the nation-state and violence

Anthony GiddensTHE TION-STATE

VIOLENCE\blume Two of A Contemporary Critique of

Historical MaterialismI

The Nation-State and ViolenceVolume Two of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism

Anthony Giddens

Polity Press

© Anthony Giddens, 1985

First published 1985 byPolity Press, Cambridge, in association with Basil Blackwell. Oxford. First published in paperback 1987 Reprinted 1989

Editorial office:Polity Press,65 Bridge Street, Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Marketing and production:Basil Blackwell Ltd108 Cowley Road, Oxford 0 X 4 1JF. UK.

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission o f the publisher.

Except in the United States o f America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Giddens, Anthony A contemporary critique of historical materialism.Vol. 2: The nation-state and violence 1. Historical materialism I. Title335.4 '119 D16.9ISBN 0 7456 0031 X ISBN 0 7456 0032 8 (pbk)

Typeset by Pioneer, East SussexPrinted and Bound in Great Britain byT.J. Press (Padstow) Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

Contents

Introduction 1

1 State, Society and M odern History 7

Power and Domination 7The Concept of the State: Preliminary Remarks 17State, Nation-State and Military Power in Social Theory 22A Discontinuist Interpretation of Modern History 31

2 T h e Traditional State: D om ination and Military Power 35

City and Countryside in Traditional States 35Surveillance and Administrative Power 41Territoriality, State, Society 49Military Power in Traditional States 53

3 T h e Traditional State: Bureaucracy, Class, Ideology 61

Bureaucracy and Class Domination 61Ideology and the M odern State 71State Systems 79

4 T he A bsolutist State and the Nation-State 83

The System of Absolutist States 84The Absolutist State as an Organization 93Military Power from the Absolutist to the Nation-State 103Nation-State, Nation, Nationalism 116

5 Capitalism, Industrialism and Social Transform ation 122

What is Capitalism? 122Capitalism and Industrialism 137

vi Contents

6 Capitalism and the State: From A bsolutism to the Nation-State 148

C o m m o d ifica tio n and S ta te D eve lopm en t 148

C ap ita lism an d W orld System T h eo ry 161

7 A dm inistrative Power, Internal Pacification 172

A d m in is tra tiv e P ow er I: C o m m u n ic a tio n and In fo rm a tio n S to rage

172

A dm in is tra tive P ow er II: In te rn a l P acification 181U rban ism , R eg iona liza tion an d S eq u es tra tio n 192

8 Class, Sovereignty and C itizenship 198

P o lyarchy 198P o lyarchy , C itizensh ip 201C itizensh ip , Ideo logy an d N ationalism 209

9 Capitalist D evelopm ent and the Industrialization o f War 222

T h e ‘L ong P e a c e ’ 222W arfa re an d Social C hange 232T h e W orld W ars 236T h e N ation -S ta te , Industria lism an d th e M ilitary 244

10 Nation-States in the G lobal State System 255

T h e N ation -S ta te an d th e In v en tio n of 'In te rn a tio n a l R e la tio n s’

257

T y p es o f N ation-S ta te 267T h e W o rld C ap ita lis t E co n o m y 276In te rn a tio n a l O rd e rs an d the S overeign ty of S ta tes 281C ap ita lism , Industria lism an d th e S ta te System 287

11 M odernity, Totalitarianism and Critical Theory 294

T o ta lita rian ism : S u rve illance an d V io lence 295D im ensions o f M o d ern ity 310T h e N eed fo r a N orm ative P o litical T h e o ry of V io len ce 325C ritica l T h e o ry in the L ate T w en tie th C en tu ry 335

Notes 342

B ib l io g r a p h y 371

I n d e x 388

Introduction

This book is the second vo lum e of th ree , all co n c e rn e d with the re levance of historical m ateria lism to to d ay ’s w orld. T h e trilogy is not in tended , how ever, as a n o th e r con tr ibu tion to the endless critical d issection of M arx’s writings. R a ther , it is an a t tem p t to explore the co n to u rs of a post-M arxist analysis of co n tem p o ra ry society and politics. M arx 's writings are o f signal im p o rtan ce for u nders tand ing o n e of the m ost pervasive influences m ould ing the m o d ern world. This influence is of course capita lism , regarded as a m ode of eco n o m ic en terp rise that has a dynam ic ten d en cy to expansion far g rea te r than any prio r type of p roduc tive o rder. But capitalism is not the only force which has shaped m odern ity , and th ere are in any case cogen t reasons to be dissatisfied with som e of the m ain perspectives of M arx ’s portrayal o f capitalist deve lopm ent.

M arx ’s d iscussion of the past origins an d fu tu re fa te of capitalism is part o f an overall historical sch em e the exp lanato ry pow er of which is limited. T h e insights he provides abou t the n a tu re of capitalist en terp rise have to be prised free from the general f ram ew ork of historical m ateria lism , and in tegra ted with a different ap p ro ach to previous history and to the analysis of m odern institutions. T rea t ing m odern societies as the culmination of a p rocess of progressive expansion of th e forces of p roduc tion fails to disclose how different they are from all forms of traditional o rd e r . M o d e rn ‘so c ie t ies ’ a re na tion-s ta tes , existing within a nation-s ta te system. T rad it io n a l s tates — o r w hat I call ‘class- divided societies ' — con tra s t very substantially with these, bo th in their in terna l charac te r is t ics and in their ex ternal rela tions with o n e an o th e r . Social scientists are accu s to m ed to th inking of ‘societies' as administrative unities with clearly defined boundaries. Class-divided societies w ere no t like this, an d if m o d e rn ones are,

2 Introduction

it is no t because of anyth ing intrinsic to social associa tion in general , bu t a result of d istinctive forms of social in tegra tion assoc ia ted with the nation-state .

H istorical m ateria lism co n n e c ts the em erg en ce of both trad it ional and m odern states with the d ev e lo p m en t of m ateria l p ro d u c tio n (or what I call ‘allocative resources ') . But equally significant, and very often the m ain m eans w hereby such m ateria l wealth is g en e ra ted , is the collection and storage of inform ation , used to co -o rd ina te subject populations. In fo rm ation s to rage is cen tra l to th e role of ‘au thorita tive resources ' in the s truc tu ring of social systems spanning larger ranges of space and tim e than tribal cu ltures. Surveillance — con tro l of in fo rm ation and the s u p e r in ten d en ce of the activities o f som e groups by o thers — is in tu rn the key to the expansion of such resources.

In this book I also p lace a good deal o f em phasis upon the role of military pow er in the organization of trad it ional and m odern states. W h o con tro ls the m eans of violence, how co m p le te such con tro l is and to what ends it is dep loyed are plainly m atte rs of s ignificance in all societies with ‘a rm ed forces'. Surveillance and con tro l of the m eans of v io lence are , how ever, p h en o m en a that largely escape the purview of the m ost influential schools of social theory , including M arxism , bo th in the n ine teen th cen tu ry and today. T h ey have to be studied in re la tion to the main p reo ccu p a tio n s of M arxism — capitalism and class conflic t — but they s tand alongside th em as in d ep en d en t influences upon the d ev e lo p m en t of m odern ity .

T h e re is a fourth ‘institu tional c luster ' re levan t to m odern ity the im pact and con seq u en ces of which is largely o b scu red in M arxist thought. This is industrialism. O ne of the m ain d eb a te s in social theo ry has been be tw een those w ho regard capita lism as the ‘m a k e r ’ of the m o d ern w orld , and those w ho ac co rd this p e rhaps dub ious h o n o u r to industrialism. T h u s to th e Marxist in te rp re ta t ion of the sp read of capitalism and its t ran scen d en ce by socialism , th e re s tan d s o p p o sed th e ‘th eo ry of industr ia l socie ty’, acco rd ing to which both capita lism and socialism are m inor varia tions on a m ajo r them e, the fashioning of m o d ern social life by industrial p ro d u c tio n . T h is opposit ion is in large p ar t a m is taken o n e because , although industrialism deve loped u n d e r the stimulus of capita lism , in various respec ts the tw o are distinct in their n a tu re and their social consequences .

Introduction 3

T h e tw en tie th -cen tu ry world is a bloody an d fr ightening one . I th ink it fair to say that M arx an tic ipa ted fierce class struggles and d ram a tic p rocesses of revolu tionary change — in which he was no t w rong — b u t n o t the appalling military v io lence that has in fact ch a rac te r ized th e p resen t cen tury . N one of the m ajor figures now com m only ac cep ted as the m ain founders of m o d ern social theory , including M ax W eb er , foresaw qu ite how savage and destruc tive w ould be som e of the forces un leashed in cu rren t times. W e b e r lived to know of the ca rnage of the First W orld W ar, but co u ld hard ly have seen how rap id ly it w ould be su cceed ed by a second w ar and by to talitarianism . No o n e could have fo reseen the com ing of the th e rm o n u c le a r age, even if the trends tha t eventually led to it were well u n d e r way in the n in e teen th cen tu ry . T h ese trends are to d o with the deve lopm en t of the m ean s of waging industr ia lized w ar. T h e m erging of industry , techno logy and the m eans of waging w ar has been one of the m ost m o m en to u s fea tu res of processes of industrialization as a whole. But its im portance has never been adequate ly analysed within the m ajo r trad itions of social theory .

Having m ade such an analysis, as 1 a t tem p t to do in the bulk of this s tudy, w h e re does it leave us in re sp ec t of the critical asp ira tions of which M arxism has been the m ain b earer? At a m in im um , o n e m ust conc lude : at a vast d is tance from the fu ture an ticipated by M arx, with few obviously available paths of moving tow ards it. C erta in ly ‘the dialectical m o v em en t of h istory’ will do noth ing for us, in the sense of guaran tee ing the t ran scen d en ce of the p rob lem s w hich, as m em bers of a global hum an com m unity , we face today. W e live in a world riven be tw een ex traord inary o p p o r tu n ity and wholesale d isaster, and only the m ost foolishly optim istic w ould suppose tha t the fo rm er will necessarily tr ium ph o ver th e la tter.

In o rd e r to p rovide system atic form to a text that spills o u t over large trac ts o f world history, I shall sum m arize the m ain claims of this study in the shape of n u m b e r of basic observations. I imagine that m ost re ad ers will regard som e of these as con ten tious , bu t I trust th a t they will also find o thers illuminating. Of course , their m eaning will only b ec o m e fully c lea r during the course of reading the b ook , and they should be re ferred back to.

I T rad it iona l s ta tes (class-divided societies) are essentially

4 Introduction

segm enta l in ch a rac te r . T h e adm inis tra tive re ach of the politica l ce n tre is low, such th a t the m em b ers of the political appa ra tus d o n o t ‘g o v e rn ’ in the m o d ern sense. T rad it iona l s tates have frontiers , no t borders.

II In the absolutist s ta te we discover a break-aw ay from traditional s tate forms, presaging the subsequen t dev e lo p m en t of th e nation-s ta te . T h e co n c e p t of sovereign ty , l inked to the no tion of im personal adm inis tra tive pow er, to g e th e r with a series of re la ted political ideas, b ec o m e in som e par t constitutive of the m odern state from absolutism onw ards.

III T h e deve lopm ent of nation-states presum es the dissolution of the c i ty /coun trys ide rela tions basic to trad it ional s tates and involves the em erg en ce of adm inistrative o rd e rs of high intensity (associated with borders).

IV N ation-states are inheren tly po lyarch ic , in a sense of that term specified below. T h e ir po lyarch ic c h a ra c te r derives from their adm inistrative co n cen tra t io n (achieved via the expansion of surveillance) and from the a lte red n a tu re of the dialectic of con tro l which this p roduces.

V Nation-states only exist in systemic re la tions with o th e r nation-states. T h e in ternal adm inistrative coo rd ina t ion of nation-states from their beginnings depends upon reflexively m on ito red conditions of an in terna tional na tu re , i n t e r national re la tions’ is coeval with the origins of n a t io n states.

VI C o m p ared with trad it ional s tates, nation-states are for the m ost par t internally pacif ied, such that m onopoly of the m eans of v iolence is norm ally only indirectly the re so u rce w hereby those who rule sustain their ‘gov ern m en t’. Military governm en ts in m o d ern states a re qu ite d iffe ren t from trad it ional m odes of ru le in this respect. This is the valid e lem en t in the co n tra s t betw een military and capitalist industria l socie ties d raw n in n in e tee n th -cen tu ry social theory .

VII T h e sp read of capitalism is of fundam enta l im p o rtan ce to the conso lida tion of a novel w orld system from the s ix teenth cen tu ry onw ards. Both capitalism and industria lism have decisively in fluenced the rise of nation-states, but the nation-state system can n o t be reductively explained in

Introduction 5

term s of their existence. T h e m odern world has been j shaped through the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-sta te system.

VIII T h e industrialization of w ar is a key process accom panying the rise Of the nation-s ta te and shaping the configuration of the nation-state system. It has led to the c rea t ion of a w orld m ilitary o rd e r th a t substan tia lly cross-cuts the divisions be tw een ‘F irs t’, ‘S eco n d ’ and ‘T h i rd ’ worlds.

IX T h e deve lopm en t, in the tw entie th cen tu ry , of an ever- increasing a b u n d a n c e of global c o n n e c t io n s s tre tch in g across the borders of s tates should not be regarded as intrinsically diminishing their sovereignty. On the contrary , it is in substantial p a r t the chief cond ition of the w orld wide extension of the nation-state system in cu r ren t times.

X T h e re a re four ‘institutional clusterings’ assoc ia ted with m odernity : heightened surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial p roduc tion and the consolidation of cen tralized con tro l of the m eans of violence. N one is wholly reducib le to any of the o thers . A co n cern with the con seq u en ces of each m oves critical theory away from its co n cen tra t io n upon the t ran scen d en ce of capitalism by socialism as the sole ob jective of fu tu re social transform ations.

Som e co m m en ts should perhaps be registered abou t the na tu re and scope of these a rgum ents. T h e main em phasis of this book is u p o n prov id ing an in te rp re ta t io n of the d e v e lo p m e n t of the nation-state in its original, i.e. ‘W este rn ’, hab ita t . P rior to the concluding th ree chap te rs , w henever I speak of ‘the na tion-s ta te ’, the re ad e r should u nders tand ‘W estern nation-sta te ' and , most o ften , ‘E u ro p ean nation-state '. In those final ch ap te rs I try to t race out how and why this political form has b eco m e generalized across the g lobe; bu t I m ak e no claim to offering an exhaustive analysis of varia tions am ong states in today ’s world.

1 State, Society and Modern History

Power and Domination

In this open in g sec tion I o u tlin e som e genera l no tions co n n e c ted w ith th e co n c ep t o f po w er, w hich will help co n s tru c t basic underly ing th em es of th e book as a w hole. ‘P o w er’, along with ‘ag en cy ’ an d ‘s tru c tu re ’, is an e lem en ta ry co n c e p t in social sc ien ce .' T o be a hum an being is to be an agen t — a lthough n o t all agen ts a re hum an beings — and to be an agen t is to have pow er. ‘P o w er’ in this highly generalized sense m eans ‘tran sfo rm ative cap ac ity ’, the capab ility to in te rv en e in a given set of even ts so as in som e way to a lte r them . T h e logical co n n ec tio n betw een agency and pow er is of the first im p o rtan ce fo r social th eo ry , bu t the ‘un iversa l’ sense o f pow er thus im plied needs co n sid erab le co n cep tu a l re fin em en t if it is to be pu t to w ork in th e in te rests o f substan tive social research .

Such co n cep tu a l re fin em en t needs to be of tw o p rincipa l sorts. O n th e o n e h an d , pow er m ust be re la ted to th e re so u rces tha t ag en ts em ploy in th e co u rse of th e ir ac tiv ities in o rd e r to acco m p lish w h a tev e r they do . R eso u rces im p lica ted in the rep ro d u c tio n of social system s tha t have som e degree of continuity— an d th u s ‘ex is ten ce’ — across space and tim e form asp ec ts of th e s tru c tu ra l p ro p e rtie s of those social system s. T w o types of re so u rce can be d is tin g u ish ed — th e a llo ca tiv e an d th e au th o rita tiv e . By th e first of these I re fe r to d o m in ion over m ateria l facilities, includ ing m ateria l goods and th e n a tu ra l fo rces th a t m ay b e h arn essed in th e ir p ro d u c tio n . T h e second co n cern s th e m ean s o f d o m in io n o v er th e ac tiv ities o f h u m an beings them selves.2 B oth sou rces o f p o w er d ep en d in large d eg ree upon th e m an ag em en t o f tim e-space re la tions.


In the sociological and an th ropo log ica l l i te ra ture , bo th Marxist and non-M arxist, prim acy has often been given to allocative resources in the consti tu tion of society and in the explication of social change. Such a view is given full and d irect expression, of course , in historical materia lism , if that te rm be taken to re fer to the in te rp re ta tion of history that M arx outlines in the 'P re face ' to A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Econom y .3 ‘History ' th e re is u n d ers to o d in te rm s of the expansion of the forces of p ro d u c tio n , underly ing bo th the institu tional o rgan iza t ion of different types of society and their p rocesses of change. But it is by no m ean s only in h istorical m ateria lism th a t this sort of emphasis appears. It is characteris tic of virtually all those theories that can be classified u n d er the rubrics of ‘cu ltu ra l ' o r ‘social evo lu tion ism ’. Such theories a t tem p t to un d ers tan d social change in term s of the differential adap ta t ion of forms of society to their ‘en v iro n m e n t’. I have criticized this view extensively elsew here , and there is no point in recap itu la ting that cr it ique here .4 Suffice it to say tha t , accord ing to the s tandpo in t inform ing this book , no acco u n t of history that gives to allocative resources som e sort of de term in ing role in e ither social o rganization o r social change can be defended .

T o say this does not m ean moving to the o th e r ex trem e — placing the whole weight of the em phasis upon au thorita tive resources. If th e re are no p rim e m overs in h u m an history (even in the last instance) the p rob lem for social analysis becom es tha t of exam in ing a varie ty of re la tions be tw een alloca tive and au thorita tive resources in the consti tu tion of social systems and in the dynam ics of social ch an g e .5

R esources do not in any sense ‘au tom atica lly ’ en te r into the rep ro d u c t io n of social systems, but o p e ra te only in so far as they are d raw n upon by contex tua lly loca ted ac tors in the co n d u c t of their day-to-day lives. All social systems, in o th e r w ords, can be studied as incorpora ting o r expressing m odes of domination and it is this co n cep t m ore than any o th e r that p rovides the focal po int for the investigation of pow er. Social systems th a t have som e regularized existence across time-space are always ‘pow er system s’, o r exhibit forms of d om ina tion , in the sense tha t they are com prised of rela tions o f au to n o m y and d e p e n d en ce be tw een ac to rs o r collec tiv ities of actors.*’ As has b een exhaustively discussed in controvers ies o v e r the n a tu re of pow er, form s of

State, Society and M odern H istory 9

dom ina tion thus p o rtrayed ca n n o t be re d u ced to ac ts o r decisions taken , o r policies forged, by individual agents. Pow er as the capability to effectively dec id e ab o u t courses of events , even w here o th e rs m ight co n te s t such dec isions, is unden iab ly im portan t. But ‘decisions’, and ‘con tested policies’, rep resen t only o n e aspect of dom ination . T h e te rm ‘non-decision-m aking’ is an unhappy one to re fer to th e o th e r aspec t o f pow er, but it has b ec o m e q u ite firmly estab lished in som e sec to rs of political science. W ha t m atte rs is no t just tha t ce rta in decisions a re no t m ad e , bu t th a t they are n o t even co n s id e red . N on-decis ionm aking, in o th e r words, is no t accura te ly seen just as the obverse of decision-making, bu t as influencing the c ircum stances in which certa in courses of ac tion are o pen to ‘ch o ice ’ in any way at all. Pow er may be a t its m ost alarm ing, and quite often its most horrifying, when applied as a sanction of force. But it is typically at its most intense and d u rab le w hen running silently th rough the repetition of institutionalized prac tices .7 As 1 use it, there fo re , ‘d o m in a t io n ’ is no t a c o n c ep t th a t carries an intrinsically negative c o n n o ta t io n .s

All social systems of any du ra tion involve an ‘institutional m ediation of p o w e r’.9 T h a t is to say, dom ination is expressed in an d th ro u g h the institu tions th a t re p re sen t th e m ost deep ly em b ed d e d con tinu ities of social life. But in th e co n tex t o f any collectivity, association o r organ ization ,10 dom ination is expressed as m odes of control, w hereby som e agents seek to ach ieve and m aintain the com pliance of o thers . I shall re fer to relatively stable form s of con tro l as types of rule. Fo rm s of rule are (m ore o r less) s table re la tions of au to n o m y and d e p e n d e n c e in social systems and are susta ined by the rou tine p rac t ices tha t those in su p e ro rd in a te posit ions em ploy to in fluence the activ ities of others . As such they are to be analytically sep a ra ted from the institutional m edia tion of p o w e r .11 T hus , for exam ple , a given type of b u reau c ra t ic organization may gen e ra te a high level of pow er in the sense of t ransfo rm ative capacity . This is t rue , for exam ple , of the m o d ern , large industrial co rp o ra t io n , as judged in te rm s of b o th th e a lloca tive and au th o r i ta t iv e re so u rces it com m ands . H ow ever, the capability of any individual, o r g roup of individuals, to con tro l w hat goes on in the organization is no t a direct extension of the ‘am o u n t’ of pow er generated . An individual may be in a ‘pow erfu l’ position in the sense tha t he o r she has the

capability to deploy a range of resources. But how far these can be used co secu re specific o u tco m es d ep en d s upon securing w ha tever com pliance is necessary from o th e rs .12 T h e frequently s ta ted experience of those in positions of ‘high pow er ' tha t what they can accom plish is hedged with very defined limits is not wholly disingenuous.

W e should distinguish the ‘scope ' of rule from its ‘in tensity’.13 T h e fo rm er refers to how far ac to rs in su p e ro rd in a te positions are able to con tro l large areas of the activities of those sub jec t to their rule. T h e scope of con tro l o f a m anageria l executive over those in lower echelons of the labour force may be quite extensive, a l though usually confined to w ha tever goes on in the sphere of ‘w o rk ’ only. By the intensity of con tro l I re fer to the sanctions that can be invoked to secu re com pliance , the m ost ex trem e being the co m m an d over the m eans of violence, of life and dea th . A varie ty of possible re la tions exist be tw een th e sco p e and intensity of con tro l — a m a t te r of g rea t significance for the them es of this book. T hus , m any trad it ional rulers have possessed ‘c o m p le te ’ pow er over their subjects, in the sense th a t those subjects a re supposed to obey their every co m m an d ‘u n d e r pain o f d e a th ’. But such p ow er by no m eans yields a wide scope of ac tua l m astery over the co n d u c t of the subject popu la tion . Ruling groups in trad it ional s tates, as I shall a rgue in som e detail later, lack the m ean s of regularly influencing the day-to-day lives of the ir subject populations. O ne of the m ajo r charac te ris t ics of the m o d ern sta te , by con tra s t , is a vast expansion of the capability of s ta te adm in is tra to rs to influence even the m ost in tim ate features o f daily activity.

All types of rule, then , rest upon the institu tional m edia tion of pow er, but channel this th rough the use of defin ite strategies of co n tro l . S tra teg ies of co n tro l na tu ra lly always d e p e n d in substan tia l deg ree upon the form of dom ina tion within which they are invoked. In a m o d ern industrial setting, for instance, strategies used by m anagers to ach ieve com pliance from w orkers o p e ra te w ithin a fram ew ork in which the d irec t th rea t of v iolence o r the use of force ca n n o t be b rough t to bear. M uch of what ‘m an ag e m en t’ m eans in m o d ern industry derives from this fact. N onetheless, the resources tha t m anagers are able to d raw upon to sustain con tro l over the w ork-force can be focused and applied in a range of different ways. All strategies o f co n tro l em ployed by



su p e ro rd in a te individuals o r g roups call forth counter-s tra teg ies on the par t o f subord inates . This p h en o m en o n rep resen ts w ha t I call the dialectic o f control in social systems, som eth ing tha t connec ts back directly to th e th em e of h u m an agency with which I o p en e d this discussion. T o be an agent is to be able to m ake a d iffe rence to the w orld , and to be able to m ak e a d iffe rence is to have pow er (w here p ow er m eans transform ative capacity). No m a tte r how g rea t the scope o r intensity of co n tro l supero rd ina tes possess, since their pow er p resum es the active co m pliance of o thers , those o thers can bring to bea r strategies of their ow n, and apply specific types of sanctions. ‘Self-consciousness’, Hegel says, ‘a tta ins its satisfac tion only in a n o th e r se lf-consciousness’,14 speaking of the master-slave dialectic. Hegel m akes of this a teleological ph ilosophy of history but, s tripped of such g randiose p re tensions, what is at issue is the capability even of the most d ep en d en t , w eak and the m ost oppressed to have the ability to carve ou t spheres of au to n o m y of the ir own.

All forms of rule have their ‘open ings’ th a t can be utilized by those in su bord ina te positions to influence the activities of those w ho hold pow er over them . O ne co n seq u en ce of this is that technologies of p ow er — in o th e r words, form alized p ro ced u res of rule — rarely if ever w ork with the ‘fixity’ which on the face of things they m ight seem to possess. T h e m ore a social system is one in which the co n tro l exercised by su p ero rd in a tes d epends upon a considerab le scope of pow er over subord ina tes , the m ore shifting and potentially volatile its organization is likely to be. T h e li te ra tu re on prisons o r asylums, for exam ple , is rep le te with descrip tions of the ‘effort-bargains’ which those w ho adm inis te r such organizations a re fo rced to co n c lu d e with inm ates in o rd e r to m ak e their rule effective.

All social rep ro d u c tio n and , there fo re , all systems of pow er, a re g ro u n d ed in the ‘pred ic tab ili ty ’ of day-to-day routines. T h e p red ic tab le — tha t is to say, regularized — ch a rac te r of day-today activity is n o t som eth ing tha t just ‘h ap p e n s ’, it is in substantial par t ‘m ad e to h a p p e n ’ by ac to rs in the d iverse settings of social life. Of course , ac to rs do not do this ‘consc iously’ in the o rd inary sense of th e te rm , a l though they do o ften discursively reflect upon the n a tu re of th e activities in which they engage. M any of the charac te r is t ic s of social life tha t ac to rs ‘m ak e h a p p e n ’ are accom plished via non-discursive ‘p ractical consc iousness’.15 T h a t

is to say, ac to rs routinely m o n i to r reflexively w ha t they do in the light of their com plex knowledge of social conventions, sustaining o r rep ro d u c in g those conven tions in the process. S ince agents in all societies are ‘social theoris ts ’, whose discursively a r ticu la ted acco u n ts are in som e part constitu tive of the social form s they re p ro d u ce in their co n d u c t , it is never the case that they blindly en ac t and re-enact the rou tines of daily life. Even in th e m ost t rad it ional o f cu ltu res ‘t rad i t io n ’ is reflexively ap p ro p r ia ted and in som e sense ‘discursively u n d e rs to o d ’.

In trad i t iona l societies , how ever , especially in small oral cu ltu res, ‘t rad i t io n ’ is no t know n as such, because th e re is no thing that escapes its influence and , there fo re , no th ing with which to con tra s t it. ‘H istory’ is no t unders to o d as the use of the past to m obilize ch an g e in the fu tu re , bu t as the repe ti tiveness of ‘reversible t im e '.16 A significant altera tion in the cond itions of h u m an social ex is tence co m es ab o u t with th e inven tion of ‘h istory’. F rom then on the c ircum stances of social rep roduc tion are them selves reflexively m on ito red in an effort to influence the form institutions assume. I tak e this to be the m ain fea tu re tha t separa tes organizations from o th e r types of collectivity. T h e term ‘o rg a n iz a t io n ’ will c ro p up a g rea t deal in this s tudy. An o rgan iza t ion is a collectiv ity in which know ledge ab o u t the conditions of system reproduction is reflexively used to influence, shape o r m odify tha t system rep roduc tion . All form s of s tate adm inistrative bodies are organizations in this sense , for reasons I shall d o cu m en t a t som e length in w hat follows. In m o d ern na t io n states, how ever, the reflexive m onitor ing of system rep roduc tion is m uch m ore highly ac cen tu a te d than in any pre-existing form of s ta te and , in addition , ‘o rgan iza t ion ’ charac te r izes m any o th e r aspects of social life.

I have earlier linked dom ina tion with the m astery of time- space. E labora ting the im plications of this m eans giving som e co n cep tu a l a t ten tion to the timing and spacing of h u m an social activities.17 It is particularly im portant to emphasize the association be tw een pow er and locales, which will also be o n e of the leading them es of the book. I use ‘loca le’ in de l ibera te p re fe ren ce to the no tion of ‘p lace’ as ordinarily em ployed by geographers, because ‘p lace ’ is o ften only a vaguely fo rm ula ted no tion and because it does no t usually m ean the co-ord ination of time as well as space. Locales re fer to the settings of in te rac tion , including the physical



aspects of setting — their ‘a rc h i te c tu re ’ — within which systemic aspects of in te rac t ion and social re la tions a re co n c en tra te d . T h e p rox im ate aspects of settings are chronically em ployed by social ac to rs in the co n s t i tu tio n o f in te rac t io n , a m a t te r of q u i te fundam ental significance to its ‘m eaningful’ qualities .1" But settings also are everyw here involved in the rep ro d u c t io n of institu tionalized activities across wide spans of time and space. T h u s , a dwelling is a locale displaying specific a rch itec tu ra l features: these are socially re levan t in so far as they are bound up with the distribution and the ch a ra c te r o f behav iou r in time-space. A dwelling which has several room s is ‘reg ionalized’, no t just in the sense tha t th e re are various distinct ‘p laces’ which it thereby contains , but in the sense th a t the room s are habitually used for different types of pursuit , d is tr ibu ted differentially in the rou tines of day-to-day life. I do no t m ean by ‘loca le’, how ever , just settings of a fairly confined nature . Locales include internally regionalized settings of very wide t im e-space ex tension , from cities to n a t io n states and beyond.

T h e im p o rtan ce of locales to the theory of pow er can be spelled o u t as follows. C er ta in types of locale form ‘pow er c o n ta in e rs ’ — c irc u m sc r ib ed a ren as fo r th e g en e ra t io n of adm inistrative pow er. A locale is a pow er co n ta in e r in so far as it perm its a co n c en tra t io n of allocative and au tho ri ta t ive resources. In what I shall call class-divided societies, castles, m anorial estates— but above all cities — are con ta ine rs for the gene ra t ion of pow er. In the m o d ern w orld , the adm in is tra tive settings of organizations — business firms, schools, universities, hospitals, prisons, etc. — are cen tre s for the co n cen tra t io n of resources. But the m o d ern s ta te , as nation-state , b eco m es in m any respects the p re -em inen t form of p o w e r co n ta in e r , as a terr itoria lly bo unded (although internally highly regionalized) adm inistrative unity.

It is possible to give som e general ind ication of how p ow er is g en e ra ted by the ‘c o n ta in m e n t’ o f resources , a l though naturally there a re m any specific d iffe rences be tw een settings within d ifferent types of society. Pow er con ta iners gen e ra te pow er, as has been m entioned , first and forem ost through the concen tra tion of a llocative and adm inis tra tive resources . T h e gene ra t ion of allocative re sou rces is, o f course , in fluenced directly by forms of available tech n o lo g y in any socie ty , bu t the level o f the ir

co n cen tra t io n d epends primarily upon factors creating au th o r i ta tive resources . T hese are of the following kinds.1 T h e possibilities of surveillance tha t settings of various kinds allow. ‘Surveil lance’ refers to two re la ted sorts o f p h en o m en a . O n e is the accum ula t ion of ‘co d ed in fo rm ation ’, which can be used to adm in is te r the activities of individuals ab o u t w hom it is g a thered . It is not just the collection of in fo rm ation , bu t its s torage that is im p o rtan t here . H um an m em ory is a s torage device , bu t the storage of in form ation is en h a n ced vastly by various o th e r kinds of m arks o r traces th a t can be used as m odes of record ing . If writing is in all cu ltu res the m ain p h en o m en o n involved, in m odern states e lec tron ic storage — tapes, records , discs, etc. — considerab ly expands the range of available s torage m echanisms. All m odes of inform ation storage are simultaneously forms of com m unica tion , cutting across the face-to-face co m m u n ica tion tha t is exhaustive of hum an in terac tion in oral cultures. T h e ‘ex te rn a l ized ’ c h a ra c te r o f in fo rm ation tra c e s inevitably severs com m unica t ion from its intrinsic co n n ec t io n with the body and the face. But e lec tron ic com m unica t ion for the first t im e in h istory sep a ra te s ‘im m e d ia te ’ co m m u n ica t io n from p re sen ce , the reby initiating deve lopm en ts in m o d ern cu ltu re tha t I shall la te r argue are basic to the em erg en ce and conso lidation of the nation-state.

T h e o th e r sense of surveillance is th a t o f the d irec t supervision of the activities of som e individuals by o thers in positions of authority over them. T h e concen tra t ion of activities within clearly b o u n d ed settings greatly enlarges the deg ree to which those activities can be ‘w a tc h ed o v e r ’, and thus co n tro l led , by su p e ro rd in a te s . In m ost types of no n -m o d ern socie ty , the possibilities of surveillance in this second sense (as in the first) are relatively limited. T h e re are m any exam ples of large aggregates of peop le being brough t to g e th e r in the construc tion of public pro jec ts , for exam ple , the building of tem ples , m o n u m en ts or roads. But these groupings usually only exist for a limited dura tion and are relatively marginal to the activities and involvem ents of the m ajority of the popu la tion . W ithin fairly confined areas, such as small rura l co m m u n itie s , ce r ta in k inds of su rve il lance p ro ced u re s can be susta ined in class-divided societies an d these can be linked to larger ne tw orks with varying degrees of success. E xam ples can be found in the role of local priests in m edieval



C atholic ism , o r in the use of in form ers by the traditional C hinese s tate. But only in cities could d irec t and regu la r surveillance be m ain ta ined by the cen tra l agencies of the sta te , and then with a low degree of success c o m p ared with m o d ern organizations. In m odern organizations, e i ther large segm ents of the daily lives of social ac to rs (as in factories o r offices), o r substantial per iods of their lives in a m ore ‘to ta l ' setting (as in prisons, o r asylums) can be subject to more-or-less co n tin u o u s surveillance.

T h e two senses of surveillance belong qu ite closely together , since the co llec tion of in fo rm ation ab o u t social activities can , and very o ften is, directly in teg ra ted with styles of supervision — som eth ing which again tends to be m aximized in m odern types of organization .2 T h e possibilities of assembling, within defin ite settings, large num bers of individuals w ho do not spend m ost of their daily activity involved in d irec t m ateria l p roduc tion . T h e fo rm ation of organizations, and o f any substantial level of disciplinary pow er, d epends upon the existence o f specialized adm inis tra tive officials o f som e kind. In o r th o d o x versions of historical m ateria lism , the early em erg en ce of such adm inis tra tive specialism is ‘exp la ined ’ in term s of the p rio r deve lopm en t of surplus p roduc tion . But the way this exp lana tion is often p resen ted m akes it ne i ther plausible n o r even a valid em pirical descrip tion . It is hardly an explanation at all, even in the m ost general sense of that te rm , because surplus p ro duc tion has to be co-o rd ina ted in som e way if it is to b ec o m e a re so u rce for the gene ra t ion of adm inistrative pow er. H ow ever, it is also empirically wanting. If ‘surplus p roduc tion ' m eans anything specific , th e te rm m ust re fe r to m ater ia l p ro d u c tio n which develops beyond w hat, for a given popu la tion of p ro ducers , are trad it ional o r p re -estab lished needs. T h u s d e f ined , surp lus produc tion is no t even the necessary condition for the fo rm ation of specialized administrative apparatuses. Such organizations have very o ften co m e in to being in c ircum stances of ac u te depriva tion for m any of the subjects of their rule — the appropria t ion of the ‘su rp lus’ pe rh ap s being at the origin of that d ep r iv a t io n .19

As M ax W e b e r em phasizes, the regularized ‘con ta in in g ’ of assemblages of individuals within the settings of organizations can only be extensively ach ieved in a society given various o th e r conditions in addition to th e expansion of ‘surplus p ro d u c t io n ’. Som e of these cond it ions a re pecu lia r to the m o d ern W est. T hey

include, particularly , the d isap p ea ran ce of ‘p re b en d a l’ form s of ren u m era t io n and the assoc ia ted deve lopm en t of a full-blown m oney econom y. T h e pure ly ‘vocational ' official is o n e with a salaried incom e, whose sources of ren u m era t io n have b eco m e wholly cu t off from the use of the official position to ga ther m ater ia l resources put to private use.3 T h e facilitating of the scope and intensity of sanctions, above all the deve lopm en t of military pow er. T h e re a re two locales of overw helm ing significance here , o r so I shall argue — the city in class-divided societies and , in m odern societies, the nation-state . T h e re la tion betw een military pow er and sanctions of law is always im portan t . O rganizations of all types develop legal rules of som e sort. All forms of law, in turn , involve sanctions adm inistered in one way or ano ther via officials. Such adm inistration is backed , in a d irec t o r a m ore indirect m an n er , by the th rea t of the use of v io lence .20 It will be part of my m ain thesis la ter in this book , h ow ever , th a t in m any m o d e rn o rgan iza tions — in c o n t r a distinction to w hat was the case in class-divided societies — the sanc tion of the use of v iolence is quite indirect and a t ten u a ted . M oreover , military pow er on the whole tends to b eco m e ra the r clearly distinct from policing pow er, the o n e tu rned ‘ex ternally’, the o th e r po in ted ‘in terna lly’.

T h e first fo rm a tion of p e rm a n e n t a rm ed forces in jects som eth ing substantially new into world history. But in all class- d iv ided socie ties , no m a t te r how s tro n g the m ilitary forces co m m an d e d by the sta te , th e re are significant sources of a rm ed opposit ion tha t escape the con tro l of the cen tra l appa ra tus . T h e p ro m in en c e of local w ar-lords, the ex is tence of m arau d in g n om ad ic groups, and all kinds o f p irates and brigands, express the segm ental ch a rac te r tha t class-divided societies display.4 T h e creation of certain conditions that influence the formation of ideology. T h e system in tegra tion of class-divided societies does no t d ep en d in a significant way upon the overall a c cep tan c e of par ticu la r symbolic o rde rs by the m ajority of the popu la tion within those societies. W hat m atte rs is the hegem ony achieved th rough such ac cep tan ce on the par t of the m em bers of dom inan t groups o r classes. C o n cen tra t io n of activities within city milieux plays an im p o rtan t par t he re in m ore than one way. T h ro u g h the expansion of surveillance, especially for exam ple as p ressed into th e service of som e k ind of form al ed u ca tio n , even if this is



confined to a small s tra tum of the l i terate , the in fluence of ideology can be considerab ly sharpened . But probab ly also the sheer physical lay-out of m any traditional cities has ideological effects. In such u rban forms, the city is frequen tly do m in a ted arch itec tu ra lly by s ta te and religious edifices, giving a visual rep resen ta tio n of pow er that no d o u b t m akes an im press upon th e minds of those w ho m ove in the vicinity of th e m .21

The Concept of the State: Preliminary Remarks

'S ta te ' has two senses in o rd inary language, but the am biguity is n o t a par ticularly w orrying o n e for social theory . T h e s ta te ’ som etim es m ean s an a p p a ra tu s of g o v e rn m e n t o r pow er, som etim es the overall social system subject to tha t g o v ernm en t or power. T h e two usages are no t confusing in m ost con tex ts , but w here they are a term inological distinction has to be observed be tw een them . T h u s I shall speak of ‘the s ta te ap p a ra tu s ' when I m ean the adm inistrative o rgans of gov ern m en t and ‘socie ty’ or ‘c u l tu re ’ when 1 m ean the encom passing social system. Both ‘soc ie ty ’ and ‘c u l tu re ’ have their own ambiguities. So far as the fo rm er is c o n c e rn e d , a w ord of cau tion is requ ired . ‘Socie ty’ has o ften been u n d ers to o d by sociologists, implicitly o r o therw ise , as a clearly b o u n d ed system with an obvious and easily identifiable set of distinguishing traits. But while this is t ru e of m odern n a t io n states, it is very often not the case with o th e r types of societies, w h e th e r these are ‘s ta tes’ o r small localized g ro u p s .22

All fo rm s of s ta te a p p a ra tu s consist o f a plurality of organizations in the sense in which I have ou tl ined tha t term above , bu t for m any p u rp o se s it is also w o rth t rea t in g that ap p a ra tu s as a single o rgan iza tion . T h is is indeed the first charac te ris t ic I wish to single ou t as definitive of the s ta te in general. A l l s t a t e s i n v o l v e t h e r e f l e x i v e m o n i t o r i n g o f a s p e c t s o f

t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l s y s t e m s s u b j e c t t o t h e i r r u l e . W e should be careful to distinguish this from the view of the s ta te set o u t by writers such as D urkhe im . D urkheim takes as the main fea tu re of the s ta te its role as an organ of co m m u n ica t io n with the rest of society. ‘T h e s ta te ’, he says, is ‘the o rgan of social thought'. This does no t imply, he goes on to add , ‘that all social though t springs from th e s ta te '. O n e so u rce is to be fo u n d in ‘the sen tim en ts , ideals, beliefs th a t the society has w o rk e d ou t

collectively and with t im e’; the o th e r lies in the ‘thought processes ' o f th e sta te . ‘T h e re is so m eth in g sp o n tan eo u s , au to m a tic , som eth ing unconsidered , ab o u t day-to-day social life’, D urkhe im writes. But ‘delibera tion an d reflection , on the o th e r h an d , are fea tu res of all tha t goes o n in the organ of g o v e r n m e n t . . . T h e re all is o rganised and , above all, o rganised increasingly to p reven t changes being m ad e w ithou t d u e considera t ion .’23 M ost of this, I th ink , is co rrec t . But D u rk h e im goes on to suppose th a t the s tate the reby inevitably rep resen ts the in terests of those it rules, save in ce rta in exceptional and ‘pa tho log ica l’ c ircum stances . H e trea ts m o d ern d em o cra t ic s tate form s too m u ch as a simple extension of s ta te pow er in general and h e also underes t im a tes how far the s ta te ap p a ra tu s can b eco m e a sou rce of p ow er in d ep en d e n t of the rest of ‘soc ie ty ’.

D urkhe im refuses to regard as charac te ris t ic o f s tates just those p h e n o m e n a that , for W eber , distinguish the s ta te from o th e r organizations. T h e definition of ‘s ta te ’ tha t W e b e r offers involves th ree m ain e lem ents: (i) the existence of a regularized adm in is tra tive staff able (ii) to sustain the claim to the legitim ate m onopoly of con tro l o f the m eans of v io lence and (iii) to upho ld that m onopoly within a given territorial area. While W e b e r’s definition highlights characteristics (violence and territoriality) that D urkheim was surely w rong not to regard as cha rac te r is t ic of s ta tes in general, we ca n n o t be wholly satisfied with it.24 W e b e r defines the s ta te in te rm s w o rk ed o u t first o f all with re fe rence to the m odern sta te , generalizing th em backw ards as it were. ‘T h e co n cep t of the s ta te ’, h e says bluntly, ‘has only in m o d ern times reach ed its full d ev e lo p m e n t’, so ‘it is best to define it in term s ap p ro p r ia te to the m o d ern type of s tate , b u t a t the sam e time, in te rm s which ab s trac t from the values of the p resen t day, since these are particularly sub jec t to c h a n g e ’.25 T h e troub le with this p ro c ed u re is tha t it tends to minimize d iffe rences be tw een trad it ional and m o d ern states in respec t of th e very fea tu res he singles out. For, as I shall try to ind icate later, only in m o d ern nation-states can the state ap p a ra tu s generally — not, o f course , universally — lay successful claim to the m onopo ly of the m eans of violence, and only in such states does the adm inistrative scope of th e s tate ap p a ra tu s co r re sp o n d directly with terr ito r ia l boundar ie s ab o u t w hich th a t claim is m ade . T h e ap p rop ria t ion of the right to m onopolize the m eans of v io lence and th e association of this with



som e kind of co n cep t io n of territoriality a re charac te ris t ics of s ta tes in general. But we have to be careful to a c cen tu a te ‘claim ' in the first p a r t and to recognize tha t the terr ito r ia l e lem en t may be quite ill-defined as regards th e second.

W eb er no t only defines th e state in term s of co n tro l of the m eans of v io lence, bu t does the sam e for the ‘politica l’, which is a far w ider category. A ‘political’ organization, accord ing to W eber, ca n n o t be specified in term s of the ends to w hich it is devoted . T h e re ca n n o t be a satisfactory ‘subs tan tive’ definition of the political, b ecau se political organizations, including states, have been c o n c e rn e d with all sorts o f d ifferent activities. ‘All the way from provision for subsis tence to the p a tro n ag e of a r t, th e re is no conceivab le end which some political associa tion has no t a t som e tim e p u rsu ed .’26 T h e only fea tu re which all political g roups have in co m m o n is the m eans they em ploy , nam ely the use of force. But, as W e b e r himself points ou t , the use of fo rce , o r of the th rea t o f its use, as a sanction is not confined to organizations that would usually be th ough t of as ‘politica l’. F o rce ‘has b een used freely by kinship g ro u p s , h o u seh o ld g roups , co n so c ia t io n s an d , in the M iddle Ages, u n d er ce rta in c ircum stances by all those en titled to b ea r a rm s’.27

I shall define the ‘political ' in the following way. All hum an in terac tion , as I have argued at som e length in o th e r sources , involves the co m m u n ica t io n of m eaning , the o p e ra t io n of pow er (the use of re sources) and n o rm ativ e m o d es of sanc tion ing (including the use of physical v iolence o r the th rea t of its use).2s In the p ro d u c t io n / re p ro d u c t io n of in te rac tion , agents draw upon co rrespond ing s truc tu ra l e lem en ts of social systems: signification (meaning), dom ina tion (power) and legitim ation (sanctions). As im plica ted in the rep ro d u c t io n of social systems, these p rovide a way of categorizing institutions that can be rep resen ted as follows:

S — D — L Sym bolic o rd e rs /m o d e s of d iscourseD(auth) — S — L Political institutionsD(alloc) — S — L E co n o m ic institutionsL — D — S L aw /m o d es of sanc tion

T h e ‘politica l’ is not def ined h e re in a substan tive way. Nor does it inevitably co n c e rn th e use of force. T h e ‘political ' aspec t o f o rgan iza t ions co n c e rn s th e ir capab ility of m arshall ing au thorita tive re sources o r w ha t I shall call administrative power.

All organizations have political features. But only in th e case of s ta tes do these involve the consolidation of m ilitary p o w er in assoc ia tion with con tro l o f the m eans of v io lence within a range of terr itories. A s tate can be defined as a political organization w hose rule is territorially o rd e red an d which is able to mobilize the m eans of v io lence to sustain tha t rule. Such a defin ition is close to th a t o f W eb er , bu t does n o t a c c e n tu a te a c la im ed m o n opo ly of the m eans of v iolence or the fac to r of legitimacy.

It should be no ted that several of the m ajor concep ts associated with political theory , as deve loped from the six teenth cen tu ry onw ards — and frequen tly generalized to all s tates — do not a p p e a r in the foregoing discussion. In particu la r , I m ak e no m en t io n of sovereignty o r of the s ign ificance of p o p u la r rep resen ta tion . My reasons for excluding these a re b o u n d up in an intrinsic way with the m ain them es of the book. T hese concep ts do no t orig inate m erely as a new descrip tive language of rule, which can be generalized back to pre-existing s ta te forms. Like the very notion of ‘g o v e rn m e n t’, they signal the em erg en ce of a novel political form ation . M o re than this, I shall argue, they b eco m e key e lem ents of w ha t the m o d ern state is — they help const i tu te its very d istinctiveness as co m p ared with traditional states.

All s tates — as s tate ap p a ra tu ses — can be d iffe ren tia ted from the w ider societies of w hich they are part. W ha t is ‘o u ts id e ’ the scope of the s tate has, since th e E n ligh tenm en t, been u n d ers to o d in varying senses as ‘civil soc ie ty ’. I shall have m o re to say about this later, bu t for the tim e being it is im portan t to en te r som e early qualifica tions ab o u t the use of the notion. Let m e c o n c en tra te h e re on the co n cep t as it can be t raced in the re la tion betw een Hegel and M arx. F o r Hegel, the s tate is the final dev e lo p m en t in the em erg en ce of a series of ‘e th ical co m m u n itie s ’ in th e course of social evolu tion , the o th e rs being the family and civil society. H egel’s views on these m atte rs are by no m eans wholly consis ten t, bu t the m ain th read of w ha t he has to say is tha t the s tate actualizes and fur thers form s of ‘the universal’ w hich are lacking in society , particularly the bürgerliche Gesellschaft of m o d ern times. T h e la t te r is largely co m p o sed of atom istic , self-seeking individuals. Civil society ca n n o t exist w ithout th e sta te , an d in v irtue of its n a tu re c a n n o t ach ieve ‘universa l f r e e d o m ’. T h e m o d e rn s tate em bodies reason , n o t by absorb ing civil society b u t



by guard ing ce rta in of the universal qualities up o n which it is p red ica ted . T h e state is ‘the Universal that has expressed its ac tua l ra tionali ty’, rep resen ting ‘the identity of the general and the particu la r will’. I t is ‘the em b o d im en t of co n c re te freed o m , in which the individual’s pa r ticu la r interests have their com ple te d ev e lopm en t, and receive ad e q u a te recognition of their rights’.211

In ‘reversing Hegel', M arx argues tha t the s ta te rests upon civil society, which it does no t t ranscend but w hose class com posit ion it reflects, and he ex tends the co n cep t of civil society to include not just the ‘econom ic ', but everything lying outside the im m ediate sphere of the s tate ap p a ra tu s itself. T h e con seq u en ce , how ever, is a fatal flaw both in the resulting in te rp re ta t ion of the s tate/civ il society re la tion and in the p resum ption tha t the s ta te can be superseded in socialism. ‘Civil socie ty’ now b eco m es som eth ing distinct from the s ta te in its origin and n a tu re , to which the s tate owes its own existence and form. This view sacrifices an im portant part of H egel’s insight into bürgerliche Gesellschaft, w ha tever else may be dub ious ab o u t his co n cep t io n of the s ta te as the ‘realization of the un iversal’. F o r Hegel sees th a t ‘civil soc ie ty ’, as bürgerliche Gesellschaft, is in substantial p a r t c rea ted by the (m odern) s ta te or, put m ore accura te ly , th a t th e two com e into existence in con junc tion with o n e ano ther .

T h e im p o rtan ce of this is not just that Hegel accen tu a te s the in d ep en d en t pow er of the political, as against M arx 's tendency to eco n o m ic reduction ism . T h e poin t is that, with the fo rm ation of the m o d ern sta te , ‘civil soc ie ty ’ is no longer tha t which co-existed with previous s ta te forms. In class-divided societies th e re are large spheres of society which retain their in d ep en d en t ch a rac te r in spite of the rise of the s ta te appara tus . T h a t is essentially w ha t I m ean by saying that the political cen tre lacks the capacity to regularly shape the day-to-day lives of those w ho are its citizens. It is also why, in class-divided societies, ‘c ity ’ and ‘co u n try s id e’, while in som e ways in te rd e p e n d e n t , have a co n tra s t in g and d istinctive c h a ra c te r as c o m p a re d with o n e an o th e r . T h e ‘c o u n try s id e ’ is no t exactly the sam e as ‘civil soc ie ty ’ bu t, nonetheless, m u ch of w ha t tha t co n cep t refers to is loca ted there , in the spheres of agrarian p ro d u c tio n and local co m m u n ity life. W ith the rise of the m o d ern state , and its cu lm ination in the nation-state , ‘civil socie ty’ in this sense simply d isappears. W h a t is ‘o u ts id e ’ the sco p e of th e adm in is tra tive re a c h of the s ta te

ap p a ra tu s can n o t be u n d e rs to o d as institutions w hich rem ain un ab so rb ed by the state.

Because of the difficulties to which the no tion of civil society gives rise, I shall no t em ploy it in the rem a in d e r of the book . I shall w an t to em phasize the significance of the elim ination of the ‘coun trys ide ' with the rise of m o d ern urbanism , w hich I shall co n n e c t directly to the n a tu re of the nation-state.

State, Nation-State and Military Power in Social Theory

At this po in t we have to shift co n cep tu a l gears som ew hat, and consider briefly w hat a p p e a r to be perplexing p rob lem s in the sociology of know ledge, applied to sociology itself. By com m on ag reem en t, ‘socie ty’ is th e o b jec t o f s tudy of sociology — m ore specifically, tha t form of society assoc ia ted with the m o d e rn era. U nders tood as a b o unded unity, ‘society’ here refers to the na t ion state. But very little a t ten t ion has been given in social theory to examining the n a tu re of such a p h en o m en o n . W hy should this be?

T h e re is a fu r ther oddity ab o u t the sociological en terp rise as it is usually practised today. O pen ing any tex tbook of sociology, the re ad e r will find th e re discussions of m ost m odern institutions — the family, class, dev iance, etc. But it is very unlikely tha t he or she will d iscover any discussion of military institutions, o r o f the im pac t of military v io lence and w ar upon m o d ern society. M uch of the sam e is true of m o re rarified treatises on social theory , which co n c e n t ra te upon capita lism , industrialism and so o n .10 Yet w ho, living in the tw en tie th cen tu ry , could for a m o m en t deny the massive im pac t which military pow er, p rep ara tio n for war, and w ar itself, have h ad upon the social world?

T o explain w ha t on th e face of things seem ex traord inary lapses in sociological th o u g h t , we have to look back to the influence of n ine teen th -cen tu ry social though t u p o n theore tica l th ink ing in the social sciences. I think it t rue to say th a t w e live today in c ircum stances for which the trad it ional sources of social theory have left us quite u n p re p a re d , especially those form s of social theo ry assoc ia ted b road ly with libera lism an d with socialism. W e live in a w orld d o m in a ted by the nation-s ta te form, in which a fragile equality in w eaponry possessed by the two m ost powerful nation-states is the m ain b rak e upon global v iolence


State, Society and M odern History 23

within the con tex t o f a novel in te rna tional o rde r . T h e world is qu ite d ifferent from tha t which m ost n ine teen th -cen tu ry th inkers an tic ipa ted ; and the styles of th ough t that d o m in a te the social sciences today tend to be heavily indeb ted to the ir n ine teen th - cen tu ry origins.

Let us cons ider again D urkhe im and M arx to illustrate bo th how and why this has co m e to be so. D urkhe im was in a general way affiliated to liberalism, and M arx ’s writings are at the co re of the m ost flourishing forms of socialist theory . Y e t ne i ther th inker gives any d e ta i led a t ten t io n to the na t ion -s ta te as a generic p h en o m en o n and ne i ther , in a system atic way, co n n ec ts the n a tu re of the m o d ern state e i ther with con tro l of the m eans of v io lence o r with terr ito r ia li ty . D u rk h e im 's theo ry of social evolution, from which his ac co u n t of the s ta te is der ived , in general allocates little im portance to military power, in traditional o r in m o d ern societies. T h is was not t rue of all au th o rs of the sam e period , as the writings of H erb er t S pence r d em ons tra te . In re spec t of the in te rp re ta t ion of non-m odern societies, S pencer was m ore representative, perhaps, of n ineteenth-century liberalism than was D urkhe im . S p en ce r a t t r ibu tes the origins and n a tu re of agrarian states largely to w arfare . But w hereas pre-industrial societies a re pre-em inently warlike , industrial society , accord ing to S pencer, is inherently pacific, depend ing upon peacefu l c o opera t ion ra th e r than antagonism betw een h u m an collectivities. W ith the expansion of industrial activities, ‘in p lace of a uniform belief im pera tive ly en fo rce d , th e re co m e m ultifo rm beliefs voluntarily accep ted . . . military conformity coercively maintained gives p lace to a varied nonconfo rm ity m ain ta ined by a willing u n ion .’31

D urkheim may no t have em phasized the im portance of military pow er and w ar in non-m odern cultures, but his analysis o f the d e v e lo p m e n t of ‘o rgan ic so lidarity ', in sp ite of th e specif ic critic ism s h e offers of S p en ce r , has a sim ilar o r ien ta t io n to Spencer 's in te rp re ta tion of industrialism. Organic solidarity refers to th e in te rd e p en d en c e in which individuals increasingly find them selves as a result o f the expansion of th e division of labour s t im ula ted by the p rogress of m o d ern industry. T h e m o d ern s tate is a d irec t expression of this t rend , because the co-ord ination of com plex e c o n o m ic ties d em an d s a ‘social in te lligence ' o f a cen tra lized type. In the biological analogy D u rk h e im som etim es

favours, the com plex but unified entity which is a m o d ern society needs a d iffe ren tia ted ‘b ra in ’ to oversee its co -ord ination and fu r th e r deve lopm en t. D urkhe im is critical o f co n cep ts of th e s tate assoc ia ted with socialism — including tha t of M arx — which he saw as trea ting m odern political organization as wholly concerned with econom ic t ransac t ions .12 For D urkhe im , the s ta te ca n n o t be aufgehoben and is of pa r ticu la r significance as a m oral o rgan ization. But far from leading him to analyse the s ta te as a n a t io n state , and as b o u n d up with military p o w er and territoriality , the effect is to d is tance him alm ost entire ly from these concerns . T h e sp read of organ ic solidarity, with its accom pany ing m oraliza tion of the ‘cult o f the individual’, is inevitably in terna tional, because the ties of in te rd e p en d en c e involved d ep e n d solely upon the sp read of m o d ern industry. ‘W a r’, D urkhe im asserts, ‘excep t for som e passing se tb ack s | ! | . . . has b ec o m e m o re an d m ore in te rm it ten t and less c o m m o n ’.33 T h e traits of pa r ticu la r nations will n o t necessarily d isap p ea r in th e g ran d sw eep of social evo lu t ion , but will b ec o m e e lem en ts of a peacefu l o rd e r of hum anity . ‘T h e national will m erges with the h um an ideal’; each s ta te will have as its aim ‘not to expand , o r to lengthen its borders, bu t to set its own house in o rd e r and to m ak e the widest appeal to its m em bers for a m oral life on an ever higher level’. By this m eans ‘all d iscrepancy betw een national and hum an morals would be ex c luded ’.34

M arx and Engels — especially Engels — did give som e m ind to military pow er an d war. Engels w ro te to M arx in 1858, ‘I am now reading , am ong o th e r things, C lausewitz’s On War.'3i T h o se o th e r things inc luded the w ork of Jom ini and von Biilow; Engels co n tin u ed to m aintain his in terest in such m atte rs th ro u g h o u t his life, writing artic les on military topics u n d e r M arx ’s n am e in the New York Daily Tribune and a n u m b er of o th e r surveys of ‘military sc ien ce’. M arx also read Clausewitz and sporadically d ipped into o th e r sources suggested by Engels, bu t apart from on e o r two m inor p ieces w ro te no th ing on the n a tu re of w ar.36 T h e notion of ‘the nat ion ' c rops up often in M arx ’s writings, bu t rarely if ever in the con tex t of his m ajo r theore tica l discussions of m o d ern capitalism. S om etim es he m eans by it a s ta te , but charac teris tica lly he uses it to re fer to the cu ltu ra l a t t r ibu tes of national com m unities . T h e Communist Manifesto re jects the idea th a t socialists have th e ob jective of abolishing ‘nationalities ',



arguing tha t these a re legitim ate expressions of cu ltura l identity. But the sam e d o cu m en t does envisage the dissolution of all significant divisive influences am ong hum an k in d , as socialism co m es to fu r th e r p rocesses a lready begun by th e sp read of capitalism. T h ro u g h p rom oting the existence of a ‘world m a rk e t ’, the bourgeoisie give ‘a cosm opolitan ch a rac te r to p ro d u c tio n and consum ption in every co u n try ’. M arx and Engels con tinue: ‘All o ld-established national industries have been des troyed o r are daily being des troyed . . . na tional one-sidedness and n a r ro w m indedness b ec o m e m ore and m ore im possible.’37

Alert though M arx might have been to the significance of military pow er, like Engels his co n ce rn with it was above all in re spec t o f rev o lu t ionary and co u n te r - rev o lu t io n a ry v io lence. W arfa re be tw een na t ions w ould b ec o m e increasingly less consequen tia l than the struggle betw een classes. T h e re seem s no way to d ispu te the conclusion tha t M arx unaffec ted ly believed tha t w ha t w orkers shared in co m m o n w ould eventually t r ium ph over what divided them nationally. T o hold tha t ‘w orkers have no coun try ' was obviously an expression of h ope as m u ch as a factual ob serva tion but, as a p ro jec t io n of im m a n en t t rends , it was perfectly in line with the m ain im petus of M arx ’s theory of capitalist deve lopm en t. For M arx, the m o d ern world is far m ore riven with conflic t than for D urkhe im , b ecause of the deeply founded class divisions that dem an d nothing short of revolutionary change for their resolution. Nonetheless, M arx’s antic ipated fu ture co m m o n w ea l th of na tions in essence re sem bles th a t which D urkhe im foresaw. As a s tu d en t of M arx 's writings on the nation and n a t io n h o o d has co m m en ted :

A n en lig h te n e d p a trio tism w hich rec o g n ised th e b ea rin g of in te rn a tio n a l p ro g re ss u p o n n a tio n a l w elfa re se em e d to M arx co m p atib le an d even fairly sy nonym ous w ith sou n d in te rn a tio n a lism. T h e tru e p a tr io t m ust fu rth e r th e ad v a n ce o f o th e r n a tio n s if on ly to assu re the p ro g ress o f his ow n; the tru e in te rn a tio n a lis t m ust strive fo r th e ad v a n ce o f p a rtic u la r c o u n tr ie s as th e sound basis o f w orld p ro g ress . . . [ M arx ] w as an in te rn a tio n a lis t, n o t only in th e sense of ad v o c a tin g a system of co o p e ra tiv e w orld re la tions, b u t in th e m o re specific sense o f conceiv ing th a t system as the re su ltan t o r fu n c tio n o f th e friend ly in te rac tio n of large na tions w hich w ere o rg an ised h arm o n io u sly from w ith in .38

T his absence in liberal sociology and in M arx ’s writings — the lack of a system atic in te rp re ta t ion of the rise of the territorially b o u n d ed nation-s ta te and its association with military p ow er — can be traced to the legacy of Saint-Simon in political theo ry and to the influence of classical political econom y. T h e re is m ore than a hint in M arx , and an o p en em b ra ce of th e idea by Engels, o f the Saint-Sim onian d o c tr ine that, in the em ergen t society to which social evolution is leading, the adm inis tra tion of hum an beings by o thers will give way to the adm inis tra tion of h u m an beings over things. D u rkhe im was less p reo ccu p ied with this th em e of Saint- S im on than by the no tion , also in som e p ar t d raw n from Saint- S im on, tha t the s tate in an industrialized o rd e r will have a m oral role to play in re la tion to the societal com m unity . T h a t is to say, in con tras t to M arx, he was m o re influenced by Saint-S im on’s la te r writings than by his earlier ones. But in ne i the r case does th e re result an unders tand ing of the state in an industrialized society as inherently assoc ia ted with con tro l of the m eans of v iolence, in which the adm inis tra tive o rd e r re la tes to defined terr ito r ia l boundaries . T h e industrial s ta te , in short, is no t a nation-state , and the industrial o rd e r — w h e th e r intrinsically m ark e d by class struggle o r no t — is po r tray ed as progressively overcom ing the militaristic ten d en c ies of pre-existing types of society. Both liberal and M arxist concep tions of the s ta te are heavily in f luenced by the ir re spec tive cr i t iques of political econom y. W h a tev e r their d ifferences, which are of cou rse in som e respec ts very p ro fo u n d , bo th schools of th ough t conceive of industrialism as essentially a pacific force, inevitably going b ey o n d na t iona l co m m u n itie s , unifying the g lobe th ro u g h in te rd ep en d en t econom ic exchange. M arx m ay have been a m ore radical critic of the ‘de-hum anizing’ effects of the division of labour than was D u rkhe im but, for bo th , m o d ern eco n o m ic life s timulates in te rd e p en d en c e and there fo re — o n ce class division has d isap p ea red — social unity on a global scale.

Now it m ight seem plain tha t , if these trad itions of th o u g h t are defic ien t in the m an n e r ind icated , the answ er is to tu rn to ‘right- l iberal’ o r conservative th inkers , w ho have ten d ed to be m ore p re o ccu p ied with the s ta te as a warlike entity. T h u s O tto H in tze, a m em b er of the so-called ‘Prussian sch o o l’ of h istorians, shares a g o o d deal in co m m o n , in som e of his em phases at any ra te , with M ax W eber. H in tze stresses the general associa tion be tw een the

26 State, Society and M odern History

State, Society and M odern History 27

existence of s tates and the consolidation of military pow er, and sees such po w er bo th as involved with th e d ev e lo p m e n t of capita lism /industr ia lism and as shaping their fu tu re course of deve lopm en t. H e is strongly critical of M arxist assum ptions: ‘It is one-s ided , ex ag g era ted and th e re fo re false to co n s id e r class conflict the only driving force in history. Conflict betw een nations has been far m o re im p o rtan t . ’39 H intze criticizes S ch u m p e te r for trying to show, in quasi-M arxist vein, that capitalism and ‘the na t io n ’ are an ti thetical. ‘T h e rise and dev e lo p m en t of cap ita lism ’, acco rd ing to Hintze, ‘rem ain unintelligible w ithou t insight into how they w ere cond it ioned by the course of national fo rm a tio n .’40 In many respects, he goes on to claim, the expansion of capitalism and the increasing pow er of the nation-state m arch in tandem .

T h is is a view w hich, in a p ar ticu la r guise, I shall also la ter be c o n c e rn e d to defend and to fu r th e r e lucidate . But in spite of the im p o rtan ce which, pu t alongside liberal and Marxist traditions, the views of Hintze, W eber , and o thers holding co m p arab le positions have, I do not th ink o n e can simply tu rn to them , abandon ing the o thers , in analysing the n a tu re of the m odern nation-state in re la tion to military power. T h u s in W eb er , w ho a t tem p ted in a ce rta in sense to m erge those two incom patib les , M arx and N ietzsche, we do not find a satisfactory t rea tm en t e ither of the nation-s ta te o r of its re la tion to the dev e lo p m en t of capitalism and industrialism. As has been m en tio n ed , this is partly because W e b e r defines the s ta te in such a way as to m ak e it difficult to distinguish som e of the specific charac te r is t ics of the nation-s ta te . It is also, how ever , b ecau se W eb er , like m ost theorists inclined tow ards the political right on these m atters , tends to see vio lence and w ar as an inescapable par t o f the hum an condition. T h e ‘Nietzschean e lem en t’ is most strongly represen ted in W eb er precisely in the conjunction betw een his overall concep t of the s ta te and his ph ilosophical s tance ab o u t the irrationality of ‘ultim ate values’. B eyond ‘u lt im ate values’ th e re lies only force, the clash of m u tually i r re co n c ilab le cu ltu res , d e fen d ed and p ro tec ted by states that necessarily op era te in a ‘house of pow er’.41 I do no t believe this view to be philosophically defensib le ,42 and it deflects a tten t ion from the ways in which the re la tions betw een nation-states in the m o d e rn w orld differ from those of earlier states. If the liberal an d M arxist s tandpo in ts a re no tab ly defic ient in certa in respects , they do nonethe le ss draw o u r a t ten t ion to the

fac t th a t cap ita lis t-industria lism in jects a w ho le set of novel dynam ics into social change.

T h e above discussion co n cen tra te s upon the fo re ru n n e rs of m o d ern sociology and we m ight ask the question , H ave no t each of the th ree general trad it ions of though t m ad e considerab le progress since then? Naturally they have done so in m any respects, bu t I think it und em an d in g to d em o n s tra te that their failings still rem ain . Marxist though t in the tw entie th cen tu ry has certainly n o t ignored the p h en o m en a of war, force and violence. How cou ld it be o therw ise in a period which might no t have seen the realiza tion of M arx 's p ro jec t io n s for the rev o lu t io n ary t ran s fo rm ation of the industrialized countries , but has been otherw ise the true ‘cen tu ry of revo lu tions’? Virtually everyone sym pathe tic to M arxism in cu rren t times accep ts th a t Marx failed to develop anyth ing m o re than the rud im ents of a theory of the m odern state. T h e result over th e last tw o d ecad es o r so has been a spate of M arxist writing designed to help rectify this omission, som e of w hich is very ins truc tive in d eed .43 But v irtually all o f it is p reo ccu p ied e i ther with the role of the s ta te in eco n o m ic life, o r with the s ta te as the focus of ‘in terna l’ oppression .44 W h ere it is analysed theoretically at all, the nation-state still tends to ap p ea r in these discussions as reducib le to eco n o m ic re la tions of one kind o r an o ther . An exam ple of the fa tuous co n seq u en ces to w hich this can lead is th e division of the ‘world system ’ in to ‘c o re ’, ‘sem i-per iphery ’ and ‘p e r ip h e ry ’, w h e re the seco n d of these ca tegories includes the s ta te socialist societies of E as tern E urope . T h e Soviet U n ion m ay be less dev e lo p ed than th e W este rn coun tr ie s econom ically , b u t in te rm s of its d ep loym en t of military pow er it is absurd to include it in the ‘sem i-periphery’.

Liberal au tho rs have w rit ten extensively ab o u t the nation-state , a lthough o ften in re la tion only to the ‘state-building’ efforts of the T h ird W orld . Unlike the m ajority of M arxists, som e such writers have dev o ted considerab le effort to grasping the n a tu re of the nation-state . Exam ples are the works of T . H. M arshall and R e inhard Bendix. Each has w ritten on the nation-state , and on nationalism , bu t in the ir th inking these o ccupy a strictly su b o rd inate p lace to w hat M arshall term s ‘c itizenship’ o r ‘citizenship rights’.45 B endix’s re cen t an d m ost m ajo r w ork is, as he says, co n ce rn ed with ‘pow er and th e m an d a te to ru le ’, and with ‘th e use of force as an a ttr ibu te o f au thority ’.46 But its overwhelm ing emphasis



is upon how arb itra ry pow er is ov e r tu rn ed by the rise of g overn m en t th rough p o p u la r delegation . ‘A uthority in the n am e of the p eo p le ’ has co m e to rep lace ‘th e au thority of K ings’.47 No o ne , surely, would wish to deny the im portance of such a phenom enon . Bendix has, m o reo v e r , p layed a leading p a r t in a t tack in g evolu tionary theories of social change , stressing the diversity of rou tes which d iffe ren t s ta tes have tak en tow ards m odern iza tion . H ow ever, like o thers in this trad it ion of thought, he has fought shy of a t tem pting to analyse how industrial organization has b eco m e b rack e ted to military pow er, and how each of these in tu rn is co n n e c ted with the ch a rac te r o f the m o d ern nation-state. T h e s ta te ap p ears as ‘political co m m u n ity ’ within which c itizenship rights may be realized, n o t as the b ea re r of military pow er within a world of o th e r nation-states. Bendix frequently cites Hintze as well as M ax W eber. But som e of their distinctive em phases, par ticularly the ‘N ietzschean s tra in ’ in W eb er , barely ap p ea r in Bendix’s w ork a t all.

N ietzsche has, how ever, b ec o m e influential again in present- day social thought, particularly in the works o f those critical of liberal and Marxist perspectives. T h u s the ‘new ph ilo sophers’ in F rance , w ho s ta rted ou t on the left, in aban d o n in g M arx have m oved to N ietzsche.4S In tu rn ing their backs on M arxism , and discovering the absence in M arx no t only of an e labora ted accoun t of th e state , but of a generic theory of pow er (as distinct from class power), the new ph ilosophers have m ad e the s ta te and pow er the fundam en ta l c o m p o n en ts of social life.

W e m ust b rea k w ith th e m e tap h y s ics o f p ro p erty , fo u n d a tio n and in fra s tru c tu re . . . F o r th e p ro b lem d o es n o t lie th e re ; it is in fin itely m o re rad ica l: p o w er d o es n o t a p p ro p r ia te the w orld , it co n tin u a lly e n g e n d e r s it in all its d im ensions. It d o es n o t e x p r o p r i a te m en an d th e ir hom es, it p l a c e s t h e m u n d e r h o u s e a r r e s t , d e e p e n s and fo rtifies the c o rn e rs w here they ta k e p a rt. F a r from m alignan tly te a rin g th e th re a d o f th e ir soc ia l fab ric , p o w er is w hat w eaves the c lo th o f every rea lity . . . If the rea lity o f cap ita l, as we know , p ro v o k es d esp air , it is useless to p lace o u r d rea m s an d h o p es in a n o th e r rea lity .4''

This style of though t , with its rhe to r ica l flourishes, sacrifices most of the insights it has ach ieved by a m onolith ic em phasis upon the ubiquity of p o w er. P o w er is eve ryw here , so its p a r ticu la r

m anifestations are uninteresting. All states are pyramids of power; th e re is no po in t in d ifferentiating betw een them in te rm s of their specific qualities o r charac teris t ics . In such writing, the n a tu re of the s ta te is ap p ro ach ed only obliquely, never d irectly , and far from helping to identify the charac te ris t ics of nation-states, this ap p ro ach hopelessly befuddles them .

I do no t m ean to imply by the p reced ing observa tions that no on e has w ritten interestingly ab o u t the nation-state in recen t times, o r tha t these co m m en ts are in any way exhaustive in re la tion to the form s of social though t to which they refer. T h e re a re today several bodies of li te ra tu re re levan t to the p rob lem s with which this book is co n ce rn ed ; my point is tha t these tend to be d isconnected from the main trends of thinking in social theory. T h e re is, and th ere has long been , a massive general l i te ra tu re on war and militarism. T h e difficulty with m ost w orks w ritten in this f ram ew ork is that they tend to generalize across all epochs. T h e c o n ten t io n ten d s to be th a t w ar has always ex is ted , and co r re sp o n d s e i th e r to som e innate aggressive ten d en c ie s of hum ankind , o r to inescapable clashes of interest betw een different h um an groups. T h u s the military aspects of nation-states are m ere ly o n e version of traits charac te r is t ic in som e way of all societies, o r at least o f all states. On the o th e r hand , th e re is a burgeon ing lite ra ture to do with the th rea t of nuc lea r war, and with the ch an ces the popu la t ion of this p lanet may o r m ay not have of surviving the next few decades. In con tras t to the b ro ad e r discussions of war, which are often all-embracing in ch a rac te r , m ost of this w ork o p e ra te s within a very narrow time-span, being co n c e rn e d with very im m edia te and urgent problem s. Essential though it is, such li te ra tu re necessarily tends to be tactica l: it is c o n c e rn e d with w ha t s teps cou ld conceivably be tak en to arres t w ha t seem s to be a p lunge tow ards disaster.

T h e re is also an extensive li te ra ture of in terna tional rela tions, and it is here that m uch of the m ateria l ge rm an e to analysing the na t ion -s ta te is to be found . H ow ever , the very n o t io n of a distinctive field of in te rna tional re lations, sep a ra ted som ehow from w hat goes on inside nations o r ‘societies’, is in som e part sym ptom atic of the lim itations in social though t I have described . F o r if ‘capitalist d ev e lo p m e n t’, o r ‘industrial dev e lo p m en t ' are seen as the pre -em inen t sources of social change , they are then regarded as the substan tive co re of sociological co n cern ; the



re la tions be tw een states, seen as a m ore con tin g en t m atte r , can be left to specialists w ho n ee d have no par ticu la r ties with social th eo ry .50 This u n fo r tu n a te and indefensible division also rests to som e degree upon the proclivity of social theorists — in con tras t to theorists o f in terna tional re la tions — to adop t evolu tionary or endogenous m odels of social deve lopm ent. If it is supposed that the m ost im portan t influences upon social change derive from factors inside ‘societies ', and if it is held in addition that these factors are primarily econom ic , then is it hard ly surprising that sociologists a re co n ten t to hive off the study of the political re la tions be tw een s ta tes to a s ep a ra te field of investigation . A lthough there m ust be divisions of labour and specialism within the social sciences, there can be no justification for the theoretical abe rra tions which this par ticu la r disciplinary parti t ion ing tends to p e rpe tua te .

A Discontinuist Interpretation of Modern History

Evolu tionary theories claim tha t , as a result o f som e discernable m echanism s of change, there a re trends of deve lopm ent in history w hich cu lm in a te in the e m e rg en ce of m o d e rn , i.e. W es te rn , societies — these standing at the top of a h iera rchy of types of society.51 Such theories p resum e som e dom inan t continuities over hum an history as a whole, w h a tev er d iffe rences are recognized betw een types of society. In m ost forms of evolutionism , these continuities are portrayed as part of a generalized process of social d iffe ren tiation , from the sim ple to the m o re com plex. M arx ’s view shares so m eth in g in co m m o n with o th e r evo lu t ionary theories in so far as social change is held to involve the progressive g row th of the forces of p ro d u c tio n . It is a d iscontinu is t acco u n t of history in the sense tha t social deve lopm en t is held to o cc u r via successive ep isodes of revolu tionary transfo rm ation . This is not the perspective I wish to endorse in p roposing a ‘discontinuist in te rp re ta t ion of m o d ern history ', by which I re fer to a set of changes confined to relatively recen t times. Such a co n cep tio n is indeed found in M arx , bu t it is never fully a r ticu la ted , and is kept secondary to th e evolu tionary view.52

A cco rd in g to this pe rsp ec tiv e , the e m e rg en ce of m o d ern capita lism does no t rep resen t the high poin t (thus far) o f a progressive sch em e of social d ev e lopm en t, b u t ra th e r the com ing

of a type of society radically d istinct from all p r io r form s of social o rde r . It is exactly this I m ean by a discontinuist in te rp re ta t ion of m odern history. Marx's writings are not irrelevant to understanding it; h ow ever given l im ita tions n o ted ea rlie r , plus his p rim ary ad h e ren c e to an evolu tionary co n cep tio n , the con tr ibu tion which can be drawn from him is inevitably only partial.

Let m e distinguish several d ifferent p ic tu res of h u m an 'history', recognizing again what co m plica ted issues are co n cea led behind the unassum ing ex ter ior of tha t appa ren tly innocuous term . O ne is the version o f evolu tion ism th a t regards h istory — here u n d e rs to o d essentially as social change — as mainly governed by increm en ta l p rocesses of deve lopm en t. In this view, th e re are no fu n d am en ta l d iscon tinu ities in social change . All phases of dev e lo p m en t th a t look like ‘revolu tions’ of o n e kind o r an o th e r turn ou t to involve less tu rbu len t, underlying processes of change. This is the position taken by D urkhe im ; it has also been held by m any o thers from C o m te through to the p resen t day. A n o th e r view sees history as being driven by processes of struggle, in w hich substantial d is junctures o cc u r betw een differen t dev e lo p m ental stages. Historical m ateria lism is o n e co n cep tio n of this sort , but social Darwinism can also be put in this ca tegory . H ere history is also unders to o d as social change and has, as it w ere , a curv ing u p w ard fo rm , bu t p u n c tu a te d by phases of rapid transm uta t ion . T h e view I want to defend is qu ite different from either of these o thers . T h e equa tion of history with social ch an g e m ust be res is ted , as bo th logically m is taken and empirically wanting. If history is tem pora li ty — the tem pora l consti tu tion of social even ts — it is clearly false to identify it with change. M oreover, hum an history does not look like what G ellner has called a ‘world g row th s to ry ’.51 F o r m ost of the ex trem ely long period during which h u m an beings lived in small hun ting and gathering societies, history was stasis ra th e r than change. If there a re ce rta in overall deve lopm en ta l p a t te rn s over tha t pe r iod , they are slight co m p ared to the continu ity in societal forms. T h e advent of class-divided societies — agrarian states o r ‘civilizations’— m arks a distinctive b reak with what w en t before. T h ese are , as Lévi-Strauss says, ‘ho t cu l tu re s ’, m ark e d by a dynam ism u nknow n previously. W ith them history both takes on a w ritten form and com es m o re plausibly to m ean social change.

B ut the p ace of change in class-divided societies, par ticularly

32 State, Society and M odem History


econom ic o r techno log ica l ch ange , is very slow w hen con tra s ted to the m o d ern industrialized societies. T h a t is why M arx is not wholly m isguided in speaking of the ‘s tagnan t ' n a tu re of the Asiatic s ta tes of trad it ional India and China. His m istake was to suppose tha t the W est, p rio r to the origins of capitalism , was any m ore dynam ic, o r ‘progressive’ than o th e r class-divided societies have been . It is only with th e arrival o f cap ita lism , m ore particularly industrial capita lism , tha t the p ace of social change becom es really d ram atic . O ver a period of, at m ost, no m ore than th ree h u n d red years, the rapidity , d ram a and reach of change have been incom parab ly g rea te r than any prev ious historical transitions. T h e social o rd e r — increasingly a genuinely global system but no t an intrinsically pacific one — initiated by the adven t of m odern ity is no t just an accen tu a t io n of previous trends o f developm ent. In a n u m b er o f specifiable and quite fundam ental respects , it is som eth ing new.

In speaking of a d iscontinu is t concep tion of m o d ern history, there fo re , I do no t wish to deny the im p o rtan ce of transitions or ru p tu re s in previous eras. I do , how ever, w an t to claim tha t, orig inating in the W est bu t becom ing m ore and m ore global in th e ir im pac t , th e re has o c c u r re d a series of ch an g es of ex traord inary m agn itude w hen co m p ared with any o th e r phases of hum an history. W h a t sepa ra tes those living in the m odern world from all p revious types of society , and all previous epochs of history, is m ore p ro found than the continu ities which co n n ec t th em to the longer spans of the past. This does n o t m ean tha t we can n o t draw upon the study of pre-existing types of society to try b e t te r to u n d ers tan d the n a tu re of the world in which we now live. But it does imply tha t the con tras ts which can be m ad e will o ften prove m ore illuminating than the continu ities that may be d iscerned . It is the task of ‘sociology', as I w ould fo rm ula te the role of tha t discipline a t any ra te , to seek to analyse the n a tu re of tha t novel w orld w hich, in the late tw entie th cen tu ry , we now find ourselves.

In the p reced ing vo lum e of this w ork I have d iscussed at som e length the n a tu re and origins of the d iscontinuities that sepa ra te us from the past an d I shall no t re p ea t tha t analysis h e re .54 T h ese d iscontinuities s tre tch from changes in the in tim ate tex tures of day-to-day life to t ransfo rm ations of a truly world-wide kind. In a period of th ree h u n d re d years, an insignificant s lither of hum an

I

history as a whole, the face of the ea rth has been w iped clean. T h a t is to say, trad it ional societies of all types have b ec o m e m ore o r less com plete ly dissolved. T o d a te these changes as originating som ew here in the s ix teen th o r seven teen th cen tu ries — although developing in a m aximal way only later — might seem im precise. But we should see these against the back g ro u n d of the whole sweep of h u m an history and in re la tion to m ajo r p rocesses of transition of o th e r sorts. W e are able to fix them m uch m ore exactly, for exam ple , than m ost ep isodes involving the origins of agrarian states, even though their con seq u en ces have in my view been m ore p rofound.

T h e fo rm ation of the nation-state , and the assoc ia ted n a t io n s ta te system, is an expression of the dislocations of m odern history. It is o n e such expression am ong o thers and in focusing primarily on it I do no t p re ten d to provide a com prehensive tre a tm e n t of m odern ity . But a t tem p tin g to u n d e rs ta n d the dev e lo p m en t of the nation-state as a specific institu tional form inevitably m eans em bark ing upon a b road spec trum of tasks. A m ong o th e r things it is necessary to look into the n a tu re of capitalism , its relation to industrialism, and the co n n ec tio n s that have existed betw een bo th and the origins of the nation-s ta te in the W est. As a prior considera tion , how ever, we have to m ake c lear the distinctive fea tu res of m o d ern states by con tras ting th em to earlier forms of s ta te organization.


2The Traditional State: Domination and Military Power

City and Countryside in Traditional States

O f th e various ways o f classifying trad itio n a l s ta te s ,1 o r class- d iv ided socie ties , th a t o ffered by E isenstad t is as useful as any. He distinguishes betw een city -states; feudal system s; pa trim on ia l em pires; n om ad o r co n q u es t em pires; and ‘cen tra lised h istorical b u re a u c ra tic em p ire s’.2 All such c lassifica tions a re som ew hat in secu re , s ince th e re are various possible overlaps b etw een these ca tegories. T h u s , th e d iffe ren tia tio n betw een p atrim on ial and b u re au c ra tic em pires is n o t a hard and fast o n e , and it w ould be d ifficult to find a h isto rical case th a t did no t in som e part fit in to bo th . C h ina, in som e ways the type-case of a b u re au c ra tic em pire , has for large periods o f its h istory been com m only reg ard ed as a varian t of pa trim onialism . F o r my pu rposes h ere , how ever, it will be sufficien t to co n c e n tra te on th e sm allest and largest types — th e city-state and th e large agrarian em pire . It m ight seem as though th e ex istence of a ca teg o ry of ‘n om ad em p ires’ is a m ajor so u rce of d ifficulty fo r th e view th a t the city is th e m ain pow er con ta iner involved in class-divided societies. H ow ever, exam ination of th e c h a ra c te r o f such em pires tends to su b stan tia te the thesis ra th e r th an p lace it in qu estio n . N om ad socie ties have m anaged to co n q u e r large sw athes o f land in the sense of subdu ing the p eo p le living on them . But w h erev er they have sought d irec tly to adm in iste r a p o p u la tio n in a regu larized fash ion , ra th e r than m erely p illaging its re so u rces , th e re su ltan t system has ten d ed

36 The Traditional State

tow ards th e pa tr im on ia l o r b u re au c ra t ic types, with fixed se tt lem ents playing as im p o rtan t a ro le as anyw here else. T h e m ost significant possible excep tion is, in fact, Egypt of th e Old Kingdom . A lthough the archaeological ev idence on th e m a t te r has to be regarded as inconclusive, som e have c la im ed tha t the city was never deve loped in m ore than a relatively ru d im en ta ry way th e re .1

Sjoberg is the m ain advoca te of the view tha t the city in class- divided societies has som ething of a universal form, architectura lly as well as in its social charac teristics . As he puts it, ‘O u r principal hypothesis is that in their s truc tu re , o r form, pre industr ia l cities— w h e th e r in m ediaeval E urope , trad it ional China, Ind ia, o r e lsew here — resem ble o n e an o th e r closely and in tu rn differ m arked ly from m o d e rn industr ia l-u rban c e n tre s . ’4 I have no d ispute with the conc lud ing part of the assertion (I w ant to s trongly em phasize the d is t inc tiveness of m o d e rn urban ism ), although th e re is som e reason to be cau tious ab o u t the m ajor proposition. A ccord ing to Sjoberg, the non-m odern city almost always displays certa in par ticu la r traits. It is walled, and the walls are very o ften part of a m ore general set of d e fence installations. T h e cen tra l area , con ta in ing gov ern m en t and religious buildings, usually dom ina tes the skyline visually; it also charac teristically contains the m ain m arke t, located on an open square. T h e central pa r t also tends to house th e res idences of the elite, with those in th e p o o re r g roups living fu r thest from the m ain a re a .s Sjoberg re jects th e idea tha t co n c en tra t io n of com m ercia l activities has norm ally been the m ain fac to r involved in the em erg en ce or grow th of trad it ional cities. T h is is partly in consc ious c o n t ra dis t inction to W eber, w ho on the whole gives strong em phasis to the com m ercia l im p o rtan ce of cities. A city, W eb er says, ‘is always a m ark e t c e n tre ’.6 Now the im p o rtan ce of the traditional city as a g en e ra to r of allocative resources can n o t be denied . This is not just because of the m arketing and m anufacturing enterprises it helps sustain. If there is any validity to Jacobs’s claim th a t u rban areas have been the m ain foci o f technologica l innovation , even in respec t of strictly agrarian p ro d u c tio n , the city has an even m ore significant role in this respec t than is o rdinarily thought. But S joberg is surely right to stress tha t the m ain influence underly ing the d e v e lo p m e n t of cities is th e adm in is tra tive resources they genera te . In his words, ‘we m ust, if we are to

Domination and M ilitary Power 37

explain the grow th , spread an d dec line of cities, co m m en t upon the city as a m echanism by which a society’s rulers can consolidate and m ain tain the ir p ow er.’7

A lthough S joberg is justified in pointing to overall similarities th a t distinguish trad it ional cities from m o d ern u rbanism , there is no d o u b t he exaggera tes their uniformity. T h ey definitely ten d to resem ble o n e an o th e r m o re than they do the m o d ern urban conglom eration , but S joberg’s charac terization is too generalized. M oreover, cities in class-divided societies usually exist in networks with o th e r pow er-con ta iners o r gene ra to rs of power. As Jacobs argues, quite substantial se ttlem ents have probably normally been found even am ong hu n te rs and ga therers , an d have co-existed with cities in larger societies. Such ‘villages’ m ay be larger than the se tt lem ents that w ould be ca tegorized as cities in S joberg’s fo rm ulation , form ing m arke ting cen tres for the trad e of agrarian o r craft p roducts .

N on-m odern cities have no t always been walled, as I have previously m en tioned . This was som etim es the case, for exam ple , in the early phase of existence of the trad it ional C hinese state, a lthough during the whole of the C hou p er iod cities had walls.8 T h e city is no t the oldest type of fortress nor, of course , the only type. Fortified villages have been co m m o n in m any parts of the world. A ccord ing to W eb er (although this is d isputable) the palisaded village was no t generally the fo re ru n n e r of the walled town. R ather, the la tter developed m ore often from the seigneurial castle — a fortress housing a lord , his w arriors and re tinue .9 W h ere bu reau c ra t ic em pires have dec lined , giving rise to som e sort of quasi-feudal system, castles, w h e th e r o r not linked to m anoria l estates, o ften rem ain as significant cen tres of pow er while cities lose the ir g randeur .

C astle c o n s tru c tio n an d c a s tle -sea ted p rin c e s w ere d iffu sed universally . T h e early E gyp tian so u rces knew th e cas tle an d castle co m m an d ers , an d we can be a lm ost ce rta in th a t these castles h o u sed ju s t as m any p e tty p rince lings. In M e so p o tam ia th e d ev e lo p m e n t of th e la te r te rr ito r ia l K ingdom s w as p re c ed ed , to ju d g e by th e o ld e s t d o cu m en ts , by a castle -sea ted p rin ced o m such as ex isted in w estern In d ia in th e tim e of the V ed as an d such is as p ro b ab le fo r P ersia a t the tim e o f the o ldest | Z o ro a s tr ia n ] G a th as .In n o r th e rn In d ia , on th e G an g es , th e ca s tle a p p a re n tly w as un iversally d o m in a n t du rin g th e p e rio d of d is in te g ra tio n .10

Sjoberg argues that in non-m odern societies, including European feudalism , the dom inan t classes are always urban. Again th e re is som eth ing in this claim tha t is co rrec t . In general it is t ru e that w herever s tates have m ain ta ined a sufficient degree of cohesion to be w orth calling ‘s ta tes’ a t all, it is the city ra th e r than th e rural a rea that has been the pre -em inen t locale in which the m em bers of the do m in an t class are to be found. But there is no poin t in s tre tch ing the claim too far because , after all, th e re has been a considerable range of variation in the composition and distribution of u p p er classes in traditional societies. Sjoberg is too anxious to stress the in d ependen t , self-sufficient ch a rac te r of the city as an adm inistrative cen tre in agrarian states. This is no t th e position I ad v o ca te here , which is m o re com plex , and does no t d ep en d upon over-straining the sorts of generalizations tha t can be m ade ab o u t non-m odern cities. T h e city is the main pow er-con ta iner genera ting au thorita tive resources in class-divided societies, but it does no t follow from this that each city is itself a def ined and co h e ren t adm inistrative cen tre . T h e re is never m ore than a small minority of the population living in cities in non-m odern societies. T h e m odes of dom ination found within them always d epend upon the re la tions betw een cities and the countryside , no t only upon the in ternal com posit ion of cities themselves. Cities that have a high deg ree of adm inistrative co n cen tra t io n and military au to n o m y ten d for the m ost par t only to be found in city-states, w hose ce n tre s they are. T h e ‘city c o m m u n es ' o f post-feudal E u ro p e are in m any ways distinctive, and certain ly should not be used as a yard-stick against which to assess the adm inistrative capabilities offered by cities in general. Chinese cities are actually m uch m ore typical in this respect. In traditional China, villages w ere in som e part ‘self-administered ', but cities w ere no t, o r at least w ere no t to the sam e d eg ree ."

T h e small p ropor tion living in cities in class-divided societies is indicative of the low level of administrative pow er which the traditional s ta te was able to ach ieve over its subjects. E ver since the te rm ‘orienta l despotism ' was co ined by W este rn observers looking East, th e re has been a s trong tendency to assum e that bu reau c ra t ic em pires are highly cen tra lized societies. But this p re su m p tio n is fu n d am en ta l ly m is taken if such socie ties a re co m p ared with m o d ern states. Consider, fo r exam ple , the Incas. Som e have seen the In ca em pire as a p rim e exam ple of a despo tic



s ta te (occasionally, even an early form of a s ta te socialist society). Baudin has linked an analysis o f In ca society to a cr it ique of m o d ern socialism in a way som ew ha t akin to W ittfogel.12 But this type of view is m isleading indeed , no t only b ecau se it rests upon a factually e rro n eo u s descrip tion of the Inca sta te , bu t b ecau se of the im plication tha t m o d ern states m erely a c cen tu a te fea tu res of trad itional ones. As M o o re and o thers have show n, the scope of imperial pow er was very m uch less in Peru than has frequently been suggested, the society being largely segm enta l and localized in ch a rac te r . As in o th e r class-divided socie ties , m ost t rad e consis ted of local m ark e tin g ; th e re was no m o re a s trong eco n o m ic in te rd ep en d en ce betw een the areas covered by the s tate adm inis tra tion than th ere was political in teg ra tio n .13

Similar conclusions have to be draw n in the case of the Aztecs, the M aurya, G u p ta and M ogul imperial s ta tes in India, and ancien t Egypt. T h e la tter of these is w orthy of co m m en t since, like the Inca sta te , it has o ften been seen as a particularly solidly c o n c e n t ra te d social fo rm a tion . W eb er in fact d raw s d irec t com parisons betw een Egypt and the rationalizing tendenc ies of m o d ern capitalism , likely to be ex acerb a ted by socialism. A ‘shell of bondage ' is being fabrica ted ‘which m en will pe rh ap s be forced to inhabit som e d ay ’, and in which they will be ‘as pow erless as the fellahs of anc ien t Egypt’.14 Egypt is like ‘a single t rem en d o u s oikos ruled patrim onially by the p h a ra o h ’,15 W e b e r says. As early as the Old K ingdom , ‘the en tire p eop le was p ressed in to a h iera rchy of c l ien tage’, this being ‘prope lled by the overrid ing im p o r tan ce of system atic cen tra l ised river-regula tion and of construc tion projects during the long season in which the absence of agricultural w ork p erm it ted drafting on an u n p re ced e n te d sca le’.16 But such a view does n o t acco rd with the findings of m ore recen t a rch aeo lo g ica l w ork on anc ien t Egypt. B u reau c ra t ic centra liza tion was m uch less deve loped than W eb er implies and the pro jec ts of irrigation con tro l he m entions w ere both sporadic and far rem o v ed from the experience of the m ajority of the population . T h e effective pow er of the pharaohs , even w hen at its height, was probably less than that som etimes wielded by imperial rulers e lsew here .17

Similar po in ts can be m ad e ab o u t city-states, a t the o th e r end of the scale in te rm s of their size from b u reau c ra t ic em pires. City- s ta te o rganization p rec ludes the existence, w ithin the re levan t


terr itoria l areas, of cen tra lized political au tho ri ty o f a b ro a d kind. It m ight be though t that the city-state, being small and confined , can ach ieve a m o re co m p a ra b le d eg ree of c o n c e n t ra t io n of authoritative resources to the m odern nation-state. H ow ever such is no t the case. City-states have, indeed , charac teris t ica lly been small, rarely covering m ore than several h u n d red square miles. W h ere they have exp an d ed to include neighbouring sta tes or peoples , the expansion has e i ther been transitory o r the s ta te has d ev e lo p ed tow ards the p a t r im o n ia l /b u re a u c ra t ic types. Small though it is, the city-state typically only develops a low level of d irec t adm inistrative con tro l over its subjects. A recen t c o m p a ra tive study of city-states has indicated that there are certain general characteristics which they display.18 City-states, like larger agrarian states, sustain m arked distinctions betw een their u rban cen tres an d rural areas, with the large m ajority of the po p u la t io n living an d w ork ing in th e sec o n d ra th e r than the first. T h e city env ironm en ts a re small. T hus , for exam ple , S um erian E rech m easu red less than two square miles; the cen tre of A thens was less than o n e square mile. T iny though they m ay be in te rm s of the s tandards of m odern u rban life, such cen tres form the locus of s ta te institutions. As th e au th o rs of th e study p u t it: ‘A lthough the cen tra l space was narrow ly confined , it was from tha t co re tha t the life of the city-state was d irec ted . In m odern term s, this ce n tre w ould be know n as the capital city inasm uch as the m ach ine ry of g o v ernm en t was co n c en tra te d within the walls separa ting city from countryside . In all five cu ltu res [studied |, walls w ere a no rm al fea tu re serving to define the ce n tre of the city-state.’19

T h e small size of the adm inistrative organizations of th e city- s ta te , to g e th e r with the res tr ic ted n a tu re of its military pow er, ensures tha t the level o f con tro l over m ost of its popu la tion is norm ally no g rea te r than tha t of the large-scale b u reau cra t ic em pire . O ne specific fea tu re of city-states, how ever, is th a t they tend to be found only where there are o th e r city-states in relatively close proximity. T hey m ak e up a type of loosely fo rm ed s tate system, differing both from those involving larger states, and from the m o d e rn nation-s ta te system. A lthough the city-states within a local system may share m ore o r less the sam e cu ltu re and the sam e language, the en d e av o u r to m ain ta in sepa ra te political and eco n o m ic identity takes p re ced e n ce over influences that


m ight ten d tow ards the co m b in a t io n of all w ithin a single overarching state. M o re o r less chron ic inter-state warfare is m ore co m m o n than p ro longed efforts to secure unity. W hen they are abso rbed in to larger imperial s tates city-states seem often to sustain a considerab le d eg ree of au to n o m y within the larger society, p reserving som e of th e ir form s of g o v e rn m en t .20

Surveillance and Administrative Power

A lthough there a re excep tions to the generaliza tion tha t the rise o f non-m odern states has everyw here been acco m p an ied by the dev e lo p m en t of writing (most no tab ly , the Incas), the associa tion is m uch too strong to be simply h a p p e n s ta n ce .21 T o unders tand the n a tu re of the co n n e c t io n , the co m m en ts 1 m ad e previously ab o u t the n a tu re of writing n eed to be expanded . A lthough it seems a very long way from questions o f the ph ilosophy of language to the analysis o f pow er in trad it ional civilizations, considera tion of the fo rm er can in fact co n tr ib u te a good deal to the e lucida tion of the latter. M any linguists have regarded writing as no m o re than an extension of speech , th e transcrip tion of u t te ran ces to transcrip tions on s tone , p ap e r o r o th e r m ateria l substances that can be m a rk e d .22 But ne ither the first origins of writing in anc ien t civilizations nor a philosophical characterization of language bears o u t such a view. Writing did no t orig inate as an isom orphic representa tion of speech, but as a m ode of adm inis trative no ta t ion , used to keep reco rd s o r tallies. R a th e r than being trea ted , on a m ore abs trac t p lane, as a m ateria l rep resen ta tion of speech , writing m ust be recogn ized as having its own distinctive charac teris t ics . Som e philosophers , dissatisfied with the usual view tha t the basic form of language is oral co m m u n ica t io n , have m ad e the case that it is actually writing ra th e r than speech which discloses the p rim ary charac te ris t ics of language .23 But it is m ore plausible to see speech and writing as two re la ted , but specifiably in d ep en d en t , m odes of language-use. W e can draw profitably upon the w ork of R icoeur to il lum inate th is .24 W hile recognizing the im p o rtan ce of s truc tu ra lis t th ough t to showing how language c a n n o t consist only of syn tagm atically o rd e re d u t te ra n ces , R icoeur pursues the critique of Saussure developed by Benveniste and o th e rs .25 B enveniste distinguishes be tw een a ‘sem iotics of the sign’ and a ‘sem antics of the sen ten ce’. T h e o n e can n o t be reduced


to the o th e r , a l though they are necessarily co n n ec ted . W hile the study of signs is a legitim ate form of enquiry , it ca n n o t in and of itself co p e with th e sem antics of the sen tence , b ecau se a sen tence consists of m ore than an a r ran g em en t of signs. Sen tences have a predicative ch a rac te r , which no t only gives th em m ean ing , but furnishes th em with the capacity of re ference . Sen tences a re the basic units of d iscourse , the m eans w hereby ‘language transcends itself, tak ing hold of th e w orld, of the self and of o thers and expressing this hold in language’.26

Now d iscourse can be spoken or w rit ten and , as writing, it m akes up a text. T exts are totalities, no t just com bina tions of sen tences , any m ore than sen tences are com binations of signs. W h ereas spoken d iscourse by its very n a tu re is evanescen t, its du ra tion being limited to the c ircum stances of its p ro d u c tio n , texts assum e a fixity th a t endures across tim e and space. In speech w hat an ac to r m eans to say, and the m ean ing of w ha t is said, are ordinarily o n e and the sam e — speakers em ploy all sorts of ‘m ethodolog ical devices ' to ensure th a t this is so .27 But, as R ico eu r says, the text escapes ‘the finite horizon lived by its a u th o r ’ and ‘w ha t the text says now m atte rs m ore than w ha t the au th o r m ean t to say.’28 T h e a u th o r of a text m ay in tend it for a p a r t icu la r au d ien ce , an d in ten d to convey ce r ta in m ean ings th rough it. But in principle th e text can reach aud iences quite rem o v ed from its au th o r , and can be read in ways which he o r she m ight never have im agined. T ex ts also b eco m e sep a ra ted from th e m oorings th a t ‘ostensive re fe re n c e ’ provides for spoken discourse. T h e co m m u n ica t io n of m ean ing in s ituated action d ep en d s in a basic way u p o n shared aw areness of e lem ents of the co n tex t of th a t ac tion .29 T h is is lacking in the case of texts, and is substantially responsible for the h erm en eu tic issues which their existence im m ediately brings in to being. At the sam e tim e as it is no longer sa tu ra ted by ostensive re fe rence , how ever, a text opens up new referen tia l possibilities den ied to oral com m unica t ion . S ince they do n o t d e p e n d for th e ir in te rp re ta t io n u p o n the situation in which they are p ro d u ced , texts o pen up new horizons o r ‘p ro jec t new ways of be ing’.10

W riting does no t begin as texts, even if all w rit ten d o cu m en ts necessarily have a ‘tex tual a sp e c t’ to them . T h a t is to say, the earliest exam ples of writing do n o t consist of sen tences , even in som e very rudim entary sense of ‘sen ten ce’. M esopotam ian picture-


writing, as it first deve loped , was em ployed almost wholly to m ak e inventories of various so rts .11 In o th e r words, it was m ad e up of d iscre te signs, no t of sem antic units. It is p robab ly the case tha t Sum erian ch a rac te rs originally were not m arks on clay at all, bu t ac tual ob jects used for coun ting and classifying. A lthough the Incas did no t develop a system of writing, and probab ly did no t have a re co rd ed ca lendar , they did possess a coun ting m easu re capable of quite sophisticated calculating and tallying procedures, using k n o t ted cords (quipus) as a m nem onic device. T h e re is som e general similarity be tw een the In ca artifacts and those found in Sum er, a lthough the ac tua l form is different. At U ruk clay labels w ere d iscovered with holes th rough them through which strings w ere draw n so that they could be used for coun ting and record ing . O bjec ts w ere also tagged acco rd ing to w hom they belonged . It seem s that these various o b jec ts la te r w ere rep resen ted in pictorial form , becom ing the basis o f Sum erian writing.-12

Lists, as G o o d y puts it, an ted a te texts in the deve lopm en t of writing, and adm inistrative lists p reced e lexical o n es .11 If writing orig inated in the perceived need for facilitating the storage and distribution of a llocative and au thorita tive resources , it also m ad e for o th e r possibilities that its inventors may not in any way have an tic ipa ted . ‘Lexical lists’ — w ord lists used for s tudy an d p rac t ice— existed in M eso p o tam ia as early as th e th ird millenium b c ,

and som e five h u n d red years la ter m ore specialized ‘text lists’ are found w hich, acco rd ing to o n e co m m en ta to r , rep resen t the first s teps tow ards the c rea tion of an encyclopaed ia . T h a t is to say, writing b ecam e co n n e c ted to the ca tegorizing and discovery of k now ledge in a system atic fa sh io n .14 H ow quick ly the scr ip t em ployed b ecam e a conven tiona l and phone tic system of writing is d ispu ted , but som e have c la im ed that this was a relatively early d ev e lo p m en t. W h a te v e r is th e t ru th of th e m a t te r , w rit ten m ateria ls tha t are d iscernibly ‘tex ts’ in R ico eu r’s sense do no t begin to p ro life ra te until the tim e at which Sum erian was no longer a spoken language, bu t a ‘classical’ o r ‘d e a d ’ one . G o o d y provides a classification of tab le ts excavated at Ugarit, written mostly in a local Sem itic language in script th a t has an a lphabe tic form. O u t of a to ta l o f 508 d o cu m en ts , th e categories are as shown in tab le l . 35


Table 1

T h e p re d o m in an ce of o rgan iza tional m ateria ls is very co n sid e rab le , an d a lthough it is alw ays possib le th a t this is the result of se lec tiv e surv ival, th e ra tio a cco rd s w ell w ith sim ilar finds elsew here . Few , if any, o f these d o cu m en ts a re likely to derive from the w ork of literate scribes representing spoken perform ances and m any p ro b ab ly have no o ra l equ ivalen ts at all.

T h e im p lica tions of w riting fo r th e su rve illance activ ities of non-m odern states a re several. W riting provides a m eans of coding in fo rm a tio n , w hich can be used to ex p an d th e ran g e of adm in istra tive co n tro l exerc ised by a s ta te ap p a ra tu s o v er bo th o b jec ts an d persons. As a m n em o n ic dev ice , even th e sim plest form of the m ark ing of signs m akes possib le the reg u la r o rd erin g of even ts and activ ities w hich cou ld no t be o rgan ized o therw ise . S to rage of in fo rm ation allow s bo th for th e s tandard iz ing o f a ce rta in range of happen ings an d , a t th e sam e tim e, allow s th em to be m o re effectively co -o rd in a ted . A list is a fo rm ula th a t tallies o b jec ts o r persons and can o rd e r them re la tive to o n e an o th er. T h is is p e rh ap s th e m ost e lem en ta ry sense in w hich w riting , even in its sim plest guise, en h an ces tim e-space d is tan cia tio n , th a t is, m akes possib le th e s tre tch in g o f social re la tio n s across b ro ad e r


spans of time and space than can be accom plished in oral cultures. S urveillance assoc ia ted with listing is, how ever , necessarily rud im en tary in term s of the pow er it can g en e ra te , a t least when u n acco m p an ied by o th e r types m en tio n ed below. All o f these are largely d ep e n d en t up o n the deve lopm en t of conven tiona l script, and the em erg en ce of ‘tex ts’ in the full sense of the term .

W ritten texts, o n ce they have co m b in ed signs so as to c rea te a sem antic c o n ten t , no longer just sort events , ob jec ts o r peop le , bu t m ak e descrip tions of th em possible. M oreover , with the ‘au to n o m y of the tex t ' th a t R ico eu r ana lyses so well, such desc rip tions can e n d u re ac ross th e g ene ra t ions . G iven the im p o rtan ce of trad it ion in class-divided societies, texts tend to b eco m e ‘classical’, dem an d in g and receiving co n tin u ed in te rp re tation by literate specialists, o ften priests. But the ex is tence of ‘classical texts’ is also directly involved in the invention of ‘history’ of which I have spoken earlier. In so far as texts describe ‘w hat w en t o n ’ plus ‘w ha t should go o n ’ in a range of social s ituations, the ‘history’ tha t is written can form a conso lida ted par t of the ap p a ra tu s of pow er. W hat w ere o n ce a series of cus tom ary forms of co n d u c t , informally sanc tioned in the daily p rac tices of local com m unities , b eco m e in som e part appropria ted and adm inistered by the s ta te ap p a ra tu s . K now ledge of ‘h is to ry ’ b ec o m e s an in terp re ta tive device w hereby sepa ra te ‘au th o r i t ies ’ can define w hat used to be con tro l led by localized cus tom . ‘A u th o r i ty ’ has a double sense which accurate ly expresses this, because it is possible to be both an au thority on a given sphere of know ledge , an d to have au thority over o thers . In the m an n e r described here , the tw o coincide .

W riting that has a sem antic co n ten t can be used in a d irec t way to describe and m o n ito r the activities of po tentially reca lc i tran t sectors o f a population. T h e keeping of detailed ‘official statistics’, plus ‘case h is to r ies ’ an d o th e r qu ite exhaustive fo rm s of docum en ta tion on the day-to-day lives of individuals is specifically ch a rac te r is t ic of m o d e rn s ta tes and organ iza tions. But m o re diffuse versions are found in all types of trad it ional state. ‘H istory’ is again involved h e re — as the te rm ‘case-history’ indicates — for inform ation of this type form s files or archives in which ‘the p re sen t’ can be scru tin ized in the light of the 'd o c u m e n te d past'. A m ong the Sum erians , for exam ple , reco rds w ere co llec ted in the form of chron ic les of yearly events an d activities re p o r ted to the


gods (and to the state). A ccord ing to W isem an, the Babylonian scribes m ad e reco rds of ‘the da tes of all public events , accessions, deaths, mutinies, famines and plagues, m ajor international events, wars, ba tt les , religious ce rem o n ies , royal d ec ree s an d o th e r per tinen t facts’.36

W riting can be used to fo rm ula te codes of co n d u c t , easily the m ost im p o rtan t aspect of this being the existence of written principles of law. T h e Sum erian system of law is again a good exam ple . It seem s to have been the result o f a g radual dev e lo p m en t o u t of cus tom ary practices , and was formalized into a co m p reh en s iv e co d e to w ard s the la t te r p a r t o f th e th ird millenium. It b ecam e the basis of the co d e of H am m urab i , and in tu rn was in su b s tan ce tak en o v er by all the Sem ites — Babylonians, Assyrians, C haldeans and Hebrews. It was primarily a system of criminal law, based on the lex talionis. As in the case of all legal codes in traditional states, it was not linked exclusively to adm inistrative organs of law en fo rcem en t — a p h en o m en o n o n ce m ore exclusive to m o d ern states. T h e adm inis tra tion of justice was semi-private. It was up to the injured party , o r to that p a r ty ’s relatives, to bring the w ro n g d o er to the judicial au thority , and norm ally also to be responsib le for ensuring tha t the decision of the co u r t was im p lem en ted .37 In cases held directly to affect s ta te security , o r to seriously im pugn the h o n o u r of the gods, d irec t punitive ac tion was usually taken by s ta te officials o r guards w ithou t reco u rse to any public judicial p ro ced u re .

I have m ad e the point earl ier th a t surveillance, as the collation and in tegra tion of in fo rm ation pu t to adm inistrative purposes, is closely re la ted to su rve il lance as d irec t superv is ion . It is ap p ro p r ia te a t this ju n c tu re to fu r th e r e lucida te how this is so, and to re la te this analysis to the n a tu re of adm inistrative power. T h e use of regularized in fo rm ation ab o u t social activities and ab o u t events in na tu re , as has been explained, is fu ndam en ta l to the existence of organizations. W h ere organizations (in this case, the state) o rd e r and co-ord ina te hum an activities, they do so by displacing aspects or spheres of co n d u c t formerly resulting from local co m m u n ity prac tices . In all societies , t rad i t io n a l and m odern , administrative pow er is the core of dom ination genera ted by au th o r i ta t iv e re so u rces , a l though it is no t th e only such re sou rce tha t exists (there is in addit ion pow er deriving from con tro l o f sanc tions and from ideology). By adm inistrative pow er I d o no t m ean p rim arily , as F o u cau l t does in speak ing of


‘disciplinary p ow er ', th a t w hich is fo u n d ed upon the ‘m oral ed u ca t io n ’ of those subject to it.38 R a ther , I m ean som eth ing else which b rooks quite large in F o u cau l t ’s analyses, c o n t r o l o v e r t h e

t i m i n g a n d s p a c i n g o f h u m a n a c t i v i t i e s . A dm inis tra tive po w er is based upon the regulation and co-ord ination of hum an co n d u c t th rough the m anipu la tion of the settings in which it takes place. Surveillance as the coding of inform ation is an essential e lem ent o f such pow er, b ecau se th e m n en o m ic and d is tr ibu tional advantages it allows over pure ly ora l cu ltu re are im m ense. But adm inistrative pow er can only b eco m e established if the coding of inform ation is actually applied in a direct way to the supervision of hum an activities, so as to d e tach them in som e part from their involvem ent with trad it ion an d with local com m unity life. In class-divided societies, opportunit ies for connecting the two forms of surveillance are distinctly limited, c o m p ared with m o d ern states. Surveillance in the sense of supervision is only possible in res tr ic ted settings, d u e to their segm ental ch a rac te r ; and even then it rarely involves the precise co-ord ination of timing and spacing tha t is found in m o d ern organizations.

In som e ag rar ian s ta tes , irrigation sch em es have b een a s ignificant fe a tu re o f p ro d u c t io n , and in O r i e n t a l D e s p o t i s m

W ittfogel associates m any of th e organizational accom plishm en ts o f traditional s tates with the adm inis tra tion of such schem es.39 W ithou t again going over w ha t is by now m uch-tram pled g round , it is c lear enough that W ittfogel wildly exaggerates the am o u n t of adm inistrative centra liza tion involved in the building o r the day- to-day w orking of irrigation projects. Leach, E b erh ard and o thers have offered con tra ry views which are m uch m ore persuasive than that ad o p ted by W ittfogel. Leach indicates tha t, while there w ere irrigation w orks of considerab le size and overall com plexity in Sinhala, these did not form a unified system and they w ere ne i ther co n s tru c ted to a general adm inistrative plan nor c o o rd in a ted in the ir regu la r use. T h e works w ere built up gradually , w ithou t th e large-scale m obiliza tion of labour-pow er, o v er a per iod of som e o n e and a half millenia.40 E b e rh a rd shows th a t the irrigation systems in C hina w ere similarly qu ite decen tra lized ; in their w orking they w ere regu la ted not by s ta te officials but by elders ap po in ted by the local com m unities .41

I have m en t io n ed in the o pen ing ch a p te r that public co n s tru c tion pro jec ts , found in som e degree in all trad it ional s tates, are inevitably m arginal to the m ain arenas of p roduc tion . A lthough


the scale of som e of these buildings is ex traord inary , given the rud im en ta ry technology available, the m e th o d s used to co ns truc t them w ere only in the c rudes t sense instances of adm inistrative pow er. T h e pyram ids of the Egyptian Old K ingdom provide an exam ple . A massive am o u n t of h u m an lab o u r-p o w er was ex p en d ed in their construc tion . H e ro d o tu s es tim ated tha t 100,000 individuals w ere em ployed for tw enty years to build the single pyram id of K hufu a t G izeh , which is by any s tandards a massive edifice. It is m ad e of som e two million l im estone b locks, fitted to g e th e r with considerab le precision. But does the preciseness of its engineering express an organizational co -o rd ination of labour of equal com plexity? T h e answ er is alm ost certain ly not. M ost of the labour used in building the pyramids was derived from massed g roups of w orkers , sub jec ted to appalling conditions of forced w ork , engaged in quarries o r in the tran sp o r ta t io n of the stones. T h e synchroniz ing of p ro d u c tio n was achieved largely th rough coe rc ion , save in the case of the skilled w orkers pu tt ing the finished b locks in p lace .42

T h e m ain instances in which any th ing re sem bling m o d ern adm inis tra tive pow er organ ized on a regu la r basis is to be found in trad it ional s tates are in military and religious settings and slave- labouring in m ines and on p lantations. Slave p lan ta tions and m ines have ce rta in ly o f ten involved d irec t and co n t in u o u s supervision co n c e rn e d with the co-ord ination of p roduc tion . But again , for th e m ost p a r t , such c i rcu m stan ces a re clearly d istinguishable from the in tegra tion of time, space and au thority charac te ris t ic of m odern adm inistrative power. It is only in the o th e r cases m en tioned , in the arm y and in aspects of religious organization , that we find anyth ing closely resem bling m o d ern adm inis tra tive pow er and, even there , relatively infrequently . I shall have m o re to say ab o u t th e military in a subsequen t section of this ch a p te r . So far as adm in is tra tive po w er in religious organizations goes, it m ight be po in ted o u t tha t this has often been m ost deve loped w hen those organizations have b een clearly d em arca te d from involvem ent in the rule of the state , as in m onasteries of various sorts .43

T h e expansion of surveillance in its tw o p rim ary senses is, w ithou t d o u b t , o f key im p o rtan ce to the fo rm a tion an d susta ined ex is tence of all types, o f n o n -m o d ern sta te . H ow ever , the c o n c e n t ra te d focusing of surveillance as ‘g o v e rn m en ta l’ p ow er is


largely, if n o t com plete ly , a p h en o m en o n of th e m o d ern state . As such, it is inheren tly involved in the capability of th e s ta te to c o o rd ina te its adm inistrative scope in a precise fashion with the bounds of a clearly delim ited territory . All s ta tes have a terr itoria l aspec t to th em but, p rio r to the advent of the nation-state , it is unusual for the adm inis tra tive pow er of th e s ta te ap p a ra tu s to coincide with defined territorial boundaries. In the era dom inated by the nation-state , how ever, this has b eco m e virtually universal.

Territoriality, State, Society

G eograph ica l au th o rs have d ev o ted a g rea t deal of a t ten t ion to discussing the boundar ies of s tates, a lthough such analyses have no t b ec o m e well know n in the l i teratures of an th ropo logy o r of sociology. Ratzel, acknow ledged as one of the founders of m odern geography, e lab o ra ted a theo ry of boundar ies which, in co m m o n with m uch of the sociological l i te ra ture of th e time, saw sta tes as ak in to bio logical o rgan ism s.44 A cco rd in g to h im , s ta tes are su rro u n d ed by ‘b o rd e r m arg ins’, consisting of th ree zones. T w o are the per iphera l a reas of adjoining states, and the o th e r is an ‘au tonom ous zo n e ’ merging the social and political characteris tics of the two states. R atze l’s w ork has m any in teresting features. He argues th a t the m argins of the terr ito ry of a s tate have to be regarded as just as im p o rtan t e lem ents of the s ta te as are its m ore cen tra l regions, the borders being an expression and m easu re of s ta te p ow er.45 B oundaries a re dynam ic aspects of a s ta te , with all v igorous s ta tes seeking to ex pand the ir spatial sp read , and declining ones co n trac t in g to physically easily defensib le land- con tours .

Besides having a m arked ly determ inis tic flavour, R atze l’s ideas a re , how ever, unsatisfac tory as a generalized theory . In d istinguishing the territoria lity of traditional s ta tes from nation-states, it is essential to see th a t the ‘f ro n tie rs ’ o f th e fo rm e r a re significantly d iffe ren t from th e ‘bo rd e rs ’ th a t exist be tw een the latter. In political geography the te rm ‘fro n tie r ’ is used in two senses. It m ean s e i ther a specific type of division betw een tw o or m ore states, o r a division be tw een settled and un inhab ited areas o f a single s ta te .46 T h e seco n d of these can be usefully fu r the r subdiv ided . ‘P r im ary s e t t lem en t fro n tie rs ’ a re th o se involved w here a s ta te is expand ing ou tw ards in to te rr ito ry previously

e ither having virtually no inhabitan ts , o r p o pu la ted by tribal com m unities . ‘Secondary se t t lem en t fron tie rs’ are those within the terr ito ry of a s ta te only sparsely inhabited for o n e reason or a n o th e r — usually because of the infertile n a tu re of the land or because of the general inhospitality of the terrain . In all cases, ‘f ron tie r’ refers to an a rea on the periphera l regions o f a s ta te (not necessarily adjoining ano ther state) in which the political authority o f th e cen tre is diffuse o r thinly sp read .47 A ‘b o rd e r ’, on the o th e r hand , is a know n and geographically draw n line separa ting and jo in ing two o r m ore states. W hile th e re m ay be, and often are, ‘m ixed’ social and political traits d isplayed by groups living in b o rd e r areas, those groups are distinguishably sub jec t to the adm inistrative dom in ion of o n e s ta te o r the o ther. B orders, in my view, a re only found with the em erg en ce of nation-states.

T h e physical env ironm en t has m anifestly been im p o rtan t in influencing w here the frontiers of trad it ional s tates have lain and w h ere the bo rde rs of nation-states have been draw n. Deserts , seas, m oun ta in chains, sw am p o r m arsh land , rivers and forests have all fo rm ed f ron tie rs in trad i t ional states. Such na tu ra l b o u n d ar ie s have o ften been p rim ary se t t lem en t fron tiers . H owever, ‘wildernesses’ have frequently been inhabited by warlike g roups w ho have , on occasion , swept ou tw ards to tak e over areas ad m in is te red by pre-existing states. S ta tes which have e i th e r o verrun na tu ra l boundar ies , o r have no t in the first p lace been enc losed by such boundar ie s , have som etim es set up artificial par tit ions of som e sort. T h e K afa K ingdom of E th iop ia was su rro u n d ed by fabrica ted barriers in those areas w here the re w ere no natura l frontiers. W hile the K afa frontier to the north was fo rm ed by a river, the rest o f the terr ito ry was enc irc led by b road , d ee p ditches , d e fen d ed by w ooden palisades. T h e only points o f en try w ere th rough gates, which w ere fortified with high ram parts and with several lines of en t re n ch m en t .48 Such artificial divides are relatively rare, b ecause they are expensive to install and difficult to m aintain; and this m an n e r of construc tion is only a feasible m o d e of defence in small societies. In larger im perial systems, the two m ost ren o w n ed exam ples of artificial boundary- m aking are , of course , the walls built by the R om ans , and the G re a t Wall of China. T h a n k s mainly to the w ork of L att im ore , we know a good deal ab o u t the la tter , and th ere a re a varie ty of



sources of in fo rm ation ab o u t the fo rm er.49 T h e walls built by the R om ans seem to have been put up wholly for defensive purposes— som e of the ‘barbarians ' took the h in t and built their own earth-w orks at a rem ove from the R o m an co n s tru c tio n s .50 T h e R om ans tended to trea t their walls as prim ary settlem ent frontiers, establishing farm ers in the adjoining areas , agri limitanei. But a lthough self-sufficient, th e ir m ain task was to p rov ide a pre lim inary line of d efence and co m m unica t ion . T h e G re a t Wall was apparen tly built to k ee p o u t foraging nom ads , bu t h ad the add it ional ro le of help ing to limit th e m obility of var ious peripheral g roups inside.

It w ould be a m istake to suppose , even w h ere the b oundar ie s of traditional states are physically clearly m arked by such installations (som ething which is in any case rare), th a t these are som eth ing akin to bo rd e rs in the m o d ern sense. In non-m odern states, w alled bo u n d ar ie s rem ain frontiers , well ou ts ide the regularized con tro l o f the cen tra l au thorit ies ; the larger the sta te , the m ore this is th e case. In n e i th e r R o m e n o r C h in a did th e walls co r re sp o n d to the limits o f ‘national sovereignty’ in the sense in which that term is applied today. R ather, they fo rm ed the o u te r extension of an ‘in -dep th ’ defensive system. M o d ern s tate borders may co inc ide with natura l defensive boundar ie s , bu t while this may be im p o rtan t to the fo r tunes of a s ta te in war, it is irrelevant to the ch a rac te r o f borders . B orders are no th ing o th e r th an lines draw n to d e m arca te states ' sovereignty. As such , it is irre levant to their n a tu re w ha t types of terra in (or sea) they pass over. As dem arca t io n s of sovereignty, they have to be agreed upon by each of th e sta tes whose bo rd e rs they are . In a few trad it ional s ta tes, such as the K afa and their neighbours , th e re have been som e m utua l ag reem en ts ab o u t w here bo u n d ar ie s lie; bu t these have been unusual ra th e r than the n o rm , have applied in small s ta tes ra th e r than large ones , and have no th ing of the precision with which bo rde rs are d raw n today.

T rad it iona l sta tes, especially the larger ones , co n ta in ed many secondary se t t lem en t frontiers . If these w ere norm ally in areas offering physical l im ita tions to s tab le h ab i ta t io n , th e re are n u m ero u s k n o w n instances w here se t t lem en ts w ere deliberately installed in o rd e r to a l te r th e socio-political m ake-up of a pa r ticu la r milieu. In co n q u es t em pires it was generally th e case


tha t indigenous popu la tions w ould be left to carry on their p re existing pa t te rns of co n d u c t — even their established adm in is tra tive system being left largely u n to u ch ed — so long as they paid their taxes o r delivered the necessary tr ibu te . But qu ite o ften the newly arrived co n q u e ro rs m ad e system atic a t tem pts to d isplace som e segm ents of the popu la t ion and settle the areas with o th e rs .51

City-states have ev e ry w h ere been bo th te rr ito r ia lly and cu ltura lly the m ost in terna lly h o m o g en eo u s of class-divided societies — simply a result o f the ir very limited size. Larger societies have almost always been internally strongly d ifferentiated regionally, the regional d iffe ren tia tions being cu ltu ra l ones as well. T h e cultura l he terogen ity of regional com m unities exists in addition to the cultural d is tance at which dom inan t classes stand from the mass of the popu la tion .52 Writing of the O ttom an Em pire, G ib b and Bow en co m m en t upon ‘the p a rad o x ’ of

a g o v ern m en t, generally a p a th e tic , unp rog ressive , an d ca re le ss o f th e w elfare o f its sub jects, an d o ften a rb itra ry an d v io len t in its dea lings w ith them , an d a soc ie ty up o n w hose in s titu tio n s an d activ ities such a go v ern m en t had little o r no effect. T h e exp lanation is to be fo u n d in th e very lack o f a com plex , a ll-em brac ing po litica l o rg an isa tio n . . . W e m ay visualise M oslem soc ie ty as co m p o sed of tw o co-ex isting g roups, th e re la tio n s b e tw e en w hich w ere fo r the m ost p a r t fo rm a l an d superfic ia l. O n e g ro u p fo rm ed th e govern ing class o f so ld iers an d officials, th e o th e r th e g o v ern ed class of m erch an ts , a r tisan s an d cu ltiv a to rs . E ach w as o rg an ised in te rn a lly on in d e p e n d e n t lines, an d n e i th e r g ro u p in te r fe re d w ith th e o rg an isa tio n of th e o th e r in n o rm al c irc u m sta n ce s .53

Let me sum m arize the discussion up to this point. T rad it iona l states d ep en d upon the genera ting of au thorita tive and allocative resources , m ad e possible by the in tersec ting re la tions betw een city and countryside. T h e deve lopm ent of surveillance capabilities is the basis o f the adm inis tra tive pow er c rea ted by sta tes as o rgan iza tions . T rad it io n a l s ta tes a re , how ever, fu n d am en ta l ly segm ental in ch a rac te r , with only limited susta ined adm inistrative au tho ri ty of the s ta te ap p a ra tu s . T h e fact th a t such states have frontiers , including secondary se t t lem en t frontiers , ra th e r than boundar ies is indicative of the ir relatively w eak level o f system in tegration . It is essential to em phasize how different, as ‘social


system s’, trad it ional s ta tes a re from m odern ones. B ecause of their in terna l he te rogene ity , a case can be m ad e fo r regard ing larger traditional s tates as ‘co m p o sed of n u m ero u s societies’.54 H ow ever, I think it reasonab le to con tinue to use the term ‘society’ in a generic way, with the proviso that the administratively unified m odern state be unders tood as highly exceptional, no t the type-case against which o th e rs should be m easured .

