shows how at the age of 65 he was released from long imprisonment by his implacable enemy, King James I.. and sent on an impossible mi~ssion with followers whom he himself called " a scum d men." The expedition to the Orinoco is well described by the author, culminating in the heart-breaking failure and his consequent execution at the bidding of Spain-surely one of the most disgraceful political crimes in our annals. But Raleigh stand~s out in these pages with great clearness, and the author has depicted his character with fairness and justice.

RLOCKADE : The diary of an Austrian middle-class woman, 1914-1924. Bh ANNA EISENMENGER. (Constable. 7s. 6d.) The title i~s somewhat misleading, as it is rather the effects of the blockade

with which this book deals. During the war the pressure of our blockade was very severe, but it was quite clearly realised to be the result of the conflict, and accepted as such.

8 2 2 SHORT NOTICES OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS.

I t will, however, probably be news to many naval officers who took part in that historic blockade that for years after the 11th of November, 1918, the conquered countries were kept in a terrible state of privation. That this was entirely unavoidable it is impossible to believe, and yet as late as January, 1920, the author is writing that " we housewives have to fight harder than ever to secure food." Alnd when food wais at length available the currency had so much depreciated that the barest necessities were almost unattainable.

What that shortage meant in suffering and death to hapless civilians years after the armistice wals signed this h k very clearly shows.

KEMALIST T U R K E Y AND T H E MIDDLE EAST. By Dr. I<. I<R~~GER of Berlin. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

GOLDEN HORN. Ry FRANCIS YEATS-BROWN. (Gollancz. 8s. 6d.) These two most recent books on Turkey cover a large amount of ground.

The first, though written with a German bias, gives us a very good picture of the Turkey of the last twenty-five years, with its strong Nationalism making itself felt, first in the Young Turk movement with its pro-German tendency resulting in the famous alliance which brought Turkey into the war against us, and then in the Remalist movement with its repudiation of Sultanate and Caliphate and its ejection from itis borders of the long established Ottoman, Greek, and Armenian population. But to us naval officers perhaps the chief interest lies in the fact that the Dardanelles lie within the Turkish borders and that Russia for her own economic welfare needs to have them in her hands.

This question must dominate all othens in the future as it has done in the past. The author sums up the pre-war situation in the following passage :-

" Russia, inspired not only by the desire for territorial expansion and the control of the Dardanelles, but also by the spiritual ideal of liberating the Christian races of the Balkans found it easy to deal the Ottoman Empire a staggering blow. If the other Great Powers-for example, Great Britain and France--offered a certain resistance to the Russian advance in the Balkans (in 1877) this was due not to the fact that they were in any way hostile to the liberation of the Balkan people, but solely to their determination to prevent Russia from capturing Constantinople and the Straits.' ' p. 134.

Similarly when dealing with the future he says :- " The Soviet have so far shown no inclination to pursue the old Tsarist

policy in this direction [z.e., possession of the Straits], but, should the Nationalist Russia of to-morrow attempt to threaten Turkey, British and Turkish interests will assuredly coincide." (p. zoo.) With the Straits open to the Russian fleet, a threat is constituted to the

flank of our trade route to the East the seriousness of which cannot be exaggerated : hence Turkey's future must always be a matter of close attention by us.

Golden Horn shows us another picture. The brilliant author of Bengal Lancer first gives us an admittedly second-hand sketch of pre-war Turkey with its Young Turk movement. Then comes the war : the author crashes in an aeroplane and is taken prisoner. His sufferinp, his misery, and his experience are wonderfully set out : the Turks' inhuman tleatment of their British prisoners has to be read to be realised, and the author's curious pensonality adds a psychological touch to the book which is sufficient in itself to make it well worth reading. His tribute to the courage of the intrepid English girl whom he calls the White Lady, and who, single-handed, aslsisted in the escape of so many British prisoners of war, is thoroughly well deserved. She risked horrors un-

SHORT NOTICES O F BOOKS AND PERIODICALS. 823

speakable for the sake of her fellow-countrymen; she is well-known to many of us, and her name deserves to stand high i,n the splendid record of devoted English women.

