the long war continues

8/14/2019 The Long War Continues...

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Individual Assignment 2The Long War Continues...

FIRMS, MARKETS AND GLOBAL DYNAMICS

Submitted To

Prof Indranil Chakraborty

Prof. Sheila R Chakraborty

Submitted By

Sujit Kumar Sahoo (U108111)


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FMGD: Individual Assignment 2

Three Articles chosen for review are

1) [Briefing Pakistan and the Taliban], A real offensive, or a phoney war?From The Economist edition May 2

nd2009

2) Does he really want a deal?From the Economist edition of May 16

th

20093) [Briefing Afghanistan], A war of necessity?

From The Economist edition of August 22nd 2009

This review has also used a Daily chart from The Economist edition of July 3rd 2009 title Force

Accounting

Introduction

One of the prime concerns for PEBMEs is to prevent another inter-PEBME war, because as we realize,

the global ramifications of such a war would be devastating and probably culminate in the annihilationof the entire human race. One of the methods/strategies adopted by US (the Big Daddy of all existing

PEBMEs) is the concept of Long War. One of the best ways to prevent an Inter PEBME war is to create

a very very strong safety mechanism. From 1946-1990s USA used the cold war against the USSR to have

the PEBMEs on one side against the common and rising enemy USSR. After the cold war came to an

unceremonious end, US started looking for a new common enemy, for which it can have all the PEBMEs

together. From 1991-till date US has identified Islam as its common enemy, and has branded them as

Islamist Extremist to enhance the threat of the brand Islamic Extremism to Global health. We have

read and analyzed a lot of literature and theory about Americas Long War; however a subtle, slow yet

significant change in strategy is in place for US to continue its long war.

Why Change in Strategy?


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Exhibit 1

Source: Daily chart from The Economist edition of July 3rd

2009 title Force Accounting

The common man across Britain, France, Germany is questioning its people in power about why they

pay out of their pockets to fund foreign wars, which they dont want to fight. With more and more

pressure from its domestic people, the PEBMEs are forced to pull their forces out of war zones of

Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the Exhibit 1 above, the contribution of forces from non US PEBMEs (

France, Germany,Britain,Canada) is close to only 58% of the total forces contributed by the US alone.

And this statistic is fast decreasing as we analyse these articles. With support from other PEBMEs

withering down, US (which is also under constant scrutiny and demand from its own citizens with

regards to the long funded wars) is looking to utilize and focus on a different strategy- Use states which

derive their nourishment from US to either fight for them ( continue the long war) or the pipe which

feeds the mouth will be pulled off. This is a win -win for both the feeder and the fed. The feeder forces

the fed to fight on its behalf (PEBMEs behalf) and the fed in turn derives generous grants and support

from the powerful feeder to sustain their vested interests. The US has chosen Pakistan and Israel to

continue its long war. Not an entirely new strategy, but as the chosen articles will show, the focus has

shifted ever so firmly to using these pawns ever more. As we might have appreciated Pakistans vested

interest is India and Israels bone of contention is Palestine and Lebanon.


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A brief Summary of the three articles

Article 1

Article 1 talks about the war that Pakistan has been somewhat forced to launch against its neighbor

Afghanistan. The US has been quite vocal in advertising and justifying its strategy of using Pakistan in its

war. What US is advertising is two things 1) Taliban is dangerous and its resurgence is real threat to the

world order. 2) Taliban is more dangerous to the interests of Pakistan than any other country. The

Article describes how US has been pushing and using Pakistan against the common enemy. The article

clearly brings out that an average Pakistani is moderate and does not want a war against Afghanistan,

tough they are concerned about the growing retaliation from the other side of Peshawar. The article

also talks about the numbers (money) involved in this strategy. 10 billion US dollars military aid was

granted to Pakistan in 2001, and more has been flowing in over the years. A common joke on this is that

US signs blank cheques to Pakistan in the name of combating Terrorism. More recently, another fund

amounting to 5.3 billion US dollars have been sanctioned and by whom (mainly the PEBMEs, US, Britain,