Military Power in Traditional States

W h e th e r o r no t m ost non-m odern states have their origins in w a r ,55 no o n e can d o u b t th a t w arfare has b ee n a lead ing p reo ccu p a tio n of d o m in an t classes everyw here. This , o f course , was the very founda tion of the con tras ts be tw een ‘military’ and ‘industria l’ societies fas tened upon by n ine teen th -cen tu ry social th inkers. S om e have ques t ioned w h e th e r w arfare is found at all in som e, o r even m ost, tribal cultures. It has b een said (by M arvin Harris) that ‘any an th ropo log is t can recite the nam es of a handful o f “prim itive’’ peoples w ho are rep o r ted n eve r to wage w ar.’56 H ow ever, it is not c lea r if a single o n e of these exam ples can be regarded as reliably au th en tica ted . Som e seem to re fer to cases of re fugees w ho, precisely as a result of warlike conflic t with their n e ighbours , have b een driven in to re m o te a reas o r b ec o m e dem oralized by com ing off the worse in the encounters . ‘Primitive w ar’ is undeniab ly d iffe ren t in ce rta in m ain respects from the w ars c o n d u c te d by m o re o rgan ized politica l com m unitie s . Sometimes, a lthough by no m eans universally, it is m ore ritualized and res tra ined than w arfare in o th e r con tex ts .57 But the bulk of bo th the archaeo log ical and an th ropo log ica l ev idence leads to the conclusion tha t war, i.e. a rm ed co m b a t be tw een g roups in which physical v iolence is used by o r on behalf of o n e com m unity against an o th e r , is p ro m in en t in all types of hum an socie ty .58 ‘Primitive w ar’ tends to involve little specia lization, how ever, ap a r t from a g en d e r division of labour. All able-bodied and y o u n g er m en (very occas ionally , w om en) a re w arrio rs , the ir w eaponry o ften being exactly the sam e as tha t used for the hunting of gam e. In class-divided societies, by co n tra s t , th e re is always a distinct ‘military’ agency — although su p p lem en ted in various ways fo r th e ac tu a l en g ag em en t of w ar — an d a dev e lo p m en t bo th of adm inis tra tive pow er and w eaponry.


In a c co u n ts of social ch an g e linked to , o r in f luenced by, historical materia lism , it is o ften suggested tha t technologica l innovations bring ab o u t the transfo rm ation of societies th rough their d irec t effects on p roduc tion . A m ore accu ra te em phasis w ould be upon the applica tion of technologica l d ev e lo p m en t to w eaponry . As M cNeill po in ts o u t , in a ce r ta in sense the ‘industrialization of w ar’ is as old as civilization: the deve lopm en t of b ronze m etallurgy m ade possible the w eapons and the a rm o u r that is as charac te ris t ic of class-divided societies as are writing or organized religion.59 How ever, as he then also goes on to stress, the parallel with m odern industrialization is only a limited one. T h e re was no p e rm an en t co-ord ination of the m eans of waging w ar with technological d ev e lopm en t, as there is in the m odern world. T h e re was no ‘w eapons p ro d u c tio n industry '. A rm s and a rm o u r were usually co n s tru c ted only slowly, with e labora te a tten t ion to detail. O nce m ade , they lasted for lengthy periods of time, and a rm o u rers always rem a ined few co m p ared to warriors— the latter , in non-nom adic com m unities , generally also being only a tiny m inority of the population .

W arfa re is such a p revalen t fea tu re of traditional s ta tes of all types tha t it is easy to assum e that all such societies display equivalent militaristic traits. Certainly th e re are m any exam ples of the m o re o r less con tinuous waging of war over very long periods. During the whole tim e of existence of the R om an Empire, the T em p le of Janus, o p en e d only during war, is rep u ted to have been closed just for tw o very short intervals of u n d er a year each . V. G o rd o n Childe, speaking of the early civilizations of the N ear East , rem arks tha t ‘qu ite certain ly Orienta l m onarch ies were c rea ted by war, m ain ta ined by continual war, and eventually des troyed by w ar.’60 In th e city-state study q u o ted earlier, it is w ritten that ‘in ters ta te w arfare be tw een city-states was so norm al tha t it can be defined as a na tu ra l a t t r ib u te .’61 Discussing India, W e b e r observes that it ‘rem a in ed inconceivable to secu la r and religious H indu l i te ra tu re ’ th a t a m o n arc h ‘should ever fail to consider the subjugation of his ne ighbours by force o r f rau d .’62 H ow ever it is n o t easy to define w hat ‘a condition of w ar’ is, since m anifestly it is no t possible to engage in d irec t a rm ed co m b a t continuously , even w hen ‘o p en hostilities’ exist be tw een states. M oreover , th e re is no paucity of exam ples of relatively peacefu l


periods in the history of non-m odern states, a l though it is true tha t these were usually cha rac te r is t ic of s ta tes rem oved for one reason o r an o th e r from neighbours of a th rea ten in g kind. T h u s anc ien t Egypt was not engaged in m ajor wars during ex tended phases of its history, a l though u n d e r the reign of T hu t-m ose the T h ird th e re began a per iod of in tense military expansionism .“

W hile it is t rue tha t very m any class-divided societies have been pervaded by militaristic values, a t least am ong their ruling groups, the re are wide d iffe rences in this respec t, and it would not do to underp lay them . T h e Assyrians are tow ards o n e ex trem e. Som e of the main aspects of adm inis tra tive pow er found in the military for som e th ree millenia a f te rw ards were first es tablished in the Assyrian armies. Assyria had a large s tanding army, with c lear and o rd e red divisions of au tho ri ty and p rom otion . It has been said of Assyria th a t ‘the s ta te was a g rea t military m ach ine ', in which ‘th e arm y co m m an d e rs w ere a t on ce the richest and most powerful class in the coun try ,’ and that ‘the military establishm ent itself rep resen ted the last w ord in p rep ared n ess .’64 T h e Assyrians also p io n ee red a range of new and in tim idating m ilitary eq u ip m en t, including iron long swords, heavy bows and lances, w heeled fortresses and siege devices. H ow ever, the Assyrian em pire at its peak lasted no m ore than a cen tu ry , and w hen it fell its collapse was sudden and co m p le te .65 Alm ost certain ly no such a d evo ted ly militaristic socie ty cou ld ach ieve the long-term stability found in som e of the o th e r ‘world civilizations’.

In som e cases, m ost particularly C hina at ce rta in periods of its history, s ta tes have m oved away considerab ly from militarism. D uring the T ’ang period , C h ina was relatively secure from serious th rea t of ex ternal a t tack , an d civilian con tro l p rospered . T h e em p e ro r re ta in ed u ltim ate military con tro l in principle bu t there was, nonethe less , a c lea r d iffe ren tia tion be tw een the military and civil au thority . T h e arm y was small, certa in ly relative to the overall size of the society, and military v irtues w ere acco rd ed ra th e r low status. T h e re are few co m p arab le exam ples of n o n m o d ern states, indeed , w h ere the military w ere looked upon with such condescension by o thers in the ruling circles. T h ey ranked b o t to m in th e five ca tegories in to which the social o rd e r was ca tegorized , a long with bandits , thieves and beggars. T h e scholar- gentry g ro u p was at the top , followed by farm ers, artisans and

m erchants. Military leaders were no t usually given political office, an d tro o p s an d the ir c o m m a n d e rs w ere ro ta te d in o rd e r to d iminish their solidarity.66

C hina is o n e of the very limited n u m b er of large traditional sta tes w here the role of the arm y was as m uch c o n c e rn e d with in ternal policing as it was with repelling invaders o r expanding the terra in of the state. But in China, as elsew here , the claim to m onopoly of con tro l of the m eans of v io lence o n the p ar t o f the s ta te ap p a ra tu s was never m o re than partially successful. Only in city-states cou ld this be said to be the case and these, as has been m en tio n ed , could no t m anage to en large the terr itorial scope of their p ow er w ithou t losing the charac te ris t ic s that def ined them . In all larger class-divided societies, the success of the s ta te in claiming m onopoly of the m ean s of v io lence was limited by two factors: the m an n e r in which the military was o rganized , an d the relative slowness of transport and com m unication.67 T h e difficulties o f m ain ta in ing large standing armies over lengthy periods were m o re o r less in trac tab le for the rulers of traditional states. All non -m o d ern states have assem bled an inner co re of tra ined , regular soldiery, bu t w ere fo rced to supp lem ent this in nu m ero u s d iffe ren t ways to put dow n rebellions and co n d u c t foreign wars. Levies, the raising of slave armies, the gathering of b o n d ed serfs and , especially, the rec ru i tm en t of m ercenar ies have been som e of the m eans used to such ends. In m ost o f these cases, including m ercen ary arm ies, p aym en t was in kind ra th e r than in the form of m o n e ta ry co m pensa t ion an d was usually provided th rough booty ga ined during the course of w ha tever conflict was being fought ou t. Soldiers (the te rm m ean s literally ‘h ired m a n ’) rec ru i ted in these various ways norm ally w ere self-equipped, and w ere loyal to their own leaders ra th e r than to the ru ler w ho conscrip ted them . G iven tha t cen tra lized military pow er played a large ro le in the system in tegra tion of traditional s tates, the rulers of such s tates were chronically caugh t in a d ilem m a. Building up the a rm ed forces m ean t ga ther ing to g e th e r recru its and p reparing th em for m ilitary du ties. S ince it was im possib le in m ost c ircum stances for such recru its to be welded into a ‘bu reau c ra t ic a rm y ’,68 the military p rep ara tio n of such soldiery cou ld easily re b o u n d upon those who h ad instigated it, by c rea ting potentially in d ep en d en t , rival sources o f p o w er within the state. O n the o th e r han d , w ithou t the capability of swelling w hatever regu la r soldiery



m ight exist, the s ta te m ight e i ther succum b to external a t tack , o r face the in ternal decay of its rule.

In larger trad it ional states, there fo re , it is alm ost always the case tha t significant e lem ents o f ac tual o r po ten tia l military pow er exist ou ts ide the con tro l o f the cen tra l s ta te appara tus . Such s tates typically show a fluctua ting tension be tw een centra lized contro l of the m eans of violence and decentralized military pow er w ielded by local w arlords o r various sorts of insurrectionary leaders. But the re are also o th e r ways in which m onopoly of the m eans of v io lence e ludes the state . A rm ed tribal groups, bands of nom ad ic warriors , robbers , b rigands and p ira tes often flourish in a reas rem o te from the purview of urban adm inis tra tion and , not in frequently , even in its im m ed ia te vicinity.69 In so far as these groups are effectively con tro l led at all, this has to be do n e locally, since the time needed for transport and com m unica tion precludes the d ep lo y m en t of cen tra lized forces, save w hen th rea ten ed by major challenges to state power. T h e m ore localized arm ed forces a re en co u rag ed in o rd e r to con tro l b rigandage, how ever, the m ore the centrifugal tendency tow ards quasi- independent military fiefdoms m ay be fu r the r p ro m o ted .

It is m isleading to desc ribe the forms of rule typically found in no n -m o d ern s ta tes as ‘g o v e rn m e n t’, if ‘g o v e rn m e n t ’ m ean s a co n ce rn of th e state with th e regularized adm inis tra tion of the overall terr ito ry c la im ed as its own. Traditional states did not ‘govern' in this sense.* T h e i r ‘polities’ were mainly limited to the g o v ernance of conflic ts within the d o m in an t classes, and within the m ain u rb an centres . As John K autsky says, ‘politics’ exist ‘principally n o t betw een classes bu t within classes. T h e aristocracy (and those a t ta c h ed to it in the towns, like servants and low-level

* Some specific comments should be made here about the city-states of Classical Greece. In most evolutionary interpretations of modernity, the Greek city-states are portrayed as

being ‘early stages’ in the development of modern government, since notions of

republicanism, democracy and citizenship appeared first of all there. But this type of

viewpoint is very misleading. The ‘Classical inheritance’ was undeniably highly important

in the subsequent emergence of modernity, as filtered through the influence of Rome and as appropriated in post-Renaissance thought. However no other cases exist among the

many documented histories of traditional states in which such ideas are developed in a comparable fashion. Greece is specifically untypical of traditional states, not a ‘stage’ in

the progressive creation of modernity. Classical republicanism, Greek or Roman, was not an early anticipation of the ‘impersonal sovereign power’ found in the theory and practice

of the modern state established in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.


bureaucra ts ) and each village and to som e ex ten t also town organisa tions like guilds are sepa ra te com m unities o r societies and h en ce consti tu te sepa ra te political arenas . ' M ilitary force , o r the th rea t o f its use, was norm ally a highly im p o rtan t basis of the trad it ional s ta te because th e s tate lacked the m eans to ‘directly adm in is tra te ’ the regions subject to its dom inion.

If it is a considerab le oversim plification, it is no t too far from th e t ru th to say tha t in larger non -m odern states the m ain overall link connec ting the s tate with the m ass of its subjects , i.e. the peasantry , was its requ irem en t for taxation. ‘T o rule in aristocratic em pires is, above all, to tax .’70 M any taxation systems in traditional s ta tes seem to have deve loped in a fairly im m edia te way from the tak ing of booty . T hus , for exam ple , while the M ongols rem ained no m ad ic warriors , they su p p o r ted them selves from the wholesale p lu n d e r of the areas th ro u g h which they passed. W hen they b ecam e the rulers of a terr itoria lly fixed em pire , they regularized an d legalized the p rac t ices prev iously ca rr ied o u t in m ore h ap h aza rd fashion. No d o u b t they provided ce rta in econom ic services which helped som e sec tors of the peasantry — improving th e yield of farm -land, for exam ple , by provid ing fertilizers, th rough irrigation im provem en ts and building up long-distance trade . But th e capability to back up taxation d em an d s th rough the use of fo rce rem a ined the single m ost essential e lem en t of s ta te p o w er.71 Of course , levels of taxation have varied widely be tw een differen t states, reg ions and periods; p rebenda l officials in local a reas w ere often m o re ex to rt iona te than those in the h igher re ach es of the s ta te appara tus . T h e case of imperial R om e seems fairly rep resen ta tive in this respect. In the co re areas in Italy, taxes w ere relatively low, and largely ind irec t, bu t in the E m pire they w ere crushing, in large p ar t because of the inability o f the cen tra l s ta te ap p a ra tu s to con tro l the activities of military adm in is tra to rs far from R om e. ‘F rom the beginning’, a cco rd ing to o n e au thority , ‘the pu rpose and utility of em pire m aking had been financial, to acqu ire lands to p lu n d e r and then to tax .’72

I have m en tio n ed previously tha t in the anc ien t N ear-Eastern civilizations codified laws w ere only rarely sanc tioned d irectly by th e cen tra l s ta te appara tus . This is, in fact, very generally t ru e of class-divided societies as a w hole, including m ost city-states as well as larger imperial form ations. Laws m ay in principle re fe r to all subjects of the state — with th e exception of the ru ler , and


som etim es his re t in u e73 — bu t the ir en fo rcem en t d ep en d s upon agencies th a t the law-makers rarely directly co m m an d . T h u s it was aptly rem a rk ed of Tsarist Russia tha t ‘T h e re are thousands of laws . . . bu t there is no law.’74 C h ina of the T a n g per iod has o ften been taken as the m odel case of a trad it ional society in which a legal o rd e r institu ted on the h igher levels was ab le successfully to regula te the co n d u c t of the m ass of the popu la tion . But this is a doub le m isconcep tion . In co n tra s t to the R o m an Em pire , which was no tab le for having a clearly codified system of formal law, the C onfucian scr ip tu res w ere in te rp re ted to ind icate tha t the au thority of the s tate should rest upon m oral ra th e r than legal p recep ts .75 T h e e m p ero r was held to supply an exam ple tha t all o the rs should follow. S ta te officials, as a result of their classical ed u ca tio n , w ere supposed to intuitively recognize the ethical principles they should pu rsue in dealing with infractions tha t cam e to their notice; they w ere no t expected to ad h e re to formal categories, bu t to find the best so lu tions from case to case .76 But also th e p re cep ts o f th e cen tra l au th o r i t ie s had little d irec t influence upon social re la tions in local com m unities .

In class-divided societies, ‘dev iance’ exists and can be controlled by the state in a significant way only am ong its own personnel and those in regular adm inis tra tive con tac t with them . It is no t really re levan t w ha t the rest o f the popu lation d o in their day-to-day lives, so long as they do no t rebel and are co m p lian t in respec t of the paym ent of taxes (w he ther taxes be levelled in m oney , in kind, o r as corvee labour). T h e persistence of custom and tradition in village com m unities , even if strongly d ivergent from the beliefs and p rac tices of those in ruling circles, usually solidifies s tate pow er ra th e r than tend ing in any way to un d e rm in e it. In C h ina, as e lsew here , the villages and sm aller towns w ere effectively self- govern ing — a point M arx m akes in his ce leb ra ted discussion of the ‘orien ta l c o m m u n es ’,77 bu t which W eb er e labo ra tes at m uch g rea te r length in his studies of China. A lthough in som e respects the findings of m ore recen t Sinology do not acco rd with W e b e r’s in te rp re ta t io n of t rad i t io n a l C h ina , this is no t o n e of them . W hereas, W eb er points ou t, the city was the seat of the m andarin , and no t a self-governing entity , the village was the reverse in each of these respects . Village d isputes w ere se ttled e i ther by the clan groups o r by th e local tem ple , w ith the p eop le actively avoiding the s ta te cou r ts and the s ta te ra re ly in tervening. T h e tem ple ‘took


care of the roads, canals , d e fence , safety ', w hereas the s tate ‘ignored the village as a unit, pure ly fiscal in terests repea ted ly com ing to the fo re ' .78

T his should not be taken to imply tha t day-to-day life for the p o p u lace of trad i t ional s ta tes was charac te r is t ica l ly o n e of gemeinschaftlich security. On the co n tra ry , a lthough this has no d o u b t varied widely, daily life was very often a m uch m ore ten u o u s , an d potentially v iolent, affair in non-m odern sta tes than it is for m ost o f the popu la t ion in the W este rn coun tr ie s today. T h e peasan t subjects of trad it ional s tates have frequen tly lived in cond itions of grinding poverty , w ha tever ‘surp lus’ they p ro d u c e being ap p ro p r ia ted by tax-gathering officials; they have suffered fam ines, ch ron ic disease and plagues. T h ey have also been open to a t tack by bandits and a rm ed m arauders ; and the level o f casual vio lence in day-to-day life seem s to have been high. T h u s w hat Le G o ff and S u the rland have d esc r ib ed for p re -m o d ern F ran ce probably applies very widely to the rural com m unities in class- divided societies. In most of rural F ran ce there was ch ro n ic gang vio lence and feuds of various sorts. T h e s tate au thorit ies did not par ticularly co n cern them selves with a t tem pting to restrain such activities. T h e au th o rs ’ conclusion fits closely with ev idence from elsew here. So long as these happen ings did no t h am p e r ‘the collection of taxes and general o rd e r , the state p re fe rred not to in te rfe re ’. T h e old regim e, they co n tin u e , ‘governed largely by no t governing; it allowed rural com m unities to settle the bulk of their own affairs’.79

3The Traditional State: Bureaucracy, Class, Ideology

Bureaucracy and Class Domination

By defin ition , a ‘s ta te ’ p resum es an adm inistrative ap p a ra tu s , a h ie ra rch y o f officials w ho specia lize in adm in is tra t ive tasks (including the arts o f war). Patrim onia l adm inis tra tion is found w here a m onarch heads what is essentially a greatly expanded ‘h o u seh o ld ’. T h e p rince su rrounds himself with a ‘m yriad of cupbearers , fauners, spittoon bearers, hairdressers and manicurists, d o o rm en , cooks , m iscellaneous en ter ta iners , and many flunkies w ho p erh ap s do little but s tan d a ro u n d d ec o ra t iv e ly ' .1 T h e descrip tion is a florid o ne , and while it conveys the flavour of the sum ptuous cour ts that rulers have o ften enough relished, it does not indicate the range of less visible and m ore sober administrative labours linked to the househo ld dom ain . W hile all officials are nom inally d ep e n d en t upon the personal whims of the ruler , they o ften m anage to carve out distinct spheres of influence of their own. T h e inner co u r t is o ften in p rac t ice fairly sep a ra te — bo th in te rm s of its re c ru i tm en t and its style of life — from the officials w hose w ork is the necessary basis o f its p e rpe tua t ion . T h e Ming em p e ro r w ho dissolved the office of p rim e m inister found himself deluged with d o cu m en ta t io n ; in the course of a w eek , 1,160 papers co n ce rn ed with 3,291 d ifferent issues w ere p roffered for his personal a t ten t io n .2

Patrim onial office differs from bureaucratic office, am ong o th e r ways, in so far as th e re is no d iffe ren tia tion betw een w hat is ‘voca tiona l’ and w hat is ‘p r iv a te ’. Political pow er is regarded as the personal d isposition of the ru ler , and anyone w ho partic ipa tes in tha t p ow er does so as a personal right ra th e r th an as the


‘in cu m b en t o f an office’. C en tra lized bu reau c ra t ic em pires always re ta in strongly pa tr im on ia l e lem en ts and in various qu ite fu n d am en ta l respects it is an e r ro r to t rea t m odern organizations as ex tend ing traits a lready found in such ‘b u reau c rac ie s ’. W hat W e b e r labels generically the ‘bene fice’ exists in d iffe ren t forms in all non-m odern organizations (although it does no t entirely d isappear in m o d ern societies). A benefice is a ‘right to off ice’. W e b e r distinguishes th ree types .1 T h e first is a benefice in kind, involving an allow ance of goods o r p roduc ts from the ruler. A seco n d is the fee benefice , w hereby ce rta in paym ents are m ad e to an official for the en a c tm en t of a specific range of tasks. This is n o t similar to the salary a m o d ern office-holder receives; it is a ‘living’ which, once having been assigned to a particu lar individual, can o ften be inherited by th a t p e rso n ’s descendan ts . Finally, and easily of g reatest im portance , are landed benefices, in which areas of land, including the right to exploit the ir resources , are m ad e the basis of the official’s livelihood. Landed benefices, in o th e r words, norm ally ca rry with them p rebenda l rights. T h e p ro c u rem en t of landed benefices can have the effect of giving officials a good deal o f au to n o m y from the ruler , because they can b eco m e a m eans of tying the locally adm in is te red popu lation directly to those officials ra the r than to the m ore rem ote overlord.

T h e p re -em inence of the landed benefice and accom pany ing prebendal prerogatives in the state adm inistration of class-divided societies is im portan t because they are directly re levant to the n a tu re of class dom ination in those societies. Som e have seen the state administrative apparatus , at least in centralized bureaucra tic em pires, as itself a class. T h u s W ittfogel asserts tha t we m ust question established concep ts of class, which ‘em erged in a society |i .e. m o d ern capitalism | tha t was decisively shaped by conditions of p rope rty . . . in fact in m o d ern societies as well as trad it ional ones s tate pow er is the main d e te rm in an t of class s t ru c tu re .’ C erta in ly in cen tra l ized b u re a u c ra t ic em pires , acco rd in g to Wittfogel, those w ho run the ap p a ra tu s of the s ta te are a ruling class, the rem a inder of the popu lation being subject to their despo tic d o m in an ce .4 A som ew ha t con tra ry view, advanced by o th e r writers, holds tha t the co n cep t of ‘class’ has no effective applica tion at all p rior to th e m o d ern world. Class fo rm ation , acco rd ing to this s tandpo in t , d epends upon the em erg en ce of capital and labour m arke ts in a full-blown fash ion .5 In be tw een ,

Bureaucracy, Class, Ideology 63

as it w ere, is the o r thodox Marxist co n cep tio n , in which class dom ination in feudalism is t raced to con tro l of the m eans of production, while o ther non-m odern states share the characteristics of the ‘Asiatic m ode of p ro d u c t io n ’, su spended at an early stage of evolution and never becom ing a class-based social order.

N one of these views is accep tab le , and in exploring why this is the case, I shall p rep a re the way for la ter discussion in this book by offering a categoriza tion of the d iffe rences be tw een ‘class- divided society’, on the one hand and the ‘class society’ of m odern capitalism, on the o ther . T h e p rebenda l form of the a llocation of offices in traditional s ta tes charac teristically ties s tate adm in is tra tion to the privileges of a r is tocracy o r gentry. T h a t is to say, th e re a re few if any exam ples of n o n -m odern sta tes in which m em bersh ip of a distinct ‘d o m in an t class’ is not locked in to the adm inistrative ap p a ra tu s of s tate power. In C hina, unusually , th e re w ere w ritten exam inations, which applican ts for official positions had to undergo . H ow ever, p re p a ra t io n fo r the exam inations requ ired m any years of s tudy and was, there fo re , only o pen to the few, even am ong the literate. T h o se w ho gained en try were subject to period ic reappraisa l by the higher echelons, and in p rac tice patr im onial favour was vital in securing p rebendal assets of any c o n se q u en ce .6 T h e adm inistrative ap p a ra tu s was run by w ealth ier m em bers of the land-owning class in probab ly a m o re restr ic tive and closed fashion than in m ost o th e r forms of trad it ional s ta te . H ow ever, to say tha t in class-divided societies the state ap p a ra tu s was for the most part staffed at its top levels by the m em bers of land-owning classes is no t to identify s tate pow er and class fo rm ation . Class form ation is not d e te rm in ed by s ta te pow er, as Wittfogel claims. But ne ither is the pow er of the s tate an expression of class d om ina tion , as Marxist theo ry would have it. T h e privileges of a r is to c ra t ic /g en try classes d ep en d upon their control of landed estates; the prebendal form of such control links their class position (in differing ways in varying types) with patr im onial fea tu res of the state.

T h ese points can be exp an d ed and clarified by m eans of table 2, which diffe ren tia tes two types of class system.

In class-divided societies it m akes sense to talk of the existence of a ‘d o m in a n t’ o r ‘ru ling’ class, bu t this te rm has to be hedged with qualif ica tions. T h e d o m in an t class has a g rea t dea l of in fluence over the ap p a ra tu s of s tate , which it staffs. T h e s tate in


tu rn , par ticularly in the figure of its ru ler , has wide-ranging, often ‘d esp o tic ’ pow er over the fate of the popu lace . But the state ca n n o t ‘g o v ern ’ an array of activities in the day-to-day life of its subjects in the sam e fashion as m o d ern states can and do. In capitalist societies, by co n tra s t , the d o m in an t class (the ow ners of large cap ita l, in w h a tev e r form th a t be held) has access to ‘g o v e rn m e n t’. But such access, for reasons to be analysed later, is m ore ind irec t than that ordinarily em ployed by the land-owning ar is tocracy o r gentry in class-divided societies, w ho rule in a d irec t way. As I em ploy it here , there fo re , ‘govern ing class' is u n d e rs to o d in a ra th e r h e te ro d o x fashion.

I use ‘class-divided’ to ch a rac te r ize trad it ional s tates since, a l though there are massive divisions of wealth and privilege betw een the dom inan t class and the m ajority of the popu la tion , class conflict is no t a m ajo r axis of g roup form ation and not a source of the m ajor t ransfo rm ative influences shaping social change. T o say this m ay seem ques t ionab le at first sight, for even m any of the m ost t ren c h an t critics of historical m ateria lism have ac cep ted tha t there is som e validity to M arx 's d ic tum tha t ‘the history of all h i therto existing society is the history of class s truggles.’7 But, ra the r than the p revalence of class conflic t — tha t is, active class struggle — in class-divided societies, it is its re la tive ab sen ce tha t is s triking. In a ce r ta in sense M arx acknow ledged this in his ch a rac te r iza t io n of the ‘Asiatic m o d e of p ro d u c tio n ' as a non-class society. But, ra th e r than drawing the


conclusion th a t lack of class conflic t is a generic fea tu re of societies o th e r than m odern capita lism , he ten d ed to t rea t the East as a d iscrepan t case, co n cen tra t in g his a t ten t ion on the ‘main line’ of deve lopm en t in E u ro p e from the G raeco -R o m an W orld to feudalism .8

It is no t difficult to explain why class conflict is relatively ra re in class-divided societies (feudalism is no different in this respect). T h e agrarian com m unities tha t form the basis o f the p roduc tion system are in substantial degree au to n o m o u s in their day-to-day o pera t ion , not only from the s ta te but from each o ther . Cities som etim es p rovide a renas for class struggles b u t these are e ither betw een segm ents of the ruling class o r betw een the rulers and the u rban poor. T h e sheer physical, social and cultura l d istance betw een d o m in an t and su bord ina te classes ensures that they rarely m ee t in o p en , collective struggle of any sort. E xcept in very unusual c ircum stances , peasant labour is no t co n d u c ted under the direct surveillance of m em bers of the dom inant class. Peasants canno t th rea ten to ‘w ithdraw their labour’, no t just because they lack the organizational m eans to d o so, but because they could n o t then survive, s ince they p ro d u c e th e ir own m eans of subsistence. In the tw entie th cen tu ry , peasant m ovem en ts have been in the vanguard of social revolutions, the reby disposing of the idea that peasan ts are always and everyw here ‘conserva tive’. But we certainly canno t generalize back from m odern revolutions to peasan t rebellions in class-divided societies. Eric W olf rem arks that ‘the historical re co rd is rep le te with peasant rebellions."' We should recogn ize , how ever, th a t their similarity to m odern revolu tionary m ovem en ts is rem ote . It m ust certain ly also be rem em b ered tha t ‘the historical re co rd ’ covers m any cen tu ries and m ost of the g lobe, in respec t o f the existence of class-divided societies; th a t it is easy to find historical instances does not necessarily m ean anything m ore than that they sporadically occur.

M ost studies of peasan t rebellions cover per iods s ince the early phase of consolidation of com m ercia l capitalism in the W est and elsewhere. Substantive research into the n a tu re and origins of earlier peasan t uprisings is relatively difficult to f ind .10 O ne such analysis, how ever, is that by E b e rh a rd , w ho has p ro d u ced a com prehensive inventory of rebellions o ccu rr ing in N orthern C hina u n d e r on e of the W ei dynas ties .11 He does, in fact, find that there w ere a considerab le n u m b e r of peasan t uprisings in the a rea


— som e 120 betw een 397 and 547 A D. As E b e rh a rd says, this helps confu te the idea of traditional C hina as a peacefu l and unified state. T h e oppressive ch a rac te r o f the fiscal d em an d s w hich the s ta te requ ired of the peasan try probab ly m o re often m ad e for a sm ouldering re sen tm en t ra th e r than the resigned accep tance of providence that supposedly is the natura l condition of the peasant. But the rebellions d o cu m en te d by E b erh a rd were nearly all transitory , localized uprisings. T h ey had little o r no im pact on the pre-existing o rd e r of things, and seem to have been mainly a sub-category of the general pa t te rns of local v iolence found in m any con tex ts in non-m odern states. T h o se that did develop in a m ore chron ic way m erged with the banditry generally p revalen t in the m ore outlying areas of China, som etim es in this guise eventually p ro duc ing armies em bark ing upon qu ite m ajor c o n q u e s ts .12 H owever, w here this hap p en ed the gang leaders b ecam e w arlords, adop ting the sam e m odes of co n d u c t as the local offic ialdom they m anaged to displace.

T h e main d ivergence betw een such p h en o m en a and those charac te ris t ic of m odern capitalism is no t to be found in the d is t inc tion be tw een no n -m o d ern ‘rebell ions ' and m odern iz ing ‘revolutions ', im portan t enough though that is. It lies in the ‘s tructura l s ignificance’ of class conflict in capitalism , lacking in class-divided society. Put briefly, class conflicts in m odern capitalism ten d to c luster at two ‘sites’, o r types of locale. O ne is the w ork-place. In capitalist societies, unlike in trad it ional states, the work-force is generally subject to d irec t surveillance, by em ployers o r ‘m a n ag e m en t’. T h e imposition of discipline in the p lace of w ork , in con junc tion with the asym m etrical rights which capital-ownership confers, m ake for chron ic struggles in the w orkplace. ‘Industrial conflict' is thus a prime and more-or-less chronic featu re of capitalist en terprise . Since, however, con tro l of capital is the underly ing basis of au thority wielded in the p lace of work, there is a rela tion betw een w ork-place struggles and b ro ad e r patterns of political conflict. Class division, in short, is a significant vehicle o f political organization in a society in which the ‘political sphere ' is universalized, no t the res tr ic ted p rerogative of the dom inan t class that it is in traditional s ta tes .13

This is an ap p rop ria te po int a t which to m ove on to consider th e ques t ion of the co n n e c t io n s of the ‘po li tica l’ an d the ‘ec o n o m ic ’. In M arxist though t , and som e o th e r types of class


theory , it is co m m o n to speak of the ‘separation of the political and the ec o n o m ic ’ as o n e of the chief distinguishing features of capitalism , co n tra s ted to o th e r types of society. T h is is an issue which goes hack to the p rob lem of ‘civil socie ty’. W ith the advent o f capitalism , the s ta te supposedly becom es distinct from civil society, although in Marxist th ough t civil society rem ains its true progenitor. Now there is som eth ing awry here , and this is o n e of the reasons why I do not use the co n cep t of civil society in this book. For, in class-divided societies, econom ic activity is normally m uch m ore clearly sepa ra ted from the political a ren a than is the case in the m odern social order. T h a t is to say, even in centralized bu reau cra t ic em pires the s ta te ‘in tervenes’ only in a rem o te way in econom ic life, the bulk of the peasantry carrying on their labour independently o f w hatever happens in the political c e n tre .14 With the deve lopm en t of m o d ern capitalism , and its a t tendan t political form, the nation-state, the political and econom ic becom e m ore closely m eshed than ever before.

How should we seek to resolve this issue, which superficially looks to be som eth ing of a paradox? T h e answ er d epends upon specifying w hat form the ‘political’ and the ‘e c o n o m ic ’ take in the two types of society , and how these d iffe ren tiations re la te to the s tructural principles upon which those types o f society are based .15 In non-m odern societies, as Polanyi em phasizes, there is no c lear sphere of the ‘e c o n o m y ’.16 In o th e r words, eco n o m ic activity is not distinct from o th e r forms of co n d u c t and social rela tion in which p ro d u ce rs are involved. T h e peasan t does no t recognize a sepa ra te sphere of ‘w o rk ’, d istinct from w hat he o r she does in the rem a in d er o f the day o r w eek; and on the larger scale th e re is no t a d em arca ted set o f ‘eco n o m ic m echan ism s’ sep a ra ted from the state. T h e re may be quite deve loped forms of com m ercia l and trading transac tions ca rr ied on by in d ep en d en t m erchan ts , but the s tate is directly involved in the main overall eco n o m ic tie — the collection of taxes. T o this we should add that the scope of the ‘politica l’ is co n cu rren tly limited. T h e ‘polity’ in traditional s ta tes is limited to the active partic ipa tion of the few, whose policies and in terna l conflicts mainly d e te rm in e the d istribution of au thorita tive resources . With the arrival o f m o d ern capitalism, a definite sp h ere of the ‘e c o n o m ic ’ — as ‘the e c o n o m y ’ — com es into being. T rad it iona l states, o f course , had econom ies in the sense th a t the ir existence d e p e n d ed upon the gene ra t ion and


dis tribution of allocative resources . But the m o d ern ‘ec o n o m y ’ is a (relatively) distinct sphere of activities from o th e r institutional sec to rs in capitalist societies. ‘D is tinct’ in this co n tex t has to be u n d e rs to o d as ‘insu la ted’ from political life, no t as cu t off from it. ‘Politics', on the o th e r han d , has a b ro a d e r definition in m o d ern societies (that is, in nation-states) , encom passing the mass of the population .

M arx m akes the em erg en ce of private p rope rty , as the basis of class fo rm ation , an essential e lem en t of his acco u n t of history. How ever, th e re are m ajo r p rob lem s with this idea, upon som e of w hich, in his less evolu tionary m om en ts , M arx himself casts a good deal o f light.17 He p resum es tha t in small, tribal com m unities the re is no private p roperty in the m eans of p ro d u c tio n , all p rope rty being ow ned com m unally . Private p rope rty is supposed to be an evolutionary deve lopm ent (depending upon the existence of surplus produc tion) ou t of the original hum an cond ition of collective ownership . A plausible conclusion to d raw from the an th ropo logy of his time, it is no t a co n cep tio n th a t has been su b s tan tia ted by the findings of su b seq u en t an th ro p o lo g ica l re search . T h is ind ica tes th a t th e re is no p a r t icu la r overall re la tionship be tw een level of ‘prim itiveness’ and the existence of private p roperty ; various kinds of private ow nersh ip of land are found in settled agricultural com m unities , as well as com m only held property .

W hen subject to scrutiny, each of the term s in ‘private p rope rty ’ discloses complexities. In m o d ern societies, ‘p r iva te ’ p roperty usually m eans tha t the ow n e r freely has the right to a liena te that p roperty — to sell it to w hoever he o r she wishes. But in preceding types of society m atte rs often tend to be both m ore am biguous in som e respects and to p lace strong limits on alienability on the o ther . P roper ty implies ‘o w nersh ip ’; and ow nersh ip p resum es the existence of a legal system th rough which ow nersh ip rights a re defined. In societies w ithou t writing, w ha t ‘law’ is rem ains only vaguely fo rm ula ted and norm ally rests substantially upon possession. In m ost class-divided societies, legal rights of ow nersh ip are not def ined with anyth ing like th e precision they are in m o d ern societies. R o m an law is a significant excep tion in this respec t, and one which u n d o ub ted ly had a m ajo r influence over the em erg en ce of capita lism in W este rn E u ro p e a t a la ter da te . P riva te landed es ta te s have existed in all n o n -m odern


societies, bu t ‘private ' here refers m ore to p reb en d a l rights ra th e r than to ow nersh ip rights in the m o d e rn sense. W h ere the landow ner has som eth ing akin to ‘legal r ights’ over p roperty , these a re usually rights to exploit its p ro d u ce and the w orkers assoc ia ted with it. M any d ifferen t co n c re te form s of land-tenure a re found . Large lan d o w n e rs m ay ow n th e ir p ro p e r ty in p erp e tu i ty , bu t with v irtually no reco u rse to in d ep en d e n t processes of law if the m onarch o r rival should usurp it. Sometim es the a r is tocracy o r gentry own their lands on lease from the state, con tingen t upon satisfactory p er fo rm an ce of military service. In o th e r systems, peasants own their plots of land, bu t a re still requ ired to give o v er som e of their p ro d u ce e i ther to the local lord, the state, o r b o th .18 O w nership rarely implies free alienability, e i ther on beha lf o f peasan ts o r of large landlords. So far as the peasants are co n cern ed , land can often not be disposed of without the permission of the local co m m u n ity council o r elders , o r of the rep resen ta tives of the clan. In the case of the large landow ners , the right to disposal of p rope rty is norm ally confined by the obligations involved in holding p rebends , as well as by constra in ts over inheritance.

It is no t devoid of all sense to say tha t , in bo th class-divided society and in capita lism , class is cen tred upon p rope rty rela tions, that is to say, in its b roades t outlines, ow nersh ip versus n o n ow nersh ip of the m eans of p roduc tion . But to issues concern ing w hat ‘ow nersh ip ’ is, we have also to add p rob lem s to do with what ‘p ro p e r ty ’ is (p roperty in the m eans of p roduc tion ) . T o say tha t class division d ep en d s upon p roperty re la tions gives a strong flavour of generality to class systems. H ow ever, as M arx in som e con tex ts strongly em phasizes ,19 w hat ‘p ro p e r ty ’ is in non-m odern societies is a lm ost entirely d iffe ren t from w hat is in capitalism . In non-m odern states, p rope rty m eans, above all, land. F o r the p ro d u cer , this entails a life led close to the rhy thm s oM iature and for the d o m in an t class intrinsic ties with ce r ta in landed dom ains, how ever m u ch the m ain ten o r of their life m ay in fact be urban. ‘C ap ita l’ is p ro p e r ty , bu t of a qu ite d ifferent o rd e r to trad it ional landed p rope rty : its p re -em inence within the newly em ergen t ‘e c o n o m y ’ implies a w hole set of institutional transfo rm ations, co m p a re d with those ch a rac te r is t ic s of class-divided society. Capital is essentially p ro p e r ty th a t is freely alienable and , thus, can change han d s in a m a n n e r governed wholly by its exchange-


value. Land as capita l is no d ifferent from any o th e r com m odity , and can be exchanged against any o th e r com m odity including, crucially, labour-pow er.

In bo th its ‘p r iva te’ and its ‘p ro p e r ty ’ aspect, ‘private p ro p e r ty ’ as capita l thus differs from the p rivate ow nersh ip of land in n o n m o d ern states. T h a t is why those w ho have held th a t ‘class’ only com es into being with the dev e lo p m en t of m o d ern capitalism have som e plausibility in their view. W ha t a ‘free peasan t ' does in term s of style of life and labour is m ore o r less the sam e as what a b o n d ed or taxed peasan t do es ,20 even in societies with large-scale irrigation schem es. But in capitalism , class in trudes into the very h ea r t o f the labour process and also co n n ec ts with som e of the m ain lineam ents of the b ro a d e r society, con tr ibu ting in a m ajor way to their form. As capita l, private p rope rty is par t of a set of co n n e c ted econom ic m echan ism s tied to specific m odes of social o rganization and social t ransfo rm ation . T h e fact tha t the mass of the popu la tion is ‘p roperty less’, th a t its m em bers have to sell their labour-pow er to em ployers to ea rn a living — a p h en o m en o n unknow n on such a scale in any p reced ing type of society in history — is an essential fea tu re of the class divisions in m odern societies. M oreover, the class re la tions (hat nestle at the co re of m o d e rn capita lis t p ro d u c tio n in tu rn are closely c o n n e c te d (although the n a tu re of these co n n ec tio n s m ust be exp lo red , no t m erely assum ed) with the m ain traits of the W estern nation-state. It is here , I shall argue, th a t we can in som e part t race how it has com e about that the continuities of the past have been so radically and irrevocably ru p tu red in the m o d ern era.

T h e alienability of lab o u r-p o w er in cap ita lism is th e p re cond ition for the existence of a mass ‘labour m a rk e t ’. In class- divided societies, regardless of w h e th e r in som e sense they own the land from which they p ro d u ce , peasan ts are ‘fixed’ to the land they till by a multiplicity of ties. T h ey m ay ‘n e e d ’ the do m in an t class to p ro tec t them from ex ternal th rea t from the w arriors of o th e r s tates o r to provide eco n o m ic services of valid coinage, irrigation, roads, etc. in so far as their p roduc tive activities are no t purely local in scope. But they are , nonethe less, in a very d ifferent position from property less wage-workers, w ho ‘n e e d ’ em ployers if they are to m ak e a livelihood at all. T h e relatively high deg ree of p roduc tive au to n o m y of th e p easan t entails tha t the m ain sanc tion which the d o m in an t class m ust invoke in case


of non-com pliance is the d irec t use of force. T h e re is no t ch ron ic class co n fron ta t ion here , bu t th e sporad ic p a t te rn of peasant risings followed by military repression previously described . In capitalism som ething very unusual has com e into being, co m p ared with p rio r history. T h e d o m in an t class no longer directly con tro ls the m eans of violence. As Saint-Simon and m any o ther n ineteenth- cen tu ry th inkers rem ark ed , the 'industrialists’ a re no t a military class. In p lace of the m eans to fo rce a potentially re luc tan t peasantry to pay w ha tever is d em an d e d of th em , em ployers have as their main sanction tha t 'dull eco n o m ic necessity’ of which M arx speaks. But how does this happen? W hy is it that a dom inant class has fo regone d irec t co n tro l o f the m eans of v iolence? On this issue M arx is silent. In this respect, how ever, for reasons already exam ined , he is no d ifferent from o th e r leading th inkers in the social sciences.

Ideology and the Non-Modern State

‘T h e ideas of the ruling class', Marx writes in a ce lebra ted passage, ‘are in every epoch the ruling ideas ', and he con tinues : ‘T h e class which has the m eans of m ateria l p ro duc tion a t its disposal, has con tro l at the sam e tim e over the m eans of m enta l p ro d u c tio n , so th a t thereby , generally speaking the ideas of those w ho lack the m eans of m ental p ro d u c tio n are subject to it.’21 If we ignore the w ider re la tion of this s ta tem en t to M arx’s historical materia lism (and the complexities and inconsistencies in his various discussions of ideology),22 it serves as a useful s tarting po in t for ideological analysis. D isen tangling its im plica tions, h o w ev er , m ean s a significant m ove away from views which have characteris tically been derived from it since M arx , and no d o u b t from M arx ’s own position also.

In non-m odern states, ideology is cha rac te r ized by ce rta in qu ite d istinctive fea tu res c o m p ared with tribal cultures, on the o ne han d , and m o d ern societies, on the o ther . T h e ra tionalization of religion, to the study of w hich W eb er m ad e such a rem arkab le con tr ibu t ion , is o n e such fea tu re . T h e dev e lo p m en t of theod icy is closely b o u n d up with the em erg en ce of writing and with the fo rm ation of sacerdo ta l groups; an d all class-divided societies have b ee n asso c ia ted with th e ex is tence of som e kind of ‘professionally’ organ ized religion. T h e ideological im plications,


how ever, are com plex and it is ludicrous to suppose , as those m aking use of the above co m m en ts by M arx som etim es have d o n e , that religious belief is no m ore than the non-m aterial aspect o f class dom ination .

W hile th e re are instances of ‘w arrior-priest’ and ‘adm inistra tor- p ries t’ ruling classes, in m ost cases s tate officials and military leaders are distinct g roups from the priests, with w hose views th e re may be m ajor d iffe rences and tensions. T h e re has been no shortage of religions tha t have glorified war and which, in so doing, have helped to knit a s ta te cult tightly to the military pursuits o f a do m in an t class. A m ong the most gory of exam ples are the A ztecs, whose sacrificial p ractices d em an d e d a never- ending s tream of victims, propelling them to sustain constan t wars o f imperial expansion. It is said tha t , in c ircum stances w here th e re was no m ajo r war, the A ztec m o n arch s agreed with their ne ighbours to s tage mass co m b a ts in o rd e r to p ro cu re captives w ho could be sacrificed to the gods.23 At the o th e r ex trem e, how ever, th e re a re cases like that o f the M aurya prince , A shoka , w ho was influenced by Buddhism to aban d o n war, initiating a m ajor schism within the ruling circ les.24 As W eb er points o u t , the m ajority of traditional d o m in an t classes have been o rien ted to m ilitary o r to o th e r secu la r values, not to religious ones. ‘A ris tocra tic irreligion’, in W e b e r’s te rm , has been m ore com m on than ‘w arring for the fa ith ’.25 T h e m odes of behav iour of the w arrio r have little affinity with the notions of humility, sin and salvation charac te r is t ic of Christianity , for exam ple , any m ore than with the self-negating ideals of the m ajor religions of the East. It is where a belief in an exclusive, universal god is com bined with the no tion of the m oral degeneracy of unbelievers — W eb er co n c en tra te s particularly upon Islam — that religious en thusiasm can be p u t d irec tly to w ork in the cause of te rr ito r ia l aggrandizem ent.

R ationalized religion is everyw here a ‘doub le -edged’ p h e n o m en o n , expressing the polyvalency of th e w ritten texts th a t are its scrip tural sources. W hile som e in terp re ta t ions of a given set of texts m ay favour the estab lished o rd e r , o thers m ay con tes t o r th rea ten it. Priestly g ro u p s o f ten m ain ta in a m o n o p o ly of in te rp re ta t io n by guard ing access to holy texts, by regula ting acquisition of the skills of literacy necessary to d ec ip h e r th em , or by strict p rocesses of ed u ca tio n a l tra in ing am ongst themselves.


But the construc tion of a ‘cosmically o rd e red ’ world always carries its dangers for any ruling class that depends upon religious sources of legitimation. T h e cosm ic o rd e r of in te rp re ted religion m ay inhibit o r forbid ac tion tha t w ould be in th e in terests of the d o m n in an t class, foster sec tional division am ong ruling groups, o r actively stim ulate opposit ional m ovem ents .

It is a m istake to associa te even strongly ra tionalized religion too closely with e th ical p rac tices that act to ‘s tandard ize ’ day-today behaviour . Even am ong the m ost d ev o u t of believers custom and trad it ion , on the o n e hand , and the secu la r d em an d s of daily life, on th e o th e r , co n s tan tly cu t ac ross w h a tev e r e th ica l co n n o ta t io n s may be assoc ia ted with religious belief. Christianity is untypical in its em phasis upon moral d an g e r (sin) and moral salvation, and in the detail with which w hat co u n ts as desirable behav iour and w hat is tu rp i tu d e are described . M any religions are little c o n c e rn e d with, o r have no im pact u p o n , e i ther the rou tine activities of day-to-day life o r the grand p ro jec ts of political leadership . T h e m o n arch m ay be a god, bu t ra th e r than being at the apex of a religious p a n th eo n , h e /sh e m ay be su bord ina te to o ther , supposedly m ore powerful o r influential, deities. Even w here a god o r gods are m alleable to h um an wishes, th rough sacrifice o r propit ia t ion of som e kind, their influence m ay be small co m p ared with the overrid ing sway of an im personal divine force im pervious to hum an persuasion. Som etim es, no d o u b t , belief in such a force encourages a resignation that might perhaps facilitate acq u iescen ce in th e status quo. T h u s it m ay be th a t the divine influence is rep resen ted as ‘fa te ’, an ‘ethically neu tra l p red es t in a t io n of the fu n d am en ta l a spec ts of every m a n ’s destiny’.26 O n the o th e r hand , accord ing to con tex t , it may prove to be com patib le with just those activities that ethically elaborated types of religious co d e can inhibit. T hus , acco rd ing to W eb er at least, the very lack of ethical ra tionalism associa ted with ‘fa te ’ can p rove very congenia l to the ou tlook of a warlike aristocracy. W hile no t p ro n e to belief in a b en e f icen t ‘p ro v id e n c e ’, a c o n c e p t io n of ‘d es t in y ’ m ay p rove a t t ra c t iv e to those w hose position is fo u n d ed up o n the p rac t ice of w arfare.

R ationalized religion tends to be confined in its appeal to the u p p e r echelons of society , d iffe ren tia ted from the rituals and the beliefs of the mass of the popu la tion . T h e fact th a t class-divided societies are no t cu ltu ra l unities is on ce m o re very re levan t here.

T h o se in the local village com m unities may speak a d ifferent language, have entirely d ifferent religious beliefs, and follow qu ite distinct custom s from the m em b ers of the d o m in an t class. C h inese off ic ia ldom m ad e p ro b ab ly th e m ost co n s is ten t and d ed ica ted a t tem p t to convey a s ta te-sanctioned religion to the popu la tion as a whole. In th e H an period , a policy of system atic e th ical ed u ca tio n was in tro d u ced , and C onfucian them es were deliberately in co rp o ra ted into widely d issem inated stories and plays.27 U n d e r the M anchus , a body of lec tu rers was set up w ho w ould to u r ro u n d peasan t com m unities , incu lca ting doctr ines of genera l m orality .28 H ow ever none of this was notab ly successful excep t am ong som e s tra ta of the s ta te officialdom them selves and ce rta in g roups in the u rban areas. M oreover , th e re w ere lateral divisions of religious affiliation o v e r long per iods as well as horizonta l ones. Buddhism was in tro d u ced into C hina as early as the first cen tu ry A D, a lthough it was only considerab ly la ter that it m ad e m uch headway. It was violently o pposed by som e of the em pero rs , bu t la ter ach ieved a wide following. T ao ism also m ade g rea t strides, having its own ecclesiastical h ierarchy which was officially recogn ized in th e eighth cen tu ry , and th e re a f te r sporadically achieved som e imperial support . It was largely to c o u n te r the popularity of Buddhism and T ao ism that in the Han and T 'an g periods the policies o f sponso red C onfucian educa tion w ere actively fostered . But m any individuals in the higher circles w ere Buddhists as well as C onfucianists , and som etim es simultaneously professed beliefs in o th e r religious views as well, the exclusivist n a tu re of N ear-Eastern religion not having taken hold in the fu r th e r Orient.

Religion resists a t tem p ts to red u ce it to a wholly social con ten t . M arx saw religion as an a liena ted expression of this-worldly strivings and of m ateria l suffering; D u rkhe im as the expression of collective values, the sacred being the manifestation of the respect in which these values a re held. No religions consist only of beliefs; all em body social p rac tices and , there fo re , a re social institutions. But it does no t follow from this tha t religious beliefs, of any sort, can be analysed as t ran sm u ted expressions of social im pera tives . T o ack n o w led g e th a t re ligious beliefs have an ‘au then tic ity ' that eludes such a red u c tio n is again to em phasize tha t religion is no t simply ideology — a cloak for asym m etrica l dom ina tion — b u t stands in com plex re la tion to the d is tribution o f power.



N one of the above rem arks co m prom ise the validity of the proposit ions tha t all class-divided societies have possessed forms o f ‘s tate religion'; tha t such s ta te religions have been in variable d egree actively fostered by m o n arch s o r g roupings within the ruling class as p rops to their pow er; and th a t religious e lem ents p e rm ea te cu ltu re at all levels prio r to the em erg en ce of m o d ern capitalism. But these things having been said, we have to add qualifying s ta tem en ts of considerab le im portance . W e should not suppose th a t religion, even ‘s ta te religion’ is a wholly conservative force; ra th e r , religion is a f ram ew o rk of th o u g h t and social organization th rough which m any aspects of life in traditional s ta tes may be filtered, including innovative forces and schism atic ones. It is also very generally an e r ro r to suppose , even within the most cohesive of non-m odern states, that the rationalized religions followed by those in the d o m in an t class have m u ch pu rchase over the day-to-day lives of the m ajority of their sub jec t populations.

T his brings us back to the field of applica tion of the passage q u o ted from Marx. T h e do m in an t class has con tro l over ‘the m eans of m ental p ro d u c t io n ’. If we re ject the idea that, in class- divided societies, (he ruling class is able to c rea te a consensus of belief and value ‘in te rna lized’ by those subject to its rule, what m eaning can be a t tr ib u ted to such a phrase? O n e p h en o m en o n of im p o r tan ce is th a t the d o m in a n t class is ab le to sustain a ‘discursive a re n a ’ of political though t and discussion from which most of the subject popu la tion is exc luded . T h e influence of writing is significant here , a l though it is by no m eans the only fac to r involved. T h e u rban settings in which the m em bers of the d o m in an t class typically m ove, ce rta in ly those m ost closely involved with the adm in is tra tion of the s ta te ap pa ra tus , provide for the possibility of a ‘cultura l cosm opolitan ism ' which is specific to small segm ents of the overall population . A fram ew ork of discourse, a series of environm ents in which politics is discursively organized , and adm inistrative inform ation co -o rd ina ted , a re basic to w ha t ‘politics’ is in class-divided societies.

T h e exclusion of m ost o f the popu la tion from partic ipa tion in the discursive sphere of politics m akes it ex trem ely difficult — in som e respec ts effectively impossible — for them to ar ticu la te a co n cep tu a l ‘field of o p p o s i t io n ’. All cu ltu res, w h e th e r they are overall socie ties o r segm en ts of larger s ta tes , d e p e n d up o n repeti tion and re -en ac tm en t for the rep ro d u c t io n of discursively


ar ticu la ted beliefs. T rad it io n an d cus tom have the weight they d o , n o t primarily because of the no rm ative com pulsion of ‘the old ways', bu t because there is not the ‘open ing ou t of the fu tu re ' and the ‘seizure of the pas t’ which the organized m obiliza tion of in fo rm ation facilitates. T h o se in oral cu ltu res manifestly have no t lacked ‘the m eans of m enta l p roduc tion '. As Lévi-Strauss am ong o thers has m ad e clear, the e lab o ra te cognitive classifications deve loped in oral cu ltu res are bo th rich in detail and internally co h e ren t in form. Even the m ost ‘prim itive’ of societies a re not w ithout their theorists (and their sceptics). But the lack of a discursive sphere for the articu la tion of generalized policies and their in tegra tion with the system atic collation of inform ation is of fatal significance for those exc luded from the political ce n tre in class-divided societies.

It is in the light of the p reced ing two points tha t we can best un d ers tan d why the system in tegration of class-divided societies does not d ep e n d in any essential way upon an ‘overall ideological consensus’. W h a t m atte rs is the ideological hegem ony of the ruler and the h igher circles of the s tate ap p a ra tu s over the rem a in d e r of the do m in an t class and adm inistrative officialdom. T h e main axis of the dialectic of con tro l in traditional s ta tes does not necessarily, o r even usually, involve strong cultura l hom ogeneity be tw een rulers and ruled. As in all pow er rela tionships, th e re is rec iprocity and au tonom y on the part of both the ruling g roups and those subord inate to that rule. But the reciprocity is primarily a po li tico-econom ic o ne , th a t is to say one m ed ia ted by the d em an d s of the d o m in an t class for revenue and of the peasan try for eco n o m ic and governm en ta l services, with the position of the do m in an t class being bo ls tered by co m m an d of the m eans of v iolence. T h e peasan t p ro d u c e rs p re serve a high d eg ree of au to n o m y o v er their ow n co m m u n ity life, o v er th e basic conditions of their labour, and over their traditional m odes of b eh av io u r generally . T h e m ain spheres in w hich ideological con tro ls are im portan t a re the inner cou r t , the h igher circles of the patr im onial ap p a ra tu s and the military leadership. In m any m onarch ica l systems the inner co u r t has been far m ore th an just the p lace w here the personal needs of the ru ler are ca te red for; it has been a political unit, the cen tre of bo th policy-m aking and intrigue. As a definite locale , it is o p en to surveillance by the m o n arch and the very surreptitious na tu re of the alliances form ed


there in b ea r witness to the ‘visible’ ideological con tro l ordinarily susta ined within it. T h o se closest to the ru le r in the inner cou r t are often chosen from g roups outside the m em bersh ip of the ruling class, for exam ple eunuchs , slaves o r foreigners. W hile their nom inal au thority m ay be non-existent, the ir real pow er has frequently been very substantial in d eed .29

T h o se in the inner co u r t on m any occasions, a l though certain ly not universally, m ay traverse the lines of au thority runn ing from the m o n arc h to bo th the adm inistrative ap p a ra tu s and to the army. T h e p rob lem of sustaining m onarch ica l con tro l over each of these was a perenn ia l , and in som e deg ree in trac tab le , o n e in all non-m odern states. T h e larger the state , the m ore this was the case, because the behav iour of subord ina tes could be influenced with m uch success only when they were within regu la r and easy access. T h e strategy of d ivide and rule has naturally been very co m m o n in societies w here the possibility of challenges by the provincial military to the po w er of the cen tra l s ta te tend to be chronic . T h u s Diocletian sub-divided the provinces of the R om an em pire in a careful and co m plica ted fashion. E ach g o v e rn o r was only perm itted a short per iod in any par ticu la r a rea , and they w ere s ep a ra ted from th e o rgan iza tion o f military co m m an d . Som etim es their ch ildren w ere held in R om e as hostages; in o rd e r to d is tance them from the governed , they w ere not allowed to adm inis te r regions from which they cam e , to pu rchase p rope rty o r to m arry th e re .10 Such a p ro ced u re , how ever, was very difficult to em ploy in respec t of the a rm ed forces, for obvious reasons — a divided leadersh ip was not likely to p rospe r on the ba tt leg round . V ery o ften the m o n a rc h sough t to m ain ta in the position of sup rem e co m m a n d e r of the military. But unless th a t ru ler was actually a war-lord o r batt le leader this did no t am o u n t to very m uch in te rm s of effective pow er, and the th rea t of deposit ion by the military ten d ed to be an ever-present o n e for the m onarch ica l au thority . C h ina seem s m o re o r less un ique in this respect, since the military leadersh ip was rarely a th rea t to internal imperial pow er. H ow ever , in the C h inese s ta te a p p a ra tu s th e re w ere extraord inarily pervasive ne tw orks of spies and inform ers, whose task it was to ensure tha t officials m ain ta ined ap p ro p r ia te codes of co n d u c t and belief. In the T ’ang period , fo r exam ple , officials w ere req u ired to a t ten d regu la r re -education sessions, to keep them in the p ro p e r ways. T h ey were n o t p e rm it ted to live in


their h o m e provinces , and given only short- term ap p o in tm en ts in an effort to k eep th em loyal to the h igher levels o f co m m an d . But they w ere also requ ired to rep o r t on o n e an o th e r , keep ing special no tes of any tendenc ies am ong their fellow officials tow ards slack co n d u c t o r q ueru lous behaviour . T h e C enso ra te was effectively an investigatory police, cha rged with uncovering any potential sources of d iss idence.31

T h e d ivergence be tw een fac to rs influencing the ideological hegem ony of the ru ler over the state officialdom on the o n e hand , and those affecting the pow er of the d o m in an t class over the re m a in d e r of the p o p u la t io n , on the o th e r , under lies the p h en o m en a m en tioned by Marx in his observations ab o u t the ‘Asiatic m o d e of p ro d u c tio n ’. W hile the re may be only relatively slow change in the overall institutions of class-divided societies, an d in the ways of life of the p ea san t co m m u n it ie s they in co rp o ra te , th e re is charac teristically a rapid tu rn o v er of pow er am o n g elites within th e d o m in an t class. T h e m ain social institutions, as M arx puts it, rem ain ‘u n to u ch ed by the storm- clouds of the political sky’.32 H ow ever, the s torm -clouds loom m ore o r less pe rm anen tly for the m em bers of the ruling elites them selves . Pa tr im onia l po w er is inheren tly uns tab le fo r the individuals involved, resting as it does upon personal affiliation and kinship relations. M u rd e r , loss of favour, pun ishm en t for in c o m p e te n c e o r c o r ru p t io n , all these m ak e for a volatile distribution of au thority within the higher echelons of the state ap p a ra tu s and the military. W hile som e rulers of trad it ional s tates re ta ined their position for m any years, this was usually ach ieved only th rough the constan t juggling of those just below them in the hierarchy . A case can be m ad e for the claim that m onarch ica l figures have, in fact, only successfully m ain ta ined their rule for lengthy periods w here th e re has been a good deal of instability d irec tly below them , inh ibiting coa li t ions in the c o u r t o r househo ld tha t m ight m o u n t an effective challenge. S tudies of dynasties indicate that periods of stable individual rule are usually qu ite short, and b roken by forcib le overth row . S even teen of the thirty-seven O tto m an sultans w ere d eposed by fo rce of a rm s ;33 the du ra tion of the average reign of U m ayyad caliphs (in the seventh and eighth centuries) was six years, while th a t o f Seljuk sultans (in the e leventh an d twelfth cen turies) was eleven years .34


State Systems

Virtually all d istinguishable ‘societies ' have existed in the con tex t of w ider inter-societal systems, in rela tion to which their own internal charac te ris t ics have in som e part to be unders tood . T h e existence of frontiers ra th e r than boundar ies is one way in which the external aspects of class-divided societies differs from the m o d ern system of nation-states, but it is plainly no t the only difference. T h e nation-s ta te system in the tw en tie th cen tu ry has b eco m e a global o ne , in which only the g rea te r par t o f the o cean s an d of the po lar wastes a re free from the claims of national sovereignty. M oreover , these claims are m ore o r less universally agreed to be valid by the governm en ts of s ta tes in the world political o rde r . T h e ‘world system s’ of previous eras were of course m u ch m ore fragm entary ; and each m ajo r em pire o r ‘world civilization' has taken itself to be the geo-political and cultural cen tre of w ha tever w ider th ea tre s of affairs w ere know n to its rulers. M encius 's aphorism tha t i n the sky th e re is only o n e sun and above the peop le there is only o n e e m p e ro r , ’15 could apply to the ou tlook fostered by all large empires.

F our general types of non-m odern inter-societal systems can be d istinguished, although each can overlap o r co-exist with the others. First, there are localized systems of tribal cultures, w he ther hunter-gatherers o r settled agriculturalists. Class-divided societies have only existed for a small segm ent of the history of hum an beings. For the vast p ro por tion of hum an history — which is som etim es, n o t w ithou t reason , called ‘pre-history’ — systems of tribal societies have been th e sole type. T h ey have co n tin u ed to exist in areas of the w orld tha t have not seen the rise of s tates, u n b eknow nst to th e s ta te pow ers tha t might d o m in a te elsewhere. Second , th e re are city-state systems. While th e re are exam ples of iso la ted city-states, these a re virtually all p o r t cities, tu rn ed ‘o u tw ard s ’ to the seafaring t rad e upon which their p rosperity was built. City sta tes have norm ally existed in systems of such states — as n o ted earlier, distinguished by ch ron ic w arfare and m utual hostility m o re often than by peaceful co o p era t io n . T h ird , th e re are systems o f feudal states. A lthough th e re has been m uch d e b a te ab o u t how far th e c o n c e p t of feudalism has precise applica tion outs ide m edieval E u ro p e , fairly close parallels to the


system of E u ro p ean feudal s tates can be found elsew here . T h e fo u r th type is the system d o m in a ted by th e large im peria l fo rm ation , with e ither sm aller s ta tes o r areas inhab ited by tribal cu ltu res a ro u n d its per ipheries. All of these a re evidently very d iffe ren t from th e m o d e rn na tion-s ta te system , with w hich, how ever, they have for a short per iod co-existed. F o r m uch longer phases, they have co-existed with o n e a n o th e r and have d isplaced o n e an o th e r in tim e and space in the cou rse of social change.

S ince som eth ing like th e fourth m illenium, imperial systems have easily do m in a ted the o thers in term s of their g ra n d eu r and scale. S om e, m ost no tab ly C h ina , have re ta in ed identifiab le similarity of institutional form over long eras, how ever m uch their terr itoria l dom ains m ight have w axed and w aned over that time. O th e r geographical areas, m ost no tab ly the N ear East and the M ed ite rran ean basin, have been do m in a ted by imperial s tates even though their cen tra l locations have shifted with the rise and dec line of p a r ticu la r k ingdom s. All t rad it ional em pires have derived from the expansion of an originally m ore confined state, o r from the conquest and ap p ropria t ion of an existing imperial dom ain by outsiders; th e re are no know n cases w here large em pires have been built exclusively upon the co -opera tive ag reem en t of pre-existing sta tes in som e kind of federa tion . T h a t is to say, em pires have been co n s tru c ted primarily th rough the d ep loym en t of military pow er; and their existence therea fte r , for reasons a lready discussed, has d ep e n d ed primarily upon their con tinued m ain tenance of military strength. In the m odern na t ion s ta te system, each state is a defined political entity , em b ed d e d in in terna tional eco n o m ic exchange transactions, upon which it d ep en d s for its co n tinued existence. In trad itional em pires, this re la tion is in a certa in sense reversed. T h e re is norm ally a ce rta in am o u n t of long-distance trad ing , which m ay s tre tch well beyond the territoria l boundar ies of the imperial form ation . But imperial expansion tends to in co rp o ra te all significant eco n o m ic needs within the dom ain of the em pire itself, re la tions with g roups on the pe r im e te r tending to be unstable. O n ce estab lished , m ost imperial s ta tes find limits to th e degree to which military pow er can be ex ten d ed and have sought to pacify adjoining states o r tribal societies by m eans o th e r th an th e sword. A fte r the early periods of dynastic expansion , the Chinese em pero rs w ere never


able to achieve m uch m ore than nominal administrative influence over T ib e t , Indonesia o r K o rea , and m ad e no a t tem p t to subdue Japan. T h ey c o n d u c te d in n u m erab le trea ties with su rround ing nom ad ic societies, giving honorif ic and m ater ia l rew ards to those who w ere co-opera tive with their wishes. Of course , just as many punitive expeditions w ere also sent against, and wars fought with, th rea ten ing outsiders . In som ew ha t similar vein, soon af te r the end of the R epub lic the R o m an s relied increasingly upon policies of buying off the barbarians a ro u n d their frontiers w here their a t tem p ts a t military ad v an ce fell short o r w ere repulsed.

Im perial fo rm ations that m aintain an exis tence over any length of time do not adjoin o th e r dom ains of equivalen t pow er, as nation-states may do today. W h a tev e r states abu t their frontiers a re lesser s ta tes, an d are generally lum ped to g e th e r by the ruling g roups with all o th e r barbarians . Em pires , in o th e r words, have had a universalizing quality within their ow n territories . T h e R om ans, for exam ple , recognized no type of in terna tional rights o r law, trea ting their own institutions as in principle generalizable across the rest o f the know n world. This seem s ch arac te r is t ic of all non-m odern imperial systems, and is a large p ar t of the reason why the peacefu l es tab lish ing of b o u n d ar ie s by trea ty was inherently unstable. T h e frontiers of the O tto m an em pire , for exam ple , w ere regarded by the s tate officialdom as m ark ing the edge of the ‘land of w a r’, and for long periods w ere substantially d ep o p u la ted , no t because of the charac te ris t ics of their physical geography but because of the almost endless skirmishes tha t ranged across the te r ra in .36 C hina provides perhaps the m ost def ined exam ple . A cco rd in g to o r th o d o x teach in g , which rem ained the s ta te ph ilosophy for many cen tu r ies , C h ina had no needs d ep en d in g upon goods o r services that had to be fe tched from b ey o n d its bo u n d ar ie s . T ra d e o u ts id e the em p ire was ordinarily carried on in con junc tion with d em an d s for t r ib u te .37

T h e re la tions be tw een city-states w ere natura lly d iffe ren t from any such pattern. City-states seem rarely to have been economically a u to n o m o u s , an d norm ally es tab lished regu la r long-d is tance trading relationships with groups outside their im m ediate vicinity. M erchan ts have usually held a higher sta tus than in em pires, to w hose ex is tence they have been m uch m o re m arginal. T h e Sum erian states d ispa tched traders far into C en tra l Asia to seek ores and o th e r vital goods.38 T h e dem an d for ex ternal sources of


supply increased the m o re a city-state was successful in ex tend ing its terr ito ry a t the expense of its neighbours. In Sum er, as in G re ece , p ro tra c ted w arfare had the co n seq u en ce of substantially reducing the am oun t of available cultivable land. C hronic military struggle requ ired the con tinual conscrip tion of soldiery, d ra in ing away w orkers from the land; an d m uch of the p ro d u ce of the soil th a t was tilled was tak en to supply the a rm e d forces . T h e co n se q u en ce s fo r S u m er w ere par ticu la r ly d ra m a tic , s ince irrigation was necessary for effective farm ing and the o u tco m e of leaving considerab le t rac ts of fa rm land uncu ltivated was their reversion to semi-desert. T h e u ltim ate fa te of the Sum erian city- s ta tes is typical of the end-result of this volatile type of state- system. T h a t is to say, they w ere abso rbed into a larger imperial o rd e r established n o t by the expansion of o n e of their n u m b er but an ou ts ide pow er. Following their conquest by the A kkad ian invaders, they b ecam e provinces of S argon’s em pire , paying taxes and tr ibu te to the imperial reg im e.39

4 The Absolutist State and the Nation-State

In the p reced ing discussion of traditional s tates I have m ade virtually no m en tion of feudal society. N or shall I a t tem p t to provide a system atic acco u n t of feudal o rd e rs in w hat follows. Such a tac tic sounds at first sight quite odd . F o r how can we unders tand the specific charac te ris t ics of m o d ern states w ithout examining the con tex ts of E u ro p ean feudalism ou t of which they arose? H ow ever, it is precisely because the m o d ern s ta te has o ften been u n d ers tood only against the b ack g ro u n d of its origins in a disin tegrating m edieval o rd e r that its d istinctive qualities are often underp layed .1 European feudalism has certain characteristics that sepa ra te it bo th from o th e r feudal systems and from o th e r types of class-divided socie ty .2 Som e of these e lem ents w ere of vital im p o rtan ce in the processes leading to the fo rm ation of the m odern state. But co n cen tra t in g upon these tends to lead to a ‘progressivist' in te rp re ta t ion of history, ep itom ized by historical m ateria lism , in which the dynam ism of the m o d ern W est is t raced to a s eq u en ce linking the Classical w orld, feudalism and m o d ern societies .1 1 do n o t wish to deny that th e re are un ique fea tu res in the long-term d ev e lo p m en t of E u ro p e to which we have to look to explain the genesis of m odern ity . But my m ain co n ce rn is to d em o n s tra te th a t m o d ern states can be co n tra s ted in a generic way to t rad i t io n a l ones. T h u s I do n o t seek to p rov ide an in terpre ta tion of how absolutist states developed ou t of feudalism; I shall n o t be c o n c e rn e d to d a te the em erg en ce of absolutism in an exact way, o r to analyse the d iffe rences be tw een par ticu la r states in respect of the traits typical of absolutist rule. My purposes are m ore typological and com para tive . In indicating just how different m o d ern states a re from all forms of trad it ional s tate , I

84 The Abso lutist State and the Nation-State

en d eav o u r to highlight som e key e lem ents of the d iscontinuities of m odern ity re ferred to earlier.

R a th e r than beginning with a cha rac te r iza tion of the absolutist s ta te as a specific form, I shall first of all consider aspects of the E u ro p e a n s ta te system. F o r the system of s ta tes th a t was conso lida ted in the six teenth and seven teen th cen tu r ies was not just an env ironm en t in which each individual s tate was fo rm ed; it was inheren tly involved in tha t process of form ation.

The System of Absolutist States

Prior to the deve lopm en t of absolutism , E u ro p e was, of course , a lready a s ta te system — a diversity of frequen tly warring states. W ith its arrival the s ta te system was greatly transfo rm ed and , indeed , for the first time som eth ing quite clearly recognizable as ‘E u ro p e ’ in the m o d ern sense cam e into being. It is conven tiona l to hold tha t the fall of C o ns tan tinop le in 1453 was the beginning of O tto m an pressure upon E u ro p ean in dependence . H ow ever, qu ite ap a r t from the fact th a t the T u rk s had been m aking substantial in roads into the co n t in en t for a long while previously, ‘E u ro p e ’ then m ore accura te ly m ean t ‘C h ris ten d o m ’. T h e Holy R om an E m pire and the P apacy gave C hris tendom its identity , although the fo rm er was not an imperial fo rm ation in the sense discussed earlier. V alery’s well-known observa tion that E u ro p e ‘is only a peninsu la of Asia’ has som e accu racy if applied to the E u ro p ean feudal states, which ap p e a r m o re as at the periphery of the m ajo r world cu ltu res than as a civilization in the ir own right. As B arraclough has po in ted ou t to good effect, the traditional idea th a t the unity of m ed ieva l E u ro p e a n civilization ‘was c o m p o u n d e d of the Latin language, the classical inheritance , and the Christian religion’4 is som eth ing of a myth. T h e R om an E m pire had its cen tre on the M ed ite r ran ean , taking in substantial par ts o f Asia and Africa, bu t no t including all of the British Isles, Scandinavia o r G erm any . M edieval Latin was only an established and du rab le cu ltura l e lem ent in ce r ta in areas of the co n t in en t and n e i th e r the P apacy nor the Holy R o m an E m p ire w ere ever genuinely universal in their appeal. T h e Byzantine E m pire was the main ce n tre of conso lida ted pow er, loca ted tow ards the edge of w ha t la te r ca m e to be ‘E u ro p e ’.5

A bsolutism changed all this. I t d id no t lead, o f course , to a

The Abso lutist State and the Nation-State 85

newly united Europe . Q uite the contrary ; the E u ro p ean con tinen t b ecam e riven anew by the divisions be tw een states and by the scars o f battle. But E u ro p e , nonetheless, b ec am e a political o rd e r with d iscernible and c lea r linkages to the nation-s ta te system that was to co m e later. In the system of feudal s ta tes , the principalities do tted across the co n t in en t w ere , for the m ost pa r t , small. T h e connections betw een them , w he the r form ed peacefully o r through war, were mainly be tw een segm ents of a ruling class which, in co m m o n with class-divided societies as a w hole, was rem o te from the cu ltu re and activities of the rest of the population . U n d e r abso lu tism , th e s ta te began to have m o re of a ‘p y ram id a l’ ch a rac te r , even if the large m ajority of its subjects co n tin u ed to live their lives m uch as before. T h e internal consolidation of the state served m ore clearly to a c c e n tu a te its terr ito r ia l form and it is during the period of absolutism tha t E u ro p e b ecam e alte red in re spec t of s ta tes’ boundaries . In feudal E u ro p e , boundar ies were fron tie rs , ch ron ica l ly d isp u ted and nebu lously adm in is te red . D ip lom acy ' existed, but it was of the trad it ional type. In o th e r

words, it consis ted mostly of a t tem p ts to buy off o th e r g roups by the offering of goods and rew ards, o r to exact t r ibu te that would be recognition of d ep en d en cy . S tanding d ip lom acy has som e an teced en ts in the feudal e ra but, for the m ost par t, it is a d ev e lo p m en t novel to the six teenth cen tu ry and thereafte r . It is the best single expression of the fact that a new type of s tate system had co m e in to being, as d o m in a ted by w ar as w ere trad itional states, but d ep en d in g also upon the recognition of each s tate of the spheres of legitim ate au to n o m y of o thers.

F rench d ip lom acy was the leader, as the F ren ch s tate was the m ost powerful in the W este rn sec to r of the co n tinen t; bu t the institution of p e rm an en t d ip lom atic activities b ecam e rapidly established th roughou t Europe . If Louis XIV was the prototypical absolutist m o n arch , his adm in is tra tion was also the m ost notably advanced in re spec t of d ip lom atic training and of d ip lom atic m anoeuvring . T h e C o m te d 'A vaux, by reason of his d espa tches , p ro d u ced som eth ing like a s tandard a c co u n t of the p rac t ice of the new d ip lom atic o rde ring of the E u ro p e an states. T h e F rench sec re ta r ie s of s ta te possessed a com plex set o f so u rces of in fo rm ation a b o u t the posit ion an d fo r tu n es of o th e r s ta tes , c o n ta in e d in regu la r re p o r ts an d m em o ran d a . ' ' T h e specific im portance of this is tha t it m ark s the ex tension of surveillance

activ ities in to the in te rn a tio n a l sp h e re , th e reb y he lp ing to const i tu te w hat subsequen tly cam e to be called ‘in terna tional re la tions’ as a p h en o m en o n . Nothing precisely ana logous seems to have previously existed in the whole long history of traditional states, and it is an essential e lem en t of the w ate rshed tha t divides the m o d ern nation-state system from the prior types. Even in seven teen th -cen tu ry F rance , d ip lom acy was still only organized in a fairly rud im en ta ry way. A t the end of his reign, Louis XIV co n tin u ed to consign som e im portan t missions to generals and clerics. Resident d ip lom ats had little in the way of training for the task , the m o re prestig ious e r ran d s being a lm ost solely the pre rogative of h igh-ranking nob lem en . Only by the eigh teen th cen tu ry did m ost coun tries have large co rps of d ip lom atic staff, at ho m e and ab ro ad , w orking perm anen tly upon foreign affairs.

A m a jo r innovation of the per iod of abso lu tism was the establishing of congresses.7 T h e re were in terna tional gatherings in the M iddle Ages, especially am ong ecclesiastics, and som e of the e t iquette that grew up in them survived into la ter times. But the congresses were essentially d ifferent, and have aptly been described as ‘o n e of the g rea t landm arks of the |s ev en teen th | cen tu ry ’.8 Prior to that cen tu ry , the represen ta tives of several s ta tes had som etim es m et in one place; but the congress of W estphalia , at the conclusion of the T h ir ty Y ears ’ W ar, was in various ways radically different. It was som eth ing close to a general E u ro p ean congress, c o n c e rn e d with settling the rela tions be tw een the diversity of E u ro p ean states. T h e m eetings occu rred in tw o cities, M ü n s te r an d O sn ab rü ck , and involved the represen ta tives of every E u ro p e an s ta te save those of the less cen tra l regions of England, Poland and D enm ark . By the tim e of the dea th of Louis X IV , n ine o th e r congresses had been held, although n o n e so grand and all-embracing as th a t of W estphalia . T h e p le tho ra of trea ties that em erged established a d is tribution of territorial state authority th roughou t E urope in each successive congress, subsequent wars and conflicts bringing fu r ther m eetings in their train . F rom the sev en teen th cen tu ry onw ards, the history of E urope has been decisively influenced by such meetings, almost always following periods of p ro tra c ted war, up to and including Yalta.

T h e co n cep t of the b a lan ce of p o w e r’ am ong E u ro p e an states has b ec o m e such a familiar and h ack n ey ed one tha t it is difficult



to re cap tu re e i ther how new it was in the sev en teen th cen tu ry , or how im p o rtan t it th en ce fo r th b ecam e in the s ta te system of absolutism and in the nation-s ta te system. T h e trea ties of U trech t established its first solid founda tion ; a f te rw ards it b ec am e an acknow ledged principle by states bo th in o rd e r to wage w ar and to sue for peace. It was a th eo ry of ach ievable equilibrium fully as consequen tia l fo r the d ev e lo p m en t of m o d ern societies as th a t of the ‘h id d en h an d ' in the sp h e re of e c o n o m ic re la tions. Its significance does not d ep e n d mainly upon the idea of a ba lance of forces to be actively striven for by the leaders of states. M ore im portan t is the explicit acknow ledgem en t of the legitimacy of o th e r s tates, n o n e of which has the right to universalize its own elem ents of adm inis tra tion o r law at the expense of o thers . It is a form ula for organization , in the sense in which I def ined that te rm in the o pen ing ch ap te r . But it is s im ultaneously a form ula for ‘an a rch y ’, for each sta te , in gaining a c cep tan c e of its own sovereignty , ack n o w led g es the s ep a ra te sovereign sp h eres of o thers . As Sorel observed , 7 / se form e ainsi entre les grands Etats une sorte de société en participation: ils entendent conserver ce qu ’ils possèdent, gagner en proportion de leurs mises, et interdire à chacun des associés de faire la loi aux autres."* If the ph rase 'une sorte de société en participation' is to o s trong, it does help cap tu re the paradoxical c h a ra c te r o f an increasingly in tegra ted s ta te system w hich n eve rthe less gives s trong and explicit recognition to the d istinct legitimacy of all s ta tes thereby linked together.

T h e states of E u ro p e ten d ed to fall into two categories: those that w ere able to exploit the new d o c tr ine and , by m ean s of d ip lom acy and war, to expand ; and those tha t , as a result, lost large trac ts of terr ito ry o r w ere sha t te red a l together . T h e risk of w ar was c o m p o u n d e d ra th e r than lessened, because d ip lom atic m anoeuvring could lead to th e o u tb reak of a rm ed conflic t w here none was in tended; and, having begun, the im pact of consolidated alliances cou ld lead to a m uch m o re w idesp read m ilitary co n fro n ta t io n than m ight o therw ise have been the ca se .10 T h e l ikelihood of the ‘acc id en ta l’ o u tb reak of w ar on a large scale was fu r th e red by the re la tive paucity of system atic inform ation th a t s tates w ere able to g a th e r bo th internally an d ab o u t one ano ther . T h e re sources of an enem y o r ally might be grossly m iscalcu la ted , as well as th e capability of th e p ar ticu la r s ta te to


wage a lengthy war. As late as the m iddle of the eigh teen th cen tu ry Lord Chesterf ie ld observed in a le t te r to his son: T h e r e is o n e part o f political know ledge which is only to be had by inquiry and conversation: th a t is, the p resen t s tate of every pow er in E u ro p e with regard to the th ree im p o rtan t points of s trength , rev en u e an d c o m m e rc e . ’11 T h e co llabo ra t ive efforts o f the E u ro p e an states, in the E as te rn sections of the co n tin en t , did b ea r fruit in o n e highly consequen tia l way, in p rocuring the d efea t of the last g rea t th rea t of an ex ternal imperial fo rm a tion of a trad it ional type — the O tto m an Em pire . T h e repulsion of the T u rk s at the gates of V ienna in the late seven teen th cen tu ry was an event pe rhaps as im p o rtan t to the la te r a scendancy of the W est as — if E dw ard M eyer and W eb er a re right — the G re ek victory at the M ara th o n was a millenium and a half earlier. With the progressive re trea t of the T u rk s the ‘E as tern ques tion ' began to be posed in som eth ing like a recognizably m odern form.

Following the em erg en ce of the main rud im ents of a reflexively m o n ito red s tate system in the e ra of absolutism, new borders began to be established be tw een states, a l though m any frontiers rem ained . It m ust be em phasized tha t it is not sheerly in respec t o f the substitu tion of borders for fron tiers that the m odern s tate differs from traditional ones. T h e n a tu re of the terr itoriality of the s ta te becom es transfo rm ed in the light o f the qu ite distinctive theories of s tate sovereignty that co inc ide with the rise of the absolutist s tate . T h e co n cep t io n of the ‘sovereign state ' has so o ften been discussed as a purely in ternal affair tha t it is worth stressing that it necessarily has external im plications for the s tate in the con tex t o f o thers . T h e s ta te is to have exclusive au thority within its ow n dom ain , all o th e r rights being con fe rred by the sovereign and revocab le by him. By its very na tu re , this form ula d raw s a c lear-cut distinction be tw een the au tho ri ty of d ifferent s tates, and gives a new significance to the terr itoria l d em arca t io n s be tw een them .

T h e re la tions be tw een feudal s tates w ere largely o r ien ted to the acqu is it ion of te rr i to ry , as the dynas tic add it ion to an am o rp h o u s ly def ined c lu s te r o f p rovinces . T h e te r r i to r ie s of m edieval ru lers w ere n o t necessarily co n t in u o u s , bu t o f ten sca t te red and divided. W hile a m o n a rc h m ight p u rsu e the am bition of consolidating all his lands in a single terr ito ry , it m ad e no g rea t odds if this was n o t achieved. M oreover , o f course ,

The Absolutist State and the Nation-State 89

within the m onarch ica lly c la im ed terr ito r ies of feudal s tates the re were large areas in which the king's writ either was not recognized at all, o r effectively co u n ted for nothing. T h e centra liza tion of political po w er assoc ia ted with abso lu tism was n o t a s imple process of the expansion of effective con tro l over a reas a lready nominally sub jec t to the au tho ri ty of the ruler. It d em an d e d substantial a ltera tion in the external and in terna l fron tiers of states. A king might own a segm ent of terr ito ry lying d ee p within lands c la im ed by an o ther . T h e fu r thering of sovereign rights could , th e re fo re , intrinsically involve m ajor clashes and , a t a m inimum, peacefully c o n d u c ted realignments o f terr itory betw een states. An exam ple of the am biguities involved is given by the differing historical in te rp re ta t io n s that have been m ad e of the shift in the position of the principality of Sedan in the m id seven teen th c e n tu ry .12 Sedan is o ften regarded as a distinct realm. But o thers have seen it as a b o u n d ary p rov ince of the larger s tate of F rance , in which the m o n arch was not ab le to sustain m ore than minimal au thority . T h e hesita tions of historians a re not particularly surprising, reflecting in som e part those cu r ren t at the time. T h e du k es of Bouillon held d irec t lordship over the a rea , bu t ow ed som e of their possessions to the bishops of Liège, w ho in turn w ere p rinces owing allegiance to the F rench crown. T h e ducal family re linquished Sedan in exchange for certa in o th e r areas in F rance. On occasion , this has been regarded by historical writers as the annexing of previously foreign terr ito ry , by o thers as the consolidation of royal p ow er over F rench lands.

In the p rocess of the rea l ig n m en t of s ta te s ’ bo u n d ar ie s , previously existing frontiers were not only a ltered , bu t significantly a lte red tow ards becom ing bo rd e rs in the sense given previously. It was a p rocess th a t did no t cu lm in a te until well in to the n ine teen th cen tu ry , par ticularly in the less settled parts o f the con tinen t. In the seven teen th cen tu ry , m any frontiers rem ained as they traditionally had been: diffusely specified, and bearing no d irec t re la tion to the political o r the eco n o m ic activity of the states co n ce rn ed . In the D utch republic , for exam ple , the re w ere a whole variety of oddities and inconsistencies, as judged in term s of the new co n c ep t io n s of sovereignty ra th e r than the old practices. Several port ions of D u tch terr ito ry w ere com plete ly cu t off from the m ain segm ent of the state. Spanish fiefs, on the o th e r han d , existed within th a t segm ent. T h e bishops of Liège

held jo int dom in ion over som e D u tch terr itory. It was primarily th e wars an d re su ltan t congresses of the sev e n te en th and e ig h teen th cen tu r ie s th a t ra tiona lized f ron tie rs in to b o rd e rs , a l th o u g h m any b o u n d ar ie s w ere left u n to u c h e d by these happenings. In the sev en teen th cen tu ry , for the first t ime, the p rac t ice of giving bo u n d ary popu la tions an ‘op tion ' to belong to o n e s tate o r a n o th e r cam e into being. T h u s , w hen various cities in the Spanish N etherlands w ere ap p ro p r ia ted by F ran ce in a trea ty of 1640, those living in th em w ere given the cho ice of rem aining and becom ing ‘F ren ch ', o r m oving back over the newly draw n line to stay Spanish o r G e rm an as they had been previously. T h e progression from frontiers to bo rde rs as m utually agreed lines on a m ap does no t, how ever, ap p e a r until the e igh teen th cen tury : th e first b o u n d a ry literally d raw n as a line seem ingly being co n s tru c ted only in the year 1718, as par t of a trea ty m ad e in re spec t o f F landers in tha t y ea r .13

O th e r innovations that b ecam e of m ajor im p o rtan ce in shaping the reflexively m on ito red system of nation-states tha t was to co m e only m ak e their first en try in the closing stages of the ‘age o f ab so lu t ism ’. O n e is th e d o c tr in e o f na tu ra l fron tiers . In t rad i t ional s ta tes leaders had certa in ly o ften tr ied to secu re dom in ion over areas tha t offered na tu ra l p ro tec t ion against the en c ro ac h m e n t of o th e r s tates. But, as e lab o ra ted from the late e igh teen th cen tu ry onw ards, the idea that a s ta te ought, as far as possible, to have natura l fron tiers was closely tied to the greatly exp an d ed co h e ren c e of the s tate as an adm inistrative unity. It was no t just p ro tec t ion in ce rta in co n tes ted bordering areas, but an em phasis upon the integral ch a ra c te r of s ta teh o o d tha t lay behind the new doctrine . T h e ‘n a tu ra l’ boundar ies involved were not p a ram ete rs tha t som ehow organically link a s tate to the hab ita t bu t w ere, ra the r , an expression of a highly deve loped co n cep tio n of s tate sovereignty. ‘N atural fron tie rs’ also eventually cam e to be seen as defined in te rm s of the linguistic o r cu ltura l hom ogeneity of the subject popu la tions within states. But this is a la ter p h en o m en o n still, and som eth ing m ore o r less com ple te ly specific to the em erg en ce of the E u ro p e an nation-state.

Of course, the form ation of a reflexively m on ito red state system in E u ro p e was no t the only ex ternal set of changes of basic im p o rtan ce in absolutism. T h is deve lopm en t was also coeval with the expansion of the pow er of ce rta in of the E u ro p ean sta tes by



sea. W hat b ecam e ‘E u ro p e ’ was tiny co m p ared to the imperial s ta tes fu r the r east, and was sm aller even than the R o m an E m pire had been. It seem s rem ark ab le , even virtually im possible, tha t a m osaic of sepa ra te sta tes should increasingly have b een able to subdue , o r to bring u n d e r the ir sway, massive areas in the rest of the world. It has to be em phasized tha t it was, indeed , qu ite ex traord inary — th e re is no th ing co m p arab le in the past history of s tates s tre tch ing over several millenia. H ow ever, the po in t I have sought to m ake in the p reced ing few parag raphs is that E u ro p e by the seven teen th cen tu ry no longer was just a m osaic of s ta tes. T h e co n so l id a ted in d e p e n d e n t sovere ign ty of each individual s ta te (or ra th e r those states that w ere able to survive the wars and the terr itoria l rea lloca tions which took p lace over several cen turies) was a t the sam e time p ar t o f a process of overall inter-state in tegration .

T h e m astery of the seas w hich th e E u ro p e a n s ach ieved , how ever, can n o t be explained as an im m edia te o u tco m e of this, bu t d ep e n d ed upon a n u m b er of qu ite con tin g en t e lem ents. T h e days of long-distance sea travel, and w hat from the point of view of the E u ro p ean s was the ‘d iscovery’ of the w orld , p re-date the technologica l d eve lopm en ts which m ade E u ro p ean naval firep ow er irresistible. In the th ir teen th cen tu ry th e re was a certa in am oun t of long-distance trad e with C hina in silks, spices and a few o th e r goods. C h ina was, in fact, b e t te r know n to E u ro p ean s than India, since som e travellers had crossed the Asian m ain land in pursuit o f co m m erce , w hereas A rab m erch an ts contro lled t rad e from Indian ports via the M iddle East to E urope . T h e d isin tegration of the T a r ta r K han E m pire a l te red that s ituation , as the M ing reg im e in C h in a s ta r ted to insu la te th a t s ta te increasingly from outsiders . E u ro p e b ecam e m o re cu t off from the rest o f the world than it had been before , since the intrusion of the O tto m an T u rk s d is located o th e r t rade routes . It was partly for these reasons tha t ad ven tu re rs (‘exp lo re rs’, as the specialized purveyors of geograph ica l know ledge , only co m e at a m u ch la ter date) began following new rou tes th a t ‘o p en e d u p ’ the rest o f the world to E u ro p e . T h e m aking of ever-bolder voyages across the world was no d o u b t in a genera l way s tim ulated by the im pact of the R enaissance, b u t does n o t seem to have been very d irectly influenced by it. T h e recovery of P to lem y’s Geography, first m ad e available in a p r in ted ed ition in 1475, h ad considerab le


general intellectual influence. But C olum bus had apparen tly not read it, and was m uch m o re indeb ted to Imago Mundi, a w ork w ritten by the late-medieval scholar, C ardinal d ’Ailly.14

Absolutism , in fact, co inc ided with a period in which m ost of the g rea t voyages of d iscovery had been accom plished and the m ain geographical forms of the con tinen ts of the world, known. In o n e sense , o f course , the significance of this can hardly be underp layed . W h a tev e r their m agnificence, o r their terr itorial scope , th e great em pires of past times had never ach ieved a genu ine know ledge of the g lobe as a whole. H ow ever co sm o politan they might have been , the ir know ledge was always basically ‘local know ledge’.15 F o r the first tim e in history hum an beings lived in a world of which, w ha tever the e th n o cen tr ism of E u ro p ean though t , they had ‘universal know ledge’. If this is a d iscontinuity with prior ages, so also is the sp read of E u ro p ean military a rm ed and com m ercia l s treng th by sea. All large-scale em pires h ad som e sort o f long-distance trade , and th e re were m any smaller s tates w hose prosperity was built very largely on a m ix tu re of c o m m e rc e an d sea-pow er. But n o m a jo r ‘w orld civilization’ had previously b een established mainly by sea-pow er as, with the dev e lo p m en t of sea-borne trading op era t io n s on a grand scale , and of colonialism , that of the W est cam e to b e .16 T h e d ev e lo p m en t of abso lu tism was no d o u b t facilita ted in som e degree by the wealth brough t into E urope by the influx of precious metals. But again there was little d irec t co n n ec tio n , and it would be foolish to try to press all o f this into som e sort of functionalist fram e. T h e re was a lull in the process of geographical discovery and of trad ing expansion for som eth ing like a period of a cen tu ry from ab o u t 1650. T h e se t t lem en t of W estpha lia in som e considerab le part led the E u ro p ean coun tries to co n c en tra te their energies on their ow n con tinen t . C om m ercia l policies were restrictive ra th e r than expansionary and coloniza tion , with the excep tion of Latin A m erica , still largely a m a t te r o f the stationing of o u tp o s ts in o th e r a reas of the w orld . T h e ex pans ion of com m ercia l and then industrial capitalism on a global scale would no t have b een possible w ith o u t the in itia tion o f W este rn ‘universalism ’; bu t it der ived fundam entally from o th e r so u rces .17 T h e m ain linking p h e n o m e n o n was to be the superiority of E u ro p ean naval pow er, which p e rm it ted the carrying of c o m m e rcial capita lism on a large scale to m any parts o f the globe.


The Absolutist State as an Organization

In te rm s o f th e d ev e lo p m e n t o f a novel type o f reflexively m o n ito red s ta te system, then , absolutism began to prise o p en the discontinuities that separa te the m odern world from prior epochs. A bsolutism still re ta ined large e lem en ts of the feudal o rd e r that p reced ed it, and was m o re diffe ren t from the nation-s ta te system tha t was its heir than it is from feudalism. If I ca n n o t agree with A n d e rso n ’s assessm ent tha t i n d ip lom acy . . . the index of feudal d o m in an ce in the Absolutist S ta te is ev iden t,’ th e re can be no quarre l with his observa tion th a t the absolutist s tates w ere ‘hybrid com positions’, ‘whose surface “m odern ity” again and again betrays a su b te rran ean a rcha ism ’.IS W ha t is im p o rtan t in judging the novelty of the absolutis t s ta te is no t just to m easu re it against feudalism , as gene ra t ions of historians have d o n e , bu t to con tras t it to o th e r form s of trad it ional s ta te in general . T h e absolutist s ta te is still, in my term s, a trad it ional s tate . T h a t is to say, in som e of its main charac te r is t ic s it rem ains a class-divided society. But in o th e r respects it has fea tu res barely found at all e lsew here.

T h ese are no t easily d istinguished if o n e supposes, as som e have do n e , tha t absolutism is a sort o f O rien ta l Despotism writ small. Not only does such an analysis rep ea t th e e r ro r of holding th a t cen tra lized b u reau c ra t ic em pires w ere m u ch m ore cohesive than actually was the case, it fails to give sufficient weight to certain distinctive aspects of the rule (and the claims to legitimacy) of the E u ro p ean m onarchs . T h ese largely ce n tre upon bo th the no tion and the actuality of sovereign ty .19 Rulers in traditional s ta tes w ere always in a ce rta in sense ‘sovereigns’: they were acknow ledged (at least by those lower in the s ta te appa ra tus) to be the suprem e au thority in the political o rder. Like the absolutist m onarchs, they claimed legitimacy by reference to sacred symbols; the no tion of ‘divine r igh t’ to rule in its co re m ean ing is hardly a E u ro p ean innovation , w ha tever its specific form might indicate . But traditional ru lers e lsew here had no t, as it w ere, in co rp o ra ted the s ta te within their own person ; they sat at the p innacle of it. T h e religious sym bolism of ‘divine right' should actually be seen as a trad it ional a c co u trem e n t to som eth ing very new — the development o f ‘governm ent’ in the modern sense, the figure o f


the ruler being a personalized expression o f a secularized administrative entity.

T h e progressive shaping of the c o n c ep t of ‘sovereignty’ in the hands of political th inkers from the fifteenth to the end of the sev e n te en th cen tu ry is in s truc tive in this regard . ‘S overe ign ’ suggests an etymological connection with the idea o f an individual ru ler bu t such is no t its m ain origin, which helps explain why it was easily transferred in to an im personal form of ‘sovereignty’. Prior to Bodin, the te rm ‘sovereign’ had been applied as an adjective in an im precise way to any individual of rank . In the fifteenth and sixteenth cen tu r ies in England, even a relatively m inor personage such as a m itred ab b o t was officially re fe rred to as a sovereign but only because he s tood at the h ead of an ecclesiastical o rganization. T h e w ord was m ore usually em ployed to re fer to charac te ris t ics of organizations them selves — th ree sovereign cour ts of law w ere recognized in F rance , for exam ple .20 In asserting (with som e reservations) that th e re can be only one sovereign , Bodin was no t simply asserting th e t ra n sc e n d e n t au th o r i ty of the individual m o n a rc h , he was desc rib ing and advocating a co -ord ina ted system of adm inistrative ru le .21 It can justifiably be c laim ed, I th ink, that ne i ther the fact o f a non- m onarch ica l regime, n o r the various theories of republican ism an d l ibertarianism associa ted with the English R evolu tion could have co m e ab o u t w ithou t the prio r establishing of a ‘d iscourse of sovereignty’.22 As co n n e c ted to political theory of the time, the c o n c e p t of abso lu tism was o p en to e lab o ra t io n b ecau se it ju x taposed the assertion of the sup rem e au thority o f an individual to a m ore generalized in te rp re ta t ion of s ta te pow er, in which th e re was in fact no necessary role for kings o r m o n arch s at all. O n ce the idea of sovereignty had effectively been tu rn ed into a principle of g overnm en t, the way was open fo r it to b eco m e co n n e c ted to that of ‘cit izenship’ — no longer applied within the confined reach of the u rban co m m u n e but having as its re fe rence the political ‘co m m u n ity ’ o f the state as a whole. H ow ever m u ch a co n n ec tio n m ight be stressed be tw een th e divine right o f kings and abso lu te sovereignty, it rem a ined vulnerab le , a focus of ideological co n cen tra t io n bu t also a spark ing po in t of struggle.

T h e political theory of abso lu te s ta te po w er o p e ra ted at som e d is tance from reality, m o m en to u s as were the adm inistrative changes which the m ost deve loped states displayed and, obviously,


absolutism was no t all of a p iece e i ther regionally o r tem porally . N one the less , ce r ta in genera l ch a rac te r is t ic s can read ily be distinguished. T h re e m ain e lem en ts are involved, each co n n e c ted with the o thers: (i) the centralization and expansion of adm inis trative pow er; (ii) the d ev e lo p m en t of new m echan ism s of law; and (iii) a l tera tions in m odes of fiscal m anagem en t.

C ourtly life in the abso lu tis t s ta te , especially in the m ost m agnificent exam ple — that o f Louis X IV — resem bled that observed in n u m ero u s imperial societies. In Louis’ case, how ever, it was str ipped of the patrim onialism cha rac te r is t ic bo th of feudal rulership and of the m ajority of o th e r m onarch ica l states. T h e inner c o u r t was not c o m p o sed of the h igher sec to rs of his household , bu t of favoured nobles and a ttendants . It was certainly a ‘political’ realm — always rife with intrigue and gossip — bu t it was not par t of the m echan ism of adm inis tra tion . T h is helped m ak e possible the c rea t ion of bu reau c ra t ic adm inis tra tion in principle, and in som e par t in p rac tice , directly responsible to the ruler. T h e m inisters ap p o in ted by Louis XIV w ere often of the nobility but no t always so. T h ey som etim es re p o r ted personally to him but m o re usually th ro u g h counc ils of g o v ern m en t , co n n ec ted directly to the executive organs of adm inis tra tion , the posts which w ere no t p rebenda l for the m ost pa r t , bu t o ccup ied by salaried, voca tional officials.21 C o lb e r t ’s policies w ere actively and deliberately oriented towards the consolidation of bureaucracy in this m a n n e r — in the system of intendants, for exam ple . Beginning with an a t te m p t to ra tiona lize taxa t ion , and to cen tralize the collection of revenue , C o lbert helped to build a h ierarchical system of adm in is tra tion , co-ord inating cen tra l and local offic ialdom to a m uch g rea te r degree than had previously been the case. T h e intendants w ere originally sen t ou t to co n d u c t surveys ab o u t th e effec tiveness of the d ep lo y m en t of fiscal resources, repo rt ing back with a view to re form . Instead , they stayed on in the provinces, sending back regu la r reports , and effectively becom ing residen t adm in is tra to rs directly responsible to the c ro w n .24

T h e co-ord ination and centra lization of s ta te pow er, in F ran ce and th roughou t E u ro p e , b rough t the m onarchy into confronta tion with co rpo ra t is t o rganizations, including the cities, diets and parliam ents, w h ere such existed. F rench tow ns, m any of which had enjoyed som e considerab le in d ep en d en ce from the cen tra l

I


political ap p a ra tu s w ere, by an edict of 1692, b rough t u n d e r the regula tion of m ayors ap p o in ted by the crown. T h e au tho ri ty of the Parlement of Paris was re shaped and curta iled . In 1673 its right o f m aking rep resen ta tio n ab o u t co n tem p la ted legislation was l im ited to the p e r io d af te r an ed ic t was reg is tered . N one the less , the c row n h ad regularly to co n su lt with the provincial Estates in the Pays d'Etats, as well as with the Assembly of Clergy. M oreover, since in many instances new official positions had been c rea ted alongside the pre-existing ones, w ithou t fully rep lacing th em , the result was a com plex w eb of in tersecting rela tions of authority , d is tr ibu ted laterally as well as h ie ra rch ic ally.25 Som ething similar hap p en ed elsewhere, a lthough with great varia tions from state to state. T h u s the Estates of B ohem ia, B randenburg and Russia w ere qu ite ruthlessly repressed . Charles XI of Sweden p reven ted the Riksdag from m eeting o th e r than sporadically af te r 1680; before the end of the reign of Felipe IV the C ortes of Castile w ere em ascu la ted . Since such organizations w ere for the most par t co m p o sed of nobility, gen try o r their representatives, these processes have som etim es been understood to ind icate th a t the absolutis t s tate was founded upon an alliance be tw een the crow n and the com m ercia l capitalist bourgeoisie. T h is was, in fact, M arx 's view. A cco rd in g to him , in a cha rac te r is t ic observation on the m a t te r , T h e centra lised Sta te pow er, w ith its ub iq u ito u s o rgans of s tand ing arm y , police, b u reau cracy , clergy an d ju d ica tu re — organs w rough t a f te r the p lan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour — originates from the days of abso lu te m o narchy , seeing nascen t middle-class society as a mighty w eapon in its struggles against feudalism .’26

T h e re is no d o u b t that in F rance , and in variable degree e lsew here , som e of the u rb an co rp o ra t io n s co -opera ted with the a scendan t s tate ap p a ra tu s of absolutism in ways in which the Estates did not. A ce rta in am o u n t of the adm inistrative au to n o m y of the cities was ced ed , in exchange for th e conso lidation of b ro a d e r fram ew o rk s of law th a t fac il ita ted th e expans ion of co m m erc ia l and m an u fa c tu r in g in terests . T h e r e w ere several reasons for this. In som e part, the parties co n c e rn e d d iscerned the advantages tha t w ould ac c ru e to th em from the deve lopm en t of such fram ew orks. Also, som e increasingly powerful e lem ents were no longer greatly c o n c e rn e d to defend the established forms of co rpora t ive au tonom y, in which the craft guilds rep resen ted a


b arr ie r to the use of free wage-labour as a m eans of expanding p ro d u c tio n . H ow ever, as im p o rtan t as anyth ing was the fact tha t fo r the first t im e the city h ad b eco m e no longer a significant defensive form in w ar — b reak th ro u g h s in military technology ren d e red its role in this respec t largely obsole te . T h e growing obso lescence of the city, in its trad it ional form , in political, econom ic and military term s, is o n e of the most fundam enta l transitions in itia ted — although certain ly no t co m ple ted — as pa r t of the em erg en ce of the absolutist state.

M arx ’s in te rp re ta t io n is to d ay largely d isc red ited , as even historians strongly sym pathe tic to Marxism acknow ledge. T h u s A nderson accep ts tha t the absolutist s tate ‘was never an arb ite r be tw een the ar is tocracy an d the bourgeo is ie , still less an instrum en t of the nascen t bourgeois ie against the a r is tocracy .’27 R a ther , it is m ost accu ra te ly seen as expressing the perpe tua t ion of the class dom ina tion of a trad itional, land-ow ning m inority , which b ecam e substantially t ransfo rm ed largely as an un in tended co n seq u en ce of a t tem p ts to co p e with th rea ts internally and externally. T h e ex ternal processes involved in the deve lopm en t of a novel s ta te system are in my opinion m uch m ore im portan t than many historians have been given to suppose. In ternally , the m ost significant fac to rs w ere p robably , as A nderson suggests, a t tem pts on the par t o f ruling authorit ies to co p e with changes leading to the partial dissolution of the au to n o m y of localized p ea san t co m m u n itie s . T h e o u tc o m e was a ‘d isp lacem en t of au thority upw ards’, considerably s treng then ing the centra lized ap p a ra tu s of royal pow er. A lm ost certain ly th e p resen ce of the partially a u to n o m o u s u rban co m m u n es was of m ajo r im p o rtan ce ( to g e th e r with o th e r d istinctively ‘E u ro p e a n ’ o r ‘W e s te rn ’ influences) in preven ting the post-feudal s ta te from crushing the peasan try in t im e-honoured fashion. A quite d istinctive political o rd e r was thereby crea ted .

T h e effects of absolutism in s treng then ing the bu reau c ra t ic rule of a terr itoria lly b o rd e red s ta te should not be exaggerated. M arx 's s ta tem en t no tw ithstanding , it is only with the em ergence of the nation-s ta te th a t a cen tra lized adm inistrative ap p a ra tu s of s ta te pow er b eco m es ‘u b iqu itous’. If it can justifiably be regarded as the highest d ev e lo p m en t of the absolutist s ta te , F rance under Louis X IV was still fairly re m o te from the nation-s ta te form. It was in som e respec ts possibly the m ost ho m o g en eo u s co u n try in


E u ro p e . M ost of the in h ab itan ts sp o k e the sam e language , a l though the d ifferences be tw een the dialects used in various provinces w ere ex trem e by la ter s tandards. But in som e key ways the scope of the s tate ap p a ra tu s rem ained quite limited. Even the m o n arch was no t simply the King of F rance ; in the Sou th he was re ferred to , and called himself, the C o m te de P rovence , while in D auph ine he was the D auphin de V iennois. If the self-enclosed ch a rac te r o f the local peasan t com m unity had b een substantially un d erm in ed , the regions re ta in ed a g rea t deal of adm inistrative con tro l over their own affairs. Both in respec t of legal and of fiscal adm inistration th e re w ere large regional varia tions and overlapping crite ria of applica tion . V olta ire observed tha t ‘what is just o r right in C h am p ag n e should no t be d ee m e d unjust o r w rong in N orm andy .’2K But such rem ained the case to the end of Louis X IV ’s reign. While R om an law p red o m in a ted in sou thern courts , in o th e r provincial areas cus tom ary law still prevailed. M oreover , som etim es a single com m unity cou ld be subject to multiple types of legal system. For instance , in the Beauvaisis th e re were som e villages within which cus tom ary law varied acco rd ing to several d iffe ren tia tions .29 In spite of the accom plish m ents of C o lbert and o th e r ministers in regularizing the tax system , m e th o d s of tax-co llection rem a in ed cap ric ious . T h e p rim ary form of d irec t taxation , the taille, was co llec ted by officials responsible to the cen tra l state. O th e r taxes w ere fa rm ed, and the Pays d ’Etats had the ir own p ro ced u res of tax-gathering. M oreover , the re w ere tw o kinds of taille, one levied chiefly on land, and applied mainly in the south , the o th e r a form of personal taxation. M any ca tegories of persons w ere exem pt from the taille, as w ere m ost of the large cities. T h ro u g h o u t the reign of Louis X IV , som e cities m ain ta ined tariffs against t rade with large parts o f F rance , while conduc ting free trade with o th e r s tates outside.

It is against this back g ro u n d that the dev e lo p m en t of legal and fiscal systems u n d e r absolutism should be assessed. T h a t they m ark an ex trem ely im p o rtan t s tep in the consolidation of the s ta te ap p a ra tu s is no t o pen to doub t. But they w ere as transitional as th e o th e r aspec ts of th e abso lu tis t s ta te th a t have been m entioned . T h e prom ulgation of abs trac t codes of law, which apply to the whole population of a s tate, is again closely connected with the no tion of sovereignty. If absolutism w ere seen only as the co n cen tra t io n of au tho ri ty in the hands of the m o n a rc h , the


dev e lo p m en t of law could be p ic tu red as the subord ina t ion of the overall political o rd e r to the will o f a despot. But if the absolutist s ta te is considered in term s of the co-ord ination of ‘sovereign adm in is tra t ion ’, the expansion of codified law appears in quite an o th e r light. It is then par t and parcel of a generalized appa ra tus of power. R a th e r than being the plaything of the m o n a rc h , it signposts an avenue to a legal system to which the la tter is e i ther formally irre levant, o r should be d eem ed sub jec t to the sam e legal principles as all o th e r m em b ers of the society.

Several aspects of the dev e lo p m en t of law can be distinguished in con junction with the rise of the absolutist state. O ne is the increasing p ro m u lg a tio n of s ta tu tes designed to apply in an im personal fashion to the w ho le of the p o p u la t io n , with no exclusions for rank . T h u s Louis X IV set up a range of codes of p ro ced u re of such a kind, covering both crim inal and civil law. T h e im p o r tan ce of such an o c c u r re n c e , to w hich th e re a re parallels in the o th e r m ajo r E u ro p ean states, is by no m eans limited just to the fo rm u la t io n of a g en e ra l co rp u s of law, significant though tha t certain ly is. It lies also in the co n cep t that the m o n arch cou ld c rea te and enforce new law. In feudalism , the Estates claim ed legal prerogatives of a traditional ch a rac te r which they also had the right to sanc tion , with the use of force if necessary. T h e territorial ru ler had similar rights but was supposed to en te r into a co m p ac t with the Estates in any m odifications of legal p ro ced u re . In the absolutist s ta te , bodies and organizations ou ts ide the cen tra l adm inis tra tive ap p a ra tu s b ec o m e at m ost ‘a priv ileged au d ien c e w hose individual c o m p o n e n ts m ight be graciously ex em p ted from the unp leasan t effects (especially fiscal ones) of the new ru les’.30

A second fac to r of m ajor im p o rtan ce co n ce rn s changes in the co n ten t of law, m ost par ticularly in respec t o f private property . T h e recovery of R om an law played a significant part in m oulding these changes, a l though its role can be exaggera ted , especially if the cha rac te r iza t ion of its origin is taken seriously. Som e features of late- and post-medieval ‘R o m a n ’ law are n o t found in Antiquity at all, and o th e rs w ere substantially m odified, such as the notions of dominium an d possessio. A cco rd in g to W eb er , the ‘a u th en t ic ’ institutions of R o m an law w ere barely m ore abs trac t than those of G e rm an ic law.31 T h e p rocess of ‘red iscovery’ of R o m an law, there fo re , also re fo rm u la ted it.32 In its re co n s t i tu ted form, R o m an


law provided the m eans of separating private p ro p e r ty from the public ' dom ain in a way n o t o pen to the feudal o rder. T h is was

m ore salient th an any specific e lem en ts of such law actually em ployed to define p rivate p ro p e rty , s ince in the cities co rpuses of com m ercia l law had b een w orked o u t tha t ow ed little to the R o m an heritage. T h e diffe ren tia tion of jus and lex, how ever, re n d e re d the form aliz ing efforts of abso lu tis t adm in is tra t ions highly co n seq u en t ia l fo r su b seq u e n t politica l an d ec o n o m ic deve lopm en t. T h e la tter gave a ready founda tion for the a t tem p ts of rulers to c lea r away m edieval licenses in favour of their own law-making capacity . But the fo rm er, at the sam e tim e and in som e deg ree as p ar t o f the self-same process of law-making, he lped eng ineer new possibilities of ‘p rivate ow nersh ip ’ of bo th land and goods outs ide the scope of s ta te power. T h e claim that the effect o f changes in th e n a tu re of law was sim ultaneously to shore up the overall dom inance of the traditional feudal class, and help confirm the growing streng th of com m erc ia l and m an u fac turing capita l, is no t a paradoxical one.

A third set o f changes in the m echan ism s of law co n cern s criminal law and the m odes of sanction ap p ro p r ia ted by the s tate appara tus . A great deal o f a t ten t ion has been paid by historians to the d ev e lo p m en t of th e gene ra l p ro p e r t ie s of law u n d e r abso lu tism , bu t m u ch less has been w rit ten ab o u t changes affecting criminal law specifically. In the period of absolutism th ere o c c u r the beginnings of incarce ra t ion and the extension of sanction ing agencies con tro l led by the sta te , rep lacing the forms of local com m unity sanction that had previously been p re p o n deran t . T h e re a re close co n n ec t io n s betw een the first two types of juridical transfo rm ation m en tio n ed and this th ird one. T h e co n cep tio n tha t a unitary sovereign au tho ri ty should rep lace feudal co rpora tism — and that this is the condition of e lim inating civil strife — found in variant guise in Bodin and in H obbes, inco rpora tes a stress upon ‘o rd e r ’ o r social discipline. T hus , acco rd ing to Bodin for instance , the ‘end of the s ta te ’ is to p ro d u ce a ‘w ell-ordered life’.33 T h e jux taposition of ‘o rd e r ’ and ‘an a rch y ’ (as also existing, in d ifferent form , in the s ta te system) is intrinsic to the co n cep tio n of sovereignty. It points the way not just to acknow ledging the n eed for generalized social discipline, but to the em ergence of an idea of ‘d ev ian ce’. A lthough , as with m ost of th e tra its of abso lu tism , th e re w ere wide varia tions


betw een d ifferent coun tr ies , it is in the sixteenth and seven teen th cen tu ries that ca rcera l o rganizations tend first to b eco m e fairly w idespread. T h e reorgan iza tion of the hôpital général of Paris in 1657 is sym ptom atic of the trends of th e time. T h is was m ad e up o f a n u m b er of o ld e r buildings g ro uped into o ne , b u t in o th e r cities new purpose-built edifices w ere co n s tru c ted — at Lyon, for exam ple , such a co n s tru c tio n was u n d e r ta k en as early as 1612. A s ta tu te of 1676 requ ired every F rench city o v er a ce rta in size to establish an hôpital général to be m odelled upon the Parisian ex am p le .14

Similar d eve lopm en ts had begun previously in England — u n d o u b ted ly c o n n e c te d with a r a th e r ea r l ie r adm in is tra tive ra tionalization of s ta te au tho ri ty th e re — with the building of houses of co r rec tio n dating from an edict o f 1575. T h ese did no t beco m e extensive and they w ere, th e reafte r , largely superseded by the es tab lishm ent of w ork-houses in a la ter period. H ow ever, E ng land cou ld boas t w ha t has been regarded as probab ly the first exam ple of ‘m o d ern im prisonm en t ' in E u ro p e — widely cop ied in o th e r coun tr ie s — Bridewell, set up in 1556. Bridewell m ay have been the m odel fo r the R asp Huis in A m ste rdam , a lthough som e have d ispu ted this.15 A type of disciplinary pun ishm ent had , in fact, existed prio r to the es tab lishm ent of Bridewell and similar re fo rm ato ries in the rest of E urope . This was the penitential con f inem en t of the m onasteries . Som e of the m ajor m onastic g roups had long since d ev e lo p e d rules for th e co r rec t iv e pun ish m en t of o ffenders by the co n f inem en t and isolation of the offender. T h e m onaster ies w ere no t the p rox im ate source of early houses of co r rec tio n , bu t th e re is a line of connec tion running right from them to the prison system of the late eighteenth and n in e teen th cen tu r ies — a p h en o m en o n of the nation-state ra th e r than the absolutist s tate. Of course , the sp read of ca rcera l o rganizations was not limited to the sphere of criminality as such, bu t form s a m uch b ro a d e r drift of social change associa ted with absolutism, la ter m axim ized in the nation-state . T h e sick, the m ad, and those in ce r ta in o th e r ca tegories cam e to be segregated from the rem a in d er of the ‘n o rm a l’ (sane/law -ab id ing /hea lthy of body) popu la tion . W h a t D o rn e r , following Foucau lt , te rm s the ‘epoch of the adm inis tra tive seques tra tion of u n re a so n ’ (1650— 1800) can plausibly be described as one in which ‘the ch u rch cou ld no longer, and bourgeois-capitalist society cou ld no t yet,


encom pass the various form s of the irra tional, especially th e poor and the d e ran g ed .’36

If som e of these e lem ents are quite pecu lia r to the absolutist s ta te , the n eed for fiscal m an ag em en t is not. T h a t is to say, like all states , the absolutist s ta te d e p e n d ed upon the co llec tion of taxes on a large scale. Becoming engaged in the prosecution of ex tended military confron ta t ions en ta iled a massive dra in on the resources of the m ajor states. It has been calculated tha t in the late sixteenth cen tu ry over th ree-quar te rs of the revenue of the Spanish state was being ex p en d ed for military purposes. A ccord ing to C lark , during the en tire seven teen th cen tu ry th e re w ere only seven ca len d a r years during which th ere was no m ajor w ar be tw een the E u ro p e an states. In o n e of these years large arm ies w ere, in fact, m obilized for battle , the re was an exchange of artillery, and a full- scale w ar was avoided only by a ha ir’s b read th . W ar ‘b ecam e an industry of the s ta te ’.37 Of course , s tates had always ca rr ied on wars. But a t a tim e at which the co n duc ting of w ar b ecam e m ore expensive and com plex, with technologica l change in w eaponry and changes in the rec ru i tm en t and train ing of the military, the m an ag em en t of re levant fiscal resources took on a d ifferent dim ension. T h e early expansion of capitalism was certain ly given a m ajor im petus (how far, and in exactly which ways, rem ains controversial) by the d em an d for huge sum s of m oney to finance military agencies. O ne of th e main series of events tha t in fluenced the subsequen t pa t te rn of the E u ro p ean s tate system was the b an k ru p tcy of Spain, cu lm inating in the late seven teen th cen tu ry , w hen tha t co u n try to all in ten ts and purposes could not m u s te r an arm y to p lace in the field. F ran ce was on the point o f ban k ru p tcy by the tu rn of the seven teen th cen tu ry , bu t the re form s in m odes of fiscal ad m in is tra t ion (following also the so-called ‘genera l crisis’)38 already referred to in relation to Colbert, set the s tandard which the rest of E u ro p e followed.39

As with m ost aspects of the absolutist s ta te , th e centraliz ing and b u reau cra t iz in g in fluences which th e ra t iona liza t ion of f inance p ro m o ted were relatively rud im entary . T h e system of tax- farm ing preserved a p rebenda l e lem en t right at th e h ea r t of the adm inistrative system. T h e re w ere so m any exem ptions in d irec t taxation deriving from ran k and reg ion th a t no co u n try possessed anything like the g rad u a ted systems of taxation th a t cam e later. T h e inform ation ab o u t earn ings up o n which such systems d ep en d


could not be g a th e red effectively even by th e m ost adv an ced of states. It is usually ac cep ted th a t Prussia u n d e r F red e r ick the G re a t was the m ost b u reau cra t iz ed of E u ro p e an states. But the size and scope of its adm inis tra tive reach was small c o m p ared to even the least b u reau c ra t iz ed of s ta te appa ra tuses in n a t io n states. In Prussia at th e tim e th ere was one civil servant for every 450 inhabitan ts ; in G e rm an y in 1925 the re was o n e for every 46 of the p o pu la t ion . I t is r e a so n ab le to ho ld , as o n e o b se rv e r co m m ents , th a t the absolutist s ta te c rea ted ‘a gov ern m en t whose decisions were really carried ou t (that is, an effective governm ent)’. But it is also fair to say, as the sam e au th o r does , th a t even e igh teen th -cen tu ry E u ro p e 'was still in the thra ll’ of institutions ‘which had been b rough t to life during the M iddle Ages’.40

T h e absolutist s ta te , th en , is a distinctive political o rd e r in several key respects , c o m p ared with the generality of traditional states. T h e dev e lo p m en t of th e E u ro p ean sta tes begins to diverge from the pre-established p a t te rn of the rise and fall o f em pires. This involves, above all, the form ation of a new type of reflexively m onito red state system, associated substantively and conceptually with the d ev e lo p m e n t of sovereignty . T h e c o n c e p t io n of sovereignty, tied sim ultaneously to the position of the absolutist ru ler and to the fo rm a tio n of a h e ig h ten ed b u re a u c ra t ic centralism , is o n e of the m ost im p o rtan t e lem en ts binding the ‘in terna l’ dev e lo p m en t of the s ta te with the ‘ex te rn a l’ solidifying o f the s ta te system.

Military Power from the Absolutist to the Nation-State

A m yriad of battles and wars, growing in size and destruc tiveness , shaped the terr ito r ia l a l ignm ent of bo th absolutis t s ta tes and the e m erg en t na t ion-s ta tes in E u ro p e . T h e fac t th a t th e re w ere ‘co n tin u o u s s ta tes’ should no t blind us to the dazzling p an o ram a of changes th a t o cc u rre d across the cen turies . As Tilly points ou t,

the enormous majority of the political units which were around to bid for autonomy and strength in 1500 disappeared in the next few centuries, smashed or absorbed by other states-in-the-making. The substantial majority of the units which got so far as to acquire a recognisable existence as states during those centuries still disappeared. And of the handful which survived or emerged into


the nineteenth century as autonomous states, only a few operated effectively — regardless of what criterion of effectiveness we employ.41

Several geo-political p a t te rn s are observab le in the transition from absolutism to the early phase of d ev e lo p m en t of the n a t io n s ta te in the n ine teen th cen tu ry .42 O ne is the rise and dec line of Spanish influence. T o speak of the role of ‘Spain ' in E u ro p e , A m erica and e lsew here in the fifteenth and six teenth cen tu r ies is obviously no t to re fer to the nation-sta te tha t la te r em erged with th a t appe lla tion . Spanish po w er was ‘in te rn a t io n a l ’ in the trad it ional sense of feudal E u ro p e . C harles V, also the h ead of the Holy R o m an Em pire , ru led over various Spanish Kingdom s, N aples and Sicily, the D u ch y of M ilan, H absburg te rr ito r ies in and n ea r to G e rm an y and the colonial lands across the Atlantic. T h e re was little co n n ec t io n betw een them o th e r than their formal allegiance to the Spanish crow n. But it is no t fa r-fe tched to suppose tha t , given ce rta in d iffe rences in the leadersh ip of the sta te , Spain might have b eco m e the cen tre of a newly forged em pire of the traditional kind.