PERIODICALS.

T H E F I G H T I N G FORCES, l AUGUST, 1932. The editor is an out-and-out advocate for a Milnistry of Defence as a panacea for many ills : he brings no new arguments to bear, and his statements are not very convincing. H e claims that it means economy in administration, real co-operation, an end of " absurd inter-Service rivalries," avoidance of such disasters as the Suvla Bay landing which " was caused largely through faulty co-operation between the naval and military forces engaged," and finally " a n end to the conservatism which still permeates the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry." I n short a veritable martial Utopia. But how the creation of a Ministry of Defence is to bring all this about is not very evident.

OCTOBER, 1932. Both this and the August number contain much editorial matter on the subject of disarmament, and Major Lefebure continues his articles on the subject. The disarming of Germany in the Peace Treaty followed by the recent demand by that country for equality of treatment in the matter of armaments naturally constitutes a serious problem. The subject is too complex to be summarized; but those who talk of England's dutl in this matter of disarmament might well be referred to the very remarkable letteis which appeared in The Ttmes of 7th and 10th October, showing ver) clearly what Great Britain has done in the matter of disarmament in comparison with other powen.;. Both letters deserve careful study.

A short hut interesting paragraph appears on the size of warships : aftel showing the succes~sive " climb downs " from 48,000 tons to a possible 22,000 tons and 11-inch guns, the editor speaks of " a determination to have the smallest size of battleships and cruisers compatible with the purposes for which these ships exist." But are we quite clear as to what those pulposes really are? Any article which successfully answers this question will be heartily welcomed by THE NAVAL REVIEW.

'I'H1.2 MARINER'S MIRROR, OCTOBHR, 1932. I n the report of the Annual General Meeting held at Greenwich on the 6th of July, the Chairman, Admiral Sir George Hope, mentioned that that day was the 21st birthday of the Scciety for Nautical Research, a fact on which the Society is much to be congratulated.

Mr. H. B. Butcher contributes an extremely interesting article on " The 1,ondon East India Company's Finst Expedition." This consisted of a merchant fleet of four ships and a victualler, all heavily armed. They were large ships for those days, the flagship, the Dragon, being of 600 tons burden. This fleet \$as commanded by Captain Jamas Lancaster, styled " General of the Voyage,' and it sailed from Torbay on the 20th of April, 1601. The crews of all ships suffered grievously from scurvy except that of the flagship herself, Idancaster having brought some bottled lime juice with him. Scores had died from it by the time the fleet reached Table Ray on 9th September, 1601, where a much needed rest w-as enjoyed. The subsequent voyages across the Indian Ocean to the Dutrh East Indies is set out in great detail, the principal cargo shipped being pepper. After many vicissitudes-including a lost rudder off the Cape of Good Hope-the Downs were reached on 11th of September, 1603, only to find

1 This periodical now appears every two months.

824 SHORT NOTICES O F BOOKS .AND PERIODICALS.

that the market was already glutted with pepper. None the less a handsome profit was made, while the crews were profoundly thankful to be " delivered . . . from infinite perils and dangers in this long and tedious navigation."

T H E N I N E T E E N T H CENTURY AND A F T E R . SEPTEMBER, 1932. Contains two thought-provoking articles on the problem of disarmament. They are written from widely different points of view, the first, b? Lord Dickenson, being styled " I s Disarmament Possible? " and the second by Admiral Richmond entitled " Geneva and the Navies."

In the first it is contended that only b\ an agreement on the two main principles of equality and security can di~sarmanient be achieved, and in the second it is emphasised that if any real results are to be attained at the next stage of the Disarmament Conference the statesman must insist on the expert explaining fully, under cross-examination, why various instruments now claimed to be indispensable are in fact required.

HON. EDITOR.

[ N O T E . - T ~ ~ October number of The Royal Air Force Quarterly had not been received up to the time of writing these notes. j

CORRESPONDENCE.

Sir,-The First Lord in his statement on the Naval Estimates indicated that the Navy is stocktaking.

