The Mobilization of Science in National Defense*FRANK B. JEWETTt, FELLOW, I.R.E.

TIHERE is perhaps no audience before which therole of science and engineering in modern war-fare can more appropriately be discussed than

one composed of members of the Institute of RadioEngineers. You are primarily communication engineersand of all the branches of applied science, that whichhas to do with the rapid transmission of intelligence isperhaps most vital to the successful use of the modernfighting instrumentalities. Rapid movement of troopsand supplies over far-flung lines of action on sea andland and in the air are possible only on the basis of veryeffective systems of radio communication. In fact,more and more are means of communication assumingthe function of a unifying influence which pervades theother arms of the military organization. They co-ordi-nate the movement of naval and aerial fleets. Theyenable infantry, tank columns, and formations ofplanes to operate as a single effective unit. They shrinkas nothing else can, a 2000-mile battle line to the com-pass of a single sector.The telephone and telegraph and particularly the

radiotelephone and -telegraph are, in effect, the key-stone of the whole military arch. You members of theInstitute of Radio Engineers are, therefore, exponentsof a very vital department of technology, and I amparticularly grateful to you for affording me theopportunity to speak here at this time to discuss themobilization of science in the war program.

Further, it is not merely in the fields we ordinarilythink of as communication that men who have devotedtheir lives to the problems of radio development are ina position to render great service.One of the striking things connected with the de-

velopment of new military tools, both offensive anddefensive, is the astounding extent to which the funda-mental phenomena on which electrical communicationis based are employed. In some cases it is applicationof established techniques in entirely new fields. Morefrequently it is the pushing of our frontiers of knowl-edge farther out, and then applying that knowledge tothe problems of war in three-dimensional space. Basi-cally, every military problem hinges on the rapid andexact location of an enemy objective and in trans-mitting and utilizing the knowledge acquired. Thismay be for the guidance of a commanding officer; theaccurate pointing, fuse setting, and firing of a gun; therelease of an aerial bomb, or any one of a hundred simi-lar things. Every single physical phenomenon which

* Decimal classification: 507.2. Original manuscript received bythe Institute, January 16, 1942. Presented, Winter Convention,New York. N. Y., January 12, 1942.

t President, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.,and Vice President, American Telephone and Telegraph Company,New York, N. Y.

can be employed must be examined. Because modernscience has changed the conditions of warfare from aslow-moving affair in localized areas to one of greatrapidity over incredible distances of land, sea, and air,it is imperative that those phenomena which havegiven us radio be developed and utilized to the full.

While the initial problem is one of intense researchand development, each step forward involves greatnumbers of skilled technicians in design, manufacture,maintenance, and operation of new implements. Itseems clear that the demand for men trained in our artis bound to be enormous, not alone in the laboratorybut in the services of supply and in the combat forcesas well.

For fifteen years following the first World War therewere frequent articles on the probable role of sciencein future warfare. While this was quite natural in viewof the part played by the airplane, the tank, and lethalgas in the titanic struggle of 1914-1918, the articles inthe main evoked interest rather than concerted actiondirected toward full employment of science in prepara-tion for more widespread and more deadly warfare.

Despite the fact that the decade and a half followingthe war was a period of the most productive activity infundamental science research and of intense effort toapply old and new knowledge promptly in industry,this laissez-faire attitude in the military sector waslargely a reflection of man's attitude generally towardwar. The weariness of the struggle and the distaste forcarnage and destruction, coupled with a naive faiththat men had learned finally the lesson of war's futil-ity, gave rise to the era of small appropriations to themilitary, to disarmament conferences, and to theLeague of Nations and similar efforts to organize theworld for a settlement of international controversiesby reasonable methods rather than by recourse to massmurder.

