the mysterious new york market
TRANSCRIPT
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The M st er iousNew York Mark e t
Robert McCullough
October 15, 2009
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t he New York ISO
Of the U.S.
New York ISO representsthe market with the mostdistorted bids on a dailyas s
Distorted bids occur in
both day ahead and hour
A large number ofbidders and generators areinvolved with as much as
10% of total supplyinvolved
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oc ey t c s Any bid whose higher segments
represent unrealistic prices Generally reflect price setting in
markets where the highest bid is
returned by the LP as the pricewhen all supply bids are
exhausted
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oc ey t c s Also used for economic
withholding May reflect computational
problems ERCOTs algorithm
tends to time out
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One of hundreds of
per hour
Generator #25855750 adds asmall increment to its bid curve at999
Obviously, the odds that$999/MWh actually represents costis very, very low
800
1000
1200
e sma ncremen s a ossto this generator since it seldomdispatches
200
400
600
$/MW
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Megawatts/Hour
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The New York ISOReceives
Approx imate ly
2,000 Simi lar B ids A
Day
So far in March we have seen43,000 bids with segments priced
These correspond to 55different bidders, submitting bids
from many different unitsthat the bids just represent NewYork City
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The d ist r ibut ion o f
b ids inc ludes many
b ids a t spec i f ic
arb it ra ry -- p r ic es
$999/MWh is the secondmost common maximum bid,
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Ec onom ic t heor assures us that a l l
o f t hese b idders are
m ak ing a ser ious
m is take
In the presence of perfectcompetition, no bidder should
affect prices
If he systematically bids
above his marginal cost, he will notbe dis atched durin man eriodswhen the plant would be profitable
If he bids below marginalcost, he may be dispatched at aloss
Logically, all bidders bid atmarginal cost
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Ec onom ic t heor assures us that a l l
o f t hese b idders are
m ak ing a ser ious $1,200.00 DayAheadSupplyCurveFor2/1/20098:00A.M.
mis take
The significant amount ofmegawatts committed only above $800.00
$1,000.00
, , implies that a lot of bidders aremaking a lot of mistakes
$400.00
$600.00
$/MWh
$
$200.00
5,000.00 10,000.00 15,000.00 20,000.00 25,000.00
Megawatts/Hour
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Ec onom ic t heor assures us that a l l
o f t hese b idders are
m ak ing a ser ious$1,000.00
DayAheadSupplyCurveFor2/1/20098:00A.M.mis take
Here is the same chart usinglogs
$100.00
ou can see t e two c usters reasonable bids below$100/MWh, doubtful bids in the
$200-$300MWh range, andim robable bids above $300/MWh
$1.00
$10.00
5,000.00 10,000.00 15,000.00 20,000.00 25,000.00
$/MWh
$0.01
$0.10
Megawatts/Hour
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What about
m i t i ga t i on?
From the current NYISO state ofthe market report:
In certain constrained areas, mostof which are in the New York City
area, some suppliers have
resources are needed to managecongestion or satisfy local
reliability requirements. In thesecases, however, the market ower
mitigation measureseffectively limit their ability toexercise market power.
2008 SOM, page vii
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s t s w or ng e answer appears to e no
Since noneconomic bids are so pervasive, it is unlikely that the rulesdescribed by the ISO are mitigating 10% or more of total bids
Readin between the lines, it a ears that a lication of themitigation rules appears to be largely directed at New York City
In September, the ISO filed an emergency motion attempting totighten up mitigation rules in NYC, citing non-economic bids
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I f w e are so sm art
unders t and t hesebids?