By the beginning of the seven teen th cen tu ry , this possibility had reced ed rapidly; the dw indling of Spanish m astery left a p e rm an en t im prin t upon the rest o f E u ro p e and eventually the w orld. If the English h ad been defea ted a t sea at th e tim e of the A rm ad a , it is difficult to see that w hat was to b ec o m e Britain w ould have tu rn ed into a leading com m erc ia l o r industrial power. T h e dec line of Spain h as tened the fragm en ta t ion of G e rm an y , a p h e n o m e n o n w hose sign ificance it w ould also be hard to underes tim ate . T h e failure of the Spanish m o n arch y to take advan tage of a pow er vacuum in W estern E u ro p e , b rough t ab o u t by a tem p o ra ry decline of F ran ce , allowed that coun try la te r not only to step back into the political a ren a , but to b ec o m e the do m in an t E u ro p ean power. Absolutist F ran ce is th e first exam ple of a s ta te tha t played a d irec tive role in E u ro p ean politics w ithout becom ing a transnational entity of the old type, and thus genuinely ushered in the beginnings of the m o d ern era.

It is no t jus t the fighting of wars an d the co n d u c tin g of d ip lom acy tha t is at issue here ; equally im p o rtan t w ere far- reach ing changes in military techno logy and organization that partly p re ced e d and partly acco m p an ied the rise of absolutism.


Sobriety is n eed ed on the p ar t o f th e W este rn h is torian w hen these a re c o m p ared with w ha t a lready existed in China, b u t the d iffe rence they m ade to the co u rse o f E u ro p ean history was quite fundam enta l . C h ina, by the eleventh cen tu ry , possessed large armies and a variety of w eaponry lacking in the W est, adding to this in the th ir teen th cen tu ry the use of g u n p o w d er to fire p ro jec t iles .43 T h e r e seem s to have b een a go o d dea l of technological innovation in w arfare and military practice in China in the twelfth and th ir teen th cen turies . A lthough th e re w ere long periods w hen C hinese in terest in sea-pow er was m arginal, in the early fif teen th c e n tu ry C h in a d ev e lo p ed a fleet o f huge p ropor tions , easily capab le of m anaging the sort o f explora tions and trad ing initiatives u n d er tak en by the E u ro p e an s .44 M oreover , com m ercia l en tre p ren e u rs built and organized their own fleets, trading th ro u g h o u t south Asia and east Africa. Again, it is easy to see a possible course tha t world history might have taken — Max W eb er to the con tra ry — if the connections betw een technological d ev e lo p m e n t, th e m ilitary an d th e sp read of co m m erc ia l capitalism in China had progressed fur ther.45 C onfucian principles, disdainful o f the military and , to a lesser deg ree , of the t rad e r , no d o u b t ac ted in a diffuse way to inhibit such progression. But the single most im portan t in fluence was a directly political decision. Just prior to the m iddle of the fifteenth cen tu ry long-distance expeditions across the Indian o cean were p roh ib ited by imperial edict, as was shortly a f te rw ards the construc tion of the ships capable of m aking the necessary voyages. T h e successful intrusion of E u ro p ean military and trad ing missions in the East, in the early period of W estern maritime expansion, was undoubtedly facilitated by this Chinese about-turn .

At the risk of a good deal o f over-simplification, it could be said that the re w ere th ree sets of military d eve lopm en ts that decisively in f luenced (but w ere also influenced by) the rise of the absolutist s ta te . O n e was a series of linked technologica l changes in a rm am ents , which rendered certain traditional land-based ways of m aking w ar largely obsolete . T h e second was the em erg en ce of greatly accen tu a ted administrative pow er within the arm ed forces, bo th in respec t o f beh av io u r on the battlefield and military training in general. ‘D iscip line’, in the m o d ern usage of the te rm , o rig ina tes in a military c o n te x t an d still p re se rves a specia l re sonance there . T h e th ird was the dev e lo p m en t of E u ro p ean

naval s treng th , which from som ew here in the six teenth cen tu ry onw ards (partly again because of technologica l changes) proved irresistible in the rest of the world. A lthough th ere a re prior exam ples of substan tia l trad ing-cum -m ilitary s ta tes , such as Phoenicia , E u rope provides the only instances of far-flung em pires based first and forem ost on con tro l o f the oceans. H ow ever m uch trad it ional em pires m ight have d e p e n d e d upon sea-bo rne co m m u n ica t io n s , the ir expansion usually resu lted from their con tro l of large land-masses.

M edieval armies w ere norm ally m ade up of fluctua ting bodies of m en serving the terr itoria l lord in exchange for land-tenure. T h ey were a rm ed with short swords and pikes. Since w arfare tended to revolve a ro u n d m o u n ted knights, the use of infantry form ations was largely p rec luded . T h e logistics of supply were against the preservation of anything m u ch m ore than a rm ed bands of re ta iners over lengthy periods of time. Arm ies of any size could usually only be su p p o r ted for a few weeks, norm ally in the sum m er. T h e existence of fortified castles and la ter walled cities gave defenders large advantages over a t tack e rs .46 During the H u n d red Y ears ' W ar, in the fou r teen th cen tu ry , som e w arrior bands were raised as m ercenar ies by individuals com m issioned by the m o narchs , and there w ere also ‘free com pan ies ' of soldiers w ho sold their services in re tu rn for p lu n d er and prom ises of land. N e ither of these types of arm y had any kind of stable ex istence, how ever. W h ere the rew ards were insufficient, the a rm y either b roke up o r took to banditry ; if success did co m e, the leaders w ould usually be taken on as th e lord 's re ta iners. T h e d o m in an ce of th e knight on ho rseback in early feudal E u ro p e was s trongly influenced by a simple but highly effective techn ica l device , the iron s t irrup .47 This m ade it possible for the lance held by the w arrior to carry the weight on im pact of horse and rider, ra th e r than just tha t p rov ided by the streng th of the h u m an arm. H ow ever the costs of p roduc ing and m ain ta in ing the a rm o u r and eq u ip m en t w ere extraord inarily expensive by th e s tandards o f the feudal econom y — ruinously so for an yone but the m ost wealthy. As F iner co m m ents , it was som eth ing like expecting a m odern soldier to p rovide a tank and crew, with full supporting services.48

T h e dev e lo p m en t of th e English longbow and the p ike, as used by the Swiss in fan trym en (borrow ing th e idea from tactics used by the R o m an s in the la te r years of th e E m pire) w ere twin



changes in military techno logy tha t helped to dissolve feudal m odes of battle . T h e second was considerab ly m ore influential than the first, b ecau se m aste ry of the longbow n ee d ed a substantial period of learning an d the English yeom anry did no t hire them selves ou t for m ercen a ry service in con tinen ta l E urope . T h e Swiss p ikem en w ere m ainly co m p o sed of m ercenar ies , and the ir fo rm a tion on the batt lefie ld req u ired d isc ip lined c o ordination. T h e Swiss C onfedera tion becam e a source from which soldiery w ere rec ru i ted from all over E urope ; their tactics were ad o p ted by m ost of the successful E u ro p ean armies until well into the fifteenth cen tury . H ow ever, the pike was in tu rn gradually o v er taken by w eaponry that harnessed the explosive fo rce of g unpow der, surely o n e of the m ost m o m en to u s technologica l changes in hum an history. T h e gun had som e very p rofound con seq u en ces for the shaping of m odern civilization because , in th e shape of early artillery , it he lped sharp ly re d u ce the significance of the castle and the city as con ta ine rs of military power. A gun is an ‘industrial’ device in the sense which that term has when applied to the Industrial Revolution. T h a t is to say, it is a m echanical artifact whose im petus depends upon the application of inan im ate sources of m ateria l energy .49

T h e Spanish armies w ere the first to use guns in large m easu re am ong the infantry. S om eth ing like a sixth of their foot soldiers in the Italian W ars ca rr ied guns; the m ajority , how ever, rem a ined p ikem en . A variety of explosive w eapons w ere tried but the two m ain ones early on w ere the ten-pound , four-foot a rq u eb u s and the f if teen-pound, six-foot m usket. By the m iddle of the sixteenth century the two-man m usket, fired from a forked rest, had becom e the leading w eapon; it fired a tw o-ounce ball th a t could p en e tra te all existing forms of a rm o u r , and had a range of som e three h u n dred yards .50 A g rea t deal of o th e r eq u ip m en t had to be ca rr ied to m ake the guns w ork , which they m ight in any case refuse to do in bad w eather. H ow ever, their use p ro m o ted tight discipline, because som ething like a hundred separa te m ovem ents had to be ca rr ied o u t in o rd e r to achieve any sort of rap id firing. T h e c o n c en tra te d fire-power of ranks of m en d e m an d e d even m ore s tr ingent an d routin ized co-ordination.

Field artillery quickly b ecam e a significant fac to r in laying siege, and its very im mobility h e lped shift the locales of battles away from co n cen tra t io n o n castles and cities — the vanquishing


of an arm y on o pen terra in would allow the artillery p ieces subsequen tly to be b rough t into ac tion against fixed fortifications if needed. New types of fortification that were invented to co u n te r explosives had no par ticu la r co n n ec tio n with u rban areas. T h e gun as well as gunpow der m ay well have originally been a Chinese invention but the E u ro p ean d ev e lo p m en t of them , u n d e r the pressure of m ore o r less co n tin u o u s war, m oved far a h e a d .51 G ustavus A dolphus (who with M aurice of Nassau m ust rank as the g reatest innovato r am ong military leaders in the absolutist period) was responsible for two m ajo r con tr ibu tions to military technology. He was am ong the first to ca rry on susta ined w in ter cam paigns, som eth ing which was m ad e possible by the a ltera tions he m ade in m odes of military tran sp o r ta t io n and supply. But he also h e lped invent a new ca rtr id g e w hich , to g e th e r with a l ightened m usket-barrel, m ad e the field gun considerab ly m ore portable . Loading and re loading becam e sigificantly qu icker, with th e result th a t new battlefield fo rm ations cou ld be ach ieved , heighten ing the offensive capabilit ies of the gun-carrying troops in rela tion to o thers . T h e subsequen t invention of the flintlock an d th e b ayone t decisively tu rn ed w arfare in th e m o d ern d irec tion . T h e fo rm er greatly augm en ted the ra te of fire, while th e seco n d m ad e the gun-carry ing sold ier s im u ltaneously a p ikem an. T h e days of the m assed ranks of p ikem en w ere then over.

T h e various technologica l deve lopm en ts in w eaponry from the th ir teen th to the late seven teen th cen tu ries ca n n o t be easily sepa ra ted from organizational changes within the military, and changes in the re la tions be tw een the a rm ed forces and the state. N onethe less , it is not difficult to show that they w ere c o n se q u en tial in their own right for the c lu t te red feudal o rd e r of k ingdom s and principalities. T h e smaller, m ore traditionally organized states w ere e ither swallowed up by the new co n cen tra t io n s of military s trength o r simply b ecam e irre levant to the m ain influences shaping the destiny of the E u ro p ean con tinen t. T h e advances in military technology heavily favoured those states which could , by w hatever m eans, no t just m obilize mass armies, bu t tra in and deploy them in a regularized fashion.

It is generally agreed th a t the F rench com pan ies ‘of o rd n a n c e ’ ( that is, o f a s tandard s trength), c rea ted during the H u n d red Y ears’ W ar, com posed the first s tanding army owing its allegiance


directly to a m o n arch . In 1445 th e F ren ch K ing h ired tw enty such com pan ies on an annua l basis, and g u a ran teed p ay m en t to their m em bers th rough the state . T h ey were each m ad e up of one h u n d red ‘lances’ and several officers, each lance including a man- at-arms, his squire , tw o a rchers , a valet and a p ag e .52 T h ey w ere a m o u n ted force , n o t infantry , an d th e re is n o t a par ticularly d irec t line of co n n ec tio n betw een them and the s tanding arm ies that w ere to co m e later. H ow ever, with their fo rm a tion a clear-cut division began to be es tab lished be tw een land-ow ners w ho p reoccup ied them selves with their estates and those w ho op ted for a m ore professional military ca ree r. In F rance , and som e o th e r coun tries , this co nverged with a gulf be tw een rec ru i tm en t to the military and the o ccu p a t io n s of the m ass of the peasantry . As the feudal levee d ro p p e d away, the Swiss instructo rs of the F rench infantry reg im ents took their recru its p redom inan tly from the ‘enfants perdus' — the rural vagrants and rabble . By the la tter part of the fifteenth cen tu ry , the F rench and the Spanish armies w ere easily the do m in an t forces in E urope , and the F rench arm y in particular had in som e respects taken on a recognizably m odern form. T h a t is to say, it was a t ta c h ed to a s ta te au thority (via the m onarch ) , was a rm ed with explosive w eaponry — to ge ther with o th e r w eapons — and had a p e rm anen tly organ ized core.

T h e ascent of F rance and dec line of Spain as military pow ers can be dram atically ch a r ted by the changing size of their armies across a per iod of close to a cen tu ry , as seen in tab le 3.53

Table 3

T h e s im ple in c rease in size of a rm ies am o n g the lead ing coun tries from the declin ing per iod of feudalism to the turn of the e igh teen th cen tu ry is o n e of the m ost striking fea tu res of E u ro p ean military history. T h e Battle of H astings involved som e 12,000 m en , with abou t the sam e num bers on e ither side. G ustavus Adolphus m ustered 30,000 m en for his campaigns, and Wallenstein


perhaps as m any as 100,000 — nom inally he was only a military c o n tra c to r bu t in reality he was a quasi-imperial ru ler in his own right. How ever, it was the grow th of the F rench army, as tab le 3 indicates, tha t was the m ost impressive fea tu re of E u ro p ean a rm ed strength . U n d e r Louis X IV , the F rench arm y surpassed in num bers tha t of the R om an E m pire at its height — an index of the degree of adm inistrative and fiscal pow er g en e ra ted by the leading absolutist s ta te , which was certain ly no t the reby easily able to have everything its own way. T h e conclusion of the T h irty Y ears ' W ar, a m ajor po in t of transition in the conso lidation of a reflexively m o n ito red s tate system, was also m ark ed by a radical expansion in the size of s tanding arm ies in m ost of the m ajor E u ro p ean states. It should be em phasized , however, that virtually everyw here these armies w ere mainly m ad e up of m ercenar ies , usually supplied by the p o o re r coun tr ies to the m ore wealthy. Even by the end of the seven teen th cen tu ry th ere w ere few b arracks anyw here in E u ro p e ; troops w ere b ille ted on civilians.

Naval pow er is obviously not just an ex tension of the land- based a rm ed forces. A ccess to sea-going rou tes differs widely betw een states acco rd ing to their geographical position; naval history is inevitably o n e of a pa r ticu la r m o d e of transpor ta t ion ; and ships have to be run by those who devo te the ir lives to that end. In any relatively p e rm a n en t navy, ships that c o n c en tra te u p o n the specialized business of m aking w ar m ust be b ack ed up by a range of vessels providing o th e r services, plus land-based facilities. As Brodie puts it, a navy consisting only of battleships would be like a railway having no th ing but locom otives .54 In feudal times, the main co n cen tra t io n of ‘E u ro p e a n ’ sea-power was a ro u n d the M ed ite r ran ean and the prim ary fighting vessel th e re — the galley — h ad no t changed m u ch for cen turies . Of course , a ro u n d the N orth Sea and A tlantic th e re w ere already sea-borne adven tu re rs — the N orsem en; bu t in spite of their ex trao rd inary exploits they w ere never m u ch m o re than in trep id sailors, t raders and m araud ing bandits, no t m aking up a ‘navy’ in the usual sense. As a vehicle of war, the galley d ep e n d ed upon ram m ing and boarding, o r was simply a t ran sp o r ta t io n vehicle for soldiery w ho w ould e n te r co m b a t on land. T h e invention of sailing ships that cou ld survive in all w eathers and , thus, w ere not conf ined to the M ed i te r ran ean basin, was o n e fac to r m aking galleys o u td a ted . M u ch m o re im p o rtan t was the ap p rop ria t ion of


guns for w arfare a t sea. Sailing ships could co n c e n t ra te barrages of cannon m uch as a r ran g em en ts of siege guns cou ld on land. Not only galleys, bu t the generally m uch lighter m onsoon-w ind sailing ships of the East w ere no m a tch for the heavily a rm ed E u ro p e an vessels. T h e la t te r cou ld also be sailed close to the wind, a tech n iq u e unknow n to Eastern sailors w hose experience was confined to the m onsoon seas.

T h e fact that the states with strong M ed ite rran ean interests s tuck to the w idespread use of galleys until deep into the sixteenth cen tu ry was o n e of the factors aiding the rise to p ro m in en ce of the English, the D u tch and later the F ren ch as m ajor naval powers. This , in tu rn , strongly influenced the dec line no t only of Spain bu t of a range of M ed ite rran ean states tha t w ere, in the post-feudal per io d , o f the first im p o r tan ce in the overall distribution of pow er in E urope . Like land-based arm ies, but persisting to a la ter da te , the fleets of the m arit im e coun tries were largely co m p o sed of hirelings, n o t ow ned by the state. A b o u t 40 p er cen t of the A rm ad a was co m p o sed of galleons ow ned by the Spanish crow n, the rest being a rm ed m erch an t vessels; and only abou t 16 per cen t of the English fleet consisted of royal warships.55 Regular navies da te mainly from the latter par t of the seventeenth cen tu ry , by which tim e the m erc h an t vessels had been fo rced o u t o f the line by increases in bo th the f ire -pow er and the m anoeuvrabil ity of warships. N onetheless, the a rm ed streng th of the m erch an t vessels tha t ro a m e d the world in search of t rade and p lu n d er was form idable ; by the m iddle of the sixteenth cen tu ry , and for a long period thereafte r , ‘E u ro p ean ships could co u n t on crushing superiority in a rm ed en co u n te rs with vessels of d ifferent design on every o cean of the ea r th . ’56

If these various transfo rm ations of land-based and naval a rm ed s tren g th had m ere ly a c c o m p a n ie d the d e v e lo p m e n t of the absolutist s ta te , o r w ere simply results o f th a t d ev e lopm en t, there would be no point in offering such an accoun t of well-docum ented military history. But the chang ing n a tu re of military pow er is far m ore im p o rtan t than that in explicating no t only the n a tu re of absolutism bu t also the ch a rac te r of the nation-state.

V arious m ain fea tu res of E u ro p e an s tate deve lopm en t were shaped in a decisive way by the con tingen t o u tco m es of military co n f ro n ta t io n s an d wars. N o th ing shows m o re clearly how implausible it is to regard the em erg en ce of m o d e rn societies as


th e result of som e sort of evolu tionary schem e that inexorably leads from the alluvial dirt of S um er to th e factory shop-floor of latter-day E u ro p e . If C h arlem agne o r an o th e r ru ler had m anaged to re-establish an imperial fo rm ation in E u ro p e with the scope and the sway of the R om an E m pire , the co n tin en t would no d o u b t have ‘s tagnated ' in just the sam e way tha t it seem ed to later W este rn observers the g rea t em pires of the East did. ‘Capitalism ' m ay have deve loped in a n o th e r sec to r of the world a ltogether; b u t the m ost likely result w ould alm ost certain ly have been that history w ould have followed an entirely d iffe ren t course. If the M ongols in the th ir teen th cen tu ry had chosen to build upon their victories on the bo rde rs of E u ro p e , ra th e r than being m ore c o n ce rn ed with the East, o r if the O tto m an E m pire had won co m p arab le victories in the seven teen th cen tu ry , ‘E u ro p e ’ would n o t have existed as a socio-political entity.

T h e E u ro p e an s ta te system was not simply the ‘political e n v iro n m e n t’ in w hich the abso lu tis t s ta te and nation-s ta te developed . It was the cond ition , and in substantial degree the very source , of that deve lopm en t. It was war, and p repara tions for war, that provided the m ost p o ten t energizing stimulus for the concentration of administrative resources and fiscal reorganization that cha rac te r ized the rise of absolutism. T echno log ica l changes affecting warfare were m ore im portan t than changes in techniques of p roduc tion . In general it is a m istake to con tra s t the supposed technologica l inertia of the M iddle Ages with a vision of rapid technologica l change from the R enaissance onw ards. T e c h n o logical change was no t foreign to medieval life,57 and did not greatly acce le ra te in the post-feudal era , at least p rio r to the sev en teen th cen tury . It is o ften po in ted out tha t the m edieval guilds resisted technologica l change , bu t forgotten that the new s ta te au tho ri ty regarded such change with as little favour as the t rad e co rp o ra t io n s had d o n e .58 T h e fairly rapid ra te of t e c h n o logical dev e lo p m en t in the m eans of m aking war was first of all substantially sepa ra te from the m ain co re of p ro d u c tio n , w hich it affec ted m u ch m ore than th e o th e r way around .

T h e em erg en ce of s tanding armies is a p h en o m en o n of m uch g re a te r sociological in te res t th an is o rd inarily recogn ized . A com parative s tandpoin t can som etim es lead to a certa in confusion here , for s tanding armies a re no t, as such, distinctive to E urope . In som e fo rm o r an o th e r , all the larger types of class-divided


society have m ain ta ined s tanding arm ies — it is feudalism tha t is unusual in tha t respect. T h u s it m ight seem as though th e re is no th ing particularly new in the E u ro p ean deve lopm en ts , which actually co m e m ore into line with w ha t has existed elsew here. But this is misleading. In o th e r trad it ional states, th e military was the m ain founda tion of bo th the in ternal adm inistrative pow er of the state ap p a ra tu s and its ex ternal d e fence (or m eans of aggression) against foreign th rea t. G iven the segm ental ch a rac te r of class- divided societies, it is o ften difficult to sep a ra te the tw o in a m eaningful way at all. But in the absolutist s ta te , for the first time, the re begins to co m e ab o u t a s ituation in which the arm y is n o t the main basis of the p reserva tion of in ternal ‘o rd e r ’. This is a transition which cu lm inates in the E u ro p e an nation-s ta te and — so I shall a rgue — explains ce r ta in of its in trinsic s truc tu ra l charac teris t ics . T h e o th e r face of the deve lopm en ts in the m eans of waging w ar is the process of internal pacif ication previously referred to (and discussed m ore fully below). This was not brought ab o u t by the grow th in the size of armies o r by the e labora t ion of military technology. R ather, the existence of large standing armies and the progression of in ternal pacif ication are co m p lem en ta ry expressions of the co n cen tra t io n of the adm inistrative resources of the state. In bo th cases w ha t is involved is a leap forw ard in the expansion of adm inistrative power.

In this leap, the o rganization of the military played a prim e role , influencing both the s ta te ap p a ra tu s and o th e r organizations including, a t a la ter da te , business firms. F o r it was to a large ex ten t in th e m ilitary sp h e re , as M u m fo rd in p a r t ic u la r has rem inded us,59 th a t adm inis tra tive pow er in its m o d ern guise was p ioneered . T h e innovations of M aurice of Nassau, the P rince of O range , a re bo th the m ost p ro m in en t exam ple of this and a t the sam e time exemplify m ore long-term trends in military o rgan ization. M au r ice he lped in itia te two c o n n e c te d adm in is tra tive changes la ter seen in all m o re b u reau cra t ized organizations — the fo rm a tion of a body of experts holding exclusive know ledge of certain essential administrative techniques, and the simultaneous creation of a ‘de-skilled’ population of ordinary soldiery. T h e re is a very real sense in w hich, th rough M au r ice ’s in terven tions, the techn iques of Taylorism b ecam e well e m b e d d e d in the sphere of the a rm ed forces several h u n d re d years before , in industrial p ro d u c tio n , they ca m e to be know n by such a label.60 As van

D o o m rem arks , com paring the two apparen tly qu ite con trasting figures, ‘with bo th persons one is s truck by the solid know ledge of the p rac t ice of their trade , their sharp analytical pow ers and a desire for experim en t which was su p p o r ted by a firm belief in the organisability and manipulability of hum an behaviour .’61 As T ay lor was to do , M aurice divided the technical aspects of the w ork of soldiery into specific, regular sequences of single activities. T hus , building upon what had already been accom plished by the Spanish co m m an d e rs , he p ro d u c ed flow charts for the handling of the m uske t and the pike, each part of the seq u en ce of ac ts involved being clearly specified. Soldiers w ere requ ired to practise these until they could autom atically follow the ‘co r rec t ' p rocedures . R a th e r than being trea ted as ‘c ra f tsm en’, skilled in the use of w eaponry , recru its w ere regarded as having to be drilled to acquire the necessary familiarity with handling military equipm ent. T h e m em bers of a unit were taught to respond simultaneously to co m m an d instructions, so as to co-ord ina te the m ovem en ts of each individual with the g ro u p as a whole.

U n d e r the im pact of these m odes of adm inistrative reshaping, p ro found changes o cc u rre d in the n a tu re of the a rm ed forces and in behav iour on the battlefield. M aurice set up the first military academ y in E u ro p e , w hose teachings by one avenue o r an o th e r b ecam e s tandard p rac t ice th ro u g h o u t the con tinen t. T h e m odern senses of ‘u n ifo rm ’ and ‘d iscipline’ can be t raced to their spread. T h e fo rm er of these te rm s was originally only an adjective but b ecam e a no u n as the w earing of s tandard ized c lo thes grew to be the no rm in armies. So far as the o rd inary soldier goes, uniforms d a te from the New M odel A rm y in the English Civil W ar. Even in the e igh teen th cen tu ry som e tro o p s dressed m ore o r less as they pleased; bu t for the m ost part in the course of the seven teen th cen tu ry the wearing of uniforms becam e firmly established am ong all ranks of soldiery. ‘D iscipline’ used to d en o te a p rope rty of so m eo n e w ho followed a set of teachings, but u n d e r the influence of military training cam e to be regarded not as the individual receiving instruction but the end-result of such ins truc tion .62 In the new m o d e of fighting wars, personal display and heroism b ecam e dram atically re d u ced in im portance , dem onstra t ing that th e trans it ion from display (spectacle) to anonym ity which F oucau lt traces for pun ish m en t is no t solely assoc ia ted with



in carcera t io n .63 T h e b arracks cam e into being in close associa tion with uniform s and regularized disciplinary training.

T h e adm inistrative tech n iq u es of M aurice w ere partly derived from copying p ro ced u re s used in the R o m an legions, an d were partly the result of adop ting notions of train ing suggested in pedagogy. T h ey reflect p rocesses of adm inis tra tive re form which by the end of the seven teen th cen tu ry w ere pene tra t ing m any spheres of activity and have, as their fons et origo, th e absolutist state. But th e re can be no d o u b t tha t the m ode l of the arm y — as C rom w ell m ad e c lea r in a particularly bold exam ple — was d irec tly lo o k ed to by m any of th o se seek ing to ex p an d the administrative resources at their disposal. T h e p ic ture in conc re te term s was, of course , a com plica ted one. T h e officer corps in most s ta tes re ta ined a hostility to the bu reaucra tiz ing of the a rm ed forces in so far as it a ffec ted their own life-styles; there was no professional o fficer corps p rio r to 1800. Officers were usually m ercenar ie s o r aris tocra ts ; ‘the fo rm er pu rsued profit, the la tter h o n o u r and ad v e n tu re .’64

T h e fact tha t the early dev e lo p m en t of the a rm ed s trength of the E u ro p ean states was organized in a ‘capita lis t ic’ fashion may be re levant to explaining the sp read of en trep ren eu r ia l en terprise tha t subsequen tly b ecam e such a significant e lem en t of W estern social institutions. T h e princely rulers of post-feudal E u ro p e all b ecam e d ep e n d en t on loans from bankers , w ho in con junction with en trep ren eu r ia l m ercen a ry co m m an d e rs , w ere the m akers and b reakers of m o n arch s .65 T h e role of th e condottieri and the bank ing families was of key im p o rtan ce in the ‘b reak aw ay’ from traditional patterns of military organization in the early form ation of absolutist states. Later, as the carrying on of wars b ecam e even m ore form idably expensive, those states th a t had successfully nego tia ted the transition from feudalism in tac t assum ed con tro l o f credit. W e are so accu s to m ed to seeing the rise of com m ercia l , an d then industrial, capita lism as d u e to the results of private initiative th a t it looks as if an initial p h ase of cap ita lis t d ev e lo p m en t g ro u n d to a halt with the consolidating of the absolutist s tate. But really the activities of Sully, C o lbert and the o thers set ce r ta in p a t te rn s which persist to this day. T h e states assum ed co n tro l o f m oney , p laced their ap p a ra tu s o f sanctions in the service of guaran tee in g its value, and a national system of

credits and deb ts was established. A lthough individual bankers an d o th e r en trep ren eu rs m ay have been pushed ou t of business, the fu r ther deve lopm en t of capitalist en terp rise was in the long ru n decisively s treng thened ra th e r than w eakened .

T o exam ine this issue, in re la tion to the fo rm a tion of the nation-sta te , som e basic co n cep tu a l questions have to be raised. W h a t exactly does ‘cap ita lism ’ m ean when used of the eco n o m ic d ev e lo p m en t of E u ro p e from the fifteenth o r s ix teen th cen tu ry onw ards? H ow does capita lism en gros d iffer from ‘industrial cap ita lism ’? A n d w hat re la tion does each of these types have to the em erg en ce of the nation-sta te? T h ese are the p rob lem s whichI shall m ak e the focus of the next chap te r . But first it is necessary to provide a concep tua liza t ion of the nation-state.

Nation-State, Nation, Nationalism

T h e te rm s ‘nation-s ta te’, ‘n a t io n ’ and ‘na tionalism ’ are o f ten , even charac teristically , used in the l i te ra tu re of the social sciences and history as though they w ere synonym ous. But I shall distinguish betw een th em .66 By ‘na tionalism ’ I m ean a p h en o m en o n that is primarily psychological — the affiliation of individuals to a set of sym bols an d beliefs em phasiz ing co m m u n a li ty am o n g the m em bers of a political o rde r . A lthough sen tim ents of nationalism often co inc ide with the ac tua l d is tribution of popu la tions within states, and while those w ho govern m odern states usually seek to p ro m o te such sen tim ents w h erev er possible, th e re is by no m eans always a c lea r co r re sp o n d en c e be tw een them . By a ‘n a t io n ’ I refer to a collectivity existing within a clearly d em arca te d territo ry , which is subject to a unitary adm inistration, reflexively m onitored bo th by the in ternal s ta te ap p a ra tu s and those of o th e r states. Both the na tion and nationalism are distinctive p rope rt ie s of m o d ern states and in the co n tex t of their original em erg en ce as well as e lsew here there is m ore than a for tu itous connec tion betw een them . T h e re can be no nationalism , in its m o d ern form at least, w ithou t the fo rm ation of nations, a l though the reverse rela tion is a m o re p rob lem a tic one.

In o rd e r to ind icate th a t nationalism is a re cen t deve lopm en t we have to con tra s t it to pre-existing forms of g roup identity. Barth is p robab ly right to say th a t sen tim en ts of g ro u p identity at all times an d in all p laces a re exclusionary: how a g ro u p or



com m unity is thought of d ep en d s upon the traits a t t r ib u ted to o thers , to ou ts iders .67 In m any tribal cultures, the w ord deno ting m em b er of the com m unity is identical to th a t used for ‘h u m a n ’, ou tsiders no t being a c co rd e d tha t dignity. T h e ch arac te r is t ic associa tion of o u ts id e r with ‘b a rb a r ian ’ has som etim es the sam e linguistic co n n o ta t io n . Occasionally , exclusionary te rm s seem to be the only ones in term s of which group identity is conceptualized. T h u s the G e rm an ic peoples re ferred to them selves as ‘betw een W end and W alsche’, n o t having any o th e r co n cep tu a l m eans of self-designation. T h e re fe ren t of ‘W e n d ’ a lte red from Finnic nom ad herders s i tuated to the north-east to incom ing Slavic groups m oving in fu r th e r south ; while ‘W a lsch e ’ was transferred from the Celts to the Rom ans. T h e notion of ‘t r ib e ’, of course , p resum es som e co n cep tio n s of a descent g roup , o r associa tion of such g roups; an d such co n c ep t io n s , to g e th e r with religious symbols, have everywhere been the m ain sources of group identity and exclusion. G enealog ica l m yths seem to have been the most co m m o n m eans w hereby ac tua l descen t an d kin connec tions b ecam e solidified with g ro u p identity , and have been as m uch par t of the history of ruling classes within class-divided societies as of overall cultures. T h e sam e is no t t rue of language. Even in small tribal com m unitie s it is n o t generally the case tha t language is, o r is felt to be , a significant index of identity and exclusion. Surround ing g roups often speak the sam e language, o r a variant of it. T h e ruling classes in class-divided societies have frequently been polyglot, this being an expression of th e cultura l mergings p ro d u c e d th ro u g h co n q u e s t an d partia l ass im ila tion .68 T h e language of the O tto m an imperial cou r t in the six teenth cen tu ry , for exam ple , com prised large n u m b ers of m ixed A rabic , Persian and T urk ish w ords and phrases, and m ost of the courtie rs could speak these and o th e r languages.69

In m edieval feudalism , as in m any class-divided societies with the excep tion of centra lized b u reau cra t ic em pires, cou r ts were usually peripa te tic . T h e Holy R o m an E m pire did no t have a fixed cap ita l, the ru ling ad m in is tra t ion regularly m oving be tw een various cities. T h e lack of a capital city in the traditional E uropean states bo th co n tr ib u ted to , an d expressed, the low degree of te rr ito r ia l in teg ra tion . It h e lp ed s t ren g th en co m m u n a li ty of ou tlook and identity am ong the d o m in an t classes bu t, by that very to k en , it inhibited an extension of th em to those in the

sub jec t popu la tions . T h o se s ta tes th a t rela tively early on deve loped fixed capita ls ten d ed to be the ones assoc ia ted with the m ost d istinguishable nascen t forms of nationalist sen tim ent, thus indicating that the m eans of p ropoga ting symbols from a national cu ltu ra l cen tre was probably as im p o rtan t even early on as any m o re ‘sp o n tan eo u s ’ identity forged at the lower levels of society. T w o of the prim ary exam ples, F ran ce and England , were ‘co n tin u o u s s ta tes ’ for several hu n d red years. T h a t is to say, they w ere n o t co n q u e re d from the ou ts ide o r su b jec ted to alien dom inion over their central regions. Because of the m utual claims of their dynasties, their terr ito r ia l and cultura l dev e lo p m en t were closely tied. P r io r to the th ir teen th cen tu ry it would m ak e most sense w hen referring to them to speak of the exis tence of two F rench k ingdom s, one loca ted in con tinen ta l E u ro p e and the o th e r off its shores, s ince bo th were ruled by F rench-speaking m o n arch s whose re ta iners and higher adm in is tra to rs w ere also French-speaking . In Scotland at that per iod , four languages were sp o k en — F ren ch am o n g th e d o m in an t class, A nglo-Saxon tow ards the south-east, G aelic in the Highlands and the W este rn Isles, an d C eltic in m arg ina l a reas tow ards (he sou th -w est.70 N evertheless, by the fifteenth cen tu ry there w ere som e definite stirrings of som eth ing like nationalist feeling, s t im ulated by the ex p e r ien ce of co n s tan t s truggles with the English. T h ese sen tim ents have their origins, as Barrow observes, not in e thn ic o r linguistic com m unality , bu t in the state 's m obilization of d ifferent classes an d s tra ta for the fight against a co m m o n enem y .71

Of course , such ‘peripheral nationalism s’ persist to this day in E u ro p e , and the dynam ics of their dev e lo p m en t a re in som e respects d iffe ren t from those of the m ore m ajo r states. In the la tter , s table adm inis tra tion from early established capita ls seems to have been crucial. ‘English’ da tes from ab o u t the fo u r teen th cen tu ry , and in som e considerab le degree sp read ou tw ards from usages first firmly estab lished in L o n d o n .72 By th e s ix teenth cen tu ry th ere can readily be traced a few co re c o m p o n en ts of ‘being English’, assoc ia ted also with ‘speaking English’. W h e th e r it could accurate ly be described as ‘nationalism ’ is highly dubious; the nationalism that em erges in the n in e teen th and tw entie th cen tu r ies is British’ ra th e r than ‘English’, a l though com plica ted by both Scottish and W elsh nationalis t feelings. F ran c e expanded in a re lative stable way across the cen tu r ies from the î le de



F rance , and it surely no t acc iden ta l that the m ost pow erful and centra lized absolutist s tate is also the one in w hich the lineages of m odern nationalism can m ost easily be d iscerned . W h a t becam e ‘F ra n c e ’ in the s ix teen th and seven teen th cen tu r ies was n ev e rtheless m ou lded from a co llec tion of provinces th a t w ere earlier bo th culturally and linguistically distinct. T h e batt le of M u re t, in the first par t o f th e th ir teen th cen tury , was o n e of those events which, trivial enough in itself, was fraught with consequences . It led to the d o m in an ce of the n o r th e rn m o n arch s over L anguedoc , which o therw ise m ight have b eco m e a pow erfu l s ta te based a ro u n d the cen tra l M ed ite rran ean coast and the R hone d e l ta .73 T h e sp read of F rench was in som e part the result of delibera te s tate policy — it b ecam e the sole official language by an ed ic t of 1539. T h e Académie Française, founded by R ichelieu , b ecam e a m ajor influence on bo th the form and the successful diffusion of the F rench language th rough the whole te rr ito ry of the state. H ow ever, m ost historians agree tha t nationalist sen tim ents in the seven teen th and early e igh teen th cen tu r ies in F ran ce w ere both ru d im en ta ry and reg ionally specific . M ost ‘F r e n c h ’ m en and w om en though t of them selves as belonging e i th e r to o n e of the provinces o r to o n e of the cities.

C o m m o n though it is to po rtray nationalism in ‘con tinuous s ta tes’ as em erging in an inevitable way from the d o c tr ines of sovereignty which they took up, there is actually little intrinsic associa tion be tw een them . A link was only forged subsequently ; Bodin and his fellow political th inkers were n o t ‘nationalists’. T h e F rench revolution undeniably had an influence on the subsequent flowering of nationalism , within ‘une nation une et indivisible'. But it was mainly in the non-unified states and principalities of cen tra l and n o r th e rn E u ro p e th a t m o d e rn co n c ep t io n s of nationalism have their origin — in R om antic ism ra th e r than consti tu tional ra tionalism .74 Nationalism is essentially a p h en o m enon of the late e igh teen th cen tu ry and after. T h e question as to why this should be so is o n e I shall take up later.

A ‘n a t io n ’, as I use the te rm here , only exists w hen a s tate has a unified adm inistrative reach over the te rr ito ry over which its sovereignty is c laim ed. T h e deve lopm en t of a plurality of nations is basic to the cen tra liza tion and adm inistrative expansion of s tate d o m ina tion in ternally , since the fixing of borders d epends upon the reflexive o rde ring of a s tate system. W e can follow

Jones in recognizing four aspects of the transform ation of frontiers into borders .75 T hese he calls allocation, delim itation, dem arca tion and adm inis tra tion .

T h e first refers to a collaborative political decision taken am ong states ab o u t the d istr ibu tion of terr ito ry be tw een them . D elim itation c o n c e rn s th e iden tif ica tion of specif ic b o rd e r sites.76 D em arca tio n in Jones’s sch em e — w ritten as a gu ide for policym akers and n o t just an acad em ic study — refers to how borders a re actually m ark e d on the physical env ironm en t. M any borders , even within the hea rt of E u ro p e today, are not d em arca te d . T h a t ap p a ren t m o d ern equivalen t of the walls built by traditional s tates, the Berlin Wall, is an anom aly because it symbolizes the failure of a m o d ern s tate to exert the level o f adm inistrative con tro l over its popu la t ion which its governing au thorit ies deem p ro p e r an d necessary . T h e b o rd e r be tw een East and W est G erm an y must be one of the most highly ‘adm in is te red’, in Jones’s term s, in the world. T h a t is to say, a high deg ree of d irec t surveillance is m ain ta ined along it. T rad it ional s tates som etim es co n s tru c ted fron tier posts, dem an d in g paym en t, and occasionally d o cu m en ta t io n , of those w ho travelled th rough. But w here these existed they were usually, in fact, at divisions be tw een provinces ra th e r than be tw een states as such. T h e coupling of d irec t and ind irec t surveillance (custom s officials and fron tie r guards , plus the cen tra l co-ord ination of passport in form ation) is o n e of the distinctive fea tu res of the nation-state.

A nation-s ta te is, there fo re , a b o rd e red pow er-con ta ine r — as I shall argue, the pre-em inent pow er-con ta iner of the m o d ern era. How this has co m e ab o u t it will be o n e of the chief tasks of the following ch ap te rs to explain. But am ong o th e r things it involves processes of u rban transfo rm ation and the in ternal pacif ication of states. T h ese are p h en o m en a that go together with the creation of generalized ‘d ev ian ce’ as a ca tegory and with processes of seq u es tra t io n . All t rad i t io n a l s ta tes have laid c laim to the formalized m onopoly o v er the m eans of v io lence within their terr ito r ies . But it is only within nation-s ta tes th a t this claim charac teris tically becom es m ore o r less successful. T h e progress of in ternal pac if ication is closely co n n e c ted with such success — they are , as it w ere, d iffe ren t sides of the sam e process.

T h e objection may be raised that there are very m any instances, even in cu r ren t times, o f s ta tes whose m onopoly of the m ean s of



violence is chronically th rea ten ed from within by a rm e d groups; tha t insurgent m ovem en ts , o ften poorly a rm e d and organized co m p ared with s ta te au thorit ies , have som etim es cha llenged and over th row n those authorit ies ; and that th e re a re diffuse levels of v iolence in m inor con tex ts of even the m ost politically quiescent societies (crimes of vio lence, dom estic v io lence and so on). N one of these, how ever, com prom ise the po int at issue, which concerns a com parison betw een nation-states and trad it ional states. T h e re are circum stances in which civil war, involving chron ic co n fro n ta tions betw een a rm ed m ovem en ts o r coalitions of m ore o r less equal s treng th , have been quite p ro trac ted . H ow ever, n o t only are such c ircum stances highly unusual, the very existence of ‘civil w ar ' p resum es a norm of a m onopolis t ic s ta te au thority . By con tras t, cond itions which in a m o d ern s ta te w ould be defined as exam ples of ‘civil w ar’, that is, divisive ‘in terna l' a rm ed struggles, have been typical o f all class-divided societies for very long periods. Again, a rm ed groups o r m ovem en ts today are almost always o r ien ted to the assum ption of s tate pow er, e i ther by taking over an existing s ta te ’s terr ito ry o r by dividing up a terr itory and establishing a sepa ra te state . Such organizations do no t and can n o t ‘op t o u t ' from involvem ent in s ta te pow er o n e way or an o th e r as frequently h ap p en ed in trad it ional states. Finally, I have no wish to underp lay the im portance o r ex ten t of v iolence tha t takes p lace in small-scale con tex ts in m o d ern societies. But 1 am principally co n c e rn e d with the m eans of v iolence associa ted with the activities o f organ ized a rm ed forces, no t with violence as a m o re b lanket ca tegory of the do ing of physical h a rm to o thers .

Collecting to g e th e r the im plications of the foregoing observations, we can arrive at the following co n cep t of the nation-state , which holds for all variants and is not intrinsically bound to any particular charac terization of nationalism. It is the sam e definition given in the vo lum e to which this book is the successor. ‘T h e nation-state , which exists in a com plex of o th e r nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance m aintaining an adm inistrative m o n o p o ly o v er a te r r i to ry with d e m a rc a te d b o u n d ar ie s (borders), its rule being sanc tioned by law and d irec t con tro l of the m eans of in terna l and ex ternal v io lence .’77

Capitalism, Industrialism and Social Transformation

5

What is Capitalism?

A m o n g bo th sociologists and h istorians, the fo r tu n es o f the concep t of ‘capitalism’ have waxed and w aned in different periods over the past cen tu ry o r so. Historians charac teris tically have been suspicious of the no tion , a lthough often on g rounds that apply to m any generalizing concep ts , that it is too diffuse to do justice to the subtleties of historical detail and particularity . W h ere they have not been close to Marxism, sociologists have o ften favoured o th e r te rm s to re fer to the changes associa ted with m odern ity , such as ‘industrialism’, or the m ore global concep t of ‘industrial socie ty’. Marxists tend to use the w ord ‘capita lism ’ with casual profligacy, regard ing the deve lopm ent of capitalist p ro d u c tio n as the most fundam en ta l p h en o m en o n affecting the m odern w orld, but not always being too careful to identify its traits in any sort of precise way. Behind the conceptual adm ixtures there are, however, a n u m b er of basic disagreem ents of substance. O ne co n cern s the prim acy of the events o r changes assoc ia ted respectively with ‘cap ita lism ’ and with ‘industrialism ’. F o r M arx, and for his self-professed followers, industrialism is in its essential respects a fur thering of charac te r is t ics found in capitalism , which is bo th m ore general and which p reced es it in time. A ccord ing to the m ajority of non-M arxist social scientists, on the o th e r hand , capitalism is bu t a transitory phase in the fo rm a tion of m odern ‘industry’ and ‘industrial socie ty’. T h e la t te r no tions a re thus m ore im p o rtan t for analysing th e m o d ern w orld, and of a m ore generic na tu re , than is the fo rm e r .1

Clearly the points at issue here are in large deg ree empirical: How should we seek to ch a rac te r iz e th e m a jo r ec o n o m ic transfo rm ations tha t have o cc u rre d over the past two centuries? But they are also co n cep tu a l . F o r evidently n e i th e r the term s ‘capita lism ’ n o r ‘industria lism ’ are always used in the sam e way by those on each side of this pa r ticu la r theore tica l fence.

It will not be my purpose in w hat follows to provide a general survey of vagaries in usage of these term s in th e l i te ra tu re of the social sciences. R a ther , I shall take two ‘classical’ sources as a po int o f d ep a r tu re , con tras ting M arx and W e b e r on the n a tu re of ‘cap ita lism ’. Both tend to speak p redom inan tly of ‘cap ita lism ’ ra th e r than ‘industrialism ’. But W e b e r ’s position is close to — and has frequently inspired — the views of those w ho see industrialism as the m ajor in fluence shaping the institutional p a ram ete rs of m o d ern society. Inverting chronology , 1 shall first o f all discuss W eber , then m ove to Marx. A lthough I shall in som e respects support M arx 's view ra th e r than that of W eb er , the s tandpo in t d ev e lo p ed will d iffer from bo th . In E u ro p e a n h istory , the deve lopm en t of capita lism an ted a te s that of industrialism, and by a considerab le period of time. T h e fo rm er was also the necessary cond ition for the em erg en ce of the latter. But capitalism and industrialism have their own distinctive features. T h ey can n o t be concep tua lly co llapsed into o n e an o th e r and em pirically they can exist in som e substantial separation . This is also true , I shall argue later, of o th e r qu ite e lem enta l aspects of the dev e lo p m en t of E u ro p ean states in the n in e teen th and early tw entie th cen turies.

A ccord ing to W eber, capitalistic activities can be found at m any times and places. T h e re is no th ing in capita lism as such that links it specifically to the W est; m odern (W estern) capitalistic activity has certa in defin ite charac teris t ics that m ark it o u t from earlie r types. In W e b e r ’s w ritings cap ita lism is tied to an in te rp re ta t ion of ‘eco n o m ic ac tion ' as a type o r aspec t o f social co n d u c t. H um an activity, in his term s, is ‘econom ically o r ien te d ’ accord ing to w h e th e r o r not it is co n ce rn ed with the satisfaction o f a m ater ia l need . ‘E co n o m ic ac tio n ’ re fers to any form of econom ically o r ien ted activity tha t is ca rr ied o u t peacefully. Not all eco n o m ic ac tion involves exchange , but exchange (which can take various d iffe ren t forms) is easily the m ost im p o rtan t m eans o f secu ring d es ired utilities. ‘E x c h a n g e ’ is any no n -co e rced ag reem en t offering an existing o r fu tu re utility against an o th e r or

Capitalism , Industrialism and Socia l Transformation 123

others given in re turn . In w ha t W e b e r som etim es calls ‘natura l eco n o m ies’,2 exchange barely o ccu rs a t all, o r is m ad e principally in kind. N atural econom ies are inimical to capita lism , although som eth ing approach ing ‘profit-m aking’ m ay exist in them , since b a r te r m ay be used to accu m u la te a range of goods by o n e or m o re of the involved parties. But ca lcu la tion in kind is essentially c o n c e rn e d with th e ca tering fo r know n and relatively fixed wants. Capitalism , in all its forms, d ep e n d s upon the exis tence of money. I t is im p o rtan t to see w ha t W e b e r is getting a t here. O n e might th ink th a t m oney is necessary to capitalistic activity primarily because it p rovides a m ean s for th e assessm ent of ‘p ro f it’. But the im p o rtan ce of m oney is m u ch m o re p ro fo u n d than this. For, as W e b e r portrays it, m oney is above all a m eans of the s to rage and transfo rm ation of resources — a m eans of the expansion , in my term inology , of t im e —space d is tancia tion and thereby of po w er.3

M oney is a s tandard of exchange-value w hich, by n a tu re of its very s tan d a rd iza t io n , rem o v es ec o n o m ic ex ch an g e from the con tex tua l limitations of bar te r . Barter requ ires tha t those who exchange goods, a t som e po in t in the trad ing process, physically m ee t to ca rry o u t the tran sac t io n . W ith th e use of m oney , exchange is no longer (in principle) tied to any par ticu la r locale. T h e re is an inheren t co n n ec tio n betw een the ‘ca lcu lab ility ’ that m oney p rom otes and its t ran scen d en ce of the im m ediacy of con tex t. T h e sam e is t ru e of the accoun ting p ro ced u re s m oney inevitably entails. ‘M o n ey ’, in a general sense, has existed in a diversity of societies, no t only in those of the class-divided type. But m o n e ta ry exchange of a fairly deve loped sort p resupposes just those form s of listing and collating of re sources that a re at the origin of writing, so im p o rtan t to the gene ra t ion of pow er in t rad i t io n a l s tates. W e b e r p laces m uch em phasis upon the invention of double-en try book-keeping in the fo rm ation of the specifically W este rn type of capitalism , and no d o u b t he is right to do so. But no less im p o rtan t is his stress upon the generic co n n ec t io n of m oney with acco u n tin g p ro ced u re s and , there fo re , with in fo rm ation storage.

As M arx does — a l though n o t of co u rse with the sam e im plica tions being d raw n fo r e c o n o m ic th eo ry — W eb er em phasizes th a t eco n o m ic transac tions involving m oney have a ‘use’ as well as an exchange (calculative) aspect. Every capitalistic en terp rise — as W eb er applies th a t te rm — involves ‘ca lculations

124 Capitalism, Industrialism and Socia l Transformation

in k in d ’,4 to do with the needs to which the com m oditie s sold are to be put. T h ese ‘co n s id e ra t io n s of u se ’ also ex ten d to the instrum ents of p roduc tion . T h u s in a w ork sh o p p roduc ing yarn , the en t re p ren e u r m ust give a t ten t io n to w ear an d tea r of the loom s and so on. In b a r te r systems th e re is n o effective way of assessing ‘investm ent', d ep rec ia t ion o r w aste in re la tion to the ach ieved o u tc o m e of p ro d u c tio n . But m o n ey p rov ides the possibility of organ iz ing an d regularizing ‘s to c k s ’ as well as ‘p ro d u c ts ' across time-space. M o n e ta ry accoun ting is a par ticu la r version of the co-ord ination of resources m ad e possible by listing and cross-listing in general , which is why we should see a close analytical co n n ec tio n betw een the ‘a c c o u n t’ and the ‘file’ in the genera tion of pow er in organizations of all types. As W eb er rem arks, m oney accoun ting

is the m e th o d of assuring the co n d i t io n s of fu tu re p roductiv ity of the business w hich c o m b in es the g rea tes t d e g re e of ce r ta in ty with the g rea tes t flexibility in re la t ion to chang ing c i rc u m sta n ce s ; with any s toring of real s tocks of m ater ia ls o r any o th e r m o d e of provision in kind such flexibility would be irra tionally an d severely im peded . It is difficult to see, w ithou t m o n e y accoun t ing , how ‘rese rves’ could be built up w ithou t being specif ied in de ta i l .5

In analysing m oney , W eb er is no t always as careful as he should be to ind icate how specific, in ce rta in ways, are the p roperties of m oney in m o d ern capitalism — som eth ing which is re levant to criticisms tha t can be m ad e of his use of the co n cep t of capitalism in general. Of course , the re now exists a m uch g rea te r variety of an th ropo log ica l and archaeo log ical studies of m oney in tribal and class-divided societies than was available in W e b e r’s day. T h e se allow us to fill in som e of th e gaps in W e b e r ’s discussion. T h e d eg ree of ‘universalisability’ o f m oney was low in virtually all cu ltu res until m o d ern times and fea tu res which have since b ec o m e in teg ra ted w ere usually d issoc ia ted from o n e an o ther . In som e societies, m oney was a m ed ium of exchange but no t a s tan d a rd of value. T h e r e are m any cases in which m oney served as a s tan d a rd of value but was not used for the o th e r purposes with w hich it is associa ted today .6 It is ra re o r unknow n to find cu r ren cy tha t does n o t re ta in a s trong co n n ec t io n with forms of use-value. P rices o ften also m ain ta ined this co n n ec tio n , even in th o se class-divided socie ties in w hich qu ite highly

Capitalism, Industrialism and Socia l Transformation 125

s tandard ized coin was in wide c ircu la tion . T h u s a price m ight be expressed in term s of a n u m b er of livestock, even w here that m ean t m o re o r less the sam e quantif ied m o n eta ry value w henever it was used. Liquid reserves w ere norm ally very low co m p ared w ith those involved in m o d e rn m o n e ta ry systems, s ince the unit of value used for the long-term storage of assets was norm ally d iffe ren t from th a t em p lo y ed fo r im m edia te ly convert ib le exchange. D eferred pay m en ts (of various possible sorts) are a m ajo r fe a tu re of the t im e —sp ace d is tanc ia t ion of m o d ern eco n o m ic activity bu t w ere always res tr ic ted in trad it ional states. T h e m eans of defe rred p ay m en t w ere often d ifferent from the s tandard in term s of which such paym en t was ca lcu la ted , since th e units o f value m ay n o t have been in supply in the requisite quan tit ie s . F o r exam ple , th e co d e of H am m u rab i p erm it ted deb to rs to repay loans co n trac ted in silver in the form of quantities of barley .7

W e b e r defines ‘capita lis tic’ en terp rise as any type of econom ic ac tion u n d e r tak en in the antic ipation of achieving profit th rough ex ch an g e .8 In several guises, it has existed ‘all over the world for thousands of years w h erev er the possibilities of exchange and m oney econom y, and m oney financing, have been p re sen t’.9 O ne m ajor type is m ercan ti le capitalism , deriving from a range of profit possibilities in trade . T h ese include the sim ple selling of goods, w h e th e r m an u fa c tu red o r not, but also n u m ero u s devices of extending credit and speculation in different currencies. W eber sepa ra tes these activities analytically from profit opportun it ie s c o n c e rn e d with political o r military organizations; and from an o r ien ta tion to profit on the part o f a political au thority o r s tate itself (e.g. tax farming). M o d ern capitalism differs from these p re existing types in a range of ways. It involves the following.1 ‘R ational capitalistic en terp rises with fixed cap ita l’."1 W eb er lays a g rea t deal o f stress upon this, and it is closely associa ted with his assessm ent of the significance of doub le-en try b o o k keeping. Prior to the m odern era, mercantile capitalism and certain sorts of f inance capita lism w ere the only form s of capitalistic econom ic en terprise that may be durable and regularly organized, apa rt from those con tro lled directly by the state. ‘Fixed cap ita l’ implies n o t only the ex is tence of a defin ite locale in w hich the en terp rise is s i tuated but also the con tro l of stable am o u n ts of p ro d u c tio n eq u ip m en t an d investm ent stocks. Of course , m u ch



has been w ritten ab o u t the c o n c e p t of ra tionaliza tion in W e b e r ’s w ork and this is no t the p lace to a t tem p t to recap itu la te even the main outlines of that deba te . In this con tex t, how ever, W eb er m akes his m ean ing reasonably clear. ‘R a tiona l’ refers to the use of m eans of p ro duc tion and investm ent w hich, given available allocative resources , are m ost effective in a tta in ing a given end — the ach ievem en t of profitable econom ic activity.2 T h e existence of a mass of free w age-labour. In prio r types of capitalistic en terp rise , especially those involving the organization of production for profit, ra the r than purely com m ercia l o r banking transactions, unfree labour has often been used. T h e econom ic d isadvantages of organizing capitalistic p ro d u c tio n th rough slave labour are d iscussed by W eb er at som e length. A ccord ing to him they are quite formidable and , hence, the widespread em ploym ent of slave labour is only possible w here slaves can be m ain ta ined very cheaply , w here th e re are o p portun it ie s for regular slave rec ru i tm en t and the p roduc tion in question is agricultural. T h e em ploym ent of w orkers for wages o r salaries involves m uch less capital risk and investm ent. T h e sanction of dismissal, in W e b e r ’s view, is a m ore efficient basis o f the disciplining of a work-force than are the pun ishm ents that can be inflicted upon slaves.11 Of course, the functional advantages of free w age-labour over unfree labour do not in and of them selves explain the adop tion of the fo rm er by capitalist en tre p ren e u rs in the em ergen t phases of m odern capitalism. W eb er agrees with Marx that the cond ition of this was the large-scale expropria tion of peasan t w orkers from their m eans of p ro d u c tio n , a p h en o m en o n that can by no m eans be wholly explained in term s of the perceived needs o f expanding capitalistic en terprises.3 T h e fo rm ation of clearly designated and co-o rd ina ted tasks in the business organization . T h is them e obviously overlaps very substantially with W eb er’s m ore general t rea tm en t of bureaucracy. Capitalist firms sh are with o th e r m o d ern o rgan iza t ions the characteristics of administrative power, involving the hierarchical specification of offices and p rocedures governed by written codes of co n d u c t. But they have a distinct disciplinary problem . T h a t is to say, a large p ro p o r t io n of those sub jec t to b u re au c ra t ic au thority do no t them selves directly par tic ipa te in it. W orkers are a ‘ho rizon ta l’ g roup ing — W e b e r occasionally says ‘class’ — subject to th e collective au thority of ‘m a n a g e m e n t’.

4 T h e co n n ec tin g of individual capitalistic en terp rises within a m ark e t econom y. By the ‘m a rk e t ’ here W eb er m eans both labour and p ro d u c t m arke ts , in which labour-pow er as well as a vast range of goods have b ec o m e com m odities . A m ark e t econom y p resu m es na t iona l and in te rn a tio n a l m ark e ts , th e reb y again d epend ing up o n the existence of highly s tandard ized m oney. In all class-divided societies th e re have been m arke ts , which in som e respects s tre tch well beyond the physical confines of specific m arket-p laces. But, as W e b e r says, these have always not only b een limited in their extensiveness, but have been regula ted by m any fac to rs o th e r th an the ec o n o m ic d em an d s of price , investm ent and profit.

T h e orig inal m o d e s o f m a rk e t regu la tion have b e e n various, partly trad i t iona l an d magical, partly d ic ta ted by kinship rela tions, by s ta tus privileges, by military needs, by welfare policies, and not least by the in te rests and r e q u ire m e n ts o f the g overn ing au tho r i t ie s of organisa tions . But in ea ch of these cases the d o m in a n t in terests have n o t b ee n prim arily c o n c e r n e d with m aximising the o p p o r tunit ies o f acquis i t ion and e c o n o m ic provision of the p a r t ic ipan ts in the m a rk e t them selves; they have, indeed , o f ten b ee n in confl ic t with th e m .12

5 T h e provision for the w ants of the whole of the popu la t ion p redom inan tly by m eans of capitalist p roduc tion . T h is is in a sense no th ing but a sum m ary version of the p reced ing points but is, at the sam e time, evidently a quite elem ental fea ture o f m odern capita lism . T h e capita lis t en te rp r ise is no t ju s t o n e type of p ro d u c tio n organization am ong o thers — as in all societies where capitalistic ven tu res have been found previously — but the form of p ro d u c tio n upon which everyone becom es d ep en d en t .

W eb er m akes it c lear tha t he regards the origins of capitalism as lying well before those of industrialism , and that the latter com es ab o u t because of pressures in troduced by the form er. A ccord ing to him, the m ain period of large-scale expansion of capita lism is in the s ix teen th and seven teen th cen tu ries . In the seven teen th cen tu ry in par ticu la r there was ‘a feverish pursuit of inven tion’, do m in a ted by the perce ived im pera tive to ch eap en p ro d u c t io n .13 It is at this po in t, W e b e r argues, tha t technologica l innovation and the pursuit o f profit in eco n o m ic ac tion ten d to begin to co m e together . A lthough th e re is a history of invention



dating back into the M iddle Ages, only in w ar — as 1 have m en tio n ed in c h a p te r 4 — did these previously go along with one ano ther .

It is hardly surprising that W eb er trea ts industrialism as a m ore o r less d irec t o u tc o m e of cap ita lism , s ince he has a lready accen tu a te d the cen tra li ty o f the ‘ra tionality ’ o f p ro duc tion to m o d ern capita lis t ic en te rp r ise as a w hole. His discussion of industry is, nevertheless, a sophis tica ted o ne , linking factory and m ach ine to their im m edia te organizational fo rerunners . S team m achinery derives from earlier m echan ized forms of p roduc tion and is not qu ite the radical innovation V ictorians took it to be. H owever, the most essential charac te ris t ic of industrialism is not the use of pow er-driven m ach inery in the p ro d u c tio n process but the co n cen tra t io n of ow nersh ip of the work-p lace , m eans of p ro d u c tio n , so u rce of pow er and raw m ateria l in the hands of the en trep ren eu r . Such a com bina tion , W eb er observes, was rarely m et with p rio r to the e igh teen th c e n tu ry .14

M arx’s dating of the origins of m odern capita lism differs little from tha t o f W eber. ‘T h e capitalistic e ra ’, M arx says, ‘dates from the six teenth cen tu ry .’15 U nlike W eber, how ever, he is re luc tan t to use the te rm ‘capita lism ’ to apply to eco n o m ic activity a t o th e r times and in n o n -E uropean con tex ts and only does so ra th e r in frequently . C ap ita l pre-exists the d ev e lo p m e n t of m o d ern capitalism but Marx den ies tha t e i ther m ercan ti le activities o r the pursuit o f profit on the part o f financiers are accu ra te ly identified as types of capitalism . A lthough variant in te rp re ta t ions of Marx are possible on this point, it can scarcely be d en ied tha t he gives little a t ten t io n to the o rgan iza tional fe a tu res of cap ita lis tic en terp rise upon which W eb er places so m uch weight. M arx’s analysis c o n c e n t ra te s ab o v e all on th e co m m o d ity , giving par ticu la r a t ten t io n to a them e that political econom y supposedly had previously ignored — the fact that, for the m ajority of the w orking popu la t ion , labour-pow er becom es a com m odity . W hile W e b e r ack n o w led g es the s ign ificance of this, an d pays due obeisance to M arx for having analysed it with g rea t insight, it does n o t play qu ite as pivotal a role for h im as it does for Marx. A ccord ing to M arx , the co n ju n c tio n of cap ita l and wage-labour bo th supplies the historical c lue to unravelling the origins of

capitalism and , at the sam e time, consti tu tes the axis of its class system. As M arx says,

In them se lves m o n e y and c o m m o d it ie s a re n o m o re cap ita l than a re the m e a n s of p ro d u c t io n an d of subs is tence . T h e y w an t transfo rm ing in to capita l. But this transfo rm at ion itself can only take p lace u n d e r ce r ta in c i rc u m s ta n ce s tha t c e n tr e in this nam ely , tha t two very d if fe ren t k inds of com m odity -possesso rs m ust c o m e face to face an d in to c o n ta c t : on the o n e hand , the ow ners of m oney , m eans of p ro d u c t io n , m ean s of subsis tence, w ho are ea g e r to increase the sum of values they process, by buying o th e r p eo p le ’s labour-pow er; on the o th e r hand , free labourers , the sellers of the ir own labour-pow er , and th e re fo re the sellers of la b o u r . . . W ith this po la r isa t ion of the m a rk e t fo r co m m o d it ie s , the fu n d a m e n ta l cond it ions of cap ita lis t p ro d u c t a re g iven .1(1

M arx’s analysis th e re fo re co n cen tra te s m uch less upon the conditions necessary for the stabilizing and expansion of p roduc t m ark e ts than upon the p ro d u c tio n p rocesses linking the transform ation of nature to the com m odification of labour-power. It is a basic part of M arx's cr it ique of political eco n o m y tha t, as he puts it, 'so-called primitive accum ula tion’ finds its main impetus in the expropria tion of the peasantry ra th e r than in the specific ach iev em en ts of en t re p re n e u rs them selves. M ajo r lacu n ae in Marxist analysis stem from this at the sam e time as do som e of its m ajor s trengths. T h e sanctity of private p roperty in o r thodox political econom y is explained in term s of the diligence of the ‘frugal e l i te ’.17 By the ir ca refu l h u sbandry , so m e g roups of individuals accum ula te wealth which they ‘p lace at the disposal’ o f the indigent, offering them the m eans of their livelihood by putting them to work. F o r M arx, the situation is no t like this at all. This ‘insipid childishness’ disguises not only a series of social changes in which ‘co nques t , enslavem ent, robbery , m u rd er ' play the g rea te r p a r t ,18 but occ ludes the class re la tions at the co re of capitalism. It would be too easy and, in som e respects , utterly m isleading to say that, for W eber , capitalism is d istinguished by its ‘rational' na tu re , w hereas for Marx capita lism is specifically ‘irra tional' because its success is cha ined to h u m an servitude. T w o differen t senses of ‘ra tionali ty ’ are in play here , re la ted to variant epistemological positions. Nonetheless, ‘m odern capitalism’ for W eber is intrinsically tied to an expansion of the organizational


fea tu res of the capitalist en terp rise , which assum e pride of p lace in his analysis over its class cha rac te r . F o r M arx, how ever, the he igh tened pow er g en e ra ted by capitalism is t raced largely to the vastly au g m en ted con tro l it allows over the m ater ia l world, in which the deve lopm en t of technology is co m b in ed in a novel way with hum an labour.

M arx’s discussion of the com m odity explains why he is re luc tan t to label p re -m odern forms of econom ic activity ‘cap ita lism ’, as W eb er does, and why capitalism has to be regarded as a ‘m ode of p ro d u c tio n ’ but one that is very different from p reced ing types . '9 ‘C apita lism ’ is now here defined by Marx in the formal way it is by W eber. But it is c lear enough that for M arx ‘capita lism ’ is not c o n cep tu a l ized as to do with the pursu it o f profit th rough exchange re la tions, but as this conjo ined to the exploitation of ‘abs trac t labour pow er'. It is not only that the m ajority of the population are property less and have to sell their labour on a m arke t to m ain ta in a livelihood. W hat is essential is that labour pow er becom es ‘detached" from o th e r traits o r charac teris t ics of the w o rk e r and can thus be in tegra ted with technology. T h e labour co n trac t is the focal e lem ent in M arx ’s analysis here, dem onstra ting how distinct capitalism is from all previous systems of the exploitation of lab o u r .20 In capitalism , labour-pow er is a com m odity in virtue of its abstract form. T h e fact that the w orker has to sell his o r her labour to an em ployer in o rd e r to gain a living is the m ain constra in t th rough which the com pliance of the labour-force is achieved. It rep laces, Marx stresses, the various adm ixtures of b o n d ag e and the th rea t o f the use of violence charac te ris t ic of traditional states. On the o n e hand, it connec ts with the upsurge in m ateria l t ransfo rm ation m ade possible by the con junction of ab s trac t labour and technology and, on the o th e r with the ‘b ourgeo is rights ' to p rivate p ro p e r ty so cen tra l to capitalist en terp rise (and to the m odern s ta te , as Marx conceives it). For, as M arx so forcefully points ou t, the rights of ‘free and equa l ' political p a r tic ip a tio n have as the ir o th e r side the subord ina t ion of the w o rk e r to capital.

G iven the m an n e r in which Marx fo rm ulates his in te rp re ta tion of capitalism , it is no t surprising that his discussion of m oney carries ce r ta in d iffe ren t em phases from that of W eber. R a th er than th e significance of m o n ey accoun ting , and of the s ta te in ac ting as a g u a ran to r of s tan d ard value, M arx o n ce again re lates


m oney to the n a tu re of the com m odity . T h e re is an unb ro k en th read runn ing from M arx 's early s tric tures ab o u t m oney , that ‘universal w h o re ’, tha t ‘p an d e r be tw een m en and n a t io n s’,21 to his analysis o f the p h en o m en o n in his m atu re eco n o m ic writings. M oney is the m edium — or, ra th e r , the m ateria l expression — of the com m odification of labour-power which m akes it ‘transla tab le’ into material goods in term s of numerically assessed equivalences. L abour-pow er can be ev a lu a ted as a cost in te rm s strictly co m p arab le to m ateria l goods o r p roduc ts , in spite of the fact that these share no th ing in co m m o n in term s of their substantive traits. M oney , accord ing to M arx , is ‘the re flection, in a single com m odity , o f the value re la tions betw een all co m m o d itie s ’.22 W h en a co m m o d ity is co n v e r ted in to m oney , the exchange confirm s the specific value-form ra th e r than providing its value; it m akes m anifest that the qualities of a service as good are not exhausted by what it can be ‘used fo r’.

M arx’s analysis of m oney , t raced back th rough his general discussion of com m odifica tion , has considerab le im p o rtan ce for charac te riz ing how ‘capita lism ’ should be und ers to o d , a lthough his view canno t be ac cep ted as it is. In refusing to apply the co n c e p t to p re -m odern ec o n o m ic en te rp r ise , M arx signals som eth ing very im portan t. Put in the term s I have suggested previously, what this am o u n ts to is that capitalism is involved in a cen tra l way in the d iscontinuity of m odern h istory .23 This issue is som ew hat subm erged in th e o therw ise charac teris tically acu te in te rp re ta t ions that ap p e a r in W eber 's writings, at least in som e par t because of his p reo ccu p a tio n with what distinguishes the long-term d e v e lo p m e n t of the W est from the o th e r ‘world civilizations'. T h e s trength of M arx’s theory is tha t it provides the leverage for analysing tha t massively sharp w rench away from trad itional m odes of eco n o m ic en terp rise that o ccu rs in E urope in the s ix teen th and seven teen th centuries . It can confidently be asserted that M arx ’s view is the m ore sophis tica ted in this respect, in spite of the p ro m in en ce that has been ach ieved by W e b e r’s thesis of the association betw een Puritanism and (he developm ent of m odern capitalism. This thesis m ay o r may not be valid — the gap betw een p ro p o n en ts and an tagonists yawns as widely as ever— but in any case it is m ore re levant to the ques tion of explaining the first origins of capitalism than to in terp re ting how it is th a t it differs from pre-existing form s of eco n o m ic activity. W e b e r ’s


analysis of the ‘ra tiona l’ n a tu re of m o d ern capitalist en terp rise is undeniab iy im portan t , a l though I shall n o t choose to use tha t term in what follows. However, M arx’s accoun t of commodification directs ou r atten tion to a particularly significant nexus of relations.

How, then , should we best concep tua lize w ha t ‘capita lism ’ is? I suggest th a t th e following e lem en ts a re involved. As I shall h en ce fo r th use the te rm , cap ita lism is a form of e c o n o m ic en terp rise that has its origins only som e four cen tu r ies ago in E u ro p ean history. T h a t is to say, a lthough th e re have been m any forms of profit-m aking en terp rise at o th e r times and in o th e r places, these a re sufficiently d ifferent from w hat has o ccu rred in m odern history that it is m ore misleading than helpful to use the sam e term to re fer to them all.

Capitalism involves the p ro d u c tio n of com m odities . In this it is not distinctive, since the p ro d u c tio n of goods for purposes of profitab le exchange has been carried on in m any o th e r contexts . But it has two distinct charac teris tics:

1 T h e process o f com m odif ica tion has n o t p ro c eed e d rem ote ly as far in any p r io r type of society , for var ious reasons. Limitations on the alienability of p roperty , especially in the most overw helm ingly im p o rtan t m eans of p roduc tion — land

fundam en ta l ly b locks the expansion of co m m o d if ied re lationships. But so also do the ‘m odes o f m ark e t regu la t ion ’ of which W e b e r speaks, m eaning that the susta ined pursuit of profit rarely em erges un tram m elled by o th e r , d ivergen t considerations.

2 T h e co m m o d if ica t io n of labour po w er is th e essential acco m p an im en t of the expansion of com m odity p ro d u c tio n in general in capitalism. M arx is entirely right to insist upon the sign ificance of this, as distinguishing m o d e rn ec o n o m ic en te rp rise from all o th e r forms of eco n o m ic o rde r . F o r the first t im e in history, large segm ents (eventually the vast majority) of the working population do not directly p ro d u ce the m eans of their own subsistence, bu t co n tra c t o u t their labour to o thers w ho, in the form of m oney wages, provide the w herew ithall for th em to survive.

Th is p resupposes the in tersec tion of tw o m arke ts , labour and p ro d u c t m arke ts . T o speak of ‘the m a rk e t ’ in general, how ever, is no t w ithout sense, b ecause of the close re la tion that necessarily


exists be tw een the two. W hile m ark e ts transcend ing the local level have existed in all class-divided societies, only in capitalism does the m ark e t b eco m e linked to the p ro d u c tio n of goods requ ired for the day-to-day needs of a considerab le p ropor tion (subsequently again nearly a com ple te majority) o f the population. M arke t re la tionships in capita lism p resum e the ex is tence of a d istinct ‘e c o n o m y ’, insulated from o th e r institutional sec to rs .24 T h e insulation of the econom y is basic to the cycle of investm ent— profit—reinvestment characteristic of capitalist enterprise. ‘Private p ro p e r ty ’ plays an essential ro le here , in the sense th a t the accu m u la t io n process is in fluenced mainly be decisions taken by those owning ‘privately h e ld ’ capital. ‘Privately h e ld ’ here should be unders tood as con trasted to one main sense which the adjective ‘public’ can have, not as m eaning resting in the hands of individual en trep ren eu rs . ‘Private p ro p e r ty ’ in this con tex t m eans capital con tro lled by agencies — w h e th e r individuals, families o r joint- s tock co rp o ra t io n s — ra th e r than by the political ap p a ra tu s of the state.

Capitalism involves the centrality of the ‘financially accounting ' organization , in which balance-sheets of investm ent and cost are used as the main index of w he ther the organization should expand o r con trac t . T h e business firm shares m uch in co m m o n with o ther , non-capitalistic organizations in respect o f its bu reau c ra t ic features — at least, such is the case with the larger econom ic organizations. But its con tinued existence depends upon sufficient profitability to provide renew ed investm ent: its w hole na tu re , as it w ere , is ‘co m m o d if ied ’. Such is not the case with o th e r organizations, including the state. Although all these organizations d ep en d upon allocative resources , and their co n tin u ed existence is tied in som e sense to ‘fiscal m an ag e m en t’, they are ‘non- com m id if ied’ in the sense that the provision of their needed resources is no t governed primarily by the o p e ra t io n of m arke t forces.

All of this so far refers to capitalism as a form of econom ic activity. It does no t satisfactorily e lucida te how o n e should use the term ‘capitalist society’. ‘C apita lism ’ can be, and frequently is, used to designate a type of overall societal o rd e r , no t only a distinctive series of eco n o m ic relationships. 1 do, indeed , w an t to claim that capitalism is the first and only fo rm of society in history of which it m ight be said with som e plausibility th a t it



both ‘has' and ‘is' a m o d e of p roduc tion . I do no t m ean this, however, in th e sem i-technical sense in w hich M arx applies the te rm ‘m o d e of p ro d u c tio n ’. I m ean tha t in capita lism , m o re than any o th e r kind of social o rd e r , eco n o m ic influences play a m ajo r dynam ic role — if n o t unequivocally the d o m in an t on e in th e way in which m any social th inkers , close and d is tan t f rom , M arxism have p resum ed . But w hat a re the principal charac te ris t ics of the type of society that can be designated ‘cap ita lis t’? 1 shall give a pre lim inary answ er here, but a fuller discussion of th e question dem ands understanding p h en o m en a to be discussed subsequently. For the re has been no capitalist society which has no t also been industrialized and which has not been a nation-state . I d a te the em erg en ce of ‘capitalist socie ties’ at the sam e period (som ew here ab o u t o r subsequen t to the tu rn of the n in e teen th cen tury) at which nation-states com e into being. Both have their roots several cen tu ries earlier, and it is obvious enough tha t any tem pora l identification of their first fo rm ation must be only quite general.

A capitalist society has the following m ajo r charac teris tics .1 ‘C apita lism ’, def ined as a form of eco n o m ic system in the m an n er ind icated , is the prim ary basis o f the p ro d u c tio n of goods and services upon which the population of th a t society as a whole depends. Because of the com bination of the inves tm en t—prof it— investm ent cycle and the m echan ized co-ord ination of hum an labour-pow er, capitalist societies are heavily in fluenced by what goes on in ‘the e c o n o m y ’, which has a very high degree of technologica l motility.2 T h e ex is tence of a distinct sphere of ‘the econom y ' involves the insulation of the ‘e c o n o m ic ’ and the ‘politica l’ from one an o th er . Such insulation m ay take various co n c re te forms and mistakes that are often m ade in characterizing it must be avoided. As m en t io n ed earlier (pp. 6 7 —8), it is m isleading to speak too readily of the ‘sep a ra t io n ’ of econom y and polity since, co m p ared with class-divided societies, these are m o re closely co n n e c ted than ever before. But the insulation of the eco n o m ic an d the political should also not be eq u a ted with com petit iveness in labour an d p ro d u c t m ark e ts .25 Such a view has often been taken by those in f luenced by classical political eco n o m y , even w h ere in o th e r re sp ec ts they have been critica l o f it. T h e classical econom ists te n d e d to identify th e sphere of the ‘ec o n o m ic ’ with the co m p eti t io n of in d ep en d e n t an d au to n o m o u s capitalist firms,

in which any form of s ta te in terven tion b reaches the division betw een econom y and polity. This no t only greatly underestim ates the ways in which the existence of an insulated ‘econom y ' depends u p o n the s ta te in the first p lace , it suggests a dec line in th e scope of the ‘e c o n o m ic ’ with th e increasing s ta te in te rv en tio n in p roduc tive activity. But w ha t is usually te rm ed the ‘in te rv en tio n ’ of the s ta te m ay have the co n se q u en ce of actually p ro tec t ing the insulation o f th e econom y — in fact, it m ay even be its necessary condition.3 T h e insulation of polity and econom y presum es institutions of private p ro p e r ty in the m eans of p roduc tion . C au tion is again necessary here . I have ind ica ted earlier tha t ‘p r iva te ’ should not be eq u a ted solely with w ealth tha t is at the disposal o f the individual en t re p re n e u r . H o w ev er ‘p ro p e r ty ’ also has to be u n d e rs to o d no t just as a series of rights but as having a defin ite co n ten t associa ted with its n a tu re as capital. It presum es, in o th e r words, the processes of com m odif ica t ion n o ted above , which affect the ‘p roperty less’ as m u ch as the ‘p ro p e r t ie d ’. In this sense w age-labour is, indeed, the o th e r face of capita l. It is for this reason tha t capitalism is a ‘class socie ty’, in co n tra s t to societies of the class-divided type. T h is does not imply, as M arx tends to a rgue , tha t class divisions and conflic ts a re the institu tional d im ension to which most (all?) o th e r divisions and conflic ts can be traced . It does m ean that class conflict (in various guises) plays a m ore im portan t dynam ic role than in any previous type of society.4 T h e n a tu re of the state , as a m o d e of ‘g o v e rn m e n t’, is strongly influenced by its institutional a lignm ents with private p rope rty and with the insulated ‘ec o n o m y ’. T h e au to n o m y of the s ta te is c o n d i t io n ed , a lthough n ev e r com ple te ly ‘d e te rm in e d ’, by its re liance upon the accum ula t ion of capita l o f which its con tro l is to a large deg ree indirect.5 T h a t ‘cap ita lis t s ta te ’ can be used as syn o n y m o u s with ‘capitalist socie ty’ d em o n s tra te s that the ‘b oundary m ain ta in ing’ qualities of the nation-state are integral to its existence. On the face of things it would seem as though capitalism , as a form of eco n o m ic activity, has no intrinsic rela tion to the nation-state . T h is indeed was the underly ing assum ption of m any n ine teen th - cen tu ry th inkers , including M arx , an d is re lev an t to the c h a rac te r is t ic l im itations o f social th eo ry re m a rk e d u p o n in

136 Capitalism , Industrialism and Socia l Transformation


ch a p te r 1. Capitalism p rom otes the d ev e lo p m en t of long-distance eco n o m ic activities tha t s tre tch well beyond the borders o f states. T h a t th e re a re ‘capitalist socie ties’, as b o u n d ed entities th en , is som eth ing that d em an d s som e considerab le analysis ra th e r than being m erely be tak en for g ran ted .

Capitalism and Industrialism

In looking at the n a tu re of industrialism, th e re are two questions to be tack led . O n e is th e co n c ep tu a l p ro b lem : how should ‘industrialism ’ be u n d ers to o d ? But we also have to consider the relation be tw een capitalism and industrialism and ask in what sense, if any, o n e might be d ee m e d the “o u tc o m e ' of the o ther.

It is o f som e in terest and re levance to co n s id er the etym ology of the w ord ‘industr ia lism ’ an d assoc ia ted te rm s to do with p roduc tion . T h e te rm ‘industry ’, which s ta r ted to com e into co m m o n coinage in English and French in the la tter part o f the e igh teen th c e n tu ry , was originally assoc ia ted prim arily with diligent lab o u r (thus ind ica ting its c lose co n n e c t io n with adm inistrative pow er, to be explored later). A dam Smith defines ‘industry’ in con tra s t to idleness, o ften using the first te rm to refer indifferently to both hum an labour and the m eans of p roduc tion .26 Ferguson links ‘industry’ with the learning of habits of ‘responsible work activity ', the en d eav o u rs of m en to im prove their arts , to ex ten d the ir c o m m e rc e , to sec u re their possessions, an d to establish their rights’.27 T h e te rm was no t em ployed in such a way as to distinguish m anufacture from either com m erce or agriculture. Similarly, ‘m ech a n ica l ’ was used to re fe r to a quality o f an assem blage of w ork-tasks , no t to m ach in es as such; and m a n u fa c tu re ’ was no t u n d e rs to o d in the sense I have just em ployed it, but as referring to the ‘p roduc tive ar ts ’ in general. Only som e way into the n ine teen th cen tu ry did this g roup of term s start to assum e the usages they have to d ay .2" Etym ological cons idera tion of such words helps em phasize that it would not be apposi te to t rea t ‘industr ia l ism ’ as a stric tly techno log ica l p h en o m en o n . In the co n cep t of ‘industrial soc ie ty ’, as applied by Saint-Simon, industrialism preserves these w ider conno ta tions . Saint-S im on’s industriels a re no t def ined in te rm s of their con tro l o v er newly em erg ing industr ia l p o w e r bu t in te rm s of their p ropensity for d isc ip lined w ork . In an industria l socie ty , in

contrast to feudalism, everyone — including those in the directive positions — is involved in p roduc tive labour.

A lthough I shall not use the te rm ‘industrial soc ie ty ’, I think it co r rec t to hold tha t industrialism refers to m o re than m echan ized technology alone. It also should be u n d ers tood to e m b ra ce m ore than such technology plus factory p roduc tion — this for two reasons. T h e ‘fac to ry ’, a locale in which d irec t p roduc tive activity is carried on through m anual labour, is too narrow a notion to c a p tu re th e organizational changes tha t o cc u r with the adven t of industrialism. R a th er , it is b e t te r to speak of the ‘industrial w o rk p lace’ (which is also first o f all a ‘capitalistic w ork-p lace’): a locale in which vocationally organ ized labour is ca rr ied on separate ly from the hom e. But ‘industria lism ’ should not be confined in its m ean ing to p h en o m en a directly involved with the work-place , how ever th a t be described . M echanization in m o d ern econom ic life has helped p ro d u ce eco n o m ic transfo rm ations affecting the c ircu la tion of com m odities . T h e deve lopm en t of m echan ized t ranspor ta t ion and m odes of co m m u n ica t io n in par ticu la r is a m ajor fea tu re of industrialism.

I shall define ‘industria lism ’ as presum ing the following traits.1 T h e use of inan im ate sources of m aterial pow er in e ither production o r in processes affecting the circulation of commodities. W hat has co m e to be te rm ed the ‘Industrial R evo lu tion’ is usually a ssoc ia ted above all with the harnessing of s team p o w er to eco n o m ic ends. But in the late eigh teenth- and early n ineteen th - cen tu ry Britain, the water-mill was at least equally im portan t in som e of the main sec tors of p roduc tion that exp an d ed most dramatically at that period. M oreover, the harnessing of electricity to p ro d u c tio n has proved to have as p ro found co n seq u en ces as the m ore directly ‘m ech an ica l’ sources of m ateria l power.2 T h e m echanization of produc tion and o th e r econom ic process. W hat a ‘m ach in e ’ is canno t be defined as easily as might at first sight a p p e a r , bu t can be said to involve an a r te fac t tha t accom plishes certain set tasks through the regularized application of inan im ate pow er resources . All m achines , no m a t te r how au to m a ted they may be, have of course in som e sense to be ten d ed by hum an labour. Early processes of industrialization norm ally involved the d irec t in tegra tion of m echan iza t ion and h u m an labour-pow er. T h e m ach in e d e m a n d e d co rresp o n d in g hum an activities of a ro u tin e type to ‘w o rk ’ it. But th e re seem s no



reason to build this into the definition of m echan iza t ion , which has also to include m ore au to m a te d p rocesses in w hich the ro le of the w o rk e r is ‘supervisory ' and the m echan iza t ion of the labour- task in question m ore o r less com ple te . M echan iza t ion should not be associated intrinsically with the econom ic utilization of science. T h e first stages of the ‘Industria l R evo lu tion’ were only quite marginally c o n n e c te d with scientific d iscoveries ; th e c loser in tegration of sc ience and techno logy is largely a m ore recen t phen o m en o n .3 Industrialism m eans the p revalence of m an u fac tu ring p ro d u c tion, bu t we have to be careful ab o u t how ‘m a n u fa c tu re ’ is to be unders tood . It is very frequently used to designate the p ro duc tion of non-agricultural goods but it should re fer to the m an n e r of p ro d u c tio n , ra th e r than simply the c rea t io n of such goods. M an u fac tu re should be regarded as co n n ec tin g (1) and (2) in a regu la rized fash ion , such th a t th e re a re rou tin ized processes creating a ‘flow’ of p ro d u ced goods.4 It is in this regularized c o m p o n en t of p ro d u c tio n that we find a link with the ex is tence of a cen tra lized w ork-p lace in which p roduc tive activity is ca rr ied on. Industrialism ca n n o t be a wholly ‘technological’ phenom enon because the three elem ents m entioned above p resum e an organization of hum an social relationships. I do not m ean to imply som e sort o f technologica l reduction ism here. T h e process of industrialization in its original form , in Britain, d em o n s tra te s various dislocations be tw een e lem ents that la ter cam e to ge ther as a m o re ho m o g en eo u s p roduc tive o rder. Several o f the m o re advanced sec tors of p ro d u c tio n in re spec t of traits (1), (2) and (3) w ere organized largely th rough the putting- ou t system ra th e r than in te rm s of the cen tra lized work-place. Som e of the early factories , by con tra s t , w ere established in sec tors of p ro d u c tio n not distinguished by a particularly high level of m echan ized m an u fa c tu re .29 But o n ce these factors had co m e together , they fo rm ed som eth ing of a unitary ‘p roduc tive package ' tha t g en e ra ted novel econom ic o p p o r tu n it ie s and was perceived as such within the fram ew ork of expand ing capitalist enterprise.

T h e re la tion of capita lism to industrialism needs to be directly discussed, bu t first it is w orth briefly asking why the co n c ep t of ‘capitalist soc ie ty ’ is accep tab le while tha t of ‘industrial socie ty’ is

not. This issue, of course , raises questions of general im portance , s ince the co n tra s t be tw een ‘capita lis t socie ty ' an d ‘industria l socie ty’ has ten d ed to ep itom ize distinct theore tica l traditions. If bo th M arx and W eb er them selves favoured the fo rm er of the two term s, W e b e r ’s writings, as has a lready been m en tio n ed , have o ften been d ru m m e d in to serv ice to su p p o r t ‘the th eo ry of industrial soc ie ty ’.30 But th e c o n c ep t of ‘cap ita lis t soc ie ty ’ is defensib le in a way in which that o f ‘industrial socie ty’ is not. Both no tions have a similar form at. T h a t is to say, in each case it is held th a t a p a r ticu la r type of ec o n o m ic fo rm ation is so im portan t for o th e r institu tions that it serves to designate the overall fo rm of society linked to it. In bo th instances, a par ticu la r dynam ic im petus is a t t r ibu ted to eco n o m ic transfo rm ations — in the one case to capitalism , in the o th e r to industrialism. A nd, in each , eco n o m ic institutions a re p resum ed to have a definite a lignm ent with o th e r institutions within a societal totality. Now in the case of capitalism , as I have defined it above , the sou rce of th e d ynam ic im petus is c lear . Nam ely , cap ita lis t ic en te rp r ise involves th e pursu it o f profit th rough the p ro d u c tio n of com m odities for sale on a m arke t; the perceived need to achieve profits sufficient to g u a ran tee an ad e q u a te re tu rn on investm ent gene ra tes a ch ron ic im petus tow ards eco n o m ic transfo rm ation and expansion. But in the instance of industrialism considered alone, such a source of dynam ism — o n e of the main features of the d iscontinuities of m odern ity — is lacking. Industrialism is a highly effective form of p roduc tive activity but it ca rries no inner dynam ic of the sort associa ted with capitalist en terprise .

A fu r the r aspec t of the co n ten tio n that m odern society both ‘has and is a m o d e of p ro d u c t io n ’, in its two different versions, is tha t som e kind of defin ite articu la tion betw een the ‘ec o n o m ic ’ and o th e r institutions must be established. Again, in the case of th e concep tion of capitalist society this is c lear, w hereas in tha t of ‘industrial society ' it is not. As a type of p roduc tion system do m in an t in a given society, capitalism is p red ica ted upon an alignm ent of the ‘ec o n o m ic ’ and the ‘politica l’, focused through p rivate p ro p e r ty and th e co m m o d if ica t io n of wage-labour. H owever, industrialism is ‘neu tra l’ in respect o f w ider institutional alignments. T h a t is to say, it is no t at all obvious th a t industrialism carries any defin ite im plications for the w ider societal totality tha t w ould p lace it in a par ticu la r type suigeneris. O f course , I do


not w ant to p re ten d tha t these m atte rs can be se ttled on the level of co n cep tu a l cogency alone. T h ey d ep e n d also u p o n a defin ite em pirical assessm ent of the t rends o f d ev e lo p m en t of m o d ern societies, which will em erge in th e co n tex t o f m y la te r argum ents.

F o r bo th M arx and W eb er , in varian t ways, industrialism is regarded largely as an ex tension of the basic fea tu res of p re existing cap ita lis t en te rp r ise , as it d e v e lo p e d in p reced in g cen tu r ies in E urope . In well-known sections of the first vo lum e of Capital,11 M arx discusses the progression of the w orkshop from a division of labour betw een skills to m an u fa c tu re and ‘m achino- facture '. T h e intensification of p ro d u c tio n th rough the c o n c e n tration of the labour force in factories , and the applica tion of m achinery to the labour p rocess , are regarded as the cu lm ination o f cap ita lis t d ev e lo p m e n t. W e b e r t races th e e m erg en ce of m echan iza tion and the factory in term s generally akin to those of M arx .12 But the similarity of the historical descrip tion disguises their con tras ting o r ien ta tion , tha t derives from their con trasting appraisal o f capitalism. In W e b e r ’s writings th e re is a generalized co n n ec tio n be tw een bu reau c racy , the capita lis t en terp rise and the m ach ine . C ap ita lism , def ined in te rm s of th e ra tiona l organization of eco n o m ic activity, is tied via the co n cep t of ra tionalization to b u re au c ra t ic organization in general and to m echan ization . W eb er in fact frequently co m p ares bu reau cracy to a m ach ine , each co n s tru c te d in term s of ‘tech n ica l’ application of formalized knowledge.

I shall tak e a position here which is different from both of these au thors , a l though at the sam e tim e draw ing on e lem en ts of each. But my view also differs from those w ho suppose that ‘capita lism ’ is a sub-type of industrialism. T h e prob lem with them all is that they fail to think th rough w ha t is implied trea ting ‘cap ita lism ’ or ‘industria lism ’ as m odes of eco n o m ic organ ization , on the one hand , and as types o f society, on the o ther . ‘Capitalist socie ty’ is a ‘soc ie ty ’ only because it is also a nation-state , having delim ited bo rde rs which m ark off its sovereignty from tha t cla im ed by o th e r nation-states. T h e charac te r is t ics of such a s tate form , I shall p ropose , d ep e n d (in its initial E u ro p ean deve lopm ent) upon conjunctions of capitalism, industrialism and certain administrative appara tuses of g overnm en t. But n one of these can be m erely red u ced to e i ther of th e o thers . T h ey cons t i tu te th ree distinct 'organizational clusters’, assoc ia ted in a d irec t way with one



an o th e r in their original E u ro p ean con tex t, but which should be kep t analytically distinct and which can have sep a ra te substantive con seq u en ces w hen institu ted in o th e r societal orders.

In the original European deve lopm ent, the close ties that existed betw een capitalism and industrialism can be explicated as follows, with many varia tions betw een d ifferent societies. T h e em erging heg em o n y of cap ita lis t en te rp r ise as a system of p ro d u c tio n in t ro d u ce d a novel so u rce of dynam ism within ec o n o m ic o rganization . Part and parcel o f this process was the fo rm ation of th e d iffe ren tia ted and insu lated econom y, which b ecam e a much m ore p rom inen t source of generalized institutional transform ation than had ever been the case in pre-existing types o f society. T h e econom y of capitalist societies, bo th internally and externally , is inherently unstable for reasons d iagnosed by Marx. T h ese concern th e m otility and ec o n o m ic expansion ism assoc ia ted with the investm ent —profit-reinvestm ent cycle. T h e stability of capitalist p ro d u c tio n , small- o r large-scale, d epends — and is know n to d ep e n d — upon the genera ting of profit sufficient to provide for ‘exp an d ed rep roduc tion '. T h e re is a prim ary sense in which all ‘eco n o m ic rep ro d u c tio n ' in capitalism is, o f necessity, in M arx’s te rm s ‘e x p a n d ed r e p ro d u c t io n ’ b ecau se the ec o n o m ic o rd e r c an n o t rem ain more-or-less static as all traditional econom ic systems tend to. T h e drive to m aintain profit, o r to en h a n ce profitability w here this is consistent with the perceived investment needs of firms, is a ssoc ia ted with an in trinsic p ropensity to technologica l innovation via m echan ized m an u fac tu re . T e c h n o logical ad ap ta t io n s can be used both to directly ch eap en the im m edia te costs of p ro d u c tio n and offset investm ent costs in respec t o f the hiring of labour. This should no t be seen, o f course, as a sm ooth ly flowing historical process. In its original phases of d ev e lo p m en t in particu la r , it involved a s tu tte ring and f rac tu red series of changes, poorly u n d ers to o d by most of those w ho played the leading parts in initiating and furthering them .

T h e im petus tow ards eco n o m ic expansion and the heightening of productiv ity thus desc ribed by no m eans exhausts what we m ight call the ‘e lec tive affinities’ be tw een cap ita lism and industria lism . Q u ite fu n d a m e n ta l is the co m m o d if ica t io n of labour-pow er. H ere we can tra c e o n e o f th e m ost basic d iscontinuities tha t sep a ra te m odern ity from pre-existing forms o f soc io -econom ic o rd e r .33 It is a p h e n o m e n o n th a t d irec tly

co n n ec ts the class system of capitalist society with industrialism as a form of p roduc tion . N onethe less , it does n o t follow from this that the transfo rm ation of that class system ipso facto implies a radical reo rdering of the n a tu re of industrialism. M arx ’s writings, and those of m ost of his followers, are ‘class reduc tion is t’. In o th e r words, they seek to explain too m any of the charac teris t ics of m o d ern socie ties in te rm s of class d o m in a t io n and class struggle. 1 have em phasized tha t , in con trast to agrarian states, cap ita lis t socie ties a re ‘class soc ie t ies’ — class conflic t is ‘s tru c tu red in to ’ them in a way quite distinct from the forms of class an tagon ism ch arac te r is t ic of trad it ional cultures. But we can n o t infer from this that class s truc tu re is at the origin of all aspects of dom ina tion in m o d ern societies.

Such an observa tion is hardly new, for it has been the stock observa tion of critics of M arx since the first t im e at which his ideas b ecam e generally know n. M any such critics, especially those w ho have p ro p o u n d e d o n e o r o th e r version of a theory of ‘industrial society ' have, how ever, simply substitu ted ‘au th o r i ty ’ for ‘class' in their analyses of m o d ern socie ty .14 M arx, it is argued , m istook o n e p a r t icu la r form of au th o r i ty (class d o m in a t io n , focused th rough p rivate p ro p e r ty ) for au th o r i ty re la tions in general , essentially assimilating au thority and property . Now it is my a rgum en t that M arxism is deficient in respec t of its co n cep t of pow er, which is t raced first and fo rem ost to con tro l of allocative resources. But it will no t do simply to substitu te a notion of au thority for that o f class in analysing the institutions of m odern societies. C ontro l of allocative resources — as capita l — assumes a p ecu lia r im p o r tan ce ' in cap ita lis t socie ties , in which the e c o n o m y ’ has the dynam ic im petus previously m en tioned . But

au thority is not all o f a piece. T h e re are various possible types or ca tegories of au thorita tive resources.

Let m e trace th rough the re la tions betw een private p roperty , the com m odif ica tion of labour-pow er and industrialism at their ‘po int of o rig in’ in the E u ro p ean societies. T h e com m odifica tion of labour-pow er is a t the ro o t of the class system of capitalist society in the sense fo rm ula ted by Marx. In prio r types of class dom ination , class explo ita tion took the form of the app rop ria t ion of ‘su rp lus’ p ro d u c tio n .35 T h e dom inan t class largely apart from the p ro d u c tiv e activities of those from w hom it drew its revenues— som eth ing in h e ren t in th e segm ental ch a rac te r of class-divided


societies, as d iscussed in prev ious ch ap te rs . In cap ita lism , how ever, the expropria tion of the m ajority of the m em bers of the popu la t ion from d irec t con tro l o f the ir m eans of subsistence m eans th a t the resu ltan t labour-force falls u n d er the im m edia te sway of the e n t re p re n e u r o r of ‘m a n ag e m en t’. At the sam e time, th e co m m o d if ica t io n o f lab o u r-p o w er n o t on ly p erm its but dem an d s its consolidation as ‘abs trac t lab o u r’, m alleab le to the organizational d irectives of em ployers. T h e result is a significant nexus o f c o n n e c t io n s to m ech an ized m a n u fa c tu re , m aking possible the ‘design’ of w ork processes in ways which in tegra te labour-pow er with the technologica l o rganization of p roduc tion . T h is does n o t o c c u r d irec tly th ro u g h th e c o n s tru c t io n of m ach ine ry , b u t d epends up o n perce ived o p p o r tu n it ie s for the ca lculative co-ord ination of p roduc tive activity .16

A fu r th e r basic point o f co n n ec t io n betw een capita lism and industrialism is to be found in the expansion o f adm inistrative p ow er in the work-place. T h is is closely b ound up again with the com m odif ica tion of labour-pow er, a lthough o n c e m o re we m ust be careful to avoid the supposition that it is the re fo re wholly reducib le to class relations. Industrialism, as I have said, involves th e e m erg en ce of the cen tra l ized w ork-p lace , within which m anufac tu ring opera t ions can be co n c en tra te d an d co-ord inated . T h e possibilities of industrial p ro d u c tio n are thus very limited in class-divided societies, qu ite ap a r t from the lack of ex is tence of sophis ticated m ach inery there , because of the difficulties facing th e sustained applica tion of surveillance in w ork settings. Several fac tors in fluence this. T h e se include, first and fo rem ost, the a fo rem en tio n ed segm ental ch a rac te r o f class-divided societies, entailing that p roduc tion is for the m ost part ca rr ied on in locales physically and socially d istant from the d irect influence of the d o m in an t class. H ow ever, w here labour-forces of som e size are g a th e red toge ther , with the ob jective of carrying on co n c en tra te d an d co llaborative processes of p ro d u c tio n , the level o f available surveillance m easures is also slight co m p ared to those w hich can be m uste red in m odern systems of p roduc tion . As W eb er claims, m odes of organizing p ro d u c tio n that rely upon slavery, o r upon som e more-or-less nakedly coercive type of corvée labour , are probably intrinsically ineffective co m p ared to the disciplinary possibilities o p en e d up by the mass utilization of ‘f ree ’ wage- labour. In addition the ‘s to rage capac ity ’ of organizations in



respec t of in fo rm ation is, how ever, low prior to the deve lopm en ts which W e b e r identifies — system atic acco u n tin g and filing.

T h e ex tens ion of su rve il lance o p e ra t io n s w ith in m o d e rn societies is n e i th e r confined to the capitalist w ork-place , n o r does it have its sole origin there . H ow ever, given th e dynam ism which the insulated eco n o m ic sp h ere injects into o th e r institutional arenas , it is a reasonab le supposition th a t th e expansion and consolidation of surveillance in the work-place strongly influences w ha t h appens elsew here. T h is can readily be d em o n s tra te d to be tied to the com m odif ica tion of labour-pow er. T h e ‘freeing’ of peasan ts from the ir involvem ent with fixed p lots of land in agrarian p ro d u c tio n , and their t ransm uta t ion into ‘w age-labour’, is also a ‘free ing ’ from the ir d ispersal in s ep a ra te , localized com m unitie s . As newly ‘m o b ile ’, they a re ava ilab le to be co n c en tra te d in m ore cen tra lized locales in which p ro d u c tio n is ca rried on via m echan ized m anufac tu re .

T h e considerations discussed in the preceding paragraphs m ake it possible to speak generically of ‘industrial capita lism ' as a type of p roduc tive o rd e r and as a form of society. It is a key part o f my a rgum en t that it is only when the con junction betw een capitalism and industrialism is well adv an ced that it b eco m es plausible to speak of the exis tence of ‘capitalist societies’. W hen I hencefo r th use the no tion ‘capitalist socie ty’, there fo re , I shall m ean a society in which industrial capitalism is the main m o to r of p roduc tion and o n e which displays the various institutional traits previously described . But it should perhaps be re -em phasized tha t this does not m ean that industrialism is confined in its influence, o r its po ten tia l influence, to capitalist societies alone.

It will be useful at this ju n c tu re to pursue the im plications of such a claim a little fur ther. In so doing I shall seek to in troduce som e them es tha t will underlie m ost of the rem a in d e r of this w ork. F o u r clusterings of institu tions can be distinguished in the con junctions be tw een capitalism , industrialism and the n a t io n state in the E u ro p ean societies, as shown in figure l. In W estern capitalism they have been closely tied to o n e an o th e r , so m uch so that the reductive tendenc ies d em o n s tra ted by M arx, and by o thers from o p p o sed positions, are readily unders tandab le .

T h e nexus of institu tions disclosed by M arx 's analysis o f the com m odif ica t ion of goods (ep itom ized by m oney capital) and the com m odif ica t ion of labour-pow er (abstract labour) consti tu tes

the core of the class system in capitalist societies. Private property in capitalism, as has been ind icated , unites rights of f reedom of co n tra c t and the ‘universal transform ability ' o f capita l, in goods o r in the p u rch ase of labour, which is so distinctive of the m odern m oney econom y. In the sense bo th of opposit ion of in terest and o f sem i-chronic struggle, class conflict is an inheren t e lem ent of capitalist p ro d u c tio n and th e re fo re — in m any varying degrees or guises — of capitalist society. T h e re are a series of issues to be fu r ther e luc ida ted here , but for the time being 1 shall pos tpone discussion of these.

Som e w ords are necessary ab o u t why industrialism does not ap p ea r in figure 1. W hen capitalism is con jo ined to industrialism, as it has been in the E u ro p e an societies, the o u tc o m e is the


Private property (Class)

Surveillance

Transformation of Means of violencenature (created (military power)environment)

Figure 1

initiation of a massively im portan t series of a lte ra tions in the re la tion be tw een hum an beings and the natura l world.·17 It is in these a lte ra tions that industrialism is em b ed d ed . In class-divided societies, p ro d u c tio n does not greatly transfo rm n a tu re , even w here , for exam ple , m ajor schem es of irrigation exist. T h e city is the m ain pow er-con ta iner and is clearly d iffe ren tia ted from the coun tryside but both p a r tak e of the ‘c o n te n t ’ of the natura l w orld, which hum an beings live both ‘in’ and ‘w ith’, in a condition of symbiosis. T h e advent of industrial capitalism alters all this. W hen co n n ec ted to the pressures of generalized com m odification, industria lism provides the m eans of rad ically a lte r ing the co n n ec tio n s betw een social life an d the m ater ia l world. T h e m ain m edia to r of this process is urbanism and I repea t he re the th eo rem in tro d u ced in th e first vo lum e of this w ork , tha t ‘u rban sociology’

can n o t m erely be regarded as one b ranch of sociology am ong o thers , but has to be t rea ted a m ajo r part o f w hat sociology is as an e n d e a v o u r to c o m p re h e n d the m o d e rn w orld . M o d e rn urbanism (both within W este rn societies and e lsew here) is n o t an extension of the traits of trad it ional cities, even w here u rban areas have grown up in and a ro u n d the sites of such cities. It forms a ‘c rea ted en v iro n m e n t’, which is the b a c k d ro p both to the o rgan iza t ion of cap ita lis t-industria l p ro d u c tio n and to the terr itoriality of the nation-state . As I have argued in the previous volum e, the obso lescence o f the city walls is bo th symbolic of, and substan tia lly im plica ted in, the e m erg en ce of tha t new adm inistrative space that is the nation-state.

For reasons already discussed, a very considerable developm ent in m odes of surveillance in the w ork-place is a prim ary fea tu re of the em erg en ce of industrial capitalism. But surveillance activities also expand the realm of the s ta te itself, bo th within its borders and ex ternally , as s ta tes begin to m o n ito r th e c h a ra c te r of ‘in te rna tiona l re la tions '. As 1 have s tressed , su rve il lance is a m ed ium of pow er which, w ha tever its ties to the ow nersh ip of private p roperty , does not derive directly from it. T h e sam e co m m en t applies to con tro l o f the m eans of violence.


Capitalism and the State: From Absolutism to the Nation-State

6

In analysing the connec tions betw een the expansion of capitalism an d the consolidation of the m odern state , two successive phases of deve lopm en t need to be assessed. T h e first, da ting from the six teenth to the late e igh teen th cen tu ry , co n ce rn s absolutism and the early diffusion of capitalist en terprise . T h e subsequen t phase is one linking the nation-state and industrial capitalism . T h e m atu ra tio n of capitalism involves a com m odifica tion of land and produc ts , on the one han d , and of labour-pow er, on the o ther . W hile these do not p roceed wholly independen tly of each o ther , the fo rm er is in tertw ined mainly with the deve lopm ent of the absolutist state. T h e la tter — o r so I shall argue — d ep en d s for its large-scale extension upon the form ation of the nation-state .

Commodification and State Development

T h e com m odifica tion of land and p roduc ts — a vast expansion of the areas of econom ic activity p en e tra ted by exchange-value — involves several e lem ents associa ted with the solidifying of the absolutist state. T h e em erg en ce of a gu a ran teed , centra lized legal o rd e r permitting and pro tec ting an expanding range of con trac tua l rights and obligations is one ; a n o th e r is the d ev e lo p m en t of a m o n e ta ry system co-ord ina ted and sanc tioned by s tate pow er; yet an o th e r is the formation of a centrally organized taxation system .1

W hat m atte rs in re spec t o f the dev e lo p m en t of a fram ew ork of law is, of course , bo th the subs tance of law and the possibilities of its en fo rcem en t by the cen tra l ized s tate appara tus . E co n o m ic

From Absolutism to the Nation-State 149

exchange as such, as has been no ted , can o p e ra te with a m inim um of legally en fo rceab le ties be tw een the parties involved, and in p reced ing form s of society ordinarily has d o n e so. An exchange of goods implies the transfer of the ‘factual con tro l ' of ob jects from one party to an o th e r , w here the assum ption is tha t (w he ther in d irect b a r te r o r sep a ra ted in time-space) o th e r ob jec ts will be also t ran s fe rred from th e seco n d party to the firs t.2 Such a re la tionship , when established in a d u rab le way, involves trust in an tic ipa ted fu tu re t ransac tions and re turns. In so far as this is institutionally ‘gu a ran teed ' , in traditional o rde rs , it is o ften m ore in the con tex t of ritual exchange than in sheerly com m ercia l transac t ions . T ra d in g c o m p an ie s have so m etim es possessed various sanctions to back up paym en t of deb ts , including the use o r th rea t of military v iolence. Civilizations in which co m m erce has been strongly ac cen tu a te d , and w here m ercan tile g roups have been particularly pow erful, have norm ally deve loped forms of bo th public and civil law re levant to trading opera tions. T ra d e has in these c ircum stances frequently been financed and d irec ted by the s ta te , in co n ju n c t io n with o th e r revenue-genera t ing activities. But in few of these instances has law co m b in ed the ‘ca lcu la tive’ and ‘co n t ra c tu a l ’ o r ien ta tions , sep a ra te from d irec t s tate involvem ent with ec o n o m ic en terp rise , such as cam e abou t in post-medieval E urope . R om e was one such instance, and the d irec t inheritance of ce r ta in of its codes, plus its m ore diffuse long-standing influence, was im portan t largely for this reason.

As W eb er stresses, the recovery and t ransm uta t ion of R om an law in E u rope p ro m o ted ‘ca lcu lab ility ’ plus a range of forms of alienability u n d er con trac tua l ly regula ted c ircum stances . T h e fo rm er of these traits is ac tually m ore im portan t than the latter. A lthough he does not deve lop the point, it is c lea r tha t the large- scale ex tension of the calculability of law d ep en d s upon the dev e lo p m en t of the p rinc ip led co n cep tio n of sovereignty that absolutism p ro m o ted . W hile royal remissions might still in trude into o therw ise ‘ra tiona l’ ca lcu la tions of eco n o m ic activity and exchange , at the sam e tim e trad it ional a r is tocra tic p rerogatives b eco m e s tr ipped away. T h is should not be seen as a process of the uncovering of a ‘cash nex u s’ c en tred in ‘civil society ', re leased from the constra in ts of pre-existing political supervision. Som e w ho have held such a view have po in ted to the fact that in Britain, the ‘h o m e of cap ita lism ',3 R o m an law never to o k a hold.

C ertainly it was in British political econom y th a t such in te rp re ta tions of the ‘rise of civil society ' cam e to be pre-em inent. But this co n cep tio n does not adequa te ly distinguish the form of law — its p ro m o tio n of calculability — from distinct codes and p ro ced u res associa ted with it. In regard of the fo rm er of these , the influence of R om an law, as a generalized ' inher itance ' and as a revitalized p h en o m en o n from the six teenth cen tu ry onw ards, was co n s id erab le everyw here , including areas that did no t directly ad o p t its tenets. M ost of the legal codes im m ediately involved in capitalist en terp rise did no t in any case derive primarily from R om an law (som eth ing also p o in ted o u t by W eber) . A nnuities , s tock certif ica tes and bills o f exchange arose from a com bina tion of G e rm an ic , English, Italian and A rab ic law. Legal provisions for the identity of com panies have their origins in part in the medieval co rp o ra t io n s and in part in urban law. M oreover , it is not the case that Britain was the 'h o m e of capita lism ' if this m eans the main cen tre of the sp read of com m ercia l and m ercan ti le operations. Capitalism in this sense was first of all m ost strongly developed elsewhere. Britain becam e the first 'hom e of industrial capitalism', but as I have ind icated previously this can n o t be regarded only as extension of pre-established capitalist enterprise .

T h e im p o rtan ce of a body of law co n n e c ted to sovereignty, then — so far as the in ternal o rganization of societies goes — is mainly tha t in specifying the 'political ' sphere it at the sam e time def ined a d is t inc t a ren a o f 'e co n o m ic ' transac t ions . A lready con ta in ing such a d iffe ren tia tion , R om an law was an im portan t sou rce for consolidating the insulation of the political and the econom ic . T h e point is that the 'e conom ic sphere ' should not be seen as a residual one , m erely left ou ts ide the constitu tional form of the m odern state , as an u n in co rp o ra ted 'civil society '. Rather, it derives from the very same sources as the sphere o f sovereignty so elemental to the nature o f the modern state.

In saying this 1 do not w ant to deny the significance of form s of civil law that w ere no t originally primarily p ro m o ted by the state, and that universalize possibilities of exchange transactions. H ere it is im p o rtan t to a c c e n tu a te tha t , a l though b ro k e n up into n u m ero u s co m p e t in g s ta tes , post-feudal E u ro p e d rew on a co m m o n cultura l legacy, deriving n o t only from the rem n an ts of secu la r R o m an influence bu t from the im pact of the C h u rch as a pan -E u ro p ean organization. Som e G e rm an ic legal p ractices , later

150 Capitalism and the State


to have a m ajo r role in the dev e lo p m en t of civil law in N orthern and C en tra l E u ro p e , w ere early on filtered th rough ecclesiastical sources and th rough eco n o m ic transactions in which the C h u rch was d irec tly involved. T h e d ivergences b e tw e en capita lis t ic activity , as intrinsically ‘t ran sn a tio n a l ’ in c h a ra c te r , and the consolidation of the absolutist s ta te , as a territoria lly b o u n d ed fo rm ation , w ere in som e respects m uch less p ro n o u n c ed than might appear. F o r a co m m o n series of legal prescrip tions and m echan ism s, in so m e d eg ree a lready in fo rm ing co m m erc ia l transactions of various kinds, facilitated intra-continental econom ic connections . T h ey even inform ed the c ircum stances in which E u ro p ean trad ing co m p an ie s re la ted to o n e an o th e r in o th e r parts of the w orld , in so far as there w ere regularized econom ic ties be tw een them .

T h e expansion of sovereignty was partly ach ieved through centra liza tion of m e th o d s of law en fo rcem en t — a m a t te r which applies to the ach ievem en t of generalized social discipline as well as to the m eans of backing up con trac ts . W e b e r tends to be ra th e r dismissive of the im p o rtan ce of legal sanc tions in rela tion to the extension of capitalist enterprise. T h e pow er of law over econom ic activity , he po in ts o u t , w e ak en e d in so m e aspec ts with the expansion of capita lism , c o m p ared with w hat had som etim es been the case previously . T h e en fo rc e m e n t of co n tro l led m axim um prices, for exam ple , b ecam e m uch m ore difficult than it was in so m e p r io r e c o n o m ic systems. Legal co e rc io n in eco n o m ic activity is limited in two chief respects . O ne is to do with the goods possessed by individuals subject to litigation — these may be too few, o r o f the w rong type, to m ak e good w hatever a given con trac tua l obligation entails. R a ther than being d ec reased by a general com m odif ica tion of p roduc ts , W eb er suggests, this type of difficulty tends to b ec o m e accen tu a ted . R ep ay m en t of defaults in cash becom es, in principle , easier but this only applies to an isolated instance, o r set of instances, of the b reaking of con trac ts . M ost eco n o m ic units b eco m e so in terd ep e n d en t tha t th e re is no way in which legal sanc tions could be b rough t to b ea r to in fluence the co n d u c t of overall sec tors of the m arke t . T h e co-ord ination of eco n o m ic agencies has to be left to the nego tia ted activities of p ro d u c tio n , pricing and investm ent, ca rr ied on w ithou t d irec t re fe ren ce to the possibility of coercive sanctions.4 A second reaso n can be found in th e re lative s trength

of p rivate ec o n o m ic in tere sts co m p a re d to those favouring conform ity to codes of law. W h ere eco n o m ic o p p o r tu n it ie s exist, W e b e r says, the tem p ta t io n to engage in them will tend to be irresistible, save w here they flout strongly held m oral im peratives orig inating in o th e r spheres of life. T h u s th e re will be little ch an ce of m aking nom inal form s of legal com pulsion coun t , given tha t the p ro m u lg a to r of laws — the s ta te — dep en d s increasingly up o n the fruits of capitalistic endeavours for its own con tinuation .

W h e th e r o r n o t these observa tions a re co r rec t , w hat they seem to neglec t is the significance of a coercive fram ew ork of law in re la tion to p ro p e r ty rights — this surely is of great im p o rtan ce to cap ita lis t d ev e lo p m en t. W h e re m ost p ro p e r ty was in land, ow nersh ip rights w ere usually g u a ran teed by a m ix ture of custom an d law, bo ls tered very o ften by the d irec t possession of the m eans of v io lence by those laying claim to such rights. But where p ro p e r ty b ec o m e s cap ita l , even landed p ro p e r ty , ow nersh ip ca n n o t be d e fen d ed primarily as a ‘sitting claim of possession’. A centra lized set of legal codes , b ack ed by effective m eans of coercion , would seem to be the necessary condition of the defence of ‘p r iv a te ’ rights w here these a re no longer the ‘visible’ a c co u trem e n ts of land ow nersh ip . Private p rope rty , as M arx so consistently stressed, has as its o th e r face the dispossession of masses of individuals from con tro l of their m eans of p roduc tion . T h e in co rpo ra t ion of such individuals as wage-workers within regularized cond itions of industrial p roduc tion belongs mainly to the second phase u n d e r discussion (the form ation of the n a t io n state). But the ‘freeing’ of w age-labour was undeniab ly a m ajor aspec t o f the early establishing of capitalist en terp rise on the g rand scale. W ithou t the cen tra lization of a coercive ap p a ra tu s of law, it is d o ub tfu l e i th e r th a t this p rocess cou ld have been accom plished , o r that the rights of private p roperty as capita l could have b ec o m e firmly em b ed d ed .

T h e formation of a generalized ‘money econom y’ is undoubtedly the sine qua non of w idespread com m odifica tion . M arx m akes this abu n d an tly clear, bo th in respec t of p ro d u c ts and of wage- labour. But he does not p rovide a co h e ren t discussion of the role of the s ta te in the provision and guaran tee ing of m o n e ta ry units. In deed , we m ay aptly rem ark with Perez-Diaz th a t this is n o t a d irec tion in which M arx cou ld feasibly have p rope lled his analysis



very far, b ecause it w ould have ten d ed to un d erm in e his view of the s ta te as resting upon re la tions of class d o m in a t io n .5 M oney has always been used for tw o m ain purposes — those of paym en t and exchange — bu t in trad it ional s ta tes the fo rm er ten d ed to p red o m in a te over the la tter. Even in som e large im perial systems, for exam ple the Persian em pire , co ined m oney was used alm ost wholly for the m aking of paym ents , usually military ones. It was not necessarily e ither m inted o r its value underw ritten by agencies of the sta te , and cou ld co-exist with various o th e r m o n e ta ry forms. M oney has, of course , also been used traditionally for hoard ing and som e have in fact suggested that this is usually the prim e fac to r m aking for the use of p rec ious m etals as coinage. Prior to seven teen th cen tu ry E u ro p e , the am o u n t of co inage in circulation tended to be limited by purely technological considerations. M edieval m oney was m ad e and s tam ped by hand , and typically involved the labour of up to a dozen craft-w orkers using different skills. T h e costs of p ro d u c tio n w ere very high — up to a q u ar te r of its value for smaller denom inations — and the accuracy of coining was widely variable. T h u s the usual p rac t ice was to assess co inage in te rm s of weight.

W hile R om e did have a s tan d a rd co inage , m ore deve loped than tha t found in any o th e r traditional s ta te , in the M iddle Ages there were num erous localized coinages. T h e Carolingian coinage system never b ecam e m ore than of marginal im p o rtan ce in most of E u ro p e and was p ro d u ced by an associa tion of craft-workers, not by any political o rganization . T h e influx of precious m etals into E u ro p e in the six teenth and seven teen th cen tu r ies w ithout d o u b t p layed a key role in m ak ing possib le th e large-scale diffusion of m o n ey .6 It has o ften been re m a rk ed how m uch this increased the available w ealth in E u ro p e , bu t p robab ly m ore im portan t was its con junc tu ra l effect in p rom oting m oney as a m edium of exchange ra th e r than only of p aym en t o r hoarding. F o r this m ade possible a transition that co m b in ed increased s tate con tro l over the provision of m oney with a burgeon ing capitalist deve lopm en t in the ‘civil’ sec tor . It provided the sp ringboard for the em erg en ce of p ap e r m oney (and subsequen tly , e lec tron ic money).

In analysing the p h en o m en o n of m oney it is useful to distinguish betw een ‘co m m o d ity m o n e y ’ — in m o d ern times m ost notably gold an d silver — and p a p e r m o ney .7 C o m m o d ity m oney exists

w here the quan tity of the m oney , assessed in physical units, co r resp o n d s to the am o u n t o f m oney on a designated quan tita tive scale of value. T h e quan ti ty of com m odity m oney is limited by th e availability of the sca rce m ateria ls used in its fabrication , a lthough the bullion value of the coin m ay be considerab ly less th an its exchange value in c irculation . C om m odity m oney may tak e the form of p ap e r m oney. W h a t m atte rs is th a t it is tied to the existence of a fixed quan tity of sca rce materia l; the am o u n t of m oney which can be g en e ra ted is limited by the availability of th a t m ateria l. T h e convertibility of m oney into gold o r silver is no t ipso facto an indication of the existence of com m odity money. T h e tying of cu rrenc ies to the gold s tandard in the early part of the twentieth cen tury , for example, does not reflect the prevalence of com m odity m oney, since the exchange value of m oney no longer in any significant fashion d ep en d ed upon a fixed qu an tu m of sca rce m ateria l resources . M oney has b eco m e ‘fiduciary '; that is, d ep e n d en t upon co n f id en ce in the political and econom ic organizations in which it is p ro d u ced and through which it is circu la ted .

In these te rm s we can readily grasp, in a general way at least, the relation betw een the dev e lo p m en t of the m o d ern s ta te and the expansion of a ‘m oney econom y '. T h e centra liza tion of s tate power was the necessary condition of the formation of com m odity m oney , in par ticu la r m aking it possible to d e tach m oney in c ircu la tion from its convertib le bullion value. Only w here the s ta te is ab le to c rea te a m o n opo ly of the ce r t i f ica t ion (not necessarily the d irect p roduction) of m oney, via legally accredited m eans , can a vast im p etu s to w ard s the co m m o d if ica t io n of p ro d u c ts be achieved. In the absolutist s tate this process was only incom pletely deve loped , d eb asem en t of the co inage being o n e of the main tactics used to tem porarily swell the s ta te ’s revenues. W hile s tate backing is requ ired for a substantial dev e lo p m en t of com m odity m oney, the basis of generalized conf idence in its value rem ains closely bound to the value of the sca rce m ateria l that physically com poses it. C om m odity m oney — like the form of s tate which was its g u a ran to r — is a sort of ‘halfway h o u se ’ betw een the m ost p red o m in an t trad it ional form s of m oney and fiduciary m oney. It is im p o rtan t to see tha t th e d ev e lo p m en t of com m odity m oney is no t just a m a t te r o f the in terna l organization of legal ten d e r , b u t is b o u n d up d irec tly with the reflexive



m onito r ing of the s tate system. C om m odity m oney , backed by a m ixture of the g u a ran tee of an individual s ta te and its bullion value, was the basis for the in te rna tional exchange of goods in m ark e t re la tions of b road scale and dep th . It allowed for a trem endous spread of capitalistic exchange outside the increasingly m ore conso lida ted bo u n d ar ie s of the state , bu t a t the sam e time was in som e considerab le deg ree an o u tco m e of tha t very consolidation .

T h e cond ition of the exis tence of fiduciary m oney is a fully a r ticu la ted s ta te ap p a ra tu s , having adm inistrative pow er over its own terr ito ry and a legal m onopoly over in ternal ‘o rd e r ' that is more-or-less com ple te . C o m m o d ity m oney need not be legal ten d e r and con f idence can be susta ined in it even th rough the vicissitudes in the m ateria l fo r tunes of par ticu la r sta tes, a l though of course the tendency to revert to ‘bullion value' in c ircum stances o f crisis is an ever-present one . F iduciary m oney o p era tes in the absence of such fall-back possibilities, depend ing upon confidence in the p roduc tive capabilit ies of business organ izations within the p en u m b ra of the sta te , and upon the s ta te ’s ow n g u aran tees of the value of its cu rrency . It is right to say of fiduciary m oney tha t it is, ‘a t least in the first instance , national m oney in the sense that the limits o f its general accep tab il i ty as the m edium o f circu la tion are d e te rm in ed by the d om ain of exercise of the political p ow er on which the fiduciary m oney is b ased ’.“ But it is just as essential to em phasize that fiduciary m oney has from its first origins been in terna tional. T h is is so not just in the sense tha t it c ircu la tes b eyond the b o rd e rs o f the s ta tes that issue the ir respec tive currencies . F iduciary m oney has not been the c rea t ion m erely of individual s ta tes bu t has been tied to an ex tens ion of the reflexively m o n ito red s ta te system, and the ‘co n f id e n ce ’ that keeps it afloat has never been conf ined to the citizenry of the s tate which is its legal gu a ran to r . T h e dev e lo p m en t of fiduciary m oney — the cond ition of a global extension of com m odified exchange of p ro d u c ts — is p ar t and parcel o f the fo rm ation of a world-wide nation-s ta te system. It should be em phasized again, perhaps , th a t this does n o t deny th a t the re m ay be m ajo r conflic ts o r tensions be tw een th e perce ived political im pera tives of s tates and those of eco n o m ic organizations.

\£ h e d ev e lo p m en t of p a p e r m o n ey should no t be seen as only a ‘s tep b ey o n d ’ co m m o d ity m oney . Its origins lie in the capita l

acco u n t in g basic to the t im e-space d is tancia tion of capitalist en terprise . Capital accoun ting , as I have em phasized , allows for the d istancing of eco n o m ic re la tions across time-space, facilitating th e s to rage and co-o rd ina t ion of in fo rm atio n used to regu la rize such re la tions . In cap ita l ac co u n t in g , m o n ey (as tab u la ted o r indexed costs , p rofits and losses) is a lready in fo rm ation , having no physical existence ap a r t from m arks upon p a p e r o r som e o th e r reco rd in g m ed ium . T h e expansion of capita lism thus already p resupposes the fo rm ation of aspects of m oney th a t presage the ch a rac te r it la ter assumes. P aper m oney, hence , should no t necessarily be though t of as the only co n c re te fo rm th a t fiduciary m o n ey displays. F iduciary m oney maximizes traits inheren t in the early deve lopm en t of m oney as in form ation; thus ‘e lec tron ic ' m oney is a fur thering of a lready established trends.