Japan along with South Korea and Saudi Arabia). The Article goes on to describe how the war against the

resurgent Taliban in Malakand , NWFP,Buner has caused much damage to the civilians and has been

very tricky to win over by the Pakistani Army ( a reason could be the unwillingness of the Pakistani Army

to win over these regions). However to keep the feeding hand continue feeding, Pakistan has to come

up with some tangible results, and according to US estimates and reports from the article itself, Pakistan

has been successful in some areas. However the reading behind the line is that US has got its PR (Public

Relations) strategy right in this regard. A small positive achievement has been projected as national

news by the US agencies. But the question still remains, can the Pakistanis (half heartedly) tame the

stubborn Pushtuns into submission.

Article 2

Article 2 talks about the hidden/mysterious agenda of Isreals Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu with

the US President Barrack Obama. The questions that has been raised in the article is that what does

Israel want in the wake of Iran getting powerful in the region (nuclear ambitions of Iran) and the

question that the article does not raise is what does the US want in this context.

(What US wants with Iran, is a no brainer, however just to re emphasize my point, the recent internal

turmoil with an otherwise stable government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does raise some suspicions for

the involvement of US and its pet Israel in this context. The supreme leader of Iran (Ayatollah Ali

Khamenei), the national media, the state forces and the Parliament supports backs Ahmadinejad, and

yet the turmoil and huge uproar against the President, does not go down well. )

The Article also talks about other issues grappling the Israeli Prime Minister, that of Lebanon and of the

perennial problem of Palestine. But does Netanyahu wants a deal or a solution is a question. However

the bigger question is does US want a solution to these problems. From an Iranian citizens point of few,

we (Iran) are next in target line of Israel and the PEBME (US)


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Article 3

The title of the third article A war of necessity in effect summarizes the article itself. Mr President (US)

himself has subscribed to the war against Terrorism in Afghanistan. As the article mentions, the

President brands the war against Taliban as a war of necessity and not choice. It is a war of defense

rather than offence. According to Mr President, US is under nuclear threat (considering volatile state of

affairs in Pakistan, which can be used by the Al Qaeda to capture nuclear weapons from Pakistan, and

use them against the US). However the statistics given in the same article about the reaction and views

of the US citizens themselves about the war in Afghanistan speaks another story. On all four questions

(refer to Exhibit 2 below, from the article) there is pessimistic support to the US govt for its war in

Afghanistan. The article ends well in favor of my conjecture (that long war will continue for long), to

quote The war will not be quick, (warned Mr Obama this week), nor easy

Exhibit 2

Source: Economist (22nd August, 2009 Edition)


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Implications

The Birth and Plight of Taliban

In a very recent news article, Zardari (Prime Minister of Pakistan, a strong ally of the US ) has openly

admitted the well known fact that Taliban is Made By US . To emphasize more on that, the US

secretary of state Hillary Clinton (almost the President of US) has admitted in a congressional hearing

that Taliban indeed is US creation.

PEBME US created a monster to fight the proxy war against the USSR and how best to fight and continue

the long war than by destroying its own monster, which has grown to be smarter and rebellious. The

production of war goods by US to fund the Talibans ( at one point of time), the south koreans ( at

another point of time),the Pakistanis, the Israelis and many others is being done with two things in mind

1) To ease the PFSCC pressure on the US economy ( PEBME) and to take the PEBME to maturelycharged economy

2) To establish the supremacy and predominance of the US forces over all the other countries,which will act as another cushion against the probability of an Inter PEBME war

Strategic location of allies chosen by US to fight for the long war

Exhibit 3

(Source Google images on Maps of middle east )


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US have chosen its allies very carefully to continue its long war. A quick look at Exhibit 3 above reinstates

the point. Pakistan has been chosen to ward off and fight the war against Afghanistan ( ie basically the Al

Qaeda and the Taliban).Israel has been chosen to check the brand Islamic Extremism from gaining

some equity in Middle east region. Also with countries like Saudi Arabia and Syria joining US in the arm,

it will not be long, when the PEBMEs can sit back and enjoy the show, where as these allies will fight the

war for them, ofcourse the backing has to be unanimously be given by the PEBME. This strategy

certainly does combine the PEBMEs, continuous the long war, till US finds another scapegoat, and also

keeps domestic agitators at bay. More recently Egypt has been is on US radar, more and more news

from this Islamic nation tying up with the US and more and more interests from the US side ( what with

the recent visit by Obama to Egypt and the swap return visit by Mubarak) augurs well for my conjecture.