In the United States particularly, the decade of the1920's saw this carried to the extreme. Warships weretaken to sea and sunk or were laid up and the Armywas reduced to the status of a moderate-sized policeforce-a force so small and scattered that no reallyeffective training or development of radically new im-plements could be had. Appropriations were cut to theirreducible minimum of maintaining a national agencywhich the country would-have liked to abolish entirelyhad it quite dared. In this atmosphere and under thesehandicaps it is to the credit of the Army and Navy thatthey did as well as they did. There was little money tospend on development and less still for research to pro-duce entirely new instruments of war.When the storm clouds of another world war began

to form in the middle 1930's, the volume of articles on

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the place and importance of modern science in warfareincreased enormously in both the scientific and laypress. So, too, did discussion of the need for insur-ing that scientific and technical men should be utilizedin the fields of their competence and not inductedindiscriminately into the combat services where men ofless specialized training could serve equally well.

So far as lay discussion was concerned, it was largelyemotional, frequently ill-informed, and sometimes fan-tastic. Naturally discussion among technical peoplewas more realistic, but on the whole was mainly relatedto applying newly acquired knowledge and techniquesto the improvement of existing military implements.The idea of organizing scientific research on a huge in-dustrial scale, where the ultimate end of "all out war"was the industry to be served, was slow to emerge.

Probably the most difficult hurdle every industryhas had to get over in- the effective introduction of sci-entific research as a powerful tool in its operation, hasbeen to realize that the most profitable research is thatwhich is carried on with the least restraint imposed bycurrent practice. Practice can be adapted to radicallynew ideas, but radical ideas rarely, if ever, evolve frommere improvements in current practice.

Research in military matters is no exception. Warbeing a very ancient art, military men are on the wholeextremely conservative as to new tools. Like doctors,long experience has made them cautious and with pos-sibly a more than ordinary tendency to impose on areseareh project requirements of current practicewhich, in fact, hamper rather than help. Againstthis tendency is the fact that they are quick to adoptthe radically new once its utility is demonstrated. Warmore than any other of man's activities puts a highpremium on being in the lead.As soon as war in Europe on a vast scale was seen to

be imminent, the nations there commenced franticallyto mobilize and organize their scientific and technicalmen and resources, and to establish effective liaisonbetween them and the combat services. For more thana year after this movement was in full swing across theAtlantic,- our aloofness from the struggle and our ar-dent desire to keep from being sucked into the tragicmaelstrom operated to prevent any effective steps inthe direction of mobilizing our vast scientific resourcesfor total war. The military services endeavored tostrengthen their scientific branches and here and thereenlisted the aid of civilian science. They were hamperedby inadequate funds, by the pattern of years of astarved organization imposed by an antiwar philoso-phy, and by the fact that civilian sciences, both funda-mental and applied, were built up on a basis ofoperation in a slow-moving peace economy. The lat-ter had no machinery for marshaling its forces forwar and, in the main, it knew little of war's require-ments and frequently preferred to follow the courses itunderstood and liked.But about two years ago, it became apparent to a

few individuals that the laissez-faire approach to themobilization of science ought to be abandoned in favorof a more direct and forceful organizational approach.At that time there existed certain technical groupsand associations which, on the one hand, called forstrengthening, and on the other were of suggestivevalue in the search for a suitable organizational setup.I have already remarked upon the scattered technicalgroups and laboratories within the Army and Navywhich over the years had been doing commendablework, but had been given insufficient funds and en-couragement. It was, of course, obvious thatt as thetension of the emergency increased, the responsibilitiesplaced upon these technical groups would mount witha resultant need to augment their personnel, but it wasequally apparent that they could not be expected tocarry the full load of scientific development and adap-tation.

Civilian participation in one way or another in thesolution of military problems has come to be taken forgranted. It was first given official recognition in theUnited States when the National Academy of Scienceswas incorporated in 1863 by an Act of Congress. Thecharter of the Academy requires that whenever calledupon by any department of the Government, it shallinvestigate, examine, experiment, and report upon anysubject of science or art, the actual expenses of suchinvestigations, experiments, and reports to be paidfrom appropriations which may be made for the pur-pose, but the Academy shall receive no compensationwhatever for any services to the Government. TheAcademy is, therefore, recognized as a continuing offi-cial adviser to the Federal Government and it mustattempt to answer such questions of a scientific ortechnical nature as are officially submitted to it bymembers of Government Departments. A permanentchannel of communication was thus created, but powerto initiate traffic over it resides with the Governmentand no auxiliary machinery was created whereby theAcademy or any other civilian agency might take theinitiative in bringing before the Government mattersof scientific importance.