D eferred paym en t, par ticularly in the shape of c red it , is o n e of the prim e forms of time-space d is tancia tion facilitated by the em erg en ce of a m oney econom y. C red it , o r the borrow ing of m oney against profits ex p ec ted from fu tu re transac tions , is a m ajor point o f co n n ec tio n be tw een the s tate as g u a ran to r of cu rrency and as the p ro p ag a to r of taxation. C red it can of course be organized in a bar te r system, o r in a system in which co inage is used m ainly for paym en t and for hoarding. But cred it possibilities a re obviously limited bo th by difficulties in calcu la ting what is ow ed and by the need to k eep in close co n tac t with the d e b to r in case of defau lt , especially w here the legal m eans of sanctioning d eb to rs a re ill-developed. M oney allows for the d e fe rm en t in time that is the essence of credit. But this canno t be seen as exemplified in a single transac tion be tw een c red i to r and deb to r . T h e po in t is tha t , in m o d ern eco n o m ic o rde rs , cred it b eco m es s tru c tu red into the c ircu la tion of com m odities . While it w ould be som eth ing of an exaggeration to see the de fe rm en t of paym en t intrinsic to the exchange of com m odities across ex tended spans of time-space as a form of c red it , th e re is no c lea r dividing-line betw een this and cred it p rope r . T h e expansion of cred it t ransac tions was linked in the period of absolutism to the general dev e lo p m en t of financial m ark e ts and in d ep en d en t financial o rganizations, gaining a m ajor m o m en tu m th rough the provision of resources for war. G irding up for w ar, as in d ica ted prev iously , also p ro v id ed the m ain impulsion tow ards the assum ption of novel acce lera tion to the



fo rm a tion of a m o n ey eco n o m y , b ecau se th e new fo rm s of taxation w ere directly m o n e ta ry in ch a rac te r , and involved the state as bo th c red ito r and d eb to r to the rest o f the society.

D uring the per iod of absolutism , taxation b ec am e ‘fiscal’ in the p ro p e r sense of tha t te rm , involving the ec o n o m ic o rganization of a recognized public dom ain of f inance and expend itu re . In m any ways the dev e lo p m en t of the m o d ern ‘tax s ta te ’ ep itom izes the fo rm ation of im personal sovereignty and the insulation of the political and th e ec o n o m ic . T h e tax-collecting activ ities of traditional s ta tes always had a ce rta in ‘pub lic ’ ch a rac te r , in so far as the adm inis tra tive ap p a ra tu s was involved with co-ord ination of tasks relevant to the lives of various segm ents of the popualtion as a whole. But only with the deve lopm en t of the m odern s tate does it co m e to be the case tha t the adm inistrative purview of the state begins to re la te to the en tire popu la t ion , in tegra ting its activities with the course of their daily lives. Such a transm uta t ion is acco m p an ied by an expand ing range of offic ia ldom , carrying o u t tasks which are ‘in the public d o m a in ’ in the sense tha t they are no longer linked pa tr im onia lly to the ru le r ’s h ouseho ld . T axa tion in the m odern s ta te is a m eans o f underw riting the s ta te ’s expenses, since p roduc tive en terp rise is largely ca rr ied on outs ide the scope of its d irec t con tro l . But taxation also becom es closely b o u n d up with the surveillance o p e ra t io n s of the state. T ax policies co m e to be used both to m o n ito r and to regula te the distribution an d the activities of the popu la t ion , and par tic ipa te in the burgeoning of surveillance opera t ions as a whole. T axes , it has been said, ‘a re used as tools to increase popu la t ion (tax b u rd en on b ach e lo rs ; tax re d u c t io n for ch i ld ren ) , to re d u ce laziness and to fo rce peop le to w ork , to ch eck ce rta in hum an vices, to influence consum ption patterns (particularly conspicuous consum ption ) and so forth . T h e educa tion o r social goals of such taxes cha rac te r is t ica l ly prevail o v e r th e fiscal goals .’9 T h e s ta tem en t m ay be som ew ha t exaggera ted in its em phasis and , in my view, applies m ore to the nation-s ta te than to the transitional form of the abso lu tis t s ta te , bu t it nonethe less draw s a t ten t ion to o n e of the m ain cha rac te r is t ic s of m o d ern tax-systems.

Let m e co n cen tra te here on the primary them e, the connections betw een the sta te , m oney and taxation , on the one hand , and the com m odif ica tion of p ro d u c ts on the o ther . A lthough in som e respects th e re was a rec ip roca l re la tion be tw een each of them ,

th e dev e lo p m en t of tax collecting and d isbursem ent of taxes prov ided a m ajor stimulus tow ards m onetiza tion , and fused the twin roles of gu a ran to r of cu r ren cy and fiscal m an ag e r within the sphere of the state. P rebenda l taxation privileges w ere the main basis for the organizing of taxing in feudal E u ro p e . T erri to ria l princes, estates, towns and o th e r co rp o ra te bodies en joyed their ow n distinct p rebendal advantages . In F ran ce and elsew here it was supposed to be the case th a t the ru ler lived exclusively off his ow n taxa tion p re rogatives , with the E sta tes only m aking con tr ibu tions u n d e r special an d unusual c ircum stances . Both the co n c ep t and the reality of sovereignty deve loped in som e part from the claim to the dominium eminens, increasingly channelled to m ee t w ha tever w ere designated by the m o n arch as 'public ' needs. As in so m any o th e r respects , the seven teen th cen tu ry was the critical p e r iod in the m o v em en t tow ards cen tra lized fiscal policies. T h o se states that survived o r expanded their boundar ies w ere also the states in which the various aspects of taxation , including the specification , co llec tion , adm inis tra tion and disbu rsem en t of taxes, w ere g a th ered firmly in the hands of the cen tra lized regime.

Th is m u ch is co m m on-o r-garden history of the tim e, but w herein lay the co n n ec tio n s with a rapidly s treng then ing a rea of capitalist en terp rise? T h e main factors involved w ere these. T h e solidifying, and m onetar iz ing , of taxation in the con tro l o f the s ta te a p p a ra tu s w ere b o th expression and in s tru m en t of the erosion of the privileges and pow er of the land-owning aristocracy. T h ey he lped to open up the space for the intrusion of co m m erce and of capitalistic endeavours , at the same time as being facilitated by those en d eav o u rs . But they also e x p a n d ed the a reas of com m odif ica tion of social life in ways in which en trep ren eu ria l en terp rise as such probably cou ld not have done . In class-divided societies, tax schem es rested norm ally upon a m ixture of m oral \ suasion and force, o ften subjecting those involved to ex trem e m ateria l depriva tion , bu t for the m ost par t no t reo rdering their day-to-day lives in a significant way. H ow ever the new taxation policies, in tegra ted with fiscal m an ag em en t, cu t across the types of re la tionship previously involved in fused politico-econom ic dom ination of the old kind. A system of regular d irec t taxation can only be sustained if those d u e to pay trans la te a t least a ce rta in p ro p o r tio n of their assets into m o n e ta ry incom e. This



does no t imply that these individuals were necessarily d raw n into com m odity m arke ts , bu t the scope of such m ark e ts undoubted ly received a m ajo r boost.

Finally, we should not u n deres t im a te the im p o rtan ce which s tate econom ic d irec tion from the beginning h ad for the grow th of genera lized capita lis t en te rp rise . Fiscal m an ag e m en t , the in fluence of the s ta te o v e r m oney supply , p ro d u c tio n and co n su m p tio n d o not d a te only from the la te r per iod of the 'in terventionist s ta te ’ but w ere in substantial deg ree necessary conditions of the large-scale expansion of capitalist activity. In the early phases of capitalist d ev e lopm en t, these have to be seen largely as un in ten d ed co n seq u en ces of policies initiated primarily for o th e r reasons , m ost pa r ticu la r ly the p ro secu tio n of w ar externally and the quelling of d iscord internally. Only later did they becom e under taken deliberately in o rd e r to crea te favourable conditions for the expansion of capitalist p ro duc tion and even then , o f course , only in a halting way and against the res is tance of landed interests in most countries. T h e w riter w ho in fact first used the term 'tax s ta te ’, R udolf G oldsche id , regarded w arfare as the ‘m oving m o to r of the w hole deve lopm en t of public f in an ce’, and certainly o n e can n o t deny this during the period of the absolutist s ta te ." ’

C en tra l to the e m erg en ce o f industrial cap ita lism is the com m odif ica tion of w age-labour. This c a n n o t be in te rp re ted as simply the w orking o u t of som e sort of en d o g en o u s ‘logic’ of capitalist d ev e lo p m en t but has to be independen tly explained. T h e com m odif ica tion of p roduc ts , especially as involved with the com m ercia liza tion of agrarian p roduc tion , p rovided one of the causal cond itions leading to the ‘freeing’ of a m ass wage-labour force from the residual bonds o f feudalism. But the co m m o d if ica tion of w age-labour — in the shape of an industrial work-force — d ep en d ed upon a range of c ircum stances o th e r than those directly involved in the expansion of eco n o m ic en terp rise itself. It will be part of my co n c e rn in c h a p te r 7 to analyse these. T h ey are factors directly b o u n d up with the nation-sta te and its involvem ent with o th e r states.

My main thesis runs as follows. In industrial capitalism there develops a novel type of class system, one in which class struggle is rife bu t also in which the do m in an t class — those w ho ow n o r con tro l large cap ita l assets — do not have o r requ ire d irec t access

to the m eans of v iolence to sustain their ru le .11 U nlike previous system s of class d o m in a t io n , p ro d u c tio n involves close and con tinuous re la tions be tw een the m ajo r class groupings. This p resum es a ‘doubling-up’ of surveillance, m o d es of surveillance becom ing a key fea tu re of eco n o m ic organizations and of the s ta te itself. T h e process of w ha t — for w ant of a b e t te r phrase — can be called the internal pacif ication of s tates is an inheren t part o f the expand ing adm inistrative co-ord ination which m arks the transition from the absolutist s ta te to the nation-state . It is this in terna l pac if ication, which co incided historically with a p ro longed per iod of absence of m ajo r wars betw een the E u ro p ean powers, th a t is the b ack d ro p against which those in the ‘classic traditions ' of liberalism and socialism deve loped their views of the intrinsically pacific n a tu re of industrial capitalism.

C er ta in e lem en ts of M arx ’s ch a rac te r iza t io n of industrial capitalism m ust be susta ined h e r e .12 It is qu ite right to claim that the advent of industrial capitalism signals a new type of productive o rde r , in which the buying and selling of labour-pow er, quantif ied into tem pora l units, com bines with rapid technologica l change to inject an ex traord inary dynam ism into p roduc tion processes. But (a) M arx’s ac co u n t is a class-reductionist o ne , in respects a lready ind icated and to be m ore fully e labo ra ted upon below; (b) Marx does no t ana lyse in any th ing like an a d e q u a te way the au thorita tive resources m ustered to stabilize industrial capitalism nationally and in ternationally ; and (c) he does no t ask what h appens to the m eans of v iolence ‘e x tru d e d ’ from the labour con tac t . [This third p h en o m en o n is adm ittedly cha rac te r ized here in a ra th e r c ru d e way, and will have to be deve loped m ore precisely. H ow ever, my th em e will be that the co r re la te of the internally pacified state — class re la tionships that rest upon a mixture of ‘dull econom ic com puls ion’ and supervisory techniques of labour m an ag em en t — is the professionalized standing army. T h e p rocess o f in ternal pacif ica tion , I shall argue, is only possible because of the he ightened adm inis tra tive unity that distinguishes the nation-s ta te from prev ious s ta te forms. On the o th e r hand, this very adm inistrative unity d ep en d s upon the ‘in fras truc tu ra l’ t ransform ations brought into play by the deve lopm ent of industrial capitalism, which help finally to dissolve the segm enta l ch a rac te r o f class-divided societies.



Capitalism and World System Theory

F rom an early d a te the dev e lo p m en t of capita lism in E u ro p e was linked to the political and eco n o m ic p en e tra t io n of w ha t b ecam e ‘the W est' in to m any o th e r areas of the world. T h e diffusion of E u ro p ean pow er, as I have a lready no ted , did not o cc u r in the t im e-honoured fashion of trad it ional imperial s tates, by d irec t military expension into ad jacen t areas — with the excep tion of the recovery of som e of the M ed ite rranean regions o ccu p ied by the O ttom ans . It o ccu rred mainly via sea-going com m ercia l and military endeavours , co n n ec tin g E u rope to a global system of p ro d u c tio n and com m ercia l re la tionships, fuelled by capitalistic econom ic m echanisms. Of course , colonialism in its various forms is also a highly im portan t associated phen o m en o n , both in respect of areas in which an existing indigenous popu la tion was m ade subject to E u ro p ean rule and in areas in which E u ro p ean settlers b ecam e p redom inan t.

I have frequen tly critic ized e lsew here those s tandpo in ts in social sc ience that have ad o p ted endo g en o u s m odels of social ch an g e .13 Such m odels tend to trea t ‘societies’ (nominally societies in general bu t usually m ean ing , in fact, nation-states) as isolated entities, whose pa t te rns of change can be u n d ers tood primarily in term s of internal processes. O n e of the m ain a t trac t ions of what has co m e to be called ‘world system studies’, assoc ia ted especially with the w ork of W allerstein , is tha t these specifically oppose any such view. As a generalized cr it ique of en d o g en o u s m odels of change , ‘world system th eo ry ’ there fo re shares a good deal in co m m o n with the ap p ro ach ad o p ted in this book and the volum e p reced ing it. S ince W alle rs te in ’s m ain p reo ccu p a tio n is with the im pact of post-six teenth-century E u ro p e upon the rest of the w orld, th e re a re im portan t substantive points of re levance to my co n cern s here.

W orld system studies a re co n ce rn ed with the longue durée of institutional t ransfo rm ation , giving par ticu la r em phasis to the d iscontinuities be tw een m o d ern history and what went before. W ha t W allerstein calls ‘w orld eco n o m ies’ have, accord ing to him, existed previously, bu t they w ere very d ifferent from what has co m e into being over the past four cen tu r ies o r so .14 States, par ticularly large im perial ones , have in earlier times been at the

cen tre of long-distance ne tw orks of co m m erce and m an u fac tu re , in which th ere was som e d egree of regional in te rd e p en d en c e in a division of labour s tre tched across substantial sec tors of the globe. T h e world eco n o m y ushered in by the dev e lo p m en t of capitalism , how ever, is the first genuine ‘world system ' in tha t it eventually co m es to be a fully global ph en o m en o n .

W orld system theory is offered in consc ious con tra s t to two a lternative views which have sought to analyse social change ou ts ide E u ro p e since th e d e v e lo p m e n t of E u ro p e a n global hegem ony. O ne , associa ted mainly with a liberal political s tance , is m odern iza tion theory; the o th e r , linked primarily with certain versions of M arxism, is d ep e n d en cy theory. T h e first school of th o u g h t usually has p ro p o se d en d o g e n o u s in te rp re ta t io n s of change. It focuses upon w hat has often ingenuously been called ‘nation-build ing’, in parts of the world o th e r than w here n a t io n states w ere established relatively early on. Against this type of v iew poin t, W allerstein s tresses th a t ‘W e d o not live in a m odern is ing world but in a cap ita lis t w orld . ' T h e so-called ‘m odern iz ing societies ' today are no t coun tries that have not yet caught up with the processes of deve lopm ent witnessed in the West. T h ey have been , and are , shaped by their involvem ent in global eco n o m ic rela tionships stem m ing from the world-wide reach of capitalism . A ccord ing to Wallerstein:

o n c e cap ita lism was conso l ida ted as a system and the re was no tu rnback , the in te rnal logic of its functioning, the sea rch for m ax im um profit, fo rced it con t inuous ly to expand — extensively to co v e r the g lobe, and intensively via the cons tan t (if no t s teady) a c cu m u la t io n of capital, the p ressu re to m echan ise w ork in o rd e r to m ake possible still fu rthe r expansion of p roduction , the tendency to facilita te and op tim ise rap id response to the p e rm u ta t io n s of the world m a rk e t by the p ro le ta r ian isa t io n of la b o u r an d the co m m ercia l isa t ion of land. T h a t is w ha t m odern isa t ion is a b o u t , if one w ants to use such a co n ten t le s s w o rd .15

In advanc ing this pos it ion , W allerstein is critica l o f those au th o rs w ho have looked to the no tion of d ep e n d e n c y to dem o n s tra te how the W est has m anaged to develop such a prim e econom ic role in the global eco n o m ic o rder. A ccord ing a t least to the c ru d e r versions of d ep en d en cy theory , the p rosperity of th e cap ita lis t co un tr ie s is p u rc h a se d at the expense of the



im poverishm ent of large areas of the rem a in d e r of the world. Not only this, but there is held to be a single m ain set of processes underly ing the uneven dev e lo p m en t of the ad v an ced and the d e p e n d e n t co u n tr ie s . W a lle rs te in ’s views sh are so m eth in g in c o m m o n with these ideas — certa in ly m o re th an with the p roponen ts of the m odernization s tandpoin t — but are also clearly d istinguishable from them . T h e thesis of m ost of the d ep en d en cy theorists is tha t, precisely because of their d ep e n d en t econom ic s ituation , the factors influencing the co u rse of deve lopm en t of per ipheral s ta tes are d ifferent from those perta in ing within the advanced capitalist core . In Wallerstein 's eyes this is m istaken , because both advanced and ‘d ep e n d en t ' s ta tes are parts o f a single capitalist eco n o m y , world-wide in scope. Peripheral s tates are certain ly seriously d isadvantaged in the world econom y but I heir paths of dev e lo p m en t are to be explained in term s of dynam ics of that eco n o m y as an overall p h en o m en o n . T h e main p h en o m en a involved are the existence of world-wide capitalist m arke ts and a division of labour in p roduc tion for those m arkets .

T h e capitalist world eco n o m y has its origins in the sixteenth cen tu ry o r , ra th e r , B raude l’s ‘long sixteenth cen tu ry ’ running from ab o u t 1450 to 1640. In identifying its m ain fea tu res , W allerstein lays par ticu la r stress upon the d ivergence of s tate and econom ic institutions. Previous ‘world econom ies’ were politically adm in is te red by imperial form ations. But the capitalist world eco n o m y is in teg ra ted econom ica lly , n o t politically, having m ultiple political cen tres . T h e co re of the system was early on located in north-west and central Europe , with the M editerranean becom ing progessively transfo rm ed into its sem i-periphery. T h e no tions of co re , sem i-periphery and per iphery all have to do with location in the single eco n o m ic system co m p o sed by th e new world econom y. In the co re areas are found a range of em erging m an u fac tu r in g industr ies an d re latively ad v a n ced form s of agrarian p roduc tion . T h e i r deve lopm en t adversely affec ted the semi-peripheral regions, which becam e ‘re ta rd ed ’ and were forced into relatively stagnant econom ic patterns. T ow ards the conclusion o f the long s ix teenth cen tu ry the pow er of the states in those areas also show ed a m ark e d decline. T h u s Spain lost its p re em in en t posit ion an d th e form erly p ro sp e ro u s city-states of N o rth e rn Italy suffered a d im inu tion in the ir influence. T h e per iphery of th e early capitalist co re , in E as te rn E u ro p e and

Latin A m erica , b ecam e d o m in a ted by cash-crop p ro d u c tio n on large estates. T h ese various regions thus b ecam e locked into an in te rd ep en d en t division of labour. T h e i r relative s tanding within the nascent world econom y was reflected in their varying political fortunes. T h e co re states w ere those in which absolutism was m ost strongly deve loped , with cen tra lized bu reau c ra t ic adm inistrative o rde rs and large s tanding armies. T h e per iphery , on the o th e r hand , was cha rac te r ized by ‘the absence of the strong s ta te ’. In the eas te rn m arches of E u ro p e th ere em erged sprinklings of principalities, while in Latin A m erica ‘the re was no indigenous s ta te au thority at all.’16 In the sem i-periphery, as befits its nam e, things w ere som ew here in betw een .

T h e d ivergent experience of s tates in the th ree sec tors can be tra c ed o u t by co m p ar in g th e d ivergen t fo r tu n es of P oland (periphery), V enice (semi-periphery) and England (capitalist core). At the open ing of the fifteenth cen tu ry , W allerstein says, the social charac teris t ics of Poland w ere not very d ifferent from those of the o th e r two societies. T ra d e and co m m erce were fairly vigorous, with co m m erc ia l ized ag r icu ltu re deve lop ing in a progressive fashion. T h e Polish nobility how ever m anaged to en ac t legislation binding the peasan try to their estates — the so- called ‘second feudalism ’ of Eastern E urope . T h e p ro d u c ts of co e rced , cash-crop labour w ere sold directly to m arke ts in the Low C ountries and elsewhere, helping to stultify the consolidation of a capita lis t ic class o f e n t re p re n e u rs . F inancing this t rad e en m esh e d th e ruling g ro u p s in very large d eb ts to ex terna l cred itors , from which it p roved difficult for them to extrica te themselves. By the early years of the seven teen th cen tu ry , Poland had devolved into an early version of a ‘neocolonia l s ta te ’17 linked to a large-scale eco n o m y , th e m ain ce n tre s of w hich w ere elsew here in E urope .

In V enice conditions w ere first o f all very d ifferent. It was itself the core s ta te of a regional eco n o m ic system and an imperial pow er with various possessions in the M ed ite r ran ean area ; it also had far-flung com m ercia l ties across o th e r parts o f E urope . T h e reasons for the dec line of V en ice are com plex , W allerstein accep ts ; bu t as the Baltic and A tlan tic becam e the m ain arenas of sea-power an d trade , V en ice was geographically m arginalized and a range of factors e ro d ed its erstwhile com m ercia l success, channelling m oney into the countryside. V enice becam e ‘deindus



trialized' w ithou t the total elim ination of its com m ercia l and bank ing activities.

In England , the process was som eth ing of a reverse o ne , as what was initially a relatively ra th e r p o o r re la tion of its m ore glittering C on tinen ta l ne ighbours becam e launched on a pa th tow ards eco n o m ic pre -em inence . T h e enc losu re m o vem en ts had the effect of com ple t ing th e break-up of feudal re la tions th a t had begun som e considerab le while before. T h e re existed a reasonably strong s tate ap p a ra tu s in E ngland that was ab le to block efforts of the aris tocracy to re tu rn to m o re trad it ional styles of agrarian p roduc tion . A diverse system of m an u fac tu re for m arke ts , plus an expansion of t rade , p laced th e coun try in a particularly suitable position to exploit o p p o r tu n i t ie s o ffered by th e expand ing capitalist world econom y. A key par t o f W alle rs te in ’s ap p ro ach d ep en d s upon the idea tha t p h en o m en a of basic im p o rtan ce to capitalism — including its class system — ca n n o t be in te rp re ted in ‘in terna lis t’ te rm s but have to be unders to o d in the con tex t of the world eco n o m y as a whole. W hen ‘cap ita lism ’ is seen to refer to the world capitalist eco n o m y , we see tha t it does no t involve a single axis of class do m in a tio n , but two. O n e is tha t of wage- labour and capita l. But this d im ension has from the early origins of capitalism been in terw oven with the spatial h ierarchy in the ‘in te rna tiona l’ division of labour, setting off co re from periphery .

F rom the s ix teen th c e n tu ry on w ard s th e cap ita lis t world econom y has s tre tch ed beyond the E u ro p ean con tinen t to the A m ericas and eventually to virtually all par ts o f the g lobe. As against those w ho have supposed that it only in the tw entie th cen tu ry tha t capita lism has in any real sense b eco m e a global p h en o m en o n , W allerstein insists tha t its world-wide reach was established very early on . ‘C apita lism ’, as he pu ts it bluntly, ‘was from the beginning an affair o f the world econom y and not of nation states . . . capita l has never allowed its aspira tions to be d e te rm in ed by national b oundar ie s in a capitalist world econom y, and the crea t ion of “n a tio n a l” barriers — generally , m ercantilism— has historically been a defensive m echan ism of capitalists loca ted in sta tes which are o n e level below the high point of s treng th in the system .’18 It is because capita lism is, in a quite essential sense , an eco n o m ic ra th e r than a political o rd e r tha t it has been able to p en e tra te in to far-flung areas of the world which— even if simply because of the ir d is tance from the co re states —

w ould have been impossible to bring under political sway. T h e sp read of th e cap ita lis t w orld eco n o m y , following the 'long six teenth cen tu ry ', con tinues the tri-partite sec tora l in te rd e p en d en c e established in its beginnings. But, of course , the specific geographical locations alter and certa in new pa tte rns of c o r e — per iphery explo ita tion are in troduced . A grow ing need for raw m ateria ls was the principal fac to r underly ing the co loniza tion or enforced incorporation of new regions within the world econom y. T h ese m ater ia ls w ere m ostly p ro d u c ed th rough the setting up of w ha t W allerstein loosely calls 'p lan ta tion system s’ — forms of p roduc tion based upon the use of large areas of land and involving co e rce d labour ra th e r th an legally 'free ' w ageJlab o u r as in the co re countries.

W ith the fu r the r dev e lo p m en t of the world system, the m ore directly coercive aspects of cash-crop labour b ecam e lessened. Serfdom , slavery, peonage w ere abolished. W allerstein proposes various reasons for this. T h e gradual incorpo ra t ion of zones previously outside the world capitalist econom y — those , for instance , from which slaves w ere derived — elevated the cost of systems of forced labour and generally m ade them less practicable. T h e political expense of m ain ta in ing contro l over p lantation systems rose, since 'the p rocess of m aintaining relative social pea ce in the co re a reas req u ired the e lab o ra t io n of various ideological schem es of “f r eed o m ” , which had the inconven ience that the co n cep t spread to realm s for which it was n o t in ten d ed .’19 Finally, W allerstein says, converg ing here with the argum en t of W eber, the increasing adoption of em ploym ent policies approxim ating to 'free wage-labour ' in the W este rn sense was p ro m p ted by the fact th a t they prove in the end to be m ore eco n o m ic than co e rced labour. T h o se w ho pay the workers ' wages a re not directly responsible for providing the rep ro d u c tio n of their families.

T h e im p o rtan ce of W alle rs te in ’s con tribu tions is considerab le. In provid ing a cr it ique of en d o g e n o u s co n c ep t io n s of social change , he also develops w ha t has proved to be an empirically fruitful in te rp re ta t ion of the n a tu re and dynam ics of capitalist enterprise . It is an in te rp re ta t ion that strongly em phasizes the regionalization of political and eco n o m ic systems and which, thereby , lays stress upon spatial fea tu res of social organization an d change. By pointing to the d ifferences th a t sepa ra te the



capitalist world econom y from imperial fo rm ations, W allerstein helps d em o n s tra te the d iscontinuities be tw een m o d e rn world history and what w en t before. N onetheless, th e re are a range of criticisms that should be m ad e ab o u t his views, w hich serve quite sharply to distinguish the position I wish to ad v an ce from th e m .20 It is im portan t to m ak e these d iffe rences of s tandpo in t c lear s ince, a l th o u g h W allers te in is cr itica l o f a n u m b e r of well- established viewpoints which I also want to attack, his formulations do not o ffer a f ram ew ork within which the main p rob lem s with which this book is c o n c e rn e d can be satisfactorily addressed .

W allers te in ’s co n cep tio n of ‘cap ita lism ’ is suspect, som eth ing which tends to have con seq u en ces for various o th e r aspects of his discussion of the dynam ics of the capitalist world econom y. He persistently identifies capita lism with sale of p ro d u c ts in a m ark e t for profit, a definition which oddly is c loser to that o f W eb er than it is to that of M arx, in spite of W allers te in ’s c la im ed affiliation to a Marxist s tandpo in t. In em phasiz ing m arke ts , W alle rs te in ’s view obscures the significance of the com m odification of labour power as distinctive of capitalist p roduc tion and , therew ith , som e of the most consequen tia l dynam ics of capitalist class s truc tu re . T o som e ex ten t this is because he stresses too m u ch the external involvem ent of s tates in the developing world system .21 But there is a m ore subtle and telling way of putting the sam e point. O ne canno t in te rp re t what (he m ean ing of ‘in te rna l’ c o m p ared to ‘ex te rna l’ in fluences is w ithou t an analysis o f the consolidation of the m odern state as a political form. For Wallerstein the existence of sepa ra te states seem s to be largely a historical residue of the fact that capitalism ca m e into being within a pre-form ed s tate system. W hile he is qu ite right to point to th e significance of this— tha t is the con tra s t be tw een the history of E u ro p e following the dem ise of the R om an E m pire and the history of the o th e r w orld civilizations' — the fo rm ation o f the m o d ern s ta te , including the nation-s ta te , is left unexplicated .

W allers te in’s a rgum en ts involve an un co m fo r tab le am algam of functionalism and eco n o m ic reduction ism . In these respects they are certain ly closer to co m m o n ly held p resum ptions of Marxism. T h e functionalism involved in W allers te in ’s writings is ev ident and qu ite pervasive, bu t pe rh ap s one exam ple of it will serve to m ak e th e poin t. T h e ex is tence of sem i-per iphera l reg ions is expla ined by re fe ren ce to th e ‘n ee d s ’ of th e w orld system. It is an

o rd e r based u p o n u n eq u a l d is trib u tio n of rew ard , an d as such , he says, ‘m ust co nstan tly w o rry ’ ab o u t th e possib le d issen tion of those w ho a re m ost ill-favoured w ith in it.22 D isrup tive co n se q u en ces cou ld co m e ab o u t if th e h igh-incom e sec to r w ere d irec tly co n fro n ted by low -incom e, d ep riv ed ones. Such co n fro n ta tio n is avo ided by th e spatial sep a ra tio n o f o n e from the o th e r p ro v id ed by th e d ev e lo p m en t of th e sem i-peripheral regions. T h is so rt of o b serv a tio n w ould be d efensib le if it w ere o ffe red sim ply as an in te rp re ta tio n of th e resu lts o f th e fo rm ation o f sem i-peripheral areas, b u t b eco m es illegitim ately teleo log ical w hen posed in the m an n e r suggested by W allerste in . M o re dam aging , how ever, th an its fu n c tio n a lis t co n n o ta tio n s is th e m ark e d ten d en c y of W alle rs te in ’s s tan d p o in t to dow nplay th e im p act of specifically po litica l an d m ilitary fac to rs up o n p rocesses of social ch an g e in th e m o d ern w orld . S ta tes ap p e a r as te rrito ria l subdivisions w ithin gross econom ic secto rs o f the w orld econom y, n o t as organizations ab le to m obilize form s o f p o w er o th e r th an eco n o m ic pow er and w ith in te rests o th e r than eco n o m ic in terests . T h e m ultip licity of s ta tes w ithin the w orld eco n o m y is in te rp re ted in tw o m ain ways (each o f w hich co n tin u es in a func tiona lis t vein). O ne is th a t the absence o f a single political au tho rity p reven ts any general con tro l o f the w orld system and thus th e p o ten tia l cu rb in g o f the w orld w ide sco p e o f cap ita list en te rp rise . T h e o th e r is th a t sep a ra te s ta tes can o ften p rov ide th e m eans for th e co re e lem en ts of cap ita lism to p reserve th e ir advan tages a t the expense of those in th e d isfavoured sec to rs o f th e w orld econom y. T h e co re sta tes a re ab le to d efen d th e ir priv ileged position w ithin th e system of ‘u n eq u a l ex ch an g e’.

C o n c e n tra tio n upon eco n o m ic re la tio n sh ip s w ith in w orld m arke ts also infects W alle rste in ’s tri-partite classification of states. T h e co n c e p ts of ‘c o re ’, ‘sem i-p erip h ery ’ and ‘p e r ip h e ry ’ a re obviously in any case fairly c ru d e , as a re th e ir rough c o u n te rp a rts in o th e r w riting of ‘F irst’, ‘S eco n d ’ and ‘T h ird ’ w orlds. Political an d m ilitary s treng th are n o t straigh tfo rw ard ly an expression of eco n o m ic d ev e lo p m en t, even if closely re la ted to it. T h is leads to defin ite odd ities in W alle rste in ’s m o d e of classifying societies. A go o d exam ple is his p lacing o f th e Soviet U n ion w ith in th e w orld system . It is no d o u b t th e case th a t th e U SSR o p era te s w ith in a w orld econom y dom inated by capitalistic m echanism s. W allerstein ap p ears to hedge his bets som ew hat ab o u t th e U SSR , b u t still



tre a ts it as a t m ost on th e m argins of th e ‘c o re ’. As I have re m a rk ed ea rlie r in th e b o o k , even if this w ere a feasib le view econom ically speak ing , it is plain ly fa tu o u s in po litico -m ilitary te rm s w hen th e Soviet U n ion is o n e o f th e tw o ‘super-pow ers’ th a t d o m in a te th e m o d ern w orld system . T h is m ean s acknow ledg ing th a t th e w orld system is n o t on ly fo rm e d by tran sn a tio n a l eco n o m ic co n n ec tio n s and in te rd ep en d en c ie s , b u t also by the global system of nation-states, ne ith er of w hich can be exhaustively re d u ced to th e o th e r.

T h ese o b serv a tio n s have to be ex ten d ed to inc lude d e m o cra tiza tion and m odern ity m ore generally . W alle rs te in ’s co m m en ts ab o u t th e u n in ten d ed co n seq u en ces o f the ex p o rta tio n o f ideas of ‘fre e d o m ’ and ‘d e m o c ra c y ’ a re su re ly to o g ra tu ito u s to be accep tab le . V irtually all s ta tes in th e w orld to d ay lay claim to being d em o cra tic . T h is is c learly n o t so m eth in g th a t can m erely be u n d e rs to o d as (he re su lt o f som e so rt of u n ex p lica ted ideo log ica l a c co m p a n im e n t o f th e sp re ad o f cap ita lism . T h e im pact of po litica l ideas an d m otives c a n n o t b e exp lained aw ay as m a tte rs o f eco n o m ic exped iency . I shall a rg u e below th a t th e fac to rs involved in th e ex tension of ‘d em o cracy ’ — leaving aside fo r th e m o m en t how th a t te rm m ight best be co n cep tu a lized — are closely b o u n d up w ith th e n a tu re o f th e na tio n -sta te . A ten d en cy to see th em as o f ra th e r m arginal im p o rtan ce is closely c o n n e c te d w ith th e fa ilu re to ack n o w led g e th e in d e p e n d e n t significance of political and m ilitary pow er in shaping ‘in ternational re la tio n s’.

M ost of W alle rste in ’s critic ism s o f ‘m o d ern iza tio n th eo ry ’ a re w ell-taken and ap t. But it is n o t a lto g e th e r possib le to avoid use of co n cep ts o f m o d ern ity , o r eq u iv a len t term s. T h e d iscon tinu ities assoc ia ted w ith th e a scen d an t position o f E u ro p e a re n o t lim ited to eco n o m ic tran sac tio n s , bu t range m uch m o re broadly . In c h a p te r 7 I shall fu r th e r deve lop the thesis th a t fou r partly sep arab le c lu sters of in stitu tio n s have been g en e ra ted by th e convergen t deve lopm en t of cap italism , as an econom ic o rd e r, and th e n a tio n s ta te , as a po litica l form . It is th ro u g h th ese th a t the g en e ra lized im p ac t o f m o d ern ity can be u n d e rs to o d an d its im plica tions fo r b o th cu rre n t an d p o ten tia l fu tu re m odes o f social o rg an iza tio n tra c e d o u t.

In w hat sense , th en , is it w o rth ta lk ing o f th e em erg en ce o f a ‘w orld system ’ from th e s ix teen th cen tu ry o nw ards an d w hat is

th e specific n a tu re of its co n n ec tio n s w ith th e expansion of cap ita lism ? I shall have m o re to say on these issues la te r and my com m ents here will be lim ited and general. T h e early developm ent o f capita lism was indeed p red ica ted upon an insu lation of the po litica l and the eco n o m ic n o t only in terna l bu t ex terna l to the te rrito ria lly b o u n d ed s ta te . T h e ex tern a l re la tio n s involved are b road ly speak ing those p o in ted to by W allerste in , co n n ec tin g a m ultip licity o f s ta tes w ith in an eco n o m ic o rd e r w hich n o n e of th em w holly co n tro l, a lth o u g h over w hich som e have m uch m ore in flu en ce th an o th e rs . T h is e co n o m ic o rd e r is o n e largely c o n stitu ted o f m ark e t re la tio n sh ip s, and thus is n o t a s im ulacrum o f th e o rgan iza tio n of cap ita lism w ithin s ta tes in re sp ec t o f class d iv isions. It is, n o n e th e le ss , o n e in w hich strong ly d efin ed im balances a re c rea ted and p e rp e tu a ted . T h e g lobal reach o f the e co n o m ic re la tio n s s tim u la ted by — a lth o u g h n o t even as econom ic re la tions wholly reducib le to — th e sp read of capitalism can accu ra te ly be called a ‘system ’, and a single system , as long as ce rta in reserv a tio n s ab o u t th a t no tion are b o rn e in m ind .21 A system should n o t be reg ard ed , in this co n n o ta tio n at least, as a unified and co h e ren t w hole. R a th er, the term refers to ce rta in re la tions of in te rd ep en d en ce , w hich m ay be diffuse and frac tu red , and m ay involve im balances o f pow er. T h e co n c ep ts o f co re , sem i-periphery and p erip h ery should only be used with co n sid e rab le cau tio n to desc ribe th e reg ionalization o f the w orld system . T h ey are gen era l, ind icative no tions ra th e r than ones th a t have any p rec isio n an d , in any c o n c re te analyses m o re p rec ise designations are called for. T h e ‘w orld cap ita lis t eco n o m y ’ refers only to o n e p articu la r a sp ec t of th e w orld system , not to it in its en tire ty . O f equal im p o rtan ce is th e s ta te system , especially in the la te r perio d at w hich it b eco m es a globally encom passing n a tio n s ta te system . M ore ab strac tly p u t, this m eans giving d u e w eight to th e effec ts o f political and m ilitary pow er in the shaping o f the in te rn a tio n a l o rd e r. The very term 'international' only has fu ll meaning with the emergence o f nation-states which, because o f their strictly demarcated character, give a very particular shape to ‘internal’ versus 'external' relations. )

D ropp ing the fun c tio n a lis t e lem en ts in W alle rs te in ’s view s, we m ust em p h asize th a t th e o rig ins o f in te rd e p e n d e n c e in th e cap ita lis t w orld econom y a re d iverse . T h a t is to say, it is no t n ecessary to hold — and n e ith e r is it in fact em pirica lly p lausib le



to claim — th a t all the in fluences affecting in te rd e p en d en c e in a trans-sta te division of lab o u r have em an a ted from th e activ ities and engagem en ts o f th e ‘c o re ’ coun tries. T h e re is no prima facie reaso n to su p p o se th a t the form s of in te rd e p en d en c e w hich have been m ost p ro m in en t at p a r tic u la r phases in th e d ev e lo p m en t of the w orld system have been those th a t have m ost fav o u red the position o f the econom ically ad v an ced societies. Social ch an g e is a m ultiform affair and , a lth o u g h ce rta in m aste r tren d s can be iso lated , it is o f the first im p o rtan ce to resist the tem p ta tio n to squeeze every th ing w ithin them .

Administrative Power, Internal Pacification

7

T h e n a tio n -sta te , let m e re p ea t, is the soc io log ist’s ‘so c ie ty ’. T h e n o n ch a lan t use o f the te rm ‘so c ie ty ’ in the lite ra tu re of sociology belies the com plexity o f th e changes c rea tin g th a t b o u n d ed and un itary w hole th a t is its usual re fe ren t. 1 say this n o t in o rd e r to p ro h ib it use of th e co n cep t in the social sciences bu t to p o in t to a range o f p rob lem s it o rd inarily conceals . U nlike trad itio n a l sta tes, th e n a tio n -s ta te is a p o w e r-co n ta in e r w hose ad m in is tra tiv e purview co rresp o n d s exactly to its te rrito ria l delim ita tion . H ow is th is adm in istra tive pow er g en e ra ted ? T h is will be the to p ic tha t will occu p y my a tten tio n in the first p a rt o f th is ch a p te r. But it leads on to fu r th e r issues. F o r th e c rea tio n o f such adm in istra tive capab ilities is im m ediately re la ted to th e co m b in ed in fluences of industrialism and urban ism . A nd it is im p o rtan t in tu rn to analyse how these co n n ec t to key aspects of the nation-state as a capitalist society , w hich m eans e luc ida ting th e n a tu re of class s tru c tu re in re la tio n b o th to sovereignty and d em o cracy . A w ord of w arn ing to the read e r: in this c h a p te r I shall assum e g re a te r fam iliarity w ith ideas in tro d u ced in th e first vo lum e of th is w ork th an I have d o n e h ith e rto since, a lthough they are essential to th e argum en ts dep loyed , th e re is no t room enough to p rov ide a full justifica tion o f them .

Administrative Power I:Communication and Information Storage

Several fac to rs co n c e rn e d w ith th e ex tension of co m m u n ica tio n a re deep ly involved w ith th e co n so lida tion o f th e adm in istra tive

Adm inistrative Power, Internal Pacification 173

unity o f th e na tio n -sta te . T h ey include: th e m ech an iza tio n of tran sp o rta tio n ; th e sev e ran ce o f co m m u n ica tio n from tra n sp o rta tio n by the inven tion of e lec tro n ic m edia; an d the expansion of th e ‘d o cu m en ta ry ’ ac tiv ities o f th e s ta te , involving an upsu rge in th e co llec tion and co lla tion o f in fo rm ation d ev o ted to ad m in is tra tive pu rposes. H o w ev er, th e seco n d and th ird o f these have increasingly m erg ed in the tw en tie th cen tu ry as e lec tro n ic m odes o f th e s to rag e o f in fo rm a tio n have b eco m e m o re an d m o re sophisticated. M oreover, electricity becom es increasingly involved in the m eans o f m echan ical p ropulsion. All th ree a re tied to g e th er in term s of the schem e o f co n c ep ts th a t in form this book. E ach rep resen ts a m ode of biting in to tim e and sp ace , p rovid ing the m eans o f rad ically increasing the scope o f tim e-space d istan- c ia tion beyond th a t availab le in class-divided societies.

T h e sim plest, and m ost effective way o f analysing the d irec t im p ac t o f in n o v a tio n s in tra n sp o r ta tio n is via th e n o tio n of tim e-space co n v e rg en ce .' S om ew here ab o u t th e m iddle o f the e ig h teen th cen tu ry , was in itia ted a series of innovations in m odes o f tran sp o rta tio n , paring dow n the tim e tak en to m ake jo u rn ey s from o n e po in t to an o th e r . In all trad itio n al s ta tes th e re w ere ro ad system s o f som e kind , o ften o f a fairly com plex so rt, as in th e R om an E m pire . Sm all b ands o f ind iv iduals cou ld m ove q u ite rap id ly o v er long d istances, particu la rly if th e re w ere staging- posts w here fresh horses co u ld be o b ta in ed . T h e V ikings w ere ab le to m ak e very fast — as well as on occasio n very long — voyages, w hich co m p are favourab ly w ith any th ing ach ieved la te r, un til the ad v en t o f m echan ically pow ered vessels. H ow ever, th e m ain im petus underly ing such form s o f (relatively) swift tran sp o rta tio n was very o ften m ilitary , com m ercia l long hau lage being slow and usually con fin ed to rivers o r seas. U ntil th e e ig h teen th cen tu ry , E u ro p e was no d iffe ren t from an yw here else in these respects. R oads w ere generally ex trem ely p o o r, ex cep t fo r a few highw ays b etw een m ajor cities and ports. In B ritain , a ‘tu rn p ik e b o o m ’ began ab o u t th e m iddle o f th e e ig h teen th cen tu ry , p rio r to w hich ‘th e ro ad s th ro u g h o u t th e K ingdom w ere ex trem ely bad and alm ost im passab le, so th a t it was very d ifficu lt to convey from place to p lace e ith e r bulky o r heavy artic les. W heel carriages cou ld be little u sed , and pack horses w ere th e genera l m eans of co n v ey an ce .’2

N ot until a ro u n d the tu rn of the n in e teen th cen tu ry was th e re a cohesively o rgan ized ne tw o rk of tu rn p ik es , p rovid ing fo r reaso n ably ch eap com m ercia l tran sp o rta tio n , in w hich re sp ec t they w ere in any case u n d ercu t fo r bulk tran sp o rt by th e rapidly develop ing canal system . T h e stage-coach system was th e first m o d ern rap id -transit fo rm of tran sp o rta tio n o p era tin g regularly and over a w ide spatial p a tte rn . It was also the first to be organized in te rm s o f a tim e-tab le , even if th o se in use well in to the n in e tee n th cen tu ry w ere very h ap h azard and poorly co -o rd ina ted by th e s tan d ard s o f su b seq u en t rap id -transit system s. A tim etab le is one of the m ost significant o f m o d ern o rgan izational devices, p resum ing and stim ulating a regu la tion of social life by quan tified tim e in a m a n n e r q u ite u n k n o w n to p rio r types o f society . T im etab les a re no t just m eans o f using tem p o ra l d iffe ren ces in o rd e r to iden tify and specify regu larized even ts — th e arrival and d ep a rtu re of co ach es, tra in s, buses o r p lanes. A time-table is a time-space ordering device, which is at the heart o f modern organizations2 All o rgan izations, up to and including th e w orld system today , o p e ra te by m eans o f tim e-tab les, th ro u g h w hich th e seq u en c in g of ac tiv ities in tim e-space is ch o reo g ra p h ed . O rgan izations have alw ays involved som e so rt o f tim e-tab le — the invention of the ca lendar, for exam ple, was a ch arac te ristic featu re o f trad itio n a l sta tes . But on ly w ith in reg u la rized tim e-space settings, o rgan ized via ‘c lock tim e’, can tim e-tab les assum e a m o re precise form . T h e m o nastery m ay have been th e earliest exam ple o f such a se ttin g ,4 bu t the com m odified tim e in h e ren t in capitalist p roduction undoubtedly was its m ost decisive propagator. T im e-space co n v erg en ce p rov ides, th en , a d ram a tic index of th e p h en o m en o n of w hich it is by now barely possible to speak w ith o u t re lapsing into cliché — th e shrink ing w orld . But lying b eh ind tim e-space co n v erg en ce th e re is th e m o re d iffuse, but p ro found ly im p o rtan t, p h en o m en o n of th e increasingly p recise co -o rd ina tion of the tim e-space sequencing o f social life.

It is som ew hat specious to focus m ainly upon th e m echanization of tran sp o rta tio n in in te rp re tin g th e d isso lu tion o f th e segm ental ch a rac te r of class-divided societies. T h e effects of such m echanization w ould have been m uch m ore lim ited w ere it n o t fo r its co n ju n c tio n w ith the inven tion of e lec tro n ic com m u n ica tio n . W ithou t th e te legraph , and subsequent^felgctronic com m unication m odes, rap id -transit tran sp o rta tio n w ould be con fined to a few

174 Adm inistrative Power, Internal Pacification


jou rn ey s p e r day for a sm all m inority and a tiny p ro p o rtio n of m a n u fa c tu red goods. M ass tra n sp o r ta tio n d em an d s p recise ly tim ed and ‘sp ac ed ' m o v em en t, w hich in tu rn p re su m es th e capab ility o f co m m u n ica tin g ‘ahead of tim e ’ w hat is p lanned . O nly given th ese can an overall traffic system be reflexively m o n ito red and thus com prehensively ‘o rg an ized ’. T h u s , ra th e r th an th e steam tra in , it is B radshaw ’s d irec to ry , co -o rd in a ted by te leg rap h ic co m m u n ica tio n , th a t ep itom izes m o d ern tra n sp o r ta tion . C o n tem p o rarie s u n d erstan d ab ly enough w ere aw ed by the railw ay, ‘a plexus o f red , a veritab le system of b lood c ircu la tio n , co m p lica ted , dividing, and reun iting , b ran ch in g , sp litting , ex ten ding , th row ing o u t feelers, o ffshoo ts, tap ro o ts , fe ed e rs .’5 But the co m b in atio n of the railw ay and th e te leg raph was w hat b rought this com plex in to being, no t th e locom otive and its rails on th e ir ow n.

M ost h isto rians an d sociologists p erhaps do n o t recogn ize the ex ten d ed p rocess th a t was involved in the sp read of m echan ized m odes of tran sp o rta tio n , a p rocess th a t did n o t cu lm in a te until th e in tro d u c tio n of w orld s tan d a rd tim e in 1884. At th e P rim e M erid ian C o n fe ren ce held in W ash in g to n d u rin g th a t y ea r, follow ing a series of acerb ic politica l d eb a te s , G reenw ich was ad o p ted as the zero m erid ian . T h e g lobe was p artitio n ed in to tw en ty -fou r tim e zo n es, e a ch o n e h o u r a p a r t , and an ex ac t beg inning of th e universal day was fixed.6 In som e sta tes , railw ays and o th e r tran sp o rt tim e-tab les w ere q u ite qu ick ly b rough t in to line with these d e lim ita tions, bu t in o th ers m o re ch ao tic p rac tices p revailed . How far o n e o r th e o th e r was th e case d ep en d ed substan tially upon the pre-existing system . As late as 1870 in the U SA th e re w ere som e eighty d iffe ren t railw ay tim es.7 H ow ever, in 1883 rep resen ta tiv es o f the ra ilro ad s m et to estab lish a uniform tim e, re ferred to as ‘th e day o f tw o no o n s’, s ince in the easte rn p a rt o f each reg ion clocks w ere p u t back at m idday.* W hen the W ash ing ton C o n feren ce w as held , F ran ce — w hose delega tes w ere th e m ost b itte r o p p o n en ts o f th e ch o ice o f G reen w ich as the zero m erid ian — still had fo u r d iffe ren t reg ional tim es, n o n e of w hich was read ily co n v ertib le to G reen w ich tim e. Paris tim e, n ine m inu tes and tw en ty-one seconds in fro n t o f G reen w ich , was a d o p ted as th e tim e o f th e railw ays, and in 1891 this was m ad e the s ta tu to ry tim e fo r th e w hole o f F ran ce . C uriosities rem ain ed . T h e tra in s w ere in fac t sch ed u led to ru n five m in u tes beh ind th e ir


‘o ffic ia l’ tim es, so as to give passengers o p p o rtu n ity to b o ard in a le isu red way. N onethe less, it was th e F ren ch w ho in itia ted the In te rn a tio n a l C o n feren ce on T im e, held in Paris in 1912; this was th e congress th a t set up a un ifo rm m eth o d of specifying ac cu ra te tim e signals and tran sm ittin g th em aro u n d th e w o rld .9

T h e sep a ra tio n of co m m u n ica tio n from tran sp o rta tio n w hich th e te leg rap h estab lished is as significant as any p rio r inven tion in h um an h istory . It red u ces to a m in im um w hat g eo g rap h ers call th e ‘fric tion o f d is tan ce '. S ep ara tio n in d is tan ce had alw ays been n o t only sep a ra tio n in tim e , bu t had been d irec tly co rre la ted with th e ex p en d itu re of costs and effo rt. M ore o r less in stan tan eo u s co m m u n ica tio n m ay n o t e lim inate e ith e r co st o r effo rt, b u t it d oes b reak th e co in c id en ce of these w ith spatial segregation . P o sta l n e tw o rk s a re , o f co u rse , a m ajo r su p p lem en t to the te leg rap h and its successo r, th e te lep h o n e . F igures 2 and 3 show th e increasing tim e-space co n v erg en ce betw een New Y ork and San F rancisco .

Figure 2 Postal time-space convergence between New York and San Francisco

Figure 3 Telephone time-space convergence between New York and San Francisco10


P osta l serv ices of a n a tio n al and in te rn a tio n a l type o rig ina ted in th e e ig h teen th cen tu ry . But early postal co m m u n ica tio n s w ere bo th slow and sp o rad ic . P rio r to th e m id -n in e teen th cen tu ry , mail was rare ly tran sp o rte d at m o re th an ten m iles an h o u r over leng thy d is ta n c e s .11 T h e p o in t a lread y m ad e a b o u t m o d ern tra n sp o r ta tio n system s in g en e ra l — th a t co -o rd in a tio n in tim e-space is as im p o rtan t as th e m ech an iza tio n o f th e ac tu a l ch an n el o f m ovem en t — applies to postal serv ices as a tran sp o rt co m m u n ica tio n dev ice . But highly e ffic ien t p o sta l system s ce rta in ly a n ted a te th e ir te lep h o n e co u n te rp a rts . In th e U SA , a fully n a tional te lep h o n e serv ice has only ex isted since the laying o f th e first tran sco n tin en ta l cab le in 1915. E ven th en trunk-calling w as tim e-consum ing c o m p ared w ith la te r on . In 1920, som e q u a r te r of an h o u r was n eed ed to m ake such a call, involving the co llab o ra tio n of as m any as eigh t o p e ra to rs . As figure 3 ind icates, by 1930 im provem en ts in netw ork co n n ec tio n s cu t dow n the average service tim e to tw o m inutes; the in troduction of au tom atic sw itching eq u ip m en t red u ced this to one m in u te in 1950. T h e com ing of d irec t long d is tan ce dialling red u ced th is to as long as it takes to co m p o se the n u m b er and for so m eo n e to answ er the call.

In te lep h o n e co m m u n ica tio n s th e re is a lm o st co m p le te tim e-space co n v erg en ce bo th w ithin s ta tes and in terna tionally . T h e re is sm all d iffe rence betw een p lacing a local call and one across th o u san d s o f m iles.12 O f co u rse the te lep h o n e is only one am ong a range o f e lec tro n ic m ed ia th a t p erm it m o re o r less in s tan tan eo u s (or, if it is p re fe rred , delayed) co m m u n ica tio n o v er indefin ite d istances. T elev ision has developed as a ‘one-w ay’ m edium of co m m u n ica tio n , bu t th e re is no in trin sic reason why it should rem ain so, since various form s of two-way link are in p rin c ip le , and in som e cases in p rac tice , possib le . Facsim ile , v ideo and co m p u te r transm ission rep resen t m o re novel form s of ac tu a l and p o ten tia l co m m u n ica tio n , the likely im p act of w hich social life is still largely unknow n , b u t w hich will u n d o u b ted ly fu rth e r ex ten d p rocesses of tim e-space conv erg en ce .

I m en tion th ese p h en o m en a h ere no t in o rd e r to a ttem p t to bring th e d iscussion of th e n a tio n -sta te th ro u g h to th e p resen t day. M y po in t is to em phasize th e significance to the consolidation o f th e na tio n -sta te in th e la tte r p a r t of th e n in e tee n th and early tw en tie th cen tu ries o f the sep a ra tio n of th e co m m u n ica tio n of in fo rm ation from tran sp o rta tio n . T h e initial leap fo rw ard in the

adm inistrative pow er g en e ra ted by the nation-state was ac co m plished p rio r to the d ev e lo p m en t of e lec tron ic com m unica t ion . But m o d ern societies have been ‘e lec tron ic socie ties’ longer than w e o rd inarily imagine and ‘in fo rm ation socie ties ' s ince their inception. T h e re is a fu n dam en ta l sense, as I have argued , in w hich all s ta tes have b ee n ‘in fo rm ation soc ie ties’, s ince the genera tion of s tate pow er p resum es reflexively m o n ito red system rep ro d u c t io n , involving the regularized gathering , s torage , and con tro l of inform ation applied to adm inistrative ends. But in the nation-state , with its peculiarly high degree of adm inistrative unity, this is b rough t to a m uch higher pitch than ever before.

In d iscussing trad it iona l s ta tes , Innis m ak es a d is tinc tion be tw een co m m u n ica t io n m edia which ‘em phasise t im e’ and those which ‘em phasise sp ace ’.13 T h e fo rm er are d u rab le but heavy, and a re the m ain textual m ateria ls o f the earlier civilizations. S tone , clay and p a rch m en t belong in this ca tegory. T h ey carry the m arks o f the w ritten w ord over very lengthy passages o f time but a re not conduc ive to the genera tion of adm inistrative pow er across wide spans of space. Papyrus and p ap e r tend to be less long-lasting but a re light, m o re easily t ran sp o r ta b le and also m o re easily reproducib le . T h e R om an co n q u es t of Egypt, acco rd ing to Innis, was peculiarly im portan t to the expansion of the E m pire , not primarily because of the terr ito ry thus acqu ired , bu t because it allowed access to large supplies of papyrus which w ere then used widely to carry adm inistrative d o cu m en ta tio n . Following the fall of R om e, the E uropean states reverted to the use of the parchm en t codex , papyrus virtually d isappearing af te r the eighth cen tury . P ap e r was initially used mainly for com m ercia l purposes, as credit d o cu m en ts and bills of exchange. T ex ts of any length, including scholarly texts, co n tin u ed to be inscribed on p a rch m en t until the deve lopm en t of the prin ting press. T h e invention of printing was a p h en o m en o n as im portan t to the fo rm a tion of the absolutist s ta te as the o th e r factors m en tio n ed in c h a p te r 6. It w ould be difficult to overes tim ate the generalized im pact of prin ting in the shaping of m o d e rn i ty .14 Printing is the first m ajor s tep in the m echan iza tion of com m unica t ion and , in m aking d o cu m en ts and texts widely available, it in itia ted th e p rocess of drawing E u ro p ean culture away from m im etic imagery in material, in tellectual and artistic dom ains.

So fa r as the s ta te is co n c e rn e d , the m ost im p o rtan t


c o n se q u e n c e of th e easy an d ch e ap availability of p r in ted m ater ia ls was an en largem en t of the sphere of th e ‘political'. T h e g row th of a ‘public sp h e re ’ of s ta te adm in is tra tion is inseparab le from tex tually m ed ia ted o rgan iza tion . T h e d iscursive a ren a the reby o p en e d up is qu ite m istakenly described if it is regarded as o n e in which ‘free speech ' is in principle possible. It is no t primarily speech which is a t issue, how ever im p o rtan t deba ting ch am b ers m ight becom e. R a th e r it is the ‘in tertex tua li ty ’ of the exchange of opin ions and observa tions via texts tha t are ‘freely ava ilab le’ — in R icoeur 's te rm s, d is tancia ted from their au tho rs— tha t m arks the decisive shift in the lurch tow ards a new form of state. I shall pursue this th em e in a la ter section but for the m o m en t I w an t to co n c e n t ra te upon the im plications for the e n la rg em en t of the adm in is tra t ive p ow er o f th e sta te . W h a t prin ting m ad e possible, and what it was increasingly used for during the phase of the consolidation of absolutism , was a very p ro found fu r th e ran ce of the surveillance op era t io n s of the state. It was essential to the codification of law upon which W eb er rightly p laces so m uch stress. Laws had long been in som e part w ritten but in the p reced ing scribal cu ltu re their influence was necessarily limited and diffuse. P r in ted codes of law, within an increasingly l i terate cu ltu re , m ad e for the increasing in tegration of ‘in te rp re ted ’ law within the p rac t ice of s ta te adm inis tra tion and for a m uch m ore consistent and d irect application of s tandardized juridical p rocedures to the activities of the mass of the population. But the sphere of the law is only o n e area in which such changes can be observed . R ecords , repo rts and rou tine d a ta collection b ec o m e par t o f the day-to-day opera t io n of the sta te , a l though of cou rse no t limited to it.

As good a single index as any of the m o v em en t from the absolutist to the nation-s ta te is the initiation of the systematic co llec tion of ‘official statistics’. In th e period of absolutism, such data-gathering was particularly c o n c en t ra te d in two areas, a t least as regards the in terna l affairs o f states. O ne was tha t of finance and taxation , the o th e r the keep ing of popu la t ion statistics — w hich te n d e d , h o w ev er , until th e e ig h teen th cen tu ry to be localized ra th e r than centra lized . T h e first bea rs witness to the significance of fiscal m anagem en t, already alluded to. T h e second is to d o with a p h e n o m e n o n I shall discuss in the next section — a p re o ccu p a tio n of the cen tralizing s tate with m ain ta in ing in ternal


‘o rd e r ’ in respect of rebellion, vagabondage and crime. T h e official statistics th a t all s tates began to k eep from ab o u t the m iddle of th e e ig h tee n th cen tu ry o n w ard s m ain ta in a n d ex ten d these concerns . But they also range over m any sec tors of social life and, for the first t ime, are deta iled , system atic and nearly com ple te . T h ey include th e centra lized collation of m ater ia ls registering births, m arr iages and dea ths ; statistics perta in ing to res idence, e thn ic b ack g ro u n d and o ccu p a t io n ; and w hat ca m e to be called by Q u e te le t an d o th e rs ‘m o ra l s ta tis tics’, re la ting to suicide, de linquency , d ivorce and so on.

T h e re is a very im p o rtan t po int to be m ad e ab o u t official statistics. F rom the time of their first beginnings onw ards s tudents o f society have regarded th em as offering a fund of m ater ia l that can be used to cha rt the charac te ris t ics of social o rganization and social change . T h e origins of em pirical social research in the social sciences are closely bound up with the use of official statistics as an index of processes of social ac tiv ity .15 D u rk h e im ’s Suicide is only o n e am ong many n ine teen th -cen tu ry w orks to have relied upon the analysis o f such statistics to subs tan tia te its conclusions. Now it m ight well be accep ted tha t , given certa in reservations abou t the m an n er of their collection, official statistics are an invaluable source of d a ta for social research . But they are no t just ‘a b o u t ’ an independen tly given universe of social objects an d events , they are in part constitutive o f it. T h e adm inistrative pow er g en e ra ted by the nation-sta te could no t exist w ithout the in fo rm ation base tha t is the m eans of its reflexive self-regulation. O th e r im plications also derive from this. Social science, even its earliest fo rm ulations did no t co m e fresh-faced and innocen t to an o rd e red array of empirical data. T h e collection of official statistics is im possib le w ithou t those involved having a system atic unders tand ing of the sub jec t-m a tte r th a t is the co n ce rn of those statistics. Such an unders tand ing is progressively m o n ito red , in the m o d ern state , by m uch the sam e m eth o d s as ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ social scientists use to analyse the d a ta thus p ro d u ced . F ro m this it follows th a t the social sc iences have them selves been persistently im plicated in the p h en o m en a they set o u t to analyse. T h e co n n e c t io n s involved h e re a re in som e p ar t em pirica l (because the co llec tion o f m o d e rn statistics norm ally involves learning processes used to ‘system atize’ and ‘im p ro v e’ them ) but also co n c ep tu a l o r theore tica l . T h e discourses of social science



are recu rren tly ab so rb ed into w ha t it is tha t they are ab o u t , a t the sam e tim e as they (logically) d raw u p o n co n cep ts an d theories already em ployed by lay ac to rs .16

Social sc ience, in o th e r w ords, has from its early origins in the m o d ern period been a constitu tive aspec t of th a t vast expansion of the reflexive m on ito r ing of social re p ro d u c t io n tha t is an integral fea tu re of the state . In the period of absolutism , two forms of d iscourse w ere particularly re levant in this respect. O ne , which I have previously m en t io n ed , was the d iscourse of early political theory , constitu tively en tang led in the fo rm ation of the m odes of sovereignty that distinguish the absolutist s ta te from traditional ones. T h e o ther , belonging to a slightly la ter phase , is the d iscourse of early eco n o m ic theory , which helped to give the m o d ern senses to ‘ec o n o m ic ’, ‘e c o n o m y ’, ‘industry ’ and a whole set o f su rround ing term s. H ow ever, these usages only b ecam e firmly established in the n in e teen th cen tu ry and it is econom ics , to g e th e r with sociology and psychology, tha t have been m ost deeply involved with the rise of the adm inis tra tive pow er of the nation-state . In saying this, I d o no t m ean to claim tha t the social sciences canno t in som e part s tand outside that pow er and subject it to analysis and cr itique, as I consider myself to be doing in this text. But we should recognize tha t o n e of the fea tu res of the m odern s tate — and of m o d ern organizations in general — is the system atic study and utilization of m ateria ls re levan t to their own rep roduc tion .

Administrative Power II: Internal Pacification

Surveillance as th e mobilizing of adm inistrative pow er — th rough the storage and con tro l o f in fo rm ation — is th e p rim ary m eans of the co n c e n t ra t io n of au th o r i ta t iv e re so u rces involved in the fo rm ation of the nation-state . But it is acco m p an ied by large- scale processes o f internal transform ation which have their origins in substantial p a r t in the dev e lo p m en t of industrial capitalism and w hich essentially can be re p re sen te d as p ro d u c in g in terna l pacif ication . T h e m ean ing of ‘in ternal pac if ica tion’ needs to be carefully u n d e rs to o d and in te rp re ted against th e b a c k d ro p of the c h a rac te r of th e in terna l adm inis tra tion of trad it ional states. It is a question w hich re tu rn s us to the th em e of v iolence.

As I have previously p o in ted ou t, in trad it ional s ta tes the

co n cep t of ‘d ev ian ce’ m akes very little sense, excep t within the res tr ic ted locales of the ruling groups. T h e adm inistrative scope of the s ta te did no t ex tend to encom pass the p rac tices of the local com m unity , even within cities w here these were spatially distant from the cen tres in which s ta te pow er was m ost co n cen tra ted . M oreover , pa tte rns of v io lence did not resem ble those which have b eco m e familiar in the (W estern) nation-state . In traditional s ta tes the relatively insecure hold of the political ce n tre over the m eans of v io lence m ean t tha t th e re could be little possibility of ‘policing’ in the m o d ern sense; that there were always poten tial sources of cha llenge, of a military kind, to the cen tre ; and that bandits , m arau d ers , p irates, urban and rural gangs of various sorts ten d ed to be ever-present.

F rom th e six teenth cen tu ry on w ard s within the E u ro p ean societies, fears were constan tly expressed in ruling circles abou t ‘p o p u la r d is tu rb an ces ' . But a l though m any of these involved trad itional m odes of p ro tes t , they m ark the beginnings of a new relationship betw een state and populace. T w o partly independen t bu t increasingly convergen t t rends of deve lopm en t ap p e a r to be involved. O ne was in m ost coun tr ie s substantially the result o f the early em erg en ce of capitalistic eco n o m ic activity, tu rn ing loose large n u m b ers of d ispossessed peasan ts , w ho b ec am e sem iunem ployed cash-crop labourers o r settled in towns and cities as a potentially queru lous mass, only partially ab so rbed into the new social setting. T h e o th e r was the es tablishing of rem edia l organizations in specific types of locale tha t sepa ra ted off ce rta in categories of individuals from the rem a inder of the population . T h is is the p rocess , o r set of p rocesses , th a t F o u cau l t calls ‘seq u es tra t io n ’.17 In seven teen th cen tu ry England , it has been es tim ated , the ‘arm y of po o r and jobless' a m o u n ted to be tw een 10 and 20 p er cen t o f the adult popu la tion , with this figure rising in times of eco n o m ic crisis to som e 30 p er cen t. A cknow ledgem en t of this as a ‘social p rob lem ' of large p ro p o r tio n s on the part of those in ruling circles was u n d o u b ted ly o n e of the m ain reasons for the c rea t ion of work-houses and the early ‘hosp ita ls '.18

Since the hospital was the prim e m odel involved in the early phases of the m ushroom ing of ca rcera l o rganizations, it is w orth briefly com m enting on its origins in relation to la ter developm ents. ‘Hospitals ', som etim es in form s to which the m o d e rn sense of the te rm could be applied — co n cen tra t in g upon the ca re of the sick



and infirm — have a long history outside E u ro p e .19 T h u s hospitals in Byzantium w ere specialized agencies of this sort, a l though they w ere always closely assoc ia ted with m onasteries . F o r exam ple , the m onastery hospital established by John C o m m en o s in 1112 had five sepa ra te wards caring for d ifferent types of illness, each w ard having ab o u t a dozen beds in it. Every w ard had two physicians, with full-time assistants and orderlies , to g e th e r with adm in is tra to rs responsible for the organization as a whole; there was also an ou t-pa tien t d ep a r tm en t . T h e re w ere a few hospitals resem bling this in E u ro p e in the M iddle Ages, such as tha t at the A bbey of St Gall, in Sw itzerland, built in the n in th cen tu ry .20 T h e Abbey building co n ta in ed a hospital with a n u m b er of wards, ten d ed by a ch ief physician and o th e r d o c to rs . But such organizations bea r only a marginal rela tion to those co n s tru c ted from the seven teen th cen tu ry onw ards. T h e religious influence and the monastic model rem ained strong but the new organizations w ere often established by the sta te , and their co n c e rn was m ore with cr im e and vagrancy th an with the ca re of the sick .21

If ca rcera l organizations have their origins in the period of absolutism, they only assum ed the guise with which we are familiar today in the cou rse of the transition to the nation-state . T h e re is no need to accep t the whole sweep of F o u cau l t ’s argum en ts to acknow ledge th a t ‘disciplinary p o w e r’ b eco m es assoc ia ted with a range of o rgan iza t ions involving new m o d es of regularizing activities in tim e-space.22 Prisons and m enta l asylums b eco m e differen tia ted from o th e r organizations, like m edical hospitals, in w hich individuals a re no t in ca rce ra ted against the ir will. ‘D epriva t ion of f reed o m ' b ec o m e s the m ain punitive m ode , rep lac ing th o se sp ec ta cu la r fo rm s of p u n ish m en t of which F oucau lt writes but which w ere , in fact, n ev e r m ore than the d ram a t ic ex cep t io n s to m o re m u n d an e fo rm s of pre-existing sanc tions.23 T h e en fo rced depriva tion of liberties is clearly in som e par t an expression of the centrality which ‘d em o cra t ic ’ o r citizenship rights co m e to assum e within the state. T h e d eb a te — particularly as s t im ulated by F oucau lt 's writings — over how far the tren d tow ards co n f in em en t as a punitive sanc tion con fo rm s to h u m an e ideals,24 is in som e respec ts misguided. T h e po in t is not only tha t there o ccu rred a transition from o n e type of punishm ent (violent, spec tacular , open) to an o th e r (disciplinary, m onotonous , h idden), bu t tha t a new nexus of coercive rela tions was established

w here few w ere loca ted before . T h e crea t ion of a perce ived need fo r ‘law and o rd e r ’ is the reverse side of th e em erg en ce of co n cep tio n s of ‘d ev ian ce’ recogn ized and ca tegorized by the cen tra l au th o r i t ie s an d by p rofessional specialists . T h e s e are intrinsic to the expansion of the adm inistrative reach of the state, p ene tra t ing day-to-day activities — and to th e ach ievem en t of an effective m onopoly of v iolence in the hands of the state authorities .

T h e m ajo r schism atic conflic ts within the W este rn nation-s ta te b ec o m e class struggles an d struggles assoc ia ted with th e rise of mass m ovem en ts o f various types. T h e ‘cr im inal’ is specifically no longer a rebe l bu t a ‘d ev ian t’, to be ad justed to the no rm s of accep tab le behaviour as specified by the obligations of citizenship. In prev ious types of society, the regularized acq u iescen ce of the mass of th e popu la t ion had not been sought o r requ ired by ruling classes, except accord ing to fairly narrow crite ria of m ateria l submission. T h e m a in ten an ce of ‘o rd e r ’ — a te rm which does no t have the sam e applica tion in any case in those types o f society — was a m a t te r o f a c o m b in a t io n of local co m m u n ity co n tro l to g e th e r with the possibility of a rm ed in te rven tion w hen necessary . But, in the nation-s ta te , im prisonm ent plus policing largely replaces both these influences. ‘Civil war', w here it occurs, norm ally is hen cefo r th clearly d istinguishable from even quite substantial vio lent co n fron ta t ions betw een the state authorit ies and fractious class groupings o r o th e r organized dissident groups.

‘Disciplinary p o w e r’ as described by F oucau lt dep en d s perhaps primarily up o n surveillance in the sense of in form ation-keeping , especially in the form of personal reco rds of life-histories held by the adm inis tra tive au thorities . But it also involves surveillance in the sense of d irec t supervision. In this sense, prisons and asylums share som e of the genera l ized ch a rac te r is t ic s of m o d e rn organizations, including the capitalistic w ork-place , bu t a range of o th e r organizations as well. All involve the co n c en tra t io n of activities e i ther for a per iod of the day, o r for a p er iod in individuals’ lives, within specially co n s tru c ted locales. W e m ay regard disciplinary pow er as a sub-type of adm inis tra tive po w er in general. It is adm inistrative p ow er tha t derives from disciplinary p ro ced u re s , from the use of regularized supervision, in o rd e r e i ther to incu lca te o r to a t te m p t to m ain ta in ce r ta in traits of



behav iour in those sub jec t to it. S ince, in previous eras, the m onaste ry was o n e of the few locales in w hich large port ions of p eo p le ’s lives cou ld be co n c en t ra te d , it is n o t surprising th a t som e of the m ain fea tu res of d isc ip linary p o w e r o r ig ina te th e re . Disciplinary pow er is built a ro u n d the t im e-table jus t like o th e r m o re spatially diffuse aspects of m o d ern organizations. B ut in this case tim e-tab les a re u sed to o rgan ize th e tim e-space seq u en c in g of settings of ac tio n within physically re s tr ic ted locales, in which the regularity of activities can be en fo rced by supervision of individuals w ho m ight no t o therw ise acquiesce . Superv is ion d e m a n d s e i th e r co n t in u ed o b se rv a t io n (as, for exam ple , in the case of a te ac h e r con fron ting a classroom of pupils) o r ready access to such observa tion w hen it is th ough t necessary (as in the instance of devices tha t can be used to k ee p a w atch upon prisoners when they are in the ir cells). In the sense tha t disciplinary p ow er involves observa tion , F o u cau l t is right to take B en th am ’s p an o p tico n as its ep itom e, regardless of how far it was actually used as a m odel by those w ho designed o r o p e ra ted prisons o r o th e r organizational locales.

But F oucau lt is m istaken in so far as he regards ‘m axim ized’ disciplinary pow er of this sort as expressing th e general n a tu re of adm inistrative p ow er within the m odern state . Prisons, asylums and o th e r locales in w hich individuals a re k ep t en tire ly seques te red from the outs ide , as G offm an has m ad e c lear, have to be regarded as having special charac te ris t ics tha t sepa ra te them off ra th e r distinctively from o th e r m o d ern organizations. In virtue of th e fact tha t it is ‘to ta l ’ in its effects upon inm ates, the fo rm er type of organization specifically d isrupts the o rd inary rou tines th rough which h um an agents live the ir lives.25 G o ffm a n ’s no tion of ‘to tal ins titu tion’ m ay o r m ay n o t have been consciously coined in awareness of its affinities to ‘totalitarianism ’ but certainly the co n cen tra t io n cam p is, in re cen t times, the m ost d ram a tic and frightful example of enforced sequestration. T h e use of techniques of surveillance in such enc losed and brutally t im e-tabled settings undeniab ly has set a malign s tam p on th e m o d e rn era. O ne can see from this regard why F oucau lt chooses to a c cen tu a te the im plica tions of th o se fo rm s of d isc ip linary p o w e r th a t w ere p e rh ap s o f ten first e s tab lished for essentially h u m an ita r ian motives. But we still have to insist th a t it is the work-p lace or,

m ore generally, the specialized locale within which administrative pow er is co n c en tra te d , th a t is p ro to typ ical of the W este rn n a t io n s tate . C harac ter is t ic of the w ork-p lace setting of the business firm o r of the school, and m ost o th e r m odern organizations, is th a t the individual only spends p ar t of the day within their walls; and that during tha t segm ent of th e day the applica tion of disciplinary po w er is m o re diffuse th an in ‘to tal in s t i tu t io n s’. In all o rganizations, in virtue of the d ia lectic of con tro l , there is som e sort of ‘effort bargain ' th a t is explicitly o r implicitly co n c lu d ed by partic ipants . But outside locales of forcible seques tra t ion , this is o n e which bo th de jure and de facto acknow ledges strict limits to the deg ree to which activities can be forcibly constra ined to fit designated o r desired pa tte rns . T h e re are certain ly qu ite close architectural similarities between, for example, nineteenth-century prisons and factories in Britain and in o th e r countries. As has been rem ark ed , the thoughts o f the early industrial en trep ren eu rs readily tu rn ed to looking for sources of docile , unfree labour in their a t tem p ts to c rea te s table conditions of p ro d u c tio n within the en terprise . O ne historian observes that, ‘T h e re w ere few areas of the co u n try |B rita in] in w hich the m o d e rn industries , particularly textiles, if ca rr ied on in large buildings, w ere not associa ted with prisons, w orkhouses and o rp h an ag es .’26 But as the sam e w rite r goes on to add , o n e of the m ost im p o r tan t characteristics of industrial capitalism is that wage-labour is ‘free’. H en ce the im position of disciplinary pow er ou ts ide con tex ts of en fo rced seques tra tion tends to be b lunted by the very real and consequen tia l countervail ing p ow er which those subject to it can , and do, develop.

This suggests that th e re a re two substantive fea tu res of the associa tion of disciplinary pow er with the m o d ern s ta te tha t should be distinguished. O n the one hand , th e re takes p lace a m ark e d im petus tow ards the expansion of this fo rm of pow er, m ad e possible by the es tab l ish m en t of locales in w hich the regularized observation of activities can be ca rr ied on in o rd e r to seek to co n tro l them . T h is is im p o rtan t for the n a tu re of the m o d e rn w ork-p lace an d , th e reb y , is a m a jo r tie co n n ec t in g industrial capitalism (as a m o d e of eco n o m ic en terprise) to the nation-state (as an adm inistratively co-o rd ina ted unit). It is no t, as such, par t o f the d irective in fluence of the s ta te ap p a ra tu s , b u t a generalized p h en o m en o n enhancing internal pacification through


prom oting the discipline of potentially reca lc i tran t g roups at m ajor points of tension, especially in the sp h ere of p roduc tion . T his is d istinguishable from a grow th in disciplinary pow er linked to , and expressive of, the sanc tions th a t those in the s ta te ap p a ra tu s are able to wield in respec t of ‘deviance '. It is this second aspect tha t is m ost closely m eshed with the dev e lo p m en t of surveillance as the policing of the rou tine activities of the mass of the popu la t ion , by specialized agencies sep a ra te from the m ain body of the a rm ed forces.

In ternal pacification involves several re la ted p h en o m en a , all to do with the progressive d im inu tion of v io lence in the in ternal affairs o f nation-states. O ne e lem ent, given particu lar p rom inence by Foucau lt , is the d isap p ea ran ce of violent form s of pun ishm ent associa ted with the legal system. Perhaps the m ost striking single index of this is to be found in the history of capita l pun ishm ent. In post-medieval times, capital p u n ishm en t could be m eted ou t for a range of transgressions, m any of them seemingly quite trivial. On the o th e r hand , the killing of an o th e r person cou ld often be a to n ed for by p aym en t of a fine and , in p rac t ice , was frequently sanc tioned by the local co m m u n ity o r by kin g roups ra th e r than by the state. R egard ing m u rd e r as at the peak of the scale of crim es, w ha tever level in the social h ie ra rchy the p e rp e tra to r might be, and separa ting m u rd e r unequivocally from the killing of alien popu la tions in times of war, a re a t t i tudes pecu lia r to the past two cen tu r ies o r so. T h ey reflect bo th the prim acy tha t ‘bourgeois rights’ assum e and their co n n ec tio n with universal c itizenship within the sovereign state.

Public execu tions w ere still ca rr ied ou t in E ngland until well into the e igh teen th cen tu ry . H angm en were well-known figures to the general public , and b rough t to their w ork various sorts of personal id iosyncrac ies and fo rm s of exh ib i t ion ism .27 T h o se m alefac to rs w ho w ere d o n e to dea th a t T y b u rn w ere taken th rough the stree ts in an open ca r t , followed by a lengthy cor tège o f officials. T h ey d ied slow, lingering dea ths , a l though friends were allowed to sh o rten their sufferings by pulling at their legs on the scaffold. A lthough the p rac t ice d ied o u t well befo re tha t of public execution itself, in earlier times corpses were o ften disposed of publicly. G ib b e tin g was the m ost co m m o n of such p rocedures . A corpse w ould be boiled o r ta r red and hung up in a cha ir o r w icker suit a t th e scen e of the c r im e, o n a busy th o ro u g h fa re o r at


a spec ia l g ib b e t p lace . T h e m ost ev iden t fe a tu re of cap ita l punishm ent subsequent to the d isappearance of public executions was the progressive in tro d u c tio n of techn iques a t tem pting to minimize bo th suffering and any sense of spectacle. T h e objective also b ecam e tha t of avoiding m utilation . Scaffolds w ere designed in such a way as to d ro p the co n d e m n e d person just far enough to d islocate th e neck , bu t no t far enough to b reak b lood vessels. Execu tions b ecam e co n cea led in time as well as in space , being early in th e m orn ing o r late a t night, ra th e r than in the m iddle of the a f te rnoon , as public execu tions used to be. As Lofland points ou t,

H isto ric e x e cu tio n s w ere noisy: p o u n d in g to b en d b od ies on to the w heel; h am m erin g to a t ta c h bod ies in cruc ifix ion ; fire c rack lin g an d w ood tum b ling to p re p a re po ts for hum an boiling . . . T h e m o d ern d es ire is fo r silen t te ch n iq u e s . V irtually no e ffo rt has been sp a red to m ake English hang ing qu ie t. A l the beg inn ing o f the m o d ern p erio d , hang ing d ro p d o o rs w ere baffled w ith ba les of co tto n and , w hen the techno logy b ecam e available , ru b b e r cush ions a n d sp ring c a tc h e s w ere u se d .28

T h e elimination of punishment-as-spectacle undoubted ly is rich in implications, but o n e main e lem ent involved is a transferra l of the sanction ing capacities of the s ta te from the m anifest use of v iolence to the pervasive use of administrative pow er in sustaining its rule. Capital pun ish m en t has today been abolished in m ost W este rn countries . But in the p reced ing period it was no longer a m e th o d of inflicting bodily pain , designed to im press the rest of the popu la t ion with the co m m an d over force possessed by the state . R a th er , it b ecam e the final sanc tion in a h iera rchy of the rem oval of liberties. Its ‘s i lence’ and ‘c o n c ea lm en t’ no d o u b t have to d o with the realization th a t the sanc tion of pu tting so m eo n e to dea th is no t in fact just a fu r ther step in the progressive deprivation o f the rights of c itizenship, bu t an entirely d istinct p h en o m en o n . T h e shift from capita l pun ishm en t to life im prisonm en t as the m ost weighty sanction is thus in line with the ‘new logic’ of p u n ish m en t th a t em erges in con junc tion with the expansion of adm inis tra tive pow er. O f course , one m ust recognize th a t m any o th e r form s of v io lence are widely ca rr ied on inside the police sta tions and prisons of the m o d ern world. But these are no t generally p a r t o f a scale o f pun ishm en t w hereby violence is used



in o rd e r publicly to display to po ten tia l w rongdoers the likely o u tco m e of any m alfeasance . On th e co n tra ry , they usually have to be em ployed in a su rrep tit ious fashion.

In local com m unities w ithin trad it ional states, w here custom was the principal binding force , th e re were o ften b lood feuds and o th e r forms of violent e n c o u n te r betw een individuals and kin groups. Peasan ts living at any d is tance away from the m ain co n cen tra t io n s of a rm ed fo rce of the s ta te au thorit ies , o r o f the ir local lord, could not be effectively p ro tec ted from bandits o r bands of a rm ed ra iders. This was true in m ost areas of trad it ional China, for instance , right up to the tw en tie th cen tu ry , n o tw ith standing the fact tha t C h ina was p robably in som e m ore cen tra l regions the m ost successfully pacified of all large imperial s ta tes .29 T rav e l was always a fraugh t en te rp r ise in such s ta tes and m erch an ts of any affluence virtually always m oved in a rm ed caravans, even for journeys of quite short d istance. Finally, within cities them selves th e re w ere very often ‘no g o ’ a reas in which, even with a rm ed p ro tec t io n , those from o th e r sec tions would fear to venture .

T h e d ev e lo p m e n t of the abso lu tis t s ta te was u n d o u b ted ly associa ted with m ajo r advances in internal pac if ication , a l though the level of day-to-day v io lence was always widely variable at d ifferent per iods and in d iffe ren t places. A ccord ing to Le G off and Su therland , as has been m en tioned previously, in m ost of rural F rance u n d e r the Old Regim e the re was a p revalence of ‘violence, rowdyism , petty thieving and the like’.30 If M acfarlane is right abou t rural England , on the o th e r han d , the level of personal safety in the seven teen th cen tury was considerably higher than in m ost par ts o f con tinen ta l E urope . A ccord ing to him, in Kirkby Lonsdale and its environs it was fairly com m on for w om en to travel on their ow n, and for peop le to cross the m oors a lone at night, even w hen carrying sum s of m oney. A large am o u n t of m ovem en t w en t on in the region, seemingly w ithou t fear of robbery . Battles be tw een w andering youth gangs, qu ite frequen t in som e areas of rural Eng land , w ere ap paren tly absen t th e re .31 A lthough th e anxieties expressed by co m m en ta to rs a t the tim e ca n n o t necessarily be tak en at their face value, it seem s definitely to have b een th e case tha t the larger cities, tow ards the la t te r par t o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry , all co n ta in ed areas in which the levels of m u rd e r and a rm ed ro b b e ry w ere very high by subsequen t

s tandards . It is only in this pe r iod , how ever, tha t th e no tion of ‘lawlessness' becom es widely used. M odern policing, with its ch arac te r is t ic m ix ture of inform ational and supervisory aspects of surveillance, was both m ad e possible and seen to be necessary by the wholesale transferra l o f popu la tions from rural to u rban env ironm ents . H o race W alpo le w ro te in 1752 of jou rneys in L ondon tha t ‘o n e is forced to travel, even at n oon , as if one were going to b a t t le . '32 R eferring to English cities in general o f the period , the W ebbs w ro te of ‘despair o f conveying any ad eq u a te p ic tu re of the lawless violence, the b a rbarous l icentiousness, and the a lm ost un lim ited o p p o r tu n i t ie s for pilfering and ro b b e ry offered by the unpo liced s tree ts ’.33

T h e rap id expansion of a newly urbanized popu la tion , in which changing m odes of life to o k som e while to b eco m e established, c rea ted unse tt led cond itions of ‘lawlessness’. T o an ex ten t, these might have dim inished of the ir own acco rd with m ore stable patterns of residence. But undoubted ly the main influence becam e the contro l which the new types of policing, in con junc tion with the sanctioning m echan ism s o f codified law and im prisonm ent, w ere able to achieve. ‘C rim ina l’ activities b ecam e m uch m ore clearly distinct from o th e r sources of social strife, and these in tu rn b ecam e plainly d iffe ren tia ted from the ex ternal military engagem ents of states. C o m p arin g London , S tockho lm and New South W ales during the second half o f the n in e teen th and early tw entie th cen tu ries , G u r r co n c lu d es that in each case th e re is a c lear t ren d tow ards a dec line in c o m m o n crim es of v io lence — a finding am ply confirm ed in o th e r s tudies.34 Until ab o u t the tu rn of the n ine teen th century , even in Britain long-distance travel m ean t risking the a t ten t ions of robbe rs o r highwaym en. But during tha t cen tu ry these p h e n o m e n a rapidly b ecam e noth ing m ore than a m em ory , invested not in frequently with a ro m an tic im age that bo re little re la tion to the past reality in question . Of course , in o th e r parts of E u ro p e such a level o f in ternal pacif ication took considerab ly longer to achieve. As late as the early tw en tie th cen tu ry travel was unsafe in som e m oun ta inous and forested areas of F ran ce and rem ains so in som e part up to th e p re sen t day in Sicily o r T u rk e y .35

A n o th e r aspec t of in terna l pacif ication is o f qu ite e lem enta l im p o rtan ce to the them es of this b o o k .36 This is the e rad ica t ion of violence, and the capability to use the m eans of vio lence, from


Adm inistrative Power, Internal Pacification 191V

the labour co n tra c t — the axis of the class system. Closely in tegra ted with, and d ep e n d en t u pon , the o th e r form s of internal pac if ica t ion , it is a m ajo r fe a tu re of th e sep a ra t io n of the 'e conom ic ' from the ‘politica l’, a l though o n e tha t is ordinarily ignored in m ost writings on the subject. It co n n ec ts closely with processes of social change I shall discuss in the next sec tion , and only the ou tl ines need be sk e tch ed here. In industrial capitalism— in con tras t to pre-existing class systems — em ployers do not possess d irect access to the m eans of v iolence in o rd e r to secure the eco n o m ic re tu rns they seek from the su b o rd in a te class. Marx entire ly co rrec tly laid considerab le em phasis upon this, even if he did no t pursue its im plications. ‘Dull eco n o m ic com p u ls io n ’, plus the surveillance m ad e possible by the co n c en tra t io n of labour within the capitalistic w ork-place , rep laces th e d irec t possibility of coerc ion by the use of force. Of course , em ployers did not re linquish th e use of san c tio n s of v io lence w ithou t som e re lu c tan ce and the class struggles w aged by w orkers have often involved violence. But these facts do no t com prom ise the key im p o r tan ce of ‘bourgeo is rights ' in the fo rm a tio n of a ‘d e m ili tar ized’ system of p ro d u c tio n . T h is is o n e of the m ost significant e lem en ts of the libera l-dem ocra tic s ta te — tha t the rights of f reedom of disposal of labour-pow er, for which the bourgeo is ie actively fough t, ca rry with th e m th e intrinsic limitation of the pow er of em ployers in the w ork-p lace to hiring and firing w orkers and to supervising ‘m an ag e m en t’. T h ese are not in any way negligible sources of contro l . H ow ever they are only possible in a society which has been internally pacified in o th e r ways and in which ‘bourgeois rights' a re m ore than the m ere sham freedom s M arx seemingly took them to b e .17

M ost of this book , excep t w here it m oves on to the terra in of the global s ta te system, is co n c e rn e d with the E u ro p ean n a t io n state. But it is pe rhaps ap p ro p r ia te at this po int to m ak e a few co m m en ts ab o u t m o d ern sta tes in which the use of force has co n tin u ed to play a m uch m ore d irec t role in the co-ord ination of the labour-force in the sphere of p roduc tion . If in these states the regu la t ion o f w ork by ‘dull ec o n o m ic co m p u ls io n ’ rem a ins u ndeve loped , it is p robab ly in som e substantial part a result of the per iphera l involvem ent of capita lism historically with the use of unfree labour. In coun tr ie s with an eco n o m ic back g ro u n d of this sort, the insulation of eco n o m y and polity ch arac te r is t ic of the

E u ro p ean nation-state has no t been achieved. O th e r aspects of internal pacif ication m ay be correspondingly also less securely deve loped — in respect, for exam ple , o f the ex is tence of a rm ed gangs w ho p e rp e tu a te organ ized terrorism in pursu it o f politicalgoals.·18

A final ch a rac te r is t ic of in te rna l pac if ica t ion , in tim ate ly co n n e c ted with the o thers , bu t nevertheless d istinguishable from them , is the w ithdraw al of the military from d irec t par tic ipa tion in the in terna l affairs o f s tate . I t is this w hich seem ed to m any nineteenth-century th inkers to confirm the thesis of the essentially pacif ic c h a ra c te r o f industria l cap ita lism . W h a t it involves, how ever, is no t the dec line of w ar but a co n cen tra t io n of military pow er ‘pointing ou tw ards ' tow ards o th e r states in the nation-state system. T h e consolidation of the internal administrative resources o f the s tate dislocates adm inistrative pow er from its s trong and necessary base in the coerc ive sanctions of a rm ed force. I do not w an t this s ta tem en t to be m isunders tood . In the nation-state , as in o th e r states, the claim to effective contro l of the m eans of violence is qu ite basic to s ta te pow er. But the registering of the m ore or less c o m p le te success of this c laim , m ad e possible by the expansion of surveillance capabilities and internal pacification , radically lessens the d e p e n d e n c e of the s ta te ap p a ra tu s upon the wielding of military force as the m eans o f its rule. T h e distinction betw een the military and civilian police is symbol and m ateria l expression of this p h en o m en o n . At the sam e time, the fact that this d is t inc tion is rarely c lea r-cu t, tha t the police m ay have param ilitary sections em ployed in cases of w hat is regarded as serious civil d is tu rbance , and tha t the military may be directly called in, a re ev idence enough tha t the d iffe ren tia tion is usually full of tension.

Urbanism, Regionalization and Sequestration

In class-divided societies, for reasons a lready e luc ida ted , cities w ere a m ain founda tion of the genera tion of b o th allocative and au thorita tive resources. T h e re la tion of m o d ern u rbanism to the nation-state is qu ite d iffe ren t, ag is the ch a rac te r o f u rban life as su ch .39 T h e sp read of m o d e rn u rbanism is u n d o u b ted ly p ro m p ted above all by the e m erg en ce of industria l cap ita lism as the do m in an t form of p ro d u c tio n system. But, in its con seq u en ces



and in its intrinsic form , m o d e rn u rban dev e lo p m en t is very different from previous cities. It form s a ‘c rea ted en v iro n m en t’, in which the transfo rm ation of n a tu re is expressed as com m odified time-space; as such it is the milieu of all social ac tion , no longer a distinct physical entity and social sec tor within a b ro ad er societal to tality . T h e co m m o d if ica t io n of tim e and of space is the condition of those processes of time-space sequenc ing described earlier as charac te r is t ic of m o d ern organizations, including the nation-state , as the m ost p ro m in en t new pow er-conta iner.

In saying this, I do not m ean to deny the im p o rtan ce of e i ther regionalization within the territory of the state or of social systems that s tre tch across states. In m any respects nation-states and the global areas covered by the nation-state system are m ore definitely regionalized than the traditional s ta tes that p reced ed them . T h e adm in is tra tive unity they display is p rim arily a p h en o m e n o n confined to the scope of the s ta te appara tus . T h e in te rd e p en d en ce , eco n o m ic and political, o f the w orld in which n a t io n states exist should no t be identified with hom ogeneity . S om e of the m ain forms of regionalization are the following.40 i1 T h e regionalized distr ibu tion of nation-states them selves, as core and peripheral states economically , as power-blocs politically and as d istinctive and au to n o m o u s cen tres of p ow er within a global p a tch w o rk o f states.2 T h e differential regional distribution of industry , in a division of labour in and across states. Industrial p ro d u c tio n is by its very n a tu re reg iona lized , s ince various types of industry ten d to develop , o r to be p laced , in distinct spatial settings and areas. T his applies no t only to fairly generalized regional distributions within and betw een states but also within qu ite restr ic ted settings, such as the spatial positioning of industrial a reas in ce rta in types of urban neighbourhoods. ‘Uneven developm ent’ can be associated with any o r all o f the types of regionalization m en tioned in (1) or (2 ).

3 T h e diffe ren tia l reg ional co n c e n tra t io n of popu la t ions , regardless of w h e th e r or no t this is expressed in the shape of cultural, e thn ic o r linguistic variations. T h e populations of na t ion s tates tend to be m uch m ore unevenly sp read than those of trad i t ional s ta tes , partly b ec au se of the l im ita tions of rural eco n o m y in th e la t te r and of the very high density u rban agglom erations assum e in the form er. T h e co n cen tra t io n of large

masses of individuals within relatively res tr ic ted spatial areas is undeniab ly o n e of the m ost s tunning diffe rences be tw een the m o d ern and the traditional world. U p to the seven teen th cen tu ry th e re w ere p robab ly only ab o u t 100 million p eop le in E u ro p e , w hich was considerab ly m o re densely p o pu la ted than the o th e r con tinen ts . T o d ay there are som e half this n u m b er w ho live in the co n u rb a tio n occupy ing the com paratively tiny a rea s tre tch ing from Boston to W ashington on the E astern S eaboard of the USA.4 T h e re a re m any c lea r-cu t and diffuse reg iona l var ia tions betw een n e ighbourhoods and locales within the built-up sections of the c rea ted env ironm ent. T h ese are, of course , som etim es p lanned bu t are probably m ore often un in tended results of the intersection of produc t, labour and housing m arkets. On a smaller scale , regionalization betw een and within the concre te ly situated locales that are the settings of organizations is o ften p ro n o u n ced and significant. T h e d eg ree of d iffe ren tia tion am o n g the n e ighbourhoods of trad it ional cities and betw een the locales in which day-to-day life was ca rr ied on was usually qu ite low. M ost large, internally differentiated locales were either public buildings o r the sites of religious com m unities . But such locales b eco m e co m m o n p lace in m o d ern society , being them selves co n ta ine rs for the genera tion of adm inistrative power. T h e in ternal regionalization of locales is involved in a d irec t way with the h ierarch ies of offices charac te r is t ic of bu reau c racy , bu t also with m any o th e r aspects of the d ifferentiation of social activities.

Sequestra tion is o n e form of regionalization, and there can be no d o u b t th a t its influence is no t confined to spheres of forcible incarceration . C oncea lm ent and revelation take on new meanings and a new re sonance in the c rea ted env ironm en t of m odern urbanism and in a society w here massively developed surveillance is so im portan t to the op era t io n s of power. W h ere disciplinary pow er is strongly focused , for exam ple , settings in which those subject to supervision can avoid being observed by superord inates b eco m e of particu la r significance in the dialectic of contro l. Seques tra tion is of such im p o rtan ce to the tissue of day-to-day social life b ecause of its co n n ec t io n with those aspects of h u m an experience that w ere previously m ore o r less freely exposed to view, if usually su rro u n d ed by ritual p rac tices and prohibitions. In spite of the criticisms m ad e by h istorians of A ries’ d iscussion of changing W este rn a tt i tudes tow ards d ea th , the general ou tlines of



the analysis he m akes seem valid. T rad itionally , he argues, dea th was a p h en o m en o n in tegra ted with life, with the continu ity of social activities.

T h e sp e c ta c le o f th e d ead , w hose b o n es w ere alw ays being w ashed up to th e su rfa ce o f th e ce m e te rie s , as w as th e sku ll in H am let, m ade no m ore im pression up o n the living th a n d id the idea of th e ir ow n d ea th . T h ey w ere as fam iliar w ith th e d ea d as they w ere fam iliarised w ith th e id ea o f th e ir ow n d ea th .

S om ew here in the six teenth cen tu ry this began to change, for reasons tha t do not have a single source but tha t converge to p ro d u ce a consis ten t trend.

Like the sexual ac t, d e a th w as h en c e fo rth increasing ly th o u g h t o f as a transg ression w hich te a rs m an from his daily life, from ra tio n a l soc ie ty , from his m o n o to n o u s w ork , in o rd e r to m ake him u n d erg o a paroxysm , p lunging him in to an irra tio n a l, v io len t an d beau tifu l w orld . . . T h is id ea o f ru p tu re is som eth in g co m p le te ly new .4'

T h e d em an d s of the early health re fo rm ers to rem ove burial g rounds from ch u rch es and city cen tres w ere , in Aries’ view, an initial symbolic expulsion of the d ead from the com m unity of the living. It p reced ed and helped shape the ‘suppress ion’ of dea th that is ch arac te r is t ic of m ore recen t times. But w ha tever its origins, which are certain ly bo th historically and psychologically com plex , this ‘suppress ion ’ is not limited to the m ateria l ev idence of m ortality . Not only d ea th is seques te red from the ord inary activities of daily life; so are o th e r ph en o m en a which, in becom ing ‘d e ta c h e d ’ from the norm al run of social life, p ro d u ce specific sources of anxiety o r distress — including both m adness and physical illness of a serious sort. If Elias is right, Aries’ co m m en t on sexuality also signals an im portan t social change , even if sexual behav iou r is not organizationally conf ined in the sam e way as the o th e r p h en o m en a . T h e re is good reason to be as cau tious ab o u t som e of Elias’s historical claims as th e re is those of Aries, bu t it does seem that sexual activity used to be engaged in m ore openly than subsequen tly cam e to be the case .42

W h a tev er the sources of these changes, their con seq u en ces are probab ly very significant for the tissue of day-to-day social life in m o d e rn sta tes . I have a rg u ed e lsew here tha t rou tin iza t ion , know ledgeably yet tacitly organ ized by agen ts in the flow of their


ac tion , is fundam en ta l to the rep ro d u c t io n of institu tionalized practices.43 In tribal and in class-divided societies, tradition infuses the rou tine and gives it m oral sources th rough which day-to-day life connec ts to the existential pa ram e te rs of h u m an life, to the rela tions of h u m an beings with na tu re , birth , sickness and dea th . T h e ‘existential co n trad ic t io n ’ via which h um an beings live their lives — tha t they are p ar t o f inorganic na tu re , and re lapse in to it a t d ea th , yet are no t of n a tu re , in so far as they live also in consc iousness of their fin itude — is no t sep a ra ted from the organized dynam ics of social life. In the m o d ern sta te , existential co n tra d ic t io n is a lm ost co m p le te ly ex p u n g ed by s truc tu ra l con trad ic t ion , the m ain locus of which is precisely the s tate itself.44 O ne o u tco m e is th a t th e rou tin ization of day-to-day social life is p recar ious , resting up o n a relatively shallow psychological base and n o t in tegra ted with m oral principles tha t provide m eans of m eeting existential d ilem mas. T h e seques tra tion of d ea th , sickness and m adness , and the privatizing of sexuality, are bo th a result of this s ituation and , a t the sam e time, a cond ition of the stability of the routine.

In virtue of seques tra tion , there fo re , a range of experiences tha t are psychologically troubling do not in trude upon the main body of activities individuals ca rry ou t in the course of the ir daily lives. Such experiences are rem o v ed from possible intrusion into the continu ity of routin ized activities and pushed instead to the o u te r margins of those con tex ts in which m ost daily social life is enac ted . I do no t m ean to p ropose som e sort of functionalist accoun t either of the origins of sequestration o r of its implications o n ce widely established. T h e dev e lo p m en t of seques te red locales is partly to be explained in term s of influences p rom oting ca rcera l organizations and partly in term s of the em erging p rim acy of ‘techn ica l’ m eth o d s of a t tem pting to ‘t re a t ’ ‘m en ta l’ and physical illness. T h e o u tco m e of seques tra tion is no t in any generalized way functional for the continu ity of social activities. In respec t of feelings of on to logical security , the m em bers of m o d e rn societies a re par ticu la r ly vu lnerab le to genera l ized anxiety. T h is m ay b eco m e in tense e ither w hen , as individuals, they have to co nfron t existential d ilem m as ordinarily suppressed by seques tra t ion , o r w hen , on a larger scale, rou tines of social life are for som e reason substantially d isrupted . T h e em ptiness o f the rou tines followed in


large segm ents of m o d e rn social life en g e n d e r a psychological basis for affiliation to symbols th a t can b o th p ro m o te solidarity and cause schism. A m ong these symbols a re those assoc ia ted with nationalism , an d I shall re tu rn to th e issues thus raised in c h a p te r 8.

Class, Sovereignty and Citizenship

8

P o ly a r c h y

T h e deve lopm en t of sovereignty , as co n cep t and reality, is of m ajor significance in rela ting what a t first sight look to be quite o pposed deve lopm ents: the au thority of the absolutist m o n arch and the com ing of the m o d ern d em o cra t ic state. At the sam e time as the drive tow ards sovereignty gene ra tes a centra liza tion of resources in the hands of the ruler , it stimulates a generalized awareness that political power depends upon collective capabilities which the figure of the m o n arch may signify, but to which the traditional trappings of kingly rule have little re levance .

T h e re are two con tras ting in te rp re ta t ions of the deve lopm en t of m odern dem o cracy , with both of which I shall tak e issue. On the on e h and th e re is the familiar Marxist acco u n t , which seeks to explain the origins of d em o cra t ic partic ipa tion in term s of class dynam ics. A lthough such an acco u n t can and has been given with widely varying degrees of subtlety, its basic outline is c lear enough. T h e main transfo rm ative influence shaping the em erg en ce of d em o cra t ic politics is the d ev e lo p m en t of capitalism and the class struggles this entails. ‘Bourgeois f reedom s’ involve a range of civil and political liberties ach ieved th rough the conflicts tha t ranged the m em b ers of the rising capitalist class against th e land-ow ning ar is tocracy. ‘Bourgeois rights’, which w ere p ro p o sed by their advocates as universal, in fact serve to legitim ate the do m in an ce o f the capitalist class. W hile M arx might adm it — especially in his m ore deta iled studies ra th e r than his m ore ab s trac t p ro n o u n c e m ents — tha t struggles involving such rights m ay have a certa in in d ep en d en ce from class conflic t, for the m ost p a r t they are seen as the su rface expression of class division. An opposing view is

Class, Sovereignty and C itizenship 199

taken by m any of M arx ’s critics. T h u s Bendix effectively seeks to reverse th e M arxist position , arguing tha t while struggles over civil and political rights w ere in certa in historical c ircum stances con jo ined to class conflicts, in fact the fo rm er have p rim acy over the la tter . N e ither the origins n o r the co n se q u en ce s of the dem ocra t iza t ion of the m o d ern s tate a re in a significant way cond it ioned by class conflict. T h u s the struggles th a t seem ed to M arx to be the very p ro to ty p e of class conflic t in n ine teen th - cen tu ry E u ro p e are seen as strivings on the part of exc luded groups to ach ieve full m em bersh ip of the d em o cra t ic polity. '

Before assessing these rival positions, som e co n cep tu a l and substantive observations should be m ade. Few co n cep ts a re m o re fiercely d eb a te d than that o f dem ocracy . I shall no t try to trace the course o f those debates , but shall follow Lindblom in regarding d em o cracy ’, in its b roades t sense, as equivalen t to ‘po lyarchy’.2 Polyarchy m eans rule by the m any, and involves ‘the continu ing responsiveness of the governm ent to the preferences of its citizens considered as political equa ls .’3 E lec tora l systems, as m odes of ensuring such ‘responsiveness of g o v e rn m e n t’ are the prim e, but not the only, p rocedura l m eans of creating polyarchy and cour ts of appeal the m ain m echan ism of sustaining it. L indblom c o n cerns himself mostly with the first of these , but the second is arguably just as im portan t in re spec t of the fo rm ulation he offers. For , as he ind ica tes , po lyarchy d ep e n d s up o n d eb a te s and persuasion w hich (in principle) co u n te r the arb itra ry use of power. I include as courts o f appeal not only parliam ents, debating ch am b ers and law courts , bu t also any a ren a in which d eb a te that influences policy decisions is ca rried on — in par ticu la r the press and , in recen t times, e lec tron ic media. T h e re is one m ajo r respec t in which I d ep a r t from L indb lom ’s usage. H e limits the no tion of polyarchy to ‘bourgeo is’ o r ‘liberal d em o crac ie s ’. I wish to m ak e it a m uch m ore encom pass ing co n cep t , such tha t liberal dem o cracy is only o n e type of polyarchy. A lthough in the E u ro p ean n a t io n s ta te po lyarch ic systems have p redom inan tly taken the form of liberal d em o cracy , o th e r types of g o v ern m en t in nation-states of all k inds ten d strongly tow ards polyarchy. T h e r e is, in short , a generic association betw een the nation-state and polyarchy which it will be my aim to help explicate^ /

Polyarchy , L indb lom m akes clear, d ep e n d s u p o n the existence of a ran g e of rights a t t r ib u te d to the m em b ers of a given

popula tion . A t this point, how ever, we have to acknow ledge an im p o rtan t p h en o m en o n assoc ia ted with sovereignty. Polyarchy evidently has som eth ing to do with w ha t M arx called ‘bourgeois rights'. Now ‘bourgeois r ights’, in their classic fo rm ula tions in the A m erican and F rench Revolu tions, a re universal rights. T h ey apply in princip le to the w hole of hum an ity and it is no t surprising to find th a t even their rad ical critics, such as M arx , to o k this for g ran ted . As the expression of underly ing eco n o m ic transac tions th a t are also po ten tia lly un iversal in n a tu re , they have no pa r t ic u la r co n n e c t io n with th e b o u n d ar ie s of states. In fact , ‘bou rgeo is r igh ts’ have b een eve ryw here ac tu a l ized within sovereign states. T h ey are, thus, m ore appropria te ly regarded as citizenship rights and I shall hen cefo r th use th a t te rm to re fer to them .

L indblom lists the following as the rights and prerogatives assoc ia ted with po lyarchy :4

1 F reed o m to form and join organizations2 F reed o m of expression3 Right to vo te4 Eligibility for public office5 Right of political leaders to co m p e te for support6 Right of political leaders to co m p e te for votes7 A lterna tive sources of in form ation8 E lec tions to dec ide w ho is to hold top au thority9 O rganizations for m aking governm en t policies d ep e n d on

votes an d o th e r expressions of p re ference .

T h e m odes in which these a re given co n c re te form obviously m ay vary very considerably and phrases such as ‘freedom of ex p ress io n ’ co n cea l a v e r itab le h o rn e ts ’ nest o f po ten tia lly divergent in terpretations. N onetheless, this is a useful formulation for general purposes of the analysis of m o d ern political systems. I p ro p o se to add to it, how ever , the classification of citizenship rights p rov ided by T . H. M arshall.5 /Marshall distinguishes th ree , types of citizenship rights — the ‘civil’, ‘politica l’ an d ‘social’j (a lthough I shall call th e th ird of these ‘e c o n o m ic ’ rights). L indb lom ’s list consists m ainly of civil an d political rights, plus th e m eans of their realization. Civil rights are those involved m ainly u n d e r categories 1, 2, 7 an d 9 in his list. T h ey are legally g u a ra n te e d rights of individuals freely to assoc ia te with one

200 Class, Sovereignty and C itizenship

Class, Sovereignty and Citizenship 201

an o th e r , to live w here they w ant, to enjoy f reedom of speeech and justice in re sp ec t of accusa t ions of ‘d ev ian t’ behav iour . T h e rem a in d e r a re political rights and prerogatives , co n ce rn in g the partic ipa tion of individuals in the exercise of political pow er, as vo ters , o r in a m o re d irec t way in th e p ra c t ic e of politics. E co n o m ic citizenship rights a re distinguishable from b o th these categories. T h ey co n ce rn the right of everyone within the s ta te to enjoy a ce rta in m in im um s tan d a rd of life, eco n o m ic welfare and security.

Polyarchy, Citizenship

W hy should it be the case th a t th e re are in h eren t co n n ec tio n s be tw een the nation-state and d em o cracy (u nde rs tood as po lyarchy)? I w an t to in te rp re t these co n nec tions , in a generalized way at least, as b o u n d up with the dialectic of con tro l , in re la tion to the co n cen tra t io n of adm inis tra tive re sources in the n a t io n state. In class-divided societies, I have suggested, the re was no ‘g o v e rn m e n t’ in the m o d ern sense. T h e adm inis tra tive reach of the s tate au thorit ies left largely u n to u ch ed the day-to-day life of the local com m unities in which the large m ass of the popu la tion lived. T h e dialectic of control in class-divided societies, in relation to the pow er of the sta te , can be ch a rac te r ized as a m a t te r of ‘segm enta l a u to n o m y ’. T h a t is to say, s ince th e level of in te rd e p en d en c e of the political cen tre and its sub jec t popu la t ion was rela tively low, the ‘effort b a rg a in ’ m ad e involved the m a in ten an ce of a large am o u n t of local co m m u n ity au to n o m y , so long as ce r ta in ob ligations to the s tate w ere m et, in re tu rn for which the s ta te prov ided a limited range of rec ip roca l services. T h e use or th rea t o f the use of military po w er ten d ed to be ev e rp re sen t in susta in ing th e adm in is tra tive reach of th e s ta te appa ra tus , b ecause the level of t i m e - s p a c e d is tancia tion it was able to co m m an d was low co m p ared , at least, with the m o d ern state. In the la tter, the build-up in administrative pow er (generated above all by the extension of surveillance in the various senses n o ted above) m arginalizes th e s ta te ’s d e p e n d e n c e up o n co n tro l of the m ean s of v io lence as a m ed iu m of ru le of its sub jec t popu la tion . H ow ever, adm inis tra tive po w er tha t dep en d s upon th e m ob iliza t ion of social ac tivities via th e expansion of surveillance necessarily increases the reciproca l relations betw een

those w ho govern and th o se w ho are gov ern ed . T h e m ore recip rocity is involved, th e g rea te r the possibilities the dialectic of con tro l offers su bord ina te g roups to influence the rulers. I take this to be th e ‘s t ru c tu ra l b a c k d ro p ’ against w hich po lyarchy develops, first o f all in the shadow of the absolutist s ta te and then m ore openly and directly in the course of the transition to the nation-state.

I assum e o n e im plication of this a rgum en t to be that P arsons’s in te rp re ta t io n of ‘pow er defla tion ' has considerab le re levance — in som ew ha t am en d ed form — to unders tand ing the ch a rac te r of the m o d ern s ta te .6(P arsons claims that systems of dom ination involve sustaining the co nf idence of those in su bord ina te groups in their rulers. W hen such conf idence , for w ha tever reason , begins to w ane , the am o u n t of pow er g en e ra ted in the system dim inishes — it b eco m es ‘u n g overnab le ' . I t is only in such c ircum stances of pow er defla tion tha t the w idespread use or th re a t o f the use of fo rce is necessary in o rd e r to sustain g o v e rn m en ta l con tro l . As an a c c o u n t of the basis o f the adm inis tra tive pow er of the nation-s ta te and its co n n ec tio n s to po lyarchy , this is helpful and p lausib le , a l though various qualifica tions have to be m ade . T h e mass of the popu la tion does no t necessarily have to have ‘conf idence ' in the system of rule, only p ragm atic ac cep tan c e of their obligations in re la tion to it. T h e use of violence (military force) may be m ore directly involved in the initial establishing of the adm inistrative o rd e r than Parsons allows, no t just confined to cond itions of p ow er defla tion. But it is in c ircum stances of pow er defla tion tha t po lyarch ic influences will tend to co m e u n d er p ressure o r be dissolved.!

T h e re a re m any co n tingen t cond itions tha t might bring abou t pow er defla tion , but in a genera l way it is likely to be strongly con d it io n ed by struggles o v er the th ree basic types of citizenship rights. In o rd e r to d em o n s tra te why this should be the case, I shall re tu rn to the work of M arshall, examining his ow n a c co u n t of the fo rm a tion of c itizenship rights in a critica l w ay.7 M arshall cha rac te r izes his typology of the th ree forms of citizenship right negatively by re fe rence to feudalism and , positively, by re fe rence to the organizational focus of each . In the feudal system, rights w ere n o t universal, in o th e r w ords , no t app licab le to every m em b er of a national polity. T h o se in the various es ta tes and corpora tions effectively belonged to separate com m unities, having

202 Class, Sovereignty and Citizenship


different rights and duties in re la tion to o n e an o ther . M oreover , these rights and duties ten d ed to form single clusters; only since the e igh teen th cen tu ry have the th ree strands of citizenship rights b eco m e distinct from o n e an o th e r . T h is is partly b ecau se each has a d ifferent organizational focus or, at least, the first two do. T h e m ain institu tional focus of the adm inis tra tion of civil rights is the legal system. Political c itizenship rights have as their focal points the institutions of par liam ent and local governm en t. T h e third — eco n o m ic rights — apparen tly in M arshall's eyes lack such an organizational location , which is p e rh ap s why he chooses the diffuse te rm ‘social rights’ to re fer to them .

Marshall's discussion is explicitly focused on Britain and he does not claim that his sch em e applies with equal cogency in o th e r contex ts . His thesis is th a t the th ree aspects of citizenship have deve loped at d iffe ren t ra tes over the past two o r th ree cen turies , with each serving as a sort of p la tfo rm for the o thers. T h e main form ative period of the d ev e lo p m en t of civil o r legal rights was the e igh teen th cen tu ry , when rights of the liberty o f the individual, and full and equal justice before the law, b ecam e firmly established. T h u s the right to live and w ork w here one pleases b eco m es generally a c cep ted , som eth ing which in earlier cen tu ries was for m any p roh ib ited both by cus tom and by s tatu te . T h e traditional view, M arshall says, only gradually ced ed p lace to the new princip le tha t re s tr ic t ions on the m o v em en t of the popu lation are ‘an o ffence against the liberty of the subject and a m en ace to the prosperity of the n a t io n ’.“ T h e legal system was primarily involved in advancing this idea, the jud ic iary delivering a series of ju d g em en ts that progressively freed individuals from th e ir b o n d ag e to th e p laces w h ere they w ere b o rn an d the o ccu p a tio n s they w ere born into. Civil f reedom s w ere essentially the end p rocess in the dissolution of the rem n an ts of feudal society. T h ey w ere the necessary founda tion for the em ergence of political rights; for only if the individual is recognized as an au to n o m o u s agen t does it b eco m e reasonab le to regard that individual as politically responsib le . T h e e s tab lishm en t of universal political rights belongs to the n in e teen th and the early tw en tie th cen turies . T h is process , acco rd ing to M arshall at least, was no t so m u ch o n e of the fo rm ation of new rights as the ex tension of old ones , previously the m onopo ly of the privileged few, to the w hole of the political com m unity . E co n o m ic rights

belong a lm ost wholly to the tw entie th cen tury . T h e n ine teen th cen tu ry , th e period of ascen d an t industrial capita lism , was a per iod at which those w ho w ere m ost adversely affec ted by the play of eco n o m ic forces had little p ro tec t io n against depriva tion . Poverty was regarded as an ind ication of social inferiority; in Britain paupers p laced in the work-house forfe ited the rights possessed by o th e r citizens, to virtually the sam e d eg ree as im prisoned criminals o r the certified insane. But in the tw entie th cen tu ry this b ecam e reversed , largely as a co n se q u en ce of the effects of political citizenship. W ith the es tab lishm ent of the universal franchise , the o rgan ized w orking class was able to secure the political s trength to conso lida te welfare o r econom ic rights as rights.

T h e d ev e lo p m en t of c itizenship rights, par ticu larly those of the second and third types, acco rd ing to M arshall, has substantially u n d erm in ed the class divisions which he accep ts a re inheren t in capitalist society. As he puts it:

In the tw en tie th cen tu ry , c itizensh ip an d th e class system have b een a t w ar . . . T h e exp an sio n of social rights is no longer m ere ly an a t te m p t to a b a te th e o bv ious n u isan ce o f d es titu tio n in th e low est ra n k s o f soc ie ty . . . It is no lo n g e r c o n te n t to raise th e floor- level in th e b asem e n t o f the social ed ifice , leav ing the su p e rs tru c tu re as it w as. It has b eg u n to rem o d e l th e w hole bu ild ing , an d it m igh t ev en en d by c o n v e rtin g the sk y sc rap er in to a b u n g alo w .’

M arsha ll’s views on these m atte rs a re som ew hat d iffe ren t from th e ideas tha t Bendix and o thers taking a co m p arab le s tandpo in t have deve loped . In M arsha ll’s co n cep tio n , c itizenship rights, and the political struggles assoc ia ted with them , d o not have a m ore p ro fo u n d role to play than class conflic t in m o d ern societies; ra th e r , the two tend to b a lan ce o n e ano ther . C itizenship rights do no t dissolve class division and ca n n o t do so, in the co n tex t of a capitalist society at any ra te , a lthough they do mellow the tensions deriving from class conflict. T h e en c o u n te r be tw een citizenship and the capitalist class system results in a nego tia ted tru ce , a ‘class co m p ro m ise ’ ra th e r than an unqualified victory for e ither side. I th ink this view — in som e key respec ts a t any ra te — is a c o r rec t o ne , a lthough I w an t to p u t it to use in a ra th e r d ifferent way than M arshall has in m ind. This m ean s criticizing som e aspects of w ha t M arshall has to say; de tach ing the analysis from



the specifically British co n tex t of d eve lopm en t; and re la ting the discussion of citizenship rights b ack to tha t of surveillance.

So far as the first o f these p rob lem s goes, w e should reg is ter an ob jec tion to M arshall 's ten d en cy to trea t the d ev e lo p m en t of citizenship rights as b rough t ab o u t by som eth ing of a na tu ra l p rocess of evo lu t ion , he lp ed a long w h ere necessary by th e beneficen t hand of the state . In Britain, as in o th e r societies, the re was little co n c ed ed by the s tate au thorit ies w ithou t conflict. T h e re has no t only been a ‘s truggle’ be tw een citizenship and class, bu t a struggle to ach ieve the rights of citizenship them selves— a l though o n e w hich , if my a rg u m e n t is co r re c t , the underpriv ileged have been able to m uste r considerab le resources to pursue their claims. In Britain, the s eq u en ce of ach iev em en t of citizenship rights M arshall describes does m ak e sense. Civil rights were in som e substantial part established p rio r to political rights and these, in tu rn , befo re eco n o m ic rights. Even in Britain, how ever, the p ic tu re is ra th e r m ore co m p lica ted than M arshall w ould allow; som e kinds of civil rights, for exam ple , have only been achieved in the tw entie th cen tu ry (others have arguably also b een e ro d ed o r diminished). D evelopm ents elsew here ca n n o t be readily p o rtrayed as a successive m ovem en t th rough the th ree stages of citizenship rights, since the o rd e r of their realization is qu ite d ifferent. T h u s in n ine teen th -cen tu ry G e rm an y , B ism arck co n c ed ed various welfare rights to the working-class specifically in o rd e r to p reven t the realization of the political rights M arshall

'R a ther , th en , than seeing the th ree ca tegories of c itizenship rights as phases in the overall dev e lo p m en t of citizenship, it is m o re plausible to in te rp re t them as( three Arenas of contestation o r conflict, each linked to a distinctive type of surveillance',· w h ere t h a t ' s u rv e i l l a n c e is b o th necessary to the p o w e r of superord inate g roups and an axis for the opera tion of the dialectic of control* Civil rights a re intrinsically linked to the m odes of su rve il lance involved in th e policing ac tiv ities of the sta te . Surveillance in this con tex t consists o f the ap p a ra tu s of judicial aild"piinitive organ izations in te rm s of which ‘d ev ian t’ co n d u c t is contro lled . M arx tends to discuss civil rights as the ca tegory of ‘bourgeois righ ts’ par excellence, legitimating the d o m in an ce of cap ita l over wage-labour. W hile th e re a re som e aspects of the M arxist position th a t a re u n d o u b ted ly valid, it is essential to see

describes.


that civil rights, and the more-or-less chronic struggles surrounding them , have a generic and in d ep en d en t significance in m odern states:

Civil rights Surveillance as policingPolitical rights Surveillance as reflexive m on ito r ing of

sta te adm inistrative pow erEconomic rights Surveillance as ‘m an ag e m en t’ of

p ro d u c tio n

Like th e o th e r two types of rights, civil rights have their own par ticu la r locale. T h a t is to say, there is an institutionalized sett ing in w hich the c la im ed universality of rights can be v indicated — the law cour t. T h e law co u r t is the pro to typ ical co u r t of appeal in which the range of liberties inc luded u nder ‘civil r ights’ can be bo th d efen d ed and advanced . Of course it w ould be wrong to see the law co u r t as the only setting in which struggles over the form and bounds of policing are en ac ted ; they o cc u r in virtually all s ituations in which surveillance of this type is ca rr ied ou t , including the s eq u es te red co n tex ts of d isciplinary pow er. T h e sam e should be em phas ized ab o u t political rights, w here the institutionalized locale of co n tes ta tio n— par liam en t o r the council ch a m b e r — is the formal setting for the discursive rep resen ta tion of rights, bu t w here a whole variety of extra-parliam entary con tes ta tions are also possible. M arshall does no t co n n e c t eco n o m ic rights with a distinctive locale and in o ne sense th e re is good reason fo r this, because th ere is no t the sam e sort o f re levant deba ting ch am b er. But I w ould suggest tha t the locale in which struggles over econom ic rights a re focused is th e w ork-p lace , the su rve il lance in ques t ion being th a t of ‘m a n ag e m en t’ over a labour-force. If th e re is no t an institu tionalized co u r t of appeal here , this reflects p h e n o m e n a of m ajo r sign ificance in the class s t ru c tu re of capita lism . T h e m ain organ ized agency of s truggle over econom ic rights is th e union and it is in th e m echan ics of industrial a rb itra t ion th a t we find the settings of con tes ta tion in re la tion to this type of surveillance.

Capitalism entails a class society and to develop th e analysis fu r th e r we m ust consider how class re la tions in fluence, an d are influenced by, the various forms of citizenship right. In explicating

these in fluences , it will be helpful to re tu rn to the critica l assessm ent of M arshall's views. This involves using M arx against M arshall, but subsequen tly I shall tip the scales the o th e r way, using M arshall against M arx. I have em phasized e lsew here the s ignificance of the capitalist labour co n tra c t in the o rganization o f cap ita lis t e n te r p r i s e .10 T h e capita lis t lab o u r c o n t ra c t is a primary e lem ent in the separation of the spheres of the ‘eco n o m ic ’ and the ‘politica l’. Now, various points have to be m ad e ab o u t this in rela tion to M arshall’s views. T h e insulation of the econom ic from the political was in som e p ar t ach ieved by the very legal f reed o m s M arshall re fers to as civil rights. Such rights and p rerogatives should not be seen as being c rea ted ‘o u ts id e’ the sphere of the sta te , but as part and parcel of the em erg en ce of the ‘public dom ain ', sep a ra ted from ‘private ly’ organized econom ic activity. Civil rights thus have been , from the early phases of capitalist d ev e lopm en t, bound up with the very definition of w hat counts as ‘political’. Civil and political citizenship rights developed to ge ther and rem ain , the reafte r , o pen to a range of d ivergent in te rp re ta t io n s which m ay d irec tly affect the d is tr ibu tion of pow er. M oreover , eco n o m ic rights can n o t be regarded as just on a par with the two o th e r types of citizenship right, because it is in the n a tu re o f capitalist society th a t these express an asym m etry of class dom ination . M arx regarded civil and political rights as liberties which are universal in principle bu t in prac tice favour the rule of the d o m in an t class. In substantial deg ree , M arx was surely right ab o u t this. T h e capitalist labour co n tra c t , particularly in the early period of the expansion of capita lis t en terp rise , exc ludes the w o rk e r from formal rights over the con tro l of the w ork-place . T h is exclusion is no t incidental to the capitalist s tate , bu t vital to it, s ince the sphere of industry is specifically defined as being ‘outs ide politics'. G iven this perspective , we can explain why eco n o m ic citizenships rights are no t to be regarded just as an extension of civil and political rights, and why they do no t have their ow n specific cou r ts o f appeal.

T h e th ree types of surveillance are , in som e respects , knit to g e th e r and , in o th e r respects , d islocated by the class ch a rac te r o f capitalist society. As I have just po in ted ou t , civil rights are of par ticu lar significance a t the ju n c tu re that connects and separates th e eco n o m ic an d th e political. T h e class asym m etry this re la tion involves bo th gives w o rk e rs ’ m o vem en ts a par ticu la r historical


im p o rtan ce and , a t the sam e time, tends to sepa ra te the struggles of the lab o u r m ovem en t at two d ifferent sites. In each of these, citizenship rights tend to be a focus of class conflic t, ra th e r than standing o pposed to it as M arshall suggests. In the political sp h e re , th e fo rm a tion of lab o u r o r socialist par tie s (actively resisted by pre-existing governm en ts in m any countries) has been g ea red to winning the universal franchise and then e i th e r to im plem enting , defend ing o r expand ing eco n o m ic rights. H ere labour m ovem en ts , in the late n ine teen th and early tw entie th cen tu ries , have b een able to build upon a co m bina tion of civil an d political rights, which have o ften been b ro a d en ed in the process. But in the rea lm of industry the situation was, and con tinues to be, different. T h e separa tion of the eco n o m ic from th e politica l m ean t th a t , in th e early years of cap ita lis t dev e lo p m en t, the w o rk e r w ho w alked in th rough the factory gates sacrificed all form al, and m uch ac tua l, co n tro l over the w ork process.

