the mega-fire phenomenon toward a new management … · 2019. 12. 20. · ¾under extreme burning...

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B THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE MEGA-FIRE PHENOMENON

Toward a New Management ModelFor Fire-Prone Ecosystems

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About the Brookings Institution and the people involved …

The Brookings Institution is one of the oldest public policy “think-tanks” in the United States. It researches economics, foreign policy, domestic policy, governance and other aspects of public policy.

The Mega-fire Project is directed by Dr Albert C. Hyde, Brookings Senior Manager for Consulting Services with the Center for Public Policy Education.

Senior Advisor on the Mega-fire project is Jerry Williams, retired from the Senior Executive Service as former National Fire Director for US Forest Service.

Agency Liaison for the project is Rex Mann, former Type 1 Incident Commander and senior Area Commander.

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…. a qualifier …

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The Wildfire Spectrum

IA

95%

MF

0.1%

EIA

4%

LF

1%

95% Total Acres Burned

85% Total Suppression Costs

70% Fatalities

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Defining a Mega-fire….

Most costly, most damaging, most destructive wildfires (record setting)

Don’t occur every year.

Multiple, simultaneously emerging large fires

Exceed all efforts at direct control until relief in weather or a break in fuel occurs

Typically come as a surprise

Force us to be defensive and reactive

Not defined in absolute terms

As much a situation as they are an incident

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Transitioning from an incident (“normal accident”)

to a situation (“ultra-catastrophe”)

Fire Protection

Public Safety

Disaster Relief

Recovery & Restoration

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Conceptual Framework for Mega-fire Management Model

Operational CapabilityCapacity, Authorities & Transition Protocols

Growth Behaviors in the Interface

Condition of the Land And Alignment of

Resource Objectives

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PHASES FOR MEGA-FIRE STUDY

Phase I (Concept Paper– 2005):

Phase II (Wildfire Operations –2006):

Phase III Land Management Practices (2007)

Phase IV Growth Behaviors at the Interface

Phase V QFFR Metrics

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Fire Operations Capability & Capacity

Identify key indicators that may signal the on-set of mega-fire potential.Outline command and coordination structures would enable

managers to more effectively transition from the more common large fire incidents to the more complex mega-fire situations.Offer doctrinal, strategic, and tactical options that may reduce

the probability and/or the severity of a mega-fire.

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The “mega-fire” phenomenon presents managers with difficult dilemmas and problems…….

The trends suggest that the more successful we become on the margins of fire suppression the more serious are our failures on the extremes.

We find ourselves trying to control catastrophic fires that we can not while intense public and political pressures insist that we “do more”

Our “failures” receive significant attention and operational“mistakes” are often amplified but nobody scrutinizes thefactors that may have predisposed them.

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Re-thinking Doctrine … Re-thinking Policy

Conventional doctrine attempts to match a growing wildfire threat with increasing suppression force.

The Mega-fire doctrine attempts to focus on the causal factors that might predispose the mega-fire and deal with contributory factors that influence the decision space once a mega-fire occurs.

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Large Size Class Fires - Acres Burned(National Wildland Acres)

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

3,500,000

4,000,000

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

•Fires Greater than 5,000 acres relatively rare before 1987

•Since 1998, over 175 wildfires greater than 50,000 acres

•Extremes are becoming more extreme and more common

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Population changes from 2000 to 2005Longstanding trend of people moving 50-60 miles outside of big cities

who are willing to commute

Source: USA Today 3/16/2006

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Meta-analysis … what is it?

Comparative assessmentMeasured against fixed variables and constants

… how is it different?First comparison of major incidentsBroader scopeFindings are preliminary

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Meta-analysis Sample

Mega-Fire 1998 Florida Complex

2000 Valley Complex (MT)

2002 Hayman (CO)Rodeo-Chediski (AZ) Biscuit (OR)Ponil Complex (NM)

2003 Cedar(Southern California)

DescriptorLargest evacuation in State history

Highest cost + loss in State history

Largest in State history

Most destructive in State history

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Meta-analysis – key variables

Land Resource Management Plan Direction

What were the dominant resource objectives and how did those objectives influence vegetative conditions? In turn, how did vegetative conditions affect fire behavior characteristics (i.e. rate-of-spread and resistance-to-control)?

Firefighting Preparedness

Was preparedness funding and staffing on the unit consistent with the Wildland Fire Preparedness (WFPR) appropriation? Was severity funding accessed and was it coordinated with cooperators?

Organizational Staffing Capabilities/Capacity

Did key oversight and supervisory positions remain filled as personnel drawdown occurred in response to increased fire activity?

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Meta-analysis – key variables (continued)

Competing Demands at Onset

How did prioritization of other incidents affect suppression efforts on this incident?

Fire Behavior Characteristics

Did fire behavior exceed suppression efforts?

Protection Priorities and Values at Risk

What were the protection priorities and trade-offs involved on this incident?

Command Roles and Responsibilities

Were other jurisdictions involved and did they share in decision-making, with its attendant costs and risks?

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Meta-analysis – key variables (continued)

Decision Dynamics

Were selected suppression alternatives, developed in the initial Wildland Fire Situation Assessment (WFSA), the same as those used in the final stages of containment?

What was the relationship between Agency Administrators, Area Commands, Incident Management Teams, the Geographic Area Multi-agency Coordination Group (MAC), and the National MAC?

Suppression Effectiveness

What strategies and tactics worked? Which did not?

After-action Assessments

As a result of this incident, what changes or revisions occurred in policy, plans, or practices.

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Preliminary Findings- Land/Resource Management Plan Direction

Most of the mega-fire acreage was in short fire-return interval ecosystems in late-seral conditions.