The questions that I ask Is Africa next? and More drama needs to unfold in the Middle East?

References

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-169660327.html

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/01/29/2148443.htm

http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14140794


http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/06-us-pakistan-

gave-birth-to-taliban-zardari-06-rs




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The Three Articles

Article 1

Briefing

Pakistan and the Taliban

A real offensive, or a phoney war?Apr 30th 2009 | BUNER, ISLAMABAD AND SWATFrom The Economistprint edition

As the Pakistani army launches a new assault on the Taliban, America hopes it isnow more serious about defeating the militants

AFP

WHEN Barack Obama unveiled his new policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan in March, he gave awarning that al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadist gangs were killing Pakistan from within.The generals who guard Pakistans national security had shown only mixed results incombating the threat, he said. They would no longer enjoy a blank cheque; they must showthat they are fighting in good faith.

On April 26th, Pakistan gave a glimpse of this: by launching an attack on the Pakistan Taliban inparts of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) recently overrun by the militants. It began with anassault in Lower Dir, near the border with Afghanistan, in which the army claims to have killed

On April 28th the army launched a bigger offensive in the scenic Buner valley, just 100km (62miles) from Islamabad, Pakistans capital. As helicopter gunships and jets strafed their positions,

the Taliban took around 70 policemen and soldiers hostage. But showing more resolve than ithad previously, the army said airborne troops had been dropped behind Taliban lines and freed18 of the captives. Major-General Athar Abbas, a military spokesman, said 50 militants had beenkilled in the first two days of fighting. He said it would take a week to drive the Taliban out ofBuner.

This sudden violence seems to have been provoked, in part, by embarrassing media reports ofthe Talibans capture of Buner. Many of the bearded fighters had come from the neighbouringdistrict of Swat, a Taliban stronghold, where NWFPs government, at the armys urging, hadbrokered a ceasefire with the militants in February. Under the terms of this pact, the government


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promised to institute Islamic law, sharia, throughout the Malakand division (whose sevendistricts, including Swat and Buner, make up about a third of NWFPs area). In return, the localTaliban, led by a zealot called Mullah Fazalullah, were to lay down their arms.The Talibans advance into Buner, which had resisted Talibanisation, was a violation of the deal,but at first neither the government nor the army seemed concerned. America, which hadopposed the Swat deal from the start, was furious. On April 22nd Hillary Clinton, the secretary of

state, said Pakistan was becoming a mortal threat to the world; its government and peopleneeded to speak out forcefully against a policy that is ceding more and more territory to theinsurgents. On April 25th she expressed concern for the safety of Pakistans nuclear arsenal ifthe Taliban were to topple the government.

Some Western diplomats considered this scaremongering. The Taliban are near Islamabadbecause the capital, a 1960s new town, was built close to the rugged border area where thesePushtun tribesmen live. But there is no chance of their seizing Islamabad. If, unthinkably, thedisparate warlords who make up the Pakistan Taliban were to mass together for a frontal attack,Pakistans army, which is 620,000-strong and well-drilled for conventional warfare, could crushthem. Indeed, many pundits reckon that an Islamist takeover in Pakistan would be possible onlywith the armys support.

The Taliban, almost exclusively Pushtun, are not popular in Pakistan. Though often anti-American, and bothered by a growing extremist fringe, most Pakistanis are moderate. Unlikesome Taliban leaders, Mullah Fazalullah is not known to have links to al-Qaeda. Yet Mrs Clintonswarning points to an uncomfortable fact: since 2001, despite lavish American sponsorship,including over $10 billion in military aid, Pakistan has only become more turbulent and violent.