If the subject is not by now quite threadbare I should like to refer to a cause at the back of some of our mistakes, namely, an inadequate realisation that peace and war require different systems of organization and a different evaluation of the relative importance of various factors.

The important things in war can be said to be associated with operations, action, decisive execution of plans ; in fact, results, as distinct from deliberate preparation.

The important thing in peace is preparation, the largest factor of which is training. Moreover, it is preparation for something that may not happen for years.

If we have not, up to now, designed our peace activities with a proper realisation of requirements, the mistake is excusable, because for many years the naval atmosphere in which we lived was dominated by the imminence of war against a specific enemy. But now that a shock has made us see clearly that present-day conditions are very different from those we used to know, we need to take a longer view in preparing the personnel of the Navy.

All this may be obvious and its reiteration irritating. Nevertheless we have not acted on it. For example, we still commission a ship and work her up into a state of high unit efficiency and then pay her off after a short 2 or 23 years-killing her as a unit. Her commission has done some good, by training officers and men, but we do not judge her commission by this. We still judge largely by visible and recordable results, while all the time the thing that matters most is hardly noticed. I refer to the individual efficiency of every officer and man, as distinct from the combined efficiency of a ship's company.

The real success of a ship's commission in 9eace is the standard of the officers and men, individually, who walk out of the ship on paying-off day, compared to their standard when they stepped on board on the day of commissioning. In war, on the contrary, the immediate efficiency of the ship is the measure of success. In actual fact, as everyone knows,

826 CORRESPONDENCE.

success in peace is measured by the efficiency-or even appearance of efficiency-of the ship as a unit-a transitory thing.

The tendency to concentrate on the transitory needs of the moment is not confined to the internal economy of the ship ; the same can be found in other parts of naval administration.

Take the Admiralty- For the sake of comparison its activities can conveniently be divided

into three general headings :- Operations, Personnel, Material.

Before the war, material unduly dominated the situation. During the war the operational side took its right place in the forefront-eventually. After the war the general organization forged in war was continued ; that is, the War Staff, now called the Naval Staff, or in other words the Operational side, was given the greatest weight. A large part of the duties of the Admiralty with regard to training were placed with the War Staff. These duties underwent a relative increase as the work connected with real operations gradually diminished.

The position to which this has led is that the control of the training of officers and men is almost divorced from their administration. Train- ing is shut up in a semi-watertight compartment with operations, while administration is shut up in other semi-watertight compartments under the Second Sea Lord and Naval Secretary.

The principle that training must be governed by war requirements is perfectly sound, in reason ; but it does not justify a system of organization which takes the training of officers and men out of the hands of the Sea Lord responsible for personnel. Such a system is wrong because the most important part of anyone's training is the experience he gets, a fact which necessitates, in my opinion, training and appointments being under one Sea Lord. The tendency at present is for an officer to be chosen for a particular job because he is good at it, not because it is good for him. This is all wrong as a general practice in peace. Although it favours the efficiency of the moment it does not lay such a good foundation for a major, possibly distant, war which will, moreover, probably need a large expansion of personnel when it does come.

Admittedly there has been improvement in some respects during the last few years ; for example, in the appointment of captains who have never been in command before promotion. But there is much more to be done.

It is clear from statements in the First Lord's speech that the Admiralty realise the errors which have resulted from trying to keep everyone

CORRESPONDENCE. 827

immediately ready for battle, and no doubt reforms in training in the fleet will be effected. In anticipation of criticism that I am therefore flogging a dead horse, I want to point out that what I am at pains to urge is reform at headquarters. Unless the controlling body is right, improvements in training will not last.

Admiralty Organization is a difficult thing to tackle, and it is with diffidence that I venture to suggest improvements; but as they are in the direction of simplification as opposed to complexity they may have a germ of practicability.

The following outline of alterations in the Admiralty is suggested :- (I) Recognise that the peace-time staff is better not modelled

too rigidly on a war-time staff. ( 2 ) DO away with the D.C.N.S. (3) Do away with the Operations Division. (4) Put Plans and Intelligence directly under the First Sea Lord ;

this will be the nucleus of the War Staff, when the nearer approach of war requires its expansion. It can have a section for operations or movements if desired, and a trade section. An additional Sea Lord, as D.C.N.S. or Deputy First Lord, to be added when operational work increases at the approach of war.