Where earlier treatments had occurred, burning intensities and resistance-to-control were much reduced.

On most of the mega-fires, passive or “hands-off” management seemed to dominate the affected landscape.

In some cases, land management objectives aimed for stand conditions that shifted species composition, changed stand structure, and modified ecological function. The net effect resulted in higher wildfire risk.

No land management plan conducted or displayed fire-related risk assessment or consequence analysis.

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Preliminary Findings- Fire Fighting Preparedness

The period 1998 thru 2003 coincides with the highest preparedness funding in Forest Service history.

The federal units evaluated in this study were at preparedness levels consistent with the WFPR appropriation.

Once multiple large wildfires began to occur, drawdown occurred rapidly. In 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2003 (the years these mega-fires occurred), Geographic Areas moved from moderate to the highest preparedness level very rapidly.

Of the seven mega-fires studied in this report, four were lightning-caused and three were person-caused.

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Preliminary Findings- Organizational Staffing Capabilities/Capacity

Every unit with a mega-fire immediately exceeded their organizational capability.

Low incidence units seemed most vulnerable to the effects of drawdown.

In some geographic areas, over 50% of key unit leadership was committed to Incident Management Teams or Area Command roles.

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Preliminary Findings- Competing Demands

All of the mega-fires studied here prompted massive mobilizations, creating immediate and acute shortages for firefighters, overhead, and aircraft.

Under extreme burning conditions, priorities changed rapidly, but mobilization commitments were fixed.

The demand for firefighting assets on mega-fires placed immense pressure to maintain initial and extended initial attack capability.

Selected suppression alternatives on one incident often affected the decision space on others. The current mobilization system does not evaluate multiple WFSA’s for their overall affect.

Wildfires that became mega-fires were initially lower priority or among the last to emerge. They usually received too few resources too late.

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Preliminary Findings- Fire Behavior Characteristics

Mega-fires occurred near or above extreme fire danger levels.

Mega-fires were fueled by high loadings of live and dead bio-mass.

Prolonged drought made more live fuel available for burning

Fire behavior characteristics exceeded all efforts at direct control, until there was a break in weather or a break in fuels.

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Preliminary Findings- Protection Priorities and Values at Risk

Homes and lives were the protection priority on all mega-fires.

Prioritizing the protection of homes occurred at the expense of significant perimeter growth.

Subsequent perimeter growth usually threatened other homes, later, elsewhere on the incident.

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Preliminary Findings-Command Responsibilities

Coordination with cooperating agencies was good on most mega-fires but decision-making was usual left to a single Area Command or Incident Management Team even when multiple jurisdictions were involved.

Except in California, where cost apportionment processes were in place, costs were generally not shared equitably between jurisdictions.

On those incidents where public safety, disaster relief, and recovery were at issue, pre-season coordination was rare. Command remained fire-centric.

Unified coordination was common, but unified command was rare.

The coordination function is highly centralized but the command function at the line officer level remains decentralized.

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Preliminary Findings- Decision Dynamics

Nearly all WFSA’s overestimated the probability of success and underestimated the consequence of failure.

Most WFSA’s were revised several times, as objectives were exceeded.

Agency Administrators at the Forest or Unit level commonly retained Line Authority, even when other large incidents were competing for critical resources and decisions made on one incident affected the decision space on another.

Although Multi-agency Coordinating Groups (MAC’s) operated at the Geographic and National levels, their focus was generally on coordination, not command.

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Preliminary Findings-Suppression Effectiveness

As wildfire threats escalated, there was enormous public and political pressure to “do more.” Expectations often exceeded reality.

Suppression efforts were generally overwhelmed by severe fire behavior on all mega-fires. Rapid growth and long-distance spotting simply outran ground attack efforts and precluded effective use of air attack at the head.

Previously treated areas, within the fire perimeter slowed rates of spread and/or reduced resistance to control.

Large-scale burnout operations, supported by engines, handcrews, and/or aerial assets generally proved effective, but were often used as a last resort very late in the incident.

Most firefighting occurred during daytime hours, when burning conditions often limited suppression effectiveness. Unseen hazards (e.g. rolling rocks, falling snags) were often cited when night-time operations were limited for firefighter safety.

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Preliminary Findings- After-action Assessments

After-action reviews evaluated in this study focused on operational performance at the tactical level.

Few of the reviews made mention of Land/Resource Management Plan revisions or amendments.

None surfaced strategic or doctrinal issues that may have prompted fire protection or resource management policy changes.

There were few inter-governmental reviews that might have more comprehensively addressed issues at the wildland-urban interface.

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What’s working?

Stronger suppression capacity

Exploiting new technologies

Better integration of research

Social/Political attention

National Fire Plan

What’s not?

Disturbing trends (fuels, weather, interface, workforce)

Disconnect between land management plans and fire considerations

Firefighting doctrine at the extremes

Catastrophic fires perceived as operational failures

Expectations for protection exceeding realities of protection

Programmatic trend analysis

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What is the mega-fire problem?

•How we fight fire?

•How we manage the land?

What is the optimal solution?—Social / political

—Natural resource

—Economic

—Ecological

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Lessons emerging…

The mega-fire problem is emerging not so much as a firefighting issue as it is a land management policy

issue .

Program policy comparisons•California – Florida•Ventura County – San Diego County•Southern Region UFSS – Western Regions USFS

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CROSSROADS…THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE

Situational assessment

Must prepare for the threat of the next catastrophicwildfire…

Strategic solution? Doctrine? Policy?

Core values

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“The highest form of leadership

triumphs without siege.”

-Sun Tzu

the mega-fire phenomenon toward a new management … · 2019. 12. 20. · ¾under extreme burning...

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