Less than a year prior to the entry of the UnitedStates into the first World War, a significant step wastaken designed to facilitate the use of the channel ofcommunication between the Government and the Na-tional Academy. In 1916 the National Research Coun-cil was created by President Wilson, and a little laterwas to play a part in focusing civilian effort on the mili-tary problems then arising. The National ResearchCouncil was, and is today, a subsidiary of the NationalAcademy of Sciences and, like the Academy, is largelyan ad-visory body only and awaits the assignment ofproblems by one or another branch of the Governmentbefore it can seriously go to work. Moreover, the Coun-cil, like the Academy, is not in possession of freemoney, a corporate laboratory, and other researchfacilities and is, therefore, not well constituted to

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conduct research work on any extensive scale.We turn our attention, therefore, to another agency

contemporaneous with the National Research Council,which was created for the express purpose of establish-ing co-operative effort between military and civiliangroups, and which was provided by Congress withfunds necessary to create research facilities and tooperate them when once created. This agency isthe National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,commonly known as the NACA. The law which createdthe Committee provides that it shall 'supervise andlirect scientific study of the problems of flight, with aview to their practical solution," and also "direct andconduct research and experiment in aeronautics." TheCommittee is composed of fifteen members, includingtwo representatives each of the War and Navy Depart-ments. Throughout its more than twenty-five years ofexistence, the NACA has given ample testimony of thefruitfulness of co-operation between military and civil-ian groups, and moreover has provided a prototype asto an organizational arrangement for effecting such co-operative effort successfully.When, some two years ago, the group to whom I

have already referred became convinced that broaderparticipation by civilian scientists in the whole militaryprogram was likely to be essential, they regarded theNACA as typifying the sort of organization they wouldlike to see created. A plan was therefore drawn up en-visaging a Committee composed in part of civilianscientists and in part of Army and Navy representa-tives. On the one hand, the Committee was chargedwith a broad study of the materials of warfare and, onthe other, it would recommend and, if possible, initiatesuch research as it believed to be in the national in-terest.The NACA was created in 1915 by an Act of Con-

gress. The somewhat duplicative plan just referred towas submitted to President Roosevelt about a year anda half ago for such action as he saw fit to take. Theproposal appealed to him and he decided to create theCommittee by Executive Order. This Order estab-lished the Committee as a division under the Officefor Emergency Management and confers upon thempower to take the initiative in many scientific matterswhich they believed to have military significance. Italso directed the Committee to develop broad and co-ordinated plans for the conduct of scientific research inthe defense program, in collaboration with the Warand Navy Departments; to review existing scientificresearch programs formulated by these Departments,as well as other agencies of the Government; and ad-vise them with respect to the relationship of theirproposed activities to the total research program.Moreover, and this is especially important, the Orderdirects them to initiate and support scientific researchon the mechanisms and devices of warfare with the ob-ject of improving present ones and creating new ones.The Order contemplated that the Committee would

not operate in the field already assigned to NACA norin the advisory field of the National Academy of Sci-ences and National Research Council. Parentheticallyit might be noted that in this latter field the Academyand Council are currently engaged on advisory work forthe Government for which the out-of-pocket expensesalone are at the rate of much more than $1,000,000a year. A recent count shows that the present person-nel of Academy and Research Council advisory com-mittees runs to about 225. These figures will give anidea of the vital part which these fact-finding groups areplaying in the present emergency. But to be a littlemore specific I might mention that one important com-mittee of the National Academy is advising the Officeof Production Management on the availability of stra-tegic materials.