( 5 ) Put all training under the Second Sea Lord and transfer to his charge, under a rear-admiral as Director of Training, the present Training and Staff Duties Division, the Naval Air Division, the Tactical Division. The Director of Training also to be the Second Sea Lord's assistant for appointments of officers and to be in charge of C.W. Branch.

(6) The Director of Manning to be in the same position as at present, but he might take over some of the elementary training, e.g., training ships and establishments.

(7) Put Naval Law under another Sea Lord, the Fourth perhaps ; discipline depends more on training than on law, and this would relieve the Second Sea Lord.

(8) If it is not unduly outraging hoary traditions it would be desirable to put the appointment of captains under the Second Sea Lord.

Needless to say, I am not supposing for a moment that re-organization at the Admiralty will right all mistakes. Almost everything to do with the personnel, both officers and men, wants a thorough overhaul ; and a new system which is simpler and better designed to stand the test of a possibly prolonged period of peace requires to be worked out. The committees mentioned by the First Lord are no doubt doing this. But

528 CORRESPONDENCE.

when they have finished their work, and their recommendations have been put into effect, it will require an Admiralty organized on sound principles to keep the personnel of the Navy on the right track.

I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

The Hon. Editor, Ex. THE NAVAL REVIEW.

REPLIES. I.

I should like to discuss the point of principle raised by " Ex " as regards the direction of Training. He recommends a return to the system under which all training was under the Second Sea Lord, with a rear-admiral as Director of Training, who would be the Second Sea Lord's Assistant in appointments and be in charge of C.W. Branch.

Until 1918 all Training was under the Second Sea Lord. He had an assistant-a post captain, whose duties were, at that time, rather diverse. When an assistant to the Second Sea Lord was first instituted in 1908 he had the duty of dealing very largely with questions arising out of the new system of training instituted in 1902. There was a great number of questions of principle still to be decided-whether midshipmen should go through a course of training as Marine officers, how the problem of the naval instructor was to be worked out, the extent to which midshipmen would be kept at school and moved from ship to ship, questions about the teaching of foreign languages and a host of similar matters.

What, in practice, happened was that this assistant " devilled " the papers, summarized the remarks of the various people who minuted them, but, as a rule, was not expected to offer solutions or recommendations of his own, though he could and often did so. It was not the position-nor was it supposed to be-of the Director of Training as visualized by " Ex," who would, presumably, be expected definitely to initiate ideas. In reality, the Second Sea Lord was the Director of Training.

The duties of the assistant to the Second Sea Lord increased in 1909 and soon included the appointments of officers-the second duty which " Ex " would place in his hands. The reasons lay in the very great dissatisfaction which many officers felt at their careers being at the disposal of the civil staff. For it was the Second Sea Lord's civil secretaries who made the appointments. They knew nothing of the officers : and there was a not unnatural-to put it very mildly-resentment at having to place one's wishes or claims before a civil assistant, who (again

CORRESPONDENCE. 829

to put it mildly) could be extremely haughty and was in possession of considerable powers. The naval assistant to the Second Sea Lord took over these duties, and naval officers whose appointments were made by him had the satisfaction of presenting any case they might wish to present to another, though senior, naval officer.

I think it would be correct to say that the assistant at that time found that the mere administrative work of selecting officers, inter- viewing them, and of conducting the fairly considerable correspondence which is a part of the whole business of such administration, took up a great deal of time, and did not leave much opportunity for consideration of the many problems of education and training. The result was that those problems fell more and more into the hands of the " Director of Education "-a professor of civil engineering at that time and whose hold upon the course and policy of naval education was extremely strong. The principles of training, as well as the details, thus passed out of the hands of the Assistant to the Second Sea Lord, a post captain, into those of a civilian. The result was that naval education lost its direction. The fact that the naval officer's ultimate function in life is to conduct war and the operations of war, that he has to be an officer, a seaman, a tactician, and a strategist were not kept constantly in view. I t was indeed actually stated at the time that the object of the training was to produce an engineer.