Even the countrys president, Asif Zardari, has conceded that the Taliban hold huge amounts ofland. The army deserves much of the blame. During a seven-year campaign in NWFP and thePushtun tribal areas adjoining it, where 120,000 troops are currently deployed, it has oscillatedbetween fighting militants and making deals that, typically, give militants the run of their areasin return for a promise (rarely kept) of good behaviour.


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The Taliban in Pakistan are linked by ideology and Pushtun tribal kinship to those fighting inAfghanistan. In South and North Waziristan, two ever-hostile tribal areas, the local commanders,including Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban, are widely believed to play host to al-Qaedas core leadership. They also send their long-haired gunmen across the border to fightWestern and Afghan forces.

For America, Britain and other Western countries there is a direct connection between militancyalong the lawless Af-Pak borderlands and jihadist bombings in Western cities. Yet Pakistan isthe biggest victim of the militant tide. Around half a million people are estimated to have beendisplaced by fighting in the north-west. From their havens there, many jihadist terrorist groupshave launched attacks on the state. Pakistan has suffered over 60 suicide-bombings in each ofthe past two years, on hotels, restaurants and mosques in Peshawar, Lahore and Islamabad, andon army facilities. Benazir Bhutto, Mr Zardaris wife, a two-time former prime minister and leaderof the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) who was murdered in December 2007, was one high-profilevictim. Foreigners are also at risk. In Peshawar, NWFPs increasingly nervy capital, two Afghandiplomats and one Iranian have been kidnapped. Americas consul last year had her (bulletproof)car sprayed with bullets.

Even if the Taliban cannot conquer Islamabad, they might soon grab some lesser strategicplacejust imaginably, Peshawar; or they could close down the motorway linking it toIslamabad. Mr Obamas new policy, which treats Pakistan as the main threat to regional stability,is intended to arrest this slide. It will come with a lot more money, including $1.5 billion a year innon-military aid over the next five years. At a conference in Tokyo on April 17th America, Britain,Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and other friends of Pakistan also pledged $5.3 billion inbudget support and other aid. Pakistan will be expected to provide better accounting for how itspends this money; for years its squandering of Americas war-on-terror cash has been an open

joke.

The mess in MalakandLike a spectre, the Malakand ceasefire had been waiting to test Americas renewed commitmentto securing Pakistan. It was agreed between NWFPs provincial government and a veteran SwatiIslamist, Sufi Muhammad, who is Mullah Fazalullahs father-in-law, shortly before the inauguralvisit to Islamabad of Richard Holbrooke, Mr Obamas Af-Pak envoy. America considered thepact yet another abdication to the Taliban by an army that has sometimes inexplicablyunderperformed. By one Western estimate, it has lost 70% of its battles against the Taliban. Ithas also lost over 1,500 soldiers.

Another cause for alarm is that Swat is not like the tribal areas, which have always been largelybeyond the writ of Pakistan. Swat, by contrast, is a thickly populated former tourist destination,famous for honeymooning couples and Pakistans only ski-lift. The Talibans capture of Swattherefore contained a promise of further militant expansion, even into Punjab, Pakistans richestand most populous province. Nor, judged on the failure of earlier deals, did the ceasefire everseem likely to weaken the militants, as the government hoped it would. When it was eventuallyapproved on April 13th by Mr Zardari after much anxious foot-dragging, an American spokesmansaid it violated the principles of democracy and human rights.

But most Pakistanis seemed to welcome the deal, believing it would end recent carnage in Swat.Since mid-2007, when Mullah Fazalullah and his followers took up arms in protest at an armyraid on a jihadist citadel in Islamabad, the Red Mosque, they have blown up 200 non-Islamicschools in the district, beheaded scores of government workers and alleged spies, andperiodically kidnapped companies of soldiers sent to fight them. Preaching class warfare, as wellasjihad, they have seized hundreds of houses and landholdings, including many of Swats prizedorchards. Half of the districts police officers and many administrators have fled, as have mostlandowners. Around 800 people have been killed, most during a heavy-handed army action thatbegan last October, and displaced at least 100,000 people.