In order to formulate adequate rules for the utiliza-tion of materials of whatever sort, accurate knowledgeas to their availability, as to new processes suggestedfor producing them, as to possible substitutes, and athousand and one other basic questions must be an-swered. This can only be done by highly trained sci-entists and engineers. Only after they have answeredcan the urgent problems or proper utilization be han-dled. The Academy has assembled a group of the mostdistinguished men in the United States to give OPMthis basic information.

Other examples are to be found in the services whichthe National Academy of Sciences and National Re-search Council are giving in advising the military de-partments on highly confidential matters; in the factthat the Medical Division of the National ResearchCouncil is the operating arm of the Medical ResearchCommittee mentioned later, and in the service theCouncil is furnishing in selecting technical personnel.Thus, in June, 1940, the National Defense Research

Committee, more familiarly known as the NDRC, wasborn. It was constituted of eight members, two of thesebeing high-ranking men from the Army and Navy re-spectively, five more being civilians well known fortheir experience in organizing and directing both fun-damental and applied scientific research, and, as aneighth member, the Commissioner of Patents.The Executive Order creating the NDRC omitted

any reference to the biological sciences, and, in par-ticular, to the medical sciences. However, during itsfirst year of operation, experience accumulated to theeffect that a broader program of attack would not onlybe useful but was, in reality, urgently demanded. Thisrealization prompted a second approach to PresidentRoosevelt, with the result that in June of last year hecreated two new functional groups. One of these wasthe Committee on Medical Research, to explore its in-dicated territory in the same manner that the NDRChad been exploring the physical sciences. Then, overand above both the NDRC and the Committee onMedical Research, there was placed the Office of Sci-entific Research and Development, usually referred to

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as OSRD. This latter office was placed in charge of Dr.Vannevar Bush, who until then had been Chairman ofthe NDRC. President Conant of Harvard was thenmade Chairman of the NDRC and Dr. NewtonRichards of the Medical School of the University ofPennsylvania was made Chairman of the CMR.

In order to insure complete co-ordination of civilianand military research and development, Dr. Bush, asDirector of OSRD, was provided with an advisorycouncil consisting of the Chairmen of NDRC, CMR,and NACA; the Co-ordinator of Naval Research, andthe Special Assistant to the Secretary of War perform-ing a somewhat similar function in that service.The Executive Orders creating these various com-

mittees naturally had to leave indeterminate the ques-tion of financial support. They are all subsidiary to theOffice for Emergency Management and, like this Office,must look to Congress for the necessary operating ap-propriation. Thus far the appropriations, while notmunificent, have been adequate. During its first yearof existence the NDRC authorized research projectswhich totaled about ten million dollars. At the begin-ning of its second year, it was granted another tenmillions and this was recently augmented by severalmillions more. To be more specific, the OSRD, duringits first year of existence, will guide the expenditure ofabout twenty millions throughout the whole scientificfield.

I should now like to take a few minutes of yourtime to explain the manner in which the expenditure ofthese funds is initiated and supervised. To begin with,let me point out that the work of the NDRC is dividedinto four major departments: Division A, of whichProfessor R. C. Tolman of California Institute of Tech-nology is Chairman, deals with armor, bombs and ord-nance, in general; Professor Roger Adams of the Uni-versity of Illinois heads Division B on chemistry; Di-vision C deals with transportation and communication,and submarine warfare, and I am its Chairman (thisDivision operates the subsurface-warfare laboratories);finally, Division D, which deals with instruments andnumerous miscellaneous projects difficult to catalog, isheaded by President Compton of Massachusetts Insti-tute of Technology. It is in this Division that themicrowave laboratory is organized.To expedite discussions, surveys, and the general

handling of the work, a further breakdown has beenfound desirable, the result being that each Divisioncomprises several so-called Sections. Division B onchemistry, under Professor Adams, is divided intothirty-one Sections-which stands to date as a sort ofrecord.The work of a Section is entrusted to a Section