" Ex's " proposal that the Director of Training should be an Assistant to the Second Sea Lord for administrative duties as well as for the direction of Training would expose us in the future to the difficulties we have had in the past. If Training is to come under the Second Sea Lord it requires to be in a branch, and under an officer, whose time is not occupied with the burdensome current administrative work.

" Ex " condemns the separation of the control of Training from Administration. The present writer takes an opposite view. The two things appear to him to be distinct and not interdependent. There appears to be no relation between say, the question of whether the sub- lieutenants' war course covers the ground adequately, and the selection, out of a number of officers available, of a watchkeeper for a sloop in China.

In the Army, the differentiation between the administrative and " Staff " duties was recognized by Lord Roberts when he remodelled the military organization. The Adjutant General was given the adrnini- strative duties, and all matters of the principles of training came under the Chief of the Staff, with his Directors for each. I think there is no question that the improvements that have taken place in Military Training since this change was made are due to this separation of

830 CORRESPONDENCE.

duties. We are under no necessity to copy the Army, but when we appeal to principles, and state, as a matter of principle, that training must not be divorced from administration, we are bound to subject that theory to the test of experience before accepting it, and see whether the divorce is unworkable or bad.

But to take our own case. The War and Staff Colleges, the Tactical course at Portsmouth are instruments of training, and by no means the least important establishments. There are surely good grounds for placing these under the First Sea Lord. The work done in them is entirely foreign in nature to the duties of a Second Sea Lord. The studies conducted are connected with problems of a wholly different kind. The preparation of books on strategy and tactics-the naval equivalents of the Field Service Regulations-these surely have nothing in common with Administration ; but what is written and taught in them is distinctly and directly connected with the duties which fall to the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Staff.

Hard and fast lines are always difficult things to draw without having recourse to " doctrinairism." But there is nevertheless a very commonly accepted recognition of the principle of a distinction between direction of policy and administration, between thinking out a problem and providing the means. Of course a total divorce between the two is fatal. To make magnificent strategical plans for which one does not possess the means is ridiculous, though it has been done. But to avoid such a thing does not mean placing the " planning " and " providing " duties in the same hands, but in making sure that there is a close touch between them.

The business of preparation for war is in those two parts-Planning, and providing the material and personnel. The second, which is the administrative portion, is concerned with the provision of stores, the production of ships and their maintenance, the provision of individuals and what corresponds to their " maintenance." Under which heading does " Training " most properly lie ? Is it preparation for war in the sense of " planning " (a bad word, I know, but the most comprehensive that I can find), or is it preparation in the sense of " provision of quantities " '2 To me it seems that it has nothing to do with administration, except that-like the operations referred to earlier-it must not ignore the practical problem of supply.

My reading of our experience of the last thirty years or so is that the whole policy of education and training has been dominated by civil professors, not by naval officers ; and that this is not due to any lack of zeal or of powers to direct that policy, but simply because administrative work has swamped the departmental Lords. When the Admiralty was

CORRESPONDENCE. 831

reorganized about a hundred years ago by Sir James Graham it was foreseen that this would happen-that departmental duties would absorb the whole time of the Sea Lords of the Admiralty to whom they were allotted.

I do not think that even the appointment of a " Director of Training " under the Second Sea Lord, even if he were not made simultaneously responsible for appointments, would be a sound arrangement. Certainly it would meet the objection that the single officer could not properly perform both duties and that he would, as has always happened, have to turn his attention to those current matters which cannot be left undone. But where, in my view, it would be wrong is that the business of direction of training is related in a far greater measure with the First Sea Lord's duties connected with the preparation for war than with those of the Second Sea Lord. This was most clearly recognized and laid down in 1918, though in practice it was not carried out for reasons of various kinds which do not affect the principle. W'hether the " Director " is under the First or the Second Lord does not seem to make any difference as regards appointments. I doubt very much whether the supposed Director, in considering what officer to appoint, would be any more affected by considerations of " varying the experience " of an officer than the present assistants to the Sea Lord. That officer is perfectly capable of taking this into consideration, and, so far as practical conditions admit, of widening the scope of officers' jobs. There is, I would suggest, no need to call him " Director of Training," which, after all is a title only, to make him acquainted with the desirability of not keeping officers in a groove. I agree almost to the full with " Ex " that a man's experience is a mast important part in his training ; but the fact that the administrative work of ensuring that he shall get the fullest range of experience falls to the Second Sea Lord, does not bring with it in its train the necessity for that officer also to be responsible for the principles governing the education and training, or for those other duties which are now associated with the Director in connection with the production of manuals of war.