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AP The Taliban in Buner, with Koran and

Kalashnikov

The Taliban behaved repellently during that offensive. Residents of Mingora, Swats biggesttown, awoke daily to find still-dripping corpses littering its central plaza, or dangling from lamp-posts there. They dubbed it Khooni Chowk, or Bloody Square. Yet almost all agree the army

killed more civilians than did the militants. The army was aiming its shells at ordinary people. Orelse, did they hit our houses every day by mistake? asks Fazal Rahman Nono, a local resident.If few Swatis have much love for the Taliban, practically none say they want a military operationto dislodge them; nor do the army and NWFPs government. General Abbas says that if the armyhad continued with its last offensive in Swat, the whole valley would have been flattened. Healso defends the ceasefire deal; he says it has isolated the radical Mullah Fazalullah by bolsteringMr Muhammad, who was until recently in prison and disgrace, having led an army of Swatis tobe slaughtered by American bombers in Afghanistan in 2001.

But far from muzzling his son-in-laws jihadist invectivewhich Mullah Fazalullah once broadcastregularly, earning himself the moniker Mullah RadioMr Muhammad has echoed it. Ahead of arally on April 19th to celebrate Mr Zardaris signing of the ceasefire accord, Mr Muhammad wasallegedly primed by the provincial government to tell the Taliban to disarm. Instead, addressing

a crowd of 40,000 in Mingora, he denounced Pakistans constitution and said democracy was forinfidels. Similarly, Mullah Fazalullahs commanders say the deal is a first step toimposing sharia throughout Pakistan.They clearly have no intention of ceding Swat to the government. Instead, the ceasefire hasenabled them to tighten their grip on it. Last week they occupied the office of Mdecins SansFrontires, an NGO, in Saidu Sharif. In early April, they occupied the northern Swati town ofBahrain, and on April 28th shot and injured one policeman there and kidnapped another.Speaking by phone, a local resident says: Ours is a life of fear and death. Yet the governmentcould probably have lived with this, if the Taliban had not embarrassed it by taking Buner.

A step too farOn April 24th, four days before the army launched its offensive, the Taliban leader in Buner,Commander Khalil, welcomed your correspondent to his requisitioned house in the village of

Sultanwas. He claimed to have been sent to the district by Mullah Fazalullah to checkthat sharia was being followed, in accordance, he said, with the terms of ceasefire agreement.Yet he and his men had proceeded to chase away the district police and a few local resisters,killing eight. They then looted every government and NGO office and well-to-do house orbusiness they could find. Pointing to a large trove of stolen computers, American-donated foodaid and jerry-cans of petrol, he said: Well give them to the poor, who really need them. Thesehouses also belonged to rich people, who ran away when we arrived because they were scared toface our justice.America is delighted by the armys subsequent assault in Buner; a Pentagon spokesman called it

exactly the appropriate response. Some American officials believe the army will even resume


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its offensive in Swat; and this time crush Mullah Fazalullah. Such optimism might seem justifiedby a modest improvement in Pakistans fortunes on other fronts. Courtesy of an IMF loan of $7.6billion, the offerings of its friends, and some penny-pinching economic management, it is nolonger at risk of insolvency, as it was late last year. And in March, skilful diplomacy by the armyand America averted a political crisis sparked by Mr Zardaris efforts to have his more-popularrival, Nawaz Sharif, rendered ineligible for election. If Pakistan now has a window of relative

political and economic stability, could Malakand prove to be a turning-point in Pakistans flaggingwar with extremism?

Probably not. The government has made no effort to use the ceasefire to extend its writ in Swat.Nor has it announced any plan to abrogate the deal. And the army shows little sign of wanting toresume the fighting in Swat. If this suggests Pakistans top brass may, under pressure fromAmerica, be doing no more than the minimum (or slightly less than that) demanded of them, itwould not be for the first time. One of the tricks used by the former president, Pervez Musharraf,was to arrest a few of the former jihadist assets of the armys Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)agency; then later release them.

America has endured many such false hopes in Pakistan. Another was in early 2007 when the ISIbacked a Taliban commander in South Waziristan, called Muhammad Nazir, to expel some Uzbekmilitants who had found refuge there. The army suggested that foreign militants would no longerbe welcome in the tribal area. But Mr Nazir did not evict his Arab terrorist guests, and inFebruary he declared a new alliance with South Waziristans main Taliban commander, MrMehsud, the alleged mastermind of Ms Bhuttos murder.