Chairman, who in turn calls to his aid certain individ-uals who become permanent members of his SectionalCommittee and who are known technically as Mem-bers. Then there are others who may be asked to renderadvice and assistance from time to time and hence are

called Consultants. Members and Consultants are offi-cially appointed by the Chairman of the NDRC andare designated only after official clearance by the Armyand Navy Intelligence and the FBI. Full consideration,therefore, is given to the basic requirements of the mili-tary services as regards the confidential handling oftheir problems. Because of its peculiar interest to you,I would note that the Section dealing with communica-tion problems is under the direction of Dr. Jolliffe, whois a Vice Chairman of Division C.

Neither the five civilian members of the NDRC it-self nor any of the Section Chairmen, Members, orConsultants are paid from public funds. Without ex-ception, they are loaned to the Government by theiremploying organizations and frequently the loan iscomplete, the work being so voluminous and detailedas to require a man's full time. Thus, when I tell youthat about 500 of the leading scientists of the countryare encompassed in the present NDRC organization,you will see that the Federal Government and even theforgotten taxpayer are getting a lot of valuable con-sulting talent free of charge.So far as I have now outlined it the functioning of

the NDRC requires no public money except a verysmall amount for paid office assistants together withthe traveling expenses of Members and Consultants.For the most part Members and Consultants do notcarry on the research and development projects whichthe NDRC decides to promote-their duties are advi-sory and administrative. They formulate the problemswhich they believe it important to have undertaken,and then arrange with various scientific institutions tocarry on the work. It is this last step which bringsin the need for considerable sums of money. For in-stance, a project assigned to a particular university orindustrial laboratory may require the full time of sev-eral of its staff together with that of numerousyounger men hired specifically for the work in hand.The number of such projects now approved and, for

the most part, contracted out to universities and indus-trial research laboratories stands around 600 while thenumber of contracting institutions is over 100; andwhen it is stated that the total value of the projectsthus far determined upon is upwards of twenty milliondollars, you will realize at once that the monetary re-sources of the scientific world would not be adequateto conduct the program on a gratuitous basis. The con-tracts vary all the way from those involving a fewthousand dollars to those calling for two to three hun-dred thousand dollars per month. I have no doubt butthat many of you here today are working either fullor part time on one or more of these NDRC contracts.The question is frequently asked as to how many

technical people have been drawn into the civilian de-fense effort which the NDRC directs, but obviouslythis is quite difficult to estimate, let alone to enumeratein detail. I have already mentioned that there areabout 500 scientists in the NDRC organization serving

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as Members, Consultants, etc. It seems likely thatsomewhere between two and three thousand scientistsare at work on defense projects as employees of con-tractors with about an equal number of less highlyskilled individuals assisting them as laboratory assist-ants, technicians, etc. Then, if the situation which Iknow to exist at the Bell Telephone Laboratories is tobe taken as a criterion, we must add to this scientificgroup another very considerable array of technicalpeople who call themselves engineers as opposed tophysicists and chemists-an array which if enumeratedwould no doubt total four to five thousand.

Recent figures from the Bell Telephone Labora-tories might be of interest as perhaps typifying thesituation found in a number of industrial laboratorieswhich are fulfilling defense contracts, some for theNDRC and some directly for the Army and Navy. Arough count shows that about 600 of our technical staffare now engaged directly on a full-time basis on defenseprojects. When J say that they are "engaged directly"on defense projects, I am excluding those who by cir-cumstances arising out of the defense program havebeen forced to devote themselves to such problems asthe finding of substitute materials and the engineeringof emergency telephone projects.Another aspect of the NDRC plan of operation