W ha t was in prio r types of society an integral e lem en t of p ro d u c tio n — a significant degree of con tro l by the w o rk e r over the p rocess of labour — had to be w on all over again in the new surve il lance settings of m o d ern p ro d u c tio n . In all cap ita lis t coun tries un ionization, b ack ed by the th rea t o r actuality of the w ithdraw al of labour-pow er, has fo rm ed the principal sou rce of the po w er tha t subord ina tes can wield in the work-place . T h e em erg en ce of th e strike, o r th rea t of it, as a m ajo r sanction in the dialectic of co n tro l in w ork settings, can be readily t raced to the novel cond itions of m o d ern p roduc tion . Peasants tend to be d ispersed , as M arx po in ts o u t in a fam ous passage in the Eighteenth Brumaire." T h e deve lopm en t of the capitalist w o rk p lace provides settings in which collective ac tion is facilitated. But just as im portan t is the fact tha t the property lessness of w orkers , upon which the d o m in an ce of en tre p ren e u rs is founded , b eco m es itself a resource . Being d ep e n d en t up o n co-ord ina ted labour-pow er, em ployers a re vu lnerab le to its collective withdrawal, as well as to a range of o th e r s tra tagem s w orkers can use to ach ieve a substantial m easu re of co n tro l w here formally they are a lloca ted none.

In my view, there fo re , it is m o re valid to say th a t class conflict has b een a m ed ium of th e ex tension of citizenship rights than to say tha t the sp read of such rights has b lun ted class divisions. All



three form s o f citizenship right distinguished by Marshall are double-edged. As aspects of surveillance, they can be m obilized to expand the co n tro l the m em b ers of the d o m in an t class are able to m ain ta in over those in su b o rd in a te positions. But, a t the sam e time, each is a lever of struggle, w hich can b e used to co u n te r th a t contro l . In a capita lis t society, class do m in a tio n provides the m ost im p o r tan t single institu t ional axis a ro u n d w h ich these struggles converge and , in tha t respec t, M arx’s view is still cogent. But it does n o t follow from this th a t su rve il lance is an ep ip h en o m e n o n of class, o r that the m odes of genera ting pow er which it provides will d isap p ea r with the t ranscend ing of the capitalist class system. Conflic t ce n tred upon ‘bourgeo is rights' is no t necessarily class conflic t, and the level and n a tu re of their realization has to be regarded as a ltoge ther m o re p rob lem atic than M arx believed.

Citizenship, Ideology and Nationalism

T rad it iona l s tates, I have p roposed , o p en ed o u t a public sphere directly re la ted to the m on ito r ing op era t io n s of the sta te , but confined to a very small ‘public'. T h e te rm ‘public’, as an adjective and as a n o u n , has a n u m b er of possible shadings of m eaning. A p h e n o m e n o n which is pub lic is ‘o p en to v iew ’, r a th e r than concealed ; and it per ta ins to a generalized body of persons ra th e r than to those in par ticu la r con tex ts of co-presence. E ach of these aspects of the ‘pub lic ’ again helps em phasize the im p o rtan ce of writing in the trad it ional s ta te . A list, o r file, o r a text, a re of necessity ‘o p e n ’ in the sense th a t they b eco m e d is tanc ia ted from their au th o rs in a way in which spoken co m m u n ica t io n ca n n o t be— at least, until the adven t of e lec tron ic m odes of in form ation storage. W ritten docum en ts also shed the contex tua l confinem ent of speech in v irtue of tha t very dis tancia tion : they potentially reach an indefinitely wide aud ience . How far the existence of writing supports a public sphere in respec t o f s tate pow er m ay vary widely, d ep en d in g upon the scope of literacy, the n a tu re of the d o cu m en ta t io n involved, and the com m unica t ive settings in which the inform ation thus s tored is utilized. But the developm ent of s tates is necessarily co n vergen t with the fo rm a tion of m odes of d iscourse w hich constitu tively shape w hat s ta te p ow er is.

It is in th e n a tu re of ag ra r ian sta tes th a t the discursive

articu la tion of adm inistrative pow er is relatively limited, by and large no t reach ing the m ass of the population . D istinctive of the m odern sta te , how ever, is a very considerab le expansion of the reflexive m onitor ing of s ta te activity. T h e d ev e lo p m en t of s tate sovereignty expresses an d fu r th e r s t im ula tes a new fo rm of adm inistrative o rd e r , signalled by the fo rm ation of the absolutist s ta te , bu t m axim ized in the nation-state . A s ta te can only be ‘sovereign’, in the te rm s of political theorists of the sixteenth cen tu ry and afte rw ards, if large segm ents of the popu la tion of tha t s ta te have m as te red an array of co n cep ts co n n e c ted with J sovereign ty .12 Now such m astery need no t be wholly discursive, especially am ong those w ho are subject to the adm inis tra tion of the s ta te ra th e r than directly involved in that adm inis tra tion . But when Machievelli, Bodin and o thers began writing abou t ‘politics’, they w ere n o t only describ ing a series of changes, no r even only m aking policy reco m m en d atio n s ; they w ere helping to consti tu te what the m o d ern s tate is as a novel o rdering of adm inistrative power. T h e dev e lo p m en t of no tions of citizenship, as per ta in ing to m em bersh ip of an overall political com m unity , are intimately bound up with this. In m any cases the mass of the popu la tion of traditional s tates did no t know them selves to be ‘c itizens’ of those I s tates, no r did it m a t te r particularly to the continu ity o f pow er within them . But the m ore the adm inistrative scope of the state begins to p en e tra te the day-to-day activities of its subjects , the less this th eo re m holds. T h e expansion of s ta te sovereignty m eans that those subject to it a re in som e sense — initially vague, but growing m o re and m ore defin ite and precise — aw are of their m em b ersh ip in a political co m m u n ity and of the rights and obligations such m em bersh ip confers .

T h e deve lopm en t of printing, and the extension of literacy, c rea te a b roadened realm of the public’ — indeed for the first time it m akes sense to apply that te rm as a noun as well as an adjective. Printing vastly expands not only the capabilit ies of reflexive m onitor ing of the state , but the d is tancia tion of co m m u n ica t io n from oral contex ts . Not until the period of th e em erg en ce of the nation-state , however, do the potentialities of prin ting becom e fully recogn ized and utilized. T h e ep o c h a t w hich the regularized co llec tion of official statistics b eco m es estab lished is the sam e as th a t in w hich a flurry of jou rna ls , gaze ttes , new sp ap ers and



p am p h le ts a p p e a r , re ach in g m ass aud iences . G o u ld n e r has co m m en ted on this in a cogen t way:

At first, such pub lications w ere m ore likely to co m b in e co m m en tary on lite ra tu re w ith ‘new s’. B ut by 1800 th e new s p red o m in a te d , as p a rliam en ts an d p o litica l c e n tre s b ecam e of w id er in te re s t, an d as the sp read o f m a rk e ts in to n a tio n a l an d in te rn a tio n a l system s m ean t th a t d is tan t ev e n ts co u ld a ffec t local p rices an d supp lies . . . T h e em erg en c e o f th e m ass m ed ia an d o f th e ‘p u b lic ’ a re m u tua lly co n s tru c tiv e d ev e lo p m e n ts . . . W ith th e g row th o f th e m ass m edia, ex em plified a t f irs t by p rin tin g , n u m e ro u s p e rso n s w ere now exposed to a c o n tin u o u s flow o f in fo rm ation , a t m o re o r less the sam e tim e. In fo rm a tio n b ec o m e s d ec o n te x tu a lised , fo r it m ust be m ade in tellig ib le , in te restin g an d conv in c in g even to p e rso n s of d iverse b a c k g ro u n d s an d in te rests , p erso n s w ho d o n o t know on e a n o th e r an d d o no t m ee t an d in te ra c t .13

Som e of the m ain d im ensions of ideology in m o d e rn sta tes are to be discovered in the na tu re and scope of discursive articulation o f inform ation available in the ‘pub lic ’ dom ain . In the con tex t of the m o d ern s ta te , the capab ility of d iffe ren t g roup ings to discursively fo rm ula te policies o r p rog ram m es th a t express their interests and to m ak e space in the public d om ain for p rom oting them , are vital. While in the nation-state all m em bers of the population share an array of concep ts constitutive of its sovereign and po lyarch ic c h a ra c te r , these m ay be m ainly o rd e re d in p ractica l consc iousness ra th e r than being availab le to be discursively fo rm u la ted as reasons for ac tion . A lthough this th eo rem applies a t all levels of society, it is likely to be strongly w eigh ted in favour of the m o re priv ileged s t ra ta an d , m o re generally , the d o m in an t class.

Of cou rse it is n o t only the degree and n a tu re of the discursive form ulation of in terests tha t m atters . T h e re a re a t least th ree m ore substantive aspects of those discursive fo rm ulations which exist th a t in fluence the ideological shadings of symbol systems.1 T h e definition of w ha t is to co u n t as ‘politica l’ and , there fo re , in principle o pen to in terven tion o r con tro l on the part o f the state. T h e re is a d irec t tie he re betw een the s ta te and the class system in capitalist society , since the ‘depolitic izing’ of econom ic re la tions is basic to class dom ination .

2 T h e defin ition of prac tices , p ro g ram m es and policies tha t are in the ‘general in te rest’, as o pposed to those th a t favour the sec tional in te rests of g ro u p s o r classes. T h e m ore the s ta te becom es adm inistratively unified, the g re a te r th e d eg ree to which g o v e rn m e n t m ust ap p ea l to the ‘genera l in te re s t ' (in som e fo rm ulation o r o ther) in o rd e r to sustain a basis for its rule. Again, th e re tend to be s trong pressures p rom oting a class bias, s ince a l though it is no t directly ‘ru n ’ by en trep ren eu r ia l groups, in capitalist societies the s ta te ap p a ra tu s is m aterially d ep e n d en t up on the prosperity of eco n o m ic en terp rises for its sources of revenue.3 T h e ar ticu la tion of ‘h istoricity’ in re la tion to p lanned o r actual t rends of social ch a n g e .14 T h e reflexive m onito r ing of all s tates involves the invention of ‘h is tory’ in som e sense o r an o th e r — the d o cu m en ted in terpre ta tion of the past tha t provides an anchorage for an ticipated developm ents in the future. But only in the m odern W est does ‘h istory’ b ec o m e ‘h istoricity’ — the con tro l led use of reflection upon history as a m eans of changing history.

Ideological aspects of nationalism can effectively be analysed in term s of these th ree ca tegories .15 Nationalism is certain ly no t wholly ideology. But it does tend to be linked in defin ite ways to the adm inis tra tive unification of the s ta te .16 Sovereignty, c i tizenship, nationalism — these tend to be co n n e c te d p h e n o m e n a for reasons it will be my aim to try to illuminate.

A useful classification of the m ain exp lana to ry ap p ro ach es to nationalism is tha t o ffered by Breuilly .17 O n e g roup of ap p ro ach es consists o f those assoc ia ted with Marxism. G e llner has caustically labelled Marxist views of nationalism the W rong A ddress T heory: ‘Just as ex trem e Shi’ite Muslims hold th a t A rchangel G abrie l m ade a m istake, delivering the M essage to M o h am ed w hen it was in tended for Ali, so M arxists basically like to th ink tha t the spirit o f history o r hum an consc iousness m ad e a terr ib le boob. T h e aw akening m essage was in ten d ed for classes, but by som e terrible postal e r ro r was delivered to nations.'1* It is manifestly th e case th a t M arx paid little a t te n t io n to th e n a tu re an d im p ac t of nationalism , and the co m m en ts he does m ak e are mostly ne ither instructive n o r p ro fo u n d .19 S ubsequen t M arxists have b een very m u ch c o n c e rn e d with ‘th e na tional q u es t io n ’, bu t it c a n n o t be p re te n d ed th a t the l i te ra tu re the reby g en e ra ted has d o n e a great



deal to illum inate the n a tu re o r origins of nationalism . N one of the various Marxist in terpre ta tions which seek to trea t nationalism as som e kind of m ask ed expression of th e in terests o f th e dom inan t class has m uch plausibility either. T h e m ost illuminating acco u n t of nationalism p ro d u c ed in re cen t t im es20 by an au th o r affilia ted with M arxism is p ro b ab ly th a t g iven by N a irn .21 A ccord ing to Nairn, nationalism has its sou rce in the uneven d ev e lo p m en t of regions within the world capita lis t econom y. T rad it ional M arxist views saw class struggle as ‘the m o to r of historical change, nationality a m ere ep iphenom enon of it. H ence, it was literally inconceivable tha t the fo rm er should be eclipsed by the la tte r .’ It is in the effects of the expansion of capitalism , no t in its class system as such , tha t the roo ts of nationalism are to be found. ‘As capita lism spread , and sm ashed the anc ien t social form ations su rround ing it, they always tended to fall apa rt along the fault-lines co n ta in ed inside them . It is a m a t te r of e lem enta ry tru th tha t these lines w ere nearly always o n es of nationality (although in ce rta in well-known cases deeply established religious divisions cou ld perfo rm the sam e func tion ) .’22

But Nairn’s view, w here it is plausible at all, only seems relevant to forms of anti-colonial nationalism , no t to the first dev e lo p m en t o f na tionalism in th e E u ro p e a n states. T h e m ain fo rm s of nationalism in E u ro p e did no t for the m ost p a r t co m e ab o u t in areas of m ark ed eco n o m ic depriva tion . G e rm a n nationalis ts in the m id -n ine teen th ce n tu ry , for exam ple , m ay have been co n ce rn ed with G e rm a n y ’s ‘back w ard n ess’ re lative to the leading E u ro p ean states, bu t to regard this as the principal origin of G e rm an nationalism is qu ite unconvincing. In o th e r cases, the deve lopm en t of nationalism was m ost m ark e d in the strongest states, no t the w eak er o r m ore ill-formed o n es .23 H ow far N a irn ’s argum ents apply even to the em ergence of nationalism in colonial o r post-colonial regions m ust be d o u b ted . T h e r e a re obviously general re la tionships betw een capitalist dev e lo p m en t on a global scale and the fo rm a tion of nationalis t sen tim ents . But w h e th e r or no t nationalism b eco m es significant in a given area , and its specific sym bolic c o n ten t , ca n n o t readily be explicated in such a way.

A second ap p ro ach , w hich is appealing b ecau se it does ap p e a r m ore directly to address these issues, is tha t assoc ia ted with D eutsch and o th e rs .24 D eu tsch lays great em phasis upon the

dev e lo p m en t of in ternal co m m u n ica t io n s within states as leading to the c rea t ion of a co m m o n sense of m oral and political identity. In this view som e of the fac to rs I have identified ^s con tr ibu t ing to the heighten ing of the adm inistrative pow er of s ta tes are regarded as directly responsible for the stim ulating of nationalist sentiments. However, on closer scrutiny, the theory is unconvincing since th ere is ne i the r any inevitable co n n ec tio n betw een the intensification of co m m u n ica t io n and the consolidation of s tates, n o r does the theory explain why such consolidation should be intrinsically accom panied by nationalism. G e llne r’s position bears a defin ite similarity to that of D eu tsch , but G e llner does seek to ind icate why nationalism should be associa ted with the diffusion o f co m m u n ica t io n s . T h e eco n o m ies of industr ia lized sta tes d ep e n d upon a hom ogenizing of cu ltu re , mass literacy and ‘a fairly m onolith ic education system’.25 T h e exigencies of industrialism thus d em an d the diffusion of co m m o n m odes of tho u g h t and belief th ro u g h o u t the w hole population . Nationalism is precisely the a t ta c h m e n t of such m odes of thought and belief to the state which is th e m eans of their co-ord ination . H ow far this analysis is an advance beyond that of D eutsch, however, is open to question. As has been previously stressed, th e re is no intrinsic reason to be found in industrial p ro d u c tio n as to why an industrialized society should be a nation-state . M oreover , G e lln e r’s analysis again does no t seem satisfactorily to distinguish th e na tion-s ta te from nationalism .

Finally, there are ‘psychological’ interpretations of nationalism.26 N either D eu tsch n o r G e lln e r has m uch to say ab o u t the co n ten t of nationalism , which is regarded as m ore o r less irre levant to its n a tu re o r to its appeal. But nationalist sen tim ents , in their first origins and in their su b seq u en t guises in the tw en tie th cen tu ry , do tend to involve som e co m m o n symbols. A t ta c h m e n t to a h o m elan d , assoc ia ted with th e c rea t io n and p e rp e tu a t io n of ce r ta in d is t inc tive ideals an d values, t ra c eab le to ce r ta in historically given fea tu res of ‘n a t io n a l’ experience — these are som e of the recu rren t traits o f nationalism . M ost psychological theories of nationalism associa te these no tions with the n ee d of individuals to be involved in a collectivity with w hich they can identify. S ince previous groupings th a t cou ld fulfil this need , such as the local com m unity o r kinship g roup , have b een largely dissolved, the symbols o f nationalism provide a m odern substitute.



N ationalism no t only offers a basis of group identity , it does so in the con tex t o f showing this identity to be the result o f distinct and precious ach ievem ents . W hile it m ay be a relatively new type of d o c tr in e , nationalism appeals to a desire for an identity securely an c h o red in the past. This type of app roach offers an analysis bo th of the first origins of nationalism and of its subsequent varieties. T h e disintegrative im pact which is w rought upon p re existing trad it ional cu ltu res by m o d ern eco n o m ic and political d ev e lo p m en t c rea te s a sea rch fo r renew ed fo rm s of g roup symbolism, of which nationalism is the most po ten t . Nationalism engenders a spirit o f solidarity and collective co m m itm en t which is energetically mobilizing in c ircum stances of cultural decay .27

A lthough I shall argue tha t the psychological d im ensions of nationalism are indeed im portan t , the origins and ch a rac te r of the pos tu la ted need for identity rem ain too vague for this type of theory to be particularly satisfactory. It has little to say abou t why nationalism should be co n n e c ted with states, o r abou t how it might re la te to asym m etries of pow er and th ere fo re to ideology. M oreover, nationalist sen tim ents tend to surge and decline; they are no t so m u ch a par t of regular day-to-day social life as those symbols co n n e c ted with the smaller groups which it is claimed fulfil the sam e psychological needs.

I have m en tio n ed these various in terp re ta tions of nationalism not simply to ob jec t to them , b u t to m ake the a rgum en t that an explica tion of the origins of nationalism shou ld in co rp o ra te e lem en ts from each , p lacing these , how ever, in a d iffe ren t f ram ew ork from them all. My in ten tion is not to offer an analysis tha t necessarily holds good for all the varian t form s which the p h e n o m e n o n has assum ed in the tw en tie th cen tu ry , but to co n c en tra te mainly upon nationalism in the E u ro p ean na t ion state . An a c c o u n t of na tionalism in such a co n tex t should illum inate the following charac teris t ics :

1 its political ch a rac te r , that is, its association with the n a t io n state;

2 its re la t ion to industr ia l capita lism , an d m o re specifically ideological characteristics o f nationalism involved with class dom ination ;

3 its likely psychological dynamics since, as a range of sentiments an d a t t i tudes ra th e r than an institu tionalized set of p ractices,

it is difficult to resist the supposition th a t th e re a re som edistinctive psychological p rocesses involved; and

4 its pa r ticu la r symbolic content.

Let m e w ork back th rough these, beginning with the question of the co n ten t o f nationalism as a symbol system. W h a tev e r their d ifferences, nationalist ideals ten d to tie a co n cep t io n of the ‘h o m elan d ' — a co n cep t of terr itoriality , in o th e r w ords — to a myth of origin, conferring cultura l au tonom y upon the com m unity which is he ld to be the b ea re r of these ideals. ‘T h e solidarity tha t a nationalis t desires is based on the possession of the land: not any land, bu t the h istoric land; the land of past genera tions , the land th a t saw the flowering of the n a t io n ’s genius .’2" Looking to th e legitimacy of past gene ra t ions as supplying cultura l au to n o m y is w hat Breuilly calls ‘historicism’, and this has m ore than a passing co n n ec t io n with the historicity of which I spoke earlier. H ere again, we have a case w here h istorians and philosophers , claiming for the m ost par t to describe par ticu la r c ircum stances , have p rov ided ideas tha t have h e lped to c o n s t i tu te those very c ircu m stan ces . H e rd e r ’s w ritings a re in som e re sp ec ts no t rep resen ta tive of those tha t in fo rm ed versions of nationalism outs ide C en tra l E u rope but, in o th e r ways, they provide an exem plary illustration of historicism as a so u rce of nationalist thought. ‘H is tory’ for H e rd e r is m ore than just writing ab o u t the past, it is th e m ean s of grasping the cultura l unity o f a collectivity. U n d ers tan d in g a cu ltu re and its specific cou rse of deve lopm en t involves a p p reh en d in g it in its to tality , d is t inc t from o th e r , d ivergent sets o f cultura l values. Language is o f key im portance in this, b ecau se it is necessarily the p ro d u c t of a com m unity , p re existing any par ticu la r gene ra t ion of individuals and carrying within it the m ain d im ensions that re n d e r the cu ltura l system in question unique.

On first inspection, such ideas seem com ple te ly d iscrepan t from the ‘bourgeois ideals’ o f classical liberalism, which have a universal ch a rac te r . In d eed we m ight see here an opposit ion between (say) British utilitarian thought and G erm an Romanticism. But a closer appraisal, in the co n tex t of the involvem ent of such views with na tionalis t sym bolism , ind ica tes a pow erfu l , if a t ten u a te d , re la tion be tw een th em , m ed ia ted by sovereignty and citizenship, as p o rtrayed diagram m atically in figure 4.



Figure 4

If we are to m ak e sense of this re la tion, and the im pact that ideas associa ted with it have had upon the w orld , we have to see it as a three-way series of c o n n ec t io n s ra th e r th an a two-way one. Ideas such as those dev e lo p ed by H e rd e r can be ex ten d ed in two directions. O n e regards the cu ltu ra l accom plishm en ts of a given s ta te as so d istinct and priceless tha t they a re eleva ted to an intrinsic superiority over others. A ‘historical mission’ is constructed which, in certain circum stances , may offer a vehicle for the most virulent forms of aggressive nationalism. But to regard this baneful course as the only o n e tha t can be cu ltivated on the basis of ‘cultura l h istoricism ’ is certain ly m is taken .29 F o r such ideas can be used, as H e rd e r in tended them to be, to effect a union be tw een cultura l diversity and co n cep ts of political o rganization of a universal ch a rac te r . Linguistically m ed ia ted cultura l values are the carriers o f d ivergent processes of history. But to be a m em b er of the com m unity which is the repository of those values can be construed in an egalitarian way, s ince all a re legatees of the sam e collective experience. M oreover, while the distinctiveness of o th e r com m unities might be acknow ledged , these can be acco rd ed equal s tatus in w hat is seen to be an inheren t cu ltura l diversity of hum ank ind . T h e re are a series of possible ties and tensions betw een nationalism, sovereignty and citizenship, depend ing upon the d irec t io n in which these ideas a re ch an n e lled . W h e re nationalism is canalized prim arily to w ard s sovereignty — particularly in c ircum stances w h ere there a re several co n ten d e rs for s ta teh o o d , o r w here an existing s tate is s trongly em b att led — nationalist sen tim ents m ay tak e an exclusivist tu rn , em phasiz ing the superiority of o n e ‘na t ion ’ over its con tenders . Here citizenship rights are likely to be poorly developed o r constric ted — especially

civil and political rights. W h e re cit izenship rights a re m ore substantially founded o r ac tua lized , they tend to influence the co n n ec tio n s be tw een sovereignty and nationalism in an opposite d irec tion , stimulating m o re polyarch ic forms of nationalist sentim ent.

This is o n e d im ension of w hat so m any s tuden ts of nationalism have po in ted to — its Janus-faced ch a rac te r , as genera ting both viru lent form s of national aggressiveness, on the o n e hand , and dem o cra t ic ideals of en l igh tenm en t, on the o ther . But th e re is a psychological aspec t to this to o .30 Nationalist sen tim ents , I have po in ted o u t , ten d to be fairly re m o te from m ost o f the activities of day-to-day social life, excep t in fairly unusual and often relatively transitory conditions. T h is is one p h en o m en o n which a p sychological in te rp re ta t ion of nationalism must a c co u n t for. A no ther , rarely m en tio n ed in the li te ra tu re but a ra th e r pervasive feature of na tionalism , is its assoc ia tion with leader-figures. W hile nationalist feelings are no d o u b t often experienced and expressed in a diffuse way, in c ircum stances in which they are strongly espoused th ere normally seem s to be a leader w ho in som e way ac ts as a focal point for their expression. An acco u n t of the rou tin ization of social activity in the time-space settings of the c rea ted env ironm en t can help us e luc ida te the n a tu re of these p h en o m en a . In the con tex ts of the m odern sta te , the routin ized ch a rac te r o f m ost day-to-day life is no t g ro u n d ed in the moral schem es of tradition . In such c ircum stances on to logical security is tenuously fo u n d e d psychologica lly , d ep e n d in g u p o n the e n a c tm en t of ‘morally m eaningless’ routines, p ro tec ted by the seques tra tion of events and experiences which might o therw ise th rea ten it. W h e re ‘m oral m ean in g ’ has re trea ted to the margins o f the p r iva te and th e pub lic , th e co m m u n a li ty supp lied by national symbols (including in par ticu la r a c o m m o n language, as perhaps the m ost po ten t ca rrier of com m unal experience) supplies o n e m eans of support for on to logical security , par ticularly w here th e re is a perce ived th rea t from outs ide the state.

In c ircum stances w here the onto logical security of individuals is pu t in jeopardy by the d isruption of routines, o r by a generalized source of anxiety, regressive forms of ob ject- identifica tion tend to occur. Individuals are likely to be swayed by the in fluence of leader-figures, identification with w hom is based on a relatively strong affec tive d e p e n d e n c e . T h e regressive affiliation with leaders, an d with the symbols linked to the ir leadersh ip , if the



Le B o n /F re u d theory of leadersh ip is co rrec t, is based on the he igh tened suggestibility p ro d u c ed by situations th a t g en e ra te high levels of anxiety. M ass su p p o r t m ay, there fo re , be gene ra ted for policies and causes ab o u t which, in o th e r c ircum stances , individuals may e i ther be fairly indifferent o r sceptical. Such su p p o r t is likely to be volatile in m o re th an o n e sense . Its durability will tend to be limited and it m ay m ove betw een s tances which seem to be quite d isc repan t from o n e ano ther . All nationalist leaders advoca te populist doc tr ines in one sense o r an o th e r , but in som e instances identification m ay be m ade with a figure exemplifying the m ore ‘dem o cra t ic ' forms of nationalism , while in o thers it will be with the m ore aggressively ‘exclusivist' types. H ere , there fo re , we can see a psychological basis for the Janus-faced ch a rac te r of nationalism .

It follows from what has been said so far tha t nationalism can ne i ther be in te rp re ted as som e sort o f abe rra tion p ro d u ced by W estern in tellectuals, as in K edourie 's view, n o r simply as an ideology p ro m o ted by d o m in an t classes, as in trad it ional versions of Marxism. Nationalism is an ch o red psychologically in distinctive features of m o d ern societies and its co n ten t is linked to the historicity they engender. N onetheless, nationalist sen tim ents and symbols are no t ideologically neutra l and , a t this point, it is re levan t to re la te the ea rlie r discussion of ideology bo th to nationalism itself and to the question of why nationalism has an inherently political d im ension. T h ese p rob lem s seem fairly easy to illum inate in the light of w ha t has been argued earlier in this chap te r . Nationalism is the cultura l sensibility of sovereignty, the co n co m itan t of the co-ord ination of adm inistrative pow er within the b o u n d ed nation-state . W ith the com ing of the nation-state , states have an administrative and territorially o rde red unity which they did not possess before. T h is unity ca n n o t rem ain purely adm in is tra tive how ever , b ec au se th e very co-o rd ina t ion of activities involved p resum es e lem ents of cultura l hom ogeneity .31 T h e ex tension of co m m u n ica t io n ca n n o t o c c u r w ithou t the ‘co n cep tu a l’ involvem ent of the whole com m unity as a know ledgeable citizenry. A nation-sta te is a ‘co n cep tu a l co m m u n ity ’ in a way in which trad it ional s ta tes w ere no t .32 T h e sharing of a co m m o n language, and a co m m o n symbolic historicity, are the most thorough-going ways of achieving this (and are seen to be so by those leaders w ho have lea rn ed from the experience of the first ‘n a t io n s ’). B ut on ly in th o se ins tances w h ere political

b oundar ie s fairly closely co incide with existing language-com- m unities is th e co n v e rg en c e be tw een the na t ion -s ta te and nationalism a relatively frictionless one. In all o th e r cases — by far the m ajority in the m o d ern w orld — the advent of the n a t io n state stimulates d ivergent and oppositional nationalism s as m uch as it fosters the co in c id en ce of nationalist sen tim ents and existing s ta te boundaries .

T h e origins of opposit ional nationalism are certain ly strongly influenced by the sp read of industrial capitalism , in the E u ro p ean con tex t and world-wide. U neven developm ent takes a regionalized form, in which periphera l areas bo th within states and within the nation-state system are systematically disadvantaged. But nationalist m ovem en ts are no t just o n e type of opposit ional m ovem en t am ong o thers , pro testing in som e sort of way directly against the dep rad a tio n s of capitalism. T h ey m ark the in jection of historicity into a reas w here the pre-existing hold of traditional m odes of behav iou r has been e ro d ed , associating such historicity with the claim to adm inistrative sovereignty. It is because nationalism is inherently linked to the ach ievem en t of adm inistrative au tonom y of the m o d ern form that all nationalist m ovem ents are necessarily politica l, no m a t te r how m uch they m ay be infused with symbolism of o th e r sorts.

Now of course nationalis t symbols can be, and very frequently have been , deliberately fostered o r m an ipu la ted by do m in an t g roups to su p p o r t their sectional interests. T h e re is no great difficulty in understanding the ideological value nationalist beliefs and values m ay have in these terms. N ationalism is a form of sen tim ent tha t can be utilized to mobilize the su p p o r t of the overall national com m unity for policies that have quite d iscrepant co n se q u en ce s for d iffe ren t sec tions o r classes within tha t com m unity . But this is in som e ways the least in teresting and significant o f the ideological ram ifications of nationalism . M ore deeply layered ideological im plications are to be tra c ed to the fact tha t the conditions involved in the reflexive m onito r ing of the m odern state , as a surveillance appa ra tus , are the sam e as those th a t help g en e ra te nationalism . S ince th e d iscursive capabilities involved in m onito r ing social rep ro d u c t io n b eco m e of essential im p o rtan ce to th e sta te , it is a ro u n d th e in tersec tion be tw een discursive consc iousness and ‘lived ex p e r ien ce’ th a t the ideological consequences of nationalism will cluster. As the ‘moral



co m p o n e n t ’ o f sovereignty, nationalis t symbols p rov ide a co re of political d iscourse tha t significantly shapes bo th the rh e to r ic of national solidarity and of opposition. Nationalism helps naturalize the recency and th e con tingency of the nation-s ta te th rough providing its myths of origin. But, at the sam e time, the d iscourse of national solidarity helps b lock off o th e r possible discursive ar ticu la tions of interest. T h e discursive a ren a of the m o d ern polity trea ts w ha t ‘politics’ is as inherently to d o with the b o u n d ed sphere of the state . T h u s if p rog ram m es of re form on the p a r t of su b o rd in a te classes (or o th e r groupings) a re to succeed , they have norm ally to be m ad e to ap p e a r in ‘the national in te rest’. But d o m in an t classes have m uch less difficulty rep resen ting their own policies as in ‘the national in terest ' than do opposit ional groups, since they have m uch m ore influence over th e style and form of w ha t can be discursively ar ticu la ted .

Capitalist Development and the Industrialization of War

9

T h e p reced ing th ree ch ap te rs have been mainly analytical in ch a rac te r . T h ey supply the co ncep tua l basis o f the rem a in d e r of the book , which co n cen tra te s upon the transferra l o f the n a t io n s ta te system to a global p lane in the tw en tie th cen tu ry . T h e historical b ack d ro p to this process is the sharp con tras t betw een the period during which the E u ro p ean states for the m ost part rem a ined at peace with o n e a n o th e r and the subsequen t o u tb reak o f the two W orld Wars.

The 'Long Peace'

T h ro u g h o u t the n ine teen th cen tu ry , the great pow ers held fairly regular in terna tional congresses, m eeting to a rb itra te various potentially th rea ten ing disputes. Relative stability betw een the fledgling nation-states was no t m atch ed by lack of tension and conflic t e i th e r inside those states o r in o th e r parts o f the world. On the co n tra ry , p rocesses of in ternal pacif ication w ere beset by challenges to the existing o rd e r ; and the sp read of E u ro p ean influence in o th e r areas of the g lobe was acco m p an ied by a variety of b loody confron ta tions . But the m easu re of security ach ieved am ong the states of E u ro p e was th e institu tional setting in which so m any th inkers imagined that an age of industrialism o r capitalism was supplan ting the military v io lence of previous eras. T h is self-same p er iod was o n e of ascend ing military capability and innova tion , the results o f w hich first m ad e them selves felt e lsewhere. As McNeill puts it:

T o w ard s th e m arg ins o f th e E u ro p e a n rad iu s o f a c tio n . . . th eresu lt w as sy stem atic ex p an sio n — w h e th e r in Ind ia , S iberia , o r th e

Capitalism & the Industrialization o f War 223

A m ericas. F ro n tie r expansion in tu rn su sta ined an exp an d in g tra d e ne tw o rk , e n h a n c e d tax ab le w ea lth in E u ro p e , an d m ad e su p p o rt of th e a rm ed e s tab lish m en ts less o n e ro u s th an w ould o therw ise have been the case . E u rope , in sho rt, lau n ch ed itself on a self-reinforcing cycle in w hich its m ilitary o rgan isa tion sustained , and w as sustained by, ec o n o m ic an d po litica l exp an sio n a t th e ex p en se o f o th e r p eo p les an d po lities o f th e ea r th . T h e m o d ern h is to ry o f th e g lobe reg is te red th a t f a c t . . . te ch n o lo g ica l an d o rg an isa tio n a l innovation co n tin u ed , allow ing E u ro p e an s to o u ts trip o th e r p eo p les o f the ea r th m o re an d m o re em p h a tic a lly un til th e g lo b e -c irc lin g im perialism o f th e n in e te e n th ce n tu ry b ec am e as c h e ap an d easy fo r E u ro p e an s as it w as c a ta s tro p h ic to A sians, A fricans, an d the peop les o f O c e a n ia .1

British t roops , for exam ple , w ere more-or-less continuously fighting colonial cam paigns in the n ine teen th cen tury . It has been estim ated by o n e au thority tha t , if we include auxiliary forces u n d e r British co m m an d , British armies w ere involved in fifty m ajor colonial wars betw een 1803 and 1901.2 Every o th e r leading E u ro p ean po w er was cau g h t up in w arfa re of substan tia l p ropor tions at som e point in the cen tu ry and , o f course , with the exception of Britain, they each un d erw en t at least one m ajo r political t ransfo rm ation . T h e wars they fought w ere the first to be ca rr ied on em ploy ing th e w e ap o n s tech n o lo g y g en e ra ted by industrialism, and in every case, with the partial exception of the Franco-Prussian W ar, victory went to the industrialized states over the m ore agrarian ones. T h e ‘industrialization of w ar’ may be said to cover a n u m b er of re la ted changes, initiated in the late eigh teen th cen tu ry o r shortly thereafte r , bu t cu lm inating only in the tw entie th cen tu ry . T h e re is a very real sense in which the First W orld W ar was the end result o f these changes. T h ey include the application of techn iques of industrial p ro duc tion to w eaponry , to ge ther with the ad ap ta t io n of new m odes of tran sp o r ta t io n and com m unica t ion for military purposes; the professionalizing of the military, including the aban d o n in g of the use of m ercenar ie s — although this p rac t ice co n tin u ed in co lonized areas of the world— and the reorganiza tion of the officer corps; the d iscarding of spec tacu la r an d ritual aspects of warfare , pe rh ap s symbolized above all by the re linquishing of brightly co lo u red uniform s in favour of cam ouflaged batt ledress , this being worn by all ranks; and the in tegra tion of military cam paigns o n land , sea and , later,

air into overall strategic plans in the co n d u c t o f w ar — these served to bring abou t a transition from 'l imited ' to 'to tal war'.

T h e im pact of industrial techn iques upon w arfare was first of all co n c en tra te d upon com m unica tions . As has been ind icated previously, the logistics of military tran sp o r ta t io n had always s trongly cond it ioned not just the en ac tm en t of wars but also the very n a tu re of class-divided society. T h e relatively slow m ovem ent of troops limited the use of violent sanc tions as a m o d e of sustaining pow er, at the sam e tim e as the system in tegration of traditional s ta tes d ep e n d ed in a d irec t way upon that th rea t . T h e fighting of wars often had a ritual and 'p rep a red ' ch a rac te r , not jus t b ecause trad it ions infused wars like o th e r segm ents of social life, but because armies n eed ed — and w ere o ften allowed — tim e to assem ble on a p re -arranged terrain .

T h e railway, s team ship and te leg raph ch an g ed all this irrevocably. M o re than any o th e r single technologica l innovation , the railway m ad e possible mass warfare . T h e 'railway b o o m ’ be tw een 1840 and 1870 put an end to long m arches to the field of w ar and c rea ted 'f ron ts’ instead of the trad itional a lte rna t ion of skirmish and b a t t le .1 T h e E u ro p ean states varied widely in term s of the d eg ree to which newly c re a te d railway system s w ere established with military purposes in mind. T h e clearest and , in term s of its con seq u en ces for subsequen t history, the m ost far- reach ing exam ple of the explo ita tion of the railways for military ends was in Prussia. T h e Prussian G en era l Staff was able to have a considerab le influence over the cons truc tion and routing of the s tate railway system .4 W h ereas in Britain the railways system was d ev e lo p ed mostly via the h ap h aza rd efforts of com m erc ia l in terests, in Prussia the railways w ere co n s tru c ted in large part to m ee t th e re q u irem en ts o f the military. A specific railway Abteilung of the G en era l Staff was established, having as its co n cern the scheduling of services in such a way as to en h an ce military objectives. W hile not being w ithout its difficulties, the system d em o n s tra ted its effectiveness in 1870, swiftly mobilizing th e G e rm a n forces in th e S aar and R h ine land . T h e railway netw ork in Italy has its beginnings in d ream s of co n q u es t an d the a t ta in m en t of Italian unity. C avour lau n ch ed his p ro g ram m e of railway building from P ied m o n t with th e in junction tha t railways w ould be 'the seams which w ould stitch to g e th e r the boo t of Italy’.5 H ow ever sepa ra te from military purposes the railways might have deve loped in Britain , in the p rosecu tion o f their

224 Capitalism & the Industrialization o f War


overseas involvem ents t i e British w ere the leaders in the military utilization of rail com m unica t ions . In Ind ia and elsew here the British set up so p h is tica ted railway n e tw o rk s serving as the b ack b o n e of their colonial rule.

T h e early part o f the n in e teen th cen tu ry was one of the very rap id dev e lo p m en t of s team ship techno logy , also led by Britain. F o r som e while, how ever, this rem ained sepa ra te from naval planning, the w o rld ’s m ost powerful navy using basically the sam e type of w ooden ship as had been in service for som e two centuries. A by now fam ous m em o ra n d u m of the Naval Office s ta ted their Lordships’ view that s team pow er should not be used in war fleets, ‘as they consider that the in troduction of steam is calculated to strike a fatal blow at the naval sup rem acy of the E m p ire ' .6 O thers in E u ro p e w ere m ore prescien t, seeing the advan tages of super io r speed and m anoeuvrability offered by s team -propelled vessels to g e th e r with the fact th a t such vessels cou ld be p ro tec ted by steel a rm our . T h e British adm ira lty rapidly w ere com pelled to reconsider their conservatism; because o f the developed industrial base of the co u n try , they w ere able to m atch and surpass fairly readily advances m ad e elsew here . It was h e re tha t was initiated that fateful com bina tion o f industry, techno logy and sc ience applied to the pro liferation of w eaponry that sp read to all aspects of military p ro d u c tio n . T h e invention of the M inie bullet gave the rifle a massive superior ity over the m usket. T h e b reech loading gun was first inven ted in 1819, in the U SA. Its large-scale app lica tion ca m e only in the seco n d half of the n in e teen th cen tu ry , m aking possible the dev e lo p m en t of au to m atic w eapons. T h e te rm ‘m ach in e g u n ’ aptly cap tu res the union of industry and w eaponry and finds its first effective exam ples in the mitrailleuse, G atling and G a rd n e r guns.7

At the W oolw ich A rsenal, by 1860, specifically inven ted m ach ines w ere able to p ro d u c e a q u a r te r o f a million Minie bullets p e r day and nearly as m any co m ple ted ca rtr idges .8 Special p ro g ram m es of scientific re sea rch designed to en c o u rag e techno log ica l innovation in the n a tu re and p ro d u c tio n of w eaponry w ere linked to the A rsenal; the U SA and the m ajor E u ro p ean sta tes all had co m p arab le schem es. T h e t im e-honoured en trep ren eu ria l involvem ent in the m an u fac tu re and trading of a rm am en ts was given a new im petus by the mass m an u fac tu re of w eaponry . F irm s like the B irm ingham Small A rm s C o m pany and

the L ondon Small A rm s C o m pany p ro d u ced for in te rna tional m arke ts but the heart of their business derived from governm en t con trac ts . While the arms m an u fac tu re rs co m p e te d fiercely with each o th e r bo th on a na tional and in te rn a tio n a l level, the p ro duc tion and d is tribution of w eaponry necessarily had to be regarded by the s tate as of p rim e co n ce rn to its in terests and as d em and ing strict regulation. It does no t by any m eans follow from this th a t g o v e rn m e n t officials have always used the ir influence in such a way to p ro m o te the m ost effective m odes of techno log ica l advance. T h e ju d g em en t of their Lordships has m any parallels in subsequen t governm enta l decisions. But the m eshing of industrial p ro d u c tio n and military streng th is of p rim e im portance am ong the influences that have shaped the m o d ern world. It is a m istake — which has charac teris tically h au n ted Marxist in terpre tations of these issues — to regard the arm am ents industry as just an o th e r expression of a voraciously expanding capita lism . Industr ia l cap ita lism p rov ided the m ean s for the industrialization of war, bu t the activities and involvem ents of nation-states are at the origin o f the ph en o m en o n .

It would be hard to exaggera te the significance for global history of the ‘arm am ents g ap ’ which existed betw een the W estern coun tries and the rest of the world th ro u g h o u t the n ine teen th and early tw entie th centuries. T h e military d o m in an ce of the W est was no m ore sustained by the d ep loym en t of large arm ies ou ts ide E u ro p e than had been the case previously. Not even the new form s of military discipline and training w ere of de term in ing im p o r tan ce in E u ro p e an a scen d an cy away from the military theatres of Europe . Most colonial and o th e r external engagem ents w ere e ither fought by conscrip t troops o r by com paratively tiny tro o p d e tach m en ts . Som e of the key battles leading to the defea t of erstwhile powerful traditional states were won by small num bers of troops, on the basis of super io r mobility and fire-power. T h e re are various exam ples in Africa but pe rhaps the m ost telling case is to be found in China, w here a relatively insignificant body of British troops was able to defea t the forces of the imperial state. Of course , at the tim e of its g reatest expansion in the n ine teen th cen tu ry there already w ere the limits to E u ro p e an hegem ony la ter to b eco m e the two poles of the m a tu re nation-s ta te system: the USA and Russia. By the Civil W ar p er iod the po ten tia l military streng th of the U SA was evident, even if it was still



conf ined to the sp h e re of the A m ericas . Russian in terna l conso lida t ion following th e C rim ean W a r b lo ck ed W este rn expansion in th a t d irec t ion , while the Russians them selves m oved eastw ards into C en tra l Asia, subdu ing the societies the re th rough the sam e fusion o f industria l and military po w er tha t allowed the E u ro p ean nations to d o m in a te m uch of th e rest of the world. Jap an ’s isolation, com bined with a rapid process of m odern ization , allowed for a fu r th e r significant a rea into which E u ro p ean a rm ed fo rce was un ab le to p en e tra te .

T h e First W orld W a r d rew in all these sta tes and in tha t sense entirely justified its n am e. T h e re is no parallel to it w ha tsoever in fo rm er times in te rm s of the n um bers of co m b a ta n ts — and non- com batan ts — involved, the ferocity of the devastation unleashed, o r the m odes in which the a rm ed struggle was fought out. In the battles of the F ron tie rs and the M arne , half a million m en on each side w ere killed — a n u m b e r g rea te r than th e to tal o f the Prussian arm y fifty years earl ier .1’ On the Som m e, the n um bers lost by both sides w ere even h igher. N ever had w ar been fough t so unrem ittingly , with the soldiery so chronically u n d e r fire. T h e Som m e was no t only the scene of u n p re ced e n te d ca rnage , bu t the very ep itom e of industrialized war:

th e w ide an d sh a tte re d c o u n try of the S om m e . . . am o n g the b ro ad , s traggling belts o f rusty w ire sm ashed an d tw isted in the cha lky loam . . . I see th e faces an d figures o f enslaved m en, th e m arch ing co lu m n s pearl-h u ed w ith cha lky d u st on the sw eat o f th e ir heavy d ra b c lo th es . . . the loud c ra ck lin g of m ach ine-guns ch an g es to a sc re ec h in g as o f steam being blow n off by a h u n d red eng ines, an d so o n no-one is left s tanding ." '

T h e ‘heavy d ra b c lo thes’ signal o th e r changes that o cc u rre d in military organization over a period of ab o u t a cen tu ry . T h e professionalization of the u p p e r echelons of military co m m an d was acco m p an ied by the deve lopm en t of mass conscrip tion . In the nation-state, while the military may u n d e r som e circum stances assume political contro l , military pow er is no longer the necessary basis of in ternally adm in is te red s tate au thority . But the o th e r side of this is th a t the military can no longer ‘op t o u t ’ from the political system, o r ac t in isolation from the b ro ad e r sovereign com m unity , as arm ies cou ld do in p rio r types of soc ie ty .11 For , in an age of the industrialization of war, the a rm e d forces d ep en d

upon the productive appara tus of industrialism, harnessed through the sovereign au thority of the territoria l s tate . Even w h ere the arm y rules, it can n o t directly govern , d ep end ing upon the sam e array of ro u tine adm inistrative agencies as does pure ly ‘civil’ governm ent. A nd ‘civil’ governm ent, in tu rn , involves an insulation of political from m ilitary po w er far m ore p rec ise th an tha t ach ieved in class-divided societies, with o n e o r two possible exceptions. T h e ‘sep a ra t io n ’ of military from political pow er within the s ta te ’s territory , as I have said, is as d istinctive of the E uropean nation-state as is that of the political from the econom ic . T h e deve lopm en t of large standing arm ies, in which au to n o m o u s ca ree rs can be forged (but which can be swelled by conscrip tion w here necessary), is a main fea tu re of the nation-state.

H un ting ton’s discussion of the professionalization of the military is still the best overall acco u n t of the p h e n o m e n o n .12 As he points o u t , p r io r to the n in e tee n th cen tu ry , o ff icer co rp s usually consisted of e i ther aris tocra ts o r m ercenaries . For the form er, w ar was still som eth ing o f a hob b y , a h ero ic realization of m an h o o d , while for the la tter it was an activity pu rsued for profit. W ith the conso lida t ion of abso lu tism , m erc en a r ie s gradually becam e ousted by the ar is tocra tic e lem en t, as the princes sought enduring loyalty am ong a perm anently established soldiery. T h o se in the ranks w ere individuals signed on for te rm s of varying lengths as vo lun teers o r co e rce d in to service by o n e m eans or ano ther . In F ran ce and in Prussia, in the m iddle of the e igh teen th cen tu ry , admission to o fficer status was almost wholly confined to aristocrats . In the fo rm er co u n try a military com m ission was a m eans w hereby a needy m e m b er of the a r is tocracy cou ld ach ieve an incom e; tow ards the end of the e igh teen th cen tu ry a th ird of the total s treng th of the arm y consisted of officers. British army officers w ere rec ru i ted on the basis of pu rchase of office and w ere m ade up of the younger sons of coun try gentry. T h is was no longer a feudal leadership but it preserved the belief in cou rage and h o n o u r as inborn traits m onopolized by the few. T h e m odes of disciplinary pow er developed for the com m on soldier rem ained primarily confined to battlefield tactics and w ere not ex tended to the officer corps. T h e military, in o th e r words, h ad n o t yet b eco m e a reflexively m o n ito red o rganization of a fully m o d e rn type, even if som e of the tech n iq u es of su rve il lance w ere p io n eered within the military sphere . This can be indexed by the



absence p rio r to 1800 ‘of any co n cep tio n of military sc ience as a distinct b ranch of know ledge , unified and co m p le te in itself, susceptib le of logical analysis into its c o m p o n e n t e lem ents , and yet possessing a defin ite re la tionship to o th e r b ranches of know ledge .’13

T h e Prussian military re fo rm s of the early n in e teen th cen tu ry rep resen t th e first m ajo r m ove tow ards a professionalized officer corps, even if the land-owning ar is tocracy rem ained the main sou rce of rec ru i tm en t. Policies of open rec ru i tm en t , exam ination and p rom otion established by S charnhors t and G ne isenau had a s trong im pact on arm y organization , but they w ere far from being fully and consistently im plem ented . H ow ever, they provided an exam ple which o th e r states soon copied . By the la tter part o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry all the E u ro p ean states, to g e th e r with the U SA and Russia, had set up schools of tra in ing for officer corps assoc ia ted with b u re au c ra t iz ed systems of re c ru i tm en t and ad v ancem en t. T h ese deve lopm en ts went hand-in-hand with the sp read of the levée en masse and the co n c e p t of ‘the nation in a rm s’ in respec t o f the co m m o n soldiery. T h e links betw een citizenship rights, sovereignty and nationalism discussed in the p reced in g c h a p te r h e re tak e on an add it ional e lem en t. /T he transition from an ‘a m a te u r ’ to a ‘professional’ officer c a d ré -^ a s everyw here assoc ia ted with th e co m p lem en tin g of ca ree r soldiers by the citizen-soldier.14 T h e 1789 Revolution abolished aristocratic do m in an ce of the officer co rps in F rance , and the levée en masse da tes from a sho rt per iod af te rw ards. T h e g o v ern m en t was perm it ted to conscrip t by ballot from all healthy young males, with som e exceptions; thus by 1813 N apoleon was able to call up an arm y of 1,300,OCX) F re n c h m e n .15

Prussia in tro d u ced p e rm a n en t universal service in 1814, an ed ict of that yea r obliging all Prussian m en to spend five years in the army, th ree on active service and two in the reserve. In o th e r countries, the trend tow ards a ‘nation in arm s’ was evident w ithout being acco m p an ied by p eace tim e conscrip tion until the tw entie th c e n tu ry .16 In general it w ould be true to say tha t the relation betw een a professionalized, p e rm a n en t arm y and mass consc rip tion has b een an uneven o n e over the past cen tu ry and a half. M ost s ta tes have in tro d u ced som e conscrip tion at som e point, but this has no t necessarily been sustained in a full-blown way outs ide of cond itions of war. H ow ever, since the late n ine teen th

cen tu ry th ere has com e abou t in all W este rn states som eth ing of a reversal in the previous co n tra s t betw een officers and the rank and file. T h e officers have b eco m e a specialized professional g roup with few connec tions with the w ider society , while the soldiery are in substantial par t co m p o sed of citizenry u n d er arms for a res tr ic ted period.

T h e adop tion of uniform s of subdued co lou r for bo th enlisted ranks and officers alike symbolizes several aspects of m odern mass war. T h e uniform serves as a m ode of cam ouflage on the field of battle , in which m ost effort has to be d irec ted tow ards being p ro tec ted from projectiles of vast destruc tive force. While values of valour and heroism persist, they are clearly distinct from the trad it ional w arrio r e th ic that flourished when w arfare was associa ted with spec tacle and display. W ithin the arm y as an organization, the uniform has the same implications for disciplinary po w er as in ca rce ra l settings of o th e r types , help ing strip individuals of those traits tha t might in terfere with routin ized pa tte rns of obed ience . T h e uniform indicates to the civilian po p u la t io n th e d is tinc tiveness of the military figure as the specialist pu rveyor of the m eans of v io lence — param ilitary sections of the police, to som e ex ten t, sharing in this role. This has b eco m e such a universal fea tu re of the nation-state that it is perhaps difficult to see how novel it is. Prior to the industrialization of w ar th e re was little in the way of a c lea r-cu t ‘war techno logy’ d istinguishable from o th e r types of im plem ent or artifact. A rm o u r and ca n n o n certain ly fall into that ca tegory but before the deve lopm en t of m odern m anufac tu ring m eth o d s they were too expensive to oust m u ndane types of hand-held w eaponry. T h ro u g h the ages swords o r knives w ere carried for individual p ro tec t ion and for utilitarian purposes as well as being put to use for military en d s .17

If mass conscrip tion prov ided the h um an fo d d e r for total war, th e in tegra ted n a tu re of t ran sp o r t and com m unica t ions was its necessary m ateria l substra tum . T h ese decisively in fluenced the assembling of a rm ed forces to wage war, the tem pora l an d the spatial co-ord ination of w arfare as pro longed com bat. Several phases had traditionally been recognized in the process of ‘making w a r’, each usually tak ing considerab le tim e an d involving the cu m b erso m e m o v em en t of personnel across space. T ro o p s had to be m obilized, bringing to g e th e r the soldiery and th e provisions



necessary to engage in arm ed conflict; they had to be concentra ted in cam paign o rd e r ; and they had to m arch to b a t t le .18 By the la tter par t o f the n in e tee n th cen tu ry the d iffe ren tia tion betw een these phases had b ec o m e substantially dissolved. T h e ex is tence of s tanding arm ies, plus reserves which cou ld be d raw n in a t short no tice , m ad e possible the very rap id gene ra t ion of fighting forces of very large size. A rm am en ts having b ec o m e specialized and mass p ro d u ced , arm ies w ere at any given m o m en t furnished with the necessary m eans for waging war. P rep a ra t io n for cam paign o rd e r also becam e m uch less time-consuming, troops being subject to co n tin u o u s discipline and regula tion , in peace as in war. Rapid transpor ta t ion allowed the co n cen tra t io n of soldiery and a t tack on the enem y to b eco m e m erged in to o n e — a tac tic first used by M oltke in the invasion of B ohem ia in 1866.

T h e telegraph was an essential e lem en t in such co-ord ina ted ac tion , as it was in the th ea tres of war them selves. T h e Prussian arm y m ain ta in ed c o n ta c t be tw een its ad v an c in g forces and h ead q u ar te rs by the simple exped ien t o f w inding o u t wire as the battalions w ent forw ard . T e leg rap h co m m an d s could be sent sim ultaneously to any sec to r of the w ar zone w here the re was an o u tp o s t c o n n e c te d th ro u g h the wire. Industr ia lized w ar, like industrialized society, has there fo re long been electronic , a lthough in its early deve lopm en t the p rocess was anyth ing but foolproof. Keeping miles of wire in tact was hardly an easy task and the te legraph was ap t to fail just at decisive m om ents . T h u s , for exam ple , M oltke lost co n tac t with the arm y of the crown prince just p rio r to the Battle of K oniggratz , and had to send a d ispatch rider to get the p r in ce ’s arm y to the scene of the e n g a g em en t .19 Nonetheless, e lec tron ic co m m u n ica t io n o p en e d up possibilities of the co-ord ination of military forces in such a way as to greatly increase th e span of w ar zones. Perm itting instant reporting , it also brough t w ar into the public dom ain in a way fully consistent with the su p p o r t a ‘w ar e ffo r t’ d em ands of the citizenry of a m o d ern sta te , a l though such news repo rt ing also of course can re b o u n d upon the asp ira tions of the s ta te au thorities .

T h e First W orld W ar was the m ateria l expression of the new m odes of industrialized w arfare bu t it is a m is take to see it as one of two par ticu la r types of even t, nam ely ‘w orld war'. U n p re c e d e n ted it certain ly was, in the h i th e r to quite un im aginab le levels of ca rnage , in its du ra tion and its spatial span. In those term s, the

S econd W orld W ar (thus far) is its only com peti to r . But it also m ad e manifest very general characteris tics of the relation betw een war and the m odern state. T h e fact that sentim ents of nationalism tr ium phed o v er the in terna tionalism of the socialist m o v em en t m ay no t have been intelligible to som e of those within that m ovem en t, bu t it signalled the im p o rtan ce tha t the co n n ec t io n of sovereignty an d c itizenship h ad assum ed and w hich w ould , henceforth , dom inate in the global com m unity . If the ties betw een industria l d ev e lo p m e n t, politica l co -o rd ina t ion an d m ilitary streng th h ad for som e while been ap p a ren t within the m ajo r W este rn states, they now b ecam e ev ident to all. Som e fea tu res of the W a r rem a in ed largely con f ined to it, such as its peculiarly im m obile t ren ch battles , bu t in m any o th e r respects it set the p a t te rn for virtually all tw en tie th -cen tu ry wars, no m a t te r how com paratively restr ic ted in scope they might be. As im p o rtan t as anything, th e o u tco m e of the w ar conf irm ed the s tatus of the nation-state in its ‘h ea r t lan d ’. No single s ta te with large-scale territoria l am bitions was able to crush the o thers in such a way as to provide for the em erg en ce of a new imperial o rd e r , e i ther in E u ro p e o r elsew here. T h a t this was so has no th ing rem ote ly to do with any generalized process of ‘evo lu tion’ that te rm inates in the nation-state bu t was the o u tco m e of con tingen t events, plus the de l ibera te en sh r inem en t of the ‘n a t io n h o o d ’ of s tates as a global principle in the congress tha t followed the term ination of the W ar.

As one h is torian puts it,

A ugust 1914 h ad n o t b een , as ex p e c ted , A ugust 1870 on a la rg e r scale , w ith th e scen e of th e a c tio n sh ifted b ec au se th e F re n c h had fo rtified th e e a rlie r ro u te . In c o n tra s t to 1870, w ar had ch an g ed from being th e c o n c e rn o f th e a rm y as an e lite to being the business o f soc ie ty as a w hole, an d from the lim ited an d ra tio n a l ap p lica tio n o f fo rce to u n re s tr ic te d v io lence . . . by 1918, the lead ersh ip s had a b so rb e d finally th e lessons p re se n te d by the p ro cess o f ind u stria lisa tio n in th e p rev io u s c e n tu ry .20

Warfare and Social Change

Janow itz no tes that li te ra tu re on the ‘n ew ’ nation-states of Africa, th e M idd le E ast and Asia, to g e th e r w ith Latin A m er ica , persistently emphasizes the influence of the military upon ‘nation- build ing’. ‘By con tras t, co m p ara t iv e m acrosocio logy has shown



very little in terest in assessing the role of military institutions in the em erg en ce of W este rn nation-states . . . T h is is par ticularly difficult to explain in the light o f th e cen tra l significance of arm ies and a rm ed conflic t in fashioning bo th the boundar ie s and the s truc tu re of the m o d ern secu la r nation-s ta te .’21 T h e reasons for such a c ircu m stan ce should have em erged strongly enough in the course of this b o o k , bu t it still rem ains to ind icate the im pact of war upon the in ternal consti tu tion of states. I have earlier stressed the significance of re la tions linking sovereignty, c i t izenship and nationalism in the W estern nation-state; these also supply a focus for analysing the institutional in fluence of war.

T h a t a c o m b in a t io n of w ar an d d ip lom acy sh ap ed th e em erg en ce of the E u ro p e an s ta te system , with som e sta tes surviving and expand ing and m ost being ab so rbed o r dissolved, has already been em phasized — an d is no th ing m ore than a co m m o n p lace of history. H ow ever, the military involvem ents of states also strongly influenced the deve lopm en t of citizenship rights and the ir co n n e c t io n s to o th e r fe a tu res of societa l o rganization , in ways tha t can be fairly readily t raced o u t , even if they are missing from most sociological discussions of these phen o m en a . If the sovereign s ta te is inherently a po lyarch ic o rd e r , in which citizenship rights are the ‘price paid ' by the do m in an t class for the m eans of exercising its pow er, citizenship in turn implies a c cep tan ce of the obligations of military service. Both the shared pa t te rns of deve lopm en t of the classical n a t io n s ta te and d ivergences be tw een states can be i l lum inated in these term s. T h e nation-s ta te and the mass arm y appe.ar toge ther , the twin tokens of citizenship within territorially bo rd e red political com m unities . T h e experience of the USA and of F rance was strongly cond it ioned by the p ro m in en ce of the citizen-soldier in and after their respective revolu tionary transfo rm ations. Within each s tate — and in o thers tha t subsequently followed their lead— the co n n ec tio n s be tw een military service, co n tro l o f the a rm ed forces, and citizenship rights w ere forged in varying ways. In the U SA the ac cep tan c e tha t the citizenry cou ld be a rm ed in the service of th e s ta te , w ithout forming a th rea t to it, m ark e d a b reak with trad it ional E u ro p e an practices. In F ran ce th e levée en masse was specifically established in such a way as to associa te citizenship with active partic ipa tion in m atte rs urgently affecting the s ta te and as a m eans of fostering feelings of national loyalty.

C onscrip tion was p ro m p ted by considerations of social policy as m u ch as by military exped iency .22 ‘Military service em erged as a hallm ark of citizenship and citizenship as the hallm ark of a political d em o c racy .’23

T h e adaptability of the new pa tte rns of military organization , however, is d em o n s tra ted by their app ropria t ion and perfec ting in Prussia, as a main e lem en t in the forging of a very d ifferent politica l system. T h e re la t ion be tw een m ilitary serv ice and citizenship rights, pa r ticu la r ly the franchise , rem a in ed u n a m biguous. As soon as the un ifica tion of G e rm a n y o c c u r re d Bismarck established universal male suffrage, as a response to what he saw as the military exigencies of the new state . In coun tr ies lacking a p rox im ate revolu tionary back g ro u n d and not so directly involved in E u ro p ean war, most no tab ly Britain, the extension of the franchise ten d ed to be halting. Only with the experience of the First W orld W ar, in which conscrip tion was not in troduced until the a rm ed forces had und erg o n e huge losses, was universal male franchise instituted. O nce m o re , this was done in explicit recognition of the ties betw een citizenship rights and military obligations.

W riting of the First W orld W ar shortly af te r its te rm ination , Churchill observed that ‘T h e great war th rough which we have passed differed from all anc ien t wars in the im m ense pow er of the co m b a tan ts and their fearful agencies of des truc tion , and from all m o d ern wars in the u t te r ruthlessness with which it was fought. All the h o rro rs of the ages w ere brough t together , and no t only armies bu t w hole popu la tions w ere th rust into the m iddle of th e m .’24 P robab ly no o n e w ould d ispu te the validity of the s ta tem en t and of in n u m erab le paralle l ones w hich co u ld be q u o ted . Nonetheless, it still tends to be assum ed by sociological au tho rs analysing social deve lopm en t in the cu r ren t cen tu ry that, if it had any lasting influence on social organization , th e First W orld W ar m erely acce le ra ted trends that w ere b o u n d to em erge in the long run in any case. But this view is no t a t all plausible and could scarcely be co u n ten a n ced at all if it w ere not for the powerful grip tha t endo g en o u s and evolu tionary co n cep tio n s of change have had in the social sciences.

If the co u rse of even ts in th e G re a t W a r , inc lud ing the p ar tic ip a tio n of the U S A in th e hostilities an d th e p ea ce se t t lem en t, h ad not tak en th e shape they did, the nation-s ta te in



its cu r ren t form m ight not have b eco m e th e d o m in an t political entity in the w orld system. But in m any o th e r ways also the W ar m arks a tu rn ing poin t bo th in world history and in the p a t te rn s of deve lopm en t in the industrialized societies involved in it. T h e collapse of socialist in terna tionalism with th e o u tb rea k of the W ar has, of course , o ften been discussed and analysed. T h e re w ere a lready very s trong p ressures linking socialist m o vem en ts to citizenship within sovereign states. But it is by no m eans c lea r that in the ab sen ce of the W ar, the pre-existing in terna tional socialist organizations might not have em erged as of key influence in world politics. T h e W ar canalized the dev e lo p m en t of s tates ' sovereignty, tying this to citizenship and to nationalism in such a p ro found way th a t any o th e r scenario subsequently cam e to ap p ea r little m ore than idle fantasy. T h e abortive revolution in one defea ted pow er — G e rm an y — and a successful one in the o th e r — Russia — did far m ore than just give a lasting geo-political shape to the co n tem p o ra ry w orld. T h e isolation of the fledgling Soviet U nion ensu red an em phasis upon territoria lity , 'nation- building' and 'fo rced industria liza tion’ th e re whiph, as T ro tsk y so sharply em phasized , was far distant from the in terna tionalism of Marxist-Leninist theory . T h e Soviet U nion b ecam e as jealously territorial as any of the 'capitalist s ta tes ', and also e m b a rk ed upon a course of developing the industrially based military s trength that p ropelled it to the very fo refron t of global power.

Fam iliar history, certain ly , bu t the po in t is tha t we should no t d raw an opposit ion be tw een the con tingen t even ts and o u tco m es of w ar and m o re generic social trends , as though w hat h appens in o ne sphere is som ehow distinct from o cc u rre n ces in the o ther . T h e re are no 'inevitable t rends ' in social dev e lo p m en t tha t are e i ther h as tened o r held back by specific historical processes. All general pa t te rns of social o rganization and social change are co m p o u n d ed of con tin g en t o u tco m es , in tended and un in tended ; all sequences o f events which can be desc ribed in a narra tive vein from som e aspec t o r a n o th e r express m o re en com pass ing influences. T h u s the events of the First W orld W ar cou ld no t have h ap p e n ed w ithout the long p rio r dev e lo p m en t of industria lism, and the conjo in ing of industrial p ro d u c tio n to the m eans of v io lence. B ut th o se even ts have decisively in f luenced what 'industria lism ’ is and has b ec o m e , and its co n n ec tio n s to o th e r social and political ins titu tions .25


The World Wars

W hen the T rea ty of Versailles generalized to the rest of the world principles of s tates’ sovereignty, there were built into its provisions an ac cep tan c e of how far the old o rde rs of things had been transfo rm ed by total war. ‘T h e T rea ty , it could be said, en th ro n es the principle of the plebiscite, the very notion of which would have s taggered m any pre-war E u ro p ean go v ern m en ts .’26 In the m ajor s tates the d em an d for soldiery for ac tive service at the front, co m b in ed with a s tress u p o n the collective w ar effort, b rought labour into a s trong bargaining position in certain sectors, as well as involving w om en in occupations they had not previously filled. U nion organizations deve loped strongly in F rance , Britain an d the U SA , with m ore d irec t and p e rm a n en t co n n ec t io n s than h i ther to existed being estab lished betw een the labour m ovem en t and the state . In F rance , for exam ple , m inim um wage ra tes were set up in 1917 in all industries d irec tly c o n n e c te d to the governm en t and p e rm an en t a rb itra tion councils established to regu la te industria l conflic t. T h e ‘ins titu tionaliza tion of class conflic t’ is norm ally discussed in the sociological li te ra tu re as though it w ere the result solely of eco n o m ic change. But the im pact of the W ar p layed a very im portan t role in it, providing m uch of the fram ew ork for la ter deve lopm ents . In the la tter per iod of the W ar, m ass-production techn iques for the m an u fa c tu re of military equ ipm en t w ere in tro d u ced in the leading states, especially in the U SA and F rance . T h e arrival o f m eth o d s o f mass p ro d u c tio n was both s tim ulated by the d em an d s of the W ar and ac c e p te d by labour-fo rces th a t , m o re highly un ion ized than before, in o th e r c ircum stances might have resisted their im plem en ta t ion in a co n c e r ted fashion.

It has been aptly rem a rk ed that

T h e su b se q u en t industria l an d social h isto ry o f th e w orld tu rn very largely on th e co n tin u in g ap p lica tio n o f th e m e th o d s of m ass p ro d u c tio n w hose sc o p e w id en ed so re m a rk a b ly d u rin g th e em erg en cy o f W orld W ar I. A nyone look ing a t th e e q u ip m en t installed in a m o d ern house will read ily reco g n ise how m u ch w e in th e la te tw en tie th c e n tu ry a re in d e b te d to in d u stria l ch a n g es


p io n eered in near-pan ic c ircu m stan ces w hen m ore an d m ore shells, gu n -p o w d er, a n d m ach in e -g u n s su d d e n ly b e c a m e th e p rice of surv ival as a sovere ign s ta te .27

This includes no t just the m ass p ro d u c tio n of co n su m er durab les but also, in p ar ticu la r , the industrialization and rationalizing of food p roduc tion . P rio r to the W ar, the m echan ized processing and pre-packaging of food was poorly deve loped . D uring the course of the conflic t, new m eth o d s of p ro duc tion cam e to the fore that revolutionized — for b e t te r o r for worse — eating habits and the n a tu re of dom estic life. T h e role of ‘housew ife’ was paradoxically c rea ted a t the sam e tim e as w om en en te red the labour-force in large n u m b ers .28

Finally, during the G re a t W ar a fateful con junc tion was w elded m ore firmly and irre trievably than ever before: the in tegra tion of large-scale sc ience and techno logy as the principal m edium of industrial ad v a n cem en t . It has o ften been c la im ed th a t w ar s tim ulates inventiveness; certain ly it is the case, as has been discussed previously, that the deve lopm ent of w eapons technology has long influenced econom ic change. But what took place during the course of the W ar was som eth ing m ore thorough-going — the co n c e r te d ap p lica tion of p rocesses of scientific d iscovery to technologica l advance th ro u g h o u t the co re sec tors of industrial p roduc tion . Before the First W orld W ar, in the sphere of the a rm ed forces, this was m ost deve loped in the navy, as the m ajor E u ro p ean states struggled to em ula te one a n o th e r in tu rn ing s team and steel to the p ro duc tion of efficient fighting ships. In the per iod leading up to the W ar , par ticularly in response to the d em ands of the struggle itself, the harnessing of science to industry b e c a m e an estab lished p h e n o m e n o n in all a reas of military p roduc tion . T h e dev e lo p m en t of tanks provides o n e of the best i llustrations.29 T an k s were originally the equivalen ts of a rm ed and p la ted ships b ro u g h t ashore an d m ad e m an o eu v rab le on land. T hey were first of all com m only know n as ‘land cru isers’ and in Britain the Bureau of Naval Design was in ch a rg e of the original e labora t ion of the co n s truc tion p rog ram m e. Like ae rop lanes , tanks were no t to have a significant effect on the battlefield until subsequen t wars — m ost devastatingly, in the S econd W orld W ar. But the ‘re search and d ev e lo p m e n t’ p ro g ram m e of which they w ere the o u tc o m e was rapidly t ran fe rred to the civilian

industries and th ereaf te r rem a ined fundam en ta l to the fu r ther expansion of industrialism .30

Of co u rse , n o t all th e t ren d s of d e v e lo p m e n t th a t w ere p ro m in en t in the G re a t W a r w ere sustained in the sam e way afterw ards. T h e strong involvem ent of w om en in a key range of jobs in industrial p ro d u c tio n , for exam ple , did no t persist and it was som e d ecad es before levels of full-time em p lo y m en t for the female labour-force again ap p ro ach ed w hat they w ere during the conflict. T h e early form s of ‘co rpo ra t ism ' w itnessed during the W ar rapidly dissolved soon af te r it en ded , leading to large-scale civil strife in G e rm an y , F rance and Britain. T h e destruc tive havoc w rought by the cam paigns, to ge ther with the im position of repara tions on and loss o f terr ito ry by the de fea ted states, c rea ted the social and eco n o m ic clim ate in which to ta litarian political ideology was to p rosper. But bo th the new forms of to ta litarian political con tro l and the in terventionist schem es of the liberal- dem o cra t ic W estern states w ere strongly influenced by policies in itia ted first o f all du r in g the W ar. In w ork ing o u t the prescrip tions of the New Deal, for exam ple , Roosevelt and his cab ine t continually looked to p ractices invoked during the W a r .31

W ilsonian d o c tr in e s , with their em phasis upon na tional sovereignty with a global com m unity of sta tes, w ere in som e substantial part a reaction against the en o rm o u s devasta tion of the W ar. But they also expressed an ack now ledgem en t of a he igh tened level of in te rd ep en d en cy in the world system, which the activities of the partic ipan t s ta tes had s tim ulated aw ay from the w ar zones themselves. C om pulsory regulation of industry and food p ro d u c tio n was not limited to internal o rganization of the re levant national econom ies; it also involved a t tem pts to con tro l the flow of resources in terna tionally well beyond anyth ing which had o ccu rred previously. G e rm an naval successes against Allied shipping in the later phases of the W ar m ean t that supplies coming from overseas had to be carefully m anaged . In 1917 the British and F ren ch set up the Allied M arit im e T ra n s p o r t C ouncil , integrating policies of naval construc tion with priorities in respect o f exports to the whole of the Allied sec tor . M u ch m o re far- reaching econom ic integration was p lanned betw een all the Allied econom ies , including the USA. T h e W a r cam e to an end before these h ad co m e to fru ition bu t, again, m ost o f the connec tions



they helped establish b ecam e fu r th e r solidified in the period following the cessation of hostilities.

T h e m odel of a w ar eco n o m y , as well as the d irec t building up of military s trength , p layed a m ajor role in all th ree states tha t em erged as leading world pow ers tow ards the end of the 1930s — the Soviet U nion , Japan and an economically resurgent G erm any . Soviet planning was nominally quite different from anything found in the capitalist coun tr ie s bu t, in fact, was strongly influenced by W estern patterns of war-time econom ic and political mobilization. In the second F ive-Year Plan of 1932—7, the a t ten t ion given to military p ro d u c tio n m ad e this par ticularly c lea r .32 S ta lin’s ‘second revo lu tion’ was aw ash with military rhe to r ic , like the war-time experience of the o th e r E u ro p ean states com bin ing appeals for m axim um produc tion with a stress upon the necessity of keeping a tight rein upon consum ption . As m easured purely in eco n o m ic term s — that is, apart from the appalling h u m an costs — the success of these policies of en fo rced m obilization was to be fundam entally im p o rtan t for subsequen t world history. By the o u tb reak of the S econd W orld W ar, the industrial p roduc tion of the Soviet U nion was th ree times as high as it had been a q u a r te r of a cen tu ry earlier. In Japan the m o v em en t tow ards a war e conom y was even m ore p ro n o u n c ed , a l though owing less to p rogram m es bo rrow ed directly from the experience of the G rea t W ar than to the m oderniz ing efforts of the state to m atch W estern ach iev em en ts . T h e se efforts h ad , from th e beginning , been inform ed by an unders tand ing that the dev e lo p m en t of industry was the key to military strength . Nonethe less , Japanese econom ic dev e lo p m en t in the 1930s was quite rem ark ab le , heavy industry increasing in o u tp u t by 500 p er cen t , th e m an u fa c tu re of a rm am en ts holding a prim e p lace in this d ev e lopm en t. Finally, in G e rm an y the National Socialists in a s tudied way sought both to re g en era te the nationalis t fe rv o u r of th e W a r and to apply m ethods of war-time eco n o m ic and political regula tion in the pursuit of national objectives, cu lm inating in a massive process of re a rm am en t soon followed by all the o th e r principal industrial coun tr ies .33

By the early phases of the S econd W orld W ar, in con tras t to the F irst, each of the m a jo r co m b a ta n ts was linked to an in terna tional system of eco n o m ic supply.34 G e rm a n y c rea ted its

own system in the cen tre of E urope , forcibly incorporating labour and m ater ia l resources from co n q u e red terr ito r ies into its war effort. A lm ost a q u a r te r of the G e rm a n labour-fo rce was co m p o sed of foreign w orkers by the m iddle years of the W ar, m ostly m ad e to w ork u n d e r co n d it io n s of co e rc io n . Japan organized a ‘C o-Prosperity S p h e re ’ in the East, bringing large n u m b ers of w orke rs — a l though these w ere overw helm ingly peasants , inexper ienced in m eth o d s of industrial p ro d u c tio n — directly u n d e r its con tro l. V ia the Lend Lease and M utual Aid prescriptions, the Soviet Union was co nnec ted to the m ajor Allied econom ies . T h ese ties w ere to prove crucial to the Soviet war effort, a l though m uch w e ak e r than the econom ic ne tw orks that the Allied states spun be tw een them selves and with o th e r regions of the w orld. How ever, the m ain basis of eventual Soviet tr ium ph on the battlefield was a channell ing of the eco n o m y into military p ro d u c tio n — red u ced subsequen t to the W ar but, nevertheless, rem ain ing of m ajo r significance in Soviet society up to cu r ren t times. T h e en o rm o u s in terna tional eco n o m ic ne tw ork dom ina ted by the U SA , in con junction with Britain, was easily the largest and it is to this that the m o v em en t tow ards g rea te r in tegra tion in the world system in the post-W ar period can be most d irectly traced . T h e in terna tional w ar econom y irrem ediably involved the U SA m uch m ore deeply in the global division of labour than before and , with the dec line of the British E m pire , allowed the fo rm er to s tand pre -em inen t in the world econom y. Its military superiority was m uch m o re narrow , save for the brief per iod at which it possessed n u c lea r w eaponry and the U SSR did no t — d u e very largely to the Soviet policy of giving priori ty to a rm am en ts and military industries above all o thers.

T h e influence of the US-British w ar econom y s tre tch ed m uch fu r th e r than m ight ap p e a r a t first sight. Both inside and outside th e British E m pire m ater ia l resources and labour-pow er were sucked in to the W ar, w h e th e r o r no t their s ta tes of origin were actively involved in the hostilities. This p layed a large p a r t in s tim ulating co n c u rre n t o r subsequen t anti-colonial m ovem ents , as well as in som e cases p rom oting indigenous forms of econom ic deve lopm en t. T h e effects of the W ar w ere felt strongly in Latin A m erica as well as in A frica, in Ind ia and o th e r Asian coun tr ies which w ere no t directly occup ied . F o r the m ost p a r t the o u tco m e was increasing in tegration within a consolidating global econom y,



but in parts o f Latin A m er ica and in Ind ia th e re o cc u rre d a lurch tow ards g rea te r industria lization . In India a sizeable arm y was fo rm ed to fight th e Jap a n ese in B urm a. T h e p ro d u c tio n of w eap o n ry an d provis ions for it gave a m a rk e d s tim ulus to industrial deve lopm ent, while the concen tra t ion of administrative resources involved provided an au tonom y of political organization th a t m ad e in d e p e n d e n c e a f te r th e W ar a largely fo reg o n e conclusion .

During the S econd W orld W ar the merging of organized science and techno logy , in itia ted in the p r io r w orld conf lic t, was co m p le ted in a system atic fashion. W ithin th e a rea of a rm a m ents p roduc tion itself, the th ree m ost im p o rtan t con seq u en ces— which taken together now dom inate the world military o rd e r — were the c rea t ion of nuclea r w eapons, the invention of ro ck e t p ropulsion and the dev e lo p m en t of w eapons systems. W h e th e r n u c lea r arm s w ould have been invented outs ide of the co n tex t of world w ar is som eth ing which is seriously o p en to d o ub t . T h e construc tion of the first nuc lea r bom bs has been co m p ared by o n e observer to the m ost im m ense building p ro jec ts of traditional em pires — the pyram ids and the G re a t Wall o f China. All were ‘visible, d ram atic , singular public works pro jec ts , the fruit of an eno rm o u s , centrally d irec ted co n cen tra t io n of reo u rce s ’.35 But the building p ro jec ts of the trad itional world took m any decades , even cen tu r ies , to cons truc t. T h e first a tom ic w eapons were m ad e by m eans of the ex p en d itu re of wealth and a co n cen tra t io n of o th e r re sources such as cou ld no t have been d ream ed of even in the early n in e teen th cen tu ry , let a lone previous ages; and it is doubtfu l if such an effort could have been m o u n ted in any co n tem p o ra ry society which was no t on a w ar footing. T h e sam e is not true of ro ck e t and jet-propuls ion , a l though each was greatly influenced by w ar d ev e lo p m en t program m es.

O nce they had first been co n s tru c ted , n u c lea r w eapons soon cam e to be m ad e in b a tch -p ro d u c t io n , like o th e r industria l products . But the fu r the r advancem en t of techn iques of rocketing basically a l te red the n a tu re of po ten tia l n u c lea r confron ta t ion . T h e aircraft th a t flew against H irosh im a and Nagasaki could be vulnerab le to co u n te r -a t tack by o r th o d o x fighter-planes o r an t i a ircraft batteries. But with fusion w arheads m o u n ted on rockets there is no possibility — for the time being a t any ra te — of successfully warding-off a t tack . T h a t this was so was formally

accep ted by the USA and the Soviet U nion in 1972, the treaty signed in th a t year effectively m ak ing illegal the a t te m p te d provision of d e fence against ballistic missiles.36

T h e em erg en ce of w eapons systems was strongly cond it ioned by the exp an d ed m odes of surveillance built into the co n d u c t of arm ed struggle during the Second W orld W ar. P roduction sectors were closely m o n ito red in o rd e r to co n n ec t technical change in m an u fac tu re to shifting needs for par ticu la r types of provisions and arm am ents . T h e experience of fighting units on the battlefield was co m m u n ica ted back directly to scientific com m ittees whose role it was to develop im provem en ts in existing techno logy and co m b a t strategies. T h e p rocess of techn ica l invention in o n e a rea requ ired co m p lem en ta ry innovations in o thers ; advances m ade by the enem y n eed ed to be co u n te red by new deve lopm en ts by the o th e r side. T h e co n v e rg en c e of high ra tes of techn ica l innovation , co -ord inated through the organized use of scientific know ledge and regula ted technological dev e lo p m en t, to ge ther underlie the increasing p ro m in en c e of w eap o n s systems. A w eapons system essentially rep resen ts the sam e kind of process of overall design — connec ting diffe ren t aspects of techno logy with the deta iled analysis of social organization — which in the pos tw a r period b ecam e ch arac te r is t ic of the technologically m ost advanced sec tors of industry in o th e r areas. Several of the most significant technologica l innovations that have affec ted social and eco n o m ic life over the past four d ecad es had their origins in the co n tex t of the W ar, o r result primarily from w eapons-re la ted deve lopm en ts a f te rw ards .37 T h ese include civilian jet-travel, key aspects of te lecom m unica tions and of ‘in fo rm ation techno logy’.

In co m m o n with its p redecesso r , the S econd W orld W ar had enduring effects upon the internal political organization of those states directly involved in it. In Britain, for exam ple , the war-time experience quite early on s t im ulated p rog ram m es for w idespread social re fo rm following the cessation of hostilities. T h e n eed for a thorough-going set of eco n o m ic citizenship rights was accep ted by g roups from both the m ajo r parties. T h e bringing of K eynes into the T reasu ry in 1940 led to a s trong and sophis tica ted range of g o v ernm en t con tro ls over the econom y, co n c re t ized four years later by a W hite P ap e r th a t obliged fu tu re adm inis tra tions to k eep national expend itu re a t sufficient levels to avoid large-scale unem ploym en t. Inc reases in taxation im posed during the W ar



also he lped to p rovide the eco n o m ic basis for the W elfare Sta te that cam e into being later. As M arw ick points ou t, the ev idence is ra th e r s trong tha t , if an e lection had been held in 1940, a L abour g o v ern m e n t w ould no t have b een r e tu rn e d to pow er. T h e experiences of the popu la t ion in w ar played a vital role in several ways. A generalized reac tion against the W ar p robab ly s tim ulated feelings of a need for change in the leadership . But the W ar experience bo th helped m ak e c lea r to large segm ents of the populace the advantages of the welfare p rogram m es of the L abour Party and , at th e sam e tim e , gave the L ab o u r leaders the o p portun ity to shape policies which then b ecam e part o f the new welfare provisions a f te rw ards .38 In the U SA th e W a r quickly p ro d u ced an u n p re ced e n te d industrial boo m , b u t also gave rise to a varie ty of agencies c o n c e rn e d with e c o n o m ic regu la t ion , to ge ther with the ad op tion of Keynesian eco n o m ic prescrip tions. T h e USA m oved af te rw ards d irectly to peace-tim e affluence, em erging as by far the w orld ’s d o m in an t eco n o m ic p ow er.39

It was not the en d o g en o u s deve lopm en t of industrialism that dissolved the pow er of trad it ional elites in G e rm an y and Japan and it was not internal processes of political change tha t resulted in the em ergence of liberal dem ocracy in those states. T h e form er was the result of d e fea t in war, the la tter th e o u tco m e of the d irec t in tervention of the US and o th e r Allied governm ents . T h e steps taken by the Allied coun tr ie s to set up a new political o rd e r in a W est G e rm a n state were to a substantial ex ten t a response to perceived Soviet am bitions. Only a year af te r the inaugura tion of the F ederal R epublic , as a result of the o u tb rea k of the K orean W ar in 1950, the US g o v ern m e n t a c c e p te d the p rincip le of G e rm an rea rm am en t . F rom then onw ards W est G e rm an y has rem ained the ‘forw ard post ' o f the W este rn military alliance in E u ro p e and has becom e very tightly woven into the U S-dom inated sec tors of the world econom y. T h e policy of ‘annexing W estern G e rm an y to N A T O ',40 to g e th e r with the de facto ac cep tan c e of E ast G e rm an y as a distinct nation-s ta te , solidified the division into ‘capitalist W est ' and ‘s ta te socialist East '. T h u s the E u ro p ean D efence T rea ty signed in 1952 (although ratified in ra the r different form th ree years later) was far m ore than just a dec la ra t ion of military alliance; it conf irm ed a par ticu la r political and social m ake-up each side of the a rm ed division of E u ro p e . A t the sam e time, the helplessness of the E ast G e rm a n au thorit ies in the face

of the uprisings in 1953 p ro v o k ed the military in terven tion of the USSR, firmly setting the political o rd e r in a Soviet m ould and leading to the expand ing eco n o m ic in tegra tion of the new state into the E astern sector.

Japan re ta in ed its te rr i to r ia l in tegrity , a l though having to relinquish all the regions it had occup ied over som e half-century of expansion. H ow ever, unlike in E u ro p e , the US role in the military v ictory in the East was so all-pervasive th a t it was able to more-or-less wholly control the program m es of social and political change institu ted in the coun try . Japan rem ains the only m ajor s ta te no t to have fully rea rm ed , but b ecam e the pivot of US military and econom ic policy in Asia. T h e K orean conflic t and successive crises in South-East Asia were im portant in consolidating the A m erican p resence in the o n e s ta te that knew the d irec t ex p e r ien ce of n u c lea r w arfare . W hile the politica l re la tions betw een the USA and Japan have been th rough a n u m b e r of vicissitudes, these influences have helped stim ulate the strong d egree of in tegration that cu rren tly exists betw een (he US and Japanese econom ies , as well as the general rise of Japan to its very high position in the world econom y.

Since the end of the S econd W orld W ar th ere have been n u m ero u s wars in different parts o f the world — although none within the geographical cen tre of what on ce was the E u ro p ean state-system — in som e of w hich, as in V ie tnam and K am p u ch ea , the re has been appalling loss of life. In co n cen tra t in g in this section on the influence of the two W orld W ars I do not m ean to un d eres t im a te the social, political o r eco n o m ic changes w rought by these o th e r struggles. M y m ain poin t is to em phasize tha t the im pact of w ar in the tw en tie th cen tu ry upon generalized pa tte rns of change has been so p ro fo u n d that it is little short of absu rd to seek to in te rp re t such p a t te rn s w ithou t system atic re fe ren ce to it. T h e significance of the W ars is no t just tha t they led to m ajor changes during the period of hostilities o r im m edia tely after. T h ey p ro d u c ed transfo rm ations which have tu rn ed o u t to be of enduring significance for the institutions bo th of the economically advanced and of o th e r types of society in the world system.

The Nation-State, Industrialism and the Military

W h en n in e teen th -cen tu ry th inkers co n tra s ted the em erging o rd e r



of ‘industrial soc ie ty ’ with ‘military socie ty’, they established som e of the main p aram ete rs of m o d ern social science. In this bo o k I have set ou t to question som e of the chief suppositions thus developed . But how far shou ld such a question ing lead us to re ject a l together the idea tha t , in the m o d e rn w orld, military power declines in relative im portance , as co m p ared to specifically political and eco n o m ic sources of social o rganization and social change? D o we in th e W est still, in fact, live in ‘military socie ties’, albeit ones in which the n a tu re of military pow er and its rela tions to o th e r sources of pow er, have been radically a ltered?

A lthough Marxist acco u n ts of the expansion of capitalism and rival in te rp re ta t ions of ‘industrial society ' still p red o m in a te , som e theories give military pow er a p ro m in en t role. T h u s Lasswell’s analysis of the ‘garrison-sta te’, originally fo rm ula ted in the 1930s, reverses the usual type of thesis found in the social sciences. According to him, in the nineteenth century industrial organization and adm inistrative ra tionaliza tion p ervaded the dev e lo p m en t of the E u ro p ean coun tries and the USA. But subsequen tly th e re has deve loped a t ren d tow ards ‘military-police d o m in a n c e ’, which th rea tens increasingly to expand in the im pending fu tu re .41 T h e garrison-state is a p h en o m en o n tha t is com ing into being, no t one that a lready exists. In Lasswell’s view, the trend tow ards the garrison-state has to be u n d ers to o d against the b ackground of the deve lopm ent of a world military order. T h e garrison-state emerges in a garrisoned world, in which resort to th e th rea t o r use of organized violence is more-or-less chronically present. It is not necessarily u n d em o cra t ic o r non-polyarch ic , since it leaves open the possibility tha t a m ajority might par tic ipa te in the internal political process. N onethe less , Lasswell’s views w ere fo rm ula ted in the co n tex t o f his fears for the fu ture of W este rn liberal dem o cracy in the face of ‘the explosive grow th of m o d ern sc ience and technology and the co n n ec tio n of these deve lopm en ts with the con tro l of large popu la tion and re sou rce basins suitable for huge capita l accu m u la t io n ' .42

In assessing the significance of military pow er today , several distinguishable questions can be posed. H ow far are W este rn nation-states curren tly dom inated by military imperatives in term s o f the ir basic eco n o m ic organization? A re p a t te rn s of military rule likely to b ec o m e m ore , ra th e r than less, co m m o n and w hat can be said ab o u t the cond itions m aking for civil ra th e r than

military governm ent? O n a global level, w hat is the n a tu re of the ‘w orld m ilitary o rd e r ' an d how does it c o n n e c t with o th e r ch a rac te r is t ic s of the m o d e rn w orld system ? In spite of the persistent tendency of the social sciences, particularly sociology, to skirt these issues, it hardly takes a giant leap of the imagination to see how re levan t they are to cu r ren t paths of deve lopm en t of m odern societies. T hey are evidently too com plex to be addressed in detail he re and I shall only a t tem p t to offer schem atic answers to them, concentrating my attention mainly upon the industrialized countries.

Of o n e thing th ere can be no d o u b t — the s tu p en d o u s scale of military ex p en d itu res in th e w orld eco n o m y as a w hole . As indexed by officially pub lished statistics, such ex p en d itu res am o u n te d to $159 billion in 1966, $200 billion in 1973, and curren tly s tand at som e $600 billion. T ak e n on their ow n, such figures do no m ore than dazzle o r depress and it is pe rhaps of g rea te r use to consider som e m ore com para t ive figures. T h u s world military expend itu re is g rea te r than the G ross N ational P roduc t of the whole of the A frican co n tinen t , Sou th Africa included. It is m ore than that of the whole of Asia, if Japan is exc luded . T h e G N P of Japan , the third largest in the w orld , is only ab o u t twice the size of the wealth d ispensed for military ends globally. As one au th o r pu ts it, i t is as if half a “Jap a n ” existed within the world econom y, but was unrecognised diplomatically .’41

How far the industrialized coun tries should really be regarded as ‘m ilitary-industria l’ societies, how ever, d ep en d s in part upon appraising the role of military expend itu re within their national econom ies . T h e m ost com m only em ployed statistical m e th o d of doing this is to analyse the ra tio of military spend ing to G N P. As m easu red in these term s, the level of military expend itu re is generally low, although pe rh ap s n o t lower than would be the case in trad i t ional s ta tes if som e sort o f co m p arab le m o d e of c o m p u ta t io n cou ld be dev ised .44 W hile th e re a re occas iona l instances of as m uch as a th ird of G N P being a lloca ted for military purposes (Israel), for the industrialized states the total is mostly be tw een 3 —5 p er cen t, including the cases of b o th the U SA and the Soviet U nion , a l though th e re is good reason to be sceptical ab o u t the official figures co n n e c ted with the latter. But there are considerab le p rob lem s with this m o d e of m easu rem en t, and it is m o re effective to analyse military expend itu re as a



proportion of total governm ent expenditure. Judged by this index, the ra tio of ‘d e fen ce ’ to o th e r spending in the industrialized coun tries varies be tw een 11 and 30 p er cen t (although it has generally declined over the past twenty years). Such figures surely do ind icate tha t the channell ing of p ro d u c tio n tow ards military ends is a m ore significant fea tu re of industrialism than the G N P ra tio would indicate . But they do no t as such reveal m uch ab o u t the ‘military-industrial co m p lex ’ involved in m o d ern p roduc tion ; n o r do they d o c u m e n t its na tu re . T h e idea th a t such a p h en o m en o n is to be found in m ost o r all industrialized societies is, as usually represen ted , a fairly vague one. E isenhow er originally em ployed the te rm in the co n tex t of trying to p ro m o te the co n c e r ted and system atic applica tion of sc ience and technology to military p ro d u c tio n , la ter using it to refer critically to w hat he cam e to see as th rea ten ing aspects of its deve lopm en t. At least two types of ap p ro ach can be distinguished using the co n cep t or som eth ing similar. O n e a rg u m e n t , o f the k ind favoured by C. W right Mills in his earlier writings, holds tha t an integration has taken p lace of the main institutional spheres of pow er in society — the political, eco n o m ic and military. In this view, b u re a u c ra t ic cen tra l iza t io n is the m ain o rganiz ing im pulsion involved. T h e o th e r a rgum en t is a quasi-M arxist one. A lthough it is e labo ra ted in varying forms, the main claim is tha t military p ro d u c tio n is explicable in term s of the eco n o m ic im peratives of cap ita lis t en te rp r is e .45 T h e ‘m ilitary-industr ia l c o m p lex ’ is the co n c re te expression of the social changes fostered by these imperatives.

H owever, ne i ther of these positions stands up well to scrutiny. If a ‘military-industrial co m p lex ’ can be said to dominate the econom y, it has to be the case tha t th e re are sharply defined links of in te rd e p en d en c e betw een military p ro d u c tio n and o th e r areas of p roduc tion ; and that m o d ern econom ies a re so re liant upon the m a in ten an ce of these ties th a t those holding political pow er find themselves com pelled to acquiesce in such produc tion needs. Now , in so m e of th e m a jo r W este rn co u n tr ie s , ‘d e f e n c e ’ co n trac to rs do ran k highly am ong the largest co rpo ra t ions . T h u s som e th ree q u a r te rs of the m ost sizeable military co n tra c to rs in the U SA are to be found in th e list of the five h u n d red largest A m er ican c o rp o ra t io n s .46 In th e Soviet U n io n , a rm s-re la ted industries ou ts tr ip all o th e r industrial sec to rs in term s of the

sophisticated application of science to technological advancem ent and there is a range of agencies devoted to ensuring that processes of techn ica l transfer are readily accom plished . But it does no t follow th a t the m ain p roduc tive organizations in e i ther econom y are substantially d e p e n d en t upon m ilitary-related activities for their p rosperity . T h e p ro p o r t io n of such p ro duc tion engaged in by m ost of the large co rp o ra t io n s in the U SA is low, with o n e or two n o tab le excep tions.47 M oreover , those firms th a t a re involved in military p ro d u c tio n show a defined tendency to m ove in and o u t of the a rea acco rd ing to shifts in the political and econom ic climate. T h u s , in the post-V ietnam period , the largest twenty-five military co n trac to rs in the U SA changed from having som e 40 per cen t o f the ir business in ‘d e fe n c e ’ in the late 1950s to u n d e r 10 per cen t in the m iddle 1970s.48 Such a situation certain ly does not per ta in in the Soviet U nion , but in tha t society decisions taken by political p lanners have at various periods significantly altered investm ent policies in re spec t of military expend itu re .

T hese observations indicate that the ‘military-industrial com plex’ is no t in the ascendancy in the econom ies of the industrialized societies. T h e p roduc tion of ‘d e fen ce ’-related goods and services is a m ajor par t of m ost o f those econom ies and exp en d itu re on them a prim e co n ce rn of m ost governm ents. C onsequen tly , bo th military leade rs and m an u fa c tu re r s a re o f ten able to wield co n s id e rab le in fluence, d irec tly and ind irec tly , o v e r ce r ta in policies. B ut n o t even m ilitary leaders and m an u fa c tu re r s co n s t i tu te a solitary g roup ing , let a lone those w hose m ain invo lvem ents a re with g o v e rn m e n t o r with o th e r sec to rs of eco n o m ic life. T h e very n a tu re of industrialized w ar in a ce rta in sense ensures a diversity of in terests and concerns . In trad it ional states, a militaristic ruling class could d o m in a te the sta te , its con tro l over the m eans of v iolence being d ep e n d e n t upon the m ustering of solidery ra the r than upon their sway over production . T h e m ean s of waging industrialized w ar necessita te re liance upon a broad productive infrastructure. But just as it has been rem arked of politics tha t ‘in capita lism the do m in an t class does n o t ru le ’, so also it could be ad d ed tha t it does no t m ak e war. So far as eco n o m ic factors are c o n c e rn e d , it is u n d o u b ted ly the case in the m o d e rn w orld tha t m ilitary ex p en d itu re can help g en e ra te favourab le conditions of p ro d u c tio n bo th fo r m an u fac tu re rs and for an overall national econom y. But — quite apa rt from the



un accep tab le functionalis t cast o f an a rg u m en t th a t suggests tha t w ha tever is the case h appens because of a beneficial end it secures — the conclusion ca n n o t be draw n from this th a t such factors d o m in a te o th e r influences. O n the co n tra ry , the military expend itu res of the co n tem p o ra ry nation-states have to be seen as mainly b ound up with their political involvem ents within the global nation-sta te system. T o be sure , it is n o t at all easy to d iscern w h ere ec o n o m ic in terests o r co n c e rn s leave off and specifically political ones begin. But tha t is no t the sam e th ing at all as the claim th a t no distinctions can be d raw n be tw een them , o r tha t o n e in som e general sense underlies the o ther.

Especially in the tw o super-pow ers and o th e r nuc lea r sta tes, the m o d ern military has access to des truc tive capabilities on a s tu p en d o u s scale. T h e m ateria l wealth p ro d u ced in the industria lized coun tries is so im m ense, co m p ared with even the largest of t raditional sta tes, that even the use of a small p ro por tion of available re sources can g en e ra te prodigious military strength . M oreover, in m ost areas of the w orld, the military confron t a lready largely pac if ied popu la t ions . In co ns ider ing m ilitary in terven tion ’ in politics, there fo re , th e re is som e sense in posing

the question , W hy are governm en ts everyw here in the m o d ern w orld no t ‘military g o v ern m en ts ’? For, as F in e r rem arks , ‘T h e arm ed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian o rgan isa tions : a m ark e d super io r ity in o rg an isa tio n , a highly em otionalised symbolic s tatus, and a m onopoly of arms. T hey form a prestigious co rp o ra t io n o r O rde r , enjoying overw helm ing superiority in the m eans of applying force. T h e w onder, therefore , is no t why this rebels against its civilian m asters bu t why it ever obeys th em .’49 T h e answ er F iner goes on to p rovide is m o re or less the sam e as m ine, a l though I shall deve lop it in term s of the them es and co n cep ts of this book.

T w o e lem en ts have to be sep a ra ted in considering the n a tu re of m o d ern m ilitary rule. O n e is how far m ilitary personnel com pose , o r a re the do m in an t part of, the h igher councils of governm en t; the o th e r is how far the m onopoly of the m eans of vio lence which the a rm ed forces, to ge ther with the police, enjoy is used d irectly to sustain adm inistrative pow er. W hile it is the fo rm er issue tha t has ten d ed to b rook large in the li te ra ture co n ce rn ed with military ‘in te rv en tio n ’ in politics, it is the la tter that is in som e m ain respects m ore significant. T h o se governm ents

in which military leaders have a prim e role m ay o ften be, bu t are no t necessarily, ones in which the m onopoly of the m eans of v io lence is extensively used in a repressive way.

A m o d ern arm y, as F iner points ou t, is in a ce r ta in sense a m icrocosm of the state as a w hole .50 T h e a rm ed forces possess their own specialized systems of supply, engineering, c o m m u n ica tions and education . In countries of a low level o f industrialization, they may be m ore advanced organizationally and technologically than the civil sec to r and m ay consequen tly be used to mobilize re so u rces fo r e c o n o m ic d ev e lo p m en t. But in industr ia lized societies the a rm ed forces bo th tend to be sepa ra ted from the rest o f the popu la tion in virtue of their specialized training, as a distinct ‘p rofessional’ g roup and , a t the sam e tim e, are d e p e n d en t upon a variety of p roduc tive and adm inistrative resources which they ca n n o t directly con tro l . A dm inistrative specialization is one factor inhibiting military direction of governm ent o r the econom y, the s trong p ressure tow ards polyarchy an o ther . ‘P rae to r ian s ta tes ’ a re rarely if ever wholly governed solely by military leaders in their h igher councils , let a lone in the m ore executive levels of adm inistrative au thority . Military governm en ts have usually only m anaged to maintain som e degree of stability in their com position and their ru le w here they have acknow ledged rec ip roca l re la tions of polyarchy and have legitimized their position by successfully m oboliz ing the su p p o r t o f m ajo r segm ents of the sub jec t popu la tion . P erlm utte r 's th reefo ld typology of military regimes is useful h e re .51 W ha t he calls an ‘a rb itra to r regim e ' is a m o d e of gov ern m en t in which the h ead q u ar te rs of the a rm ed forces is taken over by a cabal o f officers and w here this g ro u p shares p ow er with civilian political au thorities . T h e military leadersh ip ‘a rb itra tes ' policy decisions taken by those au thorit ies by broadly overseeing th em , but w ithou t a t tem pting directly to take the reins of governm ent. This type tends to be unstab le , as e i ther the political sec to r tends effectively to regain pow er o r the military leadership seeks increasingly to con tro l policy-making. In the second type, the ‘ru ler reg im e’, a military council is es tablished to d irectly con tro l the executive with, how ever, the h ead q u ar te rs being co m p o sed of ‘non-po li t ica l’ officers. Such a fo rm of g o v e rn m e n t can be m o re en d u r in g , bu t only if it gains a considerable m easure of popu lar legitimacy. T h e m ore it achieves such legitimacy, the m ore it b eco m es en m esh ed in an adm in is tra



tive o rd e r d is t inc t from th e m ilitary sp h e re th ro u g h w hich governm en ta l co n tro l was o b ta ined . H ence it tends to devolve into a third type, the ‘party-arm y reg im e’, o r in to a pure ly civil adm inis tra tion . T h e party-arm y regim e is a military d ic ta to rsh ip , in which the military leader, su p p o r ted by the high co m m an d in the h ead q u ar te rs , fu r the rs a military party th a t dom inates the loftiest councils o f the state. T h e ruling party nevertheless has to acqu ire a strong level o f po p u la r support for the system to show any sort o f stability. T h is is difficult to ach ieve, especially w here the d ic ta toria l e lem en t is m arked . In such c ircum stances , the military m ust constan tly ‘p a tro l’ the society , becom ing the main policing agency, but only tem porarily being ab le to con ta in the oppositional m ovem en ts that develop.

W e can derive from this analysis the following generalized conclusions. T h e s truc tu ra l basis for the exis tence of military g o v e rn m en ts in T h ird W orld s ta tes is th e ir re la tive lack of dev e lo p m en t of in ternal adm inistrative co-ord ina tion , co m p ared with the m ore industrialized societies. B ecause they o ften are in a significant sense ‘state-nations’, most such states lack the degree of cen tra lized adm inistrative in tegra tion achieved in the W estern nation-state . C o m p ared with traditional s tates, the military forces nonethe less face substantially pacified populations. T h e m ore successful th e m ilitary is in ‘g o v ern ing ’, h ow ever — w h ere ‘successful governing’ m eans that the state apparatus is increasingly able to influence the day-to-day activities of the m ass of the p opu la t ion — th e m o re likely it is to su ccu m b to po lyarch ic pressures. In First an d S econd W orld states, those pressures tend to be all-enveloping. T h e military may step into the ‘political a r e n a ’ in various ways, bu t ch ron ic military g o v ern m en t is m ore o r less a con trad ic tion in terms. T h e most co m m o n d irect relation be tw een the m ilitary and g o v e rn m e n t tends to be via the po lyarch ic appeal a po p u la r military leader m ay secure . But this is no t military rule; it is the use of the sym bolic trappings of military leadership to g en e ra te political legitimacy in a po lyarch ic setting.

T h e issues ra ised by the ex is tence of the m o d ern military m ust concern not just the distinction betw een civil and military regimes, bu t the use o f force in the process o f governing. As L uckham says, th e re is no sho rtage of s ta tes in which ‘civil liberties have been cur ta iled , the m ed ia b ro w b ea ten , t rad e unions deprived of

th e right to strike, o p p o n en ts of the regim e repressed . . . be they formally u n d e r civilian governm en ts o r u n d e r the military and w h e th e r the regim e is of a conservative o r progressive political te n d e n c y ’.52 W h a t is involved h e re is an assoc ia tion o f the curtailing of citizenship rights, the co n cen tra t io n of ce r ta in types of surveillance activity, and the system atic use of force based on the s ta te ’s m onopoly of the m eans of violence. I shall argue subsequen tly tha t in such re la tions can be d iscerned the origins of to ta litarianism — a p h en o m en o n specific to the m odern state . As this co m m en t indicates, how ever, tendenc ies tow ards to talitarian pow er do no t derive from the role of the military a lone, o r even of the military com bined with the police. S ince this is a m a t te r I shall take up in the final ch a p te r , let m e tu rn at this po int to a considera tion of the world military order.

T h e re a re th ree key institu tional d im ensions of th e world military o rd e r today: super-pow er hegem ony: the arm s trade ; and systems of military alliance. T h ese each re la te quite directly to o n e an o th e r , since the super-pow ers no t only have the most powerful military p resen ce bu t also d o m in a te the arm s t rad e and have co n s tru c ted global systems of alliance, o ften involving the military train ing of the arm ies of allied s ta tes .53 In the Lend-Lease P rogram m e initiated during the S econd W orld W ar, the T ru m a n D oc tr ine th a t followed the W ar, and the M cN am ara reform s, the USA began to in tegra te military aid with the forging of a global security netw ork. A ccura te statistics on the arms t rade are difficult to co m e by bu t w hat is c lea r is the increasing co m m erce in w eaponry be tw een the industrialized and T h ird W orld coun tries , som e two-thirds of such co m m erce now moving in this d irec tion .54 A high p ro p o r t io n of this consists o f m ajor w eapons systems, ra th e r th an small arm s and su p p o r t eq u ip m en t .55 In the period just af te r th e S econd W orld W ar, m uch of the w eaponry ex por ted to T h ird W orld states was of kinds being phased ou t of the US arm ed forces. But today, even in the field of the m ost sophisticated w eapons systems, som e T h ird W orld countries possess equipm ent as advanced as th a t of the A m erican military. W h ereas US policy in term s of d efence transfers form erly co n c en tra te d up o n states bo rdering the Soviet U nion , increasingly arm s transfers have been m ade to any states n o t directly tied by trea ty to the Soviets. Several lead ing W es te rn industr ia l pow ers a re m a jo r arm s expor te rs and have m ain ta ined th e capacity to p ro d u ce advanced



military technology . But they are also heavily d ep e n d en t u p o n US m ilitary supplies for ce r ta in basic types of ad v a n ced equ ipm en t. T h e USSR is easily the second largest arm s ex por te r , a lthough lagging som e way beh ind the U SA : the U SA supplies arm s to som e seventy T h ird W orld coun tries , the Soviet U n ion to th irty-two.56 Som eth ing like a th ird of Soviet arm s transfers go to its allies in the W arsaw Pact. T h e two main p ac t systems, in fact, consum e nearly th ree -quar te rs of co m b in ed w orld military expenditure .

H ow ever, a considerab le n u m b e r o f coun tr ie s ou ts ide the main industrialized states are also p ro d u ce rs of ad v an ced w eapons systems, for them selves and as exporters , with o thers curren tly seeking to follow the sam e course. Particu lar ly im p o rtan t is the po ten tia li ty of these s ta tes for th e co n s tru c t io n of n u c lea r w eapons. A lthough th ere a re only six coun tr ie s know n to have exp loded a n u c lea r dev ice , th e re a re m an y m o re th a t have separab le p lu ton ium sufficient to build n u c lea r w eap o n ry .57 T h e Non-Proliferation T rea ty of 1968 bans the transfer of n u c lea r w eapons by nuc lea r s tates to o thers and has been signed by over 1(X) coun tries , a l though a g ro u p of governm en ts have refused to be signatories. T h e trea ty does no t of course b ar n u c lea r w eapons for s tates tha t a lready possess them and does no t p reven t the dissemination of nuclear technology and materials for non-military uses. It is mainly because reprocessing o r en r ich m en t m eth o d s m ake it possible to convert the waste p ro d u c ts from n u c lea r genera ting plants into w eapons th a t such w eaponry is likely to be available soon to a range of states. N uclear reac to rs a re already e ither in o p e ra t io n o r in the p rocess o f being built in 48 of the 106 m em b er sta tes of the In te rn a t io n a l A tom ic Energy A gency .58

Bilateral and unilatera l military trea ties have supplied a new d im ension to the in terna tional division of labour, s ince they increasingly go along with co -o p era tio n in the tra in ing and recru itm ent of military personnel and the deve lopm en t of military technology. T h e global system of alliances built up by the U SA in tegrates these various activities. N A T O , the Rio T rea ty in Latin A m erica , S E A T O in South-East Asia (subsequently dissolved) and A N Z U S with A ustra lia an d New Z ea lan d , w ere designed to form an encircling chain of trea ties across the world. T o the coun tr ies thus involved the U SA has since the S econd W orld W ar p rov ided som e $80,000 million in assistance fo r military p ro jec ts

in the form of loans or g ran ts .59 U n d e r these and o th e r trea ties the U SA has m ade available m any kinds of train ing personnel. It has been es tim ated tha t in the late 1960s, in T h ird W orld coun tries a lone, th e re w ere A m erican military advisers in co n tac t with 88 military es tab lishm ents .60 Soviet military assistance is, so far, m u ch less and less w idespread too. T h e Soviets have focused a t ten t ion up o n E astern E u ro p e and upon a few strategically im p o rtan t clients, particularly in the M iddle East, but to these they have prov ided very large stocks of arm am ents .

It is in this th ird sense — the world-wide diffusion of the m eans of waging industrialized w ar — that we live today in ‘military socie ties’. T h e re is thus som e substance , given a n u m b e r of s trong qualifications, to the n ineteenth-century thesis of the rep lacem ent o f military societies by ones based upon industrialism o r econom ic exchange relations m ore generally. T h e m ore highly industrialized a s tate is, an d the m o re unified its adm inistrative system, the less it tends to be the case e i ther tha t p roduc tion for military ends p red o m in a te s over o th e r sec tors , o r tha t d irec t military ru le can be sus ta ined save in sho rt- te rm periods. U n fo r tu n a te ly and unhappily these limitations upon the scope of military pow er do n o t in them selves imply the im m inence of a world w ithout war. O n the co n tra ry , the co m b in ed sp read of industrialism and of the nation-s ta te system has served to ensure tha t virtually every s tate across the g lobe now possesses a rm ed strength far in excess of th a t of any trad it ional em pire .

T h a t the world military o rd e r is in fluenced by capitalistic m echan ism s th e re is no d o u b t . But to suppose th a t it is explicable wholly o r even prim arily as an expression of the g lobal involvements of capitalist en terprise is plainly foolish. T h e na tions ta te is th e p r im e vehic le of political o rgan iza t ion in the co n tem p o ra ry w orld, recognized as holding legitimate m onopoly of the m eans of v iolence by its own subject popu la tion and by o th e r nation-states. As the possessor of the m eans of waging industr ia lized w ar, in a global co n tex t o f the con tinu ing applica tion of sc ience to th e ad v an cem en t of military techno logy , the s tate partic ipa tes in and fur thers a generalized p rocess of militarization within the world system as a whole. W h e th e r this can at som e fu tu re point be co n ta in ed , o r will ev en tu a te in a m ore frightful conflic t than e i ther of the p reced ing W orld W ars is, of course , still com plete ly u nde te rm ined .


Nation-States in the Global State System

10

W h at has m ad e th e na t ion -s ta te ap p a ren t ly irresistible as a political form from the early n ine teen th cen tu ry to the present- day? F rom the s ta te system th a t was o n ce o n e of the peculiarities of E u ro p e th e re has deve loped a system of nation-states covering the g lobe in a ne tw ork of national com m unities . W hereas for the preceding seven o r eight thousand years there were several overall political forms existing in uneasy re la tionship with o n e an o th e r , now there is only o n e , how ever im p o rtan t the sub-categories which can be d istinguished within it. W hile th e re m ay be new types of imperialism and dom inance by large states, the traditional imperialist s ta te has d isap p ea red from the face of the ea rth . T h o se societies in which hum an beings have lived for all but a fraction of the ex is tence of h u m an k in d — tribal societies — have been e i ther des troyed o r abso rbed into larger social entities. T w o processes have, above all, been responsible for p roduc ing these ex trao rd in a ry changes , th e g lobal conso lida t ion o f industrial capitalism and the global ascendancy of the nation-state . T h e two are closely in tertwined, but it is a fundam ental mistake to conflate them .

In outline , it is not difficult to explain the universal scope of the nation-state in th e m o d ern world. T h e re are th ree m ain types of factors involved, only o n e of which is intrinsically co n n e c ted with the sp read of industrial capitalism . T h e first is the com bination of industrial and military pow er originally developed in the European nation-state. R a th e r than p rom oting peaceful eco n o m ic advance , industrialism was from the beginning m arr ied to the ar ts o f war. No s ta te th a t did n o t possess military forces ab le to use th e new o rgan iza tional fo rm s and th e new w eap o n ry cou ld h o p e to w ithstand ex ternal a t tack from those that could m uster such

forces. T h e second fac to r is the vast expansion of the adm in is tra tive pow er of the state , which I have argued is o n e of the m ain definitive features of the nation-state. Only with such an extension of au thorita tive resources does it b eco m e possible to c o n c en tra te th e alloca tive re so u rces u p o n w hich a flourishing m o d ern econom y depends. T h e he igh tened adm inistrative pow er of the na tion-s ta te is necessary n o t only to co n so lid a te re so u rces internally, bu t to cope with the vast international political network of re la tions in w hich all m o d ern states are involved with o thers . T h e third influence, o r ra th e r , set o f influences, co n cern s a series of con tingen t historical deve lopm en ts tha t c a n n o t be derived from general traits a t t r ib u ted to nation-states, but which have nonetheless decisively in fluenced the tra jec to ry of dev e lo p m en t o f the m o d ern world.

T h ese include, as s tressed previously, the period of relative p eace in E u ro p e dating from the trea ties of 1815. T h e am bition of N apoleon to c rea te a E u ro p e an ‘super-state ' which, if successfully es tab lished , might have b ec o m e som eth ing like a t rad it ional cen tra lized bu reau c ra t ic em pire , cam e to nothing. T h e hundred years following 1815 was a tim e in which a successful ba lance of pow er was m ain ta ined in E u ro p e , d is tu rbances of which w ere for the m ost p a r t con ta ined by diplom acy. This w ent to g e th e r with an acce le ra t ion of technologica l innovation in w eaponry , m ade possible by industrialism and s tim ulated by capitalism , which allowed the E u ro p ean pow ers a virtually u n tram m elled m astery of the rest o f the world. Equally im portan t , how ever, was formal recognition of the au to n o m y and ‘b o u n d ed n ess ’ of the n a t io n state , m ad e in the treaties following the First W orld W ar. If a new and form idably th rea ten ing pa t te rn of war was es tablished at this t ime, so was a new pa tte rn of ‘p e a c e ’. W hile E u ro p e was fatally destabilized by the repara tions fo rced upon G e rm an y , this was effectively the first point at which a reflexively m o n ito red system of nation-states cam e to exist globally. T h e poin t is no t so m uch the ack now ledgem en t of any particu la r s ta te boundar ies , but recognition of the authenticity of the nation-state as the legitimate a rb i te r of its ow n ‘in te rn a l ’ affairs. T h e s e d o c tr in e s w ere su b seq u en tly ren ew ed in the a l te red in te rn a tio n a l co n tex t following the term ination of the S econd W orld W ar. Y a lta is the symbol of those acco rds th a t gave recogn ition to the hegem ony

256 Nation-States in the G lobal State System

Nation-States in the G lobal State System 257

of ce rta in of the larger pow ers within th e global nation-s ta te system and formally ac cep ted the exis tence of socialist n a t io n states as au th en t ic m em b ers of tha t system.

The Nation-State and the Invention of'International Relations'

T h e d o c tr ine o f the ba lance of pow er was the an tec ed en t of the co n cep t and p rac t ice of in terna tional re la tions, of which it also b ecam e a substan tive part. W hile no t provid ing the nam e of an academ ic discipline, it was from early on bo th a descrip tion of a reality and a set o f ideas applied reflexively to help const i tu te the political cond itions it d e sc r ib ed .1 ‘Balance o f p o w e r’, as applied to the E u ro p ean s ta te system, is b e t te r u n d e rs to o d less as an ac tua l equilibrium of streng th than a sh ared policy ad o p ted by states that only conditionally recognized each o th e rs ’ sovereignty. It supplied a set o f principles guiding foreign policy acco rd ing to w hat w ould today be called ‘realist’ tenets . In this sense o n e can agree with M o rg en th au ’s s ta tem ent that ‘the in ternational balance of pow er is only a par ticu la r m anifesta tion of a general social p r inc ip le to which all socie ties c o m p o sed of a n u m b e r of au to n o m o u s units ow e the au to n o m y of the ir c o m p o n en t par ts .’2 T h e b a lan ce of pow er h ad its theoris ts bo th in the various congresses tha t a p p o r t io n e d te rr i to ry in E u ro p e and in a pro liferation of academ ic texts from the seven teen th cen tu ry onw ards (some of the early ones being inspired by Classical examples). Although they varied in their scepticism about w he ther any degree of real equilibrium cou ld be m ain ta ined , o r even achieved , m ost clearly recognized the idea of the ba lance of pow er to be a regulative notion of policy in an arena of com peting sovereign states.

V o n G e n tz ’s Fragments Upon the Balance o f Power in Europe (1806) is a g o o d exam ple . T h e ‘states system of E u ro p e ’ can only exist, he says, in virtue of ‘co m m o n exertions’ of its m em b ers .3 E ach m ust co n tr ib u te tow ards the shared end of ensuring tha t no par ticu la r o n e b eco m es able to collectively co e rce the o thers ; but the m an n e r in w hich this th em e is deve loped m akes it ap p a ren t th a t th e m ain em phasis is u p o n the m u tu a l recogn it ion of sovereignty in a dangerous political environm ent. ‘T h e state which

is n o t p rev en ted by any ex ternal consideration from oppressing a w eaker , is always, how ever w eak it m ay be, too strong , fo r the in terest o f the w hole .’4

A lthough it is o ften cons idered tha t the d o c tr ine of the ba lance o f p ow er was tran sfe rred m o re o r less u n to u c h e d from the E u ro p ean s ta te system to the global s ta te system conso lida ted a f te r th e F irst W o r ld W a r , th e re w ere in fact s ignificant innovations in th e newly re fo rm ed world system . T h e m ost obvious m ateria l d ifferences, of course , tu rn on the new role assum ed by th e U SA in w orld politics, to ge ther with the existence of th e fledgling Soviet U n ion as th e ‘nega tive p re s e n c e ’ at Versailles. T h e A m erican influence upon the shaping of the new global o rd e r was both pervasive and p ro found , in som e part rep resen ting an a t tem p ted inco rpora t ion of US consti tu tional prescrip tions globally ra th e r than a con tinuation of the balance o f pow er doctrine . T h e League of Nations proved to be so ineffectual in the face of th e tensions even tua ting in the S econd W orld W ar that there is a s trong tem pta t ion to define it as a m inor irre levancy in world affairs. But the League rep resen ted an expression of an acknow ledged need for the reflexive m onitor ing o f a world-wide system of s tates. Like the U n ited N ations afte rw ards, it was notab ly im practica l as a m eans of m aintaining global security. But this very fact rested upon a deep com m itm ent to individual s ta te sovereignty , thus fu r the ring ra th e r than dim inishing the p rim acy of th e na tion-s ta te as the universal political form of the cu r ren t era.

Both th e League of N ations and the U nited N ations w ere mainly the result o f A m erican though t and planning. T h e British G o v e rn m en t was the only o n e am ong the E u ro p ean nations to p lay an ac tive ro le in th e d ra f t ing o f th e ch a r te rs of bo th organizations. Early in 1918 the British p rem ier s ta ted it to be one o f his co u n try ’s aims to ‘seek the c rea tion of som e in terna tional o rganisa tion to limit the b u rd en of a rgum ents and to diminish the d an g e r o f w a r ’; and L ord P h il l im o re ’s co m m itte e to o k the initiative in form ulating a d ra ft for the League of N ations abou t th ree m on ths la ter .5 H ow ever, W ilson’s concep tions p rov ided the founda tion of the subsequen t Versailles m eetings. Of course , in emphasiz ing the sovereignty of the nation-state , the Versailles congress m erely in large par t co n ced ed the existence of an already existing o rd e r of global pow er. But it also he lp ed ensure tha t it



w ould b ec o m e a genu inely universal politica l form in the co n tem p o ra ry w orld , bo th by th e n a tu re o f th e global reflexive m onito r ing which it ad v o ca ted and fu r th e red , and by its m ore substantive geopolitical prescriptions. T h e exclusion of the Soviet U nion conf irm ed the rift o p e n e d up by the 1917 R evolu tion in the s ta te system, la te r to b eco m e so m om en tous . In D ecem b er 1918 Lloyd G eo rg e h ad ra ised th e ques tion of Soviet pa r tic ipa tion in th e p e a c e ta lks at a m ee tin g of the W es te rn prem iers . He expressed su p p o r t for Soviet involvem ent in the talks but was the only leading figure to do so; C lem enceau was the m ost forcible o p p o n e n t of including th e Soviets and had little difficulty eventually in persuading the o th e r delegates to accep t his position. W ilson did, how ever, m ak e an initiative to a t tem p t to halt the Russian civil w ar and Allied troops in Russia w ere gradually w ithdraw n.6

W ilson’s F o u r teen Points w ere fo rm ula ted in the con tex t of w idespread revulsion against the en o rm o u s loss of life in the W ar. T h e W ar began as a limited d ispu te am ong the E u ro p ean powers, en te red into with en thusiasm , few having any idea e ither about the dimensions the conflict would assume o r abou t the destructive con seq u en ces of industrialized a rm ed struggle. It en d ed with a s trong generalized reac tion against ‘m ilitarism ’, accen tu a te d by the views of the A m erican leadership. T h e treaties and the League of N ations w ere thus judged by their initiators very largely in term s of how far they w ould act to p reven t fu tu re o u tb reak s of military conflict. In this they p roved to be a ca lam itous failure. T h e ir longer-term effects w ere highly im p o rtan t , how ever, in consolidating co ncep tions of national sovereignty as the ‘na tu ra l ' political cond ition of h u m an k in d , via a par ticu la r in te rp re ta tion of the sovereignty —citizenship —nationalism relation. This was the most significant effect o f the ‘new system of law and justice ' am ong states that Wilson w an ted to achieve. It is im p o rtan t to see that ‘W ilsonian ism ’ was a cr it ique of the do c tr in e of the ba lance of pow er as the m ain g u a ran to r of sovereignty, em phasiz ing the n eed to ex tend th e c o n c ep t o f citizenship to apply to m em bersh ip of the global com m unity of nation-states. ‘W e [ie. nations] are all par tic ipan ts , w h e th e r we w ould o r not, in th e life of the world. T h e in terests of all nations a re o u r own also. W e are par tne rs with the r e s t . . . citizens of the w orld .’7

T h e F o u r teen Poin ts leg it im ated the co n c ep t of sovereignty as

a universally applicab le o n e in several respects. T h ey recongized th e im p o rtan ce of nationalism and assoc ia ted regions of ‘cultural identity ' as the basis for the fo rm ation of nation-states (a lthough th e re su ltan t te rr ito r ia l a l loca tions p roved usually far from h o m o g en eo u s in this regard ). T h u s th e B alkans w ere to be reo rd e red acco rd ing to established lines of ‘national alleg iance’ and the op p o r tu n ity for au to n o m o u s dev e lo p m en t was to be ac c o rd e d th e peop les of A ustria-H ungary . T h e se provisions, to ge ther with those applied to the O tto m an E m pire , m ark the final d ism em bering of the o lder type of imperial system in the W est. T h e em phasis upon the ‘impartial ad ju s tm en t’ of colonial c laim s, in such a way th a t th e in terests o f the p o p u la t io n s co n c e rn e d w ere to be m ad e consistent with self-governm ent, o p en e d the way to s ta teh o o d — in principle and increasingly in p rac t ice — to those areas u n d e r E u ro p ean tu telage. An explicit e lem en t of such stipulations was tha t the no tion of ba lance of pow er be rep laced by one of the in dependen t unity o f each state , consensually ac c e p te d by th e global co m m u n ity of s ta tes. Assessed in term s of its capability of avoiding war, Wilsonianism m ight ap p ea r — and has d o n e so to many h istorians8 — as irrem ediably u topian . But it was m uch closer to the ‘realist’ ap p ro ach tha t s ta tes’ leaders la ter ten d ed to follow than might seem , recognizing that the E u ro p ean ‘equ ilib rium ’ could not be applied globally, instead conced ing the au tonom y of nation-states as the necessary cen tre s o f co n so lid a ted adm in is tra tive and military power. Not even th e s trongest s ta te could , in principle , prevail over the opposition of multiple states acting collaboratively. W hen Wilson spoke of the Versailles T rea ty as a set of agreem ents ‘in tended to destroy one system and substitu te a n o th e r ’,9 he was hardly guilty of hyperbole , how ever m uch subsequen t history d iverged from his aspirations.