I suggest that " Training " covers a much wider field than what may be called " instruction." All tactical exercises and manceuvres are essential and important parts of training, and are very definitely under the direction of the Chief of the Staff, although many of them are conducted and designed entirely by commanders-in-chief. But the lessons which they bring out, if they are to be of general service, require promulgation : and the authority under whom promulgation or criticism naturally falls is the First Sea Lord. To take an example. Before the war a considerable number of tactical exercises were conducted in the

832 CORRESPONDENCE.

Home fleet. They were directed towards elucidating certain definite problems-the best cruising formation for a rapid deployment, the use of squadronal formations, the employment of fast divisions in action, the question of the use of flotillas in an offensive or defensive capacity. This was, essentially, " Training." The use to which these exercises would be put, the conclusions drawn, were matters for the decision of the First Sea Lord, and it would be to the Staff under his direction, and not to the administrative staff of the Second Sea Lord, that it would fall to make such analysis as would be considered necessary, to suggest the form in which any information concerning them should be issued to the fleet. Some may have seen the bulky volume in which the records of these exercises were printed. A capable staff officer could have reduced this to a comparatively small and readable volume, bringing out the salient points to the great benefit of the service as a whole.

Liddell Hart, in his " The British Way in Warfare " (p. 233) ) remarks of the Army that the British commander of to-day is usually stronger in the technique of war than in the art of war, and he asks the cause. He suggests that the answer is that " In all our military training we imitate Father William by standing on our head." In other words, we invert the true order of thought : considering technique first, tactics second, and strategy-'' also ran." That criticism might, not without justification, be applied to the Navy. If our training is to produce what, after all, is the ultimate object of a naval bfficer's existence-his fitness for war-it would seem proper that the duty of putting the training upon the best foundation, of establishing the principles upon which it is to be conducted, should fall to the Sea Lord to whom the consideration of the strategical problems falls. Do not let us think that the word " Training " merely means the production of efficient lieutenants, but look on it as the whole business of preparing our officers, and hel@ing them to prepare themselves, to use the instruments which, in every rank, they will have to use in war.

I am, etc., 2.

11. Sir,-" Ex's" letter, apart from being somewhat revolutionary,

indicates a frame of mind which I think is induced in many would-be reformers. I also get the impression that his remarks are particularly levelled at the training of officers, and only incidentally at that of men- the latter, to my mind, being every bit as important.

CORRESPONDENCE. 833

His policy is that, as the present scheme of things-and training in particular-has not worked out very well, the correct remedy is to " scrap the lot " and re-design the whole system. To this view I take exception. Whether the present scheme is good or bad there is little doubt that it has been built up gradually on a very sound scheme of administration-a system which has stood the test of war and which " Ex " himself infers is required in war time. If the present organisation is not good then I suggest that the reason is that the application has been bad, and what we should now do is to rebuild within the existing structure-not alter the foundations.

Adopting one organization for peace and another for war-or even when the threat of war occurs-introduces two grave dangers :-

(a) The scheme of administration required in war is unfamiliar to officers since it is non-existent, and experience cannot be gained in its functioning, in peace time.

(b) The transition period causes disorganisation and takes time- which time may not be given us, as strained relations sometimes have a habit of occurring without warning.