which I should like to stress is its "no-profit" feature.This applies alike to contractors and to employees ofcontractors. Perhaps this point can be brought outmost clearly by reference to a specific situation. TheUniversity of California is acting as a contractor to theNDRC on a large project which involves an annualexpenditure of around one million dollars. Certainmembers of the California faculty are employed on afull-time basis on the project and in switching fromteaching to defense work have incurred no change inrates of pay. The University has also hired from otherfaculties certain individuals to augment the defensestaff and they likewise, have gone over without changesof salary, although a payment is made to compensatefor the cost of moving in the case of both single andmarried men. It is also stipulated explicitly that theuniversity, as contractor, will derive no monetaryprofit from the work and the same requirement is ex-acted of industrial laboratories and other types of con-tractors.The "no-profit no-loss" proposition has involved the

adoption of certain more or less arbitrary but seem-ingly equitable rules of accounting. Thus, a universityis usually allowed an overhead payment amounting to50 per cent of the salaries which it pays to its membersemployed on a defense project. Similarly, an industriallaboratory, by virtue of the fact that it has to operatewith commercial capital and is subjected to a varietyof forms of taxation from which the university is ex-empt as well as other expenses, is allowed an overheadof 100 per cent of the salary item.

I suppose it depends upon one's point of view as to

whether the effort I have just outlined appears large orsmall. On the one hand, it seems fairly certain that it isonly a beginning and must expand further. On theother hand, it is certainly large already when con-trasted with any civilian effort which was able to assertitself during the last war. And looking back to thesituation which existed a quarter of a century ago, itis difficult to understand why the then available civil-ian agencies were not unleashed to an extent com-mensurate with their obvious capabilities. True, theNational Research Council was created to assist withthe solution of defense problems, but it was, as I havepointed out, in the position of a doctor waiting forclients; it could not adopt the attitude of an aggres-sive salesman and initiate attacks on what it regardedto be important military problems. Hence we can de-clare that as regards organization notable progress hasbeen made.As to future expansion of our civilian-defense effort,

it is becoming increasingly essential to bear in mind thepotential shortage of trained personnel. Without in-sinuating anything as to guilt, the chemists declarethat this is a physicist's war. With about equal justiceone might say that it is a mathematician's war. Thevisible supply of both physicists and mathematicianshas dwindled to near the vanishing point, consistentwith the maintenance of anything like adequate teach-ing staffs in our universities. If this civilian defenseeffort is to expand, and such indeed now seems im-perative, the limiting factor, therefore, may be a short-age of highly trained individuals and not a shortage offinancial aid.

This leads me to state a few general observationsconcerning the past and future of our work. It is quiteapparent that to date the burden of NDRC contractsbears much more heavily upon some institutions thanupon others. At the outset this has necessarily been thecase. While serious attention has at all times beengiven to the subdivision of projects so that they couldbe farmed out as widely as possible, a limit is fre-quently reached beyond which it isn't practicable togo in the matter of division. And in many cases, nodivision at all could be entertained, a situation that hasgiven rise to a few large contractors, of which I citedthe University of California as an example.

In the assignment of the early contracts, it has beennatural, in fact essential, to lean heavily upon those in-stitutions, both academic and industrial, which for onereason or another have been peculiarly fitted to trans-fer quickly from peacetime to wartime problems. Thishas been done with a view to conserving time. But thestages of the program to follow will doubtless involvea broader survey of the situation to find locationswhere new problems can be lodged with a minimumof interference to essential defense work and teachingnow in progress. In this survey a guiding principle willbe to utilize men and facilities in situ whenever possi-ble, thus preserving the "going value" of groups who

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are accustomed to working together. In the face ofcrises, the human tendency is usually to do the re-verse, it being so easy for central agencies to ignoreestablished but not well-known organizations, and at-tempt to cope with an emergency by calling workersfrom right and left to some new location. As a matterof fact, this tendency was beginning to make an ap-pearance even as long as two years ago when the funda-mental plan of the NDRC was under discussion. Hadthe tide then setting in been allowed to run on for somemonths unimpeded, the result inevitably would havebeen a literal army of uprooted scientists in Washing-ton and other central points, sitting around idly wait-ing for vast amounts of research equipment which hadbeen placed on order, but was not much nearer ma-terialization than that, to be installed in hastily con-structed laboratories. This would have been the easyand disastrous way. Fortunately the creation of theNDRC came in time to stem such a tide.Another present problem, and it is the last with which I