T h a t W ilson’s hopes for an ep o ch of peace and freedom w ere dashed , to a considerab le ex ten t by conflicts resulting from the very states given new au to n o m y in E u rope and elsew here , in no way com prom ises the im pact of Wilsonianism up o n th e new global state-system. T h e re s tru c tu red territoria l divisions w ere in p rac tice , ‘a jum ble of principle and exped iency’.10 T h e fo rm er had to su ccu m b to the la tter in U p p e r Silesia, for exam ple , and in the T yro l, since the o u tco m e w ould o therw ise have unduly favoured G erm an y and A ustria respectively. T h e new states recognized



th rough the covenan t of th e League of N ations en larged ra th e r than d im inished th e possibility of a rm ed conflic t in so far as they virtually all tu rn ed what had previously been hostilities betw een minorities into hostilities be tw een states. T h e transfo rm ation of nationalistic m inorities into sovereign entities gave their leaders the military s trength to co n tem p la te schem es of ac tion which before would not have been options at all. Lloyd G eorge observed that the peace trea ties w ere never given a c h a n ce to work by the ‘m iscellaneous and unim pressive army of second-ra te s ta te sm en ’ w ho a t tem p ted to co p e with th em ." But at th e sam e tim e he quite rightly po in ted o u t tha t no previous trea ty had em an c ip a ted so m any previously subject peop les and th a t the principle o f the au to n o m o u s deve lopm en t o f ‘national socie ties’ was established m uch m ore firmly than it had been before. It is in this re spec t that Wilsonian ideals had such a p ro fo u n d im pact upon the fu r th e r deve lopm en t o f the nation-s ta te system.

I have argued earlier th a t the various congresses involving the E u ro p ean states from the seven teen th cen tu ry onw ards, plus the early deve lopm en t of d ip lom acy, should no t be seen only as a ttem pts to contro l the activities of pre-constitu ted states. R ather, the m odes of reflexive regulation thus initia ted w ere essential to the deve lopm en t of those sta tes as territorially b o u n d ed units. T h e em erg en ce of a reflexively m o n ito red s ta te system has gone h and in h an d with the fo rm a tio n of th e na t ion -s ta te as the do m in an t political system in th e m o d ern w orld. T h is applies also to the period su bsequen t to the First W orld W ar, the ju n c tu re at which the nation-s ta te system becom es a m o re o r less co m p le te o ne , world-wide. T h e League of N ations b ec am e the m ajor focus for the channelling of global p rocesses o f in form ation con tro l just as m uch in te rm s of the inform ational processes and exchange. It b ecam e most p ro m in en t am o n g an expand ing c luster of o rgan izations involved in m onitor ing the global inform ation sources upon which m odern states depend. It was not the condition of existence o f m ost of these organizations, many of which an ted a te it; but it p rov ided an adm inis tra tive cen tre to which m any w ere linked and which he lped stim ulate their fu r ther expansion.

As cases in po in t we m ay tak e the dev e lo p m en t of postal services and in ternational health agencies — two instances am ong a p le th o ra of in te rna tional m odes of o rganization accelera ting since the 1920s. Postal services be tw een th e E u ro p ean states da te

back hundreds of years. In 1505 Franz von Taxis set up a cou r ie r service betw een the cour ts of several o f the E u ro p ean rulers, under tak ing to transm it le tters from Brussels to Innsbruck in five and a half days, to Lyon in four days and to G ra n a d a in fifteen day s .12 Postal trea ties w ere signed betw een m ost of the m ajor E u ro p e an s ta tes in th e s ix teen th and sev e n te en th cen tu r ies , creating a ne tw ork of postal exchange which was bo th com plex and he terogeneous . By th e m iddle of the n in e teen th cen tu ry th e re were som e twelve h u n d re d d ifferent postal ra tes perta in ing in different parts o f E urope . T h e in troduction of the penny post in Britain in 1840 s tandard ized ra tes in that coun try , leading to a t tem pts to re p ro d u ce the p rocess in the rest o f E urope . Som e tw enty years later, the US P os tm aste r con v en ed an in terna tional co n fe ren ce in Paris, at which it was agreed that bilateral trea ties w ere no longer practicab le . An in terna tional postal co m m ittee th e re fo re was established, involving the postal systems of a dozen E u ro p ean coun tr ies and the USA. A fu r ther congress, m eeting in Berne in 1874, had a m uch larger rep resen ta tion of states, setting up the first G enera l Postal U nion and the first In terna tional Postal C onven tion . T h e terr ito r ies of the m em b er states were regarded as a single postal a rea , for which a single paym ent for each item sent would be m ad e , no m a t te r how m any coun tr ie s it traversed. All packages were to be sent at internationally s tandard rates. T h e bu reau established in Berne to tak e charge of these m atte rs was o n e of the first perm anen tly established in terna tional o rganizations, altering its n am e in 1878 to the Universal Postal U nion . N um erous congresses w ere held by th e U nion both in the years leading up to and su bsequen t to the First W orld W ar. How ever, it did no t b ec o m e affiliated to th e L eague of Nations, m ain ta in ing com ple te in d ep en d e n ce until the founding of the U nited N ations, within which it is a ‘Specialized A gency’. It has greatly expanded its activities s ince then.

In the field of hea lth , a t tem p ts at in terna tional coo rd ina t ion da te back only to the n ineteen th century. From 1851 International Sanitary C onferences w ere regularly held, p roposing generalized s tan d a rd s of q u a ran t in e an d o th e r hea lth m easu res . H ealth statistics w ere the prim e co n ce rn of governm en t authorit ies , however. T h e In terna tional H ealth Office set up in Paris in 1908 was mainly devo ted to the collection and distribution of statistical in fo rm ation , co n ce rn in g pu b lic h ea lth legislation in d iffe ren t



countr ies and pa t te rns of d isease transm ission. T h e League of N ations es tab lished its ow n hea lth co m m itte e , the H ealth O rganization . It was initially devo ted to trying to d o cu m en t and ch eck the sp read of in fec tious diseases, pa r ticu la r ly those assuming ep idem ic p ro p o r tio n s in the a f te rm ath of th e W ar. But it steadily ex p an d ed its ac tivities, and th e n u m b e r of s ta tes immediately involved with it also grew, developing in con junction with the In terna t ional H ealth Office, which co n tin u ed to exist independently . Statistical m onito r ing of hea lth pa tte rns w orld wide rem ained the main p reo ccu p a tio n of bo th organizations. W ith the com ing of the UN, the W orld H ealth Organization was set up , originally to carry on the w ork of th e old L eague Health O rganization , but becom ing very m uch m o re com prehensive in the scope and scale of its opera tions. W H O drew up in terna tional sanitary regulations of a wide-ranging sort and initiated campaigns d irec ted against som e of the m ajo r diseases, with considerab le success in respec t o f m alar ia and sm allpox .13

W h e th e r directly adm in is te red by states o r no t, organizations involved in the world system show a very m ark e d increase from the period of the S econd W orld W ar onw ards, as shown in figure 5.

It m ight be tho u g h t tha t what we see em erging here is an increasing m ovem en t tow ards ‘o n e w orld ’, in which the n a t io n s ta te form is likely to b eco m e less and less significant in the face of global pa tte rns of organization. T h e argum ent I seek to present here , how ever, is ra th e r d if fe ren t .14 T h e sovereignty o f the n a t io n sta te , I have suggested , does no t p reced e th e deve lopm en t of the E u ro p ean s ta te system, o r th e transferra l o f th e nation-state system to a global p lane. S ta te authorit ies did no t ho ld large areas of sovereign pow er destined to b eco m e increasingly conf ined by the growing ne tw ork of in terna tional co n n ec tio n s and m odes of in te rd e p en d en c e . On th e co n tra ry , th e d ev e lo p m e n t of the sovereignty of the m o d ern s ta te from its beginnings d epends upon a reflexively m o n i to red set o f re la tions be tw een states. Both th e co nso lida t ion of th e sovereignty o f the s ta te and the universalism of th e nation-s ta te a re b rough t ab o u t th rough the expanded range of surveillance operations permitting ‘international re la t io n s’ to be ca rr ied on . ‘In te rn a t io n a l re la t io n s ’ a re not connec tions set up be tw een pre-established states, which could m ain ta in the ir sovereign po w er w ithout them : they are the basis

Num

ber

of IC

Os

and

stat

es

264 Nation-States in the C lobal State System

Year

Figure 5 Number of intergovernmental organizations in the world system, 1815 —197515

up o n which the nation-s ta te exists at all. T h e period of the burgeon ing o f in terna tional organizations, including the League o f N ations an d th e UN, is no t o n e of th e growing t ran scen d en ce o f the nation-state . It is o n e in which the universal scope of the nation-state was established. As in the case of the E u ro p ean s ta te system , this has co m e ab o u t th ro u g h a m ix tu re of w ar and d ip lom acy . But given the industr ia lization of w ar, w arfare everyw here tends to take on a total ch a rac te r and , in the shape of the W orld W ars, has a ffec ted all s tates in som e way o r ano ther . As a result o f the increasingly in tegra ted n a tu re of the world system, d ip lom acy can no longer be carried on only betw een clusters of states, but in ce rta in basic respects involves them all.

T h e S econd W orld W ar was even m o re devasta ting , in te rm s of lives lost and states involved, than th e First. But it m arks less of a d ram atic transition from previous p a t te rn s of w arfare , in v irtue of the fact of its tem pora l proxim ity to the First W orld W a r and


b ecau se it e x ten d e d r a th e r th an substan tively tran s fo rm ed industrialized war. As P ear to n points ou t , an und ers tan d in g of the im plications of industrialized w ar was very rapidly ach ieved by the leading states following the first world co n f lic t .16 Military streng th cou ld not any m ore be re ck o n ed in te rm s mainly of the possession of a rm am en ts and volum e of t ra in ed soldiery, bu t was seen to d e p e n d u p o n th e industrial capab ilit ies of s tates. C h am b er la in ’s view th a t eco n o m ic p ow er was a d e te r ren t in and of itself m ay have proved e r ro n eo u s , but the re la tion betw een industrial and military might had b eco m e generally accep ted . T h e political and scholarly li te ra tu re on w ar changed . A m ong the m any studies analysing the events of the First W orld W ar, a substantial p ro p o r t io n sought to co n n ec t th e o u tco m es of the conflic t to the overall econom ies o f the co n ten d in g states. T h a t is to say, it b ecam e generally ac cep ted that military streng th tu rned on the m obilization of an industrial econom y as a w hole, not just the putt ing of armies in the field. T h e im plications of this m ad e them selves felt very soon in the S econd W orld W ar. For those involved in industr ia l p ro d u c t io n b e c a m e as re levan t to the c o n d u c t of w ar as the a rm e d fo rces them selves; from the conc lud ing par t o f the First W orld W ar onw ards , u rban areas w ere regarded as necessary military targets in case o f an o u tb reak of hostilities.

A fu r ther im plication co n cern s the in terna tional sphere and s tre tches from the S econd W orld W ar to the present. Military s treng th d ep en d s upon a g rea te r range of allocative resources than can be co n c en t ra te d within th e im m ed ia te adm inistrative purview of any par ticu la r s tate . An industrial eco n o m y , how ever large it might be, is in tegra ted econom ically with a vast reach of in terna tional co n n ec tio n s in the division of labour. H ence no s ta te can s tand alone in term s of its military pow er. But it also follows that the larger s tates will tend to co-ord ina te their own ‘in terna tional spheres of in fluence’ over which hegem ony of a military-industrial kind can be m ain ta ined . T h e significance of the Y alta and P o tsdam ag reem en ts is tha t the two pre-em inent s ta te pow ers — the USA and the Soviet U nion — explicitly ac cep ted the idea o f ‘spheres of in fluence’ while confirm ing at the same time the universalism of s tates’ sovereignty. Full acknow ledgem en t o f th e sovereign au to n o m y of the Soviet U nion by the o th e r m a jo r pow ers is no less im p o r tan t in its c o n se q u en ce s th an

accep tance by the Soviets of the universal ch a rac te r o f the na t ion state . T h e first paragraph of Article T w o of the U n ited N ations ‘is based on th e princip le of the sovereign equali ty of all its M em b ers ’.17 T h e phrase ‘sovereign equali ty ’ ap p e a re d initially in the A m erican d raft o f the Four-Pow er D eclara tion on general security , rep resen t in g essentially a m odified version o f the const i tu tiona lism th a t m a rk e d the W ilsonian p roposa ls of a q u a r te r o f a cen tu ry earlier . T h e ‘equa li ty ’ involved was specifically supposed to be legal ra th e r than factual — the larger pow ers w ere to have special rights, as well as du ties, c o m m e n sura te with the ir superior capabilities. Som e of the smaller s tates ob jec ted to the privileges enshrined in m em bersh ip of the Security Council. T h e D u tch d o cu m en t p re sen ted at D u m b ar to n Oaks insisted th a t ‘All such special privileges and inequalities a re at var iance with the principle of the sovereign equality of peace- loving s ta tes .’ M ore significant E u ro p ean ob jec tions , how ever, w ere vo iced in re spec t o f th e ex tension of th e p r inc ip le of ‘sovereign equality ' to colonial peoples. In the insistence by both US and USSR represen ta tives that s ta te sovereignty should be acco rd ed to co lonized societies is encapsu la ted som e of the main trends of subsequen t global deve lopm en t.

T h e com bina tion of a reflexively m on ito red global system of nation-states, to ge ther with the pre-em inent military-industrial pow er w ielded by the U SA and Soviet U nion , a re the main distinguishing features of th e p resen t period. E ach of the su p e rpow ers has its geopolitically p rox im ate ‘sphere of in fluence’, and each has its diplomatically cu lt ivated connections of dep en d en cy o r alliance across the face of the globe. T h ese involvem ents have very definite consequences for the internal political and econom ic systems of the states involved. But to see them as acting in a o n e way fashion to limit the sovereignty of s ta tes in general w ould be misleading. T h e period since the S econd W orld W ar has seen a considerab le deve lopm en t in the effective au to n o m y of a variety o f sta tes — som e being of very recen t p ro v en an ce — at the sam e tim e as th a t o f o thers has been reduced . F o r reasons I have already m en tioned , these should be seen as linked deve lopm en ts ra th e r than distinct and sep a ra te ones.



Types of Nation-State

M any classifications of m o d ern sta tes exist in the l i te ra tu re of political sc ien ce an d sociology. G iven th a t ‘n a t io n -s ta te ’ is equivalent to ‘soc ie ty ’, it is hard ly surprising th a t ca tegoriza tions should proliferate, since there are as many criteria of classification as th e re are m odes of identifying m ajo r institutions. In the light of the discussion in this and the foregoing chap te rs , how ever, th ree bases of classification suggest them selves as useful. N ation-states exist as entities in a world s ta te system, in which a b ipolar distribution of industrial and military pow er is pre-em inent. O ne m eans of classification, th e re fo re , should be a geo-political o ne , in which the positions of the two leading pow ers supply the poles a ro u n d which th e o th e r s ta tes gravita te . Such a classification suggests the following categories:

1 F o ca l /H eg em o n ic2 A djacen t/Subsid iary3 C en tra l /A ligned4 C en tra l/N on-A ligned5 Periphera l /A ligned6 P eripheral/N on-A ligned .

Only the USA and the USSR — at p resent at least — belong in ca tegory 1. T h ey have a hegem on ic position within their spheres of influence and occupy dom inan t places within the world system, a lthough not in any sense akin to traditional imperial cen tres or to colonial em pires. T h e bipolar ch a rac te r o f the world system does not d a te from Yalta , bu t from a slightly later time. Until a short while af te r Y a lta it seem ed possible th a t the U SA m ight re trea t into its erstw hile isolationism: o r tha t its ro le in world politics w ould be a un ique o n e as the sole possessor of nuc lea r w eapons. Britain was the m ain fron t- runner in pursuing a policy of co n ta in m en t against the Soviet U nion. T h e T ru m a n D oc tr ine o f 1947, in which the A m erican g o v ernm en t assum ed the British responsibilities o f financial aid in G re e c e and T u rk e y and o ffered ass is tance to anti-Soviet reg im es, was o n e w a te rsh ed ; the a t ta in m en t of n u c lea r w eaponry by the U SSR was the o ther . N A T O and th e W arsaw P ac t have given d irec t subs tance to the bipolar division of military pow er. M utua l a c cep tan c e of s ta te

sovereignty as a universal p rinciple , how ever, has m ean t tha t the b ipo lar d is tr ibu tion of p o w er has rem a in ed diffuse in its consequences . W ithin each of the two blocs, all existing n a t io n s ta tes have a d ev e lo p ed adm in is tra t ive au to n o m y , with th e superpow ers no t having a co m p le te nuclea r m onopoly .

Within the main blocs, th ree types of s tate can be distinguished, those falling into ca tegories 2, 3 and 5. E ach focal s ta te has sought to p ro tec t its borders by ensuring tha t ne ighbouring states a re ru led by govern ing au th o r i t ies d ee m e d favourab le to its interests. T h o se coun tries th a t a re physically ad jacen t ten d to be b o th subject to m ore political p ressure than o th e rs and are m ore liable to the th rea t o r ac tuality of military in tervention . T h e Soviet U nion has borders with o th e r m ajo r s tates which for one reason o r an o th e r have b eco m e largely re frac to ry to its influence, m ost par ticularly C hina w hich, for the time being, still belongs in ca tegory 4. But along its E u ro p ean boundar ies it has ranged a series of s tates over which it m ain ta ins a very considerab le sway. T h ese ad jacen t sta tes, a c cep ted effectively by the U SA since 1947 as being within th e Soviet sp h e re of in f luence , are in dependen t m em bers of the U nited Nations, having their own in ternal political adm inis tra tions , policing systems and a rm ed forces. At the sam e time, they are manifestly subsidiary to the Soviet U nion in so far as the ir political o rde rs a re closely tied to th a t o f the USSR and in so far as certa in op tions of institutional re form are b locked . T h e geograph ica l position of the USA m akes it m uch less vu lnerab le to the vagaries of physically proxim ate states. N onethe less , bo th to the north and the sou th , th e re are s tates kep t as far as possible pliable to the in terests of the USA, w h ere s tro n g efforts a re m ad e to inhibit possib le o r ac tua l deve lopm en ts believed to be con tra ry to those interests.

By ‘cen tra l s ta tes ' I m ean those which are ‘seco n d -o rd e r’ in te rm s o f th e ir industria l and m ilitary s tren g th but w hich, nevertheless, are able to sustain a m ajor role in world politics. M any such states, including particularly those of W este rn E urope , a re a ligned with o n e o f th e focal pow ers . T h e y have full sovereignty over m ost of the ir internal affairs and , like th e East E u ro p ean societies, they have their own a rm ed forces at their disposal — but with substantially g rea te r au to n o m y over their d ep loym en t and use. Nonethe less , those which are m em b ers of N A T O and have A m erican bases on their soil a re subject to significant constra in ts up o n their possibilities o f in d ep en d en t



military action . Partly for this reason , som e cen tra l s ta tes have kep t them selves non-aligned, in E u ro p e as well as Asia, the M iddle East and Africa. W h ereas the aligned sta tes form blocs with th e tw o focal s ta tes , co -o rd ina t ing th e ir e c o n o m ic and military policies in par ticu la r , the unaligned states are ‘poly- ce n tr ic ’.18 T h a t is to say, th e fact of their non-a lignm ent gives them — in principle and o ften in p rac t ice — a g rea te r range of flexibility in their policy-making. A lthough there have been efforts on the part o f som e of their m em bers to m ak e them so, the cen tra l non-aligned states do not form a defin ite b loc in world politics.

Finally, peripheral states are those whose industrial and military capabilities are low and which are geographically d is tan t from the focal pow ers. In the case o f p e r ip h e ra l /a l ig n ed s ta tes , w hat m atte rs is d is tance from the focal s ta te with w hich collaborative re la tions a re susta ined , even w here the co u n try in question m ight be close to the o th e r focal s tate . C u b a is a p e r iphe ra l /a l igned s ta te in re la tion to the USSR, a lthough it bo rde rs u p o n the USA. While p e r iphe ra l /a l igned societies m ay be heavily d ep e n d en t econom ically upon o n e o r o th e r focal s ta te , the fact tha t they are no t geographically ad jacen t c rea te s difficulties in sustaining the sam e sort o f co n tro l th a t can be exerted over ad jacen t states. Not all per iphera l s ta tes a re ‘T h ird W o r ld ’ societies econom ically (eg. Iceland).

A geo-political ca tegoriza tion of s ta tes has to be based upon their involvem ent in, and influence over, ‘w orld politics’, tha t is to say processes of political policy fo rm ation and ac tion tha t are global in the ir co n seq u en ces . But na tion-s ta tes m ay also be g ro uped into types in term s of d ivergent m odes of original s ta te form ation . T h e E u ro p e an nation-s ta te — the ‘classical fo rm ’, as it w ere — in m any respects obviously provided a m odel tha t o th e r s tates have followed. But it is equally ev ident that o th e r s tates have not simply recap itu la ted the E u ro p ean experience and in m any cases have b eco m e nation-states in the p rocess of rebelling against E u ro p ean d o m inance . A second b ro ad classification of s ta tes can h ence be m ad e thus:

1 Classical2 Colonized3 Post-Colonial4 M oderniz ing.

Of co u rse the ‘classical n a t io n -s ta te ’ is n o t an in terna lly und iffe ren tia ted category. T h e early established nation-states in E u ro p e ten d ed to develop in w hat w ere then per iphera l areas of th e co n tin en t , along the margins of w hat were previously the m ost co n c en tra te d sec tors of s ta te p o w e r .1'’ A fu r the r wave of s ta te fo rm ation o ccu rred in cen tra l E u rope and in Italy. In very few of these cases was th e re a close co n v e rg en c e be tw een territoria l boundar ies and linguistic o r cultural identity. But, as a w hole, it is the case that the earlier nation-states deve loped w ithou t nationalis t m o v em en ts playing a large ro le in their fo rm a tio n , w h ereas na tionalism did play such a ro le in the establishing of la te r states. T h o se areas tha t inherited co m m o n linguistic tra its from the terr ito r ia l distribution of imperial R om e w ere p rone to show only w eak tendenc ies tow ards nation-state fo rm ation until s tates w ere well-developed elsew here . In th e so- called ‘Lotharing ian-B urgund ian’ zone betw een F ran ce and the G e rm an states, the linguistic divisions hardly ever con fo rm ed to established territoria l boundaries . N either F ran ce n o r Britain, the two instances usually given of a sm ooth co inc idence of ‘n a t io n ’ and ‘s ta te ’, involved linguistically hom o g en eo u s terr itories . T h e linguistic s tandard iza tion ach ieved in F rance in the n ine teen th cen tu ry was probably g re a te r than in any o th e r E u ro p ean state , but th ro u g h o u t the period the centralizing au thorit ies had to co n ten d with resistance in Brittany, O ccitan ia and o th e r regions. T h is having been said, linguistic uniformity linked to a deg ree of cu l tu ra l h o m o g en e i ty can rightly be seen to be d istinctive charac teris t ics of the classical nation-state . T o be sure th e re were, and are , excep tions am ong this g roup o f states, a lthough few like Switzerland, w here o n e language is no t recognized to have prim acy over o thers spoken within the state. Not all n a t io n states that can be p laced in the classical type w ere es tablished in the e igh teen th and n in e teen th cen turies . T h o se set up in E u ro p e and a ro u n d th e margins of E u ro p e following th e W orld W ars (including ex-imperial s ta tes like A ustria o r T u rk ey ) belong in this category . Som e states es tablished earlier, on the o th e r hand , belong ra th e r in the m odern iz ing type (eg. G erm any).

T h e ‘co lonized na tion-s ta te ’ refers to those sta tes set up as a result o f th e m ovem en t of em igran t popu la tions from E u ro p e , for exam ple th e Latin A m erican states, the U SA , C an ad a , Austra lia and , la tterly , Israel. Such states have involved processes o f long



dis tance m igration , those co n c e rn e d being norm ally draw n from he te ro g en eo u s cu ltu res of origin. Established in what w ere by E u ro p ean s tandards thinly se ttled land-areas, they have all been p red ica ted upon the use of fo rce against indigenous groups, o ften e i ther wiping ou t those g roups a ltogether , o r reducing them to a tiny fraction of the overall popu la tion . Several co lonized n a t io n states achieved their s ta tehood initially by fighting wars of national l ibera tion against the m etropo li tan pow ers — as with the U SA against Britain and various of the Latin A m erican states against Spain. It is cha rac te r is t ic of this type of s tate , how ever, tha t such wars w ere c o n d u c te d in th e re latively early stages of s ta te deve lopm en t in E u ro p e , with liberal co n cep tio n s of citizenship and sovereign rights being m o re im p o rtan t than nationalism . T h e fact that fairly hom o g en eo u s national com m unities eventually em erged should not lead us to overlook the con junctions of war, d ip lom acy and acciden t that shaped co lonized nation-states just as m uch as those in the original E u ro p ean con tex t. T h e feasibility o f linking the h e te ro g en eo u s and , at tha t t ime, isolated ex-British colonies into a single s tate was early on d o u b ted even by som e of the main p ro p o n en ts of the A m erican Revolu tion . T h e liberation wars in Latin A m erica were fought by leaders w ho differed widely ab o u t what s ta tes should be set up following their successful resolution. Bolivar and San M artin an tic ipa ted the fo rm ation of large states spann ing whole areas in which several s ta tes w ere in fact eventually es tab lished .20

O th e r co lonized nation-states, no tab ly those originally part o f the British E m pire , ach ieved their in d ep en d en ce by concession from the paren t co u n try — fuelled by nationalis t sen tim ent. M ost colonized states have ach ieved a high deg ree of linguistic and cultura l unity, at the expense of th e shedding by their im m igrants of the traits of their cu ltu res of origin. But m any , like C an ad a or Israel, have large popu la tions of e thn ic m inorities rem ain ing substantially ou ts ide the d o m in an t cu lture . Sou th A frica is a special case, o f course, perhaps worth linking to the o thers above, but in som e ways m ore aptly regarded as a colonial terr itory which has no t yet b eco m e fully ‘post-colonial’. At any ra te , the anti-colonial nationalism of its black majority clearly distinguishes it from the m ost co lonized nation-states, a l though th e re have been m o re m inor m ovem en ts of this type in the USA and th ere a re ce rta in loose affinities with th e F rench in C anada .

Post-colonial and m odern iz ing nation-states generally differ from those in categories 1 and 2 in respec t of having less linguistic and cultural hom ogeneity , a l though this is by no m eans inevitably the case. T h e resu rgence of local nationalism s within the classical na t ion -s ta te has served to d e m o n s t ra te th a t the ‘co lonia l ' exploitation of ethnically d iffe ren tia ted groups is no t con f ined to the externally adm in is te red terr ito r ies of th e E u ro p ean states. H ow ever, in m ost post-colonial nation-states th e re is no sense in which a ‘nat ion ' p recedes the em erg en ce of the s ta te and it is not w ithou t reason tha t such states have o ften b een called state- nations. T h u s it has been re m a rk ed of Black Africa tha t ,

th o u g h we loosely re fe r to th e recen tly c re a te d c o u n trie s o f th a t p a r t o f A frica as ‘n a tio n -sta tes ', an d th e ir p eo p les as ‘new nations ', it is by no m eans c e r ta in th a t such fo rm al a p p e la tio n s have any su b stan ce . D uring the run-up to in d e p en d e n ce , p eo p le in th e W est g rew a c c u s to m e d to reg a rd th e an ti-co lo n ia l m o v e m en ts th e n com ing to p o w er in A frica as v a rian ts o f the g lobal p h en o m en o n of nationalism . . . H ow ever, a f te r som e tw o d e c a d e s o f fo rm al in d e p en d e n ce , it is n o t a t all c le a r how far these e a r lie r exp ressions of n a tio n a lis tic sen tim en ts have su rv ived to b ec o m e the basis o f s ta te fo rm a tio n . N u m ero u s s tu d e n ts o f po litica l ch a n g e in Black A frica to d ay d isp u te th e ex is ten ce o f n a tio n -sta tes in m u ch o f the c o n tin e n t.21

While 1 do no t think it necessary to question the existence of nation-states in Africa o r in o th e r ex-colonial areas, for the states in question are no t of the trad it ional sort, it is obvious enough th a t their origins and ch a rac te r are mostly qu ite d isc repan t from the o th e r types m en tioned so far.

Post-colonial s tates — o r ‘s ta te -na tions’ — are based upon state appa ra tuses originally established by the colonizing societies. As the above quo ta t io n suggests, nationalism has usually p layed an im portan t p a r t in mobilizing social m ovem en ts stim ulating the transition to in d ep en d en t s ta teh o o d . But such forms of na t iona lism have ten d ed to be primarily fostered by elites aspiring to and then holding state power. T h e consolidation of the administrative p ow er of the s ta te has n o t been based , as in the classical and co lonized types, upon the m obiliza tion of internally gene ra ted resources but, ra ther, upon the ‘im ported ’ administrative resources b rough t in from the outside. T h is has p laced the p ro p o n e n ts of



nationalis t symbols in a paradox ica l position, som etim es having profoundly schismatic consequences for internal political organization. F o r na tionalis t sen t im en ts re la te to a m yth of origins supplying a psychological focus for the unity of the political com m unity ; bu t any in te rp re ta t io n of origins th a t has co n c re te re fe rence to the past is likely to s tim ulate as m u ch tension as h a rm o n y , b ecau se of the diversity of cu l tu ra l d iffe rences charac teris tically involved.

In bo th A frica and Asia, symbols and m o vem en ts that are d iscernably pro to-na tionalis t existed in som e regions sub jec ted to colonial rule. T h u s , at ab o u t the turn of the n in e teen th cen tu ry , black settlers from N orth A m erica in F ree tow n , S ierre L eone , w ere advocating a d istinctive form of ‘A fricanism ' linked to the p rom otion of rights of se lf-determ ination. A similar m ovem en t o cc u rre d in L iberia .22 H ow ever, such exam ples are relatively few and far betw een and mostly do n o t have any d irec t connec tions with types of nationalism developing in the later colonial and post-colonial periods. In Africa, Somalia , L eso tho and Swaziland are the only partia l excep tions to the generaliza tion tha t the popu lations of A frican states are co m p o sed of a multiplicity of h e te ro g en eo u s cultura l and e thn ic groupings — in this re spec t certain ly exhibiting a fea tu re som ew hat resem bling traditional s tates. It has been ca lcu la ted tha t there a re m ore th an two hu n d red culturally distinct g roups in Nigeria, although the th ree largest o f these m ak e up som e two-thirds of the total population . Even G am b ia , w hose popu la t ion only n u m b ers ab o u t half a million, has eight distinct e thn ic g roups .23

By m odern iz ing nation-states I m ean those which, even if they may have experienced d irec t colonialism, have successfully m oved from a trad it ional s ta te to a m o d ern o n e mainly th rough in terna l process of political m obilization. Again th e re a re som e parallels in African history. At the sam e period th a t Maiji Japan was undergoing the transfo rm ations that c rea ted a m o d ern sta te , s imilar a t tem p ts at s tate dev e lo p m en t w ere being m ad e in W est Africa. T h u s th e Fanti o f the G o ld Coast an d a g roup of the Y o ru b a of south-w est N igeria in d ep en d en t ly set u n d e r way en d e av o u rs to c r e a te a m o d e rn s ta te a p p a ra tu s . T h e m ost ce leb ra ted case is tha t of the trad it ional em pire of Abyssinia in the east o f th e con tinen t . H e re the ruling g roups sought to c o o rd in a te the s ta te an d develop its military po ten tia l th rough

policies designed to increase adm inistrative cen tra lization and cultura l unity. A n imperial arm y successfully defea ted an Italian fo rce at the tu rn of the cen tu ry . H ow ever the victory p roved to be a transitory o n e and it was only w here existing trad it ional states w ere e i ther too large, o r to o rem o te , o r for som e o th e r reason escaped d irec t E u ro p ean rule, tha t m odern iz ing nation-states successfully em erged .

T h e institu tional traits o f nation-states can be ca tegorized in term s of the fou r clusterings of institutions d istinguished earlier. T h u s we can ca tegorize states in term s of w here they fall on these dim ensions:

Industria lized econom y + —Capitalistic p ro d u c tio n + —Political in tegra tion + —Military rule — +

I

T h e classical nation-s ta te can be located on the left-hand of the tw o co lum ns. It has its origins in the absolutist s ta te bu t com es into being in deve loped form only with the advent of industrial

v capitalism. On the basis of a strongly deve loped adm inistrative ap p a ra tu s , it is ab le to ach ieve a high d eg ree of politica l in tegra tion within its borders . As a result o f in ternal pacification— itself d irec tly re la ted to industrial cap ita lism as a highly d istinctive fo rm of class dom ina tion — the military mainly ‘points ou tw ards ', tow ards o th e r states. T h e re is a sharp division betw een civil an d military au th o r i ty , with the a rm e d fo rces being ‘p ro fess ionally ’ c o n c e rn e d only with the p ro se cu t io n of the business of war. S om e co loniz ing sta tes fit this p a t te rn (for instance, the USA, C an ad a o r Australia) but o thers do not. T h e Latin A m erican states have mostly reach ed only a relatively low level o f industria liza tion an d exist w ithin a cap ita lis t o rb it d o m in a ted by the USA. A lthough th e re is m u ch d eb a te ab o u t its p recise na tu re , m ost of these states are ch a rac te r ized by in ternal ‘dualism ’ — th e co-existence of m odern ized cen tres to g e th e r with large agrarian regions in which cash-crop econom ies predom ina te . U rb an iza t io n has fo llow ed a d ivergen t p a t te rn from th a t es tablished in the classical nation-s ta te , with th e inner cities being su r ro u n d e d by m igrant se tt lem ents a t m ost loosely in tegra ted into m o d e rn pa t te rns o f u rb a n organization such as charac te r ized



the original E u ro p e an experience . As in the case of post-colonial s tates, th e re is no t a close similarity to p rocesses th a t p ro d u c ed the classical nation-state .

In bo th co lon ized an d post-colonial s ta tes th e re have p ro v ed to be strong tendenc ies tow ards military rule, in co n tra s t to the classical and m odern iz ing types. T h e dev e lo p m en t of military regim es actually cha rac te r izes in par ticu la r the p er iod of the universality of th e nation-state , th a t is the four d ecad es since the S econd W orld W ar. T h is is o n e fu r the r exam ple of a reversal in the expecta tions g en e ra ted by m ains tream trad itions of social science, M arxist and non-M arxist. G o v e rn m en ts do m in a ted by the m ilitary have rem a in ed largely un s tu d ied , co n s id e red as tem p o ra ry ex cep t io n s to th e genera l t ren d s of d ev e lo p m e n t g en e ra ted by industrialism o r industrial capitalism. T h e events of the past forty years across the face of the world have m ad e any such position an increasingly b izarre one . Military involvem ent in g overnm en t, in coups and coun ter-coups , has been witnessed in all the Latin A m erican states, in m ost M iddle E as tern and African coun tries , and Po land .24 A rm ies in these c ircum stances m ay be professionalized but they are also p rae to rian . T h e re is no d o u b t that the p rae to rian s ta te has its origins in som e substantial degree in the role p layed by the military u n d er colonialism. T h e very processes analysed earlier in rela tion to the E u ro p ean n a t io n state m ade it possible for military pow er to be focused ‘externally’, upon colonial dom ination . As o n e au th o r rem arks ,

In th e E u ro p e an co lo n ies d u rin g th e n in e te e n th an d tw en tie th cen tu ries , the m ilita ry w as specifically o r ien ted to w ard s ex te rn a l c o n q u e s t an d d o m in a n c e . E x te rn a l d o m in a tio n p ro v id ed a v o ca tio n a l ideal, w hich w as ex p ressed in such o rg an isa tio n s as the civil an d m ilita ry se rv ices in B ritish Ind ia, th e F re n ch F o re ign L egion, th e F re n c h E q u a to ria l A rm y (the ‘A fr ic a n s ’) an d th e S panish arm in M o ro cc o an d S ou th A m erica . T h e values of the system w ere em b o d ied in ‘civ ilisation fran ça ise ', K ip ling’s ‘w hite m a n ’s b u rd e n ’ an d th e m issionary zeal o f G e n e ra l L yau tey (a m ilitary adm in istra to r o f F rench Africa). T h e co n c ep t of ‘civilisation frança ise’ w as deve loped by the m ilitary w ho adm in is tered and , in fact, d o m in a te d F re n c h im p eria l po licy in A frica an d w ho w ere d ed ic a te d to th e expansion o f th e em p ire . T h e m ission -o rien ted m ilita ry w as p ro n e to b ec o m e in te rv en tio n is t, p a rticu la rly in th e F re n c h a n d S pan ish co lo n ies .25

M odern iz ing s ta tes have no t been p ro n e to military rule although — m ost no tab ly in the cases of G e rm an y and Japan — they m ay be assoc ia ted with a strongly militaristic e thos. It is w orth repea ting here tha t m o d ern military governm en ts should no t be seen as up-dated versions of military authority in traditional states. M odern military rule depends upon the centralized control o f the w eap o n s of industria lized w ar, and a b u re au c ra t iz ed standing arm y, norm ally opera t in g in c ircum stances in which a

1 higher level o f in ternal pac ification has been achieved than was I ever possible in trad itional s ta tes .26 In m ost m o d ern nation-states,

how ever ‘n ew ’ they m ay be, the a rm ed forces have no serious ‘co m p e t i to rs ’ in respec t of con tro l o f the m eans of v io lence .27 T h e re m ay be guerilla m ovem en ts challenging s ta te pow er — alm ost invariably su p p o r ted by external s tates and often based ex ternally to the co u n try with w hich th e ir ob jec tives are c o n c e rn e d 28 — but high levels of internal pacif ication can be ach ieved even in ‘s ta te -na tions’, as a result o f the im porta tion of m odern m odes of transport and com m unica tion , the developm ent of police forces and an ap p a ra tu s of system atic legal sanctions.

The World Capitalist Economy

W h e th e r used to re fer to a single society, ne tw orks of rela tions spanning several societies, o r to world-wide connec tions , the te rm ‘system ’ has to be a p p ro a c h e d with cau tion . T h e re is a world system, but it is m uch m ore d isaggregated and subject to uneven d ev e lo p m en t than individual s ta tes are. In this regard the critical rem arks m ad e earlier ab o u t ‘world system theory ' need to be som ew hat ex tended . In addition to its ‘econom is t ic ’ bias th e re is a def ined inclination to r e p e a t the ten d en cy o f sociologists discussing single societies to exaggerate its ‘functional in tegra tion’. T h a t a w orld system exists, in fluencing th e d ev e lo p m e n t of pa r ticu la r sta tes, does no t imply tha t there is a single dom inating dynam ic in its deve lopm en t o r tha t the ‘w h o le ’ som ehow has prim acy o v er th e ‘p a r ts ’. A consis ten t theo re t ica l language m ust be used h e re ,29 relating th e analysis of social institutions within states to regionalized systems of larger and g rea te r scope.

T h e cu r ren t world system can be effectively ch a rac te r ized in the following term s:



Symbolic orders/modes G lobal in fo rm ation systemo f discourse

Political institutions Economic institutions Law/modes o f sanction

N ation-state system W orld capitalist econom y W orld military o rd e r

Since I have so far c o n c e n tra te d u p o n the s ta te system and the processes of reflexive monitoring making possible its consolidation, toge ther with the global military o rde r , it is w orth at this point giving som e atten t ion to eco n o m ic rela tions. How should we analyse the m ain pa ram ete rs of the world capitalist econom y today? In what sense do capitalistic m echan ism s d o m in a te world ec o n o m ic o rg an iza t io n ? H ow d o these re la te to ec o n o m ic deve lopm en t within states?

T h e w orld e c o n o m y is p red o m in an tly cap ita lis t in various senses. It is d o m in a ted by sta tes in which capita lis t eco n o m ic en terp rise , with its a t ten d an t class asym m etries , is th e chief form of p roduc tion . Both in term s of the dom estic policies of such states, and certain of their outside involvements, econom ic activity is subject to various m odes of political regula tion . H ow ever, it is characteristic of their institutional organization that the ‘econom ic’ is insulated from the ‘politica l’. G iven the diversification of pow er within the hands of s tates within the nation-state system, this s ituation m akes for a considerab le scope of ac tion on the p ar t of eco n o m ic organizations across the world as a whole. W hile they can n o t rival nation-states in m ost respects , business firms geared to capitalistic p ro duc tion thus com e to play a m ajo r role in in terna tional eco n o m ic relations. T h e ir in fluence within their ‘p a re n t ’ s tates tends to be large, as governm en ts d ep e n d upon w ealth g en e ra ted by business firms for th e ir ow n ec o n o m ic viability. Since their trad ing re la tions with each o th e r , with states and with consum ers d ep e n d upon p ro d u c tio n for profit, the sp read of their in fluence brings in its train a global ex tension of com m odity m arke ts . But, from its incep tion , the world capitalist eco n o m y was never just a vast com m odity m ark e t . It involved, and involves, the com m odif ica t ion of labour-pow er in d ifferent regional settings, o ften u n d e r conditions o th e r than those of the ‘f ree ’ en try of the w o rk e r into th e m ark e t place. W h e th e r they are

small firms o r large transna tiona l co rpora t ions , m ost business en te rp rises are s lo tted d irec tly o r ind irec tly in to eco n o m ic rela tions s tre tch ing beyond the confines of any p ar ticu la r state. T h u s the ex traction of raw m ateria ls and their processing are produc tive en terprises, d raw n into the world econom y; since business firms can set up new ‘p r im e’ p ro d u c tio n units ou ts ide their s ta te of origin, capitalist p ro d u c tio n can and has b eco m e established in regions outs ide the econom ically d o m in an t states.

As they do n o t insu la te the ec o n o m ic and th e political internally , th e Soviet U n ion , East E u ro p ean societies, and a few o th e r s ta te socialist societies, in som e part form an enclave within the world capitalist econom y. Only in som e par t how ever, for these sta tes are deeply involved in the global division of labour and experience the influence of capitalistic econom ic mechanisms both in an im m edia te way and at fu r ther rem ove. T h e world capitalist eco n o m y , like all social systems, involves re la tions of p o w er, th e ir d is tr ibu tion being highly unequa l. W a lle rs te in ’s charac te r iza t ion of core , sem i-periphery and periphery , and the analysis he has deve loped in con junction with it, is useful in a general way to describe these , given the reservations already m en tioned . T h e core nations econom ically are no t necessarily so in politico-military terms, particularly if the Soviet Union is placed in the sem i-periphery. T h e geo-political classification of s tates given in c h a p te r 9 in som e large degree cu ts across econom ic d ifferentiations, and th e re are m ark ed differences within each of the gene ra l ca tegories in respec t o f ec o n o m ic , political and m ilitary pow er. Divisions be tw een co re , sem i-periphery and per iphery a lte r as the global division of labour changes and may often charac terize regions cross-cutting states ra the r than referring to clusters of states.

W hile the d ifferentiation betw een core , per iphery and semiper iphery is long-standing, d irec t eco n o m ic re la tions be tw een s tates w ere for a long per iod primarily a m a t te r of in te rna tional t rad e . T r a d e and cap ita l m o v em en ts h ad b ec o m e strongly in terna tionalized by the end of th e n in e teen th cen tu ry and up to the First W orld W ar. Flowever this was distinct from the situation perta in ing to d ay .10 A t th a t t im e considerab le segm ents of the national econom ies of the co re coun tries w ere buffered from in terna tional com petit ion .



B rew eries, b rickw orks, an d b ak e rie s supp lied lo ca l m ark e ts . T h e ‘clo th ing industry ' still consisted of local tailors. In te rn a tio n a l fre igh t ra te s w ere to o high fo r th e fu rn itu re in d u s try to en g ag e in in te rn a tio n a l trad e . A g ricu ltu re , fishing, an d h an d ic ra fts w ere n o t yet in te g ra te d ev en on th e n a tio n a l level. W orld m a rk e t p rices had b een es tab lished only fo r a few p ro d u c ts — m ainly p ro d u c e of a n o n -E u ro p ean o rig in such as co ffee , sugar, an d sp ices. F o r m any p ro d u c ts th e re w as n o t even a un ifo rm n a tio n a l p rice .31

Almost the whole com m odity m ark e t is, how ever, increasingly subject to in terna tional com peti t ion . M oreover , p ro d u c tio n has b eco m e m uch m ore in terna tionalized over the past half cen tu ry o r so than it ever was before. T h ro u g h o u t m ost o f the long period of the expansion of the world capitalist eco n o m y , the global sp read of capitalist p ro d u c tio n involved jo in ing capita l, m an ag e m ent and technology from o n e s ta te with labour pow er and raw m ateria l from others . Now it is co m m o n for each of these to co m e from different coun tries with, in addit ion , co m p o n en ts being m ade in d ifferent par ts of the world. In terna t ional p ro d u c tio n has co m e m ore and m ore to displace the cen tra l role of in terna tional trade .

In the late 1970s co rp o ra t io n s based in the U SA alone held d irec t investm ents overseas of $70 billion. If the re is a two-fold dollar value o u tp u t p er annum for every dollar invested in p lant and equ ipm ent, $140 billion is yielded yearly by these investments. Such a vo lum e of goods p ro d u ced ab ro ad , having som e inputs from the p aren t coun try , is four times as high as US annual exports . Ind irec t inves tm en ts a b ro a d d o u b le th e am o u n t of p ro duc tion ca rr ied on ou ts ide the co u n try .32 T o be sure, US foreign investm ent greatly ou tw eighs that of any o th e r s ta te and m akes up abou t two-thirds of the value of the investm ents of the O E C D co u n tr ie s .33 H ow ever, the sec to r of th e world econom y organized in term s of in terna tionalized p ro d u c tio n is growing m uch faster than the G N Ps of each of the states m ost heavily involved. T h e US eco n o m y , like that of all the co re states, is d ep e n d en t u p o n the im port o f m ineral supplies for its basic industries. No sta te , o r even co n tin en t , is self-sufficient in re spec t of all the m inera l re sou rces n e e d e d in m o d ern p ro d u c tio n . T h u s , o f th e th ir teen m ost im p o rtan t m inerals its eco n o m y requires , the

US d epends upon im porting at least half of its supplies of n ine of them . T h e o th e r co re states a re m uch less well-supplied.

In the years since the S econd W orld W ar, significant alterations have taken p lace in the alignm ent of the co re states within the O E C D econom ic bloc — the m ost striking, o f course , being the m o v em en t of Japan to b ec o m e o n e of the leading countries . T h e industrial o u tp u t of the East E u ro p ean societies is no t easy to co m p are with tha t o f the capitalist states. It p robab ly am o u n ts to roughly 30 p e r cen t of the w orld ’s o u tp u t , co m p ared with som e 60 p e r cen t for tha t o f the co re states, and only 10 p er cen t for the rem a in d er of the world. T ra d e flows are relatively low betw een the p lanned econom ies and th e co re coun tries , indicating that it is mainly via m o n e ta ry m echan ism s and raw m ateria l im ports that these ex p e r ien ce the im p ac t of g lobal capita lis t ec o n o m ic re la tions .34 P eriphera l states , especially of th e post-colonial type, a re no toriously vu lnerab le to the fluctua tions of world trad ing pa t te rn s . T h e i r position of ‘u l t ra -d e p en d en c e ’ in th e world econom y expresses their re liance upon the export of prim ary p ro d u c ts and the im port o f technology and m an u fa c tu red goods, including w eaponry . T h e significance of the periphera l nations as m arke ts for m an u fac tu red exports from O E C D countries is, in fact, d iminishing ra th e r than rising, a lthough the in te rrup tion of the trend by the O PE C states is graphic testimony to the influence con tingen t political events can have over w hat might ap p e a r to be ‘im m u tab le ’ econom ic forces.

T h e o lder industrialized coun tr ies at the co re of the world capitalist eco n o m y rem ain the pivot a round which m ost else tu rns, bu t their position is weakening . O u tp u t has mostly risen m ore slowly in these states over the past d ec ad e c o m p ared with th e Eastern E u ro p ean sta tes , and particularly in con tra s t to the ‘O rienta l S ec to r ’ (South K o rea , T a iw an , Hong K ong, S ingapore). T h e co re s ta tes have b e c o m e increasingly d e p e n d e n t u p o n external m arke ts , especially in re sp ec t of p ro duc tion of advanced capital goods. But the m obility of p ro duc tion into o th e r areas of th e w orld tends to ro b th em of th e m o n opo ly o f high-level techno log ica l capacity they o n ce enjoyed. Of course , m igration o f capital away from regions w here technologica l and labour advan tages have already been exploited occu rs also bo th within an d betw een the m o re industrially deve loped states. T h u s , in the U SA , th e re is a m o v em en t of p roduc tive en terp rise from the



m ore industrialized n o r th e rn areas to the ‘sun belt ' o f th e south , w h ere wages are low er an d un ion s treng th less m a rk e d . In no r th e rn F ran ce the early es tablished industrial areas dec line while new er industries spring up in the M ed ite rran ean region.

D e-industr ia lization and m ass u n e m p lo y m en t in th e co re coun tr ies a re so evidently co n n e c te d to t rends in the world econom y th a t everyone accep ts th a t they ca n n o t be in te rp re ted wholly in te rm s of the in ternal organization o f individual states. Here we see an awareness that the ‘com parative ' s tudy of societies as ordinarily p rac tised is defic ient. But this has no t yet p ro d u ced a general recognition of the cen tra li ty of the world system to any form of social analysis o r social theo ry tha t seeks to un d ers tan d the n a tu re of the econom ically advanced societies .35 Analyses of sem i-peripheral and per iphera l s ta tes consistently recognize that these coun tr ies have to be exam ined in te rm s of the ‘unequa l exch an g e’ in which they are involved in ternationally . But the sam e is not t rue of m ost sociological discussions of the ad v an ced countries , from the point of view e i ther of their re la tions with o n e a n o th e r o r with the rem a in d e r o f the world.

International Orders and the Sovereignty of States

I have avoided up to now discussing the p rob lem o f sovereignty in a d irect way, confin ing my argum ents to an analysis o f the s ignificance of the co n c ep t in the em erg en ce of the E u ro p ean s ta te system and stressing tha t ‘sovereignty’ only has m ean ing in the con tex t of a reflexively regu la ted system larger than any one s tate. But both an abs trac t and substan tive discussion of the sovereignty of s ta tes is called for at this point.

Sovereignty s im ultaneously provides an o rde ring principle for what is ‘in te rna l’ to s tates and w hat is ‘ex te rn a l’ to them . It presum es a system of rule th a t is universal and obligatory in rela tion to th e citizenry of a specif ied terr ito ry bu t from which all those w ho are not citizens are excluded. As M orgen thau expresses this, the sovereign au thority is the su p rem e law-making and law- enforcing agency, these being unified .36 G o v e rn m en ts rep resen t that sovereign au thority as ‘de lega tes ’, and this is a sou rce of the tendenc ies tow ards polyarchy in m odern s ta tes .37

T h e re la tion be tw een sovereignty and the p rincip led equality o f s ta tes is m u ch closer than is o ften supposed . A s ta te can n o t

b ec o m e sovereign excep t within a system of o th e r sovereign states, its sovereignty being acknow ledged by them ; in this there is a s tro n g p ressure tow ards m utua l recogn it ion as equals , w ha tever i h e factual s ituation in respec t of differential power. T h is also tends to imply a ce rta in universality a lthough , in fact, th e global a ttr ibu tion of sovereignty by all s ta tes to o n e an o th e r da tes in p rac t ice only from th e conclusion of the S econd W orld W ar. In the E u ro p ean s ta te system the states did no t recognize th e au th en tic existence of o th e r political com m unities in the way they did each o ther .

O f what does sovereignty consist? T h e following e lem ents might be listed as m ost im p o rtan t — in effect, definitive of what sovereignty is. A sovereign s ta te is a political o rganization tha t has the capacity , within a delim ited terr ito ry o r terr ito ries , to m ak e laws and effectively sanc tion the ir up-keep ; exert a m onopoly over the disposal o f the m eans of violence; con tro l basic policies relating to the internal political o r adm inistrative form of governm en t; and dispose of the fruits o f a national econom y that are the basis o f its revenue.

E ach of these capabilities is in fluenced by factors in ternal to states. But in view of the increasing in tegration of the world system since the S econd W orld W a r it might be a rgued that they are m ore and m ore limited by s ta tes ’ ex ternal involvem ents. Indeed , it is no t u n co m m o n for the claim to be m ad e that the nation-state is becom ing progressively less im portan t in world o rgan iza t ion as a result o f c u r re n t trends . T h e re is the m ultip lication of organizations tha t s tand beyond the boundaries o f states, pe rh ap s approp ria t ing capacities previously held by states. Also th e re a re fea tu res of the world system re frac to ry to the a t tem pts of par ticu la r s ta tes to con tro l them . T h ese might be listed as follows:


Organizations1 Inter-governm enta l

agencies2 Cartels , eco n o m ic unions,

transna tiona l co rpo ra t ions3 Military alliances

Aspects o f the World System1 T h e in terna tional division

of labour2 T h e w orld military o rd e r


T h e U n ited N ations and th e C o m m o n M ark e t are two agencies that fall partly u n d er 1 and partly u n d e r 2 in the ‘O rganizations ' co lum n. How they influence the sovereignty of their m em b er states? A re e i ther in any sense sovereign entities? In the case of the UN th ere is surely no real difficulty in com ing to an answer. A lthough it is the m ajo r ‘world agency’, and very significant in the reflexive m on ito r ing of th e w orld system, th e UN has n o t and is not m aking substantial in roads into the sovereignty of states. It is not a sovereign body in its own right, and the m ost significant im pact of the UN globally has actually been tow ards ex tending s tates ' sovereignty ra th e r than limiting it. By con tra s t , it might be c la im ed th a t , a l though a m o re localized in te r-gove rnm en ta l agency, the E E C does serve to restric t pre-existing forms of s tates ' sovereignty. T h e union has the capability to fram e laws which then apply in principle to the popu la tions of the states com prised within it. In add ition , ag reem en ts can be fo rm ula ted betw een the Com m ission o r the High A uthority with o th e r states on behalf o f the m em b er countries.

Let us consider the au thority of the EEC over m em b er s tates in respec t o f the cr ite ria o f sovereignty m en t io n ed above. C erta in bodies of the C om m unity do have the capacity to fo rm ula te legal principles, but these can n o t really be regarded as ‘laws' effective within the par ticu la r sta tes, s ince they m ust be ratified within the parliam enta ry bodies o f those states, which also alone possess the capability of sanction ing them . T h e E E C possesses no military arm and can n o t red u ce the capabilities of s ta tes to deploy the m eans of v io lence independen tly of w ha tever prescrip tions it m ight m ake. Of course it does no t follow from this tha t decisions o f the E u ro p ean P arliam ent, executive o rgans o r the C ourt of Justice will no t be ca rr ied o u t; but these au thorit ies do not, in this regard , hold sovereign pow er. It is prim arily in re spec t o f econom ic re la tions tha t a certa in transfer o f sovereignty has taken place. Even here , how ever, th e re is a two-way exchange, s ince m em b er states have gained certa in forms of au tonom y that w ould o therw ise have been forfeited in in terna tional trading re la tions in o th e r parts o f the world.

T h e E E C m ight a t som e fu tu re po int b ec o m e a distinct and in tegra ted super-pow er alongside those tha t cu rren tly exist. But short o f som e new m ajo r world conflict it is difficult to see this as m ore than a relatively re m o te possibility. As A ro n observes,


T o assu m e th a t th e C o m m o n M a rk e t n ecessa rily leads to a E u ro p e an fed e ra tio n (o r to a E u ro p e a n fed e ra l s ta te ) is to assum e e ith e r th a t eco n o m ics, in o u r p erio d , co n tro ls an d so to speak en co m p asses po litics, o r th a t th e fall o f ta riff b a rr ie rs will o f itself ca u se th e fall o f th e p o lit ica l an d m ilita ry o n es . T h e se tw o supp o sitio n s a re false. T h e C o m m o n M ark e t, o n c e co m p le ted , w ould n o t p re v e n t F ra n c e o r G erm a n y [o r B ritain! ] from ex ecu tin g d iv erg en t, even o p p o sed , ac tio n s in the A rab reg ion o r in the F ar East. It w ould n o t pu t th e a rm y an d the po lice fo rce a t th e o rd e rs o f the sam e m en. It w ould lfeave th e c o n s titu tio n s o f these various na tions exposed to d an g e rs th a t w ould be, for ea ch of them , d iffe ren t.38

It is, as A ron says, ‘a great illusion of o u r times ' to believe that rapidly increasing eco n o m ic and technologica l in te rd ep en d en ce— unden iab ly a cha rac te r is t ic of the world system in the period since th e S econd W orld W a r — fosters a subm erg ing of sovereignty.

T h e two p h e n o m e n a m en t io n ed as ‘A spec ts o f the W orld System ’ on p. 282, the in terna tional division of labour and the world military o rd e r , are m uch m ore im portan t in influencing s ta te s ’ sovereignty . S ta tes are m o re and m o re econom ically in te rd ep en d en t , as m easu red by a variety o f c r ite ria re levant to the in terna tion division of labour. In this regard the governability o f the industrialized states (as has long been true of the m ore ‘d e p e n d e n t ’ ones) is increasingly affec ted by happen ings only partly in th e con tro l o f the political au thorit ies within th e m .39

T h e U S A is in several respects a special case, holding such a d isp roportionate ly s trong position in the world econom y. But in the o th e r industrialized coun tr ies , including the Soviet U nion and th e East E u ro p ean societies, th e re has definitely been a dec line in the capability of governm en ts to regula te national econom ies. D epressing the econom y is m ore easy to accom plish than the reverse; a t tem p ts to increase ra tes of eco n o m ic grow th normally dem and increased partic ipation in the world econom y, thus raising the vulnerability to external fluctuations. It seem s likely that existing in ter-governm ental organizations co n c e rn e d to influence o r regu la te aspects of w orld eco n o m ic activity will be fu r the r developed and com plem en ted by o thers in fu tu re years. However, for the m o m en t, it is no t these tha t th rea ten the sovereignty of s ta tes in a g en e ra l w ay, even if th e re have b een n u m ero u s

individual cases in which loans of m oney o r d ev e lo p m en t grants have been linked to political conditions. T h e m ost serious erosion of s ta tes’ sovereignty in regard of their na tional econom ies is surely to be found in the im m ersion of these in a w orld econom y d isco n n ec ted from any sort o f overall political con tro l .

H ow ever, it is u n d o u b ted ly the world military o rd e r w hich is m ost consequen tia l in affecting the sovereignty of states. T h e industrialization of w ar has tied military pow er closely to industrial s treng th and techno log ica l sophis tica tion , within alliances tha t are no longer local but global in scope. T h e result , in the con tex t o f a world eco n o m y that perm its the very rap id diffusion of technologically advanced w eaponry and military expertise , is oddly — and perhaps ca tas troph ica lly — m ixed as regards s ta tes’ sovereignty. A lm ost all s ta tes across the g lobe possess military strength in excess of anyth ing that could be m o u n ted within the largest o f trad it ional imperial systems. Y et th e super-powers, unlike any societies tha t have previously existed in h u m an history, a re specifically ‘u n co n q u e ra b le ’ e i ther by each o th e r o r by any conceivable military coalition o f smaller states.

T h e ir sovereignty , from this aspect, is surely g rea te r than any individual s ta tes have ever sus ta ined prev iously , a l though p u rchased at the cost o f a frightful leap in the scale of the destruc tive pow er that each can unleash. Both in a generalized way and in re spec t o f their d irec t influence in ce rta in regions the existence of th e super-pow ers , o f course , limits th e scope of the military strength available to o th e r states. C ountries within N A T O and states elsew here that have A m erican military bases s ta tioned on their terr ito r ies are hardly likely to have the op p o r tu n ity to forge an independen t military strategy in the event of the ou tb reak of serious hostilities betw een W est and East. Still less is this feasible in the case of the East E u ro p ean countries. As ad ja c e n t / subsidiary sta tes to the Soviet U nion , their in ternal political and econom ic policies a re o pen to the general su p e r in ten d en ce of that coun try , b ack ed by the use of military pow er. S om eth ing similar is the case with states bordering the U SA in C en tra l A m erica , and in ce rta in o th e r parts o f the world (South K orea , T aiw an), a lthough no t in E urope . T h e US go v ern m en t, like that o f th e Soviet U nion , m ain ta ins a s trong in terest in and conduc ts its policies with a view to p ro tec t in g the in ternal stability of the sta tes involved in th e ir re sp ec tiv e m ilitary alliances. T h e


governability of s ta tes within these alliances, pa r ticu la r ly in E as tern E u ro p e , is certain ly no t a m a t te r confined to in ternal struggles alone.

L et us, the re fo re , tak e th e s ta te socialist societies of E as tern E u ro p e as an exam ple . A re they sovereign states o r are they not? T h e s tate socialist societies — in respec t of their political form and terr itoria l d is tribution — are the result o f world w ar and are a t the front line of a cold w ar because they w ere at the cen tre of two ac tua l wars. Very soon af te r the conclusion of the S econd W orld W a r it b ecam e ap p a ren t that those coun tries d isplaced from Nazi ru le by the Red Arm y w ere to be m o u ld ed to Soviet- style political and eco n o m ic institutions. T h e use of military pow er was essential to the process, opposit ion g roups and those wishing to adopt liberal dem ocratic institutions being systematically repressed through the use of force. Perceived strategic interests p layed a m o re im portan t role than internal political organizations in de term in ing which states w ere actually com pelled to follow this m odel, as the d iffe rence be tw een East G e rm an y and Austria dem onstra te s . If e lections had been allowed in the Soviet Z o n e of G e rm an y im m ediately af te r the war, th e re can be little d o u b t that they w ould have p ro d u ced fairly similar results to those held u n d e r the four-pow er o ccu p a t io n of Austria. ‘East G e rm a n y ’ m ost probab ly would no t exist a t all, o r would be a ‘cap ita lis t’ ra the r than a ‘s tate socialist’ society. In the years directly following the S econd W orld W ar, trea ties of m utual assistance signed betw een the Soviet Union and the East E u ro p ean states, and am ong the East E u ro p ean states, w ere bilateral. T h e W arsaw P act, like N A T O , was s t im ulated by tensions assoc ia ted with the K orean W ar, and integrated the Eastern bloc military organization u n d e r Soviet co m m an d . In con tra s t to the N A T O countries, how ever, the Soviet U nion has a m onopoly of nuc lea r w eapons within its military coalition and the re is no genera l staff o f the W este rn type.

Given all this, it would still be difficult to deny th a t th e East E u ro p e a n s ta tes a re sovereign units in te rm s of th e c r i te r ia previously specified, sep a ra te administratively from the Soviet U nion and from one an o ther . T h e i r au tonom y is m o re confined th an th a t o f m ost o th e r na t ion-s ta tes b u t na t ion-s ta tes they certain ly rem ain . E ach possesses a rm e d forces tha t , if they could do little to resist a Soviet offensive against th em , re ta in loyalties



to their par ticu la r s tates. T h e p ar t played by the H ungarian arm y in the events of 1956, o r even the role of the arm y in Poland m uch m ore recently , which a lm ost certain ly p re -em pted Soviet a rm ed in tervention , ind ica te th a t subord ina t ion to Soviet overall con tro l is far from co m p le te . T h a t th e na t iona l a rm ies of th e East E u ro p ean states have a low er profile within the military strategy o f the W arsaw Pact than the W est E u ro p ean sta tes within N A T O partly reflects the econom ic inferiority of the fo rm er as com pared to the latter, bu t also the fact that the loyalty of those armies to certa in forms of Soviet m an o eu v re would be questionable .

T h e limitations upon the au to n o m y o f the East E u ro p ean states a re mainly military in origin and are an ex trem e exam ple of what is com m on th ro u g h o u t the nation-s ta te system. C on tra ry to views som etim es ad v a n ced in politica l sc ience , sovere ign ty is no t indivisible, but regularly and charac teristically shaped by the g eo political position of states, their respective military streng th and, to a lesser d eg ree , their s ituation in the in terna tional division of labour. T h e sovereign p ow er of the East E u ro p ean states is confined by their proximity to the Soviet U nion , in the historical con tex t of their m utual experience of war. T h e sovereignty of, say, many of the post-colonial s tates may be limited both by a relatively low level o f in terna l adm inistrative con tro l and by external eco n o m ic d ep e n d en ce . But in these cases as in Eastern E urope , we still co n fron t nation-states holding a high degree of sovereign pow er — certainly co m p ared with segm enta l, class- divided societies existing in a world of frontiers ra th e r than borders.

Capitalism, Industrialism and the State System

At this point I shall d raw to ge ther in a system atic way som e of the m ain argum ents deve loped in this book thus far. T h e re a re two general in te rp re ta t ions of the n a tu re of the cu r ren t world system tha t tend to d o m in a te the l i terature . O ne consists of Marxist o r Marxisant acco u n ts o f the sp read of capitalism , the o th e r the type of theory favoured by m any specialists in in terna tional re lations, acco rd in g to w hich th e w orld is p o p u la ted by s ta te ‘a c to r s ’ pursu ing their goals partly in co-opera tion and partly in conflic t with o n e an o ther . T h e tw o m odels in fact barely touch . In the

M arxist pe rspec tive , s ta tes a p p e a r as m ech an ism s o f class dom ination o r of the facilitating of the overall dev e lo p m en t of capitalist en terp rise , bu t their territoriality rem ains essentially unexplica ted . In th e seco n d view, the terr ito r ia l ch a rac te r of s ta tes is given prim acy of p lace , the geo-political involvem ents of s ta te ‘ac to rs ’ being regarded as the chief origin of th e influences shap ing the d ev e lo p m en t of the w orld system. F rom this s tandpo in t , th e transfo rm ations brough t abou t by the expansion of capitalistic en terp rise form only a vague back g ro u n d to the activities of states.

E ach of these two s tandpoin ts is intrinsically defective, because each fails to co p e with w ha t th e o th e r d em o n s tra te s to be im portan t; but bo th have fu r the r shortcom ings as well. Marxist discussions do not satisfactorily separate capitalism and industrialism, thus o ften m isin terpreting even som e of the m ore sheerly ec o n o m ic t ren d s shap ing the m o d e rn w orld. T h eo r is ts of in terna tional re lations, relatively u n co n c e rn e d with what goes on inside states, tend to u n d eres t im a te the significance of internal struggles that influence external policies. Everyone acknowledges that to trea t a s ta te as an ac to r is a simplifying no tion , designed to help m ake sense of the com plexities of the re la tions betw een states. But w ha t is only a theo re t ica l m odel is all too o ften given a real significance, obscuring the fact that governm en ts can n o t be eq u a ted with states (as nation-states) and that policy decisions within governm ents usually em ana te from highly contested arenas o f social life. Recognition o f the specifically political and military involvem ents of s tates should not necessita te a re lapse into such a conceptually limited stance. On the o th e r hand , acknow ledgem ent of the fu n d am en ta l im pact of capitalism in influencing global pa t te rns of change from th e six teenth cen tu ry onw ards should not m ean ignoring the role of the geo-political involvem ents of states.

T h e c o n n e c t io n s be tw een the em erg en ce and sp read of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system can be spelled ou t in the following way. Capitalistic en terp rise first b ecam e p ro m in en t within a diversified s ta te system already distinctively different from traditional s ta te forms. T h e existence of such states supplied certa in p recond it ions for th e early deve lopm en t o f capita lism beyond its m ost ru d im en ta ry expressions including, internally , the fo rm ation of fram ew orks of law, fiscal guaran tees



and an increasingly pacif ied social en v iro n m en t allowing ‘non- co e rc iv e ’ ec o n o m ic ex ch an g e to flourish. T h e ex tens ion of capitalistic en terp rise into parts o f th e w orld ou ts ide E u ro p e was ‘built in’ to its d ev e lo p m en t in so far as, being an ‘in su la ted’ type of e c o n o m ic activity g ea red to m a n u fa c tu re in co m p eti t iv e m arkets, capitalism flowed across frontiers and borders. However, the consolidation o f a world capitalist eco n o m y was everyw here acco m p an ied by th e use of force , in con tex ts in which E u ro p ean w eaponry and military discipline enjoyed a d ram a tic superiority . Colonialism , in its various forms, canno t be regarded as m erely a disguised m o d e of capitalistic expansion , bu t certain ly for the m ost par t ten d ed to assist such expansion.

Industrialism first em erged within the institutional nexus of capitalism , whose com petit ive pressures served in substantial part to gen e ra te it. It was only with the com ing o f industrialism that the E u ro p ean states b ecam e fully fledged nation-states, in the m an n e r in which I have defined that term . T h e deve lopm en t of industrial capita lism s tren g th en ed the position of the ‘c o re ’ s ta tes within an expand ing w orld system, just as ren ew ed processes of colonial conquest served to c rea te an underpriv ileged ‘S o u th ’ loosely in tegra ted into it. N ation-states are m o re like ‘ac to rs ’ than ^ trad itional s ta tes ever w ere, for a com bina tion of reasons. T h ey are clearly b o u n d e d adm in is tra t ive unities , in which policies ad o p ted by governm en ts a re b inding upon w hole popu lations. As > ' involved in a system of states, reflexively m o n ito red by all, each g o v ernm en t constan tly negotia tes with o th e rs in reach ing such decisions. Like o th e r organizations, states also have legally defined ‘personalit ies’ in which they are rep resen ted as equivalent to individual agents. But the ‘ac tor-like’ qualities of m o d ern states have to be u n d e rs to o d in te rm s o f the specific charac te ris t ics of the nation-s ta te ra th e r than being taken as a pre-given baseline for the study of in terna tional relations.

T h e co re coun tr ie s of the W est and Japan rem ain ‘capitalist s tates ', a l though their ‘welfare cap ita lism ’ is very d ifferent from its n in e tee n th -cen tu ry an tec ed en ts . N e ither th e fact o f the ir s ta teh o o d n o r the par ticu la r geo-political d is tribution of pow ers tha t exists today can be ‘der ived ’ from their capitalistic cha rac te r . T h e ir involvem ent within an in terna tional division of labour of increasing com plexity is obviously highly re levant to short- and longer-term policies p u rsued by their governm en ts , but is far

from exhaustively acco u n tin g for those policies. Of course , s ta tes are no t th e only organizations involved in th e ex tension of the in terna tional division of labour. T h e insulation of the political an d the eco n o m ic has from the beginning involved an external d im ension — the separation of the political pow er of s tates from eco n o m ic activities of com m ercia l agencies and business firms. Som e of these, o f course , w ere essentially ou tposts o f colonizing states, but by and large this separa tion has been an e lem enta l and persisting fea tu re of the world capitalist econom y. T h e largest o f the m odern transnational co rpora tions today have annual budgets g rea te r than the m ajority of s ta tes and m aintain d irec t rela tions with governm en ts th rough the equivalents of ministries and corps of diplom ats. In the light o f this, som e have suggested tha t the transna tiona l co rpora t ions th rea ten the p red o m in an t im p o rtan ce of nation-states in the world system. However nation-states control the whole of the habitab le a rea of the g lobe, and as co rp o ra t io n s have to exist som ew here , they m ust in the last resort e i ther take pow er in a s tate o r becom e subject to one. W hatever the influence th e largest firms might have had over the policies o f s tates, none has taken th e fo rm er cou rse of action. W ith good reason — business co rpora t ions do no t, as nation-states do , have at their disposal con tro l o f the m eans of violence. As is pe rhaps w orth stressing o n ce m ore , the separa tion of military from econom ic institutions in the deve lopm en t of the E u ro p ean nation-s ta te has been as fraught with con seq u en ces for subsequen t world history as the separa tion of political and eco n o m ic pow er. A lthough th e re is no ‘logical’ reason why m odern business firms can n o t tu rn them selves into a rm ed preda to rs , as som e of the old trading com panies used to be, the d o m in an ce of the nation-s ta te today m o re o r less p rec ludes th a t possibility.

Following the classification of institutional d im ensions given earlier in this ch ap te r , I hold that the world system should be seen as influenced by several prim ary sets o f processes, each in som e part in d ep en d en t of the o thers . T h e se are processes associa ted with the nation-sta te system , co -o rd in a ted th ro u g h global netw orks of in form ation exchange, the world capitalist econom y, and the world military o rder.

In analysing the dev e lo p m en t of the nation-s ta te system from its origins in E u ro p e to its cu r ren t p re -em inence as a political o rd e r , I have sought to ques tion the idea tha t th e re is a d irect



trade-off be tw een th e sovereignty of s tates and growing in te rdep en d en c ie s in th e world system. It is o f ten supposed that, beginning in th e E u ro p e an s ta te system, m o d e rn states up to a certain point in history developed an increasing range of sovereign capacities as distinct political units. H ow ever — so this view holds — the w orld system has now b eco m e so tightly knit that in terna tional co n n ec tio n s co m e m ore and m ore to overshadow the adm inistrative capabilities of states. This is the basis o f the thesis tha t in re cen t times we see an increasing loss of sovereign pow er on th e p a r t o f nation-states, o f all sizes and types, such that in the relatively n ea r fu tu re th e nation-state will b eco m e less and less o f a significant p h e n o m e n o n in global o rgan iza tion .401 regard this idea as m isleading bo th in the analysis it offers and in the conclusion drawn. T h e em ergence of ‘sovereign states’ did d epend substantially upon a series of changes internal to those states. But from the early origins o f the E uropean state system these involved each individual s ta te in a reflexively m o n ito red o rd e r tha t was the cond ition of the ach ievem en t of a ‘b o rd e red ’ terr itory. T h e global reach of capitalism and the colonial en tang lem en ts of s tates helped ex tend those m onito r ing processes world-wide. N evertheless, until the end o f the S econd W orld W ar the nation-state was not a universal political form. Its becom ing such is som eth ing inherently co n n e c ted with, and in substantial deg ree an o u tco m e of, those very transna tiona l connec t ions tha t have seem ed to many to signal its im m inent dem ise. W ithou t the UN and a host of o th e r in ter-governm ental organizations the nation-state would not be the global form of political o rde ring that it has becom e. T h e influence o f pa r ticu la r s ta tes within w orld politics may wax o r w ane. But we should not imagine tha t the centralizing of global co nnec tions on the o n e hand , and the sovereignty of s ta tes on the o th e r , are always m utually exclusive.

T h e terr itoriality o f nation-states reflects a genuine internal adm inistrative unity and it is hardly surprising tha t b oundary d isputes, o r incursions of o n e s ta te across terr ito ry claim ed by an o th e r , are serious m atters . U nlike in the case of traditional s tates, a th rea t to a segm ent of the terr ito ry of a m o d ern s ta te is a po ten tia l cha llenge to its adm inistrative and cu ltura l integrity, no m a t te r how b a r ren o r ‘useless’ th a t segm ent of terr ito ry may be. Since states exist in an environm ent of o ther states, ‘pow er politics’ have inevitably been a fu n d am en ta l e lem en t of the geo-political

m ake-up of th e s ta te system. G iven, how ever, th a t th e in ter-state a ren a has n ev e r been a ‘H obbesian cond ition ' o f anarchy , ‘pow er politics’ has consistently b een co m p lem en ted by o th e r techn iques o r s trategies, and ca n n o t be said in som e way to disclose the essence of s ta tes’ re la tions with o n e ano ther .

T h e influence of capita lism on the dev e lo p m en t of the s ta te system has been , and is, o f a doub le kind. T h e econom ically m ost deve loped sta tes a re capitalistic, this inevitably strongly affecting th e policies fo llow ed by the ir g o v e rn m en ta l agencies . S ta te officials recogn ize that gov ern m en t revenue d ep en d s upon the prosperity of business en terp rise , which in turn places constra in ts over feasible op tions available to them . Class re la tions an d class struggles also strongly influence policy decisions, in a d irec t way in terna lly and in m o re d iffuse fash ion externally . Not only capita lis t s ta tes , how ever , bu t all s ta tes a re involved in an in ternational division of labour dom inated by capitalistic m ech a n isms — the world capitalist econom y. This has as o n e of its axes th e re la tions of ‘unequa l ex ch an g e’ betw een co re an d peripheral coun tries . T h e r e is no d o u b t th a t M arxist au th o rs have co n tr ib u ted m ore than those from any rival tradition of thought to unders tand ing these relations. W h e re their acco u n ts have been offered as theories of ‘imperialism’, nonetheless, strong reservations should be en tered about them. T h e econom ic connections involved result o ften , even charac teris tically , from policies m o tiva ted by non-econom ic considerations.

Industrialism has p roved expor tab le from the confines of the capita lis t ic o rd e rs within which it originally dev e lo p ed . T h e existence of a ‘S econd W o r ld ’ of s ta te socialism is p red ica ted u p o n the rem oval of industr ia l p ro d u c tio n from its d irec t involvem ent with a capitalist f ram ew ork of en terprise . O th e r less industrialized states in the T h ird W orld , o f course , have also institu ted forms of co m m an d econom y. N one of these countries , no t even the Soviet U nion , is m o re than partly she l te red from influences deriving from the dom inance of capitalistic mechanisms world-wide. T h e fact tha t th e U SA and the Soviet U nion — each a t the ce n tre of a com plex of political and military alliances — are at the sam e tim e th e exem plars of con tras ting m odes of econom ic organization m ight again en co u rag e the assum ption tha t the underly ing dynam ics of the w orld system are econom ic . Such a view lies at no great rem o v e from th e no tion tha t , if only



capitalism w ere to d isappear , divisions of in terests be tw een states w ould do so as well. N oth ing in the experience of the state socialist coun tries suggests th a t th e re is anyth ing to co m m en d this idea, co n n e c ted as it is to som e of the cha rac te r is t ic them es o f n ine teen th -cen tu ry social theory .

T h e industrialization of w ar con jo ined sc ience to technologica l research in such a way to co n c e n tra te w eapons deve lopm en t in the m ore econom ically ad v an ced states. This initially re in fo rced the position of those states in the world at large, and today places th e USA an d th e Soviet U nion at the c e n tr e o f w eap o n s deve lopm en t globally, as well as in ch ron ic com peti t ion with o n e an o th e r militarily. But while virtually all military research and developm ent takes p lace in the advanced industrialized countries, the world-wide distribution of a rm ed forces and w eaponry does not co r re sp o n d directly to the conven tiona l global divisions. T h e re is effectively no T h ird W orld in respect o f military forces. With the excep tion of the diffusion of nuc lea r w eapons (and how m uch longer will this rem ain exceptional?) virtually all m odern states are ‘First W o r ld ’ s tates in o n e sense — they possess the m ateria l and organizational m eans of waging industrialized war.

Modernity, Totalitarianism and Critical Theory

11

In his speech of a c cep tan c e for the Nobel Literary prize in the late 1950s, C am us observed that those

b o rn a t th e o u tse t o f W orld W a r I b ec am e tw en ty a t th e tim e b o th o f H itle r’s asce n t to p ow er and of the first rev o lu tio n ary trial. T h en , to co m p le te th e ir ed u c a tio n , they w ere c o n fro n te d in tu rn by th e S pan ish Civil W ar an d W orld W ar T w o — the un iversa l c o n c e n tra tio n cam p , a E u ro p e o f to r tu re an d prisons. T o d ay they m ust ra ise th e ir ch ild re n an d p ro d u c e th e ir w ork in a w orld th re a te n e d by n u c lea r d e s tru c tio n . N obody, surely , can ex p ect th em to b e o p tim is ts .1

T h o se ch ildren are now adults and there is no reason for them to feel any less som bre ab o u t the world in which they have co m e to m aturity than C am us imagined. Yet the co re traditions of social theory still s tand at a large d is tance from the w orld, not only in respec t o f analysing its n a tu re but, just as im portan t , in respec t of developing plausible acco u n ts of alternatives.

Of the four institutional o rd e rs of m odern ity distinguished earlier in the book , only two have received sustained a tten t ion within the social sciences. M arxism has co n c en tra te d above all upon the in te rp re ta tion of the past deve lopm en t and poten tia l fu ture transfo rm ations of capitalism giving p rim e p lace to class conflict as a m edium of social change. T h e re have been many discussions and critiques of the im pact of industrialism generally , and of technology m ore particularly , upon social life in the co n tem p o ra ry world. But, with som e no tab le exceptions, ne ither the exp an d ed role of surveillance, nor th e a l te red n a tu re of military pow er with the deve lopm en t of the m ean s of waging industrialized w ar have been m ad e centra l to form ulations of

social theory. In this conc lud ing ch a p te r I shall consider som e of the im plica tions of these p h e n o m e n a for p ro b lem s of social analysis in the late tw en tie th century . C am u s’s rem arks were m otiva ted in som e part bo th by a certa in re p u g n an ce tow ards m odern ity in general and by an aw areness of the dangers of to ta litarian political pow er in particular. T o ta l i ta r ian ism , I shall c laim , is a ten d en tia l p ro p e r ty of the m o d e rn sta te . An unders tand ing of the origins of to ta lita rian ism , as a specifically tw en tie th -cen tu ry p h e n o m e n o n , p re su m es analysing th e c o n solidated political pow er g en e ra ted by a m erging of deve loped techn iques of surveillance and the techno logy of industrialized war. Loom ing beh ind this is the question of the rela tion be tw een sta tes and the d ep loym en t of military p ow er in cu r ren t t im es — not just as an analytical issue but as a p rob lem for norm ative political theory . How might the m o n o p o ly o f the m ean s of v io lence on the part o f s ta tes be reconciled with established political ideas of the ‘good soc ie ty ’? I shall first o f all consider the n a tu re of to ta l i ta r ian politica l rule, m oving from th e re to a discussion of the tensions associated with the im pact of m odern ity and th en ce to the question of a ‘no rm ative theo ry of political violence'.

Totalitarianism: Surveillance and Violence

T h e history of the te rm 'to ta li ta rian ' is well-known, even if the co n cep t itself is one of the m ost fiercely d eb a ted in political theory . W hen G en ti le spoke of 't/no stato totalitario on behalf of Mussolini, he can have had little idea of the uses to which the term would la ter be pu t, o r the controvers ies in which it would figure. T h e w ord was first co ined as o n e carrying a favourable co n n o ta t io n in respec t o f the political o rd e r to which it re ferred , at a period when Mussolini was still advocating freedom of the press, accep ting the ex is tence of o th e r parties and favouring a com petit ive m ark e t econom y. 'T o ta l i ta r ian ' began to be used in critical a t tacks upon Italian fascism in the late 1920s, w hen oppo s i t io n par tie s w ere bru ta lly sup p re ssed , all t rad e un ions excep t s ta te-sponsored ones abolished , the C h am b er of D eputies dissolved and co n cen tra t io n cam p s set up, with the dea th penalty being institu ted for political offences.

Since then th e c o n c ep t has und erg o n e n u m ero u s vicissitudes.

M odernity, Totalitarianism and Critical Theory 295

It has been applied to m ovem en ts , parties, leaders and ideas, as well as m o re com m only to political systems.2 S ta tes o r g o v e rn m ents that have been labelled totalitarian include above all fascist Italy, Nazi G e rm an y and S ta lin’s Soviet U nion , bu t also Russia un d er the Czars, a range of trad it ional s tates, especially Egypt and R om e, absolutist s tates, and fictional societies like P la to ’s repub lic . Small w o n d e r tha t the no tion has been ca lled ‘a co n cep tu a l har lo t of u nce rta in p aren tage , belonging to no-one bu t at the service of all '.3 A m id the w elter o f usages th e re are som e general lines of ag reem en t a c cep ted by m any writers. M ost argue that to talita rian ism is, in fully deve loped form at any ra te , re cen t in origin, dating from abou t the tim e at which the term itself was invented. T h e co n c e p t is usually taken to be above all a political o ne , referring to a m o d e of organizing political pow er, involving its ex trem e co n c e n tra t io n in pursu it o f ob jec tives d ef ined by a narrow ly c ircu m sc r ib ed leadersh ip . F r ied r ich ’s definition is the o n e perhaps m ost often q u o ted in the l i terature . T o ta l i ta r ian ism , he says, is d is tinc t ‘from o th e r and o ld e r a u to c rac ie s ’ and from ‘W este rn -ty p e d e m o c ra c ie s ’. It has six characteristics: ‘(1) a totalist ideology: (2) a single party com m itted to this ideology and usually led by o n e m an , the d ic ta to r ; (3) a fully deve loped secre t police; and th ree kinds of m onopoly or, m ore precisely, m onopolis tic contro l: nam ely that o f (a) mass com m unica t ions ; (b) opera t iona l w eapons; (c) all organisations, including eco n o m ic on es .’4

T h e contrast between totalitarianism and ‘W estern-type d em o cracies’ is o f key im p o rtan ce in explaining the populari ty of the c o n c ep t in the period since the S econd W orld W ar. T o ta li ta r ian states w ere regarded by liberal political observers as including those forms of social o rd e r tha t have an advanced industrial base, bu t do no t display the ins titu tional ch a rac te r is t ic s of liberal d em o cracy . W h erea s w hen re ferr ing to Italy o r G e rm an y to talita rian ism designated a relatively transitory phase in social deve lopm en t — te rm ina ted by w ar — in the case of the Soviet U nion and th e East E u ro p ean coun tries it was used to re fer to a defin ite type of socio-political o rd e r sepa ra te from the capitalist states , con tinu ing as long as tha t o rd e r rem a ined in existence. A pplied as a ch a rac te r is t ic of th e E ast E u ro p e a n sta tes , ‘to ta l i ta r ian ’ refers to a political system supposedly displaying the charac teris t ics m en t io n ed by Friedrich . T h e U SSR and the s tate

296 M odernity, Totalitarianism and Critical Theory

socialist societies are po r tray ed as m onolith ic systems of political pow er, fo u nded upon cu ltura l and social conform ity deriving from the suppression of in terest divisions. This s tan d p o in t is often linked to an equation of Marxist socialism with au thoritar ianism, producing an all-pervasive state, subordinating the needs or wishes of the p o p u lace to the a rb itra ry policies of the s ta te authorities . Collectivism, as Belloc observed , m ay stem from noble m otives, but leads in p rac t ice to o m n ip o te n t s tate power. ‘T h e capitalist s ta te breeds a collectivist theo ry which in action p roduces som eth ing utterly different from collectivism: to wit, the servile s ta te .’5

If this type of view is co rrec t, totalitarianism canno t be regarded as a p h enom enon that could potentially co m e about in all m odern states. It is a type of rule assoc ia ted with fascist and Soviet-type societies, that could only co m e into being in liberal dem o cra t ic s ta tes if they su ccu m b ed to collectivism. T w o questions the re fo re arise. How far does it m ak e any sense to describe the Soviet U nion and the Eastern E u ro p ean states in the term s listed by Friedrich? Do these charac te ris t ics , on ce identified, bea r close com parison with episodes of fascism in E u ro p e and e lsew here? F or we should accep t , I th ink , that to talitarianism is a d ifferent phenom enon to the forms of au tocracy found in traditional states.

Examining the history of the USSR, it is evident that F riedrich’s form ulation applies m ost closely to the per iod of S ta lin’s rule, no t so readily e i ther to the early phase of dev e lo p m en t of the s ta te o r to the years since Stalin 's dea th . Lenin cam e to pow er in a c o u n try s u r ro u n d e d by hostile s ta tes , in c i rcu m stan ces of pers is ten t civil w ar, w h ere th e re was s tro n g res is tance from coun ter-revo lu tionary forces. M any of the m easu res Lenin took w ere repressive by any s tandards . But, in spite of his advocacy of the ‘vanguard p a r ty ’, it w ould be disingenuous to see Marxist- Leninism in its early phase as a ‘to ta lis t ideo logy’, s ince it acknowledged and tolerated a variety of factions and organizations. T h e nascen t Soviet U nion was far, indeed , from conform ing to the last th ree c r ite ria Friedrich m entions, since the con tro l o f the political ce n tre over the m o re far-flung areas of the coun try was tenuous and econom ic activity was still quite highly decentra lized .6 In addition , Lenin b ecam e c o n c e rn e d n ea r the end of his life with the th rea t po sed by the in fluence of the sec re t police, originally tak en over an d m odified from the organ iza tion left by his Tsarist


predecessors , and took steps to transfo rm it in to an agency that w ould dea l only with esp ionage an d serious th rea ts of c o u n te r revolution.

S ince th e m idd le 1950s, the Soviet reg im e has b eco m e d iscernably and self-consciously m o re re laxed, b reaking with its Stalinist past. Friedrich now perfo rce recognizes the significance of this, seeking, however, to in co rp o ra te it within his analysis by em phasiz ing tha t , in co m m o n with au to cra t ic s ta tes of the past, to talitarianism experiences ‘no tab le ups and d ow ns’ in the level of its intensity. Stalinism was a particularly m ark ed period of the in tensification of to ta litarian techn iques of g overnm en t, followed by changes w hich, how ever, did not a lter the essential n a tu re of the regime. ‘T h e cycle seems to go forward to an ex trem e followed by an, at times, radical reversal, a re tu rn to the original s ta te , and a re su m p tio n of the cy c le .’7 T h e changes o cc u rr in g af te r K ru sch ev ’s per iod of leadersh ip can thus be expla ined in te rm s of inheren t fea tu res of the system, which rem ains to ta lita rian in its basic institutions. Even in the m ost ex trem e years of Stalinist oppression , ‘total co n tro l’ is no t ach ieved in the party o r in respec t o f the popu lation at large; softening of the m ore brutal forces o f rule is cond it ioned by the recognition that som e am oun t o f la titude m ust be allowed to the mass of the popu la tion to follow their own paths of activity. Friedrich thus back-tracks in som e part u p o n his earlier views. But this modified acco u n t is not par ticularly plausible. It is m uch m ore convincing to hold that to ta lita rian ism , as he portrays the p h en o m en o n , is not a co n cep t designating an overall type of society — nam ely that found in the USSR and E as tern E u ro p e — but refers most appropria te ly to a defin ite aspec t of their expe rience , namely, Stalinism. It is during Stalin’s ascendancy that in ternal political processes in the USSR m ost d irectly and strikingly resem ble those in fascist Italy and Nazi G erm any . E ach of these involves the charac te ris t ics set ou t by F riedrich , but in addition is m ark ed by a reign of te rro r , using the co n c e r ted applica tion of fo rce in pursuit o f its designated objectives. A lthough this does not ap p ear in his original definition, it is implicit perhaps in the m ention of the ro le of the secre t police, and is in la ter writings a c co rd e d m ore d irec t discussion by the au tho r . As A rend t , N eu m an n and o thers do , it is surely right to em phasize the significance of te r ro r , w h ich is som ehow involved on an e lem enta ry level in totalitarianism .

298 M odernity , Totalitarianism and Critical Theory

M odernity , Totalitarianism and Critical Theory 299

If we co m p are , no t Soviet-type society to libera l-dem ocra tic capitalism as a w hole, but Stalinism, Nazism and Italian fascism, bo th in their theory and in the ir p rac tice , w e find som e m ark e d similarities. T h ese for the m ost par t do indeed ten d to involve the points m en t io n ed by Friedrich . In each case a d ic ta toria l ru ler shaped pre-existing sym bolic systems into a conso lida ted ideo logical basis of rule, accom pan ied by the pervasive use of coercion to suppress d iss idence. Italian fascism was by far th e least m u rd ero u s of the th ree . T h e secret police force O V R A was specifically es tab lished in the la te 1920s to dissolve in terna l political opposition, with heavy political censorship im posed upon antagonistic groups. Nonetheless, in the 1930s som e 20,000 people in Italy w ere a r ra igned b efo re specia l co u r ts and 10,000 im prisoned w ithou t trial. As in the o th e r states, in Italy the law was personalized , giving the individual ru ler a range of sanctions at his disposal for the con tro l o f recalc itran ts . T h u s , in 1926, Mussolini was acco rd ed the right to issue legally binding decrees , many thousands of which w ere p rom ulgated during the course of his rule. As the S uprem e L ead er of the Soviets, Stalin was able personally to d o m in a te m any aspects of overall s ta te policy. T h e Enabling Act of 1933 in G e rm an y gave Hitler, as C hance llo r , the right to m ak e laws for a ce r ta in period w ithou t the need for ra ti f ica t ion ." In each co u n try th e ‘to ta l ideo logy’ of w hich Fried rich sp eak s was based u p o n a s tro n g s tim u la t ion of nationalism , stressing radical distinctions betw een the national com m unity and ‘ou t-g roups’, and assoc ia ted with the figure of the leader. Party organization was also co n s tru c ted a ro u n d affiliation to the leader, this affiliation again being co u c h ed in the language of a self-sufficient nationalism .

T h e use of te r ro r m ark ed all th ree regim es, a l though loss of life was m uch lower in Italy than in the case of the o th e r two states. T e r ro r was justified by appeals to national unity and to the involvem ent of th e mass o f th e peop le in the governm en ta l system. ‘T h e G e rm a n p eo p le ’, accord ing to Hitler, ‘has e lec ted a single depu ty as its represen ta tive with 38 million votes . . . I feel myself just as responsible to the G e rm an peop le as w ould any pa r liam en t.’9 In Italy it n ee d ed m o re than fou r years to effectively suppress o th e r politica l p a r tie s , but in G e rm a n y this was accom plished in an im m edia te and rad ical fashion, with mass im prisonm ent and the building of large c o n c en tra t io n cam ps. By

the o u tb rea k of the W ar, th e re w ere in G e rm an y over a q u a r te r o f a million peop le im prisoned for political reasons and th ree times this n u m b e r by the end of the hostilities. D uring this period possibly as m any as twelve million peop le w ere systematically ex term ina ted . If these figures are staggering, they w ere probably surpassed in the Soviet U nion during S talin’s rule. In the purges som e one million peop le lost their lives and som e twelve million m o re died in the labour cam ps; perhaps som e twenty million peop le d ied as a d irec t result o f the use of vio lence as a m eans of political repression during the whole period of S talin’s ascen d an c y .10 In the Soviet U nion , like G e rm an y , the labour cam ps m ade a m ajo r con tr ibu tion to the co u n try ’s p e r fo rm an c e in the war. T w en ty p er cen t o f the co u n try ’s railways w ere co n s tru c ted by w orkers from the cam ps and 75 p er cen t o f th e gold m ined was ex trac ted by such workers. But in ne i ther case was the ra tionale for the ex is tence of the cam ps m ore than marginally e c o n o m ic .11

In all th ree societies, th e system atic use of v io lence was co m b in ed with the use of ne tw orks of sec re t police, having extensive and frequently em ployed powers of arres t for political transgressions, these p h e n o m e n a being closely co n n e c ted with rigid s ta te d irec tion of cultura l ac tiv ity .12 T h e w idespread use of te rro r , accord ing to A ren d t , tends to be in tegra ted with strict con tro l over cultura l p ro d u c tio n , because the po int of the th rea t o f v io lence is no t so m u ch to instil fear as to c rea te a clim ate in which ac cep tan c e of p ro p ag an d a will be facilitated.

[W hen] S ta lin d ec id e d to re w rite th e h is to ry o f th e R ussian R e v o lu tio n , th e p ro p a g a n d a o f his new v ers io n co n s is te d in destroy ing , to g e th e r w ith th e o ld e r b o o k s an d d o cu m en ts , th e ir a u th o rs a n d read ers : the p u b lic a tio n in 1938 o f a new official h isto ry o f the C om m unist P arty w as th e signal th a t the su p e rp u rg e w hich had d ec im a te d a w ho le g e n e ra tio n of S oviet in te llec tu a ls h ad co m e to an end . S im ilarly , the N azis in th e E aste rn o cc u p ie d te rrito rie s a t first used chiefly an tisem itic p ro p ag an d a to win fo rm er co n tro l o f th e p o p u la tio n . T h ey n e ith e r n ee d ed n o r used te rro r to su p p o rt th is p ro p ag a n d a . W hen they liq u id a ted th e g re a te r p a r t o f the P olish in te lligen tsia , th ey d id it n o t b ecau se o f its op p o sitio n , b u t b ec au se a c co rd in g to th e ir d o c tr in e P o les h ad n o in te llec t, an d w hen they p lan n ed to k id n ap b lue-eyed an d b lo n d -h aired ch ild ren , th e ^ d id n o t in te n d to frig h ten th e p o p u la tio n , b u t to save ‘G erm a n ic b lo o d ’.13


This does no t imply, she adds, that in to ta litarianism te r ro r is secondary to the reg im en ted con tro l o f cultura l p ro d u c tio n . On the con tra ry , te r ro r con tinues to be used by to ta lita rian regim es even when a population , o r the relevant section of the population, is com plete ly qu iescent. T e r ro r is, as it w ere, the very m edium of governm ent. T h is seem s valid from o n e respec t, bu t ques t ionab le from an o th e r . Having been used to su b d u e ce r ta in social groupings, o r to secure par ticu la r policies, the o rc h es tra ted use of v io lence tends to co n tin u e just as before. On the o th e r hand , in each of the th ree exam ples, the acqu iescence o f the m ajority was not p u rchased through the use of force against them , o r even by the dissem ination of p ro p ag an d a . All th ree regim es, particularly the ir leaders , sec u red a co n s id e rab le level o f ac tive and en thusiastic support from diverse sec tors of th e population . T h e s tuden t of to talita rian ism m ust explain this as well as the role of te r ro r in m obilizing su b jec t p o p u la t io n s for the d o c tr in e s advocated by the s ta te au thorities . Of course , mass support was in som e part fostered by p rog ram m es carefully o rch es tra ted to ach ieve that end. For exam ple , the N ational Socialists gave a great deal o f a t ten tion to p lanning the leisure activities of the population in o rd e r to develop the spirit o f national unity they deem ed desirable and p roper . All m an n e r of types of com m unal recrea tion w ere organized through local par ty cadres , under central d i rec t io n . '4 But the en thusiasm with which m uch of the population em braced the Nazi cause and expressed active support for their leader can hardly be acco u n ted for entirely by such program m es.

Let m e sum up at this po in t w here the p reced ing com m ents lead. I co n s id e r F r ied r ich ’s c o n c e p t of to ta l i ta r ian ism to be a c c u ra te and useful. T o ta l i ta r ian ism is no t ch a rac te r is t ic of trad it ional s ta tes, but only of nation-states and nation-states in relatively recen t times at that; its main features can be represen ted acco rd in g to F ried rich 's cr ite ria . But ‘to ta l i ta r ia n ’ is not an adjective that can be fruitfully applied to a type of sta te , let a lone to Soviet-style states generically . It refers ra th e r to a type o f rule, unstab le in m ajo r aspects , yet cap ab le of bringing ab o u t the most ho rren d o u s con seq u en ces for the popu la tions that suffer the b run t of its co n c en t ra te d power. T o ta li ta rian ism is, thus far at least, a p h e n o m e n o n assoc ia ted m ainly with Italian fascism, Nazism and Stalinism, bu t th e re are o th e r exam ples which fall


into the sam e ca tegory — for exam ple , the brief rule of Pol Pot in K a m p u c h ea . W hile , o f co u rse , th e re a re m ajo r d iffe rences be tw een all these exam ples, they share very im p o rtan t th reads in co m m on . T h e se co m m o n charac te ris t ics re la te to fea tu res of the m o d ern s ta te in general; th e re is no type of nation-s ta te in the co n te m p o ra ry world w hich is com ple te ly im m u n e from the potentiality of being subject to to talitarian ru le .15

T o analyse the n a tu re of to talitarianism , we have to re trace a pa th th ro u g h som e of the m ain argum ents of this book. N a tio n states differ in a fu ndam en ta l way from trad it ional ones in respec t o f the maximizing of surveillance which, in com bination with internal pacification, genera tes an administrative unity co rresponding to definite borders. Totalitarianism cannot exist in traditional s ta tes b ecause their segm enta l ch a rac te r is incom patib le with the necessary m obilization of co n c en tra te d resources . Several of the fea tu res of to ta litarian con tro l are p resen t in som e trad it ional states, bu t no t in the sam e overall com bination with o n e ano ther . T h u s w hat Friedrich calls a ‘totalist ideology' is almost the norm ra th e r than the exception in class-divided societies. T h e con f inem en t of literacy to small groupings of the popu la tion , the typical fusion of th eo cracy and military pow er, allied to the absence of a ‘public sp h e re ' in the m o d e rn sense , usually m ak e for the d o m in a n c e of a co n f ined sym bolic cu ltu re . But this c a n n o t becom e effective ‘p ropaganda ' so far as the majority of the subject popu la tion are co n ce rn ed , s ince it is not possible for the state authorit ies to ensure that it is systematically channelled to the mass. Secret police are com m on in traditional states, but normally the scope of their in fluence is limited to the locales of th e elite and of g o v ernm en t officialdom. T e r ro r , in the sense of th e large- scale use of v iolence to su b d u e o r in tim idate subject groups, particularly co n q u e red popu lations, is exceedingly co m m o n in the pages of history. But in the scale of historical m assacres and brutalities the re is no th ing tha t can m ore than rem ote ly m atch the deg radations of to talitarianism .

T h e possibilities of to ta lita rian rule d ep en d upon the existence o f societies in which the s ta te can successfully p en e tra te the day- to-day activities of m ost o f its subject popu la tion . This , in tu rn , p resum es a high level o f surveillance, based up o n the conditions analysed previously — the coding of in fo rm ation ab o u t and the superv ision of th e c o n d u c t of s ignificant segm en ts o f the


popula tion . T o ta li ta r ian ism is, first of all, an ex trem e focusing of surveillance, dev o ted to the securing of political ends d ee m e d by the s ta te au thorit ies to d em an d urgent political m obilization. Surveillance tends to b ec o m e c o n c en tra te d (a) in respec t o f a m ultip lica tion of m o d es of th e d o c u m e n t in g of the sub jec t popu la tion by the s ta te — identity cards, perm its of all sorts, and o th e r kinds of official papers , have to be held by all m em b ers of the popu la tion and used to follow even the m ost o rd inary of activities; and (b) this is the basis of an ex p an d ed supervision of those activities, ca rr ied ou t by the police o r their agents.

T h e ends to which to ta lita rian rule is m obilized tend to be strongly involved with nationalism , since nationalist sen tim ents offer the p rim e ideological m ean s of binding to ge ther o therw ise diverse populations. N ationalism is im p o rtan t in supplying the ‘to ta l’ aspect o f to talitarian doctr ines because it carries its own ‘symbolic h istoricity’, providing a myth of origins of a peop le , but also supplying th e peop le with a co m m o n destiny to be striven for in the future . Fascist thought tends to d raw upon those e lem ents of nationalist ideals that m ak e up the aggressive, exclusivist side of the nationalist Janus. M arxism , as its critics have long po in ted o u t , can readily be ad ap ted to m essianic goals and is th e locus classicus o f historicity conceived of as linking the past to an im m anent fu ture . But Stalinism, nonetheless, involves a c o n siderable adm ix tu re of nationalist thought, to which the no tion of ‘socialism in o n e co u n try ’ was adm irab ly suited. W h e th e r linked with M arxist-Leninism o r no t, nationalism lends itself readily to mass p ro p ag an d a , s ince the fate of the w hole com m unity is considered to be a shared one.


Elements of Totalitarian Rule

1 Focusing o f surveillance as:(a) in fo rm ation coding, d o cu m en ta t io n of activities of the

p opu la tion(b) supervision of activities, intensified policing

2 ‘Moral totalism ': fa te of the political com m unity as em b ed d e d in the historicity of the peop le

3 Terror, m axim izing of police pow er, allied to disposal o f the m eans of waging industria lized w ar and seques tra tion

4 Prominence o f leader figure·, appropria tion of pow er by leader depend ing no t upon a professionalized military role, bu t the gene ra t ion of mass support .

Surveillance involving the use of intensified policing rapidly tends to dissolve into te rro r , for fairly self-evident reasons. T h e m ost obvious o n e — although arguably the least consequen tia l — is that policing tends to b eco m e allied to the applica tion of m ethods of to r tu re to ob ta in confessions, in con tex ts in which crim es involve the holding of devian t political views, ra th e r than involving specified infractions of the law. M uch m ore im portan t a re the capabilities of police o r param ilitary forces to deploy the techno logy o f industrialized war against an u n a rm e d o r poorly a rm ed popu la tion . T an k s , m ortars , m achine-guns dep loyed with re fe rence to a civilian popu la tion , even if p resen ted as a th rea t ra th e r than actually pu t to use, can for policing purposes allow a tem p o ra ry physical co n tro l o f p o p u la t io n s well in excess of anything th a t could be accom plished in trad itional states. T h is is especially t ru e if the m ean s of v io lence are focused upon particu la r groupings in those popu lations, ra th e r than being used as an instrument of governm ent of the overall political community. W hen c o m b in ed with m e th o d s of seq u es tra t io n a lready well p io n ee red in o th e r co n tex ts of d ev iance , the c o n c e n tra te d applica tion of the use of force against m inority groupings can becom e extremely intense. T h e te rm ‘concen tra tion cam p ' already ca rries this m ean ing and is the m ost ‘total ' of ‘total institu tions’, thus being th e p ro to ty p e of to ta lita rian terro r. T e r ro r here , as A rend t says, is n o t c o n c e rn e d with the causing of fear for its own sake , but r a th e r expresses the ex trem ity of the ‘d ev ian c e ’ a t t r ibu ted to those in te rned , from which the m ajority ou ts ide needs to be p ro tec ted .

A key aspec t of to talitarianism , ^without which the rest w ould no t be possible, o r at least w ould no t be unified into a cohesive system of rule, is the p resence of the leader figure. T h e leader abrogates pow ers previously belonging to the law courts , political assemblies, o r sepa ra te s tate officials. T h is can be ach ieved partly on the basis of the use of te r ro r , purging those w ho disagree with particu la r policies o r w ho m ight in som e way be a sou rce of res is tance to them . But a high level o f personal affiliation to the leader on th e p a r t of the po lice an d th e military is also d em an d e d ,


as well as the active su p p o r t o f large segm ents of the general popu la tion . F o r my thesis, as against tha t o f A ren d t , is no t that te r ro r is the p rim e basis o f rule of to ta lita rian ism , bu t tha t mass support g en e ra tes the political leverage within which te r ro r can be used against ca tegories of ‘dev ian ts’. A n exp lana tion of the role of the leade r figure in to ta lita rian rule can be found in the general discussion of nationalism offered earlier. T h e th ree m ain exam ples o f d ev e lo p e d to ta l i ta r ian rule all o r ig in a ted in the shadow of a w ar tha t has recen tly en d ed and of the build-up to an o th e r shortly to begin. In the ir rise to p o w er the individuals co n ce rn ed , and th e party organizations they h ead ed , exploited this unsett led a tm o sp h ere in the rhe to r ic they p ro d u ced . In such c ircum stances , as the Le B o n /F re u d psychological theo ry of leadership suggests, th e re is a s trong tendency to identify with leader figures, on the basis o f regressive fea tu res of pe rsona li ty .16 T h e mass of the popu la tion is likely to b eco m e vulnerab le to the influence of sum bols p ro p ag a ted by the leader figure, in w hom an exaggera ted trust is m ain ta ined in spite of the punitive policies the lead e r m ight im pose. T h e m essian ic quality th a t o f ten charac te r izes upsurges of nationalis tic sen t im en t here b eco m es a t tr ibu ted in an ex trem e form to a dem ogogic leader, trusted because of his very au thorita r ian ism not in spite of it. Regressive identification with a leader figure leads to a partia l suspension of in dependen t m oral judgem ents that individuals in o th e r c i rc u m s tances might m ake , there being an affectively based ac cep tan c e on the lead e r’s judgem ents . Individuals b eco m e ‘suggestib le’, in Le Bon's te rm , to w ha tever the leader judges to be right and proper. M ilitancy associa ted with re liance on the leader figure tends to be co u p led with a s trong psychological affiliation to an ‘in-group’, which the leader symbolizes, to g e th e r with an ex trem e re jection of ‘ou t-g roups’, which fail to possess the special qualities tha t bind leade r and followership to g e th e r .17

In spite of its n am e, totalitarianism is no t an all-or-nothing p h en o m en o n and has d irec t links to a range of less ca taclysm ic potentialities of m o d ern states. Let m e briefly ind icate these, moving from 4 to 1 in th e p reced in g ch a rac te r iza t io n of to ta litarian rule. So far as po int 4 goes, the issue co n cern s tha t of the possibility of personalized rule in m o d ern states. Such a form of dom ina tion was p ro to typ ica l o f trad itional s tates, the re only having b een two know n excep tions to it — Classical G re e c e and

M odernity, Totalitarianism and Critica l Theory 305

th e R o m an Republic . T h e existence of 'd ic ta torsh ips ' today has to be u n d ers to o d against a b ack g ro u n d of universal ack n o w led g em en t of po lyarchy . A fairly high d eg ree of personaliz ing of leadersh ip can ap p ea r in all po lyarch ic systems, as W e b e r po in ted o u t and indeed actively ad v o ca ted as desirable. W h a t h e called ‘ch a rism a’ probab ly rests up o n the very psychological dynam ics of leadership just d iscussed, in so far as personalized leadership is able to gen e ra te mass support . Personalized leadership m ay, of course , be associa ted with military governm ent. An individual achieves political pow er no t th rough available elec toral m e c h a n isms, bu t th rough its seizure by the a rm ed forces, o f which that individual is e i ther the overall c o m m an d e r o r rises to p ro m in en ce w ithin th e ruling m ilitary cab ine t . Such ru lers m ay b ec o m e ‘d ic ta to rs ’ in the sense tha t , contro lling the m eans of violence, they are ab le to im pose a range of policies upon a largely reca lc i tran t popu la t ion , at least for a certain period of time. But given the difficulties in h e ren t in sustaining military g overnm en t, ‘d ic ta torsh ip’ of this sort is no t likely to persist unless the individual in question is able to gen e ra te w idespread co m m itm en t am ong a considerab le section of the civilian population .

By far th e m ost c o m m o n c irc u m sta n ce in which strongly personalized rule em erges is w here a g overnm en t is established as a result o f th e influence of a social m ovem en t — again indicating the im p o rtan ce of ‘ch a r ism a’. Such was the case in each of the th ree m ajo r c ircum stances of to ta lita rian rule, the conditions giving rise to the m ovem en ts involved no d o u b t also influencing the streng th of the personal affiliations the leaders w ere able to achieve. Stalin was the ‘in h e r i to r’ of the m antle of Lenin, bu t was able to sustain a style of personalized leadership because the im petus of the changes in itia ted by the O c to b e r R evolution were still strong, Lenin having d ied too soon af te r his assum ption of governm en t for th e re to have begun a full-scale p rocess of the routinization of charisma. Since the influence of social m ovem ents in the political life of m o d e rn nations is b o u n d to rem ain m ark ed , in the light of the ‘fields of historicity ' a ffo rded by m o d ern cu ltu re , personalized leadersh ip is ce r ta in to rem ain a p ro m in en t fea tu re of the political life of m any states.

It is partly the assoc ia tion of the charism atic leader with a social m o v em en t achieving governm en ta l po w er th a t explains


why the fos ter ing of te r ro r b eco m es a possibility. Social m ovem en ts are dynam ic m o d es of associa tion , c o n c e rn e d to mobilize change in a c co rd a n ce with convictions tha t do n o t necessarily allow m u ch space for a lternative opinions. T h e ‘m ora l lev erag e’ w hich a p o p u la r le ad e r is ab le to ach ieve o v e r a followership, co m b in ed with co n tro l of m o d e rn in s trum ents of violence, g en e ra tes repressive capabilities of a very fo rm idab le kind indeed . S ince th e F re n c h R ev o lu t io n , t e r ro r has b ee n associa ted particularly with the activities of post-revolutionary regimes and con tinues to be so in the tw en tie th -cen tu ry world. But on a m ore m inor scale it has to be reg ard ed as an eve rpresent possibility within m odern political systems w herever there are acu te p rob lem s of governability . H ere the issues involved m erge with som e of those ra ised by considering the in ternal role o f a rm ed fo rce confron ting the pacified popu la t ions of n a t io n states. Polic ing based upon th e pervasive use of v io lence , su p p o r ted by param ili tary forces o r the arm y, is in principle a possibility within states of all types. Its im p o rtan ce in the m o d ern s ta te raises questions of political theory co n c e rn e d with con tro l o f the m eans of v io lence generally , and these I shall consider in a following section .

‘M ora l to ta l ism ’ I c o n n e c t pa r ticu la r ly with th e pervasive influence of historicism in the cu ltu re of m odern ity . In the sphere o f politics it is m ost pa r ticu la r ly assoc ia ted with na tionalis t doc trines in the m o d ern world bu t, in a m o re general way, re la tes back to the in fluence of social m ovem ents . T o talk of ‘to ta lism ’ here does no t imply a c cep tan c e of the sort o f thesis advanced by T a lm o n and o thers , which traces tendenc ies tow ards to ta l i ta r ian ism to the genera l ized in f luence of d o c tr in e s regard ing the ‘po p u la r will’ as the a rb ite r o f political organization . T h e overall s ignificance of polyarchy in m o d ern sta tes is no t un re la ted to to talita rian ism — in my fo rm ulation of th e c o n c ep t ra th e r than tha t em ployed by T a lm o n — because polyarch ic involvem ent in political systems provides for possibilities of mass m obilization otherw ise p re c lu d ed .18 But the ‘totalizing’ effect o f symbol systems dep en d s m ainly upon how far they can be ap p ro p r ia ted in such a way as to coup le h istoricity with a hostile a t t i tu d e tow ards ‘o u t g ro u p s’. M arxism can be utilized in this fashion, as can various o th e r s tream s of m o d e rn th o u g h t which nom inally are qu ite


op p o sed to any vision of to ta lita rian rule. But, like nationalism , M arxism is Janus-faced and can fuel the m ost radical c r it iques of totaliz ing doctrines.

T h ese p rob lem s have been m u ch discussed in the l i te ra tu re of politica l sc ien ce , how ever , and it is u p o n th e in f luence of su rve il lance th a t I w an t to c o n c e n t ra te m ost a t ten t io n . T h e essential im p o rtan ce of surveillance as a m ed ium of pow er has n o t been g rasped within e i ther liberal o r socialist t rad it ions of political theory . In bo th cases this is bound up with the sam e em phases tha t tend to o b s tru c t a satisfactory acco u n t of the control o f the m eans of violence in influencing social organization an d social change . E co n o m ic exchange is tak en to be the e lem en ta ry binding force in m o d ern societies. In socialism in general , and M arxism in par ticu la r , oppressive form s of ru le are exam ined in rela tion to class dynam ics and in som e sense or an o th e r — directly o r indirectly — traced to the im pact of class dom ination . M arx ’s ce leb ra ted analysis o f B onapartism is a case in point. T h e ‘au to cra t ic p o w e r’ that the s ta te deve loped under Louis B o n ap a r te is exp la ined as o r ig inating in th e ‘b a la n c e ’ betw een con ten d in g classes which allowed the s ta te ap p a ra tu s to s tep in .19 S ubsequen t M arxist au th o rs have gone th rough all sorts o f co n cep tu a l co n to rt io n s to acknow ledge the adm inistrative po w er of the s ta te while still f inding its orig ins in class d o m in a tio n .20 For liberal writers on the o th e r hand , s ta te pow er is associa ted particularly with bu reau cracy , b u reau c ra t ic regulation being necessary to co-ord ina te the eco n o m ic fram ew ork of a com plex division of labour.

N e ither o f these trad it ions of thought p laces surveillance, o r th e m ech an ism s of co n tro l o f ‘d ev ian c e ’ a ssoc ia ted with the adm in is tra tive conso lida t ion of th e m o d e rn s ta te , as cen tra l . Surveillance may in terac t in various ways with class dom ination but, as has been previously stressed, is certainly no t derivative of it. B ureaucracy involves forms of surveillance activity, in bo th senses of surveillance. But the them es up o n which m ost writers (including W eber) have co n cen tra ted when analysing bureaucratic adm in is tra t ion tend to m arg ina lize those with w hich I am principally c o n c e rn e d here. B u reau cra tic pow er, as conce ived of by W e b e r at any ra te , is th e p o w e r of th e ex p e r t and the specialized official. T h e p ro b lem of surveillance, in th e overall con tex t o f the nation-state , is ra th e r different.


T h e expansion of surveillance in the m o d ern political o rd e r , in com bination with the policing of ‘d ev ian ce’, radically transfo rm s the relation betw een state authority and the governed population , co m p a re d with trad i t iona l s ta tes . A dm in is tra tive p o w e r now increasingly en ters into th e m inu tiae of daily life and th e m ost in tim ate of personal ac tions and re lationships. In an age m ore and m o re invaded by e lec tron ic m odes of th e s torage, collation and dissemination of inform ation, the possibilities of accum ulating inform ation re levan t to the p rac t ice of g o v ern m en t a re almost endless. C on tro l o f in fo rm ation , within m o d ern , pacified states with very rap id systems of co m m u n ica t io n , t ranspor ta t ion and soph is tica ted tech n iq u es of seq u es tra t io n , can be direc tly in tegra ted with the supervision of co n d u c t in such a way as to p ro d u c e a high co n c en tra t io n of s ta te pow er. Surveillance is the necessary con d it io n of th e adm in is tra t ive po w er of s ta tes , w ha tever ends this pow er be tu rn ed to. It is no t only intimately c o n n e c te d with po lyarchy , but m o re specifically with the ac tua l iza t ion of cit izenship r ights .21 C o n s id e r , fo r exam ple , eco n o m ic rights. T h e provision of welfare ca n n o t be organ ized or funded unless th e re is a close and deta iled m onito r ing of m any characteristics o f the lives of the population , regardless of w he ther they are actually welfare recip ien ts o r not. All such inform ation thus co llec ted is a sou rce o f po ten tial freedom for those whose m ateria l w an ts a re provided for through w elfare schem es. But it can also be a m eans of regulating their activities in a co-ord ina ted fashion acco rd ing to political doctrines p ro m u lg a ted by the s ta te a u th o r i t ie s ,22 w hich is no t u n c o n n e c te d with the fact that au th o r i ta r ia n g o v ern m e n ts may p ro m o te g en e ro u s w elfare schem es in com bination with the severe cur ta i lm en t of political and civil rights.

T h e co n n ec tio n of surveillance with policing m akes for o th e r possibilities of political oppression, going back again to totalitarianism, but separab le from it in their less im m odera te forms. T h e creation of ‘deviance’, within the m odern state is con tem poraneous with the fact of its suppression.21 ‘D eviance’ is not a set of activities o r a tt i tudes sep a ra te from the surveillance opera t ions of the s tate , bu t is fo rm ed in and th rough them . Now as o pposed to most— although n o t all — trad itional m odes of pun ishm en t, the co rrec tion of ‘d ev ian ce’ is specifically a m oral m atte r , how ever m u ch it m ay be overla in by p rag m a tic cons idera t ions . T h e


policing of m o d ern states can never be som eth ing which is m erely a ‘tech n ica l’ question of adm inistration. W ithin this a re buried a w hole range of com plex issues of no rm ative political theory . O ne need not go so far as to say that every criminal act is an indictm ent o f the existing social o rd e r , o r that the speech of the ‘m entally ill’ discloses a l te rna te universes of reality to tha t a c cep ted by the m ajority , to see that the Soviet p rac t ice of placing dissidents in m en ta l hospitals co n n ec ts closely with m o d ern ‘c o r re c t io n a l ’ t re a tm e n t as a whole. T o ta l i ta r ian rule p roduces sweeping and co m p reh en s iv e ca tegories of ‘d ev ian c e ’, but these c a n n o t be regarded as wholly sepa ra te p h en o m en a from those integral to m o d ern states.

T h e im plica tions of this d iscussion are two-fold. First, surveillance (in its various form s and aspects) m ust be regarded as an in d ep en d en t source of pow er, m axim ized in the m odern state, which has to be as m uch of a co n cern in social cr it ique as questions of m ateria l inequality o r the n a tu re of polyarchy. T h e writings of its m ost subtle analyst, F oucau lt , d em o n s tra te bo th th a t th e oppressive possibilities of su rve il lance c a n n o t be c o u n te red m erely by appeal to class dynam ics o r to the extension o f dem o cracy , and tha t th e re is no obvious and simple political p ro g ram m e to develop in coping with them . But we m ust also co n c lu d e th a t aspects of to ta litarian rule a re a th rea t in all m o d ern states, even if no t all a re th rea ten ed equally o r in exactly the sam e ways. W h e th e r we like it o r no t, tendenc ies tow ard to ta lita rian pow er are as d istinctive a fea tu re of o u r ep o ch as is industrialized war.

Dimensions of Modernity

Let me po rtray the four institutional clusters assoc ia ted with m odern ity in a som ew hat d ifferent way from previously (p. 146), as below. First briefly repea ting som e of the m ain in terp re ta t ions o f these o ffered in the cou rse of this book , I shall then try to ind icate how they might be applied to il lum inate sources of tension and conflict in m o d ern states.

By linking the four axes o f figure 6 a ro u n d th e edges I w an t to ind icate the potentially close re la tions tha t can exist be tw een each of them . ‘Private p ro p e r ty ’ in this figure does no t re fer primarily to legally def ined ow nersh ip of cap ita l, bu t to the



Surveillance (Polya rchy)

Private property(Class)

Military violence (Military power in the

context of the industrialization of war)

Transformation of nature (Created environment)

Figure 6

insulation of the eco n o m ic and the political d iscussed earlier. Even in the heyday of the individual e n t re p re n e u r w hat was ‘private ' had to be defined by what was ‘p u b lic ’, i.e. by the sta te , as the territorially based g u a ran to r of law. In la ter phases of capitalist d ev e lo p m en t, w here the large co rp o ra t io n s tend to have diffusely sp read share ow nersh ip , and w here governm en t d irectly adm iniste rs large sec to rs of industry, the equa tion of ‘p r iva te’ with ‘individual’ con tro l o f capitalist en terp rise becom es plainly inappropr ia te . This is n o t because — as som e in te rp re ta tions suggest — capitalism is d isappearing in the face of the em erg en ce of an o th e r p roduc tive form , but b ecause form ulations that identify capitalism with individual en trep ren eu ria l activity are deficient. T h ey confuse a particu lar epoch in the developm ent of m odern eco n o m ic en terp rise — ‘en trep ren eu ria l capita lism ' — with capita lism as a g en e ric type of p ro d u c tiv e o rd e r . T h e connec tions betw een p rivate p rope rty and class are in tim ate and direct and explain why ‘capitalist societies’ a re ‘class socie ties’. T h e re is no reason to d ispute the general lines of M arx 's position with regard to the class s tru c tu re of capitalism , which d epends upon the in tersec tion of capita l as com m odified p ro d u c ts with labour as com m odif ied labour-pow er. H ow ever, the cond itions of th e co m m o d if ica t io n of lab o u r-p o w er a re n o t h o m o g en eo u s . O th e r eco n o m ic d iffe ren tia tions besides ab sen ce of ow nersh ip of p ro p e r ty in the m ean s of p ro d u c tio n en te r in to class s tructura-

N either p rivate p rope rty n o r class conflic t have the overall im p o rtan ce in history th a t M arx a ttr ibu tes to them . In capitalism ,

tion .24

class re la tions and struggles b eco m e particularly significant, but this c a n n o t be gene ra l ized back to p r io r types of society . Surveillance is an in d ep en d en t sou rce of institutional clustering in all class-divided as well as m o d e rn societies. In its two aspects , surveillance is fu ndam en ta l to social organizations of all types, th e s ta te being historically the m ost co n seq u en t ia l fo rm of organization, but nevertheless only being one organization am ong m any o thers . In nation-states surveillance reaches an intensity quite u n m atched in previous types of societal o rde r , m ade possible through th e genera tion and con tro l o f in form ation , and d ev e lo p m en ts in co m m u n ica t io n an d tran sp o r ta t io n , plus fo rm s of supervisory con tro l o f ‘d ev ian ce ’. T h ese are in various ways quite decisively influenced by th e expansion of capitalism , although again they are ne i the r reducib le no r inevitably tied to it o n c e they co m e into existence. In stim ulating the dev e lo p m en t of a class system not based upon the d irec t con tro l of the m eans of v iolence on the p ar t of the d o m in an t class, in which violence becom es ex truded from the labour co n trac t , the em erg en ce of capitalism serves to ac cen tu a te som e key trends in the m o d ern state . T h e successful m onopoly of con tro l of the m eans of v io lence in the hands of the s ta te au thorit ies is the o th e r face of surveillance in the w ork-place and the co n tro l of deviance.

O nce const i tu ted in this way, in the con tex t of the s ta te system th e nation-s ta te increasingly becom es the pre -em inen t form of political o rganization . C on tro l o f the m eans of v io lence becom es bound up with the role of professional a rm ed forces, within a fram ew ork of industrialized war, while system integration depends in an essential way upon surveillance. This la t te r dev e lo p m en t, of course , does n o t ren d e r u n im p o rtan t the con tro l o f the m eans of v io lence , par ticu la rly given the close c o n n e c t io n s th a t exist betw een industrialism and war. N onetheless, the po ten tia l for m ilitary ru le is th e reb y re s tr ic ted , since in a m o d e rn s ta te ‘g o v e rn m e n t’ involves specialized adm inistration and the partic ipation of the popu la tion within a po lyarch ic d ia lec tic of control.

T h e technological changes stimulated by the energetic dynamism of capitalist deve lopm ent involve processes of the transform ation of the natural world quite distinct from anything occurring before. Such processes are, how ever, intrinsically linked to industrialism ra th e r than to capita lism as such. W h ereas in tribal and class- divided societies h u m an beings regard them selves as ‘co n t in u o u s ’


with na tu re , with the adven t of m odern ity n a tu re increasingly becom es tre a ted as th e passive instrum en t of h u m an purposes. T h e result is a m yriad series of technologically based t ran sm uta tions o f the na tu ra l env ironm en t far b ey o n d anything seen in p rio r types of society. In th e industrialized societies, and m u ch of the rest o f the world re ach e d by the in fluence of industrialism, hum an beings live in a c rea ted en v iro n m en t distinct from the ‘given' w orld of na tu re . M o d e rn u rbanism , so d ifferent in m ost respects from cities in earlier forms of society, is the most tangible and consequential expression of this phen o m en o n . It is misleading to speak of m o d ern urban ism as the ‘built en v iro n m e n t’, as m any urban sociologists and g eographers do. T rad it io n a l cities are also ‘built en v iro n m en ts ’ and thus it m ight a p p e a r as though the effects of industrialism in re la tion to the city solely co n ce rn the physical sp read of co n s tru c ted settings. H ow ever, the c rea ted env ironm en t of m o d ern u rbanism is ne i ther conf ined to the areas in w hich co n s t ru c te d h u m an h ab ita t io n s exist n o r a m a t te r prim arily of the sp read of such areas. R a th e r , it involves transfo rm ations in the re la tions betw een the habits o f day-to-day social life and the milieux in and th rough which they are o rd e red .

In po lyarch ic systems im bued with historicity ,25 social m o v em ents b eco m e of basic im portance . M ost m o d ern states have been in som e par t shaped by political m ovem en ts e ither leading to a revolu tionary b reak with pre-existing m odes of organization , o r to progressive political re form tending to a similar conclusion. G iven the en tan g lem en t of the origins of th e m o d ern s ta te with capitalism , it is no t surprising tha t such political m ovem en ts , both in fact and in theories o ffered abou t them by social observers, have converged strongly with labour m ovem ents . In M arxism in particu la r , in which an encom pass ing role is a lloca ted to class struggle, the labour m o v em en t is regarded as m ore o r less the sole inherito r o f the pressures for social and political change begun by ‘bourgeois’ m ovem ents. A ccord ing to the analysis developed here, how ever, the labour m o v em en t is o n e am ong o th e r form s of social m o v em en t tha t deve lop within m o d ern states and across their boundaries .