In a more recent setback, Abdul Aziz, head of Islamabads Red Mosque, was released from jailon April 16th. He had survived the armys assault on the mosque (though over a hundred, andperhaps many more, of his followers did not) by fleeing dressed in a black burqa. Within hours ofhis release Mr Aziz was back in the pulpit, claiming credit for the introduction ofsharia to Swat,and predicting the same for all Pakistan.Another act of Pakistani slipperiness, the governments failure to dismantle the latest incarnationof the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) terrorist group that is alleged to have carried out a murderouscommando-style attack in Mumbai last November, may be most troubling. In response to strongAmerican, British and, naturally, Indian pressure, it arrested half a dozen mostly mid-level LETmembers, and vowed to try them for this crime. But there is little prospect that the groupssenior leaders, currently under house arrest, will face justice. And the government has alreadyfailed in its obligation to take over LETs assets, which include schools, dispensaries andhospitals. In Punjab, which is home to LET (a group formerly trained by the ISI to fight in Indian-held Kashmir), the government has taken over 20 LET schools and five hospitals. Yet the groupis estimated to retain control over an estimated 50-70 other properties, which it holds in othernames.

Pakistans failure to suppress LET invites the thought that the army has not entirely abandonedits old proxy. And it still considers India, against whom it has fought three full-scale wars, to beits main enemy. To some extent, this obsession with India illuminates the armys troubles in thenorth-west. By maintaining its readiness for a conventional war on Punjabs plains, it has beenslow to acquire the necessary counter-insurgency skills; hence its brutish reliance on artillery fire

in Swat.

Worse, the army stands accused of protecting some of its former militant allies in the tribalareas, to preserve them for future (or perhaps current) use in Afghanistan and Indian-heldKashmir. This allegation is often cited to explain the armys failures. But there is rarely evidencefor it. Increasingly, though, senior American officials decry Pakistans obsession with India.General David Petraeus, chief of Americas Central Command, argues that Pakistan faces greaterdanger from home-grown extremism. With a smile, General Abbas suggests he doesnt think


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much of this: When people come here and tell us about our neighbour, how good or bad he is,allow us to take it with a pinch of salt.

Rigid, deceitful and, it seems, convinced that Islamist militancy poses a much lesser threat toPakistan than America reckons, the army will always be an awkward ally along the north-westfrontier. Then again America is a difficult friend for Pakistan. Its pressing objective is to stanch

the flow of Taliban into Afghanistan and to crush al-Qaedas leadership; these are not prioritiesfor many Pakistanis. And if the Pakistani armys efforts against the Taliban have not beensuccessful, it reasonably counters that the cross-border insurgency has been inflamed byAmericas own blunders in Afghanistan and its missile strikes into Pakistan.

The army considers that it takes a longer-term view of what is required for its troubled north-west. In Swat, for example, it seems to think it would be fruitless to pulverise the Taliban, and inthe process kill many civilians, while Pakistans civil institutions are too weak to fill the vacuumthat would be created. This is not entirely unreasonable. Local dissatisfaction with Pakistansslothful and corrupt justice systemso much worse, Swatis say, than the traditional system ofmodified sharia that it replaced in 1969has helped fuel Mullah Fazalullahs insurgency.Many also seem to believe that, once sharia is instituted, the brutal militants will fade away.Inam-ur-Rahman, head of the Swat peace committee, a group that speaks to both the army andTaliban, says: For Gods sake, lets implement the deal. It will bring peace. Alas, that soundsnaive. But even a government determined to crush the Taliban will struggle without the supportof the local population. Even if you take a Pushtun person to paradise by force, he will not go,adds Mr Rahman. He will go with you only by friendly means.