shall trouble you, is one which by its existence suppliesevidence that real progress has already been madein some of the research programs thus far initiated. Ithas to do with shortening the time gap between provenlaboratory research results and the stage where massproduction can be undertaken. Some of the laboratoryresults already achieved hold such promise that everyday which intervenes before their widespread utiliza-

tion becomes a serious matter. Obviously the problemsto be met here cover a wide range of equipment and ma-terials-as wide as that marked out by the scientificresults themselves-and since they involve large-scalemanufacture, the whole plan must be carefully workedout with other official agencies, particularly the Officeof Production Management and the armed services.I am sure, however, that we are prepared to meet andsolve these problems, and rather than be concernedwith the difficulty of making progress along this ave-nue, I think all who are guiding the work of the NDRCwould exclaim to the ranks of scientists and techni-cians, "Bring on your results, the more the better, andwe will guarantee them a speedy passage to the firingline! "

In the foregoing, I have attempted merely to sketchthe setup of organized civilian research and develop-ment created for the war emergency. Obviously, it isonly a part of the total effort which is being mobilized.It would be unfair to thousands of scientists and engi-neers to infer that the main results were dependent onthe work of these agencies.The scientific departments of the armed services are

being greatly enlarged; industrial laboratories are turn-ing more and more of their efforts to direct and indirectwar work and engineers everywhere are active. Funda-mental and applied science are on the march.

CBS International Broadcast Facilities*A. B. CHAMBERLAINt, MEMBER, I.R.E.

Summary-This paper describes the present significance of inter-national broadcasting; its growth and present status in both the Easternand Western hemispheres; factors governing service to Columbia's newLatin American international network consisting of sixty-four stationslocated in eighteen different countries; the many problems attendantupon successful relaying of programs to these many points; facilitiesfor this service, including new studios, frequency-modulation program-relay circuits, and two complete 50-kilowatt transmitting plants locatedat Brentwood, Long Island, New York; features of design and operat-ing performance characteristics of the transmitting apparatus, includ-ing thirteen directive antenna arrays and their associated transmissionlines. A typical international radio relay receiving-station installationand the importance of properly engineering such facilities, will alsobe briefly discussed.

INTRODUCTIONR ADIO broadcasting means the dissemination of

radio communications intended to be receivedby the public, directly or by the inteimediary

of relay stations. In the broadest sense, this appliesboth to short-wave and medium-wave broadcasting..The chief difference between the two lies in the publicinvolved. Whereas medium-wave broadcasting is in-tended to be received by a public located in the coun-

* Decimal classification: R550. Original manuscript receivedby the Institute, August 4, 1941. Presented, Toronto Section,March 24, 1941; Boston Section, March 28, 1941; WashingtonSection, May 12, 1941; New York Meeting, September 3, 1941.

t Chief Engineer, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., NewYork, N. Y.

try originating the broadcast, short-wave broadcastsare designed for the public of one or more other coun-tries than that of origin.The Columbia Broadcasting System is, at the pres-

ent time, constructing two new 50-kilowatt interna-tional broadcast stations and thirteen directive an-tenna arrays near Brentwood, Long Island, a sparselypopulated location, approximately 37 miles east of theNew York studios.

Before discussing the purpose and technical aspectsof this modern short-wave transmitting plant, it wouldbe well to review briefly the history and present-daysignificance of international broadcasting.

HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCEBroadcasting by short-wave began experimentally

during 1924. In the United States, this service was thenknown as "experimental relay broadcasting." Con-siderable activity took place in other countries atabout the same time, notably in Holland, England,and Germany. The development of this service movedalong slowly until the early 30's, when it became moreactive in both England and Germany. At about thistime, the Empire Broadcasting Service of the British

Proceedings of the I.R.E.118 March, 1942