F igure 7, as with o thers th a t follow, should be u n d ers to o d as su p e r im p o sed u p o n th e p reced in g o ne . M o v em en ts o r ien te d towards the expansion of free speech and dem ocra t ic prerogatives a re in no sense limited to those ‘bourgeois ' groupings whose



Free speech/Democratic movements

Figure 7

in f luence was so s trong in th e re latively early phases of dev e lo p m en t of the m o d ern state. Marx was certain ly right to claim that the ideals em b ra ced by rising en trep reneuria l g roups w ere in som e par t ideological and the scorn with which he addressed them was often justified. But ‘bourgeois rights' have a m uch m ore generalizable re levance in m odern polyarchic systems than his analyses tend to em phasize. M ovem ents o r ien ted to the en largem ent of d em o cra t ic par tic ipa tion within the polity should be seen as always — in g rea te r o r lesser degree , and with various adm ix tu res of o th e r aims — o r ien ted tow ards redressing im balances of pow er involved in surveillance. W ha t ‘d em o cracy ' m eans here has to be u n d e rs to o d as inherently involved in the very con tes ta tions such m ovem en ts p rom ote . T h e re is a basic flaw, how ever , in the thesis o f M ichels and o th e rs th a t the expansion of organizations inevitably supplan ts ‘d em o c racy ’ with 'oligarchy'. T h e in tensification of surveillance, which is the basis o f the dev e lo p m en t of organizations in m odern societies and in th e world system as a w hole is, on the con tra ry , the condition o f the emergence o f tendencies and pressures towards democratic participation. In each of its aspects surveillance p ro m o tes the possibility of the consolidation of pow er in the hands of do m in an t classes o r elites. At the very sam e time, how ever, this p rocess is a c co m p an ied by coun te r- in f luences b rough t to b ea r in the dialectic of contro l .

P eace m ovem en ts have a pecu lia r significance in an e ra of po ten tia l nuc lea r con fro n ta t io n , bu t it w ould be in co rrec t to see these as solely co n f ined to the very r e c e n t past. Ideals of


re linquishing violence as a m o d e of o rdering h u m an affairs are probably as old as s tanding armies, thus an teda ting the m o d ern period by several th o u san d years. Such ideals have been close to the core values of at least som e of the world 's great religions and , since the adven t of the m o d ern sta te , m ovem en ts co n n e c ted with th em co n t in u e to be in fused by th e in f luence of religious symbolism. T h e no tion of ‘p e a c e ’, like tha t o f ‘d em o c racy ’, has to be reg a rd ed as a c o n te s te d c o n c e p t cen tra l to this type of m ovem ent. ‘P e a c e ’ m ay in such con tex ts m ean little m ore than the absence of war, but characteristically is m u ch m ore richly endow ed with m eaning . T h u s , in Q uakerism , pacifist values are assoc ia ted bo th with es tablished concep ts of Christianity and with views ab o u t the po ten tia l harm ony of hum an rela tionships free from the use of physical force. P eace m o vem en ts in a nuc lea r age have m ore urgent objectives than any co m p arab le social agencies in previous times and th ere is, hence , a strongly defined ‘ta c t ic a l’ e lem en t to them no t en fo rced upon p rio r types. N evertheless, they are manifestly linked to ideals of ha rm on ious social activity free from the organized use of violence. M ovem ents that in som e sense have peace as their en d should be at least analytically sep a ra ted from those which ad o p t pacifism as a m eans, although the division in p rac tice is by no m eans always clear-cut. Som e social m ovem en ts have been explicitly ‘n o n v io len t’, eschew ing the em p lo y m en t of force to reach the ends they seek . But the ir co n c e rn s a re no t necessarily o r ien ted primarily tow ards reducing o r dissolving the influence of a rm ed fo rce in the world at large.

By ‘ecological m o v e m e n ts ’ 1 m ean those c o n n e c te d with re shap ing the c re a te d en v iro n m e n t, w hose co n c e rn is thus primarily with the in fluence of industrialism in the m o d ern world. Such m ovem ents often draw upon traditionally established values, a l though the m ost significant per iod of their dev e lo p m en t only da tes from the early part o f the n ine teen th cen tu ry . M ovem ents d irec ted against the im pact of industrialism at tha t t im e ten d ed to be heavily in fluenced by R om antic ism and in general th e re m ay be a ‘backw ard- look ing’ o r ien ta tion to ecoological m ovem ents , s ince their o r ien ta tion m ay be tow ards the recovery of a tt i tudes to the na tu ra l w orld assoc ia ted with p re -m odern form s of society. G iven th e effects of th e industrialization of w ar and the close co n n ec t io n of th e techno logy of n u c lea r pow er with th a t involved


in nuc lea r w eaponry , it is no t surprising tha t ecological and peace m o vem en ts overlap in the ir ob jectives and their m em bersh ip . T h u s as one s ta tem ent pu ts it, the supporters of ‘green m ovem en ts’ are

u n ite d by th e ir love o f n a tu re , th e ir re sp e c t fo r th e E a r th ’s reso u rces, an d th e ir co m m itm en t to the ideal o f h a rm o n y b e tw een p eop le o f every race , co lo u r an d c re ed . T h ese fu n d am e n ta l beliefs im ply o th e r values: a re sp e c t fo r th e g en tle r side o f hu m an n a tu re ; a d islike o f m ateria lism ; a w illingness to sh a re th e w o rld ’s w ealth am o n g all its p eo p le ; a d es ire for dec isions to b e o p e n e d to all c o n c e rn e d ; an d th e se a rch fo r perso n a l tru th .26

T h e diffuse c h a ra c te r o f the s ta tem en t ind ica tes bo th the overlaps tha t m ay exist betw een the types of social m ovem en ts rep resen ted here , as well as the conflic ts in which they can be involved. L abour m ovem en ts orig inated primarily as m odes of ‘defensive con tro l ' of the w ork-place in c ircum stances in which the formal au thority w orkers held over their cond itions of labour was slight o r non-existent. W h e th e r co n ce rn ed with the im provem ent of econom ic conditions, the achieving of secure employment, o r m ere ly with the acquis it ion of political pow er, labour m ovem en ts may co m e into sharp opposition to goals of each of the o th e r th ree types of m ovem en t. T h e im p rovem en t of the prosperity of w orkers in a given sec to r of industry may lead them to su p p o r t policies inimical to , say, w hat m ay be regarded as necessary by o thers to p ro tec t the natura l env ironm en t. Similarly, ecological aims m ay only be realizable by deflecting o r b locking co n cern s cen tra l to those in the labour m ovem ent. Ecological m ovem en ts tend to be ‘co u n te r -cu ltu ra l’ in the sense that they p lace in q ues t ion som e of the d o m in an t o rgan iza t ional and technologica l bases of m o d ern societies. Such an o rien ta tion may in som e circum stances set them against free speech or dem ocra tic m ovem en ts , in so far as the la tter are co n ce rn ed to expand organizational p ro ced u re s of par tic ipa tion in political systems. T h e significant co n v e rg en ces be tw een p e a c e and ecological m o vem en ts in cu rren t times should not ob scu re the fact that th e re a re a range of ac tua l and poten tia l conflic ts be tw een these also.

T h e relative im portance of the various types of social m ovem ent ind ica ted above will natura lly vary acco rd ing to a variety of

c ircum stances . H ow ever, they can be fairly readily co n n e c ted with the m odes of classifying states o ffered in ch a p te r 10, as well as with the m o re diffuse in fluence o f cap ita lism an d of industrialism. T h e ch a rac te r and ex ten t o f class conflict, an d the assoc ia ted d e v e lo p m e n t of lab o u r m o v em en ts , a re prim arily g o v erned by the level o f expansion of cap ita lis t ic fo rm s of p ro d u c tio n bu t a re certain ly in fluenced also by the form of the state. T h e labour m o v em en t is likely to be a m ain , a l though not the cen tra l , focus of conflict in m ost post-colonial states , but may also converge with, o r be o v e rshadow ed by, free s p e e c h /d e m o cratic m o vem en ts o r ien ted m ore to the transfo rm ation of the political o rde r . In m ost such states, w h e th e r o r no t they have military governm en ts , p ro tes t d irec ted against the military is m uch m ore likely to take the free sp ee c h /d e m o c ra t ic form than to be organized in the guise of peace m ovem ents . Nevertheless, m ovem ents d irec ted tow ards dem o cra t ic goals can readily in som e part be inspired by ideals of national and in terna tional harm ony and by ‘co u n te r-cu ltu ra l’ revolts against the do m in an ce of technological imperatives. T h e ‘coun ter-cu ltu re’ here , however, is likely to involve the affirm ation of non-W estern values against those held to em an a te from W este rn cu ltu ra l hegem ony. W ithin all industrialized societies labour m ovem en ts ten d to have a basic organizing role for o th e r types of social p ro tes t . It does no t follow from this, how ever, e i ther that s ta te socialist societies are ‘class societies’ in the sam e sense as capitalist ones, o r that the cha rac te r of labour m ovem ents has not changed significantly in the capitalist coun tries during the cou rse of the ‘institutionalization of class conflic t’.27

T h e in te rp re ta t ion given by T o u ra in e of the ‘dec line’ of the labour m ovem ent, co m p ared with o th e r social m ovem ents , should be re s is ted .2S A cco rd in g to T o u ra in e , w ho pu rsues a line of argum ent ad o p ted by many o th e r observers, the labour m ovem ent is assoc ia ted ab o v e all with th e phase of en tre p ren e u r ia l capitalism. It com es into being in opposit ion to the rule of private capita l, seeking to c rea te a m ore equ itab le d is tribution of the fruits o f p ro d u c tio n , but tends to b eco m e less and less significant as the course of social deve lopm ent in the industrialized countries c rea tes a ‘p ro g ram m e d soc ie ty ’, in which the co-ord ination of inform ation is increasingly the m ain m edium of power. O th e r types o f social m ovem en t com e increasingly to the fore, displacing


th e labour m ovem en t from its cen tra l position as a m echan ism of social p ro test . T o u ra in e ’s writings are im p o rtan t and illuminating because they b reak away from the idea tha t the labour m ovem en t is inevitably the p rim e sou rce of opposit ion in capitalist societies. At the sam e time, he does no t su ccu m b to the view that the ‘dec line’ of tha t m ovem en t suggests a general process of the d isap p ea ran ce of radical sources of opposit ion in such societies. H ow ever, his view ignores the fact that capitalist societies (or nation-s ta tes) have from the ir incep tion been ‘p ro g ram m e d societies’, in which greatly he igh tened surveillance plays a vital role. F rom the perspective I have p roposec here , the labour m o v em en t re ta ins a cen tra li ty in capitalist societies because of their inherently class ch a rac te r . On the o th e r hand , m ovem ents o r ien ted tow ards surveillance, the military and the im pact of the c rea ted env ironm en t are also in a generic way co n n e c ted to institu tional fea tu res of those societies, as well as to their involvem ents in the world system.

T h e re a re m any forms of social m ovem en t no t m en tio n ed in the p reced ing paragraphs. S om e of the m ost im p o rtan t include the following:

1 Nationalist m ovem ents2 W om en 's m ovem ents3 E thn ic m ovem ents4 Religious revivalism5 S tuden t m ovem ents6 C o n su m er m ovem ents .

T h e general principle o ffered previously — that m o d ern social m o v em en ts exist in th e sam e ‘a ren as of h is to ric ity ’ as the organizations they o ppose , seek to modify o r c rea te — applies to all of these also. But it is no t my am bition to seek to develop an explication of the origins and ch a rac te r of social m ovem en ts in general, only to provide a ‘co n cep tu a l m ap ' tha t will link sources of social pro test with the m ain them es discussed in this book. T h e only claim I want to m ake is that each of these m ovem en ts , and o thers th a t do no t ap p e a r in the list, can be s ituated on this m ap. T o develop the point it is necessary to re la te the discussion back to the issue of c itizenship rights, fo rm ing a th ird figure super im posed on the p reced ing two.

In figure 8, four analytically distinct forms of ‘c o n te n t ’ o f the



Figure 8

s truggles in w hich m o d e rn social m o v em en ts engage are re p re sen te d . M o v em en ts d i rec ted tow ards th e expansion of dem ocra tic prerogatives are co n ce rn ed above all with that bundle of rights and obligations which l have followed M arshall in calling political rights. In linking con tes ts over civil rights to peace m ovem ents we have to bea r in mind w hat has been said ab o u t the connota tions of 'peace '. P eace m ovem ents fight ou t their struggles on a terra in o f civil rights in so far as their ob jectives involve the questioning of the use of fo rce in hum an social relations. In this respect, the ob jec t of their in ten tions is the generalized use of v iolence on the part o f s tates, including police repression as well as the role of the military in war. In th e segm ent connec ting political and legal rights th e re are to be found som e of the most im portan t and difficult d ilem m as of m odern politics. For, as has been m en tio n ed , the surveillance opera t ions c o n d u c te d by the m o d ern s ta te a re from som e aspects the sine qua non o f the realization of civil rights; yet the expansion of surveillance creates con tex ts in which rights which have been hard-w on are u n d e r th rea t .

W hile the main a rea of struggle of labour m ovem en ts is over eco n o m ic citizenship rights, such m ovem en ts can have and have had a m ajor in fluence upon the ach ievem ent and m a in ten an ce of o th e r rights. G iven the ch a rac te r of capitalist deve lopm en t they are b o u n d to co n t in u e to do so. T h u s , as has been ind icated previously, in the capitalist s tates class conflict has been the chief m ed ium of th e ach ievem en t o f political rights as well as certa in kinds of civil rights. H ow ever, it is obvious enough tha t these

th ree areas of con tes ta tion s tand in a re la tion of tension as m uch as unity with one an o th er . T h e rights of w orkers actively to w ithdraw their labour, for exam ple , can easily be reg a rd ed by o th e r g roup ings , n o t necessarily with any affilia tion to the do m in an t class, as con traven ing aspects of bo th their political and civil rights.

In designating as ‘m oral im peratives ' the terra in upon which ecological o r coun ter-cu ltu ra l m ovem en ts tend to co m e into play, I do no t in tend to claim tha t the th ree ca tegories of citizenship rights involve no m oral considerations. My suggestion is tha t an ab id ing co n c e rn of m o v em en ts of this kind is with th e re- m oraliza tion of spheres of life d en u d e d of ‘m oral m ean in g ’ by the im p ac t of techno logy o r of the c re a te d e n v iro n m e n t m ore generally. O ne of the charac te ris t ics of m odern ity tha t has been exhaustively ana lysed in the sociological and philosoph ical l i te ra tu re is exactly this and those w ho have raised the issue have been entire ly co rrec t to do so. But they have not been right to suggest, as m ost of them have do n e , that a co n ce rn with the recovery of ‘m oral m ean ing ' is the true origin of class conflicts. W hile th e re m ay be a significant overlap be tw een m ovem ents involved with each , th e re is no sense in which o n e is wholly explicable in term s of the o ther .

Discussing M arshall’s analysis of citizenship rights earlier, I have suggested th a t th ese do not necessarily s tand in a progression, such tha t each in tu rn is the basis o f the ex tension of the o thers ; and I w ant to em phasize this again here. In Britain, up o n w hich M arshall’s discussion co n cen tra te s , it is largely true to say th a t th e re was such a progression . But rights o n ce established can com e u n d er attack o r be dissolved, and the history of o th e r s tates across the face of the world d em o n s tra te s clearly enough tha t the ca tegories of citizenship right form substantially in d ep en d en t a renas of struggle. M oreover , their ch a rac te r and m o d e of realization m ay vary widely. All social m ovem en ts a re in som e p a r t involved in engagem en ts over such issues and it is in this respec t that the sch em e deve loped here can help illuminate the list o f m ovem en ts m en t io n ed above. T a k e two exam ples from th a t list — nationalis t an d w o m e n ’s m o v em en ts . N ationalist m o vem en ts tend to be loca ted in the co n cep tu a l space tow ards the top r ight-hand co rn e r of figure 8, being c o n c e rn e d norm ally with the winning of political rights for m inorities within a s ta te or


for g roups seeking to form a new political o rde r . For the m ost p a r t , na tionalis t m o v em en ts have been o r ien te d tow ards the expansion of dem o cra t ic par tic ipa tion , in o rd e r to claim rights of political invo lvem ent. But th e m o re agressive side of the nationalist Janus has ten d ed to involve values that w ould be lo ca ted fu r th e r dow n th e cen tra l axis in so far as an ‘an t i m o d e rn is t ’ e th ic is involved. W o m e n ’s m o v em en ts involve a varie ty of social assoc ia tions s tre tch in g b ac k a t least to th e n ine teen th cen tury . T h e earlier forms w ere primarily o r ien ted tow ards ach iev ing ec o n o m ic and political rights for w om en equivalent to those held by m en. Such goals still lag s h o r t of ach ievem en t but to them have been ad d ed a range of o th e r imperatives. Earlie r types of w o m en ’s m o v em en t w ould be p laced tow ard th e to p left-hand c o rn e r of figure 9; la ter forms m ove m ore to the top right-hand corner.

Social m ovem en ts are the ‘ac tive’ expression of sites of conflict o r struggle, but o f course the tensions involved in m odern societies are no t confined to areas w h ere agencies o f ac tua l o r po ten tia l change exist. Restricting a t ten t ion to the industrialized societies, we can m ap crisis tendenc ies by adding to the d iagram m atic rep resen ta tions given in th e p reced ing discussion.

T h e capitalist societies today represen t form s of class c o m prom ise in respec t o f their eco n o m ic organization (see figure 9).29 T h a t is to say, class conflic t is focused th ro u g h systems of industrial bargaining — which include the right to s trike — and through the ‘political class struggle ' o f par ty organizations. It is a com prom ise in the sense tha t the m ajor classes have reach ed an

M odernity, Totalitarianism and Critica l Theory 321

Figure 9


acco m m o d a t io n with o n e an o th e r , albeit a fragile o n e liable to be d isrupted by influences from inside and outside the administrative scope of states.

S ince capita lis t socie ties a re class societies , th e tensions be tw een classes rem ain potentially d isruptive for the w ider social system. T h e class system o p e ra te s th rough the (mobile) insulation of the eco n o m ic and the political, which is o n e cond ition of liberal dem o cracy as a political form. It can hardly be a m a t te r of ch an ce th a t l ibera l-dem ocra tic systems, with the exception of G e rm an y and Japan , are to be found exclusively in classical and co lonized nation-states. C harac ter is t ic of liberal d em o cracy is no t just the insulation of the eco n o m ic from the political, but the insulation of bo th from the military .30 T h a t th e re is no inheren t an d necessary re la tion , how ever, betw een th e p re -em inence of capitalist en terp rise within a particu la r national econom y and liberal dem o cracy , is d em o n s tra ted by any n u m b er of examples. T h e co inc idence of the two is based historically on the changes leading to the ‘ex trus ion’ of v io lence from the labour co n trac t , ‘pushing ap a r t ' not just eco n o m ic and political p ow er but also the s ta te ’s con tro l over the m eans of v io lence from both.

By the governability of capitalist societies I m ean how far it is possible for the s ta te au thorit ies to m aintain s table cond itions of rule. T o ‘g o v e rn ’, as I have previously stressed, m eans not just to ‘hold p o w e r ’ bu t to be ab le to m obilize re so u rces th rough systematically influencing large areas of the lives of the subject po p u la t ion . T h e governability of a m o d e rn society d ep e n d s primarily upon the degree of ‘organizational in teg ra tion ’ it is able to achieve. Class conflicts p resen t o n e th rea t to such integration. So long as a society rem a ins capita lis t , in the sense 1 have previously fo rm ula ted tha t te rm , class conflic t will be endem ic in it. T h e class com prom ise , ach ieved th rough the availability of form alized m odes of industrial conflict plus s ta te-organized social w elfare, tends to be based firmly upon an ‘effort barga in ’ betw een th e labour-force, em ployer and the state. This in tu rn dep en d s in som e substantial part upon the delivery of ad e q u a te econom ic pe r fo rm an ce to sustain levels of prosperity for the s tronger , m ore un ion ized sec tions of the work-force . S tra ins in th e ‘class co m p ro m ise ’ th e re fo re feed in directly to governability . B ut one canno t the reby infer, as M arxist o r thodoxy w ould have it, tha t class s truggle is 'the' p ro b lem g o v ern m en ts face . It is o n e

p h en o m en o n am ong o thers influencing governability — a centra l o ne , to be sure , but no t necessarily the m ost basic.

T h e governability of a m o d ern state co n cern s the success of the surveillance opera t ions it is able to sustain , these in turn how ever only having som e re levance in so far as they allow con tro l over aspects o f the day-to-day lives o f the popu lace . W ha t is im p o r tan t h e re is no t so m u ch the level o f leg itim acy a governm ent can genera te in respect o f the mass of the population , as how far es tablished pa t te rns of social co n d u c t are m alleab le in respec t of s ta te policies. In o th e r words, how far a governm en t actually ‘governs’ may d ep e n d less upon a generalized ac cep tan ce of the justifiability of its policies than upon a day-to-day ac cep tan c e of them . In e i ther case, how ever, ‘g o v ern m e n t’ only exists when th ere is a ‘two-way’ rela tion betw een the p rog ram m es of the ruling au thorit ies and ‘behavioural in p u t’ from those w ho are governed . Such a re la tion is th rea ten ed w hen significant sec to rs of th e labour-fo rce w ithdraw co -o p era tio n in class struggles, but it may be m enaced from o ther sources also. Of great im portance here is not so m uch d irec t d isillusionm ent with s tate policies — the w ithdraw al of legitimacy — as hostility o r aversion to the main pa t te rns of co n d u c t involved in m o d ern social and e c o n o m ic life. If ‘a n o m ie ’ is tak en to m ean a genera lized dissatisfaction with m ajor cultura l values, which lose their grip upon the day-to-day lives of individuals, then it can be accura te ly seen as a generic po ten tia lity within m o d ern societies. T h e re is no reason to suppose that it is m ore of a th rea t to governability than class conflic t, but clearly it stem s in som e considerab le deg ree from sepa ra te origins.

It seem s plausible to suggest that capitalist and s ta te socialist societies may be placed differentially within the p reced ing figure in term s of d iffe rences in their institutional alignments. T h u s in the capitalist s tates the principal ‘w eighting’ of tensions cou ld be said to lie a long a line draw n from b o ttom right to top left. P rob lem s of susta in ing th e class co m p ro m ise lie close to difficulties of governability , deriving their sources partly from anom ic cond itions perta in ing in various sec to rs of society. How far governm en ts co p e successfully with these p rob lem s in turn influences rec ip roca lly levels of class s truggle an d an o m ic ‘w ithdraw al’ from d o m in an t institu tional patterns.

In estab lished l ibera l-dem ocra tic s tates, so long as the ‘class



Z____^Z_______ \

z________\z__________ \

z_____________ ^z________________^z________________________ \

^ \ Industrialism

Figure 10

co m p ro m ise ’ is sustained in a reasonably effective way, the role of force in the in ternal consti tu tion of social o rd e r is limited. As industrialized states, bo th capitalist and s ta te socialist societies share a co m m o n pool of p rob lem s of governability deriving from anom ic d isaffection which may m otiva te a range of different social m o vem en ts (see figure 10). S ta te socialist societies do not, h ow ever , involve the sam e class dynam ics as th e cap ita lis t countries . T h e re is not a dom inan t class which, insulated from th e m ech an ism s of politica l p o w er, nego tia tes bo th with su b ord ina te classes and with the s ta te au thorities . In ‘w o rk e rs ’ s ta tes’ th e govern ing au thorit ies , in principle and in p ractice , have co m m an d over large arenas of eco n o m ic life, translating clashes involving labour organizations into d irec t confron ta t ions with the state . T h ese u n d oub ted ly are a m ajor in fluence upon the governability of the state , indicating tha t labour m ovem en ts are a perhaps m ore po ten t sou rce of t ransfo rm ation in s ta te socialist societies than in the W este rn countries. For, in the fo rm er, in contrast to the latter, there is no t the m eans of keeping ‘econom ic’ s truggles se p a ra te from direc tly ‘po li tica l’ o n es .31 G iven this c ircum stance , which has led to m ajo r conflicts in the Eastern E u ro p ean coun tr ies — although no t in the Soviet U nion itself —

over the past th ree decades , tendenc ies tow ards th e use of force in internal governm en ta l affairs b rook fairly large.

The Need for a Normative Political Theory of Violence

T h e tw entie th cen tu ry has b een decisively shaped in its m ajo r lines of dev e lo p m en t by M arxism , but is at the sam e tim e in som e respects o p a q u e to M arxist though t. M arx’s writings are fo u nded upon the idea th a t h u m an history crea tes th e conditions for the em anc ipa tion of social life from pre-existing form s of oppression o r exploitation . T h e teleological im plications of M arx ’s acco u n t of history are in som e respects puzzlingly am biguous, but that som e sort o f te leology is a t t r ib u ted to h u m an social dev e lo p m en t seems undeniable. A ccording to Marx, ‘hum an beings only set themselves such puzzles as they can resolve.’ T h e past developm ent of hum an societies, culminating in capitalism, has produced a world in which industrial p ro d u c tio n is cap ab le o f genera ting w ealth far in excess of anything available to hum an beings before. S ince industrialism has co m e into being within the fram ew ork of class society, the fruits o f p ro d u c tio n , in the shape of th e ‘good life’, a re den ied to the m ajority of its very producers . But the labour m ovem en t is at h and to solve the riddle of history, and com es to p ro m in en ce th rough the self-same processes that fu r ther the expansion of capitalist p roduc tion . T h e victory of the working- class re -hum anizes cond itions of p ro d u c tio n , re tu rn ing a s trong m easure of con tro l over the p roduc tive p rocess to the w orkers and abolishing classes. A (world) society in which p ro d u c tio n is consciously organ ized acco rd ing to hum an need , ra th e r than accord ing to the vagaries of capitalist en te rp rise , com es into being.

T h is scenario is in som e respects not so far from the reality of w hat has h ap p e n ed over the past h u n dred years as m ost of M arx ’s critics w ould assert. A m ong the industrialized societies a t least, capitalism is by now a very d ifferent p h en o m en o n from w hat it was in the n in e teen th cen tu ry and labour m ovem en ts have played a p rim e role in changing it.32 In m ost of the capitalist countries , we now have to speak of the existence of ‘welfare cap ita lism ’, a system in which the labour m ovem en t has achieved a considerable s take and in w hich eco n o m ic citizenship rights b rook large.

S om e of M arx ’s p roposa ls — never e lab o ra ted in any detail —


ab o u t the fu tu re form of a type of social o rd e r t ranscend ing capitalism now look less than adequa te . P lanned p roduc tion within a highly com plica ted m odern econom y, if he envisaged such a thing, has p roved m u ch m ore difficult to ach ieve in an effective fashion than seem ed likely in the n in e teen th cen tury . Schem es of w o rk e rs ’ self-m anagem ent have m e t with nu m ero u s difficulties and if, as som e in terp re ters suggest, M arx foresaw the em ergence of a global post-scarcity econom y, this looks today com plete ly beyond the bounds of possibility. Nevertheless, it seem s by no m eans im prac ticab le to envisage an eco n o m ic o rd e r in which p lanned p ro d u c tio n , coup led to a s trong injection of se lf-m anagem ent, would serve to re tu rn a m easu re of con tro l over w ork-processes to those involved in them . T h e sam e could not be said of con tro l o f th e m eans of v iolence. M arx toyed with the no tion of a popu lace of a rm ed w orkers as the best c o u n te r balance to the pow er of coerc ion vested in the sta te , but such ideas seem positively a rcha ic today. In those coun tries w here som eth ing close to this s ituation is found, at least in respec t of small w eaponry , like the U SA o r som e of th e Latin A m erican countries , the results afe hardly pra iseworthy. In any case, talk of re tu rn ing con tro l of the m eans of v iolence to the po p u lace m akes no sense w hatsoever in the case of the deve loped w eapons of industrialized war. In term s of historical agencies of change, there is no parallel in the sphere of w eaponry to the p ro le ta ria t in the a rea of industrial labour. No plausible ‘dialectical c o u n te rp a r t ’ to the progressive accum ula t ion of military p ow er seems to exist. P rotest m ovem en ts and peace m ovem ents there are, but even in the m ost optim istic portrayal of the nea r fu tu re it is scarcely conceivab le these could parallel the world-historical role Marx foresaw for the w orking class.

Now to this it could simply be said that history has no teleology, apa rt from the purposes individual hum an beings in co rpora te into their ac tions; and tha t the part which the p ro le ta ria t was supposed to play in history was ex traordinarily exaggera ted . But such an observation in no way com es to grips with the problem s at issue. W ha t would the ‘good society ' look like in re spec t of con tro l o f the m eans of violence? W hat m ean ing are we to at tr ibu te to ‘society ' in this phrase anyway, given the division of the w orld in to a m ultip lic ity of nation-sta tes , all hav ing the capability of deploying a rm e d fo rce of considerab le destruc tive


pow er and w here som e sta tes literally have the capability to destroy the whole of hum anity? T h ese questions raise far m ore difficulties, of course , than could be adequa te ly d iscussed here and I shall confine myself to indicating a possible ap p ro ach to them — o n e of which I shall develop fu r th e r in the th ird vo lum e of this w ork .33

Such an ap p ro ach w ould have to co n c e rn itself bo th with prob lem s of w orld policing and military rule within states, and with the fu ndam en ta l issue of v iolence be tw een states in an e ra of industrialized war. In states th roughou t the world today, to repea t a them e of the last few chap te rs , pacified popu la tions — save in ce rta in c ircum stances and in a few regions — co nfron t soldiery possessing industrialized w eaponry . In s ituations in which the use o f police pow er is highly repressive th e re m ay be little o r no effective distinction be tw een the police and the military. How far policing involves the extensive use of fo rce against a range of ‘d ev ian t ’ ac tivities will d ep e n d bo th up o n the defin it ion of ‘dev iance’ within a given society, and upon a series of o th e r cond itions to do with the overall organization of the societal system. O ne main e lem ent is how far w hat co u n ts as ‘d ev ian ce ’ is specifically restr ic ted to criminal activities, not em bracing political acts. Of course , a great deal tu rns on what is to co u n t as ‘poli tica l’ here. P erhaps all that needs to be said in this co n tex t is tha t the public sp h e re ’ o f political d eb a te should be open enough to allow

non-violent appraisal of w here ap p ro p r ia te divisions are to be draw n betw een w hat is ‘politica l’ and what is m erely ‘c r im inal’.

T h e ques tion of military rule has already been discussed, albeit with som e brevity. T h e poten tia lity for military gov ern m en t in m odern states is relatively limited, if ‘g o v ern m e n t’ here m eans assum ing overall responsibility for rule. It is a d ifferent m a t te r if we cons ider the capability of the military to m ain ta in diffuse sanctions holding governm en ts to ce rta in styles of policy, o r confining w hat they do within definite limits. H ere the influence of the military is s trong in a large p ro p o r tio n of nation-states, and in the na tu re of the case it is impossible to look for any guaran tees th a t military ‘in te rv en tio n ’ will no t o cc u r even in the m ost stable o f liberal dem o crac ie s . O n e fac to r likely to be im p o rtan t is res is tance to th e en c ro ac h m e n t of militaristic values, som eth ing w hich is surely o n e of th e m ain shared inspirations of c o n te m p o ra ry p e a c e a n d eco log ical m ov em en ts . W h a t co n s t i tu te s


‘militarism ’ is no t a cons tan t , bu t has been very substantially c h a n g ed by the d ev e lo p m e n t of the a rm e d fo rces s ince the n ine teen th cen tu ry and by the co n co m itan t industrialization of war. M ilitaristic values of the traditional type probab ly w ere d isplayed for the final tim e on a large-scale with the defea t of Japan in the S econd W orld W ar. Even then they had b eco m e largely subord ina ted to the dem ands of a m odern , professionalized arm y, in which the display of ex trem e individual valour is of m arginal im p o rtan ce co m p ared with effective discipline on the field of ba tt le and efficient p roduc tion in industry. ‘M ilitarism ’ today m eans m ore than anyth ing else a proclivity on the p ar t of those in the h igher echelons of the a rm ed forces and in o th e r leading circles ou ts ide to look first o f all for military solutions to issues which could be solved by o th e r m eans; and the read iness of the lower ranks to accep t such solutions unquestioningly. Military discipline does no t necessarily p rec lu d e the deve lopm en t of a sophis ticated political cu l tu re within the a rm ed forces, and the fostering of ‘o p en n ess’ in this respec t should presum ably be one e lem en t in any political p ro g ram m e which seeks to co m b a t militarism. T h e re are obviously com plex issues involved in this m atte r , how ever, s ince th e re is som e plausibility to the a rgum ent tha t it is the professionalized, a-political army that is least likely to bring the influence of military pow er to bea r upon g o v e rn m ental decisions.·14

I have suggested earlier tha t , significant as questions of th e role o f th e military in g o v ernm en t in m odern states may be, they are s trictly seco n d ary to th e issues posed by the sp read of industr ia lized w eap o n ry in the w orld military o rd e r . It is undoub ted ly in this respec t tha t we find ourselves today furthest from the sorts o f p rob lem s tha t p reo ccu p ied m ost eigh teenth- and n ine teen th -cen tu ry political th inkers . W e seem bereft o f plausible courses of ac tion that could do any m ore than limit th rea ts g rea te r than hum an beings have ever had to face in the cou rse of their long history. W hen even ‘o r th o d o x ’ w eapons have reached the destruc tive po ten tia l o f cu r ren t times, it is no d o u b t desirable to seek to preven t any o u tb rea k s of w ar at all. But the m ost urgent and necessary task facing us today is plainly the prevention o f w arfare involving nuclea r a rm am en ts — o r o th e r w eapons which m ight in the nea r fu tu re ap p ro ach them in their destruc tive potential. No one who lives in the present-day world can fail to be


aw are that the re is a ‘two-step ' process facing us and it is by no m eans clear if o r how hum anity can take the second step involved. T h e first s tep is tactica l; it is simply a m a t te r o f th e pers is tence of a s ituation in which, as over th e past forty years, nuc lea r w eapons rem ain unused. T h e second is the im p lem en ta t ion of a no rm ative political theory of the m eans of v io lence — the c rea tion of a social o rd e r in which use o f military pow er will no longer th rea ten o u r existence as a whole. History has no teleology and it would only be the m ost sanguine of observers w ho could confidently assert tha t the second step will ever be taken .

An unders tand ing of the necessarily ‘tac tica l ' n a tu re of coping with the l ikelihood of n u c lea r w ar in p re sen t times can be d ee p en ed by briefly recap itu la ting the in fluence of w ar upon the deve lopm en t of the E u ro p ean s tate system and the global n a t io n state system. D ating from som ew here a round the year 1000 AD, war in Europe no longer remained a chronic series of disaggregated a rm ed struggles, gradually beco m in g p a r t o f an a r is to cra t ic w arr io r cu l tu re and tak ing on a r i tualized fo rm .35 In m any en co u n te rs , a l though not in those en te red into against foes from o u ts id e E u ro p e , th e re w ere form alized re s tr ic t ions up o n the co n d u c t of battle , observed by all parties to the com bat. This was su cceed ed by a period in which the art and the sc ience of w arfare w ere pushed fo rw ard and w here the a rm e d forces w ere c o o rd in a ted in the service of newly s tren g th en ed states. In its overall c o n to u rs , this p e r iod can be said to s tre tch from som ew here in the sixteenth cen tu ry to the o u tb rea k of the First W orld W ar. W ar and d ip lom acy b ecam e integrally linked, with the fo rm er being, as C lausewitz m ad e explicit, the ins trum en t to be applied w here d ip lom atic m easures failed o r w ere o therw ise rebu tted . It can be said with som e tru th tha t C lausewitz sought to de tach the co n d u c t of w ar from militarism in its traditional m eaning — the pursuit o f w ar as an intrinsic value, o r for the virtues that could be p ro m o ted th rough partic ipa tion in b loody co m b a t .36 T h e m ost fam ous of all rem arks upon the n a tu re of war— ‘W ar is no t m erely a political ac t, but also a real political ins trum ent, a con tinua tion of political co m m erce , a carrying ou t of th e sam e by o th e r m ean s ’37 — is no t an expression of a w arrior philosophy, but an observa tion ab o u t the practicalities of the p recarious exis tence of s ta tes within the E u ro p ean s tate system. N either w ar n o r military v ictory are ends in them selves; they are



in s trum ents in the realization of longer-term policies. W ar has a ch a rac te r shaped by its political in ten tions and the main strategy to be em ployed is to achieve the d ip lom atic ends at least military cost.

A lthough the realization for m ost of those involved cam e after the em erg en ce of the p h en o m en o n , the dev e lo p m en t of the m eans of waging industrialized w ar in the la tter par t of the n ine teen th cen tu ry irretrievably changed the n a tu re of warfare and its role in rela tion to the am bitions of states. T h is is no t to say th a t C lausew itz’s d ic tum b ecam e irrelevant as soon as the armies c lashed . But w ar cou ld no longer be held to the limited engagem ents , res tr ic ted by the political motives underly ing them , that C lausewitz had in m ind. T h e era of ‘total war' negates just this supposi t ion , as well as o th e rs with w hich C lausew itz charac terized the na tu re of warfare. Prior to the twentieth century it was accep ted by co m b a tan ts , and m ad e part of in terna tional law, that w ar is a conflict betw een political entities, in which individuals par tic ipa te only in so far as they relinquish their civilian s tatus to b eco m e agents of the s ta te .w But with the advent of industrialized war, the mass of the popu lation is inevitably involved, with victory dem an d in g the smashing of the system of p ro duc tion tha t is the necessary base of the w ar effort. During the First W orld W ar the im plications of this were gradually realized by the partic ipants , a lthough the generalization of war to the whole of th e popu la tions of the belligerent s tates o ccu rred only in the Second. T h e objectives of the military effort in the Second W orld W a r w ere not just the overcom ing of the military forces of the o th e r side, but the subdu ing of the ‘mass of the enem y p eo p le ’.

During the interim period between the two W orld Wars, various l im itations on w ar w ere d iscussed by the politic ians on an in terna tional level. T h e prohib it ion of various types of w eapon was widely canvassed. So w ere proposa ls for in terna tional rules govern ing the use of w eaponry and the limitation of the use of airforces. W ith one o r two exceptions, such as the use of poison gas, all this eventually cam e to naught. In the open ing par t o f the S econd W orld W ar th e re was, on bo th sides, som e a t tem p t to ensure tha t air strikes be limited to industrial targets directly co n n ec ted with military p ro d u c tio n . But even if this h ad been techn ica l ly feasible , it was n o t ob serv ed , th e m ore-or-less

indiscrim inate bom bing of civilian targets rapidly becom ing one of the m ain m eans w hereby the will of the o p p o n e n t to co n tin u e was to be b roken . T h e a tom ic bom bs d ro p p e d on H irosh im a and Nagasaki w ere no th in g m o re n o r less th an a c o n c e n t ra te d applica tion of te rro r , designed to shock Japan into su rrender. This aim was accom plished , bu t these self-same acts u shered in a new phase of military v io lence — o n e that has p ro d u c ed even m ore d ram atic a schism with previous forms of military conflict than did the earlier phase o f the dev e lo p m en t of industrialized war.

T h e existence of n u c lea r w eapons is a d irec t dev e lo p m en t of the in tegration of industrialism and m odes o f con d u c tin g war, but the scale of their des truc tive capabilities is so huge that even the th rea t of their use alters the n a tu re of war. In the case of the n u c lea r pow ers , particularly the super-powers, the established connec tion betw een d ip lom acy is not b ro ken , but it is reversed. T h ese states ca n n o t use their possession of n u c lea r a rm am en ts to fu r th e r the ir d ip lom atic goals , bu t ins tead have to em ploy d ip lom atic m anoeuvring to a t tem p t to ensu re tha t s ituations do not arise in which those a rm am en ts might be un leashed . T h is is particularly the case w here the super-powers confron t one ano ther directly , the ‘success ' of the d ip lom acy in (he C uban missile crisis, for exam ple , being m uch m ore that a military engagem ent was avoided than tha t K ennedy ach ieved his initial aim (which was of the sam e o rd e r in any case) — to keep Soviet missiles ou t of C uba. U nfor tunate ly , while the existence of nuc lea r w eapons a lters the n a tu re of the c o n n e c t io n s be tw een d ip lom atic bargaining and war, it does no t do away with d ip lom acy, o r with the s tra teg ic n a tu re of th e re la tions be tw een sta tes in an in te rd ep en d en t world that is a t the sam e tim e frac tu red and chaotic . Given the n a tu re of the nation-sta te system, political activity within and on behalf of s tates tends to be c o n c e rn e d with short- r a th e r than long-term in terests an d to p u rsue m u tua l interests only w hen short- term gains ac c ru e to the individual states.

M oreover , it is ap p a ren t tha t the p resen ce of large stock-piles of nuclea r w eap o n ry by the super-pow ers does no t bring to an en d — short o f their d ep lo y m en t in w ar — the dynam ic processes of techn ica l ch an g e effec ted by the co m bina tion of science, industry and w eapons deve lopm en t. An arm s race has been an


inheren t p a r t o f bo th p ea ce and w ar since th e co-ord ination of industrial p ro d u c tio n and the m eans of waging w ar first becam e the basis of military streng th in the m o d ern age. T h e m ost well- d o c u m e n te d exam ple in th e n in e tee n th and early tw en tie th cen tu ries is that betw een Britain and G e rm an y , in which each expressly geared its w eapons p roduc tion to that o f the o ther , using ca lcu la ted fo rm ulae of military adequacy to organize their own industrial effort. As in the cu r ren t arm s race , industrial en terp rise was s t im ulated , in certa in sectors at least, by the pressures induced by the arm s com petit ion . It has been claim ed th a t the techno logy of naval w arfare changed as m u ch in the half c en tu ry be tw een 1850 and 1900 as in th e th o u san d years previously.39 T h e fission w eapons exploded over H iroshim a and Nagasaki w ere rep laced less than ten years la ter by the m uch m ore des truc tive fusion w eapons, these in tu rn being rapidly fu r the r deve loped to increase their explosive p o w er m any times over. T h e applica tion of technologica l deve lopm en t to delivery systems is only o n e aspec t o f a battery of technical advances in gu idance and o th e r areas; to which have to be ad d ed laser w eapons and the expanding deve lopm en t of chem ical w eaponry .

W hat validity there is in the idea of the ‘military-industrial c o m p lex ’ derives from th e e lem en t of co -o rd in a ted forw ard planning which is involved in the military rivalry betw een the super-powers. T h e regularity of innovation , and its gearing to industrial p ro d u c tio n , do not just der ive from processes of technologica l innovation in the econom y as a whole but from the continual a t tem p t to re spond to w hat the o th e r side will do and the advances they will m ake . T h e arm s race is no t ba lance of pow er d ip lom acy applied to w eapons deve lopm en t in a bipolar setting. If it involves som e kind of equilibrium , it is a highly unstab le and shifting o n e in which the ra tiona le of technical advance is no t simply the ach ievem en t of parity with the o th e r pow er, but the ability to adap t w eapons p roduc tion to p ro jec ted fu tu re innovation .40 In a s ituation of ‘m obile equilibrium ' the re is no point at which overall res tra in t upon fu r th e r technologica l advance in w eapons dev e lo p m en t, o r even calling a halt to the fur ther accum ulation of existing w eaponry, will no t tend to favour o n e side ra th e r than the o ther . T o take just o n e exam ple — rep ea ted in its essential form in all subsequen t negotia tions — the first A m erican proposa l for arm s con tro l , the Baruch Plan of


1946, w ould have p u t n u c lea r w eap o n s u n d e r in te rn a t io n a l supervision. But the Soviet U nion , which at th a t t im e had n o t yet exp loded a nuc lea r device , w ould have b een left at a m ajo r disadvantage co m p ared with the USA , which w ould have been able to d o m in a te the supervising body. T h e Soviets m ad e the coun ter-p roposa l for d isa rm am en t prio r to in terna tional con tro l and the c rea t ion of nuclear-free zones to ge ther with various n o n aggression pacts. H ow ever, such a situation w ould have given the Soviet U nion a significant advan tage over the rival pow er, s ince it m ain ta ined m u ch the larger non-nuc lear army. Only in c i rc u m stances w here bo th s tand to gain in the short- o r m edium -term has th e re been som e success — as in the N on-prolifera tion T re a ty and the SA LT ag reem ents . T h e fo rm er was designed to check the diffusion of n u c lea r w eaponry to sta tes no t yet possessing it and the SALT agreem ents probably actually formalized the competitive na tu re of the arm s race m ore than acting to arrest its course.

W hile the massive dev e lo p m en t of w eaponry on the part of the super-pow ers has to have prim ary p lace in any analysis of military pow er in the nuclea r age, the co n tin u ed build-up of the m eans of industrialized w ar elsew here , via the world military o rd e r , is m uch m ore than just a spin-off from the m ain cen tres of the arms race. T h e diffusion of ‘First W orld ' w eaponry to virtually all s ta tes is itself em bro iled in a generalized arm s race , having a n u m b er of focal points in the re la tion be tw een states in regions of high tension. T h e sam e logic fuels arm s com peti t ion in these areas as in the n u c lea r arm s race and is, o f cou rse , in som e part fostered by the military transfers m ad e by the super-pow ers and the o th e r states with deve loped arms industries. T h a t is to say, rival s tates pro jec t what the o thers are likely to possess in the im m inen t fu tu re and while m ost m ay be d e p e n d e n t upon technologica l advances in a rm am en ts m ad e in the industrialized states, an increasing n u m b er of coun tries are likely to p ro m o te ind igenous arm s industr ies .41 M ost d is turb ingly , as has been m en tio n ed previously, the sp read of the techno logy and raw m ateria l for ‘p eacefu l ' n u c lea r use is likely to lead to the fu r ther expansion of n u c lea r w eaponry in spite of existing trea ty regulations.

A norm ative political theory of control of the m eans of violence in the cu r ren t age ca n n o t do o th e r than begin from C am u s’s pessimism, seeking from th ere to develop at least som e guidelines


to m ore optim istic possibilities in the longer-term fu ture . T h e a ttractiveness of M arxist though t , in con tra s t to th e ‘u topian socialism ’ w hich M arx an d Engels a t tack ed so abrasively in the n in e teen th cen tu ry , was th a t the em ergence of the new socialist o rd e r was no idle d ream , but supposedly im m an en t in the n a tu re of capitalist deve lopm ent. W e can call upon no such dialectic today and instead, it m ight be argued , m ust appeal to a renew al of u topian ism , m ixed with the firmest form of realism. T h e tactics of (a) survival in the face of the global des truc tive capabilities possessed by the super-pow ers and (b) minimizing the possibility of the o c c u rre n ce of n u c lea r w ar involving o th e r states, have to be an overrid ing priority. But ‘p e a c e ’ in respec t of (a) and (b) is hardly a construc tive pa th for indefinite fu tu re deve lopm en t, which has to be linked to a concep tion of the ‘good society ' no m a t te r how rem o te the likelihood of its ach ievem en t is at present.

Som e of the param ete rs of d eb a te seem clea r and indisputable . T h e scientific know ledge which allowed the c rea tion of nuclea r w eapons ca n n o t be dissolved, short of the des truc tion of m odern civilization itself by m eans of those w eapons. Nor is th e re any feasible type of in te rn a tio n a l agency o r m utually agreed p ro g ram m e which is likely to persuade e i ther of the super-powers to shed their nuclear w eapons, singly or jointly. P eace m ovem ents, in co m b in a t io n with th e g o v ern m en ts of o th e r s ta tes can , nevertheless, potentially have a large influence on key aspects of the world military o rd e r and the arms race. T h e ob jec ts of the tactical phase of facilitating ‘p e a c e ’ — m eaning here the absence of nu c lea r w ar — are plain to see, even if the p ow er which can be applied to reach them is slight indeed co m p ared to tha t of the politica l, m ilitary and ec o n o m ic o rgan iza t ions likely to be opposed . T h ey include, above all: the p rom otion of d é ten te be tw een the super-powers, in the con tex t o f securing the fullest possible o p en n ess of co m m u n ica t io n and in fo rm ation flow betw een them ; the prom otion of program m es of conversion within w eapons industries, phasing out in particu la r the p ro d u c tio n of w eapons systems, tu rn ing the research and dev e lo p m en t involved to o th e r uses;42 the instituting of m u ch m o re severe restrain ts than currently exist upon the transfer of nuclear pow er technology and m ateria ls to non-nuc lear states, to g e th e r with a reversal of nuc lea r pow er p ro g ram m es in all s tates w h ere they have been im p lem en ted , in favour of non-nuc lear pow er sources; and the


unilateral ab an d o n m en t of nuclea r w eapons by the smaller nuclear states. T h e very im plausibility th a t such p roposa ls cou ld be effectively p ressed h o m e in th e n ea r fu tu re , o r even in the m edium -term , d em o n s tra te s tha t C am us was no t overs ta ting his case.

Critical Theory in the Late Twentieth Century

C o m te an d M arx , pe rhaps the two most p ro m in en t n ineteen th - cen tu ry social th inkers, shared a certain o u tlook in co m m o n , in spite of the wide d ivergencies betw een their views. For bo th , the know ledge g en e ra ted by th e social sciences is to rescue hum anity from a past in which the m ost decisive events which affected social deve lopm en t w ere beyond hum an m astery , p ro jec ting us into a fu tu re in which we con tro l o u r own destiny. In C o m te ’s case, what m atte rs is d iscovering the laws of m otion of societies, this know ledge allowing the system atic p red ic t ion on the basis of which we can ap p ro p r ia te o u r own history and tu rn it to o u r purposes. Prévoir pour pouvoir: an unders tand ing of social life will allow us to transform it in m uch the sam e way as natura l sc ience has m ad e possible the system atic transfo rm ation of the natura l world. F o r M arx, th e e ra of ‘h istory’, as o p p o sed to tha t of ‘pre-history’, will co m e ab o u t when the class divisions that have been the m o to r of social change up to the present have finally been transcended . Again, unders tand ing o u r past history will allow us to shape the fu tu re and resources will b eco m e devo ted to the use of the whole h u m an com m unity ra th e r than being channelled to the advan tage of sectional groupings.

W hat has g one w rong with these sorts o f vision and how should we seek to re c o n s t ru c t critica l theo ry in the late tw en tie th c en tu ry ? If th e early Positivist Socie ties a re long fo rgo tten , M arxism at least has m ore than lived up to the adage of its fo u n d e r tha t in te rp re ta t ions of the world a re ten a penny, the p o in t being to use them to ch an g e it. N o tw iths tand ing the eno rm o u s p ractica l im pact of M arx's writings, and the valid appraisals they co n ta in , th e tw en tie th -cen tu ry w orld is very d ifferent from the fu tu re he an tic ipa ted . A viable critical theory today m ust be post-Marxist and must also be capable of subjecting to cr it ique just those aspects of M arxism tha t lend them selves to explo ita tive d o m in a t io n . M arx ism was co n ce iv ed of by its


orig ina to r as a cr itique of political econom y and has certain ly m o re than p roved its w orth as a sou rce of opposit ion to the less sa lubrious influences of capitalism. But as a do c tr in e ad o p ted by existing states its im pact has been little short of d isastrous. It can no longer be p re ten d ed , excep t pe rhaps by the m ost o b d u ra te of ostriches am ong M arx’s self-professed followers, that this is simply the o u tco m e of d istortions o f M arx’s ideas. M arxism has proved particularly vu lnerab le to becom ing itself ideology and is w eak in respec t o f providing a cr it ique of just this vulnerability. Marxism has been p roc la im ed obso lescen t often enough by its hostile critics, but how should those w ho have som e sym pathy with its liberative inspiration appraise its weaknesses?

If we re ject evolutionism , the sort of critical theo ry Marx a t tem pted to build is already a t tack ed at its heart .41 T h e transition from capitalism to a global socialist o rd e r is only com prehens ib le in M arxian te rm s if it be ac cep ted th a t capitalism in co rp o ra te s all the ach ievem ents of past history, ready to be ac tua lized by the t ran sc en d en c e of capitalist p roduc tion . If capitalism is no t the high-point o f an evolu tionary sch em e but a specific fea tu re of the d ev e lo p m en t of the E u ro p ean societies — and only o n e axis of their institutional organization at that — this s tandpoin t collapses. T h e validity of m uch of w ha t M arx has to say in analysing the n a tu re of capitalist p ro duc tion need not be p laced in doub t; indeed , a good case can be m ad e for saying that large segm ents of it are co r rec t and as re levant to the world of today as in the n ine teen th cen tu ry .44 H ow ever, M arx acco rds un d u e centra li ty to capitalism and to class struggle as the keys to explaining inequality o r exploitation, and to providing the m eans of their transcendence. Marxist though t is as defic ient in analysing som e of the m ajor sources of exploitative dom ination as it is in offering plausible p rog ram m es of ac tion for overcom ing them . T h is ju d g em en t applies not only to the p h en o m en a discussed earlier in the chap te r— surveillance and con tro l o f the m eans of v io lence — but also in par ticu la r to inequalities of g en d e r and to e thn ic exploitation .

M arx’s in terp re ta t ion of history is unified with a p ro g ram m e of practical ac tion precisely b ecause of the role which class division and class conflict play bo th in the s truc tu ring of capita lism and in its t ran scen d en ce . Its s treng th , as it w ere, is also its weakness. Distinct from ‘u topian socialism ’ because it addresses th e real possibilities of social t ran s fo rm a tio n , co n ta in e d within the


tendentia l m o v em en t of capitalism , it p laces th e w hole b u rd en of history upon o n e revolu tionary agency — the p ro le ta r ia t , ac ting in the contex t o f class struggle. Critical theory today m ust develop substantive accoun ts of the origins of m odern ity and its global influence tha t do n o t seek to c ram everything in to the conven ien t exp lanato ry catch-all o f ‘cap ita lism ’. F rom w hich it follows tha t ‘socialism’, if u n d ers to o d as the negation of capitalism , is itself carry ing too heavy a burden w hen supposed to be a generalized m eans for overcom ing explo ita tion , or the sole m odel of the ‘good socie ty’.

In being s tr ipped of historical g u aran tees , critical theory r e en ters the un iverse of con tingency and has to ad o p t a logic tha t no longer insists upon the necessary unity of theo ry and p ractice . How o therw ise co u ld we co n fro n t a w orld w hich , fo r the foreseeable fu tu re , m ust carry on under the shadow of possible total des truc tion? I do not m ean by this tha t the M arxian th eo rem o f th e unity o f th eo ry and p rac t ice shou ld be a b a n d o n e d altogether . W hat we should envisage is, ra the r , a process of critique that does not recoil from connecting material possibilities o f social re fo rm with an u top ian e lem ent. Every analysis of existing cond itions of social life, because it is ‘h istorical’, i.e. concerned with the temporality of institutions in their reproduction by hum an actors , generates an understanding of their potential t ransfo rm ation . This is a logical po in t, not o n e tha t specifies w hat a given course of ac tion o r p ro g ram m e can actually achieve. All social analysis, pu t an o th e r way, is implicitly social cr it ique and also has t ransfo rm ative im plications for w ha tever it describes. T h ese provide the ‘g ro u n d in g ’ of critical theory , but do not in and b f them selves ind icate how im m an en t possibilities in a given set o f c ircum stances can be ac tua lized , o r what connec tion that ac tualization might bea r to m ore inclusive goals. T h e ‘u top ian m o m en ts ’ of critical theory are necessary precisely w here w ha t is im m anen t does no t disclose a practical m eans of reach ing those m o re inclusive goals; and for a critical theo ry w ithout historical g uaran tees this s ituation is likely to be exceedingly co m m on .

T h e diagnosis of tenden tia l p rope rt ie s of social systems should rem ain closely co n n ec ted to social critique, bu t is likely to relapse into d o g m a — as M arxism itself so frequen tly does — if regarded as th e exclusive basis of p rac t ice . It m ay o ften be necessary to accept, even to accen tua te , the gap betw een co n c re te possibilities


of change and the desired o u tco m es of the social critic. T h e re is, so to speak , a necessarily non-u top ian e lem en t in u top ian ism , not jus t because pathw ays to a par ticu la r goal m ay be disclosed which w ere no t previously perce ived , but because th e stimulus of the u topian p rospec t m ay itself in fluence the im m an en t possibilities of action. Such a view of critical theo ry should no t be confused with the idea of C o m te (and M arx) tha t the ‘cognitive ap p ro p r ia t io n ’ of history will eventually allow h u m an beings to contro l their own destiny. This kind of co n cep tio n is flawed in m ajor respects: because the u nders tand ing of w hat is im m anen t does no t gu a ran tee its conve rgence with w ha t critical theo ry m ay seek to actualize; and because any ‘und ers tan d in g ’ of a par ticu la r fea tu re of social life o r of history, in becom ing par t o f social life, m ay act to frac tu re the very forms of con tro l it was in tro d u ced to achieve.

A critical theory without guaran tees must confront the situation tha t , just as history has no inheren t teleology, ne ither a re there privileged agents of the realization of processes of social re form . Just as we should resist the teleology of the Marxist in te rp re ta tion of history, we should bew are the assoc ia ted co n cep tio n that the under-privileged o r exploited are the true bearers of em ancipatory forms of social change. In Marxism there remains a s trong residue of t ran sm u ted m a s te r—slave d ialectic: ‘the w o rk e r is no th ing , but shall b ec o m e every th ing .’ T h e a t trac tions of M arxism probab ly derive in som e large deg ree just from this em phasis , which can be m ad e to appeal s im ultaneously to the historicity of nationalism an d to th e po lyarch ic ten d en c ie s of th e m o d e rn s ta te . T h e d o c tr ine m ay be morally seduc tive and practically consequen tia l bu t it is, nonetheless, false.

If the views set ou t in this book co m m an d any c red en ce , all four m ain institutional axes of m odern ity are ‘world-historical’ in their s ignificance. It follows tha t a critical theo ry responsive to the d em ands of the p resen t day should regard these as cen tra l bo th to th e in te rp re ta t io n of im m a n en t c h a n g e an d to the no rm ative d em an d s of construc ting (utopian) m odels of th e ‘good soc ie ty ’. T h e m ost u rgen t issues facing us today are those to do with the expansion of the world military order, the industrialization of w ar an d the existence of n u c lea r weapons. P eace m o vem en ts offer the op p o r tu n ity to in fluence th e ‘run-aw ay’ ch a rac te r of military expansion . A t th e sam e tim e , they supply a c lea r


illustration of the d is tance be tw een the n u rtu r ing of im m an en t change and the grav ita tional pull of u topian ism . T h e re is no op tion but for such m o vem en ts to o p e ra te up o n a tactical level, while at th e sam e tim e fostering d eb a te ab o u t ‘possible w orlds ' in which the th rea t o f n u c lea r conflict has d isappea red a ltogether .

This has im plications which those in the peace m ovem en ts themselves may be re luc tan t to face. For discourses of u topianism can (not must) negatively affect tactica l decisions re levan t to coping with a heavily militarized world. In d eb a te s ab o u t n u c lea r w eaponry above all we should observe M arx ’s d irective no t to ju d g e ideas by th e ir m anifest c o n te n t b u t by th e p rac t ica l con seq u en ces of their p ropagation . It is possible, for exam ple , tha t p rog ram m es of ac tion that seek to w ork ‘th rough ' official o rgan iza tions , r a th e r than m erging with genera l ized co u n te r - cultura l p ro tes t , m ight be m ost effective in som e key respects and in ce r ta in p a r t ic u la r con tex ts . W a lze r’s p o in t ab o u t n u c lea r w eaponry and d e te r ren c e is an im portan t o ne , showing how significant it is for peace m ovem en ts to propel d eb a tes abou t these into the ‘public sp h e re ’ in the most u rgent way possible: ‘T h o u g h d e te r re n c e tu rns A m erican an d Russian civilians (E uropean ones too) into m ere m eans for th e preven tion of war, it does so w ithou t restrain ing us in any way. It is in the n a tu re of the new techno logy that we can be th rea ten ed w ithout being held captive. T h a t is why d e te r ren c e , while in princip le so fr ightening, is so easy to live w ith .’45 S heer c lam our ab o u t the ‘stored-up h o rro r ’ upon which d e te r ren c e dep en d s can perhaps serve to p u n c tu re such com placency . But the enorm ously difficult pa th tha t m ust be t ro d d e n is o n e which so m eh o w co m b in es the im m edia te and con tinu ing avo idance of n u c lea r conflict with the d issolution of the process of the industrialization of w ar in a radically new world o rde r . N ow here are the d iscontinuities of m odern history m o re acu te .

T h e inevitable p rim acy of these co n cern s over all o thers , of course , does no t m ean tha t the p rob lem of the avo idance of n u c lea r w ar is en tire ly sep a rab le from th e m o re trad it ional em phases o f critica l theory , o r tha t these can be shelved while we wait to see w h e th e r the m o d ern world will survive at all in recognizable form. T h e fact tha t the global econom y is dom inated by capitalistic m echan ism s, an d that the m ost influential agencies within it a re cap ita lis t s ta tes and tran sn a tio n a l co rp o ra t io n s ,


rem ains of fu ndam en ta l im p o rtan ce to th e n a tu re of the world system as a whole. T h e highly im b a lan ced c h a ra c te r o f the in te rna tional division of labour betw een co re and per iphery , plus the low deg ree of in ter-governm ental regula tion over the world econom y, are expressive of the pre-em inent influence of capitalist p ro d u c tio n world-wide. As regards th e m ain co m p o n e n ts of capitalist p ro d u c tio n , it is surely still to M arxism tha t we have to look to d iscover the m ost telling critique. T h e con trad ic t ion be tw een p rivate app ropria t ion and socialized p ro d u c tio n that M arx d iagnosed as inheren t in the n a tu re of capitalist en terp rise still prevails. W hile th e division of lab o u r nationally and in terna tionally has b eco m e ex traord inarily com plex , rendering the w orld system increasingly in tegra ted econom ically , the main prope lling fo rce m o tiva ting ec o n o m ic expansion rem ains the capitalist accum ulation process. T h e success of labour m ovem ents in tem per ing som e of the m ost noxious effects of capitalistic m echan ism s within national econom ies has no t been transferred to inequalities in the global division of labour as a whole. T h e divisions betw een First and T h ird W orlds, o r betw een N orth and Sou th , involve im balances of resources of a level co m p arab le to any th ing found in the d iffe rences be tw een classes within trad it ional states. But it is ev ident that som e of the most urgent p rob lem s facing the world econom y are to do with industrialism ra th e r than with the m echan ism s of capitalist p ro duc tion as such. T h a t is to say, they lead us to look away again from the traditional areas of co n cen tra t io n of M arxist theory — in its m o re o r thodox forms at any ra te — tow ards ecological problem s.

Ecological m ovem en ts and concerns are no t new, in the sense th a t from th e early im pact of industrialism th ere w ere those who held tha t industrial p ro d u c tio n would alter — no t necessarily for the b e t te r — m any qualities of h um an life, dem an d in g different a t t i tu d es to th e na tu ra l w orld from those of ea rl ie r times. A lthough, as in so m any respects , M arx ’s writings on this issue involve a n u m b e r of overlapp ing strands, in general it is th e case th a t M arx was no t a critic o f industrialism. R a th er , for him industrialism holds out the prom ise of a life o f ab u n d an ce , through turn ing th e forces of n a tu re to hum an purposes. It is a par ticu la r m o d e of organizing industrial p ro d u c tio n — capita lism — tha t needs to be co m b a t ted , no t the industrial o rd e r itself. Such a view has to be d ee m e d essentially w anting from the perspec tive of the late tw en tie th cen tury . M arx ’s paeans to industrialism might be


readily u n d e rs tan d ab le in the co n tex t o f th e n in e teen th cen tu ry , particularly given his dismissal o f M althus. In a world of staggering po p u la t io n g row th , e m b e d d e d in an increasingly inclusive in terna tional division of labour, the m ater ia l re sou rces requ ired for a co n tin u o u s expansion of industrial p ro d u c tio n are simply not available, and those th a t exist co m e u n d e r m ore and m ore strain.

A critical theory alert to ecological issues canno t just be limited to a co n c e rn with the exhaustion of the e a r th ’s re sources — immense though may be the issues to be faced in this respect — but has to investigate the value of a range of re la tions to n a tu re tha t tend to be qu ash ed by industrialism. In com ing to term s with these we can h o p e no t so m u ch to ‘re scu e ’ n a tu re as to explore possibilities of chang ing h u m an re la t ionsh ips them selves . An unders tand ing of the role of urbanism is essential to such an explora tion . T h e sp read of urbanism of cou rse separa tes h um an beings from n a tu re in the superficial sense tha t they live in built en v iro n m en ts . But m o d e rn u rban ism p ro found ly affec ts the c h a rac te r o f h u m an day-to-day social life, expressing som e of the m ost im portan t in tersec tions of capitalism and industria lism .46

Finally, critical theory m ust co m e to te rm s with those aspects of m odern institutions assoc ia ted with surveillance as a m edium of pow er. U n d e rs to o d as the reflexive m o n ito r in g o f social re p ro d u c t io n , su rve il lance has been im p o r tan t bo th to the consolidation of the world system in m o d e rn times and to the internal o rde ring o f s tates. T h e questions ra ised by its role as a source of pow er can only increase in im portance in the forseeable fu ture . In tensified surveillance and to ta lita rian tendenc ies are intimately linked. This is n o t som eth ing which should lead us to d espa ir , for adm in is tra t ive po w er and po lyarchy are equally closely co n n e c ted . T h e re is no t a d irec t re la tion betw een the expansion of the adm inistrative pow er of s ta tes and political oppression . T h e m ore effectively s ta tes seek to ‘g overn ’, the m ore there is the likelihood of coun ter-balance in the form of polyarchic involvem ent. G iven the d istinctive d o m in an ce of the nation-s ta te in the world system, how ever, the possibility tha t this might lead to the fo rm ation of a dem ocra tica lly o rd e red world governm en t seem s entire ly rem ote . If the argum en ts dep loyed in this book are valid, the increasing social in tegra tion of the g lobe does not b e to k en an incip ient political unity.


Notes

T h e following books by the au th o r are re ferred to in abbrev ia ted form th ro u g h o u t the notes:

Central Problems in Social Theory (London: H utch inson , 1977)- CPST.New Rules o f Sociological M ethod (London: H u tch inson , 1976)- NRSM.Studies in Social and Political Theory (London: H utch inson , 1977) - SSPT.The Class Structure o f the Advanced Societies (L ondon: H utch inson , 1979; revised ed ition , 1981) — CSAS.A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism (London: M acm illan , 1981), vol. I - CCHM. vol. I.Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: M acm illan , 1982) - PC ST.The Constitution o f Society (C am bridge: Polity Press, 1984) — CS.


1. cf. C P S T , c h a p te r 2; C S , p a s s im .2. F o r a fu lle r exposition , see C P S T , c h a p te r 3.3. K. M arx , ‘P re fa c e ’ to ‘A C o n trib u tio n to the C ritiq u e of P o litica l

E co n o m y ’, in K. M arx an d F. E ngels, S e l e c t e d W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e (L ondon: L aw rence an d W ishart, 1968); cf. C P S T , c h a p te r 3.

4. C S , c h a p te r 5.5. See espec ia lly C C H M , vol. 1, ch a p te rs 3, 4 an d 5; C S , c h a p te rs 4

an d 5.6. N R S M , c h a p te r 3.7. T a lc o tt P arsons, ‘O n th e c o n c e p t o f po litica l pow er', Proceedings

o f t h e A m e r i c a n P h i lo s o p h ic a l S o c ie t y , 107, 1963.

Notes to Chapter 1 343

8. C P S T , p. 9 Iff.9. C S A S , pp . 1 5 6 -6 2 .

10. C S , c h a p te r 5.11. Ibid., p. 14ff.12. C P S T , pp . 8 8 - 9 4 .13. Ibid.14. G . W . F. H egel, T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y o f S p i r i t (O xford : C la ren d o n

Press, 1977), p. 126.15. C P S T , c h a p te r 2; C S , c h a p te r 1 an d p a s s im .16. O n th is m a tte r see the c e le b ra te d d e b a te b e tw een L évi-S trauss an d

S artre a b o u t th e n a tu re o f h istory . F o r a sum m ary version , cf. C lau d e Lévi-S trauss: ‘R ép o n ses à q u e lq u es q u es tio n s ', E s p r i t . 31, 1963.

17. C S c h a p te r 3 an d p a s s im . S im m el's rem a rk s on such m a tte rs can still be rea d w ith p ro fit. See ‘D er R aum und d ie räu m lich e n O rd n u n g en d e r G ese llsc h a ft’, in his S o z io lo g ie (Leipzig: D u n ck e r and H um bo lt, 1908).

18. C P S T , pp. 8 4 - 5 .19. C C H M , vol. I, pp . 9 7 — 100. T h e w ork o f Ja n e Jacobs, h o w ever it

m ight be c ritic ized in som e respec ts , is p a rticu la rly im p o rta n t here .20. In this bo o k 1 use ‘v io le n ce ’ in a s tra ig h tfo rw ard sense, no t in th e

m uch w id er m ean ing a t tr ib u te d to it by B ourd ieu an d o th e rs . I m ean by ‘c o n tro l o f th e m ean s o f v io le n c e ’ c o n tro l o v e r th e

•capab ilities o f do in g physical h a rm to the h u m an body by th e use o f force.

21. C C H M , pp. 140—56.22. C S , pp. 166ff.23. Em ile D u rk h e im : P r o fe s s io n a l E th i c s a n d C iv ic M o r a ls (L ondon :

R ou tledge , 1957), pp . 7 9 —80.24. cf. A. G id d en s , ‘T h e n a tio n -sta te an d v io len ce ', in W a lte r W.

Pow ell an d R ich a rd R obb ins, C o n f l i c t a n d C o n s e n s u s (New Y ork : F ree P ress, 1984).

25. M ax W e b er, E c o n o m y a n d S o c i e t y (B erk e ley : U n iv ersity o f C a lifo rn ia P ress, 1978), vol. I, p. 56.

26. Ib id ., p. 55.27. Ibid., p. 54.28. C P S T , pp . 81 — 111; C C H M , vol. I, pp. 4 6 —8.29. G . W. F. H egel, T h e P h i lo s o p h y o f R ig h t (L ondon : Bell, 1896),

sec tio n 261.30. Janow itz n o te s th a t, d u rin g th e first fo u r W orld C on g resses of

Sociology, th e to p ic s o f m ilita ry in stitu tio n s an d w ar w ere no t d iscussed . A t th e F ifth W orld C ongress, held in W ash ing ton in 1962, a single p a p e r on th e ro le of the m ilita ry in the new n a tio n s

w as p re se n te d in th e po litica l socio logy sec tion . O nly in 1964 was th e re in tro d u c e d a spec ia l sec tio n on ‘T h e P ro fess ional M ilitary an d M ilita rism ’. M orris Janow itz, ‘A rm ed fo rces an d soc ie ty : a w orld p e rsp e c tiv e ’, in Ja cq u e s van D o o rn , A r m e d F o r c e s a n d S o c ie t y (T h e H ague: M o u to n , 1968), p. 15. cf. a lso m y d iscussion in C C H M , vol. I, pp . 1 7 7 -8 2 .

31. H e rb e rt S p en ce r, T h e E v o l u t io n o f S o c ie t y , ed ited by R o b e rt L. C a rn e iro , (C h icago : U niversity o f C h icago Press, 1967), p. 61. S p en ce r a c c e p ts th a t m o d ern so c ie tie s a re still in a tran s ito ry phase b e tw een m ilitary soc ie ty an d industria lism . T h u s he ho lds th a t ‘a ce rta in b ru ta lisa tio n has to be m a in ta in ed du rin g o u r passing phase o f civ ilisation’, an d th a t ‘w hile national an tagon ism s co n tin u e strong an d n a tio n a l d e fe n c e a necessity , th e re is a fitness in th is sem im ilitary d isc ip lin e .’ B ut he also m akes c le a r th a t th is c a n n o t last in the lo n g e r te rm , fo r ‘the d ire c t e ffec t of w ar on industria l p rog ress is rep ress iv e .’ S ee H. S pencer, T h e S t u d y o f S o c io lo g y (A nn A rbo r: U n iversity o f M ich igan Press, 1961), pp. 172, 173 an d 179.

32. E. D u rkhe im , S o c ia l i s m (New Y ork : C ollier, 1962), pp. 8 0 — 105 an d p a s s im .

33. E. D urkhe im , P r o fe s s io n a l E th i c s & C iv ic M o r a l s , p. 53.34. Ib id ., p. 74.35. E ngels to M arx, 7 Jan . 1858, in K. M arx and F. Engels, W e r k e

(B erlin : D ietz V erlag , 1963), vol. 24, p. 252.36. T h e m ost usefu l g en e ra l so u rc e on th ese issues is B. Sem m el,

M a r x is m a n d t h e S c i e n c e o f W a r (O xford : O xford U niversity Press,1981). cf. S o lom on F. B loom , T h e W o r ld o f N a t io n s (New Y ork : O xford U niversity P ress, 1941), pp. 11—32.

37. K. M arx an d F . E ngels, ‘T h e C o m m u n ist M an ife s to ’, in M arx & E ngels, S e l e c t e d W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e , pp . 3 8 —9.

38. B loom , T h e W o r ld o f N a t io n s , pp . 206 — 7. See a lso G a ll ie ’s co m m e n ts , in W . B. G allie , P h i lo s o p h e r s in P e a c e a n d W a r (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1978), c h a p te r 4.

39. Felix G ilb e rt, T h e H is to r ic a l E s s a y s o f O t to H i n t z e (New Y ork : O xfo rd U niversity P ress, 1975), p. 183. H in tze is c ritica l, how ever, o f th e social D arw in ism of G u m p h o w icz an d R a tzen h o fe r, cf. also Ja cq u e s N ovicow , L a g u e r r e e t s e s p r é t e n d u s b ie n fa i t s (Paris: A lcan , 1894).

40. Ib id . (I have so m ew h at m odified th e tran sla tio n ).41. Still an essen tia l so u rce fo r u n d e rs ta n d in g W e b e r’s view s in this

re sp e c t is W olfgang J. M om m sen , M a x W e b e r u n d d ie d e u t s c h e P o li t ik , 1 8 9 0 — 1 9 2 0 (T ü b in g en : M ohr, 1959).

42. cf. ‘M ax W e b er on fac ts an d v a lu es’, in S S P T .

43. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 9.

344 Notes to Chapter 1

Notes to Chapters 1 and 2 345

44. See, fo r exam ple , the o th e rw ise ad m irab le su rvey given in Bob Jessop , T h e C a p i ta l i s t S t a t e (O xford : M artin R o b e rtso n , 1982).

45. C o n tra s t th e by now classic study, B a rrin g to n M o o re , T h e S o c ia l O r ig in s o f D e m o c r a c y a n d D ic ta to r s h ip (H arm o n d sw o rth P engu in , 1969), w hich p laces p a r tic u la r em phasis up o n fo rce an d v io lence in th e shap ing of m o d e rn s ta tes .

46. R e in h a rd B end ix , K in g s o r P e o p le (B erk e ley : U n iv ers ity o f C a lifo rn ia P ress, 1978), p. 16.

47. Ib id ., p. 4.48. See ‘F rom M arx to N ietzsche? T h e new co n serv a tism , F o u cau lt,

an d p ro b lem s in c o n te m p o ra ry po litica l th e o ry ’, in P C S T .49. B e rn a rd -H en ri Levy, B a r b a r is m W i th a H u m a n F a c e (New Y ork :

H arp er, 1977).50. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 8.51. See espec ia lly C S , c h a p te r 5.52. C C H M , vol. I, pp. 7 6 - 8 1 .53. E rn e s t G e lln e r, T h o u g h t a n d C h a n g e (L o n d o n : W eid en fe ld , 1964),

pp . 12— 13. cf. C S , c h a p te r 5.54. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 3 an d p a s s im .

2 The Traditional State: Domination and Military Power1. I shall a lso use th e te rm ‘n o n -m o d ern ’ soc ie ties, in p re fe re n c e to

‘n o n -cap ita lis t’, w hich I em p lo y ed in C C H M , vol. I. I used the se co n d o f these to b rea k w ith th e co n v e n tio n a l usage o f ‘p re ca p ita lis t’, b ecau se th e cap ita lis t so c ie ties fo r a long p erio d o f tim e co -ex isted w ith o th e r types o f soc ie ty . B ut ‘n o n -ca p ita lis t’ m ight suggest th a t the industria lized s ta te soc ia list so c ie tie s be lo n g in th e sam e ca te g o ry as triba l an d class-d iv ided soc ie ties, w h ich is n o t all th a t felicitous.

2. S. N. E isenstad t, T h e P o l i t ic a l S y s t e m s o f E m p i r e s (G len c o e : F ree Press, 1963). C o m p are H. J. M. C laessen an d P. S kaln ik , T h e E a r ly S t a t e (T h e H ague: M o u to n , 1978).

3. Jo h n A. W ilson, ‘E gypt th ro u g h th e New K in g d o m ’, in C arl H. K rae lin g a n d R o b e rt M. A dam s, C i ty I n v in c ib l e (C h icago : U niversity o f C h icag o P ress, 1960). It shou ld b e em p h asized th a t m ost n o m ad ic s ta te s still d o have te rr ito r ia l affilia tions. 'N om adism . . . [is] o rg an ised m obility o v er a sp a ce th a t m ay be vast b u t is de lim ited by cu s to m , trea tie s , o r ta c it ag re em e n ts w ith co m p etin g o r re la te d g ro u p s .’ S ee Jean -P au l R oux, L e s t r a d i t io n s d e s n o m a d e s (Paris: M aisonneuve , 1970), p. 37.

4. G id eo n S joberg , T h e P r e in d u s tr ia l C i ty (G len co e : T h e F re e P ress, 1960), p. 5.

5. Ib id ., pp . 95ff.6. W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c i e t y , vol. 2, p. 1213.7. S joberg , T h e P r e in d u s tr ia l C i t y , p. 67.8. P au l W h e a tley , T h e P iv o t o f t h e F o u r Q u a r te r s (E d in b u rg h :

E d inbu rgh U niversity P ress, 1971).9. W eb er, E c o n o m y <6 S o c i e t y , vol. 2, p. 1222.

10. Ibid., p. 1223.11. Ib id ., p. 1229 an d ff. See also M. W eber, T h e R e l ig io n o f C h in a

(G len co e : F re e P ress, 1964).12. W ittfogel, O r ie n ta l D e s p o t i s m ; L ouis B audin , A S o c ia l i s t E m p ir e .

T h e I n c a s o f P e r u (P rin ce to n : V an N ostrand , 1961).13. S ee a lso A lfred M etrau x , T h e H is to r y o f th e I n c a s (New Y ork :

S ch o ck en , 1970).14. W eb er, E c o n o m y S o c i e t y , vol. 2, p. 1402.15. Ibid.16. Ib id ., pp. 1 0 4 4 -5 .17. cf. W . M . F. P e tr ie , S o c ia l L i f e in A n c i e n t E g y p t (L o n d o n :

C o n s tab le , 1923); J. E. M. W hite , A n c i e n t E g y p t (L ondon : A llen W ingate , 1952); W illiam F. E d g erto n , T h e q u es tio n o f feudal in stitu tio n s in an c ie n t Egypt", in R ush ton C o u lb o rn , F e u d a l i s m in H is to r y (P rin ce to n : P rin ce to n U niversity Press, 1956).

18. R o b e rt G riffe th an d C aro l G . T h o m as, T h e C i ty - S ta te in F iv e C u l tu r e s (C alifo rn ia : S an ta B arb ara , 1981).

19. Ibid., p. 186.20. Ib id ., p. 190. cf. a lso R o b e rt J. B raidw ood & G o rd o n W illey,

C o u r s e s T o w a r d U r b a n L i f e (C h icago : A td in e , 1962); M . E. L. M allow an, ‘T h e d ev e lo p m e n t o f c ities: from A1 U baid to th e en d of U ru k ’, in th e T h e C a m b r id g e A n c i e n t H i s to r y (C am b rid g e : C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1970), vol. I.

21. cf. C C H M , vol. I, pp . 9 4 - 5 .22. cf. B loom field : ‘W riting is n o t language , bu t m ere ly a way of

rec o rd in g language by m eans o f visible m a rk s’. L. B loom field, L a n g u a g e . (New Y ork : A llen & U nw in, 1933), p. 21.

23. Ja cq u e s D errid a , O f G r a m m a to lo g y (B altim ore: Jo h n s H opk ins U niversity P ress, 1974) an d o th e r w orks.

24. See, in p a rticu la r, P aul R ico eu r, H e r m e n e u t i c s & T h e H u m a n S c ie n c e s (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1981); an d also John B. T h o m p so n , ‘A ction , ideo logy an d th e te x t’, in his S t u d ie s in t h e T h e o r y o f I d e o lo g y (C am bridge: Polity Press, 1984). I am p articu la rly in d e b ted to T h o m p so n ’s p a p e r fo r my d iscussion here .

25. E . B enveniste, P r o b le m s in G e n e r a l L in g u is t ic s (F lorida: U niversity of M iam i Press, 1971).



26. T h o m p so n , ‘A ction , ideo logy an d th e te x t’.27. R oy T u rn e r , ‘W o rd s, u tte ra n c e s a n d ac tiv itie s ’, in h is E th n o -

m e t h o d o lo g y (H arm o n d sw o rth : P engu in , 1974).28. P. R ico eu r, ‘T h e m o d e l o f th e tex t: m ean ing fu l a c tio n co n s id ered

as a te x t’ in his H e r m e n e u t i c s a n d th e H u m a n S c ie n c e s , p . 201.29. cf. P au l Ziff, S e m a n t ic A n a ly s i s ( Ith a ca : C o rnell U n iversity Press,

1960).30. P. R ico eu r: ‘W h a t is a tex t? E x p lan a tio n & U n d ers ta n d in g ’, in his

H e r m e n e u t i c s a n d th e H u m a n S c ie n c e s .31. I. J. G elb , A S t u d y o f W r i t in g (L ondon : R o u tled g e & K egan Paul,

1952), c h a p te r 1. See also S. N. K ram er, F r o m th e T a b le ts o f S u m e r (In d ian H ills: C o lo ra d o U niversity P ress, 1956).

32. G e lb , A S t u d y o f W r i t in g , p. 60ff.33. Jack G oo d y , T h e D o m e s t i c a t i o n o f t h e S a v a g e M i n d (C am bridge:

C a m b rid g e U n iversity P ress, 1977), p. 83. T h is b o o k is afu n d am e n ta l so u rce fo r co n sid erin g q u es tio n s of th e re la tio n ofw riting to pow er.

34. A. H. G ard in e r, A n c i e n t E g y p t ia n O n o m a s t ic a (O xford : O xford U niversity Press, 1947), vol. I, p. 1.

35. G o o d y , T h e S a v a g e M i n d , p. 86.36. D. J. W isem an, ‘B ooks in th e A n c ie n t N ear E ast an d in th e Old

T e s ta m e n t', in P. R. A ck ro y d , C. F. E vans an d G . W . H. L am pe, T h e C a m b r id g e H i s to r y o f t h e B ib l e (C am b rid g e : C a m b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1963), vol. I, p. 45.

37. E dw ard M cN all B urns an d Philip Lee R alph , ‘T h e civ ilisa tions of th e N ile’, in th e ir W o r ld C iv i l is a t io n s (New Y ork : N o rto n , 1974).

38. M ichel F o u cau lt, D is c ip l in e a n d P u n is h (L ondon : A llen L ane,1977).

39. W ittfogel, O r ie n ta l D e s p o t i s m .40. E d m u n d L each , ‘H ydrau lic soc ie ty in C ey lo n ’, P a s t a n d P r e s e n t ,

15, 1959.41. W olfram E b erh a rd , C o n q u e r o r s a n d R u le r s (L eiden: Brill, 1970).42. I. E. S. E dw ards, T h e P y r a m id s o f E g y p t (B altim ore: M ax P arrish ,

1962); A. W . S h o rte r, E v e r y d a y L i f e in A n c i e n t E g y p t (L ondon : M arsto n & C o., 1932).

43. O n th is see W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. 2, p. 1168ff.44. F . R atzel, A n th r o p o g e o g r a p h ie (S tu ttg a rt: 1882); P o li t is c h e

G e o g r a p h ie (B erlin : R. O ld en b o u g , 1897).45. F. R atzel, P o l i t i s c h e G e o g r a p h ie , p. 584ff. H ow ever cf. J. A ncel,

L e s f r o n t i è r e s (Paris: G allim ard , 1938).46. J. R . V. P re sco tt, B o u n d a r i e s a n d F r o n t ie r s (L ondon : C ro o m H elm ,

1978), c h a p te r 2.

47. Ib id ., p. 40ff.48. G . W . B. H un tin g fo rd , T h e G a lla o f E th io p ia (L ondon : H ak luy t

S ocie ty 1955), p. 116.49. O w en L a ttim o re , I n n e r A s ia n F r o n t ie r s o f C h in a (New Y o rk :

O xford U niversity Press, 1940); J. B aradez, F o s s a tu m A f r i c a e (Paris: A rts e t M etie rs, 1949); R. G . C ollingw ood, R o m a n B r i ta in (O xford: C la ren d o n P ress, 1932).

50. B aradez , F o s s a tu m A fr ic a e .51. Irfan H ab ib , T h e A g r a r ia n S y s t e m o f M u g h a l I n d ia (L ondon : A sia

P ublish ing H ouse, 1963).52. E b e rh a rd , C o n q u e r o r s & R u le r s .53. H. A. R. G ib b an d H aro ld B ow en, I s la m ic S o c ie t y a n d th e W e s t

(L ondon : O xford U niversity P ress, 1950), vol. I, p. 209.54. Jo h n H. K au tsky , T h e P o l i t ic s o f A r i s to c r a t i c E m p i r e s (C hapel

Hill: U niversity o f N orth C a ro lin a Press, 1982), p. 120. cf. also Bendix, w ho says th a t in trad itional social o rd ers ‘the te rm “soc ie ty” is ap p lied on ly w ith d ifficulty , s ince the peop le them se lves live in fragm ented subo rd ination , w hile the ir ru lers co n s titu te “the soc ie ty” b ec au se they a re p erso n s w orthy of n o te in th e c o u n try .’ See R e in h a rd B endix , N a t io n B u i ld in g a n d C i t i z e n s h ip (B erke ley : U niversity o f C a lifo rn ia Press, 1977), p. 401.

55. F o r a re c e n t d iscussion of th e so-called ‘w arfa re th e o ry ’ of the s ta te , see C laessen an d S kaln ik , T h e E a r ly S ta te .

56. M arvin H arris, C a n n ib a ls a n d K in g s (L ondon : F o n tan a , 1978), p.41.

57. cf. K. F. O tte rb e in , T h e E v o l u t io n o f W a r (New H aven : H um an R e la tio n s A re a F iles P ress, 1970).

58. A s H arris pu ts it, v irtually all sm all soc ie ties, inc lud ing H u n te rs an d g a th e re rs , ‘ca rry o u t som e fo rm of in te rg ro u p c o m b a t in w hich team s of w arrio rs d e lib e ra te ly try to kill e a ch a n o th e r ’. S ee H arris, C a n n ib a ls a n d K in g s , p. 41; cf. Q u incy W right, A S t u d y o f W a r (C h icago : U niversity of C h icago Press, 1965), c h a p te r 6; T . B rock an d J. G alting , ‘B elligerence am ong the p rim itiv es’, J o u r n a l o f P e a c e R e s e a r c h , 3, 1966.

59. W illiam H. M cNeill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r (O xford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.

60. V. G o rd o n C hilde, M a n M a k e s H i m s e l f (L ondon : W atts , 1956), p. 234.

61. G riffe th an d T h o m as, T h e C i ty - S ta te in F iv e C u l tu r e s , p. 197.62. W eber, T h e R e l ig io n o f I n d ia (G len c o e : F re e P ress, 1958), p. 64.63. John A. W ilson, T h e B u r d e n o f E g y p t (C hicago: U niversity of

C h icago Press, 1951).



64. B urns a n d R a lph , ‘T h e M e so p o tam ian an d P ersian civ ilisa tions’, in W o r ld C iv i l iz a t io n s , p. 63. S ee also Y igael Y ad in , T h e A r t o f W a r fa r e in B ib l i c a l L a n d s in th e L ig h t o f A r c h a e o l o g i c a l S t u d y (L o n d o n : W eiden fe ld , 1963), 2 vols.

65. A. T . E. O lm stead , H is to r y o f P a le s t in e & S y r ia (New Y ork : C h arles S crib n er, 1931).

66. C hung-li C hang , T h e C h in e s e G e n t r y (S e a ttle : U n iversity o f W ash ing ton Press, 1955); W olfram E b erh ard , A H is to r y o f C h in a (L o n d o n : R o u tled g e , 1950); John K. F a irb an k , C h in e s e T h o u g h t a n d I n s t i tu t i o n s (C h icago : U niversity o f C h icago Press, 1959).

67. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 7.68. W eber, E c o n o m y & S o c i e t y , vol. 2, p. 980ff.69. cf. E ric H obsbaw m , P r im i t i v e R e b e l s (M an ch este r: M a n ch e s te r

U n iversity P ress, 1959). cf. a lso Philip A. K uhn , R e b e l l i o n a n d its E n e m ie s in L a te I m p e r ia l C h in a (C am bridge: H arvard U niversity P ress, 1970), c h a p te r I.

70. K autsky , A r i s to c r a t i c E m p i r e s , pp. 73 an d 150.71. M ichae l R aw din , T h e M o n g o l E m p ir e : i ts R is e & L e g a c y (New

Y ork : F re e P ress, 1967).72. R o b e rt G . W esson, T h e I m p e r ia l O r d e r (B erkeley : U n iversity of

C a lifo rn ia Press, 1967), p. 248. cf. a lso G . H. S tevenson , R o m a n P r o v in c ia l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (O xford : Basil B lackw ell, 1949); Ju les T o u ta in , T h e E c o n o m ic L i f e o f th e A n c i e n t W o r ld (L ondon : K egan Paul, 1930).

73. T h e S acred Law of the O tto m a n E m pire supposed ly s to o d h igher th an th e S ultan , a lth o u g h in p ra c tic e th is w as m o re o r less m eaningless.

74. N evin O . W in ter, T h e R u s s ia n E m p i r e o f T o d a y & Y e s t e r d a y (L ondon : S im pkin , 1914), p. 440.

75. W . T . D e Bary, ‘C h in ese desp o tism an d th e C o n fu c ian ideal: A se v en te en th ce n tu ry V iew ’, in F a irb an k , C h in e s e T h o u g h t a n d I n s t i tu t io n s .

76. Jo sep h N eedham , S c ie n c e & C iv i l is a t io n in C h in a (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1954), vol. 1.

77. K. M arx, ‘T h e B ritish ru le in In d ia ’, in S h lom o A vineri (ed.), K a r l M a r x o n C o lo n ia l i s m a n d M o d e r n i s a t io n (New Y ork : D oub leday , 1968).

78. W eb er, T h e R e l ig io n o f C h in a , pp . 91 an d 93; see also E b e rh a rd , A H is to r y o f C h in a , p. 64ff.

79. T . J. A . Le G o ff an d D. M. G . S u th erlan d , ‘T h e rev o lu tio n an d the ru ra l co m m u n ity in e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry B rittan y ’, P a s t a n d P r e s e n t , 62, 1974, p. 97.


3 The Traditional State: Bureaucracy, Class, Ideology

1. W esson , T h e I m p e r ia l O r d e r , p. 116.2. C . H u ck er, ‘T h e T ung-L in m o v em en t o f the L ate M ing P erio d ', in

F a irb an k , C h in e s e T h o u g h t a n d I n s t i tu t io n s .3. W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c i e t y , vol. 2, pp. 1032— 8.4. W ittfogel, O r ie n ta l D e s p o t i s m , pp. 302 — 3.5. T h is w as th e view I o n ce a d v o c a ted . S ee C S A S , pp . 132—8 and

p a s s im .6. S. W ells W illiam s, T h e M id d le K in g d o m (New Y ork : W iley, 1879),

vol. I, pp. 354—6.7. M arx & E ngels: ‘T h e C o m m u n ist M an ife sto ’, p. 35. E ngels la te r

ad d e d to th is th e rese rv a tio n ‘T h a t is, all w r i t te n h is to ry ’ w hich, from th e p o in t o f view d iscussed here , d o es n o t a l te r an y th in g o f ! the su b stan ce of the claim .

8. cf. C C H M , vol. 1, pp. 1 0 5 - 8 .9. E ric W olf, P e a s a n t W a rs o f t h e T w e n t ie t h C e n tu r y (New Y ork :

H arp er, 1969), p. 279.10. K au tsky , A r i s t o c r a t i c E m p i r e s , pp . 281 —92.11. W . E b e rh a rd , D a s T o b a - R e ic h N o r d c h in a s . (L e iden : Brill, 1949). I

K autsky , m istaken ly in my view, trie s to asso c ia te all p ea sa n t u p risings w ith co m m e rc ia liz a tio n , a rg u in g th a t in th e re le v a n t I p e rio d o f C h in ese h isto ry th e re was a s ign ifican t a c c e le ra tio n o f j co m m erce .

12. E b e rh a rd , C o n q u e r o r s & R u le r s , p. 89ff.13. cf. C C H M , vol. 1, p. 220ff.14. T h is p o in t is m ade in M ichael M ann , ‘S ta tes, a n c ie n t an d m o d e rn ’, ]

A r c h iv e s e u r o p é e n n e s d e s o c io lo g ie . 18, 1977.15. C S , c h a p te r 4.16. K arl Polanyi, T h e G r e a t T r a n s fo r m a tio n (L ondon: V ic to r G o lla n c z ,!

1945).17. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 5.18. Ja cq u e s S oustelle , D a ily L i f e o f th e A z t e c s o n th e E v e o f t h e i

S p a n is h C o n q u e s t (S tan fo rd : S tan fo rd U niversity Press, 1970).19. P articu larly in K. M arx, G r u n d r i s s e (H arm o n d sw o rth : P e n g u in ,!

1973), p. 107ff.20. If th is is n o t a c o n tra d ic tio n in te rm s. See, fo r exam ple , W olf,

P e a s a n t W a rs , p. 10— 11, w here he defines th e ‘p e a sa n try ’ as ag ra ria n w o rk e rs w ho have to tran sfe r p a rt o f th e ir p ro d u c t to a ru ling g ro u p .

21. K. M arx an d F. E ngels, T h e G e r m a n I d e o lo g y (L ondon : L aw ren ce i an d W ishart, 1965), p. 61.


22. cf. Jo rge L arra in , M a r x is m & I d e o lo g y (L ondon : M acm illan , 1983).23. S oustelle , D a ily L i f e o f t h e A z t e c s , pp. 100— 1.24. B. P. L am b, In d ia : a W o r ld in T r a n s i t io n (New Y o rk : P raeg er,

1963), pp . 2 6 —7.25. W eb er, E c o n o m y S o c i e t y , vol. I, pp. 472 — 80.26. Ib id ., p. 431.27. A rth u r F. W right, T h e C o n fu c ia n i s t P e r s u a s io n (S tan fo rd : S tanford

U niversity Press, 1960).28. K ung-chuan H siao, R u r a l C h in a , I m p e r ia l C o n tr o l in th e N in e t e e n th

C e n tu r y (S eattle : U n iversity o f W ash ing ton Press, 1960).29. O n th e ro le o f e u n u c h s in R om e, see A. H. M. Jones, T h e L a t e r

R o m a n E m p i r e (O xford : Basil B lackw ell, 1964), vol. II, p. 570ff.30. E dw ard G ib b o n , T h e D e c l in e & F a ll o f t h e R o m a n E m p i r e (New

Y ork : M o d ern L ibrary , 1932), vol. I, p. 102ff.31. G o rd o n T u llo ck , T h e P o l i t ic s o f B u r e a u c r a c y (W ash ing ton : P ublic

A ffairs P ress, 1965), pp . 215— 16.32. K. M arx, C a p ita l , vol. I (L o n d o n : L aw rence & W ishart, 1970),

p. 376.33. A. D. A lderson , T h e S t r u c tu r e o f t h e O t to m a n D y n a s ty (O xford:

C la ren d o n Press, 1956), p. 76.34. C a lc u la tio n s given in K au tsky , A r i s to c r a t i c E m p ir e s , p. 247.35. Li C h ien -n u n g , T h e P o l i t ic a l H is to r y o f C h in a , 1 8 4 0 — 1 9 2 8

(P rin ce to n : V an N o stran d , 1956), p. 43.36. A lb e r t H . L yber, T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e

(C am bridge , M ass: H arv ard U niversity P ress, 1963), p. 29.37. cf. M F re d e rick N elson, K o r e a th e O ld O r d e r in E a s te r n A s ia

(B aton R ouge: L ou isiana S ta te U niversity Press, 1946), p. 84ff.38. cf. Je re m y A. S ab lo ff & C . C . L am b erg -K arlo v sk y , A n c i e n t

C iv i l is a t io n a n d T r a d e (A lb e rq u e rq u e : U n iversity o f N ew M exico P ress, 1975); R o b e rt M. A dam s, ‘A n th ro p o lo g ica l p e rsp e c tiv es on a n c ie n t tr a d e ’, C u r r e n t A n th r o p o lo g y , 15, 1974.

39. S am u e l N oah K ra m e r, H is to r y B e g in s a t S u m e r (New Y o rk : A n ch o r, 1959).


1. cf. C C H M , vol. I, pp . 182—6.2. O f co u rse , such a s ta te m e n t b ru sq u e ly shoves aside a ran g e of

co m p lex issues m u ch d e b a te d by h isto rians, w hich a m o re d e ta iled d iscu ssio n w ould necessarily have to exam ine a t som e leng th . A lth o u g h it is ageing , p ro b ab ly th e m ost usefu l g en e ra l d iscussion in E ng lish is still R u sh to n C o u lb o rn , F e u d a l i s m in H i s to r y(P r in c e to n : P rin c e to n U n iv ersity P ress , 1956). cf. a lso O w en


L a ttim o re , ‘F eu d a lism in h is to ry ’, P a s t a n d P r e s e n t , 12, 1957; F. C h ey e tte , L o r d s h ip a n d C o m m u n i t y in M e d ia e v a l E u r o p e (New Y ork , 1968).

3. P erry A n d erso n , P a s s a g e s f r o m A n t i q u i t y to F e u d a l i s m (L ondon :N ew L eft B ooks, 1974), a n d L in e a g e s o f t h e A b s o l u t i s t S t a t e(L ondon : New Left Books, 1974).

4. M a u ric e A sh ley , T h e G o l d e n C e n tu r y , E u r o p e 1 5 9 8 — 1 9 1 7(L ondon : W eiden fe ld , 1969), p. 217.

5. G eo ffre y B arra c lo u g h , E u r o p e a n U n i ty in T h o u g h t & A c t i o n (O xford : Basil B lackw ell, 1963). C o m p are R ené A lb rech t-C arré , T h e U n i ty o f E u r o p e : a n H is to r ic a l S u r v e y (L ondon : S eek e r & W arb u rg , 1966).

6. cf. M e in eck e , D e r I d e e d e r S ta a ts r ä s o n (B erlin : R. O ld en b o u rg , 1924).

7. E. M. Satow , A G u id e to D ip lo m a t ic P r a c t i c e (L ondon : L ongm an, 1922); G a r re tt M atting ly , R e n n a i s s a n c e D ip l o m a c y (L o n d o n : Jo n a th an C ap e , 1955).

8. G . N. C lark , T h e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y (O xford : C la ren d o n Press, 1947), p. 135.

9. A. Sorel, L E u r o p e e t la r é v o lu t io n f r a n ç a i s e (Paris: E. P lon , 1885), vol. I, pp . 3 3 —4. cf. M an n in g on th e e m e rg e n c e o f ‘m e ta d ip lo m atics’ — th e a ttr ib u tio n o f ind iv iduality to s ta te s in a m a n n er unknow n in p rio r s ta te form s. C. A. W . M anning , T h e N a tu r e o f I n t e r n a t io n a l S o c i e t y (L ondon : Bell, 1962).

10. cf. M einecke , D e r I d e e d e r S ta a tr ä s o n .11. Q u o ted in C lark , T h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n tu r y .12. Ib id ., p. 141ff.13. Ibid., p. 144.14. R o g e r L o ck y e r, H a p s b u r g a n d B o u r b o n E u r o p e 1 4 7 0 — 1 7 2 0

(L ondon : L ongm an, 1974).15. C lifford G ee rtz , L o c a l K n o w l e d g e (N e w Y ork : Basic B ooks, 1983).16. T h e te rm ‘th e W est’ is o f co u rse of q u ite rec en t p ro v en a n ce , and

w as fav o u red by C o n tin en ta l (especia lly G erm an ) a u th o rs som e w hile be fo re it cam e in to w idesp read use am o n g E nglish-speaking w riters.

17. T h is m eans tak ing issue w ith W alle rs te in ’s fo rm u la tio n o f ‘w orld system th e o ry ’ w hich, o f co u rse , has b een the su b jec t o f m uch c ritica l d iscussion in any case (see th e d iscussion on pp. 161 —71).

18. A nderson , L in e a g e s o f t h e A b s o l u t i s t S ta te , pp. 39 and 29. A nderson d o e s say th a t d ip lo m ac y ‘w as o n e o f th e g re a t in s titu tio n a l inv en tio n s o f th e a g e ’, an d th a t ‘w ith its em erg en c e a n in te rn a tio n a l s ta te system w as bo rn in E u ro p e .' (p. 37).


19. S ee Q u en tin S k in n er, T h e F o u n d a t i o n s o f M o d e r n P o l i t ic a l T h o u g h t (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1978), 2 vols, espec ia lly vol. 2, p. 286ff.

20. C lark , T h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n tu r y , p. 219, cf. B e tran d d e Jouvenel, S o v e r e ig n ty (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1957).

21. cf. C . B. M acpherson , ‘A political theo ry of p ro p e rty ’ in D e m o c r a t ic T h e o r y : E s s a y s in R e t r i e v a l (O xfo rd : C la re n d o n P ress 1973), p. 125ff.

22. cf. C h ris to p h e r Hill, T h e W o r ld T u r n e d U p s id e D o w n (L ondon : T em p le Sm ith , 1972).

23. W ell ana ly sed by H in tze, in S ta a t u n d V e r fa s s u n g (G ö ttin g en : V an d e n h o ec k , 1962), p. 264ff.

24. Jo h n C. R ule, L o u is X I V a n d th e C r a f t o f K in g s h ip (C o lum bus: O h io S ta te U niversity Press, 1969).

25. L ockyer, H a p s b u r g a n d B o u r b o n E u r o p e , pp . 481 — 2.26. K. M arx, ‘T h e civil w ar in F ra n ce ', in M arx & E ngels, S e l e c t e d

W o r k s , p. 289.27. A n d erso n , L in e a g e s o f t h e A b s o l u t i s t S ta te , p. 18.28. Q u o ted in W illiam F. C h u rch , T h e G r e a tn e s s o f L o u i s X I V , M y th

o r R e a l i t y ? ( B oston, M ass: H ea th , 1959), p. 47.29. P ie rre G o u b e rt, B e a u v a is e t le B e a u v a is i s d e 1 6 0 0 ä 1 7 8 0 (Paris:

S EU PE N , 1960), p. 13ff.30. G ian fran c o Poggi, T h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f th e M o d e r n S ta te (L ondon:

H u tch in so n , 1978), p. 73. Poggi’s d iscussion o f th e d ev e lo p m e n t of law in the ab so lu tis t s ta te , a lthough brief, is exem pla ry .

31. W eber, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. 2, pp. 800—2.32. cf. P. V inogradoff, R o m a n L a w in M e d ia e v a l E u r o p e (L ondon :

H arp er, 1909).33. P re s to n K ing, T h e I d e o lo g y o f O r d e r (L ondon : A llen & U nw in,

1974), p. 75.34. cf. K laus D o ern e r, M a d m e n a n d th e B o u r g e o is ie (O xford : Basil

B lackw ell, 1981).35. S ean M cC onville , A H is to r y o f E n g li s h P r is o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(L ondon : R o u tledge & K egan Paul, 1981), p. 31 ff.36. D o ern er, M a d m e n a n d th e B o u r g e o is ie , pp. 15— 16.37. C lark , T h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n tu r y , p. 98.38. T re v o r A ston , C ris is in E u r o p e 1 5 6 0 — 1 6 6 0 (L ondon : R o u tled g e &

K egan P aul, 1965). O f co u rse , the th e m e of th e ‘g en e ra l crisis ' has b ee n d iscussed a lm ost a d n a u s e a m in the su b se q u en t lite ra tu re .

39. A key so u rc e fo r th e ea rly se v e n te e n th ce n tu ry in F ra n c e is A. D. L ub linskaya, F r e n c h A b s o l u t i s m : T h e C r u c ia l P h a s e , 1 6 2 0 — 2 9 (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1968), c h a p te rs 3 an d 5.

40. E. N. W illiam s, T h e A n c i e n R e g i m e in E u r o p e (L ondon : B odley H ead , 1970), pp. 2 an d 14.

41. C. T illy , ‘R eflec tio n s on the h is to ry of E u ro p e a n s ta te -m ak in g ’ in his ed ited vo lum e T h e F o r m a t io n o f N a t io n a l S ta te s in E u r o p e (P rin ce to n : P rin c e to n U niversity Press, 1975), p. 38.

42. B eautifu lly ana ly sed in C lark , T h e S e v e n te e n th C e n tu r y , p. 155ff.43. F rank A. K ierm an and John K. F airbank , C h in e s e W a y s in W a r fa re ,

(C am b rid g e , M ass: H arv ard U n iv ersity P ress, 1974). S ee, in p a rticu la r, the a r tic le by H e rb e r t F ran k e , ‘S iege an d d e fe n ce of tow ns in m ed iaeval C h in a ’.

44. C h a rles O. H u ck e r, C h in e s e G o v e r n m e n t in M in g T im e s : S e v e n S tu d ie s (New Y o rk : C o lum bia U niversity Press, 1969). A very useful survey o f C h inese m ilitary s tren g th a p p e a rs in c h a p te r 2 of W illiam H. M cNeill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r (O xford: Basil Blackwell,1983).

45. cf. K autsky , A r i s t o c r a t i c E m p i r e s , ch a p te rs 2 —3.46. C h a rle s W . C . O m an , T h e A r t o f W a r in t h e M i d d le A g e s ,

3 7 5 — 1 5 1 5 (Ith aca : C o rnell U niversity P ress, 1953). S ee also S idney T oy , A H is to r y o f F o r t i f i c a t io n f r o m 3 0 0 0 B C to 1 7 0 0 (L ondon : H ein em an n , 1955).

47. L. T . W hite , M e d ia e v a l T e c h n o lo g y a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e (O xford: C la ren d o n Press, 1962), c h a p te r I.

48. S am uel E. F iner, ‘S tate- and nation -bu ild ing in E u ro p e : the ro le of the m ilitary’, in T illy (ed.), T h e F o r m a t io n o f N a t io n a l S ta te s , p. 103.

49. T h e m e ch a n iza tio n of w ea p o n ry a n te d a te s by c e n tu r ie s its ap p lica tio n to the ‘logistics o f w ar’. H orses an d hum an m uscle rem a in ed th e basis o f m ilitary tran sp o rta tio n even in th e F irst W orld W ar, in w hich the British arm y sh ipped m ore to n s of oats an d hay to the F ro n t than am m u n itio n . T h e av erag e foo t-so ld ier th ro u g h o u t the h isto ry of civ ilization cou ld no t m arch m ore than b e tw een tw elve an d e ig h teen m iles a day, o r ca rry m o re than som e eigh ty p ounds, inc lud ing tw o w eek s’ ra tions, cf. S. L. A. M arshall, T h e S o ld ie r 's L o a d a n d th e M o b i l i t y o f a N a t io n (W ash ing ton : C o m b at F o rc es P ress, 1950).

50. T h e o d o re R opp, W a r in th e M o d e r n W o r ld (W estport: G reenw ood ,1959).

51. P itrim S o ro k in , S o c ia l a n d C u l tu r a l D y n a m i c s (New Y o rk : A m erican B ook C om pany , 1937), vol. 3.

52. R opp , W a r in t h e M o d e r n W o r ld , p. 7.53. G eoffrey P arlier, ‘T h e “m ilitary rev o lu tio n ” 1550— 1660 — a m yth?’,

J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H is to r y , 48, 1976, p. 206.54. B e rn a rd B rodie , A G u id e to N a v a l S t r a te g y (P rin ce to n : P rin c e to n

U niversity Press, 1958).



55. G a r re tt M attingly , T h e D e f e a t o f th e S p a n is h A r m a d a (L ondon : Jo n a th a n C ape , 1959).

56. M cN eill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r , p. 100. See also C arlo M . C ipolla , G u n s a n d S a i ls in t h e E a r ly P h a s e o f E u r o p e a n E x p a n s io n 1 4 0 0 - 1 7 0 0 (L ondon : C ollins, 1965).

57. cf. Je an G im p e l, T h e M e d ia e v a l M a c h in e (L o n d o n : V ic to r G o llancz , 1977).

58. T h e p h rase is from C lark , T h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n tu r y , p. 65.59. Lewis M um ford , T h e M y th o f t h e M a c h in e (L ondon : S eek e r &

W arb u rg , 1967), an d T h e P e n ta g o n o f P o w e r (L ondon : S eek e r & W arb u rg , 1971).

60. M aury D. F eld , T h e S t r u c tu r e o f V io l e n c e (B everly Hills: Sage,1977), p. 6ff; see also Ja cq u e s van D oorn , T h e S o l d i e r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e (B everly Hills: Sage, 1975), p. 9ff.

61. V an D o o rn , T h e S o l d i e r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e , p. 11.62. F eld , T h e S t r u c tu r e o f V io l e n c e , p. 7.63. F o u cau lt, D is c ip l in e a n d P u n is h .64. S am uel P. H u n ting ton , T h e S o l d ie r a n d T h e S t a t e (C am bridge,

M ass: H arv ard U niversity Press, 1957), p. 20.65. A classical w ork on the su b jec t is R. E h re n b erg , D a s Z e i t a l t e r d e r

F u g g e r (Jena , 1896). W . S o m b art's K r ie g u n d K a p i ta l i s m u s (D u n c k e r an d H u m b o lt, M un ich , 1913) rem a in s suggestive , a lth o u g h som e of its key ideas a re now so m ew h at d isc re d ite d . F or a w ell-know n c ritiq u e , see J. U. Nef, W a r a n d H u m a n P r o g r e s s (C am bridge, M ass: H arv ard U niversity Press, 1950). cf. a lso J. M. W in ter, ‘T h e ec o n o m ic an d social h isto ry of w ar’, in his W a r a n d E c o n o m ic D e v e l o p m e n t (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1975).

66. R ecap itu la tin g the d iscussion o ffe red in C C H M , vol. I, pp . 190—6.67. F re d e rik B arth , E th n i c G r o u p s a n d B o u n d a r i e s (B ergen: U niversi-

ta ts-fu r P aget, 1969).68. John A. A rm strong , N a t io n s B e fo r e N a t io n a l i s m (C h ap e l Hill:

U n iversity o f N orth C a ro lin a Press, 1982), p. 5.69. A. D. A lderson , T h e S t r u c tu r e o f t h e O t to m a n D y n a s t y (O xford:

C la ren d o n Press, 1956).70. H ugh S eton -W atson , N a t io n s a n d S ta te s (L ondon : M e th u en , 1982),

p. 26ff.71. G . W . S. B arrow , F e u d a l B r i ta in (L ondon : A rno ld , 1956), p. 4 lOff.72. A lb e rt C . B augh, A H is to r y o f t h e E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e (L ondon :

R o u tled g e & K egan P au l, 1951).73. S e ton -W atson , N a t io n s a n d S ta te s , pp . 4 4 —5.74. E . K ed o u rie , N a t io n a l i s m (L ondon : H u tch in so n , 1961).

356 Notes to Chapters 4 and 5

75. cf. S. B. Jones, B o u n d a r y M a k in g : a H a n d b o o k f o r S t a t e s m e n (W ash in g to n : C a rn e g ie E n d o w m en t fo r In te rn a tio n a l P eac e M o n o g rap h , 1945).

76. P re sco tt , B o u n d a r ie s a n d F r o n t ie r s , p. 65.

77. C C H M , vol. I, p. 190.

5 Capitalism, Industrialism and Social Transformation

1. Cf. ‘F o u r m yths in the h isto ry o f social th o u g h t’, in S S P T .2. S tep h e n K alberg , ‘M ax W e b e r’s un iversa l-h isto rical a rc h ite c to n ic

o f e c o n o m ic a lly -o rie n te d a c t io n ’, in S co tt M cN all, C u r r e n t P e r s p e c t i v e s in S o c ia l T h e o r y , vol. 4, 1983, p. 266ff; W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. I, p. lOOff.

3. F ro m a d iffe ren t th e o re tic a l s ta n d p o in t, P arsons an d L uhm ann have d ev e lo p e d a para lle l idea . M oney fo r them is, as such , a ‘m ed iu m o f c o m m u n ic a tio n ’, to g e th e r w ith o th e r o v e rla p p in g m ed ia . S ee N iklas L uhm ann , T r u s t a n d P o w e r (C h ich este r: W iley,1979), c h a p te r 3; and , p a rticu la rly , P arsons: ‘O n th e c o n c e p t of po litica l p o w er’.

4. W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. I, pp. 101—2.5. Ib id ., p. 102. In the passage c o n c e rn e d , W e b er d iscusses bo th pre-

m o n e ta ry system s an d soc ia list th e o rie s of th e ab o litio n o f m oney . T h e ‘ir ra tio n a l’ a sp ec t o f p rov ision in kind refers to the la tte r, w hich in W e b e r’s eyes a re w holly im p ra c tic ab le in a m o d ern ec o n o m ic se tting .

6. cf. P au l Einzig, P r im i t i v e M o n e y (O xford : P erg am o n Press, 1966), p a r t 4.

7. Ib id ., p. 447.8. W eb er, T h e P r o te s ta n t E th i c a n d th e S p i r i t o f C a p i ta l i s m (L ondon :

A llen & LJnwin, 1976), p. 17ff.9. W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. I, p. 165.

10. Ib id . See also M. W eb er, G e n e r a l E c o n o m ic H is to r y (New Y ork : C ollier, 1961), pp . 232—3.

11. Ibid., p. 163.12. Ib id ., pp. 8 3 —4.13. W eb er, G e n e r a ! E c o n o m ic H is to r y , p. 231.14. Ibid., pp. 224—5.15. K. M arx, C a p i ta l (L ondon : L aw rence & W ishart, 1970), vol. I,

p. 715.16. Ibid., p. 714.17. Ib id ., p. 713.18. Ib id ., p. 714.


19. cf. C C H M , vol. I, p. 96ff.20. Ib id ., c h a p te r 6.21. K. M arx : ‘E co n o m ic & P h ilo so p h ica l M a n u sc r ip ts ' in T . B.

B o tto m o re , K a r l M a r x , E a r ly W r i t in g s (New Y ork : M cG raw -H ill,1964), pp . 1 8 9 - 9 1 .

22. M arx, C a p ita l, vol. I, p. 96.23. F o r fu rth e r d iscussion o f th is po in t, see C C H M , vol. I, ch a p te rs

2 - 5 .24. S ee espec ia lly K arl P o lanyi, T h e G r e a t T r a n s fo r m a t io n .25. cf. C C H M , vol. I, p. 113ff.26. A dam Sm ith , T h e T h e o r y o f M o r a l S e n t i m e n t s (O xford : O xford

U n iversity P ress, 1976), p. 11.27. A d am F erg u so n , A n E s s a y o n t h e H i s to r y o f C iv i l S o c i e t y

(E d in b u rg h : E d in b u rg h U niversity P ress, 1966), p. 105.28. K eith T rib e , G e n e a lo g ie s o f C a p i ta l is m (L ondon: M acm illan , 1981),

p. 106.29. cf. ‘F o u r m yths in th e h isto ry of social th o u g h t', in S S P T .30. cf. S idney P o llard , T h e G e n e s i s o f M o d e r n M a n a g e m e n t (L ondon :

A rno ld , 1965).31. M arx, C a p ita l , vol. 1, p. 3 7 Iff.32. W eb er, G e n e r a l E c o n o m ic H is to r y , c h a p te r 27.33. cf. C C H M , vol. 1, c h a p te r 6.34. F o r a d iscussion of som e o f th ese issues (no t ex p ressed w holly in

the sam e form in w hich 1 w ould pu t them today), see C S A S , c h a p te r 3 an d p a s s im .

35. C C H M , vol. 1, p. 1 lOff.36. H arry B raverm an , L a b o u r a n d M o n o p o l y C a p i ta l (New Y ork :

M on th ly R eview P ress, 1967).37. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 5.

6 Capitalism and the State: from Absolutism to the Nation-State

1. Joseph S chum peter, ‘T h e crisis o f the tax sta te ', in A lan T . P eaco ck e t a l., I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m ic P a p e r s (New Y o rk : M acm illan , 1954).

2. W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. I, p. 328ff.3. W eb er, G e n e r a l E c o n o m ic H is to r y , p. 251.4. W eb er, E c o n o m y & S o c ie t y , vol. 1, pp . 334—7.5. V ic to r M . P erez -D iaz, S ta te . B u r e a u c r a c y a n d C iv i l S o c i e t y

(L ondon : M acm illan , 1978). F o r the b est d iscussion o f M arx on the issue, a lthough stric tly lim ited in te rm s of its ow n critica l s tandpo in t, see S. D e B runhoff, M a r x o n M o n e y (L ondon : P lu to P ress, 1977).

U seful co m m en ts co n n e c tin g w ith my d iscussion h e re a re to be found in G . K. Ingham , C a p i ta l i s m D iv id e d ? {L ondon : M acm illan ,1984). A m ong o th e r w orks see, in p a rticu la r, R . F. H arro d , M o n e y (L ondon : M acm illan , 1969).

6. cf. M ax W eb er, G e n e r a l E c o n o m ic H is to r y , p. 258ff.7. cf. A n to n y C u tle r, M a r x ’s C a p i ta l a n d C a p i ta l i s m T o d a y (L ondon :

R o u tled g e & K egan Paul, 1978), vol. 2, p. 30ff.8. Ib id ., p. 35.9. R udolf Braun, T a x a tio n , sociopolitical structu re , and state-building:

G re a t B rita in an d B ran d en b u rg -P ru ss ia ’, in T illy, T h e F o r m a t io n o f N a t io n a l S ta te s , p. 246.

10. R udo lf G o ld sc h e id : ‘S taa t, ö ffe n tic h e r H aushalt und G ese llsch aft',H a n d b u c h d e r F in a n z w is s e n s c h a f t (T ü b in g en : M öhr, 1926), vol. I, p. 149.

11. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 6 an d p a s s im .12. W hen these a re p o rtra y ed in a p a rtic u la r fash ion . See C C H M , vol.

I, c h a p te r 2.13. See, fo r exam ple , C P S T , c h a p te r 6; C S , c h a p te r 5.14. Im m anuel W alle rs te in , T h e M o d e r n W o r ld S y s t e m (New Y ork :

A cad em ic Press, 1974), c h a p te r 1. cf. a lso T e re n c e K. H opkins,‘T h e s tudy o f th e cap ita lis t w orld eco n o m y : som e in tro d u c to ryco n s id e ra tio n s’, in W alte r L. G o ld fra n k , T h e W o r ld - S y s t e m o f C a p i ta l i s m : P a s t a n d P r e s e n t (B everly Hills: Sage, 1979).

15. I. W alle rs te in , ‘M o d ern isa tio n : R eq u ie sce t in P a c e ’, in his T h e C a p i ta l i s t W o r ld E c o n o m y (C am b rid g e : C a m b rid g e U niversity Press, 1979), pp. 133 & 134'.

16. W alle rs te in , T h r e e p a th s of n a tio n a l d ev e lo p m e n t’, Ibid., p. 39.17. Ibid., p. 41.18. W alle rs te in : ‘T h e rise and fu tu re dem ise o f th e w orld cap ita lis t

system : c o n c e p ts fo r co m p ara tiv e ana ly sis’, Ibid., p. 19.19. W alle rs te in , ‘T h e ru ra l eco n o m y in m o d ern w orld so c ie ty ’, Ibid.,

p. 125.20. F o r exam ple R. B renner, ‘T h e o rig in s o f cap ita lis t d ev e lo p m e n t: a

c r itiq u e o f neo-S m ith ian M arx ism ’, N e w L e f t R e v ie w , 105, 1977; T h e d a S kocpol, ‘W alle rs te in ’s w orld-cap italist system : a th eo re tica l and h istorical c r it iq u e ’, and M. Janow itz ‘A sociological perspective on W alle rs te in ’, b o th in A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f S o c io lo g y , 82, 1977.

21. cf. T . K. H opk ins and 1. W alle rs te in , ‘T h e c o m p ara tiv e s tudy of n a tio n a l so c ie ties ', S o c ia l S c i e n c e I n f o r m a t i o n , 6, 1967.

22. I. W allerstein , ‘D ep en d en ce in an in te rd ep en d e n t w orld : the lim ited possibilities o f transfo rm ation w ithin the cap ita list w orld -econom y’, in T h e C a p i ta l i s t W o r ld - E c o n o m y , p . 69. I t shou ld b e p o in te d o u t th a t W alle rs te in has in la te r w orks tr ied to m ove aw ay from his



e a r lie r functionalism . B ut he has n o t d o n e so conv incing ly . As C o n n e ll says, ‘W a lle rs te in re p e a te d ly sp e ak s o f s tru g g le an d p rac tice , b u t it is h a rd to f e e l th em in his m ore g en e ra l fo rm u la tions.’ S ee R. W . C onnell, ‘C lass fo rm atio n on a w orld sc a le ’, in his W h ic h W a y is U p ? (Sydney: A llen & U nw in, 1983).

23. cf. C P S T , p. 73ff.

7 Administrative Power, Internal Pacification

1. D. G . Jan e lle , ‘C e n tra l p la ce d e v e lo p m e n t in a t im e —sp a ce f ra m e w o rk ’, P r o f e s s i o n a l G e o g r a p h e r , 20, 1968. S ee a lso D on P ark es an d N igel T h rift, T im e s , S p a c e s a n d P la c e s (C h ich ester: W iley, 1980), c h a p te r 7.

2. J. B ischoff, A C o m p r e h e n s i v e H is to r y o f t h e W o o l le n a n d W o r s te d M a n u fa c tu r e s (L ondon , 1842), p. 428. T h is passage is q u o te d and critic ized in som e p a r t by D erek G reg o ry , w ho suggests th a t the ro ad system w as in fac t ra th e r b e t te r th a n it im plies. S ee his R e g i o n a l T r a n s f o r m a t i o n a n d I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n (L o n d o n : M acm illan , 1982, pp. 5 4 —5).

3. cf. E v ita r Z eru b av e l, H id d e n R h y t h m s (C h icago : U niversity o f C h icag o Press, 1981).

4. Lew is M um ford , I n t e r p r e ta t io n s a n d F o r e c a s ts (L ondon : S eek e r & W arb u rg , 1973).

5. F ran k N orris, T h e O c to p u s (L ondon : G ra n t R ichards, 1901), p. 42.6. cf. E v ita r Z eru b av e l, H id d e n R h y t h m s .7. D erek H ow se, G r e e n w i c h T i m e a n d t h e D i s c o v e r y o f t h e

L o n g t i t u d e (New Y ork : O xfo rd U niversity Press, 1980), p. 121.8. S te p h e n K ern , T h e C u l tu r e o f T i m e a n d S p a c e 1 8 8 0 — 1 9 1 8

(L ondon : W eiden fe ld , 1983), p. 12.9. Ib id ., p. 13.

10. F igu res 2 an d 3 from R onald A bler, ‘E ffects o f space-ad ju sting te ch n o lo g ie s on the hu m an geo g rap h y o f th e fu tu re ’, in A b le r e t a i , H u m a n G e o g r a p h y in a S h r in k in g W o r ld (N orth S citua te : D uxbury, 1975), pp. 39 and 41.

11. Ib id ., p. 40.12. Ith ie l d a Sola Pool, T h e S o c ia l I m p a c t o f t h e T e l e p h o n e (B oston,

M ass: M IT P ress, 1977).13. H. A. Innis, E m p i r e a n d C o m m u n ic a t io n s (O xford : C la ren d o n

P ress, 1950), p. 7.14. A lth o u g h it co u ld b e c la im ed M cL u h an m anaged to d o so. F o r a

m o re sober, ye t in stru c tiv e , ap p ra isa l see in p a r tic u la r E lizab e th L. E isen ste in , T h e P r in t in g R e v o l u t i o n in E a r ly M o d e r n E u r o p e (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1983).


15. cf. A n th o n y O b ersch a ll, T h e E s ta b l i s h m e n t o f E m p i r i c a l S o c ia l R e s e a r c h in G e r m a n y , (T h e H ague: M o u to n , 1965). O n th e grow th o f s ta te d o cu m e n ta tio n , see B. R. M itchell, E u r o p e a n H is to r ic a l S ta t i s t ic s , 1750— 1970 (New Y o rk : C o lu m b ia U niversity Press, 1975).

16. cf. C S , c h a p te r 6.17. F o u cau lt, D is c ip l in e a n d P u n is h .18. D o ern e r , M a d m e n a n d th e B o u r g e o is ie , p. 16ff.19. G eo rg e R osen , ‘T h e hosp ita l: h is to rica l socio logy o f a com m unity

in s titu tio n ’, in E lio t F re id son , T h e H o s p i ta l in M o d e r n S o c ie t y (G len co e : T h e F re e Press, 1963).

20. B rian T ie rn e y , M e d ia e v a l P o o r L a w (B erke ley : U n iv ersity o f C a lifo rn ia Press, 1959).

21. Sean M cC onville , A H is to r y o f E n g lis h P r is o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (L ondon : R ou tledge & K egan Paul, 1981), vol. 1, p. 31 ff.

22. cf. ‘F rom M arx to N ietzsche? N eo-conservatism , F o u cau lt, and p ro b lem s in co n te m p o ra ry po litica l th e o ry ’, in P C S T ; see a lso CS, c h a p te r 3.

23. cf. G eo rg e R u sch e and O tto K irch h e im er, P u n is h m e n t a n d S o c ia l S t r u c tu r e (New Y ork : Russell & R ussell, 1968), p. 42ff.

24. cf. M ichael Ignatieff, A J u s t M e a s u r e o f P a in (L ondon : M acm illan ,1978).

25. cf. C S , c h a p te r 2.26. S idney P o llard , T h e G e n e s i s o f M o d e r n M a n a g e m e n t (L ondon :

A rno ld , 1965), p. 163.27. See th e w ork by H o race B leackley , T h e H a n g m e n o f E n g la n d ,

re p r in te d in its e n tire ty in Jo h n L ofland , S t a t e E x e c u t i o n s (M o n tc la ir NJ: P a tte rso n Sm ith , 1977).