The basic defect in all our post-war training schemes has been the lack of money allocated to training as a whole, which point " Ex " does not mention ; but I am with him when he suggests that our training methods require overhaul. In particular I consider the initial training of young officers and men tends to be far too technical, instead of being designed purely for character-training-that essential requirement in our composition which is so often neglected. Once, however, these officers and men are drafted to ships of the fleet I fail to agree with what I imagine " Ex's " views must be. Once in a ship the character-training period is passed, and you must train with the efficiency of the ship as the object-not the efficiency of the individual. Granted individuals may suffer by this ; but, if you don't follow this rule, the very grave defect will occur that progress as a whole is hampered by lack of familiarity of the personnel with the materiel, which familiarity alone shows us what both the personnel and the materiel are capable of, and so paves the way for further advance.

The remedy to my mind is an extended training period in training squadrons (or establishments) before men are drafted to ships in the fleet, i.e., training for the individual's sake, and, if you like, additional periods at intervals during a man's period of service.

Incidentally I would like to suggest to " Ex " that a very big obstacle to training of any sort is the time spent on " house-maiding " ; this must be reduced if we are to obtain more time for training generally.

834 CORRESPONDENCE.

I should like now to comment on one or two special points in " Ex's " letter. I am not sure what point he wishes to make in his remarks about the length of a ship's commission being 2 to 24 years. If he is contemplating longer commissions I think they are most inadvisable to avoid our becoming like some regiments whose ideas are chiefly bound up in what happened in (say) 1920. If he contemplates continuous commissions they are to be deprecated because :-

(a) The officers, and the men who work under them, change too frequently and fail to get to know each other.

(b) Progress in training of any sort is impeded by the constant changes in personnel.

The remaining remarks about measurement of success, while undoubtedly true superficially, are open to the objection that, if progress is to be made, training must be with a view to ship, not individual, efficiency.

He then goes on to show that the control of training of personnel is almost divorced from their administration, and offers suggestions for a reorganization of the Admiralty. This really suggests a lack of co-operation between the relevant divisions at the Admiralty-a conclusion which " Ex " draws rather half-heartedly. Now, as I have said above, I don't agree that such a reorganization is necessary ; but, apart from this, if such a scheme were adopted it might well be argued that training was then a specialized subject on its own, and not enough in touch with materiel-the use of which is, after all, what training is for. This, ilz

extremis, might result in either materiel getting too complicated for the personnel, or our materiel lagging behind that of other navies.

As regards " Ex's " remarks on officers being chosen for jobs because they are good at them, and not because the jobs are good for the officers, I am in entire agreement. This can, however, moderately easily be remedied without any changes in organization.

In conclusion may I recapitulate :- (a) I do not think an extensive Admiralty reorganization is

necessary, as the existing one has stood the test of war and will undoubtedly be required in any future war, and a special peace-time organization might be very dangerous. On the other hand closer liaisons between the various administrative and training divisions at the Admiralty are very necessary.

(b) Training of young officers and men should be much more extensive and a thing apart ; carried out with the object of inculcating discipline, morale and the right ideas, etc., and with no idea, necessarily, of fitting them for their future duties. This latter part of their training, i.e., the end as

CORRESPONDENCE. 835

opposed to the means, will come when they are drafted to ships of the fleet.


THE HON. EDITOR, GR. THE NAVAL REVIEW.

PROMOTIONS. Sir,-L. D. M.'s statistical letter on the subject of percentage pro-

motions in the August NAVAL REVIEW invites fuller records from any officers who have them.

I am a memb,er of the Greynvile term which entered Osborne in January, 1911, and perhaps the statistical history of the term may be of interest. It is as follows :-

I Cadets 1 Midshipmen Sub-lieuts. Lieutenants Lieut-cdrs. Commanders

* One put down a term.

7 3-Cdrs (E).

The only comment I should like to make is on the stated fact that L. D. M.'s statistics exclude Conway cadets. Four of these cadets joined up with my t,erm on going to Dartmouth, and, of these four, one was axed as a lieutenant and the remaining tlhree have all reached commander's or commander (E)'s rank. These three very materially alter the percentage of the term promoted, and I feel that they should be taken into consideration in working out statistics, as, had they not existed, others would presumably have been promoted in their place- not necessarily from my term, of course.


NUMBER FIVE. THE HON. EDITOR,

THE NAVAL REVIEW.

the naval review 1932

Documents