Article 2

Israel and America

Does he really want a deal?May 14th 2009 | JERUSALEMFrom The Economistprint edition

Binyamin Netanyahu comes to talk to Barack Obama

AP Netanyahu waits for the headmaster


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THE more he can talk about the wider region, the less he need focus on the narrow, awkwardissue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That, at any rate, is a perennial suspicion about BinyaminNetanyahu, Israels once-again prime minister, which he will try to allay when he arrives inWashington for his first meeting, on May 18th, with Barack Obama.

He will want to talk to the president at length, say Mr Netanyahus people, about Irans nuclear

ambitions, the most pressing and dangerous problem in the eyes of Israels government. MrNetanyahu discerns an unprecedented convergence of interests between Israel and moderatestates in the region in the face of a perceived threat from Iran and Hizbullah, the well-armedShia political movement Iran sponsors in Lebanon. But the Israeli prime minister says this is

irrespective of his willingness, indeed his desire, to proceed with parallel talks with thePalestinians. He would, of course, discuss those talks too with Mr Obama.

He will also want to discuss new ideas apparently evolving in Washington about a broad regionalrapprochement. King Abdullah of Jordan, a recent guest at the White House, speaks of a 57-state solution between Israel and the entire Muslim world, embracing the full membership of theOrganisation of the Islamic Conference. Mr Netanyahu says this dovetails with his own publicstatements and private urgings that leading regional governments should be more active indiplomacy aimed at making peace with Israel. He apparently made the same point to Egyptspresident, Hosni Mubarak, at the resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh on May 11th. But he is said toacknowledge a need to make progress directly with the Palestinians.

But how? Israeli officials leave that vague, hinting that Mr Netanyahu may unfurl a new plan inMr Obamas presence and then show it to the world. He denies a report that he sought to meetthe leader of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, but was rebuffed. In any event, the twoleaders will not have met before each presents his case at the White House; negotiationsbetween the Palestinian Authority and Israel have, in effect, been suspended since the previousIsraeli government of Ehud Olmert left office on April 1st.

The Palestinians want

Israels new

government to accept

a two-state solution, tostop building

settlements and to

resume the talks

where they were left

off. Mr Netanyahu says

he wants to talkbut

without

preconditions. His

officials say that no

government need

accept the negotiating

positions of its predecessor unless they were enshrined in a signed agreement, which they were

not.

In contrast, senior people in Mr Obamas team have been loudly insisting, in a string ofstatements intended to soften Mr Netanyahu up before his White House encounter, on the needfor a two-state solution and for settlement building to stop. Youre not going to like my sayingthis, the vice-president, Joseph Biden, told the American Israel Public Affairs Committee(AIPAC), a powerful lobby, at its convention in Washington earlier this month. Israel should not


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build more settlements, [it should] dismantle existing outposts and allow Palestinians freedom ofmovement and access to economic opportunity.

Mr Netanyahus men claim this was not a scolding: the vice-president spoke of moresettlements and Mr Netanyahus government says it will merely permit the expansion of existingones rather than build more. His government, like its predecessor, says it will indeed take

down illegal outposts, meaning those that have not been sanctioned even by Israelsgovernment; its predecessors promise to do so was honoured mainly in the breach.

Such semantic bobbing and weaving may remind Mr Obamas team, especially those in it whoonce worked for President Bill Clinton, of Mr Netanyahus fraught previous term as primeminister, from 1996 to 1999. That SOB doesnt want a deal, growled Mr Clinton at aparticularly frustrating juncture in diplomacy. It remains to be seen whetheror how fastMrObama may come to the same conclusion.

Article 3

American opinions on Afghanistan

A war of necessity?Aug 20th 2009 | WASHINGTON, DCFrom The Economistprint edition

Americans are giving Barack Obama the benefit of the doubt. For now

AP

THE orator-in-chief has not lost his touch. Addressing a crowd of military veterans on August17th, Barack Obama thanked them for their service and vowed to give their successors in

uniform everything they might need, while also cutting waste from the military budget. Hereminded them that he was cancelling plans for a costly presidential helicopter that, among otherthings, would have let him cook a meal while under nuclear attack. If America is under nuclearattack, he assured them, the last thing on my mind will be whipping up a snack.

The main purpose of his speech, however, was to drum up support for the war in Afghanistan.This is not a war of choice, he said. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even


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larger safe haven from which al-Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only awar worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defence of our people.

