the most fundamental and elementary question out of which most – if not all – epistemological...

8/7/2019 The most fundamental and elementary question out of which most if not all epistemological inquiries arise

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Sahil Warsi MA(F)St.Stephens Coll.

An Analysis of the Gettier Problem

The most fundamental and elementary question out of which most if not all epistemological inquiries arise, concerns the matter of what factor or factorsqualify a certain entity, in this case a proposition(s), to be valid knowledge.Broadly speaking, Epistemological philosophers have identified three suchfactors. They provide a definition that indicates knowledge to be something thatis - justified true belief (JTB Analysis). In the case of a given proposition p; anindividual s is said to have knowledge i.e. S knows P if and only if:

Case (A)

i. P is trueii. S believes that P is trueiii. And S is justified in their belief that P is true.

The above is a very broad definition and categorization of what factors makesomething out to be knowledge but the broadness of the same has proven tobe problematic; often allowing what is not knowledge to be technically eligibleunder the same criterion. Epistemologists such as Chisholm and A.J. Ayer haveoffered various refined and stricter versions that are allegedly better at bothindicating what can actually count as knowledge and at eliminating and keepingout, what is not. In the case of Chisholm, the necessary and sufficient conditionsfor knowledge can be presented as: - S knows P if and only if:

Case (B)

i. S accepts P,ii. S has adequate reason for Piii. And, P is true.

A.J. Ayers conditions for what makes something eligible as knowledge are asfollows: S knows P if and only if:

Case (C)

i. P is trueii. S is sure that P is true, andiii. S has the right to be sure that P is true.


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Regardless of these refinements and additional qualifications, variousEpistemologists continue to feel that these definitions and criterion areinsufficient as they will still allow the existence of situations, where somethingthat is clearly not knowledge will be, in light of the same qualifications, countedas knowledge. The purpose of this paper, is to focus on one such Epistemologist,

namely Edmund Gettier who in 1963 presented two counterexamples(referred to as the Gettier problem) that were meant to exemplify the veryinadequacies of the JTB analysis.

Gettier claimed that all of the aforementioned theorizations of what the necessaryand sufficient conditions of knowledge were (Cases A, B and C) lacking, insofaras they shared the same exoskeleton of the broad JTB analysis. Case A couldbe argued to be false insofar as the conditions stated within in do not constitute asufficient condition for claiming the S knows P. In the cases of B and C, the sameargument used above, can easily show the falsity of the former if has adequateevidence for or has the right to be sure that is substituted and replaced for is

justified in believing that. That is, the refinements made of the justification clausein cases B and C, are superficial and do not have their desired and intendedeffect.

Gettier focuses on the same idea of Justification and considers it to be theAchilles heel of the JTB theory. His counterexamples are based on the ideathat, firstly, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition thatis in fact false and secondly, for any proposition p, if s is justified in believing pand p entails q, and s deduces q from p and accepts q as a result of thisdeduction, then s is justified in believing q.It is appropriate at this juncture, to present the one of the counter examples onwhich Gettier bases his refuation:

We are asked to assume that Smith has good evidence for the false proposition:

1. Jones owns a Ford.

Moving further, Smith infers from (1) the following three disjunctions:

2. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.3. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.4. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and we haveestablished that Smith recognizes these entailments, he is technically justified inbelieving each of propositions (2)-(4). Now it so happens, by more than sheercoincidence, that Brown is presently in Barcelona. Given these assumptions andstrictly adhering to the JTB qualifications, we can easily say that Smith, when hebelieves (3), holds a justified true belief.


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However, the question then arises: is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge?Since Smith has no evidence whatever as to Brown's whereabouts, and sobelieves what is true only because of luck, the answer has no. This alone isenough to show that the aforementioned are not necessary and sufficient

conditions for knowledge.The solutions to the Gettier problem - for proponents of the JTB analysisconstitute in taking, broadly speaking, one of two routes. The first involvingstrengthening the problematic Justification criterion (as attempted by Chisholm)and the second in adding an additional qualification to the JTB analysis forinstance once that prevents inference from falsehood.

As mentioned earlier Chisholms attempted strengthening of the Justificationclause by indicating it as S requiring adequate evidence for P, falls short as itis a superficial alteration of the original clause without any real impact. The fateof the suggestion to supplement the JTB analysis with another clause preventing

inference from falsehood, is more or less the same. Gettier problems do notnecessarily need to involve inference as the medium for judgment. For instance:

Assume that Adam is sitting on a park bench. At a distance he sees a dogplaying with a toy from this, he comes to the seemingly true proposition that Ican see a dog over there. Assume that what Adam thinks is a dog, is really aperfected life-like Robot dog made by the Chinese and what Adam is seeing, is aprototype they are testing. He is not aware that any such dogs have beencreated. Under these circumstances, the proposition I can see a dog over there,is naturally false but assume further, that behind the Robot dog away fromAdams view, is a real dog. This makes the proposition true. Seemingly, thisbelief is directly justified by a visual experience; it is not inferred from anyfalsehood. But if I can see a dog over there is indeed a non-inferential belief,then the JTB analysis, even with the supplemented clause preventing inferencefrom falsehood, gives us the wrong result that James knows the proposition Ican see a dog over there.

Another counterexample illustrating that a supplementary clause in insufficient, isthe famous Barn County case supplied by Goldman. Suppose there is a townin Midwest America with the following peculiar feature: The landscape next to theroad leading through that town is full of barn-facades every few miles: structuresthat from the road look exactly like barns but are fake from any other point ofview The purpose of the devices is to fooling unsuspecting motorists into falselybelieving in the presence of barns. Suppose Adam is driving along the road thatleads through this town. Naturally, he will on repeatedly form a false belief in theexistence of a barn. Since Adam has no reason to suspect that he is the victim oforganized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, Johnstops to look at one barn and that just happens to be the only real barn in thattown. This time, his belief is both justified and true. However, what changes, isthat his arrival at truth is a matter of luck. Therefore one can judge that Henry's


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belief is not an instance of knowledge. Yet once again, the condition preventinginference from falsehood is met and satisfied in this case. His belief is clearly notthe result of any inference from a falsehood.

It becomes evident that Gettier problems are based on the idea of Epistemic luck

and no matter how refined the justification clause can become one can nevereliminate instances of epistemic luck. What is needed is a fourth clauseamending the JTB analysis entirely but the question remains what that clausewill be.

the most fundamental and elementary question out of which most – if not all – epistemological...

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