28. Ibid., p. 312. See also A lice M orse E arle , C u r io u s P u n is h m e n ts o f B y g o n e D a y s (M o n tc la ir: Sm ith , 1969). O rig inally pub lished in 1896.

29. cf. E b erh ard , C o n q u e r o r s a n d R u le r s .30. T . J. A. Le G o ff an d D. M. G . S u th erlan d , ‘T h e R evo lu tion and the

ru ra l co m m u n ity in e ig h teen th ce n tu ry B rittan y ’, P a s t a n d P r e s e n t ,62, 1974, p. 97.

31. A lan M acfarlan e , T h e J u s t ic e a n d th e M a r e 's A l e (O xford : Basil B lackw ell, 1981), pp. 1 8 9 -9 0 .

32. Q u o ted in T . A. C ritch ley , A H is to r y o f P o l ic e in E n g la n d a n d W a le s (L ondon : C o n s tab le , 1978), p. 22.

33. S. an d B. W ebb , E n g lis h L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t (L ondon : M acm illan , 1922), vol. 4, p. 408.

34. T e d R o b e rt G u rr , R o g u e s , R e b e l s a n d R e f o r m e r s (B everly Hills: Sage, 1976), p. 34ff.

35. M acfa rlan e , T h e J u s t ic e a n d th e M a r e 's A l e , p. 189.


36. A lth o u g h it is an a ly sed a t g re a te r leng th in C C H M , vol. I.37. O n th is m a tte r th e re a re m a jo r d isag reem en ts am o n g in te rp re te rs

o f M arx . F o r a re le v an t d iscussion , see S teven L ukes, M a r x is m a n d M o r a l i ty (O xford : O xford U niversity Press, fo rthcom ing ).

38. G u rr , R o g u e s , R e b e l s a n d R e fo r m e r s .39. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 5.40. F o r a d iscussion o f reg iona liza tion , see C S , c h a p te r 3.41. Philippe Ariès, W e s te r n A t t i t u d e s T o w a r d s D e a th (B altim ore: Johns

H opk ins U niversity P ress, 1974), p. 58. See also Jo a ch im W haley,M ir r o r s o f M o r ta l i t y (L ondon : E u ro p a , 1981); an d Le R oy L adurie , 'C h an u , L eb run , V ovelle: la nouvelle h isto ire d e la m o rt’, in L e T e r r i to i r e d e l 'h is to r ie n (Paris: G allim ard , 1973—8), 2 vols.

42. N o rb e rt E lias, T h e C iv i l is in g P r o c e s s (O xford : Basil B lackw ell,1978).

43. C S , c h a p te r 2; C P S T , pp. 123—8.44. C C H M , vol. 1, pp. 2 3 0 - 9 .


1. So little im p o rta n ce d o es B endix a tta c h to class div ision tha t n e ith e r the c o n c e p t o f ‘c lass’, n o r any re la ted n o tio n s em ploying the c o n c ep t, a p p e a r in the index o f K in g s o r P e o p le . In th is re sp e c t the in d ex er has b ee n perfec tly tru e to th e c laim s o f th e book .

2. C h a rle s E. L indb lom , P o li t ic s a n d M a r k e t s (New Y o rk : Basic B ooks, 1977), pp. 132 — 3 an d p a s s im . L indb lom relies heavily upon R. A. D ahl, P o ly a r c h y (New H aven : Y ale U niversity P ress, 1971). S ee a lso D ah l, A P r e fa c e t o D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y (C h icag o : U niversity o f C h icag o P ress, 1956).

3. D ahl, P o ly a r c h y , pp. 1—2.4. A gain follow ing D ahl, P o ly a r c h y .5. T . H. M arsh a ll, C la ss . C i t i z e n s h ip a n d S o c ia l D e v e l o p m e n t

(W estp o rt: G re en w o o d Press, 1973).6. P arsons, ‘O n the c o n c e p t o f po litica l p o w e r’, an d ‘S om e reflec tio n s

on th e p lace of fo rce in soc ia l p ro ce ss’, in H arry E ck ste in , I n t e r n a l W a r (G len co e : F re e P ress, 1964). S ee also L uhm ann , T r u s t a n d P o w e r .

/ 7. H ere I d raw ex tensively up o n ‘C lass d iv ision , class co n flic t andc itizen sh ip righ ts', in P C S T .

8. Q u o ted in M arshall, C la ss , C i t i z e n s h ip a n d S o c ia l D e v e l o p m e n t , p. 46.

9. M arshall, Ib id ., pp. 84 an d 9 6 —7.10. cf. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 6.


11. K. M arx, ‘T h e E ig h te en th B ru m aire o f L ouis B o n a p a r te ’, in M arx & Engels, S e l e c t e d W o r k s , pp. 171—2.

12. cf. Q u en tin S kinner, T h e F o u n d a t io n s o f M o d e r n P o li t ic a l T h o u g h t (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1978), 2 vols.

13. A lvin W. G o u ld n e r, T h e D ia l e c t ic o f I d e o lo g y a n d T e c h n o lo g y (New Y ork : S eabury , 1976), p. 95.

14. C P S T , pp. 2 2 1 - 3 .15. C C H M , vol. I, pp . 1 9 0 - 1 .16. A rm strong , N a t io n s B e fo r e N a t io n a l i s m , p. 9ff.17. John Breuilly, N a t io n a l i s m a n d th e S ta te (M an ch este r: M a n ch e ste r

U n iversity P ress, 1982), p. 19ff. I have m odified th e ca te g o rie s som ew hat.

18. E rn est G elln er, N a t io n s a n d N a t io n a l i s m (O xford : Basil B lackw ell, 1983), p. 129.

19. cf. B loom , T h e W o r ld o f N a t io n s .20. As G e lln e r ac ce p ts , w hile deny ing th a t w hat m akes it illum inating

has m u c h to d o w ith M arx is t th o u g h t. S ee h is N a t io n s a n d N a t io n a l i s m , p. 96.

21. T o m N airn, T h e B r e a k - u p o f B r i ta in (L ondon : New Left Books, 1977).

22. N airn, T h e B r e a k - u p o f B r i ta in , pp. 351 an d 353.23. E. G elln er, ‘N ationalism , o r the new con fessions of a justified

E dinburgh sinner’, in his S p e c ta c le s a n d P r e d ic a m e n ts (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1979).

24. K arl W. D eu tsch , N a t io n a l i s m a n d S o c ia l C o m m u n ic a t io n (B oston: M IT Press, 1966).

25. G e lln er, N a t io n s a n d N a t io n a l i s m , p. 140.26. See, for exam ple , L. D oob, P a tr io t i s m a n d N a t io n a l is m (New H aven:

Y ale U n iversity P ress, 1964); A n th o n y D. S m ith , T h e o r i e s o f N a t io n a l i s m (L ondon : D u ck w o rth , 1971).

27. cf. D avid A pter, T h e P o li t ic s o f M o d e r n i s a t io n (C hicago: U niversity o f C h icag o Press, 1965), an d ‘P o litica l relig ion in new n a tio n s’, in C lifford G ee rtz , O ld S o c ie t i e s a n d N e w S ta te s (New Y ork : C ollier- M acm illan , 1963).

28. A n thony D. Sm ith , N a t io n a l i s m in t h e T w e n t ie t h C e n tu r y (O xford: M artin R o b e rtso n , 1979), p. 3. cf. B en ed ic t A n d erso n on the ‘sh ru n k en im aginings of re c e n t h is to ry ’ g en e ric to nationalism . B enedict A nderson , I m a g in e d C o m m u n i t i e s (L ondon: V erso , 1983).

29. cf. E lie K ed o u rie , N a t io n a l i s m (L ondon : H u tch in so n , 1960).30. H ere I follow th e analysis given in C C H M , vol. I, pp. 192—6.31. Sm ith, N a t io n a l i s m in t h e T w e n t i e t h C e n tu r y , p. 187.32. As H obsbaw m co m m en ts in re sp e c t o f ‘in v en ted tra d itio n s’:

O n e m a rk e d d iffe ren ce b e tw e en o ld an d in v en ted p ra c tic e s m ay be ob se rv ed . T h e fo rm e r w ere specific an d s trong ly b ind ing


soc ia l p rac tice s , th e la tte r te n d ed to be q u ite unspec ific and vague . . . B ut if th e c o n te n t of British pa trio tism o r ‘A m erican ism ’ was no tab ly ill-defined, though usually specified in co m m en taries a sso c ia ted w ith ritua l occas io n s, the p r a c t i c e s sym bolising it w ere v irtually co m p u lso ry — as in s tan d in g up for th e singing of the N ational A n th em in B ritain , the flag ritua l in A m erican schoo ls. T h e cru c ia l e lem en t seem s to have been th e inven tion o f em o tiona lly an d sym bolically c h a rg ed signs o f c lu b m e m b ership ra th e r th an the s ta tu te s an d o b je c ts o f th e c lub . T h e ir sign ificance lay p rec ise ly in th e ir un d efin ed universality .

E ric H obsbaw m an d T e re n c e R anger, T h e I n v e n t io n o f T r a d i t io n(C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1983), In tro d u c tio n , p. 11.

9 Capitalist Development and the Industrialization of War

1. M cN eill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r , p. 143.2. C . B. O tley , ‘M ilitarism an d the social a ffilia tions o f the British

a rm y e lite ’, in van D oorn , A r m e d F o r c e s a n d S o c i e t y , p. 85.3. R opp, W a r in t h e M o d e r n W o r ld , p. 143ff.4. W illiam M cElw ee, T h e A r t o f W a r, W a te r lo o to M o n s (L ondon :

W eiden fe ld , 1974), p. 106ff.5. Ib id ., p. 110.6. M ichael Lewis, T h e H is to r y o f t h e B r i tis h N a v y (L o n d o n : A llen &

U nw in, 1959), p. 199. S ee a lso M cN eill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r ,p. 226ff.

7. G . A. S h ep p erd , A r m s a n d A r m o u r 1660 to 1018 (L o n d o n : H art- D avis, 1971).

8. O. F. G . Hogg, T h e R o y a l A r s e n a l (L ondon : O xford U niversity Press, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 7 8 3 - 9 2 .

9. R opp, W a r in t h e M o d e r n W o r ld , p. 224.10. H en ry W illiam son, T h e W e t F la n d e r s P la in (L ondon : B eaum on t

Press, 1929), pp. 14— 16.11. A m os P e rlm u tte r , T h e M i l i ta r y a n d P o li t ic s in M o d e r n T im e s

(New H aven : Y ale U niversity Press, 1977), p. 21.12. S am uel P. H u n tin g to n , T h e S o l d ie r a n d th e S t a t e (C am bridge:

H arv a rd U niversity P ress, 1957). S om e of H u n tin g to n ’s c laim s have n everthe less b een extensively, an d justly , sub jec t to serious criticism how ever.

13. Ib id ., p. 29.14. Ib id ., p. 37.


15. S am uel E. F in er, ‘S ta te an d n a tion -bu ild ing in E u ro p e : the ro le o f th e m ilita ry ’, p. 150. cf. a lso R. D. C h a llen er, T h e F r e n c h T h e o r y o f t h e N a t io n in A r m s , 1 8 6 6 — 1 9 3 9 (New Y o rk : Russell & R ussell, 1965).

16. F eld , T h e S t r u c tu r e o f V io le n c e , p. 146.17. cf. M a u ric e P ea r to n , T h e K n o w le d g e a b le S t a t e (L ondon : B urnett,

1982), p. 19.18. Ibid., p. 22.19. M cN eill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r , pp . 248—9.20. P ea rto n , T h e K n o w le d g e a b le S ta te , pp. 3 3 —4.21. M orris Janow itz, M ili ta r y C o n f l i c t (B everly Hills: Sage, 1975), p.

70. In w hat follow s I d raw ex tensively on his analysis.22. Feld , T h e S t r u c tu r e o f V io l e n c e , pp. 145 — 6.23. Janow itz, M ili ta r y C o n f l i c t , p. 76.24. O n th is issue see R aym ond A ron , T h e C e n tu r y o f T o t a l W a r

(L ondon : V erschoy le , 1954), p. 96ff. an d p a s s im .25. W inston S. C hurch ill, T h e W o r ld C r is is (L ondon : T h o rn to n &

B u tte rw o rth , 1923), vol. I, pp. 10— 11.26. A rth u r M arw ick , W a r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e in th e T w e n t ie t h C e n tu r y

(L ondon : M acm illan , 1974), pp. 8 8 —9.27. M cN eill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r , p. 331.28. M arw ick , W a r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e .29. B. L. H art, T h e T a n k s (L ondon : C assell, 1959), 2 vols.30. cf. G e ra ld F e ld m an , A r m y , I n d u s t r y ct L a b o u r (P rin ce to n :

P rin c e to n U niversity P ress, 1966); A lan S. M ilw ard , T h e E c o n o m ic E f f e c t s o f t h e W o r ld W a rs o n B r i ta in (L ondon : M acm illan , 1970); John T e rra in e , I m p a c t s o f W a r (L ondon : H u tch inson , 1970).

31. S. E. M orison e t a i . T h e G r o w th o f t h e A m e r i c a n R e p u b l i c (L ondon : O xford U niversity P ress, 1969), vol. 2, c h a p te r 6.

32. cf. Jo h n E rikson , T h e S o v ie t H ig h C o m m a n d : a M i l i ta r y - P o l i t ic a l H is to r y (L o n d o n : M acm illan , 1962); M oshe Lew in, P o li t ic a l U n d e r c u r r e n t s in S o v i e t E c o n o m ic D e b a te s (P rin ce to n : P rin ce to n U niversity Press, 1974).

33. D. C. W att, T o o S e r io u s a B u s in e s s : E u r o p e a n A r m e d F o r c e s a n d t h e A p p r o a c h o f t h e S e c o n d W o r ld W a r (L ondon : T e m p le Sm ith1975); B. K lein , G e r m a n y ’s E c o n o m i c P r e p a r a t io n f o r W a r (C am bridge, M ass: H arvard U niversity Press, 1959).

34. M cN eill, T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r , pp. 353—6. cf. a lso his A m e r ic a , B r ita in a n d R u s s ia : T h e i r C o o p e r a t io n a n d C o n f l ic t , 1941 — 1946 (L ondon : O xford U niversity P ress, 1953).

35. M ich ae l M an d leb a u m , T h e N u c le a r R e v o l u t i o n (C am b rid g e : C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1981), p. 2.

36. Ibid., p. 3.


37. M ilw ard , E c o n o m ic E f f e c t s o f t h e W o r ld W a rs .38. M arw ick , W a r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e , p. 163.39. R ich a rd P o len b e rg , W a r & S o c ie t y : T h e U n i t e d S ta te s . 1 9 4 1 — 4 5

(New Y ork : J. P. L ipp inco tt, 1972). cf. a lso Joyce an d G ab rie l K olko , T h e L i m i t s o f P o w e r (New Y ork : H arp er, 1972).

40. P e te r C alvocoressi, W o r ld P o l i t ic s S i n c e 1 9 4 5 (L ondon : L ongm an, 1968), p. 23.

41. H aro ld D. Lasswell, T h e garrison-sta te hypothesis to d a y ’, in Sam uel P. H u n tin g d o n , C h a n g in g P a t te r n s o f M i l i ta r y P o l i t ic s (G len co e: F re e Press, 1962), p. 51; H. E lan, ‘H. D. Lassw ell’s d ev e lo p m en ta l ana lysis’, W e s te r n P o l i t ic a l Q u a r te r ly , 11, 1958. T h e thesis w as first se t o u t in L assw ell’s W o r ld P o l i t ic s a n d P e r s o n a l I n s e c u r i t y (New Y o rk : M cG raw -H ill, 1935).

42. Lassw ell, T h e g arriso n -sta te hypo thesis to d a y ’, p. 54.43. G avin K ennedy , D e fe n s e E c o n o m ic s (L ondon : D u ck w o rth , 1983),

p. 45. F o r ca lc u la tio n s on w orld m ilitary e x p e n d itu re , see the W o r ld A r m a m e n t s a n d D is a r m a m e n t Y e a r b o o k . 1984. (L ondon : T ay lo r an d F rancis).

44. cf. M ichael M ann , ‘C ap ita lism an d M ilita rism ’, in M artin Shaw, W a r. S t a t e a n d S o c i e t y (L ondon : M acm illan , 1984).

45. M ills’s analysis is c o n c e n tra te d on th e USA , an d he d o es n o t claim th a t it h o ld s in its e n tire ty fo r o th e r in d u s tria liz ed co u n trie s . C. W right Mills, T h e P o w e r E l i t e (New Y ork : O xford U niversity Press, 1956). F o r versions o f the ‘e c o n o m ic ’ view see, fo r exam ple , P aul A. B aran an d Paul A. Sweezy, M o n o p o l y C a p i ta l (New Y ork : M onth ly R eview Press, 1966); E rn e s t M andel, M a r x i s t E c o n o m ic T h e o r y (L ondon: M erit Publishers, 1968); M ichael K idron, W e s te r n C a p i ta l i s m S in c e t h e W ar (L ondon : W eidenfe ld , 1968).

46. K ennedy , D e fe n s e E c o n o m ic s , p. 156.47. cf. S tan ley L ieberson , ‘A n em p irica l s tudy of m ilita ry -industria l

linkages’, in Sam C. S arkesian , T h e M i l i ta r y - I n d u s t r ia l C o m p le x : a R e a s s e s s m e n t (B everly Hills: Sage, 1972).

48. Ja cq u e s G an sler, T h e D e f e n c e I n d u s t r y (C am bridge , M ass: M IT Press, 1980).

49. S. E. F iner, T h e M a n o n H o r s e b a c k (L ondon : Pall M all, 1962), p. 6.50. Ibid., p. 15ff.51. P erlm u tte r , M ili ta r y a n d P o li t ic s in M o d e r n T im e s , p. 141 ff.52. cf. R ob in L u ck h am , ‘M ilitarism : fo rce , class an d in te rn a tio n a l

co n flic t’, in M ary K a ld o r an d A sb jo rn E ide, T h e W o r ld M i l i ta r y O r d e r (L ondon : M acm illan , 1979), p. 245.

53. cf. R a lp h E. L app , T h e W e a p o n s C u l tu r e (New Y ork : N orton , 1968).

54. Jan O berg , T h e new in te rn a tio n a l m ilita ry o rd e r : a th re a t to


h u m an se cu rity ’, in A sb jo rn E ide an d M arek T h ee , P r o b le m s o f C o n te m p o r a r y M i l i ta r i s m (L ondon : C ro o m H elm , 1980), p. 47.

55. M ary K aldo r, T h e B a r o q u e A r s e n a l (L ondon : D eu tsch , 1982). p. 133ff.

56. K a ld o r an d E ide, T h e W o r ld M i l i ta r y O r d e r , p. 5.57. F ra n c is A. B eer, P e a c e A g a in s t W a r (San F ran c isco : F reem an ,

1981), p. 310.58. cf. W . E pste in , T h e L a s t C h a n c e : N u c le a r P r o l i fe r a t io n a n d A r m s

C o n t r o l (New Y o rk : F re e Press, 1975).59. K aldo r, T h e B a r o q u e A r s e n a l , p. 132.60. M iles D. W olpin , M ili ta r y A i d a n d C o u n t e r R e v o lu t i o n in th e

T h i r d W o r ld (L exington , M ass: L exington Books, 1972).

10 Nation-States in the Global State System

1. cf. A. F. P o llard , T h e b a lan c e o f p o w er’, J o u r n a l o f t h e B r i tis h I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f fa i r s , 2, 1923; E rn s t B. H aas, T h e b a lan c e of pow er: p resc rip tio n , c o n c e p t o r p ro p a g a n d a ? ’, W o r ld P o li t ic s , 5, 1953.

2. H ans J. M o rg en th au , P o li t ic s A m o n g N a t io n s (New Y ork : K nopf,1960), p. 167.

3. F ried rich von G en tz , F r a g m e n ts U p o n th e B a la n c e o f P o w e r in E u r o p e (L ondon : M. P e ttie r, 1806), pp . 6 1 —2 an d p a s s im .

4 . Ibid., pp. 111 — 12.5. F ra n s A. M. A lting von G en sau , E u r o p e a n P e r s p e c t iv e s o n W o r ld

O r d e r ( L eyden: S ijthoff, 1975), p. 183.6. G e rh a rd S chu lz , R e v o l u t i o n s a n d P e a c e T r e a t i e s 1917—20

(L ondon : M e th u en , 1967), p. 158ff.7. Jam es B row n S co tt, P r e s id e n t W i ls o n 's F o r e ig n P o lic y (New Y ork :

O xford U niversity P ress, 1918), pp. 190 an d 270.8. F o r in stan ce , A. J. P. T ay lo r, T h e S t r u g g le f o r M a s te r y in E u r o p e ,

1848—1918 (O xford : C la ren d o n Press, 1954), p. 567.9. Ray S. B aher an d W illiam E. Doss, T h e P u b l ic P a p e r s o f W o o d r o w

W ils o n . W a r a n d P e a c e (New Y ork : H arp er, 1927), vol. I, p. 631.10. P ea rto n , T h e K n o w le d g e a b le S ta te , p. 178.11. L loyd G eo rg e , T r u th A b o u t th e P e a c e T r e a t i e s (L ondon : V ic to r

G o llancz , 1938), vol. 2, p. 107.12. E van L uard , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A g e n c ie s (L ondon : M acm illan , 1977),

p. 1 Iff.13. R. B erkov , T h e W H O : a s t u d y in D e c e n t r a l i s e d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(G en ev a : W H O , 1957).


14. F o r an in fluen tia l s ta te m e n t o f th e co n v e n tio n a l view , see Jam es N. R osen thau , T h e S t u d y o f G lo b a l I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e (L ondon : P in ter,1980).

15. F ro m B ru ce R u sse tt a n d H arv ey S ta rr, W o r ld P o l i t ic s (San F ran c isco : F re em a n , 1981), p . 52.

16. P ea r to n , T h e K n o w l e d g e a b l e S t a t e , p. 185ff.17. A lting von G ensau , E u r o p e a n P e r s p e c t iv e s o n W o r ld O r d e r , p. 187.18. Jo se p h F ra n k e l, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t io n s in a C h a n g in g W o r ld

(O xford : O xford U niversity Press), p. 165ff.19. cf. S te in R o k k an , ‘C ities, s ta te s an d na tions: a d im en sio n a l m odel

fo r th e s tudy o f co n tra s ts in d ev e lo p m e n t', in S. N. E isen stad t and S tein R o k k an , B u ild in g S ta te s a n d N a t io n s (B everly Hills: Sage, 1973).

20. A. W . O rridge , ‘V arie ties o f nationalism ', in L eo n a rd T ivey , T h e N a t io n - S ta te (O xford : M artin R o b e rtso n , 1981), pp . 5 0 — 1.

21. A rno ld H ughes, ‘T h e n a tio n -sta te in B lack A fric a ’, in T ivey, T h e N a t io n - S ta t e , p. 122.

22. Paul H air, ‘A frican ism : the F re e to w n c o n tr ib u tio n ’, J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n A fr ic a n S t u d i e s , 5, 1967.

23. H ughes, ‘T h e n a tio n -s ta te in B lack A fric a ’, p. 132.24. P erlm u tte r, M ili ta r y A P o li t ic s in M o d e r n T i m e s , p. 89.25. Ib id ., p. 92.26. R aym ond A ron , O n W a r (L o n d o n : S eek e r & W arb u rg , 1958),

p. 19ff.27. R aym ond G rew , ‘T h e n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry E u ro p e a n s ta te ’, in

C h a rle s B righ t an d S usan H ard in g , S t a t e m a k i n g a n d S o c ia l M o v e m e n t s (A nn A rb o r: U n iversity of M ichigan P ress, 1984).

28. cf. R o b e rt G ilp in , W a r a n d C h a n g e in W o r ld P o l i t ic s (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1983).

29. C S , c h a p te r 1 an d p a s s im .30. R ich a rd C o o p e r, T h e E c o n o m ic s o f I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e (New Y ork :

M cG raw -H ill, 1968), p. 152ff.31. Lars A nell, R e c e s s io n , t h e W e s te r n E c o n o m ie s a n d th e C h a n g in g

W o r ld O r d e r ( L o n d o n : P in ter, 1981).32. L este r R. B row n, W o r ld W i th o u t B o r d e r s (New Y o rk : R andom

H ouse, 1972), p. 2 Iff.33. R o b e rt J. G o rd o n an d Ja cq u e s P elkm ans, C h a l le n g e s to I n t e r

d e p e n d e n t E c o n o m ie s (New Y o rk : M cG raw -H ill, 1979).34. A nell, R e c e s s io n a n d th e C h a n g in g W o r ld O r d e r , pp . 6 4 —5.35. T h e w ork o f W alle rs te in an d his fo llow ers is in som e p a r t an

excep tion to th is bu t, besides show ing lim ita tions a lready discussed, it has th u s fa r c o n c e n tra te d m o re on early phases o f cap ita lis t d ev e lo p m en t.


36. M o rg en th au , P o li t ic s A m o n g N a t io n s , p. 328.37. R aym ond A ron , P e a c e a n d VKcrHMalabur: K rieger, 1981), p. 738ff.38. Ibid., p. 747.39. C elso F u rta d o , A c c u m u l a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (O xford : M artin

R o b e rtso n , 1983), p. 96ff.40. R aym ond A ron , T h e I m p e r ia l R e p u b l i c (L ondon : W eiden fe ld ,

1974).

11 Modernity, Totalitarianism and Critical Theory

1. Q uo ted in A. J. M ay, E u r o p e S in c e 1 9 3 9 (New Y ork : Holt, R inehart an d W inston , 1966).

2. C arl J. F ried rich e t a i , T o ta l i ta r ia n is m in P e r s p e c t iv e : T h r e e V ie w s (L ondon : Pall M all, 1969), p. 6ff.

3. B enjam in R. B arber, ‘C o n c ep tu a l fo u n d a tio n s o f to ta lita r ian ism ’, in F ried rich , T o ta l i ta r ia n i s m in P e r s p e c t i v e , p. 19.

4. C arl F rie d ric h , Totalitarianism (C am b rid g e , M ass: H arv ard U niversity Press, 1954); cf. also C. J. F ried rich an d Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New Y ork : P raeg er Press, 1967).

5. H ila ire B elloc, T h e S e r v i l e S ta te (In d ian ap o lis : L iberty , 1932), p. 125.

6. D avid L ane, P o li t ic s a n d S o c ie t y in th e U S S R (L ondon: W eidenfeld , 1970).

7. F rie d rich e t a l ., ‘T h e evolving th e o ry an d p ra c tic e o f to ta lita rian reg im es’, in T o ta l i ta r ia n i s m in P e r s p e c t i v e , p. 131.

8. A ryeh L. U nger, T h e T o ta l i ta r ia n P a r ty (C am bridge: C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1974), p. 13ff.

9. Q u o te d in M ic h ae l C u rtis , ‘R e tre a t from to ta lita r ia n ism ’, in F rie d rich e t a l ., T o ta l i ta r ia n i s m in P e r s p e c t iv e p. 76.

10. R o b e rt C onquest, T h e G r e a t T e r r o r (New Y ork : M acm illan , 1968).11. cf. Jam es M illar an d A lec N ove, ‘W as S talin really n ec essa ry ?’.

P r o b le m s o f C o m m u n is m , 25, 1976.12. cf. C lau d e L efo rt, L ' in v e n t i o n d é m o c r a t iq u e (Paris: F ay ard , 1981),

p. 85ff.13. H an n ah A ren d t, T h e O r ig in s o f T o ta l i ta r ia n i s m (L ondon : A llen &

U nw in, 1967), pp. 3 4 1 —2.14. cf. U nger, T h e T o ta l i ta r ia n P a r ty , p. 170ff.15. C P S T , pp . 1 4 3 - 4 .16. C C H M , vol. I, pp . 194—6.17. cf. S igm und F reu d , G r o u p P s y c h o lo g y a n d th e A n a ly s i s o f t h e E g o

(L ondon : H o g arth Press, 1922).


18. J. L T a lm o n , T h e O r ig in s o f T o ta l i ta r ia n D e m o c r a c y (New Y ork : P ra eg e r Press, 1961). As M enze em phasizes, to ta lita r ian ism has a ‘th o ro u g h ly am b iv a len t re la tionsh ip to m o d e rn d e m o c ra c y . . . T o ta lita r ia n ism is in c o n c e iv a b le an d u n rea lisa b le w ith o u t the d e m o c ra tic n o tio n o f p o p u la r so v e re ig n ty an d its c o n c re te rea lisa tio n in th e m o d e rn s ta te .’ See E rn e s t A. M enze , T o ta l i ta r ia n is m R e c o n s i d e r e d (L o n d o n : K en n ik a t, 1981), p. 15.

19. M arx , ‘T h e E ig h te en th B rum aire o f L ouis B o n a p a r te ’.20. S ee N icos P o u lan tzas , P o l i t ic a l P o w e r a n d S o c ia l C la s s e s (L ondon :

New L eft B ooks, 1973).21. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 10.22. cf. F. F . P iven an d R. A. C low ard , R e g u la t in g th e P o o r (L ondon :

T av isto ck P ub lica tions , 1972).23. F o u cau lt, D is c ip l in e a n d P u n is h .24. cf. C S A S , c h a p te r 6 an d p a s s im .25. C S , c h a p te r 4.26. Q u o ted in R ichard T ay lo r, ‘T h e G reen s in B ritain ', in D avid C oates

e t a t., A S o c ia l i s t A n a t o m y o f B r i ta in (C am bridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 160.

27. cf. C S A S .28. S ee A lain T o u ra in e , T h e P o s t - I n d u s t r ia l S o c i e t y (L ondon :

W ildw ood , 1974) an d o th e r su b se q u en t pub lica tions.29. cf. C laus O ffe, D is o r g a n is e d C a p i ta l is m (C am bridge: P o lity Press,

1985).30. H u n tin g to n , T h e S o l d i e r a n d th e S ta te .31. C S A S , c h a p te r 12.32. cf. C S A S , c h a p te r 11 an d p a s s im .33. A. G id d en s , B e t w e e n C a p i ta l i s m a n d S o c ia l i s m (C am bridge: Polity

Press, fo rthcom ing).34. T h is is essen tially the view o f H un ting ton . S ee T h e S o l d i e r a n d th e

S ta te .35. cf. M ichael H ow ard, T e m p e r a m e n ta b e l l i : can w ar be co n tro lled ?’,

in his R e s tr a in t s o n W ar (O xford : O xford U niversity Press, 1979); an d his W a r in E u r o p e a n H is to r y (O xford : O xfo rd U niversity P ress, 1976).

36. F o r w hat is p e rh ap s the defin itive study of C lausew itz, see R aym ond A ro n , P e n s e r la g u e r r e — C la u s e w itz (Paris: G allim ard , 1976), 2 vols.

37. K. M . von C lausew itz, O n W ar (L ondon : R egan Paul, 1908), vol. 1. b o o k I, p. 85.

38. H ow ard , ‘T e m p e r a m e n t a b e lli: can w ar b e c o n tro lle d ? ’, p. 9ff.39. M an d e lb au m , T h e N u c le a r R e v o lu t io n , p . 94.40. Ib id ., c h a p te r 4.


41. A b ra h a m S. B eck e r, M il i ta r y E x p e n d i t u r e f o r A r m s C o n t r o l (C am bridge, M ass: B allinger, 1977).

42. cf. M ary K ald o r, ‘D isa rm am en t: th e a rm a m e n t p ro cess in re v e rse ’, in E. P. T h o m p so n an d D an S m ith , P r o te s t a n d S u r v i v e (H arm o n d sw o rth : P engu in , 1980).

43. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 3.44. Ib id ., c h a p te rs 5, 6 an d 7.45. M ichael W alzer, J u s t a n d U n ju s t W a rs (L ondon : A llen L ane, 1978),

p. 271.46. C C H M , vol. I, c h a p te r 6.

Bibliography

A bler, R. e t al. H u m a n G e o g r a p h y in a S h r i n k in g W o r ld , N orth S c itua te , Suxbury , 1875.

A dam s, R . ‘A n th ro p o lo g ic a l p e rsp ec tiv es on a n c ie n t tr a d e ’, C u r r e n t A n t h r o p o l o g y , 15, 1974.

A lb rec h t-C arré , R. T h e U n i ty o f E u r o p e : a n H is to r ic a l S u r v e y , L ondon , S eek e r an d W arb u rg , 1966.

A ld e rso n , A. D . T h e S t r u c t u r e o f t h e O t t o m a n D y n a s t y , O xfo rd , C la ren d o n P ress, 1956.

A lting, von G en sau , F. A . M. E u r o p e a n P e r s p e c t iv e s o n W o r ld O r d e r , L eyden , S ijthoff, 1975.

A ncel, J. L e s f r o n t i è r e s , P aris, G allim ard , 1938.A n d erso n , B. I m a g in e d C o m m u n i t i e s , L ondon , V erso , 1983.A n d erso n , P. L in e a g e s o f t h e A b s o l u t i s t S ta te , L ondon , New Left Books,

1974.A n d erso n , P. P a s s a g e s f r o m A n t i q u i t y to F e u d a l i s m , L ondon , N ew Left

B ooks, 1974.A neil, L. R e c e s s io n , t h e W e s te r n E c o n o m ie s a n d th e C h a n g in g W o r ld

O r d e r , L ondon , P in ter, 1981.A p te r, D. ‘P o litica l relig ion in new n a tio n s’ in C. G ee rtz , O ld S o c ie t i e s

a n d N e w S ta te s , New Y ork , C o llie r-M acm illan , 1963.A p ter, D . T h e P o li t ic s o f M o d e r n i s a t io n , C hicago , U niversity o f C hicago

Press, 1965.A ren d t, H . T h e O r ig in s o f T o ta l i ta r ia n is m , L ondon , A llen & U nw in,

1967.A riès, P. W e s te r n A t t i t u d e s T o w a r d s D e a t h , B altim ore , Jo h n s H opk ins

U niversity Press, 1974.A rm stro n g , J. A . N a t io n s B e fo r e N a t io n a l i s m , C h ap el Hill, U n iversity of

N orth C aro lin a Press, 1982.A ron , R. T h e C e n tu r y o f T o t a l W a r , L ondon , V erschoy le , 1954.A ron , R. O n W a r , L ondon , S eek e r & W arb u rg , 1958.A ron , R. T h e I m p e r ia l R e p u b l i c , L o ndon , W eiden fe ld , 1974.A ron , R. P e n s e r la g u e r r e — C la u s e w itz , Paris, G allim ard , 1976.A ron , R. P e a c e a n d W a r , M a lab u r, K rieger, 1981.

372 Bibliography

A shley , M . T h e G o l d e n C e n tu r y , E u r o p e 1 5 9 8 — 1917 , L o n d o n , W eiden fe ld , 1969.

A ston , T . C ris is in E u r o p e 1 5 6 0 — 1 6 6 0 , L ondon , R o u tled g e & K egan Paul, 1965.

A vineri, S. (ed.) K a r l M a r x o n C o lo n ia l i s m a n d M o d e r n i s a t io n , New Y ork , D ou b led ay , 1968.

B aher, R. S. an d D oss, W . E. T h e P u b l ic P a p e r s o f W o o d r o w W ils o n , W a r a n d P e a c e , N ew Y ork , H arp er, 1927, vol. I.

B aradez , J. F o s s a tu m A f r i c a e , Paris, A rts e t M etiers, 1949.B aran , P. A. an d Sweezy, P. A. M o n o p o l y C a p i ta l , N ew Y ork , M onth ly

R eview Press, 1966.B arber, B. R. ‘C o n cep tu a l foundations of to ta lita rian ism ' in C. J. F riedrich

e t al. T o ta l i ta r ia n i s m in P e r s p e c t i v e : T h r e e V ie w s , L ondon , Pall M all, 1969.

B arrac lo u g h , G . E u r o p e a n U n i ty in T h o u g h t a n d A c t i o n , O xford , Basil B lackw ell, 1963.

B arring ton M oore , T h e S o c ia l O r ig in s o f D ic ta to r s h ip a n d D e m o c r a c y , H arm o n d sw o rth , P enguin , 1969.

B arrow , G . W. S. F e u d a l B r i ta in , L ondon , A rno ld , 1956.B arth, F. E th n ic G r o u p s a n d B o u n d a r ie s . Bergen, U niversitats-fiir Paget,

1969.B audin , L. A S o c ia l i s t E m p ir e . T h e ln c a s o f P e r u , P rin ce to n , V an

N ostrand , 1961.B augh, A. C. A H is to r y o f t h e E n g lis h L a n g u a g e , L ondon , R o u tled g e &

K egan Paul, 1951.B ecker, A . S. M ili ta r y E x p e n d i tu r e f o r A r m s C o n tr o l , C am bridge, M ass.,

B allinger, 1977.B eer, F. A. P e a c e A g a in s t W a r, San F ran c isco , F reem an , 1981.B elloc, H. T h e S e r v i l e S ta te , In d ian ap o lis , L iberty , 1932.Bendix, R. N a t io n B u i ld in g a n d C i t i z e n s h ip , B erkeley, U niversity of

C alifo rn ia Press, 1977.B endix, R. K in g s o r P e o p le , B erkeley , U niversity o f C a lifo rn ia Press,

1978.B enven iste , E. P r o b le m s in G e n e r a l L in g u is t ic s , F lo rida , U niversity of

M iam i Press, 1971.B erkov, R. T h e W H O : a s tu d y in D e c e n t r a l i s e d A d m in is t r a t io n , G eneva,

W H O , 1957.B ischoff, J. A C o m p r e h e n s i v e H i s to r y o f t h e W o o l le n a n d W o r s te d

M a n u fa c tu r e s , L ondon , 1842.B leackley , H. 'T h e H angm en of E n g la n d ’, rep rin te d in J. L ofland , S ta te

E x e c u t i o n s , M o n tc la ir, NJ, P a tte rso n Sm ith , 1977.B loom , S. F. T h e W o r ld o f N a t io n s , New Y ork , O xford U niversity Press,

1941.

Bibliography 373

B loom field , L. L a n g u a g e , N ew Y ork , A llen & U nw in, 1933.B o tto m o re , T . B. K a r l M a r x , E a r ly W r i t in g s , N ew Y ork , M cG raw -H ill,

1964.B raidw ood , R. J. an d W illey, G . C o u r s e s T o w a r d U r b a n L i f e , C h icago ,

A td in e , 1962.B raun , R. ‘T ax a tio n , so c io p o litica l s tru c tu re , an d sta te -bu ild ing : G re a t

B rita in an d B ran d en b u rg -P ru ss ia ’ in C. T illy (ed.) T h e F o r m a t io n o f N a t io n a l S ta te s in E u r o p e , P rin ce to n , P rin ce to n U niversity Press,1975.

B raverm an , H. L a b o u r a n d M o n o p o l y C a p i ta l , New Y ork , M onth ly R eview Press, 1967.

B renner, R . ‘T h e orig ins o f ca p ita lis t d e v e lo p m e n t: a c r itiq u e o f neo- S m ith ian M arx ism ’, N e w L e f t R e v ie w , 105, 1977.

B reuilly , J. N a t io n a l i s m a n d t h e S t a t e , M a n c h e s te r , M a n c h e s te r U n iversity Press, 1982.

B right, C . an d H ard ing , S., S t a t e m a k i n g a n d S o c ia l M o v e m e n t s , A nn A rb o r, U n iversity o f M ichigan Press, 1984.

B rock , T . an d G alting , J. 'B e llige rence am ong the p rim itives’, J o u r n a l o f P e a c e R e s e a r c h , 3, 1966.

B rodie, B. A G u id e to N a v a l S tr a te g y , P rin ce to n , P rin c e to n U niversity P ress, 1958.

B row n, L. R. W o r ld W i th o u t B o r d e r s , New Y ork , R andom H ouse, 1972.B urns, E. M. an d R alph , P. L. W o r ld C iv i l is a t io n s , New Y ork , N orton ,

1974.C a lvocoressi, P. W o r ld P o l i t ic s S i n c e 19 4 5 , L ondon , L ongm an , 1968.C h a llen er, R. D. T h e F r e n c h T h e o r y o f t h e N a t io n in A r m s , 1 8 6 6 — 1939,

New Y ork , Russell & R ussell, 1965.C h e y e tte , F. L o r d s h ip a n d C o m m u n i t y in M e d ia e v a l E u r o p e , N ew Y ork ,

1968.C hien -nung , Li, T h e P o l i t ic a l H is to r y o f C h in a , 1 8 4 0 — 1928, P rin c e to n ,

V an N ostrand , 1956.C hilde , V. G . M a n M a k e s H im s e l f , L ondon , W atts , 1956.Chung-Li, C hang, T h e C h in e s e G e n tr y , S eattle , U niversity o f W ashington

Press, 1955.C h u rch , W . F. T h e G r e a tn e s s o f L o u i s X I V , M y th o r R e a l i ty ? , B oston,

M ass., H ea th , 1959.C hurch ill, W . S. T h e W o r ld C r is is , L ondon , T h o rn to n & B u tte rw o rth ,

1923, vol. I.C ipolla , C. M . G u n s a n d S a ils in t h e E a r lv P h a s e o f E u r o p e a n E x p a n s io n

1 4 0 0 - 1 7 0 0 , L ondon , C ollins, 1965.C laessen , H. J. M . an d S kaln ik , P . T h e E a r ly S ta te , T h e H ague , M o u to n ,

1978.C lark , G . N. T h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n tu r y , O x ford , C la ren d o n Press, 1947.

374 Bibliography

C oates , D. e t al. (eds) A S o c ia l i s t A n a t o m y o f B r i ta in , C am b rid g e , Polity Press, 1984.

C ollingw ood, R. G . R o m a n B r i ta in , O xford , C la ren d o n P ress, 1932.C onnell, R. W . W h ic h W a y is U p ? , Sydney, A llen & U nw in, 1983.C o n q u est, R . T h e G r e a t T e r r o r , N ew Y ork , M acm illan , 1968.C o o p e r, R. T h e E c o n o m ic s o f I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , N ew Y ork , M cG raw -

Hill, 1986.C o u lb o rn , R. F e u d a l i s m in H is to r y , P rin c e to n , P rin c e to n U niversity

Press, 1956.C ritch ley , T . A. A H is to r y o f P o l ic e in E n g la n d a n d W a le s , L ondon ,

C o n s tab le , 1978.C u tle r, A . M a r x 's C a p i ta l a n d C a p i ta l i s m T o d a y , L ondon , R o u tled g e &

K egan Paul, 1978, vol. 2.D a Sola P ool, 1. T h e S o c ia l I m p a c t o f t h e T e l e p h o n e , B oston , M ass.,

M IT Press, 1977.D ahl, R. A. P o ly a r c h y , N ew H aven , Y ale U niversity Press,D ahl, A . P r e fa c e to D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y , C h icago , U niversity o f C h icago

Press, 1956.D e Bary, W. T . ‘C h in ese despo tism an d the C o n fu cian Idea l: a seven

te e n th c e n tu ry v iew ' in J. K. F a irb an k C h in e s e T h o u g h t a n d I n s t i tu t io n s , C h icago , U niversity o f C h icag o Press, 1959.

D e B runhoff, S. M a r x o n M o n e y , L ondon , P lu to Press, 1977.D e Jouvenel, B. S o v e r e ig n ty , C am b rid g e , C am b rid g e U niversity Press,

1957.D errid a , J. O f G r a m m a to lo g y , B altim ore , Joh n s H opk ins U niversity

Press, 1974.D eu tsch , K. W . N a t io n a l i s m a n d S o c ia l C o m m u n ic a t io n , B oston , M IT

Press, 1966.D o ern e r, K. M a d m e n a n d th e B o u r g e o is ie , O xford , Basil B lackw ell,

1981.D oob , L. P a tr io t i s m a n d N a t io n a l i s m . New H aven, Y ale U niversity

Press, 1964.D ü rkhe im , E. P r o fe s s io n a l E th i c s a n d C iv i l M o r a ls , L ondon , R ou tledge ,

1957.D ü rkhe im , E. S o c ia l i s m , New Y ork , C o llie r, 1962.E arle , A. M. C u r io u s P u n is h m e n ts o f B y g o n e D a y s , M o n tc la ir, NJ,

P a tte rso n Sm ith , 1969.E b erh ard , W . D a s T o b a - R e ic h N o r d c h in a s , L eiden, Brill, 1949.E b erh a rd , W . A H is to r y o f C h in a , L ondon , R ou tledge , 1950.E b e rh a rd , W . C o n q u e r o r s a n d R u le r s , L eiden , Brill, 1970.E ck ste in , H. I n t e r n a l W a r , G len c o e , T h e F re e Press, 1964.E d g erto n , W. F. ‘T h e q u es tio n o f feu d a l in stitu tio n s in a n c ie n t E gyp t' in

R. C o u lb o rn , F e u d a l i s m in H is to r y , P rin c e to n , P rin c e to n U niversity P ress, 1956.

Bibliography 375

E dw ards, I. E. S. T h e P y r a m id s o f E g y p t , B altim ore , M ax P arrish , 1962.E h re n b erg , R . D a s Z e i t a l t e r d e r F u g g e r , Jena , 1896.E ide, A. an d T h ee , M. P r o b le m s o f C o n te m p o r a r y M i l i ta r i s m , L ondon ,

C ro o m H elm , 1980.Einzig, P. P r im i t i v e M o n e y , O xford , P erg am o n P ress, 1966.E isenstad t, S. N. T h e P o l i t ic a l S y s t e m s o f E m p ir e s , G len c o e , T h e F ree

P ress, 1963.E isenstad t, S. N. and R o k k an , S. B u ild in g S ta te s a n d N a t io n s , B everly

Hills, Sage, 1973.E isenste in , E. L. T h e P r in t in g R e v o lu t i o n in E a r ly M o d e r n E u r o p e ,

C am b rid g e , C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1983.E lan, H. ‘H. D. Lassw ell’s d e v e lo p m e n ta l ana lysis’, W e s te r n P o l i t ic a l

Q u a r te r ly , 11, 1958.Elias, N. T h e C iv i l is in g P r o c e s s , O xford , Basil B lackw ell, 1978.Engels, F. L e tte r to K. M arx, 7 Ja n u ary 1858, in K. M arx an d F. Engels,

W e r k e , B erlin, D ietz V erlag , 1963, vol. 24.E pste in , W . T h e L a s t C h a n c e ; N u c le a r P r o l i f e r a t io n a n d A r m s C o n tr o l ,

New Y ork , T h e F ree Press, 1975.E rikson , J. T h e S o v i e t H ig h C o m m a n d : a M i l i ta r y - P o l i t i c a l H is to r y ,

L ondon , M acm illan , 1962.F a irb an k , J. K. C h in e s e T h o u g h t a n d I n s t i tu t io n s , C h icago , U niversity

o f C h icag o P ress, 1959.Feld, M. D. T h e S t r u c tu r e o f V io le n c e . Beverly Hills, Sage, 1977.F e ld m an , G . A r m y , I n d u s t r y a n d L a b o u r , P rin c e to n , P rin c e to n

P rin c e to n U niversity Press, 1966.F erguson , A. A n E s s a y o n th e H is to r y o f C iv i l S o c ie t y , E d inbu rgh ,

E d inbu rgh U niversity Press, 1966.F iner, S. E. T h e M a n o n H o r s e b a c k , L ondon , Pall M all, 1962.F iner, S. E. ‘S ta te- an d n a tion -bu ild ing in E u ro p e : th e ro le o f th e

m ilita ry ’ in C. T illy (ed.) T h e F o r m a t io n o f N a t io n a l S ta te s in E u r o p e , P rin ce to n , P rin ce to n U niversity Press, 1975.

F o u cau lt, M. D is c ip l in e a n d P u n is h , L ondon , A llen L ane, 1977.F ran k e , H. ‘Siege and d e fe n ce o f tow ns in m ed iaeval C h in a ’ in F. A.

K ierm an an d J. K. F a irb an k , C h in e s e W a y s o f W a r fa r e , C am bridge , M ass., H arvard U niversity Press, 1974.

F ran k el, J. I n t e r n a t io n a l R e la t io n s in a C h a n g in g W o r ld , O xford , O xford U niversity Press,

F re id so n , E . T h e H o s p i ta l in M o d e r n S o c ie t y , G len c o e , T h e F re e Press, 1963.

F reu d , S. G r o u p P s y c h o lo g y a n d th e A n a ly s i s o f th e E g o , L ondon , H o g arth P ress, 1922.

F ried rich , C. J. T o ta l i ta r ia n is m , C am b rid g e , M ass., H arv ard U niversity P ress, 1954.

376 Bibliography

F ried rich , C . J. an d B rzezinski, Z . K. T o ta l i ta r ia n D ic ta to r s h ip a n d A u t o c r a c y , New Y ork , P ra eg e r P ress, 1967.

F ried rich , C. J. e t al. T o ta l i ta r ia n is m in P e r s p e c t iv e : T h r e e V ie w s , L ondon , Pall M all, 1969.

F u rtad o , C. A c c u m u l a t i o n a n d D e v e lo p m e n t , O xford, M artin R obertson ,1983.

G allie , W . B. P h ilo s o p h e r s in P e a c e a n d W a r, C am bridge , C am b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1978.

G an sler, J. T h e D e f e n c e I n d u s t r y , C am bridge , M ass., M IT Press, 1980. G a rd in e r , A. H. A n c i e n t E g y p t ia n O n o m a s t ic a , O x fo rd , O xford

U niversity P ress, vol. I.G ee rtz , C . O ld S o c ie t i e s a n d N e w S ta te s , New Y ork , C o llie r-M ethuen ,

1963.G ee rtz , C . L o c a l K n o w le d g e , New Y ork , Basic Books, 1983.G elb , I.J. A S t u d y o f W r it in g , L o n d o n , R ou tledge & K egan Paul, 1952. G elln er, E. T h o u g h t a n d C h a n g e , L ondon , W eidenfe ld , 1964.G e lln e r , E. S p e c t a c l e s a n d P r e d ic a m e n ts , C am b rid g e , C a m b rid g e

U niversity Press, 1979.G elln er, E. N a t io n s a n d N a t io n a l i s m , O xford , Basil B lackw ell, 1983. G ibb , H. A. R. an d B ow en, H. I s la m ic S o c ie t y a n d th e W e s t , L ondon ,

O xford U niversity Press, 1950, vol. 1.G ib b o n , E. T h e D e c l in e a n d F a ll o f th e R o m a n E m p ir e , New Y ork,

M o d ern L ibrary , 1932, vol. I.G iddens , A. C e n tr a l P r o b le m s in S o c ia l T h e o r y , L ondon , H u tch in son ,

1977.G id d en s , A. N e w R u le s o f S o c io lo g ic a l M e th o d , L ondon , H u tch in son ,

1976.G iddens, A. S tu d ie s in S o c ia l a n d P o li t ic a l T h e o r v , L ondon, H utch inson ,

1977.G id d en s , A. A C o n t e m p o r a r y C r i t iq u e o f H i s to r i c a l M a te r ia l i s m ,

L ondon , M acm illan , 1981, vol. I.G iddens , A. T h e C la s s S t r u c tu r e o f t h e A d v a n c e d S o c ie t ie s , L ondon,

H u tch in so n , 1981 revised edn.G iddens, A. P r o file s a n d C r i t iq u e s in S o c ia l T h e o r v , L ondon, M acm illan,

1982.G id d en s , A. T h e C o n s t i tu t i o n o f S o c ie ty , C am bridge, Polity Press, 1984. G iddens , A. ‘T h e n a tio n -sta te an d v io len ce’ in W . W . Pow ell and

R. R obbins, C o n f l i c t a n d C o n s e n s u s , New Y ork , T h e F re e Press,1984.

G iddens, A. B e tw e e n C a p ita l is m a n d S o c ia l is m , C am bridge, Polity Press, fo rthcom ing .

G ilb e rt, F. T h e H is to r ic a l E s s a y s o f O t to H in t z e , N ew Y ork , O xford U niversity Press, 1975.

Bibliography 377

G ilp in , R. W a r a n d C h a n g e in W o r ld P o l i t ic s , C am b rid g e , C am bridge U niversity P ress, 1983.

G im pel, J. T h e M e d ia e v a l M a c h in e , L o ndon , V ic to r G o llancz , 1977.G o ld fra n k , W . L. T h e W o r ld - S y s te m o f C a p i ta l i s m : P a s t a n d P r e s e n t ,

B everly Hills, Sage, 1979.G oldsch ied , R. ‘S taat, ö ffen tich er H aushalt und G ese llschaft’, H a n d b u c h

d e r F in a n z w is s e n s c h a f t , T ü b in g en , M öhr, 1926, vol. I.G o o d y , J. T h e D o m e s t i c a t i o n o f t h e S a v a g e M in d , C am b rid g e ,

C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1977.G o rd o n , R. J. an d P elkm ans, J. C h a lle n g e s to I n t e r d e p e n d e n t E c o n o m ie s ,

New Y ork , M cG raw -H ill, 1979.G o u b e rt, P. B e a u v a is e t le B e a u v a is is d e 1 6 0 0 a 1780, P aris, SEU PEN ,

I960.G o u ld n e r, A. W. T h e D ia le c t ic o f I d e o lo g y a n d T e c h n o lo g y , New Y ork ,

S eabu ry , 1976.G re g o ry , D. R e g i o n a l T r a n s f o r m a t i o n a n d I n d u s t r i a l R e v o lu t i o n ,

L ondon , M acm illan , 1982.G rew . R. ‘T h e n in e tee n th -ce n tu ry E u ro p e an s ta te ’ in C. B right and

S. H ard in g , S t a t e m a k i n g a n d S o c ia l M o v e m e n t s , A nn A rb o r, U n iversity o f M ichigan Press, 1984.

G riffe th , R. an d T h o m a s , C . G . T h e C i ty - S ta te in F iv e C u l tu r e s , C alifo rn ia , S an ta B arbara , 1981.

G u rr , T . R. R o g u e s , R e b e l s a n d R e fo r m e r s , B everly Hills, Sage, 1976.Haas, E. B. ‘T h e balance of pow er: prescrip tion, co n cep t o r p ropaganda?’,

W o r ld P o li t ic s , 5, 1953.H abib, I. T h e A g r a r ia n S y s t e m o f M u g h a l In d ia , L ondon, Asia Publishing

H ouse, 1963.H air, P. ‘A frican ism : the F ree to w n co n trib u tio n ', J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n

A fr ic a n S tu d ie s , 5, 1967.H arris, M. C a n n ib a ls a n d K in g s , L ondon , F o n tan a , 1978.H arro d , R. F. M o n e y , L o n d o n , M acm illan , 1969.H art, B. L. T h e T a n k s , L ondon , C assell, 1959, 2 vols.H egel, G . W. F. T h e P h i lo s o p h y o f R ig h t , L ondon , Bell, 1896.H egel, G . W . F. T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g y o f S p ir i t , O xford , C la ren d o n

Press, 1977.Hill, C . T h e W o r ld T u r n e d U p s id e D o w n , L ondon , T em p le Sm ith , 1972.H in tze, 0 . S ta a t u n d V e r fa s s u n g , G ö ttin g e n , V a n d e n h o ec k , 1962.H obsbaw m , E. P r im i t i v e R e b e ls , M an ch este r, M a n ch e s te r U niversity

Press, 1959.H obsbaw m , E. an d R anger, T . T h e I n v e n t io n o f T r a d i t io n , C am bridge ,

C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1983.H ogg, O. F. G . T h e R o y a l A r s e n a l , L o ndon , O xford U niversity Press,

1963, vol. 2.

378 Bibliography

H opkins, T . K. an d W allers te in , I. ‘T h e co m p ara tiv e s tudy o f na tio n al so c ie ties’, S o c ia l S c i e n c e I n f o r m a t i o n , 6, 1967.

H ow ard , M. W a r in E u r o p e a n H is to r y , O xford , O xford U niversity Press,1976.

H ow ard , M . ‘T e m p e r a m e n t a b e l l i : c a n w ar b e c o n tro l le d ? ’ in his R e s tr a in t s o n W a r , O xford , O xfo rd U niversity Press, 1979.

H ow se, D. G r e e n w ic h T im e a n d t h e D i s c o v e r y o f t h e L o n g i tu d e , New Y ork , O xford U niversity Press, 1980.

H u ck e r, C. ‘T h e T ung-L in m o v e m en t o f the L ate M ing P e r io d ’ in J. K . F a irb an k , C h in e s e T h o u g h t a n d I n s t i tu t io n s , C h icago , U niversity of C h icago Press, 1959.

H u ck er, C . O. C h in e s e G o v e r n m e n t in M in g T im e s : S e v e n S tu d ie s , New Y ork , C o lu m b ia U niversity Press, 1969.

H ughes, A. ‘T h e n a tio n -sta te in B lack A fric a ’ in L. T ivey (ed .) T h e N a t io n - S ta te , O xford , M artin R o b e rtso n , 1981.

H un ting fo rd , G . W . B. T h e G a lla o f E th io p ia , L ondon , H ak luy t Society ,1955.

H u n ting ton , S. P. T h e S o l d i e r a n d th e S ta te , C am bridge , M ass., H arvard U niversity Press, 1957.

H u n ting ton , S. P. C h a n g in g P a t te r n s o f M i l i ta r y P o li t ic s , G len c o e , T h e F ree Press, 1962.

Ignatieff, M. A J u s t M e a s u r e o f P a in , L ondon , M acm illan , 1978.Ingham , G . K. C a p i ta l i s m D i v id e d ?, L ondon , M acm illan , 1984.Innis, H. A. E m p ir e a n d C o m m u n ic a t io n s , O xford , C la ren d o n Press,

1950.Janelle , D. G . ‘C e n tra l p lace d ev e lo p m e n t in a tim e-space fra m ew o rk ’,

P r o fe s s io n a l G e o g r a p h e r , 20, 1968.Janow itz, M. ‘A rm ed fo rces an d soc ie ty : a w orld p e rsp e c tiv e ' in J. van

D oorn , A r m e d F o r c e s a n d S o c ie t y , T h e H ague, M o u to n , 1968.Janow itz, M. M ili ta r y C o n f l i c t , Beverly Hills, Sage, 1975.Janow itz, M. ‘A soc io log ical p e rsp ec tiv e on W alle rs te in ’, A m e r i c a n

J o u r n a l o f S o c io lo g y , 82, 1977.Jessop , B. T h e C a p i ta l is t S ta te , O xford , M artin R o b ertso n , 1982.Jones, A. H. M. T h e L a te r R o m a n E m p ir e , O xford , Basil B lackw ell,

1964, vol. II.Jones, S. B. B o u n d a r y M a k in g : A H a n d b o o k f o r S ta te s m e n , W ashington,

C a rn eg ie E n d o w m en t fo r In te rn a tio n a l P eac e M o n o g rap h , 1945.K alberg, S. ‘M ax W eb er’s un iversal-h istorical a rc h itec to n ic of ec o n o m ic

ally o r ie n te d a c tio n ’ in S. M cN all, C u r r e n t P e r s p e c t iv e s in S o c ia l T h e o r y , 1983, vol. 4.

K aldo r, M. ‘D isa rm am en t: th e a rm a m e n t p ro cess in re v e rse ’, in E. P. T h o m p so n an d D. S m ith , P r o te s t a n d S u r v i v e , H a rm o n d sw o rth , Pengu in , 1980.

Bibliography 379

K aldor, M . T h e B a r o q u e A r s e n a l , L ondon , D eu tsch , 1982.K aldor, M . and E ide, A. T h e W o r ld M ili ta r y O r d e r , L ondon , M acm illan ,

1979.K au tsk y , J. H. T h e P o l i t ic s o f A r i s t o c r a t i c E m p i r e s , C h a p e l Hill,

U n iversity o f N orth C a ro lin a P ress, 1982.K ed o u rie , E . N a t io n a l i s m , L o n d o n , H u tch in so n , 1961.K ennedy , G . D e f e n s e E c o n o m ic s , L ondon , D u ck w o rth , 1983.K ern , S. T h e C u l tu r e o f T i m e a n d S p a c e 1 8 8 0 — 1()1 8 , L ondon ,

W eidenfe ld , 1983.K id ron , M. W e s te r n C a p i ta l i s m S in c e t h e W a r, L ondon , W eidenfe ld ,

1968.K ierm an, F . A. an d F airb an k , J. K. C h in e s e W a y s in W a r fa re , C am bridge,

M ass., H arv ard U niversity Press, 1974.King, P. T h e I d e o lo g y o f O r d e r , L ondon , A llen an d U nw in, 1974.K lein, B. G e r m a n y 's E c o n o m ic P r e p a r a t io n f o r W a r , C am b rid g e , M ass.,

H arvard U niversity P ress, 1959.K olko , J. an d G . T h e L im i t s o f P o w e r , New Y ork , H arp er, 1972.K raeling , C. H. an d A dam s, R. M. C ity I n v in c ib le , C h icago , U niversity

o f C h icag o Press, I960.K ram er, S. N. F r o m th e T a b le ts o f S u m e r , Ind ian Hills, C o lo ra d o

U niversity P ress, 1956.K ram er, S. N. H is to r y B e g in s a t S u m e r , New Y ork , A n ch o r, 1959.K u h n , P. A . R e b e l l i o n a n d i ts E n e m ie s in L a te I m p e r i a l C h in a ,

C am bridge , M ass., H arvard U niversity Press, 1970.K ung-chuan H siao, R u r a l C h in a , I m p e r ia l C o n t r o l in t h e N in e t e e n t h

C e n tu r y , S ea ttle , U niversity o f W ash ing ton Press, 1960.L adurie , Le Roy, L e T e r r i to i r e d e i h i s t o r i e n , P aris, G a llim ard , 1973—8,

2 vols.L am b, B. P. I n d ia : a W o r ld in T r a n s i t io n , New Y ork , P raeg e r, 1963.Lane, D. P o li t ic s a n d S o c i e t y in t h e U S S R , L ondon , W eiden fe ld , 1970.L app, R. E. T h e W e a p o n s C u l tu r e , New Y ork , N orton , 1968.L arra in , J. M a r x is m a n d I d e o lo g y , L ondon , M acm illan , 1983.Lasswell, II. D. W o r ld P o l i t ic s a n d P e r s o n a l I n s e c u r i t y , New Y ork,

M cG raw -H ill, 1935.Lasswell, H. D. ‘T h e garrison-sta te hypothesis to d ay ’, in S. P. H unting ton ,

C h a n g in g P a t te r n s o f M i l i ta r y P o li t ic s , G len c o e , T h e F re e Press, 1962.

L a ttim o re , O . I n n e r A s i a n F r o n t ie r s o f C h in a , N ew Y o rk , O xford U niversity Press, 1940.

L a ttim o re , O. ‘F eudalism in h is to ry ’, P a s t a n d P r e s e n t , 12, 1957.Le G off, T . J. A. an d S u th erlan d , D. M. G . ‘T h e rev o lu tio n an d the ru ra l

co m m u n ity in e ig h tee n th -ce n tu ry B rittan y ’, P a s t a n d P r e s e n t , 62, 1974.

380 Bibliography

L each , E. ‘H ydrau lic soc ie ty in C ey lon ', P a s t e n d P r e s e n t , 15, 1959.L efo rt, C. L in v e n t io n d é m o c r a t iq u e , Paris, F agard , 1981.Lévi-S trauss, C. ‘R ép o n ses à q u e lq u es q ues tions ', E s p r i t , 31, 1963.Lévy, B-H. B a r b a r is m w ith a H u m a n F a c e , New Y ork , H arp er, 1977.Lew in, M. P o l i t ic a l U n d e r c u r r e n t s in S o v i e t E c o n o m i c D e b a te s ,

P rin c e to n , P rin c e to n U niversity Press, 1974.Lewis, M. T h e H i s to r y o f t h e B r i t is h N a v y , L ondon , A llen & U nw in,

1959.L ieberson , S. ‘A n em pirica l s tudy of m ilita ry -industria l linkages’ in

S. C. S arkesian , T h e M i l i ta r y - I n d u s t r ia l C o m p le x : a R e a s s e s s m e n t , Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972.

L indblom , C. E. P o li t ic s a n d M a r k e t s , New Y ork , Basic Books, 1977.Lloyd G eo rg e , D. T r u th A b o u t th e P e a c e T r e a t ie s , L ondon , V icto r

G o llancz , 1938.L o ckyer, R. H a p s b u r g a n d B o u r b o n E u r o p e 1 4 7 0 — 1 7 2 0 , L ondon ,

L ongm an, 1974.L ofland, J. S ta te E x e c u t io n s , M ontc la ir, NJ, P a tte rso n Sm ith , 1977.L uard , E. I n t e r n a t io n a l A g e n c ie s , L ondon , M acm illan , 1977.L ublinskaya, A. D. F r e n c h A b s o l u t i s m : T h e C r u c ia l P h a se , 1 6 2 0 — 20 ,

C am bridge , C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1968.L uckham , R. ‘M ilitarism : fo rce , class and in te rn a tio n a l c o n f lic t’, in

M. K a ld o r an d A. E ide, T h e W o r ld M i l i ta r y O r d e r , L ondon , M acm illan , 1979.

L uhm ann , N. T r u s t a n d P o w e r , C h ich este r, W iley, 1979.Lukes, S. M a r x is m a n d M o r a l i ty , O xford , O xford U niversity Press,

fo rthcom ing .Lyber, A. H. T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e O t to m a n E m p ir e , C am bridge,

M ass., H arvard U niversity Press, 1963.M cC onville, S. A H is to r y o f E n g lis h P r iso n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , L ondon,

R o u tled g e & K egan Paul, 1981, vol. 1.M cElw ee, W. T h e A r t o f W a r, W a te r lo o to M a n s , L ondon , W eidenfe ld ,

1974.M cNall, S. C u r r e n t P e r s p e c t iv e s in S o c ia l T h e o r y , 1983, vol. 4.M cN eill, W. H. A m e r i c a , B r i ta in a n d R u s s ia : T h e i r C o o p e r a t io n a n d

C o n f l ic t , 1041 — 1946 , L ondon , O xford U niversity Press, 1953.M cN eill, W . H. T h e P u r s u i t o f P o w e r , O xford , Basil B lackw ell, 1983.M acfarlane , A. T h e J u s t ic e a n d th e M a r e 's A l e , O xford , Basil B lackw ell.

1981.M acp h e rso n , C. B. D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y : E s s a y s in R e t r i e v a l , O xford ,

C la ren d o n Press, 1973.M allow an, M. E. L. ‘T h e d ev e lo p m en t o f cities: from A1 U baid to the

en d o f U ru k ’ in T h e C a m b r id g e A n c i e n t H i s to r y , C am b rid g e , C am b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1970, vol. I.

Bibliography 381

M andel, E . M a r x i s t E c o n o m ic T h e o r y , L ondon , M erit P ub lishers, 1968.M an d elb au m , M . T h e N u c le a r R e v o lu t i o n , C am bridge , C am bridge

U niversity P ress, 1981.M ann , M . ‘S ta tes , a n c ie n t an d m o d e rn ’ A r c h i v e s e u r o p e e n e s d e

s o c io lo g ie , 18, 1977.M ann , M . ‘C ap ita lism an d M ilita rism ’ in M. Shaw , W a r, S ta te a n d

S o c ie t y , L ondon , M acm illan , 1984.M anning , C. A. W . T h e N a tu r e o f I n t e r n a t io n a l S o c ie t y , L o n d o n , Bell,

1962.M arshall, S. L. A. T h e S o ld ie r 's L o a d a n d th e M o b i l i t y o f a N a t io n ,

W ashing ton , C o m b a t F o rc es Press, 1950.M arshall, T . H . C la ss, C i t i z e n s h ip a n d S o c ia l D e v e l o p m e n t , W estp o rt,

G re en w o o d Press, 1973.M arw ick , A. W a r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e in th e T w e n t ie t h C e n tu r y , L ondon ,

M acm illan , 1974.M arx, K. ‘E co n o m ic an d P h ilo so p h ica l m a n u sc rip ts’ in T . B. B o tto m o re ,

K a r l M a rx , E a r ly W r i t in g s , New Y ork , M cG raw -H ill, 1964.M arx, K. ‘P re fa c e ’ to ‘A C o n trib u tio n to the C ritiq u e o f P o litica l

E co n o m y ’ in K. M arx an d F. Engels, S e l e c t e d W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e , L ondon , L aw rence an d W ishart, 1968.

M arx, K. ‘T h e British ru le in In d ia ' in S. A vineri (ed.), K a r l M a r x o n C o lo n ia l i s m a n d M o d e r n i s a t io n , New Y ork , D oub leday , 1968.

M arx, K. ‘T h e civil w ar in F ra n c e ’ in K. M arx an d F. Engels, S e l e c t e d W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e , L ondon , L aw rence an d W ishart, 1968.

M arx, K. ‘T h e E igh teen th B rum aire of L ouis B o n a p a rte ' in K. M arx and F. Engels, S e l e c t e d W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e , L ondon , L aw ren ce and W ishart, 1968.

M arx, K. C a p ita l , L ondon , L aw rence an d W ishart, 1970, vol. 1.M arx, K. G r u n d r is s e , H a rm o n d sw o rth , P engu in , 1973.M arx, K. an d Engels, F. W e r k e , B erlin, D ietz V erlag , 1963, vol. 24.M arx, K. and Engels, F. T h e G e r m a n I d e o lo g y , L ondon , L aw ren ce and

W ishart, 1965.M arx, K. an d Engels, F. S e l e c t e d W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e , L ondon ,

L aw rence an d W ishart, 1968.M arx, K. an d Engels, F. ‘T h e C o m m u n ist M an ife sto ’ in th e ir S e le c t e d

W o r k s in O n e V o lu m e , L ondon , L aw rence and W ishart, 1968.M atting ly , G . R e n n a i s s a n c e D ip lo m a c y , L ondon , Jo n a th a n C ap e , 1955.M atting ly , G . T h e D e fe a t o f th e S p a n is h A r m a d a , L ondon , Jo n a th an

C ape , 1959.M ay, A. J. E u r o p e S i n c e 1 9 3 9 , New Y ork , H olt, R in eh a rt & W inston,

1966.M ein eck e , F. D e r I d e e d e r S ta a ts r ä s o n , B erlin , R. O ld en b o u rg , 1924.

382 Bibliography

M enze, E. A. T o ta l i ta r ia n i s m R e c o n s i d e r e d , L ondon , K en n ik a t, 1981. M étraux , A. T h e H i s to r y o f t h e I n c a s , N ew Y ork , S ch o ck en , 1970. M illar, J. an d N ove, A. ‘W as S talin really n ecessary ?’, P r o b le m s o f

C o m m u n i s m , 25, 1976.M ilw ard, A. S. T h e E c o n o m ic E f f e c t s o f th e W o r ld W a rs o n B r i ta in ,

L ondon , M acm illan , 1970.M itchell, B. R. E u r o p e a n H is to r ic a l S ta t i s t ic s , 1 7 5 0 — 1970, New Y ork ,

C o lu m b ia U niversity Press, 1975.M om m sen, W . J. M a x W e b e r u n d d ie D e u t s c h e P o li t ik , / 8 9 0 — 1920,

T ü b in g en , M öhr, 1959.M o rg en th au , H. J. P o li t ic s A m o n g N a t io n s , New Y ork , K nopf, 1960. M orison , S. E. e t al. T h e G r o w th o f t h e A m e r i c a n R e p u b l i c , L ondon,

O xford U niversity Press, 1969, vol. 2.M um ford , L. T h e M y th o f th e M a c h in e , L ondon , S eek e r & W arburg ,

1967.M um ford , L. T h e P e n ta g o n o f P o w e r , L ondon , S eek e r & W arburg ,

1971.M um ford, L. I n te r p r e ta t io n s a n d F o r e c a s ts , London, S eeker & W arburg ,

1973.N airn, T . T h e B r e a k - u p o f B r i ta in , L ondon , New Left B ooks, 1977. N eedham , J. S c ie n c e a n d C iv i l is a t io n in C h in a , C am bridge , C am b rid g e

U niversity Press, 1954, vol. 1.Nef, J. U. W a r a n d P ro g re s s , C am bridge , M ass., H arv ard U niversity

Press, 1950.N elson, M. F. K o r e a a n d th e O ld O r d e r in E a s te r n A s ia , B aton R ouge,

L ouisiana S ta te U niversity Press, 1946.N orris, F. T h e O c ta p u s , L ondon , G ra n t R ichards, 1901.N ovicow , J. L a g u e r r e e t s e s p r é t e n d u s b ie n fa i ts , Paris, A lcan , 1894. O berg , J. ‘T h e new in te rn a tio n a l m ilitary o rd e r: a th re a t to hum an

se c u r ity ’ in A. E ide an d M. T h e e , P r o b le m s o f C o n t e m p o r a r y M ili ta r is m , L ondon , C room H elm , 1980.

O berscha ll, A. T h e E s ta b l i s h m e n t o f E m p i r i c a l S o c ia l R e s e a r c h in G e r m a n y , T h e H ague, M o u to n , 1965.

O ffe, C. D is o r g a n is e d C a p i ta l is m , C am bridge , Polity Press, 1981. O lm stead , A. T . E. H is to r y o f P a le s t in e a n d S y r ia , New Y ork , C harles

S cribner, 1931.O m an , C. W . C . T h e A r t o f W a r in t h e M id d le A g e s , 3 7 5 — 1515, Ithaca ,

C o rnell U niversity Press, 1953.O rridge , A. W. ‘V arie tie s of n a tio n a lism ’ in L. T ivey (ed.) T h e N a t io n -

S ta te , O xford , M artin R o b ertso n , 1981.O tley , C . B. ‘M ilitarism an d the social affilia tions o f the B ritish arm y

elite ’ in J. van D oom , A r m e d F o r c e s a n d S o c ie ty , T h e H ague, M outon ,1968.

Bibliography 383

O tte rb e in , K. F. T h e E v o l u t io n o f W a r , N ew H aven , H u m an R e la tions A re a F iles Press, 1970.

P arkes, D. an d T h rift, N. T im e s . S p a c e s a n d P la c e s , C h ich e s te r, W iley, 1980.

P arlie r, G . ‘T h e “m ilita ry rev o lu tio n ” 1550— 1660 — a m y th ?’, J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H is to r y , 48, 1976.

P arsons, T . ‘O n th e c o n c e p t o f po litica l p o w er’, P r o c e e d in g s o f th e A m e r i c a n P h i lo s o p h ic a l S o c ie t y , 107, 1963.

P arsons, T . ‘O n th e c o n c e p t of po litica l p o w er’ an d ‘S om e re flec tio n s on the p lace of fo rce in soc ia l p ro ce ss ' in H. E ckste in , I n t e r n a l W a r , G len c o e , T h e F re e Press, 1964.

P eaco ck , A. T . I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m ic P a p e r s , New Y ork , M acm illan , 1954.

P earto n , M . T h e K n o w le d g e a b le S ta te , L ondon , B urnett, 1982.P erez-D iaz, V . M . S ta te . B u r e a u c r a c y a n d C iv i l S o c i e t y , L o ndon ,

M acm illan , 1978.P erlm u tte r, A . T h e M i l i ta r y a n d P o li t ic s in M o d e r n T im e s , New H aven,

Y ale U niversity Press, 1977.P etrie , W. M. F. S o c ia l L i f e in A n c i e n t E g y p t , L ondon , C o n s tab le , 1923.Piven, F. F. an d C low ard , R. A. R e g u la t in g th e P o o r , L ondon , T av isto ck

P u b lica tio n s , 1972.Poggi, G . T h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e M o d e r n S ta te , L ondon , H u tch inson ,

1978.P olanyi, K. T h e G r e a t T r a n s fo r m a t io n , L ondon , V ic to r G o llancz , 1945.P o len b e rg , R. W a r a n d S o c i e t y : T h e U n i t e d S ta te s . 1941 — 45 , New

Y ork , J. P. L ipp inco tt, 1972.P o llard , A. F. ‘T h e b a lan ce of pow er', J o u r n a l o f t h e B r i tis h I n s t i t u t e o f

I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f fa ir s . 2, 1923.P ollard , S. T h e G e n e s is o f M o d e r n M a n a g e m e n t , L ondon, A rnold , 1965.P ou lan tzas , N. P o l i t ic a l P o w e r a n d S o c ia l C la s se s , L o ndon , New Left

B ooks, 1973.Pow ell, W . W. an d R obbins, R. C o n f l i c t a n d C o n s e n s u s , New Y ork , T h e

F re e Press, 1984.P resco tt, J. R. V. B o u n d a r ie s a n d F r o n tie r s , L ondon, C room H elm , 1978.R atzel, F. A n th r o p o g e o g r a p h ie , S tu ttg a rt, 1882.R atzel, F. P o li t is c h e G e o g r a p h ie , Berlin, R. O ld en b o u g , 1897.R aw din, M. T h e M o n g o l E m p ir e : its R is e & L e g a c y , New Y ork , F ree

P ress, 1967.R ico e u r, P . H e r m e n e u t i c s a n d th e H u m a n S c i e n c e s , C am b rid g e ,

C am b rid g e U niversity P ress, 1981.R o k k a n , S. ‘C ities, s ta te s a n d n a tio n s: a d im ensiona l m o d e l fo r th e study

o f co n tra s ts in d e v e lo p m e n t’, in S. N. E ise n sta d t an d S. R o kkan , B u i ld in g S ta te s a n d N a t io n s , B everly H ills, Sage, 1973.

384 Bibliography

R opp , T . W a r in t h e M o d e r n W o r ld , W estp o rt, G re en w o o d , 1959.R osen , G . ‘T h e hosp ita l: h is to rica l socio logy o f a co m m u n ity in s titu tio n ’

in E. F re id son , T h e H o s p i ta l in M o d e r n S o c i e t y , G len c o e , T h e F ree Press, 1963.

R o sen th au , J. N. T h e S t u d y o f G lo b a l I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , L ondon , P in ter,1980.

R oux, J-P. L e s t r a d i t io n s d e s n o m a d e s , Paris, M aisonneuve , 1970.R ule, J. C . L o u i s X I V a n d th e C r a f t o f K in g s h ip , C o lum bus, O h io S ta te

U niversity P ress, 1969.R usche, G . an d K irch h e im er, O . P u n is h m e n t a n d S o c ia l S t r u c tu r e , New

Y ork , R ussell & R ussell, 1968.R ussett, B. an d S tarr, H. W o r ld P o li t ic s , San F ran cisco , F re em a n , 1981.Sabloff, J. A. an d L am berg-K arlovsky , C. C. A n c i e n t C iv i l is a t io n a n d

T r a d e , A lb e rq u e rq u e , U niversity o f New M exico Press, 1975.S ark es ian , S. C . T h e M i l i t a r y - I n d u s t r ia l C o m p l e x : a R e a s s e s s m e n t ,

Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972.Satow , E. M. A G u id e to D ip lo m a t ic P r a c t ic e , L ondon , L ongm an , 1922.Schulz, G . R e v o lu t io n s a n d P e a c e T r e a t ie s 1 9 1 7 — 2 0 , L ondon, M ethuen ,

1967.S ch u m p e te r, J. ‘T h e crisis o f the tax s ta te ' in A. T . P eac o ck , et al.

I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m ic P a p e r s , New Y ork , M acm illan , 1954.S co tt, J. B. P r e s id e n t W i ls o n 's F o r e ig n P o l ic y , New Y ork , O xford

U niversity Press, 1918.S em m el, B. M a r x is m a n d th e S c i e n c e o f W a r , O xford , O xford U niversity

Press, 1981.S eton -W atson , H. N a t io n s a n d S ta te s , L o ndon , M eth u en , 1982.Shaw , M. W a r, S ta te a n d S o c ie t y , L ondon , M acm illan , 1984.S h ep p ard , G . A. A r m s a n d A r m o u r 1 6 6 0 to 1918 , L ondon , H art-D avis,

1971.S h o rte r, A. W. E v e r y d a y L i f e in A n c i e n t E g y p t , L ondon, M arston &

C o., 1932.S im m el, G eo rg , S o z io lo g ie , Leipzig, D u n c k e r an d H u m bo ld t, 1908.S joberg , G . T h e P r e in d u s tr ia l C i ty , G len c o e , T h e F re e Press, 1960.S k inner, 0 · T h e F o u n d a t io n s o f M o d e r n P o l i t ic a l T h o u g h t , C am bridge ,

C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1978, 2 vols.S kocpo l, T . ‘W alle rs te in 's w orld -cap ita lis t system : a th e o re tic a l and

h isto rical c ritiq u e ', A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f S o c io lo g y , 82, 1977.Sm ith , A. T h e T h e o r y o f M o r a l S e n t i m e n t s , O xford , O xford U niversity

Press, 1976.Sm ith , A. D. T h e o r ie s o f N a t io n a l i s m , L ondon , D u ckw orth , 1971.Sm ith , A. D. N a t io n a l i s m in th e T w e n t ie t h C e n tu r y , O xford , M artin

R o b e rtso n , 1979.S om bart, W . K r ie g u n d K a p i ta l i s m u s , D u n c k e r an d H u m b o ld t, M un ich ,

1913.

Bibliography 385

Sorel, A . L ’E u r o p e e t la r é v o lu t io n f r a n ç a is e , P aris, E . P ion , 1885.S o rok in , P. S o c ia l a n d C u l tu r a l D y n a m i c s , N ew Y o rk , A m eric an B ook

C om pany , 1937, vol. 3.Soustelle, J. D a ily L i f e o f th e A z t e c s o n th e E v e o f th e S p a n is h C o n q u e s t ,

S tan fo rd , S tan fo rd U niversity Press, 1970.S p en ce r, H. T h e S t u d y o f S o c io lo g y , A nn A rb o r, U n iversity o f M ichigan

Press, 1961.S p en ce r, H . T h e E v o l u t io n o f S o c ie t y , ed ited by R o b e rt L. C a rn e iro ,

C h icago , U niversity o f C h icag o Press, 1967.S tev en so n , G . H . R o m a n P r o v in c ia l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , O x fo rd , Basil

B lackw ell, 1949.T a lm o n , J. L. T h e O r ig in s o f T o ta l i ta r ia n D e m o c r a c y , New Y ork ,

P ra eg e r P ress, 1961.T ay lo r, A . J. P. T h e S t r u g g le f o r M a s te r y in E u r o p e , 1 8 4 8 — 1918,

O xford , C la ren d o n Press, 1954.T ay lo r, R. ‘T h e G re e n s in B rita in ', in D. C o a te s e t al. A S o c ia l i s t

A n a t o m y o f B r i ta in , C am b rid g e , P olity Press, 1984.T e rra in e , J. I m p a c t s o f W a r , L ondon , H u tch in so n , 1970.T h e C a m b r id g e A n c i e n t H is to r y , C am bridge , C am b rid g e U niversity

Press, 1970, vol. 1.T h e C a m b r id g e H i s to r y o f t h e B ib le , C am bridge , C am b rid g e U niversity

Press, 1 9 6 3 -7 0 , vol’. I.T h o m p so n , E. P. an d S m ith , D. P r o te s t a n d S u r v iv e , H a rm o n d sw o rth ,

P engu in , 1980.T h o m p so n , J. B. S t u d ie s in t h e T h e o r y o f I d e o lo g y , C am b rid g e , Polity

Press, 1984.T ie rn ey , B. M e d ia e v a l P o o r L a w , B erkeley , U niversity o f C alifo rn ia

Press, 1959.Tilly, C. ‘R eflec tions on the h istory of E u ro p ean s ta te -m ak in g ' in C . T illy

(ed.) T h e F o r m a t io n o f N a t io n a l S ta te s in E u r o p e , P rinceton , P rinceton U niversity Press, 1975.

T ivey , L. (ed.) T h e N a t io n - S ta te , O xford , M artin R o b e rtso n , 1981.T o u ra in e , A. T h e P o s t - I n d u s t r ia l S o c ie t y , L ondon , W ildw ood , 1974.T o u ta in , J. T h e E c o n o m ic L i f e o f t h e A n c i e n t W o r ld , L o n d o n , K egan

Paul, 1930.T oy , S. A H is to r y o f F o r t i f i c a t io n f r o m 30(H) B C to 1700 , New Y ork,

H e inem ann , 1955.T rib e , K. G e n e a lo g ie s o f C a p i ta l i s m , L ondon , M acm illan , 1981.T u llo ck , G . T h e P o l i t ic s o f B u r e a u c r a c y , W ash ing ton , P ublic A ffair

Press, 1965.T u rn e r , R . E th n o m e t h o d o l o g y , H a rm o n d sw o rth , P engu in , 1974.T u rn e r , R . ‘W ords, u tte ra n c e s an d ac tiv itie s’ in his E th n o m e t h o d o l o g y ,

H arm o n d sw o rth , P engu in , 1974.

386 Bibliography

U nger, A. L. T h e T o ta l i ta r ia n P a r ty , C am bridge , C am b rid g e U niversity Press, 1974.

van D oorn , J. A r m e d F o r c e s a n d S o c i e t y , T h e H ague, M o u to n , 1968.van D o o rn , J. T h e S o l d i e r a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e , B everly Hills, Sage, 1975.V inogradoff, P. R o m a n L a w in M e d ia e v a l E u r o p e , L ondon , H arp er,

1909.von C lausew itz, K. M. O n W a r , L ondon , K egan Paul, 1908.von G en tz , F . F r a g m e n ts U p o n th e B a la n c e o f P o w e r in E u r o p e , L ondon,

M. P e ttie r, 1806.W allers te in , I. T h e M o d e r n W o r ld S y s t e m , New Y ork , A cad em ic Press,

1974.W allers te in , I. T h e C a p i ta l i s t W o r ld E c o n o m y , C am bridge , C am bridge

U niversity P ress, 1979.W alzer, M. J u s t a n d U n ju s t W a rs , L o n d o n , A llen L ane, 1978.W att, D . C. T o o S e r io u s a B u s in e s s : E u r o p e a n A r m e d F o r c e s a n d th e

A p p r o a c h o f t h e S e c o n d W o r ld W a r , L ondon, T em p le Sm ith , 1975.W ebb, S. an d B. E n g lis h L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t , L ondon , M acm illan , 1982,

vol. 4.W eber, M. T h e R e l ig io n o f In d ia , G len c o e , T h e F ree Press, 1958.W eber, M. G e n e r a ! E c o n o m ic H is to r y , New Y ork , C ollier, 1961.W eber, M. T h e R e l ig io n o f C h in a , G len c o e , T h e F ree Press, 1964.W eber, M. T h e P r o te s ta n t E th ic a n d th e S p ir i t o f C a p i ta l i s m , L ondon,

A llen & U nw in, 1976.W eber, M. E c o n o m y a n d S o c ie t y , B erkeley , U niversity o f C a lifo rn ia

Press, 1978, vol. 1.W esson, R. G . T h e I m p e r ia l O r d e r , B erkeley, U niversity of C a lifo rn ia

Press, 1967.W haley , J. M ir r o r s o f M o r ta l i t y , L ondon , E u ro p a , 1981.W heatley , P. T h e P iv o t o f t h e F o u r Q u a r te r s , E d in b u rg h , E d inbu rgh

U niversity P ress, 1971.W hite, J. E. M. A n c i e n t E g y p t , L ondon , A llen W ingate , 1952.W hite , L. T . M e d ia e v a l T e c h n o lo g y a n d S o c ia l C h a n g e , O xford ,

C la ren d o n Press, 1962.W illiam s, E. N. T h e A n c i e n R e g i m e in E u r o p e , L ondon , B odley H ead ,

1970.W illiam s, S. W. T h e M id d le K in g d o m , New Y ork , W iley, 1879, vol. I.W illiam son, H. T h e W e t F la n d e r s P la in , L ondon , B eaum on t Press, 1929.W ilson, E. ‘Egypt th ro u g h the New K ingdom ' in C. H. K raeling and

R. M . A dam s, C ity I n v in c ib l e , C h icago , U niversity o f C h icag o Press,1960.

W ilson, J. A . T h e B u r d e n o f E g y p t , C h icago , U niversity o f C h icago Press, 1951.

Bibliography 387

W inter, J. M. W a r a n d E c o n o m ic D e v e l o p m e n t , C am bridge , C am bridge U niversity P ress, 1975.

W in ter, N. O . T h e R u s s ia n E m p i r e o f T o d a y a n d Y e s te r d a y , L ondon , S im pkin , 1914.

W isem an , D. J. ‘B ooks in th e A n c ie n t N ea r E as t a n d in th e O ld T e s ta m e n t', in P. R. A ck ro y d an d C. F. E vans, T h e C a m b r id g e H is to r y o f t h e B ib l e , C a m b rid g e , C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity Press, 1 9 6 3 -7 0 , vol. I.

W ittfogel, O r ie n ta l D e s p o t i s m , New H aven, Y ale U niversity P ress, 1957.W olf, E. P e a s a n t W a r s o f t h e T w e n t ie t h C e n tu r y , New Y ork , H arp er,

1969.W olp in , M . D. M ili ta r y A i d a n d C o u n t e r R e v o lu t i o n in t h e T h i r d W o r ld ,

L exington , M ass., L ex ing ton B ooks, 1972.W o r ld A r m a m e n t s a n d D i s a r m a m e n t s Y e a r b o o k , 1984, L o n d o n , T ay lo r

an d F rancis.W right, A. F. T h e C o n fu c ia n is t P e r s u a s io n , S tan fo rd , S tan fo rd U niversity

Press, 1960.W right, 0 · A S t u d y o f W a r , C h icago , U niversity o f C h icag o P ress, 1965.W right M ills, C . T h e P o w e r E li te , N ew Y ork , O xford U niversity Press,

1956.Y ad in , Y. T h e A r t o f W a r fa r e in B ib l i c a l L a n d s in t h e L ig h t o f

A r c h a e o l o g i c a l S tu d y , L ondon , W eidenfe ld , 1963, 2 vols.Z eru b av e l, E. H id d e n R h y t h m s , C h icago , U n iversity o f C h icag o Press,

1981.Ziff, 1’. S e m a n t ic A n a ly s i s , I th aca , C o rnell U niversity Press, 1960.

Index

absolutist states:and balance of power 87 development of 83—4, 112, 178—9 European system of 84—92, 93,

111-12

and growth of capitalism 148—9, 151-60 , 164, 274

military power 104— 15, 228 as organization 93—103 as traditional stale 85, 93 se e a lso administration; army,

standing; boundaries; sovereignty; territoriality

administration: in absolutist state 95—9, 102—3,

112-15 , 1 8 1 -3 , 189 in business organization 127 centralization of 47, 95—9, 102,

119, 164, 179 - 80, 247, 273 - 4 and concentration of resources

1 5 -1 6 , 19, 113-15 and discipline 15, 114—15, 182—90,

194, 2 0 5 -6 , 230 and law and violence 16, 201—2 and military power 105, 112— 15,

247-51and nation-state 4, 10, 157, 172—81,

1 8 6 -7 . 194, 2 0 1 -2 ,2 1 1 -1 2 , 214, 219 - 20, 256, 308 - 9, 341

as organization 12 patrimonial 61—2, 63, 76, 78, 95 in religious organizations 48 in traditional states 38—40, 46—9,

5 2 ,5 5 ,6 1 -3 , 75, 113, 178,181 -2 , 2 0 9 -1 0

se e also bureaucracy; city-state; communication; industrialism; information; pacification

agency, concept of 7, 9, 11 — 12 agrarian states:

origins of 23, 32, 34 as traditional states 35, 38, 40,

4 7 - 8 , 6 5 ,2 0 9 -1 0 se e also traditional states

Anderson, 1*. 93, 97 Anell, L. 279Arendt, H. 298, 3 0 0 -1 , 3 0 4 -5 Aries, P. 1 9 4 -5 army, standing 16

in absolutist states 108—10, 112—13 conscription 82, 227 — 30, 233—4 discipline 230— Iand industrial capitalism 160, 164,

276and nation-state 227—33, 312 professionalization of 223, 227—31,

250, 275, 312, 328 in traditional stales 55 — 6, 113 se e a lso nation-state: garrison-state

a m / praetorian state; power, military

Aron, R. 2 8 3 -4authority/authoritarianism 143, 297,

305, 309 se e a lso power; resources:

authoritative

Barraclough, G. 84 Barrow, G. W. S. 118 Barth, F. 116 -1 7

Index 389

B audin. L. 39 B elloc , H. 297B endix, R. 2 8 - 9 , 199, 204, 348n54B enven iste , E. 41B ischoff, J. 173B loom , S. F. 25Bodin, L. 94, 100, 1 1 9 ,2 1 0boundaries:

o f absolutist sta tes 85, 8 8 —90 o f nation-states 4, 4 9 —50, 7 9 —81,

1 2 0 - 1 , 141, 268, 270, 291 natural 5 0 - 1 , 9 0 o f traditional states 49, 51 see also frontier

B ourdieu, P. 343n20 Braudel, F. 163 Braun, R. 157 Breuilly, J. 212, 216 B rodie, B. 110 bureaucracy:

of absolutist states 97, 102—3 o f business organization 127, 134 and capitalism 141, 308 o f traditional states 61 —2, 67, 93 see also adm inistration

Burns, Ei. M. and Ralph, P. L. 55

C am us, Albert 2 9 4 - 5 , 333, 335 capita lism , com m ercial 105

and absolutist state 96, 100, 102, 1 1 5 - 1 6

expansion o f 92, 102, 126 capitalism , finance 126, 129 capitalism , industrial:

and civil soc iety 6 6 —8, 2 0 6 —7 as c lass system 6 3 —4, 66, 6 9 —70,

136, 1 4 3 - 6 , 1 5 9 - 6 0 , 172, 204,2 0 6 - 9 , 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 9 2 ,3 1 1 - 1 2 , 3 1 7 - 1 9 , 3 2 1 - 2 , 325

and contro l o f v io len ce 27, 71, 1 9 0 - 2 , 222

and d em ocracy 198, 204 expansion o f 1, 92, 122—8, 148,

1 5 5 - 9 ,2 1 3 , 226, 2 8 8 - 9 ,3 1 2 and m odernity 1—2, 4 —5, 31 — 2,

1 6 8 - 7 0 , 181, 3 1 0 - 2 4 , 3 3 6 - 7 and nationalism 220 origins o f 68, 122—37, 150—3

and socia l change 33, 182, 336 and urbanism 192—3 and world system theory 161—71,

2 7 6 - 7 , 2 8 7 - 8 see also bureaucracy; change,

socia l: class: industrialism ; labour; M arx, K.; M arxism: and capitalism ; soc iety , capitalist; W eber, M ax

capitalism , w elfare 289, 325 change, socia l 8, 28, 180, 212, 294,

308, 313, 335 - 9 and capitalism 30, 3 1 —3 en d ogen ou s m odel 161 — 2, 166—8,

171, 234 evolutionary m odel 31 — 2, 234 and warfare 2 3 2 —5, 2 4 2 —4, 245,

247C hesterfield , Lord 88 C hilde, V . G . 54 China:

military pow er 5 5 —6, 7 7 —8, 105, 226

surveillance in 15 as traditional state 35, 3 7 —8, 47,

5 0 - 1 , 5 9 , 6 1 , 6 3 , 6 5 - 6 , 74, 8 0 - 1 , 189

and world system 268 Churchill, W. S. 234 citizenship:

and absolutist states 94 and nation-states 2 8 —9, 183—4,

212, 229, 2 3 2 - 5 and nationalism 210, 216, 229, 259,

271and traditional states 210 see also polyarchy; rights

city /cou n trysid e: in absolutist states 97 dissolution o f relations betw een 4,

22in traditional states 16, 21, 38, 40,

52, 146, 192, 313 city-state:

and adm inistration 3 9 —40, 58 and a llocative resources 36 and authoritative resources 38, 40,

46

390 Index

classical G reece 57n ideo logy /p o w er in 16— 17 inter-state relations 79, 8 1 —2 military pow er in 40, 54, 56, 107 as traditional state 3 5 —41, 51, 65 see also traditional sta tes

civil society: and absolutist sta tes 149—50 and govern m en t 18 in H egel 2 0 — 1 in Marx 21, 67 and nation-state 2 1 —2, 184

civil war 121 Clark, G . N. 102 class:

in absolutist sta tes 9 6 —7 com prom ise 204, 3 2 1 —4 form ation 6 2 —3, 6 8 —70 and rights 204, 2 0 6 —7 in traditional states 6 2 —6, 6 9 —75 see also capitalism ; class struggle;

dom ination; traditional states class struggle:

institutionalization o f 236, 317 in Marx 2 —3, 2 5 —7, 65, 136, 143,

153, 198 - 9, 213, 294, 311, 3 3 6 - 7 and m odern capitalism 66, 146,

1 5 9 - 6 0 , 1 9 1 ,2 9 2 ,3 1 1 - 1 3 ,3 1 7 , 3 1 9 - 2 3

in nation-state 184, 2 0 8 —9 and traditional states 6 4 —5, 7 0 — 1

class-divided so c iety , see traditional states

C lausew itz, K. M. von 24, 329 —30 co llectiv ism 297colon ialism 92, 161, 213, 223, 225, 272

anti-colon ial m ovem en ts 240— I co lo n ized nation-state 2 7 0 — 1, 275 and military pow er 275, 289 p ost-colon ial states 213, 2 7 2 —3,

2 7 5 - 6 , 280, 2 8 7 ,3 1 7 com m od ifica tion 129 — 34, 136, 140,

1 4 5 - 6 ,3 1 1 and absolutist state 148—60 of sp ace and tim e 174—5, 193 see also labour: com m odification of

com m u nication : and adm inistrative pow er 14, 172—81,

2 1 0 - 1 1 ,2 7 6 ,2 9 6 , 3 0 9 ,3 1 2

develop m en t of 138 and nationalism 214, 219 and warfare 5 6 —7, 2 2 3 —5, 2 3 0 — 1

C om te, A . 32, 335, 338 congresses 8 6 —7, 90. 222, 2 5 7 —9, 261 control:

d ia lectic o f 4, 10— 1 1 ,7 6 , 186, 194, 2 0 1 - 2 ,2 0 5 ,2 0 8 ,3 1 2 ,3 1 4

m odes o f 9strategies o f 10— 11, 183—4, 191,

208 see also rule

corporations, transnational 2 4 7 —8,2 7 7 - 9 , 290, 3 1 1, 339

corporatism 9 5 —7, 100, 238 critical theory and develop m en t of

m odernity 5, 3 3 5 —41 C utler, A ntony 155

death , attitudes to 194—6 d em ocracy 169

and in fluence o f warfare 243, 245 and nation-state 172, 198—9, 201,

2 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 9 6 - 7 ,3 1 4 ,3 1 7 , 3 1 9 - 2 2

see also polyarchy d ep en d en cy theo-y 162—3 D eutsch , K. W. 2 1 3 - 1 4 deviance:

in absolutist state 100— 1, 182—4 in nation-state 120, 184, 187, 205,

3 1 2 ,3 2 7and totalitarianism 3 0 4 — 5, 3 0 8 — 10 in traditional state 59, 181—2

dip lom acy: in absolutist states 8 5 —6, 87, 93, 104 and nation-states 233, 256, 261, 264,

271, 329 - 31 see also international relations

d iscip line, see adm inistration D oerner, K. 101 — 2 dom ination:

in absolutist sta tes 97 capitalist 143, 159—60, 202, 308,

314, 336 m odes o f 8 — 10, 12 in traditional states 38, 46, 62 —4, 72 see also pow er

Index 391

Dürkheim, E. 180 and control of violence 23 and religion 74 and social change 32 and the state 17—18, 23—6

Eberhard, W. 47, 65—6 economy:

in absolutist states 149—52 government control 28, 242—3, 284 and military power 245—9 planned 280, 292as separate sphere 134—6, 142—3,

145, 211, 285 war economy 238—40 world 162-70 , 213, 2 3 9 -4 1 ,

2 7 6 - 81,292,339 - 40 se e also market economy;

‘political’ sphere EEC as international organization

2 8 3 -4Egypt as traditional state 36, 39, 48,

55, 296 Eisenstadt, S. N. 35 Elias, N. 195 Engels, F.:

and class struggle 350n7 and control 26 and military power 24—5

England/Britain: as absolutist state 101, 104, III ,

118, 1 8 9 -9 0 ,2 0 3 -5 and capitalism 149—50, 165, 204 and industrialization 139, 186 as nation-state 236, 238, 242 — 3,

270, 320and warfare 223—6, 228, 234, 240,

242, 332 and world system 258, 267

evolutionism, cultural/social 8, 23—4, 2 6 ,2 9 ,3 1 -2 , 112,336

exchange 123—6, 131—2 in absolutist state 148—9, 153, 155

fascism 297, 303 Germany 296, 298—9, 300— 1 Italy 2 9 5 -6 , 29 8 -9 ,3 0 1

Ferguson, Adam 137

feudalism 35, 7 9 -8 0 , 83, 202 and the city 38 and class 63, 65 European 8 3 - 5 , 8 8 - 9 , 92, 95,

117, 158 and law 9 9 -1 0 0 , 203 military power 106—10, 113 territoriality 117

Finer, S. E. 106, 2 4 9 -5 0 Foucault, M. 4 6 - 7 , 101, 114-15 ,

182 -5 , 187,310 France:

as absolutist state 85—6, 89—90, 9 5 ,9 7 -1 0 2 , 104, 118-19 , 158,189-90

military power 108— 11, 228— 9, 233 as nation-state 236, 238, 270, 281 as traditional state 60

franchise, extension of 203—4, 208, 234

Friedrich, C. 296— 9, 301—2 frontier:

of feudal states 85, 88—90 of traditional state 4, 49—52,

7 9 -8 1 ,9 0 , 120 se e also boundaries

Gellner, E. 32, 212, 214 Gentile, G. 295 Germany:

and absolutism 104, 205 military power 224, 228—9, 231,

2 3 4 -5 , 2 3 9 -4 0 , 332 as nation-state 238—40, 243, 270,

276, 322 nationalism 213 totalitarianism 296, 298—301

Gibb, H. A. R. and Bowen, H. 52 Goffman, E. 185 Goldscheid, R. 159 Goody, J. 43 Gouldner, A. W. 211 government, concept of:

in absolutist state 93—4, 103 and capitalism 64 and nation-state 29, 288, 312,

3 2 2 -4 , 341

392 Index

in traditional states 4, 10, 57 — 60, 64, 9 3 - 4,201

see also power; military: and state authority; rule

Grew, R. 317Griffith, R. and Thomas, C. G. 40, 54 Gurr, T. R. 190

Harris, M. 53 Hegel, G. W. F. 11, 2 0 -1 Herder. J. G. von 216— 17 Hintze, O tto 26—7, 29 historicism 216, 313

and totalitarianism 303, 307 historicity 212, 216, 219—20, 303 history:

continuities of 31 discontinuist view 31—4, 83—4,

132, 161 -2 , 167,339 and nation-state 212, 216 in traditional states 12, 45 se e also progressivist view

Hobbes, G. 100 Hobsbawm, E. 362n32 Hughes, Arnold 272 Huntington, S. P. 228—9, 369n30

ideology: influence of 16— 17 and nation-state 211 — 12, 215,

2 1 9 -2 0 and religion 71—4 and totalitarianism 299, 303 in traditional states 46, 71 —8

imperial systems 35, 38—9, 80—2, 88, 117, 153, 255

industrialism: and administration 137, 144, 172,

243definition 138and development of modernity 2,

4 - 5 , 2 3 - 4 , 1 2 2 -3 , 128 -9 , 214,28 9 ,3 1 2 -1 3 ,3 1 5

and military power 27, 29, 222, 235, 2 4 6 -7 , 254, 2 5 5 -6 , 265, 312, 3 2 9 - 32

as pacific 23, 26, 160 relation to capitalism 34, 137—47,

148, 288 - 9, 292, 294, 325, 3 4 0 -1

se e also capitalism; society, industrial

industrialization:of food production 237—8 of manufacture 138—9, 235—41 of warfare 3, 54, 2 2 3 -3 7 , 2 4 1 -2 ,

2 6 4 -5 , 276, 285, 293, 2 9 4 -5 , 3 1 2 ,3 1 5 ,3 3 8 -9 in nation-state, against own population 303, 304

se e a lso army, standing; weaponry information:

in absolutist states 87—8, 156, 179-80

in modern capitalism 144—5 in nation-states 173, 177—81,

184 -5 , 2 0 9 -1 1 , 261, 309, 312 storage of 2, 14—15, 124 in traditional states 44, 46—7, 75—6 se e a lso surveillance

Innis, H. A. 178 integration, functional 276 integration, social 2, 341 integration, systemic:

class-divided society 16, 52—3, 56, 76, 224

in nation-state 312 international relations:

in absolutist states 85—9 in nation-states 4 — 5, 30— 1, 79 — 80,

86,90, 147, 155, 170 -1 , 2 2 2 -3 , 256, 2 5 7 -6 6 , 2 8 7 -9 0 , 331

se e also diplomacy investment 134—5, 140, 142 Italy:

totalitarianism in 295 — 6, 298 — 9, 301

warfare in 224

Jacobs, Jane 36—7, 343n 19 Janowitz, M. 232—3, 343—4n30 Japan:

military power 227, 239—40, 244, 328

as nation-state 243—4, 273, 276, 289, 322

and world system 280 Jones, S. B. 120

Index 393

K autsky, J. 5 7 - 8 , 350n34 K edourie, E. 219 K eyn es/K eyn esian ism 242—3

labour: alienability o f 70com m od ifica tion o f 129 — 33, 140,

1 4 2 - 6 , 148, 1 5 9 - 6 0 , 167, 2 7 7 ,3 1 1

contract 131, 191, 207, 312, 322 division of 23, 26, 53, 141, 163—4 free w age-labour 127, 136, 144 — 5,

152, 166, 186, 191 international division of 164—5,

171, 193, 240, 253, 265, 278, 284, 287, 2 8 9 - 9 0 , 292, 3 4 0 - 1

slave 48, 127, 144, 166 and use o f v io len ce 190— 1 and war 236

labour m ovem ents 204, 2 0 7 —8, 236, 3 1 3 , 3 1 6 - 2 0 , 3 2 4 - 5 ,3 4 0

language and national identity 74, 98,11 7 - 1 9 , 216, 218 - 20, 2 7 0 - 1

Lasswell, H. D. 245 L attim ore, O. 50 law:

in absolutist sta tes 9 8 — 100, 1 4 8 - 5 2 , 179

crim inal 100— 1, 190 in nation-state 121, 206 and san ctions 16, 148 — 9, 190, 276 and totalitarianism 299 in traditional states 46, 5 8 —9, 6 8 —9

Le G off, T . J. A. and Sutherland,D. M. G . 60, 189

Leach, Edm und 47 leader-figures 2 1 8 - 19, 296, 299,

3 0 4 - 7 see also nationalism

League o f N ations 2 5 8 —9, 261 —4 Lévi-Strauss, C. 32, 76, 343n 16 Lindblom , C. E. 199 — 200 Lloyd G eo rg e , D . 259, 261 locale:

o f c lass struggle 66 defin ition 12— 13 o f dom inant class 38, 7 6 —7 o f industrialism 138, 144 — 5, 194

and military pow er 16, 107—8 and origins o f capitalism 124, 126

Lofland, J. 188 Luckham , R. 2 5 1 —2

M acfarlane, Alan 189 M cN eill, W. H. 54, 1 1 1 ,2 2 2 - 3 ,

2 3 6 - 7 m anagem ent:

in capitalism 66, 127, 160, 206 and control 10, 144

m arket eco n o m y and origins o f m odern capitalism 128, 130,1 3 3 - 5 , 140, 1 6 4 - 7

M arshall, Т . H. 28, 200, 2 0 2 - 9 , 3 1 9 - 2 0

M arw ick, Arthur 236, 243 M arx, K.:

and absolutist sta tes 9 6 —7, 152 and capitalism 122—4, 127,

129 - 33, 136, 1 4 2 - 3, 145, 160, 1 6 7 ,3 1 1 ,3 3 5 - 7 ,3 4 0 - 1

and civil rights 2 0 5 —9 and contro l o f v io len ce 2 —3, 23,

2 4 - 6 , 71, 191, 326 and industrialism 2, 140— 1 and nationalism 2 1 2 — 13 and religion 7 1 —2, 7 4 —5 and socia l change 3 1 —3, 6 4 —5,

3 1 3 - 1 4 , 3 2 5 - 6 , 335, 338 sta te /c iv il society 2 0 — 1, 24, 28,

153, 200and traditional states 59, 69, 7 1 —2,

78see also class struggle

M arxism: and capitalism 1, 2, 6 6 —7, 122, 245,

287 - 8, 292, 294, 336, 340 and class dom ination 6 3 —4, 68,

308, 322 and dem ocracy 198—9 and m ilitary pow er 2 —3, 28, 245,

308and nationalism 2 1 2 — 13, 219,

303, 3 0 7 - 8 and private property 68 and socia l change 313, 325, 3 3 5 —8 and warfare 226

394 Index

materialism, historical 83 and allocative resources 8, 15 in Marxism 1 —3, 8, 213, 337—8 and social change 32, 54, 64, 336—8

Michels, R. 314 modernity 295 — 341

influence on 2 institutional clusterings of 5,

141 -6 , 150, 169 ,310 -25 see a lso capitalism: and modernity;

industrialism; nation-states modernization theory 162, 169 monarchy, se e absolutist states money 124 -6 , 128, 130, 1 3 1 -2

in absolutist states 148, 152—5, 1 5 7 -9

commodity money 153—5 fiduciary money 154, 155—6 paper money 154, 155—6

Moore, S. 39Morgenthau, H. J. 257, 281 movements, social:

ethnic 318ecological 314, 3 1 5 -1 6 , 320, 327,

3 4 0 -1peace movements 314—17, 319,

3 2 6 -7 , 334, 3 3 8 -9 and social protest 313—21, 324 and use of terror 306—7 se e a lso labour movements;

nationalism; revolutionary movements; women

Mumford, L. 113

Nairn, T. 213nation, definition 116—17, 119 nation-states:

and balance of power 87 and capitalism 4—5, 27, 141, 145,

148, 152, 160, 172, 255, 274,287 - 8,292

classifications of 267—76 colonized, se e colonization and democracy 169 economic relations 276—81 formation of 34, 83, 85, 179—81,

2 7 0 -1

and industrialization of war 5, 159, 2 2 6 -7 , 2 4 5 -5 4 , 3 2 9 -3 2

military power 16, 104, 111 — 13, 116, 2 2 7 -3 5 , 2 4 5 -5 4 , 255, 2 7 4 -6 , 329

modern states as 1—2, 4 —5, 121, 135 -6 , 177,341

modernizing nation-state 273—6 nation-state system 170, 193,222,

2 2 6 -7 , 233, 249, 254, 2 5 5 -9 3 and organization 12, 15, 221 ‘political’ and ‘econom ic’ spheres

6 7 -7 0 , 136, 179 ,211-12 , 221 as power-container 13— 14, 97, 120,

172, 193 praetorian state 274 reflexive monitoring 178, 180—1,

210, 212, 2 2 0 -1 , 256, 2 5 8 -9 , 261, 2 6 3 -4 , 266, 277, 289

regionalization 193—4, 220 socialist 257and ‘state-nation’ 251, 272, 276 administration; boundaries;

ideology; international relations; nationalism; polyarchy; sovereignty; surveillance; territoriality; totalitarianism; violence

nationalism 197 in absolutist states 119 definition 116, 121 in feudal systems 118 modern liberal views 28, 216 and nation-state 212—21, 229,

2 3 2 -3 , 235, 2 5 9 -6 0 , 2 7 0 -3 , 3 1 8 ,3 2 0 -1 ,3 3 8

and totalitarianism 299, 303, 305,307

NATO 243, 253, 2 6 7 -9 , 2 8 5 -7 nature and modernity 130, 146—7,

3 1 2 -1 3 ,3 1 5 ,3 1 8 ,3 4 0 -1 Nietzsche, F. 27, 29 nomadic states 35 — 6, 81

organization: absolutist state as 93—104 and capitalism 130—1, 134

Index 395

definition 12, 87 international 258—9, 261—4,

2 8 2 -7 , 2 9 0 -1 in modern state 15, 193, 312, 314 political aspect 19—20 religious 48in traditional state 46, 48, 52

pacification, internal: and military power 113, 251, 276 and nation-state 4, 120, 160,

181-92 , 222, 274, 289,302,307, 309

Parsons, T. 202 Pearton, M. 232, 265 peasants:

in absolutist states 97—8 and class struggle 65—7, 70— 1 and ideology 76—8 and modern capitalism 127, 130,

145, 182, 208 in traditional state 58, 60, 69

Perez-Diaz, V. M. 152—3 Perlmutter, A. 251, 275 Poggi, G ianfranco 99 Polanyi, K. 67 police/policing:

in absolutist states 190, 205 in nation-state 251 —2, 276 power 16secret 297 - 300, 3 0 2 -3 and supervision 205—6, 303—4,

307, 3 0 9 -1 0 , 319 in traditional state 182 world policing 327 se e also power, military;

surveillance ‘political’ sphere:

definitions 19—20, 21 and dominant class 75 — 6 and ‘econom ic’ sphere 66—70, 75,

1 3 4 -6 , 140, 150, 157, 191,2 0 7 -8 , 290,311,322

expansion of 179and regulation of economic sphere

2 7 7 -8 Pollard, S. 136

polyarchy 4, 198—201, 233, 306—7,309 ,312 -14 ,338 ,341

and citizenship 201—9, 218 and military power 250—1, 312 se e a lso democracy

power: balance of 8 6 - 7 ,2 5 6 - 6 0 centralization of 94—5, 97—9, 154,

296, 3 0 8 -9 deflation of 202 distribution of 74, 207, 278, 314 and domination 8—9 institutional mediation of 9 —10,

4 5 - 6 and locale 12—13 and resources 7—8, 10, 13—17, 143 technologies of 11, 295 se e a lso domination; rule

power, military: bipolar division 267—8, 332 and capitalism 254 and development of modernity 2, 5,

1 6 ,2 4 -5 ,2 7 ,8 0 , 170, 245,271, 2 8 9 -9 0 , 2 9 4 -5

‘garrison-state’ 245 and law 16neglect of in social theory 2—3,

2 2 - 7 , 308, 326 and state authority 4, 55—7, 192,

2 2 7 -8 , 2 4 7 -5 1 , 2 7 4 -6 , 306, 312, 317, 3 2 7 -8

and violence 3, 16, 20, 192, 222—3,3 2 7 -3 3

world military order 5, 284—5,3 2 8 -3 4 , 338

se e also absolutist states; army, standing; industrialization: of war; nation-states; traditional states

power, naval 90—2, 105—6, 110—11, 225, 237, 332

printing and modernization 178—9, 210-11

production: capitalist 70, 134—5, 142—5,

159 - 60, 279, 340 internationalization of 278—80

396 Index

mass 236—7 mental 71, 75—6 planned 326 surplus 15, 68, 143—4

profit, and origins of capitalism 124, 12 6 -9 , 131, 133, 140, 142, 167

progressivist view of history 83 property, private:

in absolutist states 99—100, 152 capital as 6 9 -7 0 , 134, 136, 152, 317 and capitalism 130—1, 136, 140,

143, 146, 152 and class formation 68—9 and industrialism 129 and modernity 310— 11 in traditional societies 69—70

punishment: capital punishment 187—8 se e also administrative power:

discipline

Ouetelet, A. 180

Ratzel, F. 49 religion:

rationalization of 71—5 in traditional societies 48, 54 se e also ideology

representation as constitutive of modern state 20

resources: allocative 2, 7—8, 13, 36, 67, 134,

143, 256, 265 authoritative 2 ,7 —8, 13—14, 19,

3 6 - 8 , 40, 67, 143, 160, 181, 256 concentration of 13—17, 198, 201,

241distribution 43, 67—8, 340 generation of 13, 36, 46, 52,

6 7 - 8 , 1 9 2 -3 se e also power

revolutionary movements: modern capitalism 3, 66 peasant 65—6, 71 and social change 31 see also movements, social

Ricoeur, P. 4 1 - 3 , 45, 179 rights:

‘bourgeois’ 131, 187, 191, 198-200205, 209, 3 1 3 -1 4

citizenship 200—1, 202— 9, 216— 182 3 3 -4 , 2 4 2 -3 , 252, 3 1 8 -2 0 , 325; civil 199, 2 0 0 -1 , 203, 2 0 5 -8 , 2 1 7 -1 8 , 309, 3 1 9 -2 0 economic 200—1, 203— 8, 242,309, 319, 321, 325 political 199, 2 0 0 -1 , 2 0 3 -8 , 2 1 7 -1 8 ,3 0 9 ,3 1 9 -2 1

and surveillance 309 rule 20

intensity of 10, 11 scope of 9, II se e also government

Russia/Soviet Union: law in 59military power 28, 227, 229, 235,

2 3 9 - 40, 246 - 8, 253 - 4, 266,267, 293, 333

as nation-state 244 totalitarianism 296—301 and world economy 168— 9, 292 and world system 258—9, 265—9,

278, 2 8 4 -7

Saint-Simon, С. H. com te de 26,71, 137

sanctions: and absolutist states 100, 149,

151 -2 , 190 and capitalism 127, 151—2, 187 and military power 16, 71, 149 of the state 10, 19, 188 and traditional states 46

Sartre, J. -P. 343n 16 Schumpeter, J. 27 science and technology:

and natural world 312— 13 and warfare 237 — 8, 240— 2, 247,

248, 2 5 4 ,2 9 3 ,3 3 1 -2 sequestration:

in absolutist states 101, 182—5 in nation-state 120, 185 — 6, 194—7,

206, 218

index 397

and totalitarianism .30.3 4, 309 see a lso deviance

Simmel, B. 343nl7 Sjoberg, G. 36—8 Smith, Adam 137 social sciences and use of

statistics 180— 1 social theory:

modern liberal 28—9, 308 modern Marxist 2—3, 28, 294—5,

308‘new philosophers' 29—31 nineteenth-century 2, 22—8,

53, 1 3 6 -7 socialism:

and capitalism 2, 5, 336—7 and internationalism 232, 235 and the state 21, 24—5 state socialism 28, 286—7, 292—3,

297,317, 3 2 3 -4 society, capitalist 145, 172, 339

characteristics of 134—7, 139—41, 318, 3 2 1 -4

as class society 143. 146. 311, 322 society, industrial 2, 4, 53, 122, 137,

139-40 , 143, 2 4 4 -5 , 317, 321 se e also industrialism

society, military 4, 53, 245—54 se e a lso power, military

Sorel, A. 87 sovereignty:

in absolutist states 4, 87—9, 91, 9 3 - 4 ,9 8 - 1 0 0 , 103, 149-51. 1 5 7 -8 , 181, 198, 210

as constitutive of modern state 4,20, 51, 198, 2 5 7 -6 0 , 263, 2 6 5 -6

and equality of states 281 —2 and international orders 281 —7, 291 of nation-state 4 —5, 90—1, 141,

172, 200, 2 0 5 -1 0 , 212, 219, 228,2 3 5 -6 , 238, 268

and nationalism 119,216—21.229,2 3 2 -3 , 259, 271

in traditional state 93 Spain as absolutist state 102, 104, 107,

109, 111, 114, 163 Spencer, H. 23

Stalinism 2 9 6 - 301,303 state, the:

and control of violence 18—20,2 3 - 4 , 2 6 -3 0

definitions 17 — 20, 23 —6 and information 177—8 intervention by 136, 159, 238 political aspects 19—20, 29 public sphere 209— 11 state systems 79—82, 84—7, 155,

2 5 5 -9 3se e also boundaries; government;

territoriality state-nations, se e colonialism: post

colonial states statistics, use of 45, 179—80, 210

se e a lso information surveillance:

in absolutist states 85—6, 160,179, 189 -90

and authority 2in capitalist society 66, 144—5, 147,

160, 191, 294, .312, 3 1 8 -1 9 and direct supervision 14— 15,

4 6 - 8 , 6 5 - 6 , 1 8 4 -5 , 303, 309 and information 14—15, 46—7 and military power 228, 242, 252,

295in nation-state 4, 5, 14, 120, 157,

179, 181, 1 8 4 -7 , 192, 194,201 - 2 , 220, 263, 312, 314, 319, 323, 341

and totalitarianism 302—3, 304, 308 -10 ,341

in traditional society 14—15,1 6 -1 7 , 4 4 - 9 , 52, 65,76, 144

see a lso information; police: secret symbols, national 93, 116, 118,

2 1 4 -1 6 , 2 1 8 -2 1 , 273, 299,305, 307

see also nationalism

Talmon, J. L. 307 taxation:

in absolutist states 98, 102—3,148, 1 5 7 -8

in modern states 157

398 Index

in traditional states 58—9, 67, 1 5 7 -8

territoriality of state 18—20, 23—4, 49, 85, 8 8 - 9

of absolutist states 85, 88—9, 97, 103, 120

of nation-states 26, 103, 147, 172, 216, 228, 235, 256, 288, 291

of traditional states 49 se e also boundaries; frontier

Thompson, J. B. 42 Tilly, C. 1 0 3 -4time-table, importance of 174—5, 185 totalitarianism:

elements of 303—10 and modernity 3, 295—7, 301 —3,

341rise of 238, 252, 2 9 5 -6

Touraine, A. 317—18 trade, international 91 — 2, 105,

2 7 8 -8 0 tradition:

importance of 45, 47. 59, 196, 218 monitoring of 11 — 12

traditional states 35—60, 61 —82 as class-divided societies 1—2, 13,

6 2 - 5 , 158, 192, 196, 3 1 2 -1 3 communication 178, 224 definitions 35 and feudalism 83 generation of resources 36, 52,

6 7 - 8 , 1 9 2 -3 and history 12, 32—4 markets in 128military power 2, 16, 40, 48, 53— 60,

7 6 - 7 , 80, 112-13 , 1 2 0 -1 , 189, 224, 248, 251, 276

and origins of capitalism 124—6,153

'political' and 'econom ic' spheres 6 6 -7 1

power in 41, 77 - 8, 117, 124, 209 religion in 71 —6 and rule 10, 85, 305—6 as segmental 3—4, 16, 21, 39, 47,

5 2 - 3 ,7 3 - 4 , 113, 1 4 3 -4 , 160, 174, 302

transportation 173—4, 224 se e also agrarian states; boundaries;

bureaucracy; city-states; government; ideology; law; organization; surveillance; taxation

transportation:mechanization of 138, 173—7, 276,

309, 312and warfare 56—7, 223—4, 230— 1 se e also power, naval

tribal systems 53, 68, 79—80, 117,196, 2 5 5 ,3 1 2 -1 3

unionization 208, 236 se e also labour movements

United Nations as international organization 258, 262—4, 266,268, 283, 291

urbanism, modern 22, 36—7, 146—7, 192 -4 , 313, 341

and nation-state 120, 172, 274—5 se e also city-state

USA:military power 225, 226—7, 229,

2 3 3 -4 , 240, 2 4 6 -8 , 2 5 2 -4 , 266, 267, 293, 333

as nation-state 236, 238, 243—4 and world system 258, 265—6,

2 6 8 -7 1 , 274, 2 7 9 -8 1 , 2 8 4 -5 , 292

utopianism 334, 336—9

Valéry, P. 84 van Doom, J. 113—14 violence 2, 16, 18 -2 0 , 23, 26, 202

in absolutist states 149, 152,182 -4 , 190

in capitalism 70—1, 147, 160,1 9 0 -1 ,2 2 2 ,3 2 2 ,3 2 6

and 'garrison-state' 245 military intervention in govern

ment 249—52 in nation-states 4, 16, 18, 23,

2 6 -3 0 , 1 2 0 -1 , 188, 230, 235, 254, 276, 295, 312, 315, 319, 324

political theory of 325—35

Index 399

to ta lita ria n ism 2 9 8 —302, 3 0 4 —7,308

in tra d itio n a l s ta te s 5 6 —7, 76, 1 2 0 - 1 , 131, 1 8 1 - 2 , 201, 248

see also p o w e r, m ilita ry V o lta ire , F . M . A . d e 98 von G e n tz , F . 2 5 7 —8

W alle rs te in , I. 1 6 1 - 7 0 , 278, 3 5 2 n l7 , 367n35

W alp o le , H . 190 W alzer, M . 339w ar, see a rm y , s ta n d in g ; c o m m u n ic a

tio n ; d e m o c ra c y ; in d u s tr ia liza tio n : o f w ar; tra n s p o r ta tio n ; w eap o n ry

W arsaw P a c t 267, 2 8 6 —7 w eap o n ry :

d e v e lo p m en t o f 5 3 —4, 55, 102, 1 0 5 - 1 2 , 223, 2 2 5 - 6 , 2 3 0 - 1 ,2 3 6 - 7 , 256

an d in d u str ia liz a tio n 2 4 0 — 1, 285, 2 9 3 ,3 1 5 ,3 2 6 - 31

an d n u c le a r w e ap o n s 240 — 2, 253, 3 1 5 - 1 6 , 3 2 8 - 9 , 3 3 1 - 5 , 338

tra d e in 2 5 2 —4 w e ap o n s sy s tem s 2 4 1 —2, 252

W eb b , S. a n d W eb b , B. 190 W eb e r, M ax:

an d a d m in is tra tio n 15— 16, 18 ,6 2 , 1 4 4 - 5 , 308

an d cap ita lism 123—9, 130— 1, 1 3 2 - 3 , 167

a n d c ity 3 6 —7, 39, 5 9 —60 and in d u stria lism 128—9, 140— 1

a n d la b o u r 166 an d law 59, 99, 1 4 9 - 5 2 , 179 a n d lea d e rsh ip 306 m a rk e t e co n o m y 128 a n d m ilita ry p o w e r 3, 27, 54, 105 an d re lig ion 7 1 —3 an d th e s ta te 18—20, 2 6 —7, 29

W esso n , R. G . 58, 61 W illiam s, E. N. 103 W illiam son , H. 227 W ilso n /W ilso n ian ism 238, 2 5 8 —61,

266W isem an , D . J. 46 W ittfo g el, 39, 47, 6 2 - 3 W olf, E. 65, 350n20 w o m en , s ta tu s o f 2 3 6 —8

w o m e n ’s m o v em e n ts 318, 3 2 0 — I w o rk -p lace 138—9

as lo ca le o f a d m in is tra tiv e p o w e r 1 4 4 - 5 , 1 8 5 - 6 , 191, 2 0 6 - 8 , 316

as lo ca le o f su rv e illa n ce 66, 144—5, 147, 312

w o rld system 4, 174, 238, 240, 2 5 5 - 9 3 , 3 3 9 - 4 1

as b ip o la r 267reg io n a liza tio n 163—5, 168—9,

1 7 0 - 1 , 193 an d soc ial ana ly sis 281 th eo ry 28, 161—7 1 ,2 7 6 —7

W righ t M ills, C . 247 w riting , d e v e lo p m en t o f 14, 41 —6,

5 4 ,6 8 ,7 1 ,7 5 , 124, 209 a n d su rv e illa n ce 4 4 —7

the nation-state and violence

Documents