This echoes what Mr Obama said on the campaign

trail last year. He made a distinction between the dumb war in Iraq and the good one inAfghanistan. Osama bin Laden plotted the toppling of the twin towers from Afghanistan.

Overthrowing the Taliban regime that sheltered him was the right thing to do. If elected, Mr

Obama promised to pull out of Iraq and concentrate on Afghanistan.

As president, he has kept his word, though not as quickly as he said he would. We will removeall our troops from Iraq by the end of 2011, he reiterated this week, and for America, the Iraqwar will end. At the same time, he is sending more troops to Afghanistan. Their mission, hesays, is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies.

Like George Bush before him, Mr Obama reckons that the best way to sell a war to Americans isto mention al-Qaeda early and often. But also like Mr Bush, his war is more complicated than hemakes it sound. American troops are not really fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, because theyare not there any more. The groups surviving leaders have mostly fled to neighbouring Pakistan.

They could come back, perhaps, if America were to abandon Afghanistan and the Taliban tookover again. Denying them a safe haven is obviously in Americas national interest. But there areseveral other wild places where al-Qaeda might also set up shop, such as Yemen, Somalia,Eritrea, Sudan, the Philippines or Uzbekistan. We clearly cannot afford to wage protractedwarfare with multiple brigades of American ground forces simply to deny al-Qaeda access toevery possible safe haven. We would run out of brigades long before bin Laden ran out ofprospective sanctuaries, writes Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank.

Mr Obama knows this, of course. His purpose in committing so many troops to Afghanistan is notmerely to prevent al-Qaeda from returning but also to prevent the country from collapsing intochaos and destabilising its nuclear-armed neighbour, Pakistan. That is too complicated to put on

a bumper sticker, but Mr Obama still has the political capital to attempt it.

That may sound surprising. Opinion polls in America show a growing pessimism aboutAfghanistan (see table). But such gloomy views are seldom offered unprompted. The anti-warmovement has all but lapsed into silence. A Democratic pollster asked people at Netroots Nation,a big conference this month for left-wing activists, which issue they were spending most timecampaigning about. The war in Afghanistan came last. Like other Americans, progressives arenow much more worked up about domestic issues, such as whether they will have health


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insurance next year. As an electoral issue, Afghanistan is about as inconsequential as it couldbe, says Charlie Cook, a political analyst.

That means that Mr Obama has a relatively free hand in deciding how to deal with Afghanistan,at least for now. Since he did not start the war, no one accuses him of being a warmonger. Sincehe is prosecuting it seriously, hardly anyone accuses him of being weak-kneed. He has funds,forces and a strategy: to combine rigorous counter-insurgency with efforts to promote

development and good governance. He has some time to make it work. But how much?

Voters may not be paying much attention to Afghanistan right now, but Congress is growingincreasingly uneasy, says Jessica Mathews, the president of the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, a think-tank. Lawmakers worry that the costs of Americas huge and open-ended commitment may outweigh its benefits. Counter-insurgency campaigns typically takemany years, cost a fortune in blood and treasure and end in failure. The people who know mostabout Afghanistan are often the gloomiest. Is Nation-Building Doomed? asks Foreign Affairs.

Is It Worth It? wonders theAmerican Interest.Mr Biddle, who wrote the article in theAmerican Interest, thinks the war is worth fighting, butonly barely. The costs will be high, the outcome uncertain. Mr Obamas strategy promises morebloodshed in the short run in exchange for a chance of stability in the long term. That is hardly acombination that will appeal to voters, so it will be hard to sustain political support for it for long

enough to make it work.If the number of American deaths rises too fast, Americans will start to take notice ofAfghanistan and Mr Obamas job will become much harder. Mr Cook cautions that the body countwould have to rise very sharply indeed to affect the mid-term congressional elections next year.But that is not impossible. The war will not be quick, warned Mr Obama this week, nor easy.Ms Mathews goes further: Afghanistan could be for Mr Obama what Iraq was for Mr Bush, oreven what Vietnam was for Lyndon Johnson.


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the long war continues

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